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Reachability for Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games

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Abstract

We give polynomial time algorithms for deciding almost-sure and limit-sure reachability in Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games (BCSGs). These are a class of infinite-state imperfect-information stochastic games that generalize both finite-state concurrent stochastic reachability games ([1]), as well as branching simple stochastic reachability games ([16]).

1 Introduction

Branching Processes (BP) are infinite-state stochastic processes that model the stochastic evolution of a population of entities of distinct types. In each generation, every entity of each type $t$ produces a set of entities of various types in the next generation according to a given probability distribution on offsprings for the type $t$. BPs are fundamental stochastic models that have been used to model phenomena in many fields, including biology (see, e.g., [28]), population genetics ([23]), physics and chemistry (e.g., particle systems, chemical chain reactions), medicine (e.g. cancer growth [2, 33]), marketing, and others. In many cases, the process is not purely stochastic but there is the possibility of taking actions (for example, adjusting the conditions of reactions, applying drug treatments in medicine, advertising in marketing, etc.) which can influence the probabilistic evolution of the process to bias it towards achieving desirable objectives. Some of the factors that affect the reproduction may be controllable (to some extent) while others are not and also may not be sufficiently well-understood to be modeled accurately by specific probability distributions, and thus it may be more appropriate to consider their effect in an adversarial (worst-case) sense. Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games (BCSG) are a natural model to represent such settings. There are two players, who have a set of available actions for each type $t$ that affect the reproduction for this type; for each entity of type $t$ in the evolution of the process, the two players select concurrently an action from their available set (possibly in a randomized manner) and their choice of actions determines the probability distribution for the offspring of the entity. The first player represents the controller that can control some of the parameters of the reproduction and the second player represents other parameters that are not controlled and are treated adversarially. The first player wants to select a strategy that optimizes some objective. In this paper we focus on reachability objectives, a basic and natural class of objectives. Some types are designated as undesirable (for example, malignant cells), in which case we want to minimize the probability of

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ever reaching any entity of such type. Or conversely, some types may be designated as desirable, in which case we want to maximize the probability of reaching an entity of such a type.

BCSGs generalize the purely stochastic Branching Processes as well as Branching Markov Decision Processes (BMDP) and Branching Simple Stochastic Games (BSSG) which were studied for reachability objectives in [16]. In BMDPs there is only one player who aims to maximize or minimize a reachability objective. In BSSGs there are two opposing players but they control different types. These models were studied previously also under another basic objective, namely the optimization of extinction probability, i.e., the probability that the process will eventually become extinct, that is, that the population will become empty [15, 18]. We will later discuss in detail the prior results in these models and compare them with the results in this paper.

BCSGs can also be seen as a generalization of finite-state concurrent games [1] (see also [21]), namely the extension of such finite games with branching. Concurrent games have been used in the verification area to model the dynamics of open systems, where one player represents the system and the other player the environment. Such a system moves sequentially from state to state depending on the actions of the two players (the system and the environment). Branching concurrent games model the more general setting in which processes can spawn new processes that proceed then independently in parallel (e.g., new threads are created and terminated). We note incidentally that even if there are no probabilities in the system itself, in the case of concurrent games, probabilities arise naturally from the fact that the optimal strategies are in general randomized; as a consequence it can be shown that branching concurrent stochastic games are expressively and computationally equivalent to the non-stochastic version (see [18]).

We now summarize our main results and compare and contrast them with previous results on related models. First, we show that a Branching concurrent stochastic game $G$ with a reachability objective has a well-defined value, i.e., given an initial (finite) population $\mu$ of entities of various types and a target type $t^*$, if the sets of (mixed) strategies of the two players are respectively $\Psi_1$, $\Psi_2$, and if $\Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu, t^*)$ denotes the probability of reaching eventually an entity of type $t^*$ when starting from population $\mu$ under strategy $\sigma \in \Psi_1$ for player 1 and strategy $\tau \in \Psi_2$ for player 2, then $\inf_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \sup_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu, t^*) = \sup_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \inf_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu, t^*)$, which is the value $v^*$ of the game. Furthermore, we show that the player who wants to minimize the reachability probability always has an optimal (mixed) static strategy that achieves the value, i.e., a strategy $\sigma^*$ which uses for all entities of each type $t$ generated over the whole history of the game the same probability distribution on the available actions, independent of the past history, and which has the property that $v^* = \sup_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \Upsilon_{\sigma^*,\tau}(\mu, t^*)$. The optimal strategy in general has to be mixed (randomized); this was known to be the case even for finite-state concurrent games [1]. On the other hand, the player that wants to maximize the reachability probability of a BCSG may not have an optimal strategy (whether static or not), and it was known that this holds even for BMDPs, i.e., even when there is only one player [16]. This also holds for finite-state CSGs: the player aiming to maximize reachability probability does not necessarily have any optimal strategy [1].

To analyze BCSGs with respect to reachability objectives, we model them by a system of equations $x = P(x)$, called a minimax Probabilistic Polynomial System (minimax-PPS for short), where $x$ is a tuple of variables corresponding to the types of the BCSG. There is one equation $x_i = P_i(x)$ for each type $t_i$, where $P_i(x)$ is the value of a (one-shot) two-player zero-sum matrix game, whose payoff for every pair of actions is given by a polynomial in $x$ whose coefficients are positive and sum to at most 1 (a probabilistic polynomial). The function $P(x)$ defines a monotone operator from $[0, 1]^n$ to itself, and thus it has, in particular, a greatest fixed point (GFP) $g^*$ in
We show that the coordinates $\mathbf{g}^*$ of the GFP give the optimal non-reachability probabilities for the BCSG game when started with a population that consists of a single entity of type $t_1$. The value of the game for any initial population $\mu$ can be derived easily from the GFP $\mathbf{g}^*$ of the minimax-PPS. This generalizes a result in [16], which established an analogous result for the special case of BSSGs. It also follows from our minimax-PPS equational characterization that quantitative decision problems for BCSGs, such as deciding whether the reachability game value is $\geq p$ for a given $p \in (0,1)$ are all solvable in PSPACE.

Our main algorithmic results concern the qualitative analysis of the reachability problem, that is, the problem of determining whether one of the players can win the game with probability 1, i.e., if the value of the game is 0 or 1. We provide the first polynomial-time algorithms for qualitative reachability analysis for branching concurrent stochastic games. For the value=0 problem, the algorithm and its analysis are rather simple. If the value is 0, the algorithm computes an optimal strategy $\sigma^*$ for the player that wants to minimize the reachability probability; the constructed strategy $\sigma^*$ is in fact static and deterministic, i.e., it selects for each type deterministically a single available action, and guarantees $\Upsilon_{\sigma^*,\tau}(\mu, t^*) = 0$ for all $\tau \in \Psi_2$. If the value is positive then the algorithm computes a static mixed strategy $\tau$ for the player maximizing reachability probability that guarantees $\inf_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu, t^*) > 0$.

The value=1 problem is much more complicated. There are two versions of the value=1 problem, because it is possible that the value of the game is 1 but there is no strategy for the maximizing player that guarantees reachability with probability 1. The critical reason for this is the concurrency in the moves of the two players: for BMDPs and BSSGs, it is known that if the value is 1 then there is a strategy $\tau$ that achieves it [16]; on the other hand, this is not the case even for finite-state concurrent games [1]. Thus, we have two versions of the problem. In the first version, called the almost-sure problem, we want to determine whether there exists a strategy $\tau^*$ for player 2 that guarantees that the target type $t^*$ is reached with probability 1 regardless of the strategy of player 1, i.e., such that $\Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau^*}(\mu, t^*) = 1$ for all $\sigma \in \Psi_1$. In the second version of the problem, called the limit-sure problem, we want to determine if the value $v^* = \sup_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \inf_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu, t^*)$ is 1, i.e., if for every $\epsilon > 0$ there is a strategy $\tau_\epsilon$ of player 2 that guarantees that the probability of reaching the target type is at least $1 - \epsilon$ regardless of the strategy $\sigma$ of player 1; such a strategy $\tau_\epsilon$ is called $\epsilon$-optimal. The main result of the paper is to provide polynomial-time algorithms for both versions of the problem. The algorithms are nontrivial, building upon the algorithms of both [1] and [16] which both address different special subcases of qualitative BCSG reachability.

In the almost-sure problem, if the answer is positive, our algorithm constructs (a compact description of) a strategy $\tau^*$ of player 2 that achieves value 1; the strategy is a randomized non-static strategy, and this is inherent (i.e., there may not exist a static strategy that achieves value 1). If the answer is negative, then our algorithm constructs a (non-static, randomized) strategy $\sigma$ for the opposing player 1 such that $\Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu, t^*) < 1$ for all strategies $\tau$ of player 2. In the limit-sure problem, if the answer is positive, i.e., the value is 1, our algorithm constructs for any given $\epsilon > 0$, a static, randomized $\epsilon$-optimal strategy, i.e., a strategy $\tau_\epsilon$ such that $\Upsilon_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu, t^*) \geq 1 - \epsilon$ for all $\sigma \in \Psi_1$. If the answer is negative, i.e., the value is $< 1$, our algorithm constructs a static randomized strategy $\sigma'$ for player 1 such that $\sup_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \Upsilon_{\sigma',\tau} < 1$.

Related Work. As mentioned, the two works most closely related to ours are [1] and [16]. Our results generalize both. Firstly, de Alfaro, Henzinger, and Kupferman [1] studied finite-state

\[\text{when the value is positive and not equal to 1, even for BMDPs there need not exist an optimal strategy for the player maximizing reachability probability [16].}\]

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concurrent (stochastic) games (CSGs) with reachability objectives and provided polynomial time algorithms for their qualitative analysis, both for the almost-sure and the limit-sure reachability problem (see also [25, 22, 24, 7] for more recent results on finite-state CSG reachability). Branching Markov Decision Processes (BMDPs) and Branching Simple Stochastic Games (BSSGs) with reachability objectives were studied in [16], which provided polynomial-time algorithms for their qualitative analysis. The paper [16] also gave polynomial time algorithms for the approximate quantitative analysis of BMDPs, i.e., for the approximate computation of the optimal reachability probability for maximizing and minimizing BMDPs, and showed that this problem for BSSGs is in TFNP. Note that even for finite-state simple stochastic games the question of whether the value of the game can be computed in polynomial time is a well-known long-standing open problem [9]. It was also shown in [16] that the optimal non-reachability probabilities of maximizing or minimizing BMDPs and BSSGs were captured by the greatest fixed point of a system of equations $x = P(x)$, where the right-hand side $P_i(x)$ of each equation is the maximum or minimum of a set of probabilistic polynomials in $x$; note that these types of equation systems are special cases of minimax-PPS, and correspond to the case where in each one-shot game on the rhs of the minimax-PPS equations only one of the two players has a choice of actions.

The quantitative problem for finite-state concurrent games, i.e., computing or approximating the value $v^*$ of the game (the optimal reachability probability), has been studied previously and seems to be considerably harder than the qualitative problem. The problem of determining if the value $v^*$ exceeds a given rational number, for example 1/2, is at least as hard as the long-standing square-root sum problem ([18]), a well-known open problem in numerical computation, which is currently not known whether it is in NP or even in the polynomial hierarchy. The problem of approximating the value $v^*$ within a given desired precision can be solved however in the polynomial hierarchy, specifically in TFNP[NP] [22]. It is open whether the approximation problem is in NP (or moreover in P). It was shown in [24] that the standard algorithms for (approximately) solving these games, value iteration and policy iteration, can be extremely slow in the worst-case: they can take a doubly exponential number of iterations to obtain any nontrivial approximation, even when the value $v^*$ is 1. Note also that there are finite-state CSGs, with reachability value= 1, for which (near-)optimal strategies for minimizer (maximizer, respectively) need to have some action probabilities that are doubly-exponentially small [25, 7]; thus a fixed point representation of the probabilities would need an exponential number of bits, and one must use a suitable compact representation to ensure polynomial space. This is of course the case also for branching stochastic games; the optimal or $\epsilon$-optimal strategies constructed by our algorithms may use double-exponentially small probabilities, which can however be represented succinctly so that the algorithms run in polynomial time.

Another important objective, the probability of extinction, has been studied previously for Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games, as well as BMDPs and BSSGs, and the purely stochastic model of Branching Processes (BPs). These branching models under the extinction objective are equivalent to corresponding subclasses of recursive Markov models, called respectively, 1-exit Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (1-RCSG), Markov Decision Processes (1-RMDP), and Markov Chains (1-RMC), and related subclasses of probabilistic pushdown processes under a termination objective [20, 14, 19, 15, 18, 13]. The extinction probabilities for these models are captured by the least fixed point (LFP) solutions of similar systems of probabilistic polynomial equations; for example, the optimal extinction probabilities of a BCSG are given by the LFP of a minimax-PPS. Polynomial time-algorithms for qualitative analysis, as well as for the approximate computation of the optimal extinction probabilities of Branching MDPs (and 1-RMDPs) were given in [19, 15].
However, negative results were shown also which indicate that the problem is much harder for branching concurrent (or even simple) stochastic games, even for the qualitative extinction problem. Specifically, it was shown in [19] that the qualitative extinction (termination) problem for BSSG (equivalently, 1-RSSG) is at least as hard as the well-known open problem of computing the value of a finite-state simple stochastic game [9]. Furthermore, it was shown in [18] that (both the almost-sure and limit-sure) qualitative extinction problems for BCSGs (equivalently 1-RCSGs) are at least as hard as the square-root sum problem, which is not even known to be in NP.\textsuperscript{2} Thus, the extinction problem for BCSGs seems to be very different than the reachability problem for BCSGs: obtaining analogous results for the extinction problem of BCSGs to those of the present paper for reachability would resolve two major open problems.

The equivalence between branching models (like e.g. BPs, BMDPs, BCSGs) and recursive Markov models (like 1-RMC, 1-RMDP, 1-RCSG) with respect to extinction does not hold for the reachability objective. For example, almost-sure and limit-sure reachability coincide for a BMDP, i.e., if the supremum probability of reaching the target is 1 then there exists a strategy that ensures reachability with probability 1. However, this is not the case for 1-RMDPs. Furthermore, it is known that almost-sure reachability for 1-RMDPs can be decided in polynomial time [5, 4], but limit-sure reachability for 1-RMDPs is not even known to be decidable. The qualitative reachability problem for 1-RMDPs and 1-RSSGs (and equivalent probabilistic pushdown models) was studied in [4, 3]. These results do not apply to the corresponding branching models (BMDP, BSSG). Another objective considered in prior work is the expected total reward objective for 1-RSSGs and (17) and 1-RCSGs ([37]) with positive rewards. In particular, [37] shows that the “qualitative” problem of determining whether the game value for a 1-RCSG total reward game is \( \infty \) is in PSPACE. None of these prior results have any implications for BCSGs with reachability objectives.

For richer objectives beyond reachability or extinction, Chen et. al. [8] studied model checking of purely stochastic branching processes (BPs) with respect to properties expressed by deterministic parity tree automata, and showed that the qualitative problem is in P-time (hence this holds in particular for reachability probability in BPs), and that the quantitative problem of comparing the probability with a rational is in PSPACE. Michalevski and Mio [30] extended this to properties of BPs expressed by “game automata”, a subclass of alternating parity tree automata. More recently, Przybylko and Skrzypczak [32] considered existence and complexity of game values of Branching turn-based (i.e., simple) stochastic games, with regular objectives, where the two players aim to maximize/minimize the probability that the generated labeled tree belongs to a regular language (given by a tree automaton). They showed that (unlike our case of simpler reachability games) already for some basic regular properties these games are not even determined, meaning they do not have a value. They furthermore showed that for a probabilistic turn-based branching game, with a regular tree objective, it is undecidable to compare the value that a given player can force to 1/2; whereas for deterministic turn-based branching games they showed it is decidable and 2-EXPTIME-complete (respectively, EXPTIME-complete), to determine whether the player aiming

\textsuperscript{2}The results in [18] were phrased in terms of the limit-sure problem, where it was shown that (a) deciding whether the value of a finite-state CSG reachability game is at least a given value \( p \in (0, 1) \) is square-root-sum-hard, and (b) that the former problem is reducible to the limit-sure decision problem for BCSG extinction games. But the hardness proofs of (b) and (a) in [18] apply \textit{mutatis mutandis} to (b) the almost-sure problem for BCSG extinction, and to (a) the corresponding problem of deciding, given a finite-state CSG and a value \( p \in (0, 1) \), whether the maximizing player has a strategy that achieves at least value \( p \), regardless of the strategy of the minimizer. Thus, both the almost-sure and limit-sure extinction problem for BCSGs are square-root-sum hard, and also both are at least as hard as Condon’s problem of computing the exact value of a finite-state SSG reachability game.
to satisfy (respectively, falsify) a given regular tree objective has a pure winning strategy. Other past research includes work in operations research on (one-player) Branching MDPs \[31, 35, 11\]. None of these prior works bear on any of the results on BCSG reachability problems established in this paper.

**On the complexity of quantitative problems for BCSGs.**

All quantitative decision and approximation problems for BCSG extinction and reachability games are in PSPACE. This follows by exploiting the minimax-PPS equations whose least (and greatest) fixed point solution captures the extinction (and non-reachability) values of these games, and by then appealing to PSPACE upper bounds for deciding the existential (and bounded-alternation) theory of reals ([34]), in order to decide questions about, and to approximate, the LFP and GFP of such equations. This was shown already for BCSG extinction games in [18]. A directly analogous proof yields the same PSPACE upper bound for BCSG reachability games. As mentioned before, the corresponding decision problems (e.g., deciding whether the BCSG game value is at least a given probability \(p \in (0, 1)\)), are square-root-sum-hard, already for finite-state CSG reachability games [18] (which are subsumed by both BCSG extinction and BCSG reachability games). This implies that even placing these decision problems in the polynomial time hierarchy would require a breakthrough. An interesting question is how much the PSPACE upper bounds can be improved for the approximation problems. As noted earlier, Frederiksen and Miltersen [22] have shown that for finite-state CSG reachability games, the game value can be approximated to desired precision in TFNP[NP]. We do not know an analogous complexity result for quantitative approximation problems for BCSG extinction or reachability games, nor do we know square-root-sum-hardness for these approximation problems. We leave these as interesting open questions.

**Organization of the paper.**

Section 2 gives background and basic definitions. Section 3 shows the relationship between the optimal non-reachability probabilities of a game and the greatest fixed point of a minimax-PPS. Section 4 presents the algorithm for determining if the value of a game is 0. Section 5 presents the algorithm for almost-sure reachability, and Section 6 for limit-sure reachability.

**2 Background**

This section introduces some definitions and background for Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games. It builds directly on, and generalizes, the definitions in [16] associated with reachability problems for Branching MDPs and Branching Simple Stochastic Games.

We first define the general model of a (multi-type) Branching Concurrent Stochastic Games (BCSGs), as well as some important restrictions of the general model: Branching Simple Stochastic Games (BSSGs), Branching MDPs (BMDPs), and (multi-type) Branching Processes (BPs).

**Definition 1.** A **Branching Concurrent Stochastic Game (BCSG)** is a 2-player zero-sum game that consists of a finite set \(V = \{T_1, \ldots, T_n\}\) of types, two finite non-empty sets \(\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i, \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i \subseteq \Sigma\) of actions (one for each player) for each type \(T_i\) (\(\Sigma\) is a finite action alphabet), and a finite set \(R(T_i, a_{\text{max}}^i, a_{\text{min}}^i)\) of probabilistic rules associated with each tuple \((T_i, a_{\text{max}}^i, a_{\text{min}}^i), i \in [n]\), where \(a_{\text{max}}^i \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i\) and \(a_{\text{min}}^i \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i\). Each rule \(r \in R(T_i, a_{\text{max}}^i, a_{\text{min}}^i)\) is a triple \((T_i, p_r, \alpha_r)\), which we can denote by \(T_i \xrightarrow{p_r} \alpha_r\), where \(\alpha_r \in \mathbb{N}^n\) is a \(n\)-vector of natural numbers that denotes a finite multi-set over the set \(V\), and where \(p_r \in (0, 1) \cap \mathbb{Q}\) is the probability of the rule \(r\) (which we assume to be a rational number, for computational purposes), where we assume that for all
If for all types $T_i \in V$, either $|\Gamma_{\max}^i| = 1$ or $|\Gamma_{\min}^i| = 1$, then the model is a “turn-based” perfect-information game and is called a Branching Simple Stochastic Game (BSSG). If for all $T_i \in V$, $|\Gamma_{\max}^i| = 1$ (respectively, $|\Gamma_{\min}^i| = 1$), then it is called a minimizing Branching Markov Decision Process (BMDP) (respectively, a maximizing BMDP). If both $|\Gamma_{\min}^i| = 1 = |\Gamma_{\max}^i|$ for all $i \in [n]$, then the process is a classic, purely stochastic, multi-type Branching Process (BP) ([26]).

A play of a BCSG defines a (possibly infinite) node-labeled forest, whose nodes are labeled by the type of the object they represent. A play contains a sequence of “generations”, $X_0, X_1, X_2, \ldots$ (one for each integer time $t \geq 0$, corresponding to nodes at depth/level $t$ in the forest). For each $t \in \mathbb{N}$, $X_t$ consists of the population (set of objects of given types), at time $t$. $X_0$ is the initial population at generation 0 (these are the roots of the forest). $X_{k+1}$ is obtained from $X_k$ in the following way: for each object $e$ in the set $X_k$, assuming $e$ has type $T_i$, both players select simultaneously and independently actions $a_{\max} \in \Gamma_{\max}^i$ and $a_{\min} \in \Gamma_{\min}^i$ (or distributions on such actions), according to their strategies; thereafter a rule $r \in R(T_i, a_{\max}, a_{\min})$ is chosen randomly and independently (for object $e$) with probability $p_r$; each such object $e$ in $X_k$ is then replaced by the set of objects specified by the multi-set $\alpha_r$ associated with the corresponding randomly chosen rule $r$. This process is repeated in each generation, as long as the current generation is not empty, and if for some $k \geq 0$, $X_k = \emptyset$ then we say the process terminates or becomes extinct.

The strategies of the players can in general be arbitrary. Specifically, at each generation, $k$, each player can, in principle, select actions for the objects in $X_k$ based on the entire past history, may use randomization (a mixed strategy), and may make different choices for objects of the same type. The history of the process up to time $k - 1$ is a forest of depth $k - 1$ that includes not only the populations $X_0, X_1, \ldots, X_{k-1}$, but also the information regarding all the past actions and rules applied and the parent-child relationships between all the objects up to the generation of $k - 1$. The history can be represented by a forest of depth $k - 1$, with internal nodes labelled by rules and actions, and whose leaves at level $k - 1$ form the population $X_{k-1}$. Thus, a strategy of player 1 (player 2, respectively) is a function that maps every finite history (i.e., labelled forest of some finite depth as above) to a function that maps each object $e$ in the current population $X_k$ (assuming that the history has depth $k$) to a probability distribution on the actions $\Gamma_{\max}^i$ (to the actions $\Gamma_{\min}^i$, respectively), assuming that object $e$ has type $T_i$.

Let $\Psi_1, \Psi_2$ be the set of all strategies of players 1, 2. We say that a strategy is deterministic if for every history it maps each object $e$ in the current population to a single action with probability 1 (in other words, it does not randomize on actions). We say that a strategy is static if for each type $T_i \in V$, and for any object $e$ of type $T_i$, the player always chooses the same distribution on actions, irrespective of the history.

Different objectives can be considered for the BCSG game model. The extinction (or termination) objective, where players aim to maximize/minimize the extinction probability, has already been studied in detail in [19] for BSSGs and in [18] for BCSGs\(^3\). In particular, in [18] it was shown that the player minimizing extinction probability for BCSGs always has an optimal (randomized)

\(^3\)Strictly speaking, the model studied in [18] is 1-exit Recursive concurrent stochastic games (1-RCSGs) with the objective of termination, but such games are easily seen to be equivalent to BCSGs with the extinction objective: there is a simple linear-time transformation from a 1-RCSG termination game to a BCSG extinction game, and vice versa (see [20] for the same correspondence, in the purely stochastic setting).
static strategy, whereas the player maximizing extinction probability in general may only have \( \epsilon \)-optimal randomized static strategies, for all \( \epsilon > 0 \). (For BSSGs, it was shown in [19] that both players have optimal deterministic static strategies for optimizing extinction probability.)

This paper, on the other hand, deals with the (existential) reachability objective for BCSGs, where the aim of the players is to maximize/minimize the probability of reaching a generation that contains at least one object of a given target type \( T_{f^*} \). This objective was previously studied in [16], but only for BMDPs and BSSGs, not for the more general model of BCSGs. It was already shown in [16] that in a BSSG the player minimizing reachability probability always has a deterministic static optimal strategy, whereas (unlike for the extinction objective) in general there need not exist \( \text{any} \) optimal strategy for the player maximizing reachability probability in a BMDP (and hence also in a BSSG and BCSG). On the other hand, it was shown in [16] that for BMDPs and BSSGs, if the reachability game value is \( = 1 \), then there is in fact an optimal strategy (but not in general a static one, even when randomization is allowed) for the player maximizing the reachability probability that forces the value 1 (irrespective of the strategy of the player minimizing the reachability probability). It was also shown that deciding whether the value \( = 1 \) for BSSG reachability game can be decided in P-time, and if the answer is “yes” then an optimal (non-static, but deterministic) strategy that achieves reachability value 1 for the maximizer can be computed in P-time, whereas if the answer is “no” a deterministic static strategy that forces value \( < 1 \) can be computed for the minimizer in P-time.

We will show in this paper that the reachability game also has a value for the more general imperfect-information game class of BCSGs. We do so by establishing systems of nonlinear minimax-equations whose greatest fixed point gives the vector of values of the non-reachability game.

Let us note right away that there is a natural “duality” between the objectives of optimizing reachability probability and that of optimizing extinction probability for BCSGs. This duality was previously detailed in [16] for BSSGs. The objective of optimizing the extinction probability (i.e., the probability of generating a finite tree), starting from a given type, can equivalently be rephrased as a “universal reachability” objective (on a slightly modified BCSG), where the goal is to optimize the probability of eventually reaching the target type (namely “death”) on all paths starting at the root of the tree. Likewise, the “universal reachability” objective can equivalently be rephrased as the objective of optimizing extinction probability (on a slightly modified BCSG). By contrast, the reachability objective that we study in this paper is the “existential reachability” objective of optimizing the probability of reaching the target type on some path in the generated tree. Despite this natural duality between these two objectives, we show that there is a wide disparity between them, both in terms of the nature and existence of optimal strategies, and in terms of computational complexity: we show that the qualitative (existential) reachability problem for BCSGs can be solved in polynomial time, both in the almost-sure and limit-sure sense.

The BCSG reachability game can of course also be viewed as a “non-reachability” game (by just reversing the role of the players). It turns out this is useful to do, and we will exploit it in crucial ways (and this was also exploited in [16] for BMDPs and BSSGs). So we provide some notation for this purpose. Given an initial population \( \mu \in \mathbb{N}^n \), with \( \mu_{f^*} = 0 \), and given an integer \( k \geq 0 \), and strategies \( \sigma \in \Psi_1, \tau \in \Psi_2 \), let \( g_{\sigma,\tau}^k(\mu) \) be the probability that the process does not reach a generation with an object of type \( T_{f^*} \) in at most \( k \) steps, under strategies \( \sigma, \tau \) and starting from the initial population \( \mu \). To be more formal, this is the probability that \( (X_l)_{f^*} = 0 \) for all \( 0 \leq l \leq k \). Similarly, let \( g_{\sigma,\tau}^*(\mu) \) be the probability that \( (X_l)_{f^*} = 0 \) for all \( l \geq 0 \). We define
$g^k(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g^k_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu)$ to be the value of the $k$-step non-reachability game for the initial population $\mu$, and $g^*(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu)$ to be the value of the game under the non-reachability objective and for the initial population $\mu$. The next section will demonstrate that these games are determined, meaning they have a value where $g^*(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu)$. Similarly, for $g^k(\mu)$.

In the case where the initial population $\mu$ is a single object of some given type $T_i$, then for the value of the game we write $g^*_i$ (or similarly, $g^k_i$, and when strategy $\sigma$ and $\tau$ are fixed, we write $(g^*_{\sigma,\tau})_i$). The collection of these values, namely the vector $g^*$ of $g^*_i$'s, is called the vector of the non-reachability values of the game. We will see that, having the vector of $g^*_i$'s, the non-reachability value for a starting population $\mu$ can be computed simply as $g^*(\mu) = f(g^*, \mu) := \prod_{i} (g^*_i)^{\mu_i}$. So given a BCSG, the aim is to compute the vector of non-reachability values. As our original objective is reachability, we point out that the vector of reachability values is $r^* = 1 - g^*$ (where 1 is the all-1 vector), and hence the reachability value $r^*(\mu)$ of the game starting with population $\mu$ is $r^*(\mu) = 1 - g^*(\mu)$.

We will associate with any given BCSG a system of minimax probabilistic polynomial equations (minimax-PPS), $x = P(x)$, for the non-reachability objective. This system will be constructed to have one variable $x_i$ and one equation $x_i = P_i(x)$ for each type $T_i$ other than the target type $T_f$. We will show that the vector of non-reachability values $g^*$ for different starting types is precisely the Greatest Fixed Point (GFP) solution of the system $x = P(x)$ in $[0, 1]^n$.

In order to define these systems of equations, some shorthand notation will be useful. We use $x^v$ to denote the monomial $x_1^{v_1} \cdot x_2^{v_2} \cdot \ldots \cdot x_n^{v_n}$ for an $n$-vector of variables $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and a vector $v \in \mathbb{N}^n$. Considering a multi-variate polynomial $P_i(x) = \sum_{r \in R} p_r x^r$ for some rational coefficients $p_r, r \in R$, we will call $P_i(x)$ a probabilistic polynomial, if $p_r \geq 0$ for all $r \in R$ and $\sum_{r \in R} p_r \leq 1$.

**Definition 2.** A probabilistic polynomial system of equations (PPS), $x = P(x)$, is a system of $n$ equations, $x_i = P_i(x)$, in $n$ variables where for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $P_i(x)$ is a probabilistic polynomial.

A minimax probabilistic polynomial system of equations (minimax-PPS), $x = P(x)$, is a system of $n$ equations in $n$ variables $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, where for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $P_i(x) := \text{Val}(A_i(x))$ is an associated Minimax-Probabilistic-Polynomial. By this we mean that $P_i(x)$ is defined to be, for each $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, the minimax value of the two-player zero-sum matrix game given by a finite game payoff matrix $A_i(x)$ whose rows are indexed by the actions $\Gamma^i_{\max}$, and whose columns are indexed by the actions $\Gamma^i_{\min}$, where, for each pair $a_{\max} \in \Gamma^i_{\max}$ and $a_{\min} \in \Gamma^i_{\min}$, the matrix entry $(A_i(x))_{a_{\max},a_{\min}}$ is given by a probabilistic polynomial $q_{i,a_{\max},a_{\min}}(x)$. Thus, if $n_i = |\Gamma^i_{\max}|$ and $m_i = |\Gamma^i_{\min}|$, and if we assume w.l.o.g. that $\Gamma^i_{\max} = \{1, \ldots, n_i\}$ and that $\Gamma^i_{\min} = \{1, \ldots, m_i\}$, then $\text{Val}(A_i(x))$ is defined as the minimax value of the zero-sum matrix game, given by the following payoff matrix:

$$A_i(x) = \begin{bmatrix}
q_{i,1,1}(x) & q_{i,1,2}(x) & \cdots & q_{i,1,m_i}(x) \\
q_{i,2,1}(x) & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
q_{i,n_i,1}(x) & \cdots & \cdots & q_{i,n_i,m_i}(x)
\end{bmatrix}$$

with each $q_{i,j,k}(x) := \sum_{r \in R(T_i,j,k)} p_r x^r$ being a probabilistic polynomial for the actions pair $j,k$.

If for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, either $|\Gamma^i_{\min}| = 1$ or $|\Gamma^i_{\max}| = 1$, then we call such a system minimax-PPS. If for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $|\Gamma^i_{\min}| = 1$ (respectively, if $|\Gamma^i_{\max}| = 1$ for all $i$) then we will call
such a system a \textbf{maxPPS} (respectively, a \textbf{minPPS}). Finally, a \textbf{PPS} is a minimax-PPS with both $|\Gamma_{\text{min}}^i| = 1 = |\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|$ for every $i \in \{1, \cdots , n\}$.

For computational purposes, we assume that all coefficients are rational and that there are no zero terms in the probabilistic polynomials, and we assume the coefficients and non-zero exponents of each term are given in binary. We denote by $|P|$ the total bit encoding length of a system $x = P(x)$ under this representation.

This paper will examine minimax-PPSs. Since $P(x)$ defines a monotone function $P : [0,1]^n \rightarrow [0,1]^n$, it follows by Tarski’s theorem ([36]) that any such system has both a \textbf{Least Fixed Point (LFP)} solution $q^* \in [0,1]^n$, and a \textbf{Greatest Fixed Point (GFP)} solution, $g^* \in [0,1]^n$. In other words, $q^* = P(q^*)$ and $g^* = P(g^*)$ and moreover, for any $s^* \in [0,1]^n$ such that $s^* = P(s^*)$, we have $q^* \leq s^* \leq g^*$ (coordinate-wise inequality).

We will show that the GFP of a minimax-PPS, $g^*$, corresponds to the vector of \textit{values} for a corresponding BCSG with \textit{non-reachability} objective. We note that it has previously been shown in [18] that the LFP solution, $q^* \in [0,1]^n$ of a minimax-PPS is the vector of \textit{extinction/termination} values for a corresponding (but different) BCSG with the extinction objective, and that the GFP of a min-max-PPS is the vector of \textit{non-reachability} values for a corresponding BSSG [16].

\textbf{Definition 3.} A (possibly randomized) \textbf{policy} for the max (min) player in a minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, is a function that assigns a probability distribution to each variable $x_i$ such that the support of the distribution is a subset of $\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i$ (or $\Gamma_{\text{min}}^i$, respectively), where these now denote the possible actions (i.e., choices of rows and columns) available for the respective player in the game matrix $A_i(x)$ that defines $P_i(x)$.

Intuitively, a policy is the same as a static strategy in the corresponding BCSG.

\textbf{Definition 4.} For a minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, and policies $\pi$ and $\tau$ for the max and min players, respectively, we write $x = P_{\pi,\tau}(x)$ for the PPS obtained by fixing both these policies. We write $x = P_{\pi}(x)$ for the minPPS obtained by fixing $\pi$ for the max player, and $x = P_{\tau}(x)$ for the maxPPS obtained by fixing $\tau$ for the min player. More specifically, for policy $\pi$ for the max player, we define the minPPS, $x = P_{\pi}(x)$, as follows: for all $i \in [n]$, $(P_\pi(x))_i := \min\{s_k : k \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i\}$, where $s_k := \sum j \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i \pi(x_i, j)q_{i,j,k}(x)$, where $\pi(x_i, j)$ is the probability that the fixed policy $\pi$ assigns to action $j \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i$ in variable $x_i$. We similarly define $x = P_{\tau}(x)$ and $x = P_{\pi,\tau}(x)$.

For a minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, and a (possibly randomized) policy, $\pi$ for the max player, we use $q_{\pi,*}$ and $g_{\pi,*}$ to denote the LFP and GFP solution vectors of the corresponding minPPS, $x = P_{\pi}(x)$, respectively. Likewise we use $q_{*,\pi}$ and $g_{*,\pi}$ to denote the LFP and GFP solution vectors of the maxPPS, $x = P_{\pi}(x)$.

\textbf{Note:} we overload notations such as $(g_{*,\pi})_i$ and $(g_{*,\pi})_i$ to mean slightly different things, depending on whether $\pi$ and $\tau$ are as static strategies (policies), or are more general non-static strategies. Specifically, let $E_i \in \mathbb{N}^n$ denote the unit vector which is 1 in the $i$’th coordinate and 0 elsewhere. When $\tau \in \Psi_2$ is a general non-static strategy we use the notation $(g_{*,\pi})_i := g_{*,\pi}(E_i) = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} g_{\pi,\sigma}(E_i)$. We likewise define $(g_{*,\pi})_i$. It will typically be clear from the context which interpretation of $(g_{*,\pi})_i$ is intended.

\textbf{Definition 5.} For a minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, a policy $\pi^*$ is called \textbf{optimal} for the max player for the LFP (respectively, the GFP) if $q_{*,\pi}^* = q^*$ (respectively, $g_{*,\pi}^* = g^*$).

An optimal policy $\tau^*$ for the min player for the LFP and GFP, respectively, is defined similarly.
For $\epsilon > 0$, a policy $\sigma'$ for the max player is called $\epsilon$-optimal for the LFP (respectively, the GFP), if $\|q_{\sigma', \ast}^* - g^*\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon$ (respectively, $\|g_{\sigma', \ast}^* - g^*\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon$). An $\epsilon$-optimal policy $\tau'$ for the min player is defined similarly.

For convenience in proofs throughout the paper and to simplify the structure of the matrices involved in the minimax-probabilistic-polynomials, $P_i(x)$, we shall observe that minimax-PPSs can always be cast in the following normal form.

**Definition 6.** A minimax-PPS in simple normal form (SNF), $x = P(x)$, is a system of $n$ equations in $n$ variables $\{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$, where each $P_i(x)$ for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$ is one of three forms:

- **FORM L:** $P_i(x) = a_{i,0} + \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{i,j} x_j$, where for all $j$, $a_{i,j} \geq 0$, and $\sum_{j=0}^{n} a_{i,j} \leq 1$
- **FORM Q:** $P_i(x) = x_j x_k$ for some $j, k$
- **FORM M:** $P_i(x) = \text{Val}(A_i(x))$, where $A_i(x)$ is a $(n_i \times m_i)$ matrix, such that for all $a_{\max} \in [n_i]$ and $a_{\min} \in [m_i]$, the entry $A_i(x)_{a_{\max}, a_{\min}} \in \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \cup \{1\}$.

(The reason we also allow “1” as an entry in the matrices $A_i(x)$ will become clear later in the context of our algorithm.)

We shall often assume a minimax-PPS in its SNF form, and say that a variable $x_i$ is “of form/type” L, Q, or M, meaning that $P_i(x)$ has the corresponding form. The following proposition shows that we can efficiently convert any minimax-PPS into SNF form.

**Proposition 2.1** (cf. [20, 14, 15]). Every minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, can be transformed in P-time to an “equivalent” minimax-PPS, $y = Q(y)$ in SNF form, such that $|Q| \in O(|P|)$. More precisely, the variables $x$ are a subset of the variables $y$, and both the LFP and GFP of $x = P(x)$ are, respectively, the projection of the LFP and GFP of $y = Q(y)$, onto the variables $x$, and furthermore an optimal policy (respectively, $\epsilon$-optimal policy) for the LFP (respectively, GFP) of $x = P(x)$ can be obtained in P-time from an optimal (respectively, $\epsilon$-optimal) policy for the LFP (respectively, GFP) of $y = Q(y)$.

**Proof.** We can easily convert, in P-time, any minimax-PPS into SNF form, using the following procedure.

- For each equation $x_i = P_i(x) := \text{Val}(A_i(x))$, for each probabilistic polynomial $q_{i,j,k}(x)$ on the right-hand-side that is not a variable, add a new variable $x_d$, replace $q_{i,j,k}(x)$ with $x_d$ in $P_i(x)$, and add the new equation $x_d = q_{i,j,k}(x)$.
- For each equation $x_i = P_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{m} p_j x^{\alpha_j}$, where $P_i(x)$ is a probabilistic polynomial that is not just a constant or a single monomial, replace every (non-constant) monomial $x^{\alpha_j}$ on the right-hand-side that is not a single variable by a new variable $x_{ij}$ and add the equation $x_{ij} = x^{\alpha_j}$.
- For each variable $x_i$ that occurs in some polynomial with exponent higher than 1, introduce new variables $x_{i1}, \ldots, x_{ik}$ where $k$ is the logarithm of the highest exponent of $x_i$ that occurs in $P(x)$, and add equations $x_{i1} = x_i^2$, $x_{i2} = x_{i1}^2, \ldots, x_{ik} = x_{ik-1}^2$. For every occurrence of a higher power $x_{il}^l$, $l > 1$, of $x_i$ in $P(x)$, if the binary representation of the exponent $l$ is $a_k \ldots a_2 a_1 a_0$, then we replace $x_{il}$ by the product of the variables $x_{ij}$ such that the corresponding bit $a_j$ is 1, and $x_i$ if $a_0 = 1$. After we perform this replacement for all the higher powers of all the variables, every polynomial of total degree $> 2$ is just a product of variables.
• If a polynomial $P_i(x) = x_{j_1} \ldots x_{j_m}$ in the current system is the product of $m > 2$ variables, then add $m - 2$ new variables $x_{i_1}, \ldots, x_{i_{m-2}}$, set $P_i(x) = x_{j_1} x_{i_1}$, and add the equations

\[
x_{i_1} = x_{j_2} x_{i_2}, \quad x_{i_2} = x_{j_3}, x_{i_3}, \ldots, x_{i_{m-2}} = x_{j_{m-1}} x_{j_m}.
\]

Now all equations are of the form L, Q, or M.

The above procedure allows us to convert any minimax-PPS into one in SNF form by introducing $O(|P|)$ new variables and blowing up the size of $P$ by a constant factor $O(1)$. It is clear that both the LFP and the GFP of $x = P(x)$ arise as the projections of the LFP and GFP of $y = Q(y)$ onto the $x$ variables. Furthermore, there is an obvious (and easy to compute) bijection between policies for the resulting SNF form minimax-PPS and the original minimax-PPS.

Thus from now on, and for the rest of this paper we may assume if needed, without loss of generality, that all minimax-PPSs are in SNF normal form.

**Definition 7.** The dependency graph of a minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, is a directed graph that has one node for each variable $x_i$, and contains an edge $(x_i, x_j)$ if $x_j$ appears in $P_i(x)$. The dependency graph of a BCSG has one node for each type, and contains an edge $(T_i, T_j)$ if there is a pair of actions $a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i, a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i$ and a rule $T_i \xrightarrow{p} \alpha_r$ in $R(T_i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}})$ such that $T_j$ appears in $\alpha_r$.

### 3 Non-reachability values for BCSGs and the Greatest Fixed Point

This section will show that for a given BCSG with a target type $T_{f^*}$, a minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, can be constructed such that its Greatest Fixed Point (GFP) $g^* \in [0,1]^n$ is precisely the vector $g^*$ of non-reachability values for the BCSG.

For simplicity, from now on let us call a maximizer (respectively, a minimizer) the player that aims to maximize (respectively, minimize) the probability of not reaching the target type. That is, we swap the roles of the players for the benefit of less confusion in analysing the minimax-PPS. While the players’ goals in the game are related to the objective of reachability, the equations we construct will capture the optimal non-reachability values in the GFP of the minimax-PPS.

For each type $T_i \neq T_{f^*}$, the minimax-PPS will have an associated variable $x_i$ and an equation $x_i = P_i(x)$, and the MINIMAX-PROBABILISTIC-POLYNOMIAL $P_i(x)$ is built in the following way. For each action $a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i$ of the maximizer (i.e., the player aiming to maximize the probability of not reaching the target) and action $a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i$ of the minimizer in $T_i$, let $R(T_i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}) = \{ r \in R(T_i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}) \mid (\alpha_r)f^* = 0 \}$ be the set of probabilistic rules $r$ for type $T_i$ and players’ action pair $(a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}})$ that generate a multi-set $\alpha_r$ which does not contain an object of the target type. For each actions pair for $T_i$, there is a probabilistic polynomial $q_{i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}}$ that does not contain an object of type $T_{f^*}$, because then the term with monomial $x^\alpha_r$ will be 0. Now after a polynomial is constructed for each pair of players’ moves, we construct $P_i(x)$ as the value of a zero-sum matrix game $A_i(x)$, where the matrix is constructed as follows: (1) rows belong to the max player in the minimax-PPS (i.e., the player trying to maximize the non-reachability probability), and columns belong to the min player; (2) for each row and column (i.e., pair of actions $(a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}})$) there is a corresponding probabilistic polynomial $q_{i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}}(x)$ in the matrix entry $A_i(x)_{a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}}$.

The following theorem captures the fact that the optimal non-reachability values $g^*$ in the BCSG correspond to the Greatest Fixed Point (GFP) of the minimax-PPS.
Theorem 3.1. The non-reachability game values \( g^* \in [0, 1]^n \) of a BCSG reachability game exist, and correspond to the Greatest Fixed Point (GFP) of the minimax-PPS, \( x = P(x) \), in \([0, 1]^n\). That is, \( g^* = g(P(g^*)) \), and for all other fixed points \( g' = g(P(g')) \) in \([0, 1]^n\), it holds that \( g' \leq g^* \). Moreover, for an initial population \( \mu \), the optimal non-reachability value is \( g^*(\mu) = \prod_i (g^*_i)^\mu_i \) and the game is determined, i.e., \( g^*(\mu) = \sup r \in \Psi_1 \inf r \in \Psi_2 \ g_{\sigma,\tau}^*(\mu) = \inf r \in \Psi_2 \sup r \in \Psi_1 \ g_{\sigma,\tau}^*(\mu) \). Finally, the player maximizing non-reachability probability in the BCSG has a (mixed) static optimal strategy.

Proof. Note that \( P : [0, 1]^n \rightarrow [0, 1]^n \) is a monotone operator, since all coefficients in all the polynomials \( P_i(x) \) are non-negative, and for \( x \leq y \), where \( x, y \in [0, 1]^n \), it holds that \( A_i(x) \leq A_i(y) \) (entry-wise inequality) and thus \( \text{Val}(A_i(x)) \leq \text{Val}(A_i(y)) \). Thus, \( P_i(x) \leq P_i(y) \). Let \( x^0 = 1 \) and \( x^k = P(x^{k-1}) = P^k(1) \), \( k > 0 \) be the \( k \)-fold application of \( P \) on the vector 1 (i.e., the all-1 vector). By induction on \( k \) the sequence \( x^k \) is monotonically non-increasing, i.e., \( x^{k+1} \leq x^k \) ≤ 1.

By Tarski’s theorem ([36]), \( P(\cdot) \) has a Greatest Fixed Point (GFP) \( x^* \in [0, 1]^n \). The GFP is the limit of the monotone sequence \( x^k \), i.e., \( x^* = \lim_{k \to \infty} x^k \). To continue the proof, we need the following lemma.

Lemma 3.2. For any initial non-empty population \( \mu \), assuming it does not contain the target type \( T_f \), and for any \( k \geq 0 \), the value of not reaching \( T_f \) in \( k \) steps is \( g^k(\mu) = f(x^k, \mu) := \prod_{i=1}^n (x^k_i)^{\mu_i} \). Also, there are strategies for the players, \( \sigma^k \in \Psi_1 \) and \( \tau^k \in \Psi_2 \), that achieve this value, that is \( g^k(\mu) = \sup r \in \Psi_1 \ g^k_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) = \inf r \in \Psi_2 \ g^k_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) \).

Proof. Before we begin the proof, let us make a quick observation. For a fixed vector \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \), consider the zero-sum matrix game defined by the payoff matrix \( A_i(x) \) for player 1 (the row player). Consider fixed mixed strategies \( s_i \) and \( t_i \) for the row and column players in this matrix game. Thus, \( s_i(a_{\text{max}})(t_i(a_{\text{min}})) \), respectively, defines the probability placed on action \( a_{\text{max}} \) (on action \( a_{\text{min}} \), respectively) in \( s_i \) (in \( t_i \), respectively). The expected payoff to player 1 (the maximizing player), under these mixed strategies is:

\[
\sum_{a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma_1, a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma_2} s_i(a_{\text{max}}) t_i(a_{\text{min}}) q_{i,a_{\text{max}},a_{\text{min}}}(x)
\]

\[
= \sum_{a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}} \left[ s_i(a_{\text{max}}) t_i(a_{\text{min}}) \sum_{r \in R'(T_i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}})} p_r x^{\alpha_r} \right]
\]

\[
= \sum_{a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}} \sum_{r \in R'(T_i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}})} s_i(a_{\text{max}}) t_i(a_{\text{min}}) p_r x^{\alpha_r} = \sum_{r \in R'(T_i)} p'_r x^{\alpha_r}
\]

(1)

where \( R'(T_i) \) is the set of all probabilistic rules for type \( T_i \); the newly defined probability \( p'_r \) of a rule \( r \) is equal to \( s_i(a_{\text{max}}) * t_i(a_{\text{min}}) * p_r \) for the pair \( (a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}) \) for which the rule \( r \) is in \( R'(T_i, a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}) \), and where \( \alpha_r \) is the population that rule \( r \) generates, meaning rule \( r \) is defined by \( T_i \overset{p_r}{\rightarrow} \alpha_r \).

Now let us prove the Lemma by induction on \( k \). For the basis step, clearly \( g^0(\mu) = 1 \), since the initial population does not contain any objects of the target type. Moreover, \( x^0 = 1 \) and so \( f(1, \mu) = 1 \).

For the inductive step, first we demonstrate that \( g^k(\mu) \geq f(x^k, \mu) \). Consider a strategy \( \sigma^k := (s, \sigma^{k-1}) \) for the max player (i.e., the player aiming to maximize the non-reachability probability), constructed in the following way. For all \( i \), and for every object of type \( T_i \) in the initial population \( \mu = X_0 \), the max player chooses as a first step the minimax-optimal mixed strategy \( s_i \) in the zero-sum matrix game \( A_i(x^{k-1}) \) (which exists, due to the minimax theorem). The min player (player
2), as part of its strategy, chooses some distributions on actions for all objects in the population $X_0$ (independently of player 1), and then the rules are chosen according to the resulting probabilities, forming the next generation $X_1$ at time 1. Thereafter, the max player acts according to an optimal $(k-1)$-step strategy $\sigma^{k-1}$, starting from population $X_1$ ($\sigma^{k-1}$ exists by the inductive assumption, and we will indeed prove by induction that the thus defined $k$-step strategy $\sigma^k$ is optimal in the $k$-step game). Note that $\sigma^k$ can be mixed, and can also be non-static since the action probabilities can depend on the generation and history.

Now let $\tau$ be any strategy for the min player. In the first step, $\tau$ chooses some distributions on actions for each object in $X_0 = \mu$. After the choices of $\sigma^k$ and $\tau$ are made in the first step, rules are picked probabilistically and the population $X_1$ is generated. By the inductive assumption, $g^{k-1}(X_1) = f(x^{k-1}, X_1)$, i.e., the value of not reaching the target type in next $k-1$ steps, starting in population $X_1$, is precisely $f(x^{k-1}, X_1)$. Therefore, the $k$-step probability of not reaching the target, starting in $\mu$, using strategies $\sigma^k$ and $\tau$, is $g^k_{\sigma^k, \tau}(\mu) = \sum_{X_1} p(X_1) g^{k-1}_{\sigma^{k-1}, \tau}(X_1) \geq \sum_{X_1} p(X_1) f(x^{k-1}, X_1)$, where the sum is over all possible next-step populations $X_1$, and in each term $f(x^{k-1}, X_1)$ is multiplied by the probability $p(X_1)$ of generating that particular population $X_1$. The reason for the inequality is because, by optimality of $\sigma^{k-1}$ for the max player in the $(k-1)$-step game, we know that $g^{k-1}_{\sigma^{k-1}, \tau}(X_1) \geq g^{k-1}(X_1) = f(x^{k-1}, X_1)$.

The sum $\sum_{X_1} p(X_1) f(x^{k-1}, X_1)$ can be rewritten as a product of $|\mu|$ terms, one for each object in the initial population $X_0$. Specifically, given $X_0$, let $L_{X_0, X_1}$ denote the set of all possible tuples of rules $(r_1, \ldots, r_{|X_0|})$, which associate to each object $e_j$ in the population $X_0$, a rule $r_j$ such that if $e_j$ has type $T_i$, then $r_j \in R(T_i)$ is a rule for type $T_i$, and furthermore such that if we apply the rules $(r_1, \ldots, r_{|X_0|})$, they generate multisets $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{|X_0|}$, such that we obtain the population $X_1 = \bigcup \alpha_i$ from them.

Then for $X_0 = \mu$, we can rewrite $\sum_{X_1} p(X_1) f(x^{k-1}, X_1)$ as:

$$\sum_{X_1} p(X_1) f(x^{k-1}, X_1) = \sum_{X_1} \sum_{(r_1, \ldots, r_{|X_0|}) \in L_{X_0, X_1}} \left( \prod_{j=1}^{|\mu|} p_{r_j} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{j=1}^{|\mu|} f(x^{k-1}, \alpha_r_j) \right)$$

$$= \prod_{j=1}^{|\mu|} \sum_{r_j} p_{r_j} f(x^{k-1}, \alpha_r_j),$$

where $r_j$ ranges over all rules that can be generated by the type of object $e_j$, and $p_{r_j}$ is the probability of generating rule $r_j$ for object $e_j$ in the first step, under strategies $\sigma^k$ and $\tau$. $\alpha_r_j$ is the population produced from $e_j$ under rule $r_j$. Note that the term $\sum_{r_j} p_{r_j} f(x^{k-1}, \alpha_r_j)$ for an object $e_j$ of type $T_i$ has the same form as equation (1) above. This observation implies that, since the mixed strategy $\bar{s}_i$ is minimax-optimal in the zero-sum matrix game with matrix $A_i(x^{k-1})$, the term $\sum_{r_j} p_{r_j} f(x^{k-1}, \alpha_r_j)$ corresponding to each object $e_j$ of type $T_i$ is $\geq Val(A_i(x^{k-1})) = P_i(x^{k-1}) = x_k^i$. Hence, for any strategy $\tau$ chosen the min player, starting with the objects in $\mu = X_0$, the probability of not reaching the target type in next $k$ steps under strategies $\sigma^k$ and $\tau$ is $g^k_{\sigma^k, \tau}(\mu) \geq \prod_{i=1}^{|\mu|} x_k^i = f(x^k, \mu)$. Therefore, the $k$-step non-reachability value is $g^k(\mu) = \sup_{r_j \in \Psi_i} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g^k_{\sigma^k, \tau}(\mu) \geq \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g^k_{\sigma^k, \tau}(\mu) \geq f(x^k, \mu)$.

Symmetrically we can prove the reverse inequality by using the other player as an argument. That is, similarly let $\tau^k$ selects as a first step for each object of type $T_i$ in the initial population
\(\mu = X_0\) the (mixed) optimal strategy in the corresponding zero-sum matrix game \(A_i(x^{k-1})\) (exists by the minimax theorem). Simultaneously and independently the max player chooses moves for the objects, and then rules are picked in order to generate population \(X_1\). Afterwards, the min player acts according to an optimal \(k - 1\)-step strategy \(\tau^k\) (which exists by the inductive hypothesis). As before, \(g^k(\mu)\) can be written as a product of \(|\mu|\) terms, where each term is \(\sum_{\tau}\pi_{\tau}^i(f(x^{k-1},\alpha_{\tau}))\).

Again, by the choice of \(\tau^k\), it follows that the term for each object \(e_j\) of type \(T_i\) is at most \(\text{Val}(A_i(x^{k-1})) = P_i(x^{k-1}) = x_i^k\). Thus, showing that \(\sup_{\sigma}\psi(g^k_{\sigma,\tau^k}(\mu)) \leq f(x^k,\mu)\), and \(g^k(\mu) \leq f(x^k,\mu)\). So, at the end \(g^k(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma}\psi(g^k_{\sigma,\tau^k}(\mu)) = \inf_{\tau}\psi_2 g^k_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) = f(x^k,\mu) = \prod_{i=1}^n(x^k_i)\).

Note that the constructed strategy \(\sigma^k\) (and \(\tau^k\)) is thus optimal for the player maximizing (respectively, minimizing), the probability of not reachability the target type in \(k\) steps. If the initial population consists of a single object of type \(T_i \neq T_f\), then the Lemma states that \(g^k_i = x^*_i\) for all \(k \geq 0\).

Now we continue the proof of Theorem 3.1. We show that the game is determined, i.e., \(g^i(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma}\psi_1 \inf_{\tau}\psi_2 g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) = \inf_{\tau}\psi_1 \sup_{\sigma}\psi_2 g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu)\), and that the game value for the objective of not reaching \(T_f\) is precisely \(f(x^*,\mu)\), where \(x^* = \lim_{k \to \infty} x^k \in [0,1]^n\) is the GFP of the system \(x = P(x)\), which exists by Tarski’s theorem. As a special case, if the initial population \(\mu\) is just a single object of type \(T_i \neq T_f\), we have \(g^i = x^*_i\).

Since the sequence \(x^k\) converges to \(x^*\) monotonically from above (recall \(x^0 = 1\) and the sequence is monotonically non-increasing), then \(f(x^k,\mu)\) converges to \(f(x^*,\mu)\) from above, i.e., for any \(\epsilon > 0\) there is a \(k(\epsilon)\) where \(f(x^k,\mu) \leq f(x^{k(\epsilon)},\mu) < f(x^*,\mu) + \epsilon\). By Lemma 3.2, the min player strategy \(\tau^k\) (as described in the Lemma) achieves the \(k(\epsilon)\)-step value of the game, i.e., \(\sup_{\sigma}\psi_1 g^k_{\sigma,\tau^k}(\mu) = f(x^{k(\epsilon)},\mu) < f(x^*,\mu) + \epsilon\). But for any strategy \(\sigma\), \(g^*_{\sigma,\tau^k}(\mu) \leq g^k_{\sigma,\tau^k}(\mu)\), since the more steps the game takes, the lower the probability of non-reachability is. So it follows that \(\sup_{\sigma}\psi_1 g^*_{\sigma,\tau^k}(\mu) \leq \sup_{\sigma}\psi_1 g^k_{\sigma,\tau^k}(\mu) < f(x^*,\mu) + \epsilon\). And since it holds for every \(\epsilon > 0\), then \(\inf_{\tau}\psi_2 \sup_{\sigma}\psi_1 g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) \leq f(x^*,\mu)\). Thus, by standard facts, \(g^*(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma}\psi_1 \inf_{\tau}\psi_2 g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) \leq \inf_{\tau}\psi_2 \sup_{\sigma}\psi_1 g^*_{\sigma,\tau}(\mu) \leq f(x^*,\mu)\).

To show the reverse inequality, namely \(g^*(\mu) \geq f(x^*,\mu)\), let \(\sigma^*\) be the (mixed) static strategy for the max player (i.e., the player aiming to maximize the probability of not reaching the target type), that for each object of type \(T_i\) always selects the (mixed) optimal strategy in the zero-sum matrix game \(A_i(x^*)\) (which exists by the minimax theorem). Fixing \(\sigma^*\), the BCSG becomes a minimizing BMDP and the min-max-PPS, \(x = P(x)\), becomes a minPPS, \(x = P'(x) = P_{\sigma^*}(x)\). In this new system of equations, for every type \(T_i\) (i.e., variable \(x_i\)), the function on the right-hand side changes from \(P_i(x) = \text{Val}(A_i(x))\) to \(P_i'(x) = \min\{m_b : b \in \Gamma_i\}\), where \(m_b := \sum_{j \in \Gamma_{\max}} \sigma^*(x_i, j) \cdot q_{i,j,b}(x)\).

Hence, \(P'(x) \leq P(x)\) for all \(x \in [0,1]^n\). Thus, if we denote by \(y^k, k \geq 0\) the vectors obtained from the \(k\)-fold application of \(P'(x)\) on the vector \(1\) (i.e., the all-1 vector), then \(y^k \leq x^k\) for all \(k \geq 0\). So it follows that \(y^* \leq x^*\), with \(y^*\) and \(x^*\) being the GFP of \(x = P'(x)\) and \(x = P(x)\), respectively. But since the fixed strategy \(\sigma^*\) is the optimal strategy for the max player with respect to vector \(x^*\) and achieves the value \(P_i(x^*) = \text{Val}(A_i(x^*))\) for all variables, \(x^*\) must also be a fixed point of \(x = P'(x)\) and hence \(x^* = y^*\).

Now consider any strategy \(\tau\) for the min player in the minimizing BMDP. Recall that a minimizing BMDP is a BCSG where in every type the max player has a single available action. Then by the induction step in the proof of Lemma 3.2 it holds that for every \(k \geq 0\), starting in the initial population \(\mu\), the probability of not reaching the target type \(T_f\) in \(k\) steps under strategy \(\tau\) is
at least \( f(y^i, \mu) \). Hence, the infimum probability of \textit{not} reaching the target type (in any number of steps) is at least \( \lim_{k \to \infty} f(y^k, \mu) = f(y^*, \mu) = f(x^*, \mu) \). Therefore, \( \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g_{\sigma^*, \tau}^*(\mu) \geq f(x^*, \mu) \). However, we know that \( g^*(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g_{\sigma^*, \tau}^*(\mu) \geq \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g_{\sigma^*, \tau}^*(\mu) \), which shows the reverse inequality.

We can deduce that \( g^*(\mu) = \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g_{\sigma^*, \tau}^*(\mu) = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} \sup_{\sigma \in \Psi_1} g_{\sigma^*, \tau}^*(\mu) = f(x^*, \mu) = \inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2} g_{\sigma^*, \tau}^*(\mu) \) and \( \sigma^* \) is an optimal (mixed) static strategy for the max player under the non-reachability objective.

Note that the player minimizing the non-reachability probability need not have any optimal strategy, even for a BMDP (see Example 3.2 in [16]).

**Corollary 3.3.** Given a BCSG reachability game, and a probability \( p \in (0, 1) \), deciding whether the game value is \( \geq p \) is in \( \text{PSPACE} \).

The \( \text{PSPACE} \) upper bound follows from Theorem 3.1, by appealing to decision procedures for the (existential) theory of reals to answer quantitative questions about the GFP of the corresponding minimax-PPS equations. This is entirely analogous to very similar arguments in [18, 16, 20], so we do not elaborate. Any substantial improvement on \( \text{PSPACE} \) for such quantitative decision problems would require a major breakthrough on exact numerical computation, even for BPs or BMDPs (see [20, 16, 18]).

## 4 P-time algorithm for deciding reachability value = 0 for BCSGs

In this section we show that there is a \( \text{P-time} \) algorithm for computing the variables \( x_i \) with value \( g_i^* = 1 \) for the GFP in a given minimax-PPS, or in other words, for a given BCSG, deciding whether the value for reaching the target type, starting with an object of a given type \( T_i \), is 0. The algorithm does not take into consideration the actual probabilities on the transitions in the game (i.e., the coefficients of the polynomials), but rather depends only on the structure of the game (respectively, the dependency graph structure of the minimax-PPS) and performs an AND-OR graph reachability analysis. The algorithm is easy, and is very similar to the algorithm given for deciding \( g_i^* = 1 \) for BSSGs in [16].

**Proposition 4.1.** (cf. [16], Proposition 4.1) There is a \( \text{P-time} \) algorithm that given a BCSG \( x = P(x) \), with \( n \) variables and GFP \( g^* \in [0, 1]^n \), and given \( i \in [n] \), decides whether \( g_i^* = 1 \) or \( g_i^* < 1 \). Equivalently, for a given BCSG with non-reachability objective and a starting object of type \( T_i \), it decides whether the non-reachability game value is 1. In the case of \( g_i^* = 1 \), the algorithm produces a deterministic policy (or deterministic static strategy in the BCSG case) \( \sigma \) for the max player (maximizing non-reachability) that forces \( g_i^* = 1 \). Otherwise, if \( g_i^* < 1 \), the algorithm produces a mixed policy \( \tau \) (a mixed static strategy) for the min player (minimizing non-reachability) that guarantees \( g_i^* < 1 \).

**Proof.** Let \( W = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \) denote the set of all variables in the minimax-PPS, \( x = P(x) \). Recall that the dependency graph of \( x = P(x) \) has a directed edge \((x_i, x_j)\) iff variable \( x_i \) depends on variable \( x_j \), i.e., \( x_j \) occurs in \( P_i(x) \). Let us call a variable \( x_i \) \textit{deficient} if \( P_i(x) \) is of form L and \( P_i(1) < 1 \). Let \( Z \subseteq \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \) be the set of deficient variables. The remaining variables \( X = W - Z \) are partitioned, according to their SNF-form equations: \( X = L \cup Q \cup M \).
1. Initialize \( S := Z \).

2. Repeat until no change has occurred:
   
   (a) if there is a variable \( x_i \not\in S \) of form L or Q such that \( P_i(x) \) contains a variable already in \( S \), then add \( x_i \) to \( S \).

   (b) if there is a variable \( x_i \not\in S \) of form M such that for every action \( a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma^i_{\text{max}} \), there exists an action \( a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma^i_{\text{min}} \), such that \( A_i(x)(a_{\text{max}},a_{\text{min}}) \in S \), then add \( x_i \) to \( S \).

3. Output the set \( \bar{S} := \bar{W} - S \).

Figure 1: Simple P-time algorithm for computing the set of types with reachability value 0 in a given BCSG, or equivalently the set of variables \( \{x_i \mid g^*_i = 1\} \) of the associated minimax-PPS.

Figure 1 gives the algorithm. The intuition behind it is as follows: notice that in 2.(b) no matter what strategy the max player chooses in the particular variable (i.e., type in the game), the min player can ensure with positive probability to end up in a successor variable that already is bad for the max player. The resulting winning strategies for players’ corresponding winning sets (it is irrelevant to define strategies in the losing nodes) are: (i) for \( x_i \in S \), the min player’s strategy (mixed static) \( \tau \) selects uniformly at random among the “witness” moves from step 2.(b), and (ii) for \( x_i \not\in S \) the max player’s strategy (deterministic static) \( \sigma \) chooses an action \( a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma^i_{\text{max}} \) that ensures staying within \( S \) no matter what the minimizer’s action (which must exist, otherwise \( x_i \) would have been added to \( S \)).

We need to prove that \( g^*_i < 1 \) iff \( x_i \in S \). First, we show that \( x_i \in S \) implies \( g^*_i < 1 \). Assume \( x_i \in S \) (and therefore \( \tau \) is defined). We analyse by induction, based on the time (iteration) in which variable \( x_i \) was added to \( S \) in the iterative algorithm. For the base case, if \( x_i \) was added at the initial step (i.e., \( x_i \in Z \)), then \( g^*_i \leq P_i(1) < 1 \). For the induction step, if variable \( x_i \) is of type L or Q, then \( g^*_i = P_i(g^*) \) is a linear combination (with positive coefficients whose sum is \( \leq 1 \)) or a quadratic term, containing at least one variable \( x_j \) that was already in \( S \) prior to \( x_i \), and hence, by induction, \( g^*_j < 1 \). Hence, \( g^*_i < 1 \). If \( x_i \) is of form M, then for \( \forall a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma^i_{\text{max}}, \exists a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma^i_{\text{min}} \) such that the corresponding variable \( x(a_{\text{max}},a_{\text{min}}) \in S \) (i.e., \( g^*_i(a_{\text{max}},a_{\text{min}}) < 1 \), and \( \tau \) gives positive probability to all such witnesses \( a_{\text{min}} \). So for any strategy \( \sigma \) that the maximizer picks, \( \Sigma_{a_{\text{min}},a_{\text{max}}} \sigma(x_i,a_{\text{max}})\tau(x_i,a_{\text{min}})g^*_i(a_{\text{max}},a_{\text{min}}) < 1 \). It follows that for any strategy \( \sigma \), \( (g^*_{i,\tau})_i < 1 \), or in other words \( (g^*_{i,\tau})_i < 1 \).

Next, to show that if \( g^*_i < 1 \) then \( x_i \in S \), we show the contrapositive. Assume \( x_i \in \bar{S} \) (and therefore \( \sigma \) is defined). All variables of form \( L \cup Q \) depend only on variables in \( \bar{S} \) (otherwise they would have been added to \( S \)). Moreover, for every \( x_i \) of type M, there is a maximizer action \( a_{\text{max}} \) such that, all variables in row \( a_{\text{max}} \) of the matrix of \( A_i(x) \) are in \( \bar{S} \). If no such action exists, then \( x_i \) would have been added to \( S \) in step 2.(b). Let \( \sigma(x_i) \) choose such an action \( a_{\text{max}} \) deterministically (i.e., with probability 1). In the dependency graph of the resulting minPPS, \( x = P_{\sigma,x}(x) \), there are no edges from \( \bar{S} \) to \( S \): all variables of type \( L, Q \), or \( M \) depend only on \( S \) variables, otherwise they would have been added to \( S \). Moreover, \( \bar{S} \) does not contain any deficient variables. So, \( P_i(1) = 1 \) for every \( x_i \in \bar{S} \), and the all-1 vector is a fixed point for the subsystem of the minPPS, \( x = P_{\sigma,x}(x) \) induced by the variables \( \bar{S} \). In other words, \( (g^*_{i,\sigma})_i = 1 \) (thus \( g^*_i = 1 \)) for all \( x_i \in S \).
5 P-time algorithm for almost-sure reachability for BCSGs

In this section the focus is on the qualitative almost-sure reachability problem, i.e., starting with an object of type $T_i$, decide whether the reachability value is 1 and there exists an optimal strategy to achieve this value for the player aiming to maximize the reachability probability. That is, the algorithm presented here computes a set $F$ of variables (types), such that for any $x_i \in F$, starting from one object of type $T_i$ there is a strategy $\tau$ for the player aiming to reach the target type $T_f^*$, such that no matter what the other player does, almost-surely an object of type $T_f^*$ will be reached. We of course also wish to compute such a strategy if it exists. Before presenting the algorithm, we give some preliminary results based on the results in [16].

Following the definitions introduced in ([16], Section 5), a linear degenerate (LD)-PPS is a PPS where every polynomial $P_i(x)$ is linear, containing no constant term (i.e., $P_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_{ij}x_j$) and where the coefficients $p_{ij}$ sum to 1. Hence, a LD-PPS has for LFP ($q^*$) and GFP ($g^*$) the all-0 and the all-1 vectors, respectively. Furthermore, a PPS that does not contain a linear degenerate bottom strongly-connected component (i.e., a component in the dependency graph that is strongly connected and has no edges going out of it), is called a linear degenerate free (LDF)-PPS. In other words, a LDF-PPS is a PPS that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5.1(ii) below. Given a minimax-PPS $x = P(x)$, a policy $\tau$ for the min player is called LDF if the resulting PPS for all max player policies $\sigma$, namely $x = P_{\sigma,\tau}(x)$, is a LDF-PPS. Having introduced this, now we can reference some known results from [16] and give a concurrent version (Lemma 5.4) of one of the Lemmas from [16].

**Lemma 5.1** (cf. [16], Lemma 5.1). For any PPS, $x = P(x)$, exactly one of the following two cases holds:

(i) $x = P(x)$ contains a linear degenerate bottom strongly-connected component (BSCC), $S$, i.e., $x_S = P_S(x_S)$ is a LD-PPS, and $P_S(x_S) \equiv B_S x_S$, for a stochastic matrix $B_S$.

(ii) every variable $x_i$ either is, or depends (directly or indirectly) on, a variable $x_j$ where $P_j(x)$ has one of the following properties:

1. $P_j(x)$ has a term of degree 2 or more,
2. $P_j(x)$ has a non-zero constant term, i.e., $P_j(0) > 0$ or
3. $P_j(1) < 1$.

**Lemma 5.2** (cf. [16], Lemma 5.2). If a PPS, $x = P(x)$, has either GFP $g^* < 1$, or LFP $q^* > 0$, then $x = P(x)$ is a LDF-PPS.

**Lemma 5.3** (cf. [16], Lemma 5.5). For any LDF-PPS, $x = P(x)$, and $y < 1$, if $P(y) \leq y$ then $y \geq q^*$ and if $P(y) \geq y$, then $y \leq q^*$. In particular, if $q^* < 1$, then $q^*$ is the only fixed-point $q$ of $x = P(x)$ with $q < 1$.

**Lemma 5.4** (cf. [16], Lemma 9.1). For a minimax-PPS, $x = P(x)$, if the GFP $g^* < 1$, then:

1. there exists a (mixed) LDF policy $\tau$ for the min player such that $g^*_{* \tau} < 1$.
2. for any LDF min player’s policy $\tau'$, it holds that $g^* \leq q^*_{* \tau'}$. 

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Proof. For the first point, recall that since \( g^{*} < 1 \), the algorithm from the previous section will return a mixed static strategy (policy) \( \tau \) for the min player such that \( g^{*}_{\sigma,\tau} < 1 \). Thus for all max’s strategies \( \sigma : g^{*}_{\sigma,\tau} \leq \sup_{\pi \in \Psi} g^{*}_{\pi,\tau} = g^{*}_{\pi,\tau} < 1 \). By Lemma 5.2, all PPS’s, \( x = P_{\sigma,\tau}(x) \), are LDF, which results in the policy \( \tau \) being LDF as well.

Showing the second claim, let us fix any LDF policy \( \tau' \) for the min player. Notice that \( g^{*} = P(g^{*}) = \inf_{\sigma} P_{\sigma,\pi}(g^{*}) \leq P_{\sigma,\tau'}(g^{*}) \). In the resulting maxPPS, there exist a strategy \( \sigma \) for the max player such that \( g^{*} \leq P_{\sigma,\tau'}(g^{*}) = P_{\sigma,\tau'}(g^{*}) \). For every variable \( x_{i} \) with \( g^{*}_{i} = \max\{g^{*}_{1}, \ldots, g^{*}_{i} \} \) in the maxPPS, the strategy itself chooses the successor in the dependency graph that maximizes \( g^{*}_{i} \).

Now using Lemma 5.3 with LDF-PPS \( x = P_{\sigma,\tau'}(x) \) and \( y := g^{*} < 1 \), it follows that \( g^{*} \leq q^{*}_{\sigma,\tau'} \leq \sup_{\pi \in \Psi} q^{*}_{\pi,\tau'} = q^{*}_{\pi,\tau'} \).

We now present the algorithm. First, as a preprocessing step, we apply the algorithm of Figure 1, which identifies in P-time all the variables \( x_{i} \) where \( g^{*}_{i} = 1 \). We then remove these variables from the system, substituting the value 1 in their place. We then simplify and reduce the resulting SNF-form minimax-PPS into a reduced form, with GFP \( g^{*} < 1 \). Note that the resulting reduced SNF-form minimax-PPS may contain some variables \( x_{j} \) of form M, whose corresponding matrix \( A_{j}(x) \) has some entries that contain the value 1 rather than a variable (because we substituted 1 for removed variables \( x_{j} \), where \( g^{*}_{j} = 1 \)). Note also that in the reduced SNF-form minimax-PPS each variable \( x_{i} \) of form Q has an associated quadratic equation \( x_{i} = x_{j}x_{k} \), because if one of the variables (say \( x_{k} \)) on the right-hand side was set to 1 during preprocessing, the resulting equation \( x_{i} = x_{j} \) would have been declared to have form L in the reduced minimax-PPS. We henceforth assume that the minimax-PPS is in SNF-form, with \( g^{*} < 1 \), and we let \( X \) be its set of (remaining) variables.

We apply now the algorithm of Figure 2 to the minimax-PPS with \( g^{*} < 1 \), which identifies the variables \( x_{i} \) in the minimax-PPS (equivalently, the types in the BCG), from which we can almost-surely reach the target type \( T_{f}^{*} \) (i.e., \( g^{*}_{i} = 0 \) and there is a strategy \( \tau^{*} \) for the player minimizing non-reachability probability that achieves this value, no matter what the other player does).

**Theorem 5.5.** Given a BCGS with minimax-PPS, \( x = P(x) \), such that the GFP \( g^{*} < 1 \), the algorithm in Figure 2 terminates in polynomial time and returns the following set of variables:

\[ \{x_{i} \in X \mid \exists \tau \in \Psi_{2} (g^{*}_{\pi,\tau})_{i} = 0 \} \]

Proof. First, let us provide some notation and terminology for analyzing the algorithm. The integer \( t \geq 1 \) represents the number of iterations of the main loop of the algorithm, i.e., the number of executions of steps 2 through 7 (inclusive; note that some of these steps are themselves loops). Let \( S_{t} \) denote the set \( S \) inside iteration \( t \) of the algorithm and just before we reach step 3 of the algorithm (in other words, just after the loop in step 2 has finished). Similarly, let \( F_{t} \) denote the set \( F \) just before step 6 in iteration \( t \) of the algorithm. We also define a new set, \( K_{t} \), which doesn’t appear explicitly in the algorithm. Let \( K_{t} := X - (S_{t} \cup F_{t}) \), for every iteration \( t \geq 1 \). The set \( \gamma^{i}_{t} \) in the algorithm denotes a set of moves/actions of the min player at variable \( x_{i} \) (i.e., type \( T_{f}^{*} \)).

We now start the proof of correctness for the algorithm. Clearly, the algorithm terminates, i.e., step 6 eventually gets executed. This is because (due to step 7) each extra iteration of the main loop must add at least one variable to the set \( S \subseteq X \), and variables are never removed from the set \( S \). It also follows easily that the algorithm runs in P-time, since the main loop executes for at most \(|X| \) iterations, and during each such iteration, each nested loop within it also executes
1. Initialize $S := \{ x_i \in X \mid P_i(0) > 0 \}$, that is $P_i(x)$ has a constant term. Let $\gamma_0 := \Gamma_{min}^i$ for every variable $x_i \in X - S$. Let $t := 1$.

2. Repeat until no change has occurred to $S$:
   
   (a) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - S$ of form $L$ where $P_i(x)$ contains a variable already in $S$, then add $x_i$ to $S$.
   
   (b) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - S$ of form $Q$ where both variables in $P_i(x)$ are already in $S$, then add $x_i$ to $S$.
   
   (c) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - S$ of form $M$ and if for all $a_{min} \in \Gamma_{min}^i$, there exists a $a_{max} \in \Gamma_{max}^i$ such that $A_i(x)(a_{max},a_{min}) \in S \cup \{1\}$, then add $x_i$ to $S$.

3. For each $x_i \in X - S$ of form $M$, let:
   
   $\gamma_t := \{ a_{min} \in \gamma_{t-1} \mid \forall a_{max} \in \Gamma_{max}^i, A_i(x)(a_{max},a_{min}) \notin S \cup \{1\} \}$. (Note that $\gamma_t \subseteq \gamma_{t-1}$.)

4. Let $F := \{ x_i \in X - S \mid P_i(1) < 1 $, or $P_i(x)$ is of form $Q \}$

5. Repeat until no change has occurred to $F$:
   
   (a) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - (S \cup F)$ of form $L$ where $P_i(x)$ contains a variable already in $F$, then add $x_i$ to $F$.
   
   (b) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - (S \cup F)$ of form $M$ such that for $\forall a_{max} \in \Gamma_{max}^i$, there is a min player’s action $a_{min} \in \gamma_t^i$ such that $A_i(x)(a_{max},a_{min}) \notin F$, then add $x_i$ to $F$.

6. If $X = S \cup F$, return $F$, and halt.

7. Else, let $S := X - F$, $t := t + 1$, and go to step 2.

Figure 2: P-time algorithm for computing almost-sure reachability types $\{ x_i \mid \exists \tau \in \Psi_2 (g_{*,\tau}^i) = 0 \}$ for a minimax-PPS (in SNF), associated with a given BCSG.

at most $|X|$ iterations. So, the proof of correctness requires us to show that when the algorithm halts, the set $F$ is indeed the winning set for the minimizer (i.e., the player that aims to minimize the non-reachability probability). That is, we need to show that for all $x_i \in F$ there exists a (not-necessarily static) strategy $\tau$ for the minimizing player such that $(g_{*,\tau}^i)i = 0$, i.e., regardless of what strategy $\sigma$ the maximizer plays again $\tau$ the probability of not reaching the target is 0. On the other hand, if $x_i \in S$, we need to show that there is no such strategy $\tau$ for the minimizer that forces $(g_{*,\tau}^i)i = 0$. In fact, we will show that for all $x_i \in S$ the following stronger property $(**)_i$ holds:

$(**)_i$: There is a strategy $\sigma$ for the maximizing player, such that for any strategy $\tau$ of the minimizing player $(g_{\sigma,\tau}^i)i > 0$; in other words, starting with one object of type $T_i$, using strategy pair $\sigma$ and $\tau$, there is a positive probability of never reaching the target type.

Note that property $(**)_i$ does not rule out that $g_{*,\tau}^i = 0$, because even if $(**)_i$ holds it is possible that $\inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2(g_{\sigma,\tau}^i)i} = 0$.

First, let us show that if variable $x_i \in S$ when the algorithm terminates, then $(**)_i$ holds. To
show this, we use induction on the “time” when a variables is added to \( S \). That is, if all variables \( x_j \) added to \( S \) in previous steps and previous iterations satisfy \((**)_j\), then if a new variable \( x_i \) is added to \( S \), it must also satisfy \((**)_i\). In the process of proving this, we shall in fact construct a single non-static randomized strategy \( \sigma \) for the max player that ensures that for all \( x_i \in S \), regardless what strategy \( \tau \) the min player plays against \( \sigma \), the probability of not reaching the target starting at one object of type \( T_i \) is positive.

Consider the initial set \( S \) of variables \( \{x_i \in X \mid P_i(0) > 0\} \) that \( S \) is initialized to in Step (1.) of the algorithm. Clearly all these variables satisfy \( g_i^* \geq P_i(0) > 0 \). Thus, for these variables assertion \((**)_i\) holds using any strategy \( \sigma \) for the maximizer. Next consider a variable \( x_i \) added to \( S \) inside the loop in step (2.) of the algorithm, during some iteration.

(i) If \( x_i = P_i(x) \) is of form \( L \), then \( P_i(x) \) contains a variable \( x_j \) (with a positive coefficient), that was added previously to \( S \), and hence \((**)_j\) holds. Thus there is a positive probability that one object of type \( T_i \) will produce one object of type \( T_j \) in the next generation. It thus follows that \((**)_i\) holds, by using the same strategy \( \sigma \in \Psi_1 \) that witnesses the fact that \((**)_j\) holds.

(ii) If \( x_i = P_i(x) \) is of form \( Q \) (i.e., \( x_i = x_j \cdot x_r \)), then \( P_i(x) \) has both variables already added to \( S \), i.e., \((**)_j \) and \((**)_r \), both hold. Then \((**)_i \) also holds, because starting from any object of type \( T_i \), the next generation necessarily contains one object of type \( T_j \) and one object of type \( T_r \), and thus by combining the two witness strategies for \((**)_j \) and \((**)_r \), we have a strategy \( \sigma \in \Psi_1 \) that, starting from one object of type \( T_i \), will ensure positive probability of not reaching the target, regardless of the strategy \( \tau \in \Psi_2 \) of the minimizer.

(iii) If \( x_i = P_i(x) \) is of form \( M \), then \( \forall a_{min} \in \Gamma^i_{min}, \exists a_{max} \in \Gamma^i_{max} \) such that \( A_i(x)(a_{max}, a_{min}) \in S \cup \{1\} \). In this case, let us define the strategy \( \sigma \) to behave as follows at any object of type \( T_i \): for each \( a_{min} \in \Gamma^i_{min} \), we designate one “witness” \( a_{max}[a_{min}] \in \Gamma^i_{max} \), which witnesses that \( A_i(x)(a_{max}[a_{min}], a_{min}) \in S \cup \{1\} \). Then, at any object of type \( T_i \), \( \sigma \) chooses uniformly at random among the witnesses \( a_{max}[a_{min}] \) for all \( a_{min} \in \Gamma^i_{min} \). So, starting with one object of type \( T_i \), no matter what strategy the min player chooses, there is a positive probability that in the next step that object will either not produce any offspring (in the case where \( A_i(x)(a_{max}[a_{min}], a_{min}) = 1 \)) and hence not reach the target, or else will generate a single successor object of type \( T(a_{max}[a_{min}], a_{min}) \), associated with variable \( x(a_{max}[a_{min}], a_{min}) \) that already belongs to \( S \), and hence such that \((**)_j\) holds. Hence, by combining with the strategies that witness such \((**)_j\) with the local (static) behavior of \( \sigma \) described for any object of type \( T_i \), we obtain a strategy \( \sigma \) that witnesses the fact that \((**)_i\) holds.

Now consider any variable \( x_i \) that is added to \( S \) in step (7.) of some iteration \( t \), in other words any variable \( x_i \in K_t \). Since all variables in \( K_t \) were not added to \( S_t \) or \( F_t \) during iteration \( t \), we must have that: (A.) \( x_i \) satisfies \( P_i(1) = 1 \) and \( P_i(0) = 0 \); (B.) \( x_i \) is not of \( Q \) type; (C.) if \( x_i \) is of form \( L \), then it depends directly only on variables in \( K_t \); and (D.) if \( x_i \) is of form \( M \), then

\[
\exists a_{max} \in \Gamma^i_{max} \text{ such that } \forall a_{min} \in \gamma^i_t, A_i(x)(a_{max}, a_{min}) \notin (F_t \cup S_t \cup \{1\}).
\] (2)

Let \( (q_h)_{h=0}^{\infty}, h \in \mathbb{N} \) be the infinite sequence of increasing probabilities defined by: \( q_h = 2^{-(1/2^h)} \). Note that as \( h \to \infty \), the probability \( q_h \) approaches 1 from below.

Given a finite history \( H \) of height \( h \) (meaning the depth of the forest that the history represents is \( h \)), for any object \( e \) in the current generation (the leaves) of \( H \), if the object \( e \) has type \( T_i \) such
that the associated variable $x_i \in K_i$, we shall construct the strategy $\sigma$ to behave as follows starting at the object $e$. The strategy $\sigma$ will choose one action $a_{\text{max}}$ that “witnesses” the statement (2) above, and will place probability $q_h$ on that action, and it will distribute the remaining probability $1 - q_h$ uniformly among all actions in $\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i$. We claim that this strategy $\sigma$ ensures that for any object $e$ of type $T_i$ such that $x_i \in K_i$, irrespective of the strategy of the minimizing player, the probability of not reaching the target type $T_{f^*}$ starting with $e$ (at any point in history) is positive. This clearly implies that $(g^{a_{\text{max}}})_{K_i} > 0$. To prove this, there are two cases here:

1. First, suppose that during the entire play of the game, at all objects $e$ whose type $T_i$ such that $x_i \in K_i$ has form $M$, the min player only uses actions belonging to $\gamma_i^t$. Then in the resulting history of play there can not be any such object $e$ whose child in the history (a necessarily unique child, since $e$ has type $M$) is an object $e'$ of a type in $S_i$ (this is because step (3.) of the algorithm, which defines $\gamma_i^t$, ensures that actions for the min player in $\gamma_i^t$ can not possibly produce a child in $S_i$, no matter what the max player does). Furthermore, such an object $e$, occurring at depth $h$ in history, must with positive probability $\geq q_h$, produce a child $e'$ with a type in $K_i$ (because of point (D.) above, and because of the fact that the max player plays at $e$ a witness $a_{\text{max}}$ to the statement (2) with probability $\geq q_h$).

So consider an object $e$ of some type in $K_i$, that occurs in a history $H$ at height $h \geq 0$, and consider the tree of descendants of $e$. What is the probability, under the strategy $\sigma$, and under any strategy $\tau$ for the min player whose moves are confined to the sets specified by $\gamma_i$, that the “tree” of descendants of $e$ is just a “line” consisting of an infinite sequence of objects $e_0 = e, e_1, e_2, \ldots$, all of which have types contained in $K_i$? This probability is clearly

$$\prod_{d=h}^{\infty} q_d = \prod_{d=h}^{\infty} 2^{-(1/2)^d} \geq \prod_{d=0}^{\infty} 2^{-(1/2)^d} = 2^{-\sum_{d=0}^{\infty} (1/2)^d} = 2^{-2} = \frac{1}{4}$$

That is, irrespective of what strategy $\tau$ is played by the minimizer, there is positive probability bounded away from 0 (indeed, $\geq 1/4$) of staying forever confined in objects having types in $K_i$. In such a case, clearly, there will be positive probability of not reaching the target type (since the types in $K_i$ are not the target type).

2. Next suppose that, on the other hand, there is a history $H$ of some height $h$ and a leaf $e$ of $H$ that has type $T_i$ where $x_i \in K_i$, such that the min player’s strategy $\tau$ plays at object $e$ some action(s) outside of the set $\gamma_i^t$ with positive probability. Note that for all actions $a_{\text{min}} \not\in \gamma_i^t$, there is a max player’s action $a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i$ such that $A_i(x(a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}})) \in S_i \cup \{1\}$. Note moreover that the strategy $\sigma$ assigns positive probability, at least $(1 - q_h)/|\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|$ to every action in $\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i$. Thus, if the min player’s strategy $\tau$ puts positive probability $\tau(H, e, a_{\text{min}}) > 0$ on some action $a_{\text{min}} \not\in \gamma_i^t$, then with probability $\geq (\max_{a_{\text{min}} \not\in \gamma_i^t} \tau(H, e, a_{\text{min}})) \cdot \frac{(1 - q_h)}{|\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|}$, either the object $e$ will have no child (since we can have $A_i(x(a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}})) = 1$), or the only child of object $e$ in the history will be an object $e'$ whose type is in the set $S_i$, from which we already know that the target type $T_{f^*}$ is not reached with positive probability. So in either case, with positive probability the target type $T_{f^*}$ will not be reached from descendants of $e$.

Now, let us assume the max player uses this strategy $\sigma$, and suppose we start play at one object $e'$ of type $T_i$ such that $x_i \in K_i$. Suppose, first, that during the entire history of play the min player’s strategy $\tau$ uses only actions in $\gamma_i^t$ for all variables $x_i \in K_i$ of form $M$. In this case, with
positive probability bounded away from 0 (in fact $\geq 1/4$), the play tree after $k$ rounds (i.e., depth $k$), for any positive $k \geq 1$, consists of simply a linear sequence of objects having types in $K_t$. Thus in this case, with probability $\geq 1/4$, the play will forever stay in $K_t$, and will never reach target type $T_f$. On the other hand, suppose the min player’s strategy $\tau$ does at some point in some history consisting entirely of a linear sequence of objects of types in $K_t$, namely at some specific object $e$ of type $K_t$ at depth $h$, plays an action outside of $\gamma^i_t$ with positive probability. Then $\sigma$ ensures that with positive probability (albeit a probability depending on $h$ and thus not bounded away from 0) either $e$ will have no child or the unique child of $e$ will be an object of type $T_j$ such that $x_j \in S_t$, i.e., there is a positive probability of not reaching the target $T_f$, from the descendants of $e$, and thus also from the start of the game (because we assumed the play staring from $e'$ and up to $e$ consists of a linear sequence of objects all having types in $K_t$). Thus, for all strategies $\tau \in \Psi_2$, and all $x_i \in K_t$, $(g^{x_i}_\sigma,\tau)_i > 0$. Note however, that in general it may be the case that $\inf_{\tau}(g^{x_i}_\sigma,\tau)_i = 0$, because in the case when $\tau$ does play outside of $\gamma^i_t$, the probability of not hitting the target type is not bounded away from 0 (it depends both on the depth $h$ at which $\tau$ first moves outside of $\gamma^i_t$ with positive probability, and it also depends on the probability of that move, and for both reasons it can be arbitrarily close to 0). This establishes the first part of the proof, i.e., that for every $x_i \in S$ the property $(**)_i$ holds.

Now we proceed to the second part of the proof. Suppose $F$ is the set of variables output by the algorithm when it halts (and that therefore $S = X - F$). Suppose the algorithm executed exactly $t^*$ iterations of the main loop before halting (so that the value of $t$ just before halting is $t^*$). We will show that there is a (randomized non-static) strategy $\tau$ of the minimizing player such that, for all $x_i \in F$, regardless what strategy $\sigma$ the maximizer employs, starting with on object of type $T_i$, the probability of not reaching the target type is 0. In other words, that $(g^{x_i}_*,\tau)_i = 0$, which is what we want to prove.

Before describing $\tau$, we first describe a static randomized strategy (i.e., a policy) $\tau^*$ for the minimizing player, that will eventually lead us toward a definition of $\tau$.

Specifically, we define the policy (randomized static strategy) $\tau^*$ as follows. Let $\tau'$ be any LDF policy such that $g^{x_i}_{*,\tau'} < 1$. Such an LDF policy $\tau'$ must exist, by Lemma 5.4(1.). For all variables $x_i \in S$, let $\tau^*(x_i) := \tau'(x_i)$. In other words, at all variables $x_i \in S$, let $\tau^*$ behave according to the exact same distribution on actions as the LDF policy $\tau'$. For every variable $x_i \in F$ of form $M$, define $\tau^*$ as follows: note that $x_i$ must have entered $F$ in some iteration of the inner loop in step (5.) of the algorithm, during the final iteration $t^*$ of the main loop. Therefore, for all $a_{\max} \in \Gamma^i_{\max}$, there exists a “witness” action $a_{\min}[a_{\max}] \in \gamma^i_t$, such that the associated variable $A_i(x_i a_{\max}, a_{\min}[a_{\max}])$ was already in $F$, before $x_i$ was added to $F$. For $x_i \in F$ we define the policy $\tau^*$ at variable $x_i$, i.e., the distribution $\tau^*(x_i)$, to be the uniform distribution over the set $\{a_{\min}[a_{\max}] \in \gamma^i_t \mid a_{\max} \in \Gamma^i_{\max}\}$ of such “witnesses”.

We now wish to show that $\tau^*$, as defined, is itself an LDF policy. Consider any fixed policy (i.e., static randomized strategy) $\sigma$ for the max player, and consider the resulting system of polynomial equations $x = P_{\sigma,\tau^*}(x)$. For every variable $x_i \in F$, consider the variables $x_i$ depends on directly in the equation $x_i = (P_{\sigma,\tau^*}(x))_i$. Let’s consider separately the cases, based on the form of equation $x_i = P_i(x)$: (1) if $x_i = P_l(x)$ is of form $L$, then in $x_i = (P_{\sigma,\tau^*}(x))_i$ the variable $x_i$ depends directly only on variables in $F$, because it would have been added to set $S$; (2) if $x_i$ is of form $M$, then again it depends directly only on variables in $F$, because $\tau^*(x_i)$ only puts positive probability on actions in $\gamma^i_t$; (3) if $x_i$ is of form $Q$, then $x_i$ depends directly on at least one variable in $F$, because otherwise it would have been added to $S$. This implies that, in the dependency graph of
\[ x = P_{\sigma, \tau^*}(x), \] every variable in \( F \) satisfies one of the three conditions in Lemma 5.1(ii) (namely, 1. or 3.). So for every variable \( x_i \in X \), consider paths in the dependency graph of \( x = P_{\sigma, \tau^*}(x) \) starting at \( x_i \):

- either there exists a path from \( x_i \) in this dependency graph to variable \( x_j \in F \), which in turn must have a path to a variable \( x_{j'} \) such that either \( P_{j'}(1) < 1 \), or \( x_{j'} \) has form \( Q \). In either case, this means that \( x_i \) satisfies one of the conditions of Lemma 5.1(ii) (namely, either condition (1.) or condition (3.)); Or

- all paths from \( x_i \) only contain variables in \( S \). But for all variables \( x_k \in S \), \( \tau^*(x_k) \) is exactly the same distribution as \( \tau'(x_k) \), and since the LDF policy \( \tau' \) was chosen so that \( g_{\tau^*, \tau'}^* < 1 \), this means that there is a path from \( x_i \) to a variable \( x_j \) satisfying one of the three conditions in Lemma 5.1(ii) (specifically, condition (3.)).

Therefore, \( x = P_{\sigma, \tau^*}(x) \) is a LDF-PPS. But since the fixed strategy \( \sigma \) was arbitrary, this implies that \( \tau^* \) is indeed an LDF policy. Since \( \tau^* \) is LDF, by Lemma 5.4(2.), it holds that \( g^* \leq g_{\tau^*, \tau'}^* \).

We now construct a non-static strategy \( \tau \), which combines the behavior of the two policies (i.e., two static strategies) \( \tau' \) and \( \tau^* \) in a suitable way, such that for all \( x_i \in F \), \( (g^*_{\tau^*, \tau'}): = 0 \). In other words, \( \tau \) will be a strategy for the minimizer such that, no matter what strategy \( \sigma \) the maximizer uses starting with one object of type \( T_i \), the probability of not reaching the target type is 0.

The non-static strategy \( \tau \) is defined as follows. The strategy \( \tau \) will, in each generation, declare one object in the current generation to be the “queen” (and this object will always have a type in \( F \)). Other objects in each generation will be “workers”. Assume play starts at a single object \( e \) of some type \( T_i \) such that \( x_i \in F \). We declare this object the “queen” in the initial population. If the queen \( e \) has associated variable \( x_i \) of form \( M \), then \( \tau \) plays at \( e \) according to distribution \( \tau^*(x_i) \). This results, (with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the maximizer, in some successor object \( e' \) in the next generation of type \( T_j \) such that \( x_j \in F \). In this case, we declare \( e' \) the queen in the next generation, and we apply the same strategy \( \tau \) starting at the queen \( e' \) of the next generation, as if the game is starting at this single object \( e' \) of type \( T_j \). If the variable \( x_i \) associated with the queen \( e \) is of form \( L \), then in the next generation either we hit the target (with probability \( (1 - P_i(1)) \), or (with probability \( P_i(1) \)) we generate a single successor object \( e' \) of some type \( T_j \) such that \( x_j \in F \). In this latter case again, we declare \( e' \) the queen of the next generation, and we use the same strategy \( \tau \) that is being defined, and apply it to \( e' \) as if the game is starting with the single object \( e' \). If the queen \( e \) has associated variable \( x_i \) of form \( Q \), then in the next generation there are two successor objects, \( e' \) and \( e'' \) of types \( T_j \) and \( T_k \) respectively (these may be the same type), such that either \( x_j \in F \) or \( x_k \in F \), or both are in \( F \). In this case, we choose one of the two successors whose type is in \( F \), say wlog that this is \( e' \), and we declare \( e' \) the queen of the next generation, we proceed from \( e' \) using the same strategy \( \tau \) that is being defined, as if the game starts with the single object \( e' \). However, we declare the other object \( e'' \) a “worker”, and starting with \( e'' \) and thereafter (in the entire subtree of play rooted at \( e'' \)) we use the static strategy \( \tau' \) (i.e., the LDF policy) \( \tau' \). This completes the definition of the non-static strategy \( \tau \).

We now show that indeed \( \tau \) satisfies that, no matter what strategy \( \sigma \) the maximizer uses against it, for any \( x_i \in F \), starting with one object of type \( T_i \), the probability of not reaching the target type is 0. In other words, we show that using \( \tau \) the probability of reaching the target type is 1, no matter what the opponent does.

To see this, first note that the LDF policy \( \tau' \) was chosen so that \( g_{\tau^*, \tau'}^* < 1 \). Thus, since in the resulting max-PPS \( x = P_{\sigma, \tau'}(x) \) the player maximizing non-reachability probability always has a static optimal strategy (by Theorem 3.1), it follows that the subtree of the play rooted at
any “worker” object $e''$ starting at which strategy $\tau'$ is applied by the min player, has positive probability $(1 - g^*_{e'',\tau'})_i > 0$ of eventually reaching the target type.

Next note that the sequence of queens is finite if and only if we have hit the target. Next, we establish that if the sequence of queens is infinite, then, with probability 1, infinitely often the queen is of type Q and thus in the next generation it generates both a queen and a worker. Thus, because of the infinite sequence of workers generated by queens, there will be infinitely many independent chances of hitting the target with probability at least $\min_i(1 - g^*_{e,\tau'})_i$. Hence, we will hit the target (somewhere in the entire tree of play) with probability 1.

It remains to show that, if the sequence of queens is infinite, then, with probability 1, infinitely often a queen is of type Q. We in fact claim that with positive probability bounded away from 0, within $n$ generations either we reach a queen of type Q, or the queen has the target as a child. To see this, we note that each type $x_i \in F$ has entered $F$ in some iteration of the loop in step (5.) of the algorithm (in the last iteration of the main loop). We can thus define inductively, for each variable $x_i \in F$, a finite tree $R_i$, rooted at $x_i$, which shows “why” $x_i$ was added to $F$. Specifically, if $P_i(1) < 1$ or $x_i$ has form Q, then $R_i$ consists of just a single node (leaf) labeled by $x_i$. If $x_i$ has form L, then it was added in step (5.) because $P_i(x)$ has a variable $x_j$ that was already in $F$. In this case, the tree $R_i$ has an edge from the root, labeled by $x_i$, to a single node labeled by $x_j$, such that this child is the root of a subtree $R_j$. If $x_i$ has form M then $R_i$ has a root labeled by $x_i$ and has children labeled by all variables $x_{(a_{\max},a_{\min}[a_{\max}]]) \in F}$, and have $R_i((a_{\max},a_{\min}[a_{\max}]])$ as a subtree, where $a_{\max} \in \Gamma_{\max}$ and where $a_{\min}[a_{\max}] \in \gamma^t_{\max}$, is the “witness” for $a_{\max}$, in the condition that allows step 5.(b) of the algorithm to add $x_i$ to $F$.

Clearly the tree $R_i$ is finite and has depth at most $n$ (since there are only $n$ variables, and there is a strict order in which the variables entered the set $F$).

Now we argue that starting at a queen of type $T_i$, using strategy $\tau$ for the minimizing player, with positive probability bounded away from 0 in the next $n$ steps the sequence of queens will follow a root-to-leaf path in $R_i$, regardless of the strategy of the max player. To see this, note that if a node is labeled by $x_j$ is of form L, then the play will in the next step, with probability associated with the transition in the BCSG move to the unique child (the new queen) $x_j'$ that is the immediate child of the root in $R_j$, and thus next will be at the root of the subtree $R_j'$. If the node is labeled by $x_j$ of form M, then irrespective of the distribution on actions played by the max player, in the next step with positive probability bounded away from 0, we will move to a child $x_{(a_{\max},a_{\min}[a_{\max}]]) \in F}$, which is a child of the root in $R_j$, itself rooted at a subtree $R_j((a_{\max},a_{\min}[a_{\max}]])$, because at queen objects we are using $\tau^*$ for the minimizer. Thus, starting at a queen $x_i$, with positive probability bounded away from 0, within $n$ steps the play arrives a leaf of the tree $R_i$. If the leaf corresponds to a variable $x_j$ with $P_j(1) < 1$, then the process will reach in the next step the target type with positive probability bounded away from 0. If, on the other hand, the leaf corresponds to a variable $x_j$ of form Q, then the queen generates two children. The probability that the queen reaches infinitely often a leaf of type L with $P_j(1) < 1$ but does not reach the target is 0. Thus, if the queen never reaches the target throughout the play, then the queen will generate more than one child infinitely often with probability 1, and hence will generate infinitely many independent workers with probability 1. By the choice of the policy $\tau^*$ followed by workers, the subtree rooted at each worker will hit the target with positive probability bounded away from 0. Hence, the probability of hitting the target type is 1. This completes the proof of the theorem. □
Corollary 5.6. Let $F$ be the set of variables output by the algorithm in Figure 2.

1. Let $S = X - F$. There is a randomized non-static strategy $\sigma$ for the max player (maximizing non-reachability) such that for all $x_i \in S$, and for all strategies $\tau$ of the min player (minimizing non-reachability), starting with one object of type $T_i$, the probability of reaching the target type is $< 1$.

2. There is a randomized non-static strategy $\tau$ for the min player (minimizing non-reachability), such that for all strategies $\sigma$ of the max player (maximizing non-reachability), and for all $x_i \in F$, starting at one object of type $T_i$ the probability of reaching the target type is $1$.

Proof. 1. The strategy $\sigma$ constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5 for variables $x_i \in S$ achieves precisely this.

2. The strategy $\tau$ constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5 for all variables $x_i \in F$ achieves precisely this. \qed

Remark: Neither the strategy $\sigma$ from Corollary 1, nor the strategy $\tau$ from 2, both of which were constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.5, are static strategies. However, we note that both of these non-static randomized strategies have suitable compact descriptions (as functions that map finite histories to distributions over actions for objects in the current populations), and that both these strategies can be constructed and described compactly in polynomial time, as a function of the encoding size of the input BCSG.

6 P-time algorithm for limit-sure reachability for BCSGs

In this section, we focus on the qualitative limit-sure reachability problem, i.e., starting with one object of a type $T_i$, decide whether the reachability value is 1. Recall that there may not exist an optimal strategy for the player aiming to reach the target $T_{f^*}$, which was the question in the previous section (almost-sure reachability). However, there may nevertheless be a sequence of strategies that achieve values arbitrarily close to 1 (limit sure reachability), and the question of the existence of such a sequence is what we address in this section. Since we translate reachability into non-reachability when analysing the corresponding minimax-PPS, we are asking whether there exists a sequence of strategies $\langle \tau^*_j \mid j \in \mathbb{N} \rangle$ for the min player, such that $\forall j \in \mathbb{N}, \epsilon_j > \epsilon_{j+1} > 0$, and where $\lim_{j \to \infty} \epsilon_j = 0$, such that the strategy $\tau^*_j$ forces non-reachability probability to be at most $\epsilon_j$, regardless of the strategy $\sigma$ used by the max player. In other words, for a given starting object of type $T_i$, we ask whether $\inf_{\tau \in \Psi_2(g_{i, \tau}^*)} = 0$.

Again, as in the almost-sure case, we first, as a preprocessing step, use the P-time algorithm from Proposition 4.1 to remove all variables $x_i$ such that $g_i^* = 1$, and we substitute 1 for these variables in the remaining equations. We hence obtain a reduced SNF-form minimax-PPS, for which we can assume $g^* < 1$. The set of all remaining variables in the SNF-form minimax-PPS is again denoted by $X$. Thereafter, we apply the algorithm in Figure 3, which computes the set of variables, $x_i$, such that $g_i^* = 0$. In other words, we compute the set of types, such that starting from one object of that type the value of the reachability game is 1. Before considering the algorithm in

---

\[5\text{However, it is worth pointing out that the functions that these strategies compute, i.e., functions from histories to distributions, need not themselves be polynomial-time as a function of the encoding size of the history: this is because the probabilities on actions that are involved can be double-exponentially small (and double-exponentially close to 1), as a function of the size of the history.}\]
1. Initialize $S := \{ x_i \in X \mid P_i(0) > 0 \}$, that is $P_i(x)$ has a constant term.

2. Repeat until no change has occurred to $S$:

   (a) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - S$ of form $L$ where $P_i(x)$ contains a variable already in $S$, then add $x_i$ to $S$.

   (b) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - S$ of form $Q$ where both variables in $P_i(x)$ are already in $S$, then add $x_i$ to $S$.

   (c) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - S$ of form $M$ and if for all $a_{min} \in \Gamma^i_{min}$, there exists $a_{max} \in \Gamma^i_{max}$ such that $A_i(x)_{(a_{max},a_{min})} \in S \cup \{1\}$, then add $x_i$ to $S$.

3. Let $F := \{ x_i \in X - S \mid P_i(1) < 1, \text{ or } P_i(x) \text{ is of form } Q \}$

4. Repeat until no change has occurred to $F$:

   (a) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - (S \cup F)$ of form $L$ where $P_i(x)$ contains a variable already in $F$, then add $x_i$ to $F$.

   (b) if there is a variable $x_i \in X - (S \cup F)$ of form $M$ and if the following procedure returns “Yes”, then add $x_i$ to $F$.

      i. Set $L_0 := \emptyset$, $B_0 := \emptyset$, $k := 0$. Let $O := X - (S \cup F)$.

      ii. Repeat:

         - $k := k + 1$.
         - $L_k := \{ a_{min} \in \Gamma^i_{min} \cup \bigcup_{j=0}^{k-1} L_j \mid \forall a_{max} \in \Gamma^i_{max} - B_{k-1} \land A_i(x)_{(a_{max},a_{min})} \in F \cup O \}$.
         - $B_k := B_{k-1} \cup \{ a_{max} \in \Gamma^i_{max} - B_{k-1} \mid \exists a_{min} \in L_k \land A_i(x)_{(a_{max},a_{min})} \in F \}$.

      Until $B_k = B_{k-1}$.

      iii. Return: “Yes” if $B_k = \Gamma^i_{max}$, and “No” otherwise.

5. If $X = S \cup F$, return $F$, and halt.


Figure 3: P-time algorithm for computing the types that satisfy limit-sure reachability in a given BCSG, i.e., the set of variables $\{ x_i \mid g_1^i = 0 \}$ in the associated minimax-PPS.

Figure 3 in detail, we provide some preliminary results that will be used to prove its correctness. More precisely, we first examine the nested loop in step 4.(b) of the algorithm. This inner loop is derived directly from a closely related “limit-escape” construction used by de Alfaro, Henzinger, and Kupferman in [1]. For completeness, we provide proofs here for the facts we need about this construction.

For a variable $x_i$ of form $M$, for 1-step local strategies $\sigma(x_i)$ and $\tau(x_i)$ at $x_i$ for the two players (i.e., $\sigma(x_i)$ and $\tau(x_i)$ are distributions on $\Gamma^i_{max}$ and $\Gamma^i_{min}$, respectively), and for a set $W \subseteq X \cup \{1\}$ which can include both variables and possibly also the constant 1, let us define:

$$p(x_i \rightarrow W, \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) = \sum_{\{(a_{max},a_{min}) \in \Gamma^i_{max} \times \Gamma^i_{min} \mid A_i(x)_{(a_{max},a_{min})} \in W\}} \sigma(x_i)(a_{max}) \cdot \tau(x_i)(a_{min})$$
Thus \( p(x_i \rightarrow W, \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) \) denotes the probability that, starting with one object of type \( T_i \), and using the 1-step strategies specified by \( \sigma(x_i) \) and \( \tau(x_i) \), we will either generate a child object of type \( T_j \) such that \( x_j \in W \), or (only if \( 1 \in W \)) generate no child object (i.e., go extinct in the next generation).

Assume that in step 4.(b) for a variable \( x_i \) the loop stops at some iteration \( m \) (i.e., \( B_{m-1} = B_m \)), but \( B_m \subset \Gamma^i_{\text{max}} \), and hence step 4.(b) answers “No”, and \( x_i \) is not added to \( F \). In such a case, let us define the following 1-step strategy, \( \sigma(x_i) \) for the max player which will be used in the next lemma. Let \( D^i_{\text{max}} := \Gamma^i_{\text{max}} - B_m \). Let

\[
\sigma(x_i)(a_{\text{max}}) := \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{|D^i_{\text{max}}|} & \text{for every } a_{\text{max}} \in D^i_{\text{max}} \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \tag{3}
\]

**Lemma 6.1.** Suppose that for a variable \( x_i \in X - (S \cup F) \) the answer in step 4.(b) of the algorithm is “No”, and let \( \sigma(x_i) \) be defined as in (3). Then, there is a constant \( c_i > 0 \) such that for every local 1-step strategy \( \tau(x_i) \) for the min player at \( x_i \), the following inequality holds:

\[
p(x_i \rightarrow S \cup \{1\}, \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) \geq c_i * p(x_i \rightarrow (F \cup S \cup \{1\}), \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i))
\]

**Proof.** Suppose the loop from step 4.(b) stops at iteration \( m \), such that \( B_{m-1} = B_m \subset \Gamma^i_{\text{max}} \). There are two possibilities:

1. \( L_m = \emptyset \): That is, for every \( a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma^i_{\text{min}} - \bigcup_{q=0}^{m-1} L_q \), there exists \( a_{\text{max}} \in D^i_{\text{max}} = \Gamma^i_{\text{max}} - B_{m-1} \) such that \( A_i(x)(a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}) \in S \cup \{1\} \). Let \( \tau(x_i) \) be an arbitrary 1-step strategy for the min player and let \( \sigma(x_i) \) be as defined in (3). Also let \( D^i_{\text{min}} := \Gamma^i_{\text{min}} - \bigcup_{q=0}^{m-1} L_q \). Then it follows that:

\[
p(x_i \rightarrow S \cup \{1\}, \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) \geq \sum_{a_{\text{min}} \in D^i_{\text{min}}} \frac{1}{|D^i_{\text{max}}|} \tau(x_i)(a_{\text{min}}) = \frac{1}{|D^i_{\text{max}}|} \sum_{a_{\text{min}} \in D^i_{\text{min}}} \tau(x_i)(a_{\text{min}}) \tag{4}
\]

Note that, by construction, for all \( a_{\text{max}} \in D^i_{\text{max}} \) and \( a_{\text{min}} \in \bigcup_{q=0}^{m-1} L_q \), \( A_i(x)(a_{\text{max}}, a_{\text{min}}) \in O \). Hence, since the support of distribution \( \sigma(x_i) \) is \( D^i_{\text{max}} \), and since \( D^i_{\text{min}} = \Gamma^i_{\text{min}} - \bigcup_{q=0}^{m-1} L_q \), we have

\[
p(x_i \rightarrow (F \cup S \cup \{1\}), \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) \leq \sum_{a_{\text{min}} \in D^i_{\text{min}}} \tau(x_i)(a_{\text{min}}) \tag{5}
\]

Combining these bounds, we get:

\[
p(x_i \rightarrow S \cup \{1\}, \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) \geq \frac{1}{|D^i_{\text{max}}|} \sum_{a_{\text{min}} \in D^i_{\text{min}}} \tau(x_i)(a_{\text{min}}) \geq \frac{1}{|D^i_{\text{max}}|} p(x_i \rightarrow (F \cup S \cup \{1\}), \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i))
\]
2. \( L_m \neq \emptyset \), but \( \{ \alpha_{\text{max}} \in D_{\text{max}}^i \mid \exists \alpha_{\text{min}} \in L_m \text{ s.t. } A_i(x)_{(\alpha_{\text{max}},\alpha_{\text{min}})} \in F \} = \emptyset \). Therefore for all \( \alpha_{\text{max}} \in D_{\text{max}}^i \), and for all \( \alpha_{\text{min}} \in L_m, A_i(x)_{(\alpha_{\text{max}},\alpha_{\text{min}})} \in O \). Let \( \tau(x_i) \) be any 1-step strategy for the min player, and let \( \sigma(x_i) \) be as defined in 3. Let \( D_{\text{min}}^i := \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i - \bigcup_{q=0}^{m-1} L_q \). Note that if \( D_{\text{min}}^i = \emptyset \), then \( p(x_i \rightarrow S \cup \{1\}, \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) = 0 = p(x_i \rightarrow (F \cup S \cup \{1\}), \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) \). So, in this case, the lemma holds for any constant \( c > 0 \). If \( D_{\text{min}}^i \neq \emptyset \), then both the inequalities (4) and (5) hold again, with the minor modification that now we have \( D_{\text{min}}^i = \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i - \bigcup_{q=0}^{m-1} L_q \) instead of \( D_{\text{min}}^i = \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i - \bigcup_{q=0}^{m-1} L_q \).

Therefore, in both cases the lemma is satisfied with \( c_i := \frac{1}{|D_{\text{max}}^i| - B_m|} \).

We are now ready to prove correctness for the algorithm in Figure 3.

**Theorem 6.2.** Given a BCSG with minimax-PPS, \( x = P(x) \), with GFP \( g^* < 1 \), the algorithm in Figure 3 terminates in polynomial time, and returns the set of variables \( \{ x_i \in X \mid g^*_i = 0 \} \).

**Proof.** The fact that the algorithm terminates and runs in polynomial time is again evident, as in case of the almost-sure algorithm. (The only new fact to note is that the new inner loop in step 4.(b), can iterate at most \( \max_i |\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i| \) times because with each new iteration, \( k \), at least one action is added to the \( B_{k-1} \), or else the algorithm halts.)

We need to show that when the algorithm terminates, for all \( x_i \in F, g^*_i = 0 \), and for all \( x_i \in S = X - F, g^*_i > 0 \).

Let us first show that for all \( x \in S, g^*_i > 0 \). In fact, we will show that there is a strategy \( \sigma \in \Psi_1 \), and a vector \( b > 0 \) of values, such that for all \( x, i \in S, (g^*_i)_i \geq b_i > 0 \). For the base case, since any variable \( x \) contained in \( S \) at the initialization step has \( g^*_i \geq P_i(0) > 0 \), we have \( (g^*_i)_i \geq P_i(0) > 0 \) for any strategy \( \sigma \), so let \( b_i := P_i(0) \). For the inductive step, first consider any variable \( x_i \) added to \( S \) in step 2, in some iteration of the main loop of the algorithm.

(i) If \( x_i = P_i(x) \) is of form \( L \), then \( P_i(x) \) has a variable \( x_j \) already in \( S \), and by induction \( (g^*_j)_j \geq b_j > 0 \). Since \( P_i(x) \) is linear, with a term \( q_{ij} \cdot x_j \), such that \( q_{ij} > 0 \), we see that \( (g^*_j)_i \geq q_{ij} \cdot b_j > 0 \), so let \( b_i := q_{ij} \cdot b_j \).

(ii) If \( x_i = P_i(x) \) is of form \( Q \) (i.e., \( x_i = x_j \cdot x_r \)), then \( P_i(x) \) has both variables previously added to \( S \), i.e., \( (g^*_j)_j \geq b_j > 0 \) and \( (g^*_r)_r \geq b_r > 0 \). Then clearly \( (g^*_j)_i \geq b_j \cdot b_r > 0 \). So let \( b_i := b_j \cdot b_r \).

(iii) If \( x_i = P_i(x) \) is of form \( M \), then \( \forall a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i, \exists a_{\text{max}} \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i \text{ such that } A_i(x)_{(a_{\text{max}},a_{\text{min}})} \in S \cup \{1\} \). For each \( a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i \), let us use \( a_{\text{max}}[a_{\text{min}}] \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i \), to denote a “witness” to this fact, i.e., such that \( A_i(x)_{(a_{\text{max}}[a_{\text{min}}],a_{\text{min}})} \in S \cup \{1\} \). Let strategy \( \sigma \) do as follows: in any object of type \( T_i \) corresponding to \( x_i \), \( \sigma \) selects uniformly at random an action from the set \( \{ a_{\text{max}}[a_{\text{min}}] \in \Gamma_{\text{max}}^i \mid a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i \} \) of all such witnesses. Clearly then, for any \( a_{\text{min}} \in \Gamma_{\text{min}}^i \), the probability that \( \sigma \) at an object of type \( T_i \) will choose the witness action \( a_{\text{max}}[a_{\text{min}}] \) is at least \( \frac{1}{|\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|} \) (and in fact is also at least \( \frac{1}{|\Gamma_{\text{min}}^i|} \)). So, using \( \sigma \), starting with one object of type \( T_i \), no matter what strategy the min player chooses, there is a positive probability \( \geq \frac{1}{|\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|} \) that either the object will have no child or the object will generate a single child object of type \( T_i(a_{\text{max}}[a_{\text{min}}]) \), associated with variable \( x_j = A_i(x)_{(a_{\text{max}},a_{\text{min}})} \in S \), and hence such that \( (g^*_j)_j \geq b_j > 0 \). So no matter what strategy the min player picks, there is at least \( \frac{1}{|\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|} \) probability that the unique child object belongs to \( S \), or that there is no child object. Hence, \( (g^*_j)_i \geq \frac{1}{|\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|} \cdot \min\{b_j \mid x_j \in S\} > 0 \), and again we let \( b_i := \frac{1}{|\Gamma_{\text{max}}^i|} \cdot \min\{b_j \mid x_j \in S\} \).
Now consider any variable \( x_i \) added to \( S \) in step 6 at some iteration of the algorithm (i.e., \( x_i \in K := X - (S \cup F) \)). Because \( x_i \) was not previously added to \( S \) or \( F \), then: (A.) \( x_i \) satisfies \( P_i(0) = 0 \) and \( P_i(1) = 1 \); (B.) \( x_i \) is not of type \( Q \); (C.) if \( x_i \) is of form \( L \), then it depends directly only on variables in \( K \); and (D.) if \( x_i \) is of type \( M \), then the answer for \( x_i \) in step 4.(b) (during the latest iteration of the main loop) was “No”.

For each \( x_i \in K \) of type \( M \), let \( \sigma(x_i) \) be a probability distribution on actions in \( \Gamma_{\max}^i \) defined in (3). Let strategy \( \sigma \) use the local 1-step strategy \( \sigma(x_i) \) at every object of type \( T_i \) encountered during history. We show that, for every \( x_i \in K \), \( (g^*_\sigma)_i \geq b_i \) for some \( b_i > 0 \).

By Lemma 6.1, for each variable \( x_i \in K \) of type \( M \), and for any arbitrary 1-step strategy \( \tau(x_i) \) for the min player at \( x_i \), there exists \( c_i > 0 \) such that:

\[
p(x_i \to S \cup \{1\}, \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i)) \geq c_i \cdot p(x_i \to (F \cup S \cup \{1\}), \sigma(x_i), \tau(x_i))
\]

For \( r \geq 1 \), let \( Pr^\sigma_{x_i}(K \cup_{=} (S \cup \{1\})) \) denote the probability that, starting with one object of type \( T_i \), where \( x_i \in K \), using strategy \( \sigma \) and an arbitrary (not necessarily static) strategy \( \tau \), the history of play will stay in the set \( K \) for \( r - 1 \) rounds, and in the \( r \)’th will either transition to an object whose type is in the set \( S \), or will die (i.e., produce no children). Define \( Pr^\sigma_{x_i}(K \cup_{=} (F \cup S \cup \{1\})) \) similarly. The following claim is a simple corollary of Lemma 6.1. Let \( c := \min\{c_i \mid x_i \in K\} \). (Note that \( 0 < c \leq 1 \).)

**Claim 6.3.** For any integer \( r \geq 1 \), and for any (not necessarily static) strategy \( \tau \) for the min player, \( Pr^\sigma_{x_i}(K \cup_{=} (S \cup \{1\})) \geq c \cdot Pr^\sigma_{x_i}(K \cup_{=} (F \cup S \cup \{1\})) \).

**Proof.** Let \( H(x_i, K, r - 1) \) denote the set of all sequence of types in \( K \) of length \( r - 1 \), starting with \( x_i \in K \). For a history (sequence) \( h \in H(x_i, K, r - 1) \), let \( l(h) \) denote the index of the variable associated with the last type in \( h \), i.e., the one occurring at round \( r - 1 \). For each \( h \in H(x_i, K, r - 1) \) there is some probability \( q_h \geq 0 \) that, starting at \( x_i \in K \), the population follows the history \( h \) for \( r - 1 \) rounds. So

\[
Pr^\sigma_{x_i}(K \cup_{=} (S \cup \{1\})) = \sum_{h \in H(x_i, K, r - 1)} q_h \cdot p(x_{l(h)} \to S \cup \{1\}, \sigma(h), \tau(h)) \\
\geq \sum_{h \in H(x_i, K, r - 1)} q_h \cdot c_{l(h)} \cdot p(x_{l(h)} \to (F \cup S \cup \{1\}), \sigma(h), \tau(h)) \quad \text{(by Lemma 6.1)} \\
\geq c \cdot \sum_{h \in H(x_i, K, r - 1)} q_h \cdot p(x_{l(h)} \to (F \cup S \cup \{1\}), \sigma(h), \tau(h)) \\
= c \cdot Pr^\sigma_{x_i}(K \cup_{=} (F \cup S \cup \{1\}))
\]

We now argue that for all \( x_i \in K \), there exists \( b_i > 0 \) such that for any strategy \( \tau \) for the min player, \( (g^*_\sigma)_i > b_i > 0 \).

Consider any strategy \( \tau \) for the min player. For \( x_i \in K \), let \( Pr^\sigma_{x_i} (\Box K) \) denote the probability that the history stays forever in \( K \), starting at one object of type \( T_i \). Let \( Pr^\sigma_{x_i} (K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) \) denote the probability that the history stays in set \( K \) until it eventually either dies (has no children) or transitions to an object with type in set \( S \). Note that:

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\[(g^*_i, \tau_i) \leq Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(\Box \mathcal{K}) + Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) \cdot \min\{(g^*_i, \tau_i) | x_j \in S\} \]
\[
\geq Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(\Box \mathcal{K}) + Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) \cdot \min\{b_j | x_j \in S\}
\]

We will show that, regardless of the strategy \(\tau\) for the min player, this probability must be at least:
\[
b_i := \frac{c}{2} \min\{b_j | x_j \in S\}
\]
where \(c := \min\{c_i | x_i \in K\}\). Recall that \(0 < c \leq 1\). Let \(p = Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(\Box \mathcal{K})\). If \(p \geq \frac{c}{2}\), then we are done, since the inequalities above imply \((g^*_i, \tau_i) \geq \frac{c}{2} \geq b_i\). So, suppose \(p < \frac{c}{2}\). Observe that:
\[
Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) = Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(\mathcal{K} \cup \{1\}) \cdot \Box \mathcal{K} \cdot Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(\Box \mathcal{K}) = Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) \cdot \Box \mathcal{K} \cdot (1 - p) \geq Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) \cdot \Box \mathcal{K} \cdot \frac{1}{2}.
\]

So it only remains to show that \(Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}) | \Box \mathcal{K}) \geq c\). Note that the event \(\Box \mathcal{K}\) is equivalent to the event \((K \cup (F \cup S \cup \{1\}))\). The event \(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})\) is equivalent to the disjoint union \(\bigcup_{r=1}^{\infty} K \cup (F \cup S \cup \{1\})\). Likewise for the event \(K \cup (F \cup S \cup \{1\})\). Therefore:
\[
Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}) | \Box \mathcal{K}) = \frac{Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}))}{Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(\Box \mathcal{K})} = \frac{\sum_{r=1}^{\infty} Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}))}{Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}))} = \sum_{r=1}^{\infty} \frac{Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}))}{Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}))}
\]

But by Claim 6.3, for all \(r \geq 1\), \(Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) \geq c \cdot Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (F \cup S \cup \{1\}))\). Hence, summing over all \(r\), we have \(\sum_{r=1}^{\infty} Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\})) \geq c \sum_{r=1}^{\infty} Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (F \cup S \cup \{1\}))\). Hence, dividing out and using (6), we have \(Pr_{x_i}^{\sigma, \tau}(K \cup (S \cup \{1\}) | \Box \mathcal{K}) \geq c\).

Thus, \((g^*_i, \tau_i) \geq b_i\), and since this holds for an arbitrary strategy \(\tau\) for the min player, we have \((g^*_i, \tau_i) \geq b_i > 0\).

We next want to show that if \(F\) is the set of variables output by the algorithm when it halts, then for all variables \(x_i \in F\), \(g^*_i = 0\), or in other words, that the following holds:
\[
\forall \epsilon > 0, \exists \tau \in \Psi_1 \text{ s.t. } \forall \sigma \in \Psi_1, (g^*_i, \tau_i) \leq \epsilon
\]

Let \(N := \max_i |\Gamma_{min}^i|\). Given some \(0 \leq \epsilon \leq \frac{1}{2N}\), consider the following static distribution, \(safe(x_i, \epsilon)\), on actions for the min player at \(x_i\) (i.e., distribution on \(\Gamma_{min}^i\)):
\[
safe(x_i, \epsilon)(a_{min}) := \begin{cases} (e^2)^{j-1} \cdot \frac{1 - e^2}{|L_j|} & \text{if } a_{min} \in L_j, \text{ for some } j \in \{1, \ldots, k - 1\} \\ (e^2)^{k-1} \cdot \frac{1}{|\Gamma_{min}^i - \bigcup_{q=0}^{k-1} L_q|} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]
Given an $\epsilon > 0$, we define a (static) strategy $\tau_\epsilon$ as follows. If a variable $x_i$ of form M is in $S$, then we let $\tau_\epsilon(x_i)$ be the uniform distribution on the corresponding action set $\Gamma_{\min}^i$. For variables in $F$, we define $\tau_\epsilon$ as follows. Consider the last execution of the main loop of the algorithm. Let $F_0 = \{ x_i \in X - S \mid P_i(1) < 1, \text{ or } P_i(x) \text{ is of form Q} \}$ be the set of variables assigned to $F$ in Step 3, and let $x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}, \ldots, x_{i_k}$ be the variables in $F - F_0$ ordered according to the time at which they were added to $F$ in the iterations of Step 4. For each variable $x_{i_t} \in F$ of form M we let $\tau_\epsilon(x_{i_t}) = \text{safe}(x_{i_t}, e_t)$ where the parameters $e_t$ are set as follows. Let $n$ be the number of variables, and $N := \max_i |\Gamma_{\min}^i|$ the maximum number of actions of player min for any variable of form M. Let $\kappa$ be the minimum of (1) $1/N$, (2) the minimum (nonnegative) coefficient of a monomial in $P_i(x)$ over all variables $x_i$ of form L, and (3) the minimum of $1 - P_i(1)$ over all $x_i$ of form L such that $P_i(1) < 1$. Let $\lambda = \kappa^n$. Clearly, $\lambda$ is a rational number that depends on the given minimax-PPS $x = P(x)$ (and the corresponding BCSG) and it has polynomial number of bits in the size of $P$. Let $d_0 = \lceil \log(\frac{n}{\lambda}) \rceil$ and let $d_t = d_0 \cdot (2N)^t$ for $t \geq 1$. We set $e_t = 2^{-d_t}$ for all $t \geq 0$. The numbers $e_t$ can be doubly exponentially small, but they can be represented compactly in floating point, i.e., in polynomial size in the size of $P$ and of $\epsilon$. Note from the definitions that $e_0 \leq \epsilon / n$, and $e_t = (e_{t-1})^2N$ for all $t \geq 1$.

Consider the max-PPS $x = P_{*\tau_{\epsilon}}(x)$ obtained from the given minimax-PPS $x = P(x)$ by fixing the strategy of the min player to $\tau_\epsilon$. For every variable $x_i$ of form L or Q, the corresponding equation $x_i = P_i(x)$ stays the same, and for every variable $x_i$ of form M the equation becomes $x_i = \max_{a_{\max} \in \Gamma_{\max}^i} \sum_{a_{\min} \in \Gamma_{\min}^i} \tau(x_i)(a_{\min}) \cdot A_i(x)(a_{\max}, a_{\min})$. Let $f^* = g_{*,\tau_{\epsilon}}$ be the greatest fixed point of the max-PPS $x = P_{*\tau_{\epsilon}}(x)$, and let $M = \max\{ f^*_i | x_i \in F \}$. We will show that $M \leq \epsilon$, i.e., $f^*_i \leq \epsilon$ for all $x_i \in F$.

First, we show that all variables of $X$ have value strictly less than 1 in $f^*$, and we also bound the value of the variables of $S$ in terms of $M$.

**Claim 6.4.**

1. For all $x_i \in X$, $f^*_i < 1$.
2. For all $x_i \in X$, $f^*_i \leq \lambda M + (1 - \lambda)$.

**Proof.** The algorithm of Proposition 4.1 (see Fig. 1) computes the set $X$ of variables $x_i$ of the minimax-PPS such that $g^*_{\epsilon} < 1$ (this set is denoted $S$ in Fig. 1, but to avoid confusion with the set $S$ of the limit-sure reachability algorithm of Fig. 3, we refer to it as $X$ in the following). We use induction on the time that a variable $x_i$ was added to $X$ in the algorithm of Fig. 1 to show the claim. For part (2), our induction hypothesis is that if a variable $x_i$ is added to $X$ at time $t$ (where the initialization is time 1) then $f^*_i \leq \kappa^t M + (1 - \kappa^t)$. This inequality implies (2) since $t \leq n$ and $\lambda = \kappa^n$.

For the basis case ($t = 1$), $x_i$ is a deficient variable, i.e., $P_i(1) < 1$, hence $f^*_i \leq P_i(1) \leq 1 - \kappa < 1$.

For the induction step, if $x_i$ is of form L or Q, then $P_i(x)$ contains a variable $x_j$ that was added earlier to $X$, hence $f^*_i < 1$ follows from $f^*_j < 1$ by the induction hypothesis. For part (2), if $x_i$ is of form L, then the coefficient of $x_j$ in $P_i(x)$ is at least $\kappa$ and $f^*_j \leq \kappa^{t-1} M + (1 - \kappa^{t-1})$ by the induction hypothesis, hence $f^*_i \leq \kappa(\kappa^{t-1} M + (1 - \kappa^{t-1}))) + 1 - \kappa = \kappa^t M + (1 - \kappa^t)$. If $x_i$ is of form Q, then $f^*_i \leq \kappa^t M + (1 - \kappa^t)$. If $x_i$ is of form M then for every action $a_{\max} \in \Gamma_{\max}^i$, there exists an action $a_{\min} \in \Gamma_{\min}^i$ such that the variable $x_j = A_i(x)(a_{\max}, a_{\min})$ was added previously to $X$, and hence its value in $f^*$ is $< 1$ by the induction hypothesis. Since $\tau_\epsilon(x_i)$ plays all the actions of $\Gamma_{\min}^i$ with nonzero probability, both when $x_i \in S$ and when $x_i \in F$, it follows that $f^*_i < 1$. This shows part (1). For part (2), if
$x_i \in F$, then $f^*_t \leq M \leq \kappa M + (1 - \kappa')$, where the first inequality follows from the definition of $M$. Suppose $x_i \in S$ and let $a_{\max}$ be an action in $\Gamma^t_{\max}$ that yields the greatest fixed point $f^*_t$ in the max-PPS equation $x_i = (P_{*,\tau_e}(x))_i$. The right-hand side for this action is a linear expression that contains a variable $x_j = A_t(x)_{(a_{\max}, a_{\min})}$ that was added previously to $X$, and the coefficient of this term is $1/|\Gamma^t_{\max}| \geq 1/N \geq \kappa$, since $\tau_e(x)$ is the uniform distribution for $x_i \in S$. Therefore, $f^*_t \leq \kappa f^*_j + (1 - \kappa) \leq \kappa(\kappa^{-1}M + (1 - \kappa^{-1})) + 1 - \kappa = \kappa M + (1 - \kappa')$.

\[ \square \]

We can show the key lemma now.

**Lemma 6.5.** For all $x_i \in F$, $f^*_t \leq \epsilon$.

**Proof.** Recall that $F = F_0 \cup \{x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}, \ldots, x_{i_{\kappa}}\}$. Let $M_0 = \max\{f^*_t | x_i \in F_0\}$ and let $M_t = f^*_t$ for $t \geq 1$ be the value of $x_{i_t}$ in the greatest fixed point $f^*$ of the max-PPS $x = P_{*,\tau_e}(x)$. Thus, $M = \max\{M_t | t \geq 0\}$. Let $r_t = (e_t)^{2N-1}$. Note that for every $x_{i_t} \in F$ of form $M$, the probability with which $\tau_e(x_{i_t}) = \text{safe}(x_{i_t}, e_t)$ plays any action in a set $L_j$ is at least $(e_t)^{N-1} - 1/(2N)$ which is $(e_t)^{2N-1} - 1$ because $e_t < 1/(2N)$. Let $s_t = \Pi_{j=1}^t r_j$; by convention, $s_0 = 1$.

We will show first that for all $t \geq 0$, there exist $a_t, g_t \geq 0$ that satisfy $a_t \geq \lambda s_t$ and $g_t \leq t e_0 a_t / \lambda$, and such that $M_t \leq a_t M^2 + (1 - a_t - g_t) M + g_t$. We will use induction on $t$.

**Basis:** $t = 0$. Then $M_0 = f^*_t$ for a variable $x_i \in F_0$ which is either a deficient variable of form $L$ or a variable of form $Q$. If $x_i$ is of form $L$, then note that (1) $P_t$ does not contain a constant term (because otherwise $x_i$ would have been added to set $S$ in Step 1), (2) all the variables of $P_t(x)$ are not in $S$ (because otherwise $x_i$ would have been added to set $S$ in Step 2), hence they are all eventually added to $F$ and thus their value in $f^*$ is at most $M$, and (3) the coefficients sum to at most $1 - \kappa$ because $P_t(1) < 1$. Therefore, $M_0 = f^*_t \leq (1 - \kappa)M \leq \lambda M^2 + (1 - \lambda)M$. If $x_i$ is of form $Q$, at least one of the variables of $P_t(x)$ must belong to $F$ (because otherwise $x_i$ would have been added to $S$ in Step 2), hence its value in $f^*$ is at most $M$, and the value of the other variable is at most $\lambda M + (1 - \lambda)$ by Claim 6.4. Therefore, $M_0 = f^*_t \leq M(\lambda M + 1 - \lambda) = \lambda M^2 + (1 - \lambda)M$. Thus in both cases, $M_0 \leq \lambda M^2 + (1 - \lambda)M$. We can take $a_0 = \lambda$, $g_0 = 0$.

**Induction step:** We have $M_t = f^*_t$. If $x_{i_t}$ is of form $L$, then $P_t(x)$ contains a variable $x_j$ that was added earlier to $F$; its coefficient, say $p$, is at least $\kappa$. Note again that $P_t(x)$ does not contain a constant term, all the other variables of $P_t(x)$ are not in $S$, hence they are all eventually added to $F$ and their value in $f^*$ is at most $M$, and the sum of their coefficients is $1 - p$. Since the variable $x_j$ was added earlier to $F$, by the induction hypothesis we have $f^*_j \leq a_j M^2 + (1 - a_j - g_j) M + g_j$ for some $u \leq t - 1$. Therefore, $M_t \leq p(a_u M^2 + (1 - a_j - g_j) M + g_j) + (1 - p)M = a_t M^2 + (1 - a_t - g_t) M + g_t$, with $a_t = pa_u$ and $g_t = pg_u$. Since $u \leq t - 1$, we have $a_u \geq \lambda s_u \geq \lambda s_{t-1}$, and since $p \geq \kappa \geq \kappa$ it follows that $a_t = pa_u \geq \lambda \cdot s_{t-1} \cdot r_t = \lambda \cdot s_t$. Also, $g_t = pg_u \leq p e_0 a_u / \lambda \leq e_0 a_t / \lambda$.

Suppose $x_{i_t}$ is of form $M$, and let $a_{\max} \in \Gamma^t_{\max}$ be an action of the max player that yields the greatest fixed point $f^*_t$ in the max-PPS equation $x_{i_t} = (P_{*,\tau_e}(x))_{i_t}$. Then $a_{\max}$ belongs to some $B_j$ in Step 4 of the algorithm of Fig. 3, and thus there is a $a_{\min} \in L_j$ such that the variable $A_{i_t}(x)_{(a_{\max}, a_{\min})}$ was added earlier to $F$, i.e., it is variable $x_{i_u}$ for some $u \leq t - 1$ or it belongs to $F_0$. The probability $p = \tau_e(x_{i_t})_{(a_{\min})}$ of this action in strategy $\tau_e$ is $p = (e_t)^{N-1} - 1/(2N)$. All the variables $A_{i_t}(x)_{(a_{\max}, a_{\min})}$ for $a \in \cup_{1=1}^{j} L_q$ are not in $S$, hence they are all eventually assigned to $F$. The total probability that strategy $\tau_e$ gives to the actions $a \in \cup_{1=1}^{j} L_q$ is $1 - (e_t)^{N-1}$. The remaining probability assigned to the other actions $a \in \Gamma^t_{\max} - \cup_{1=1}^{j} L_q$ is $(e_t)^{N-1}$ which is $\leq p e_t$ since $e_t \leq 1/(2N)$. Therefore, $M_t \leq p M_u + (1 - p - p e_t) M + p e_t$ for some $u \leq t - 1$. By the induction hypothesis, $M_u \leq a_u M^2 + (1 - a_u - g_u) M + g_u$, where $a_u \geq \lambda s_u$ and $g_u \leq u e_0 a_u / \lambda$. Hence,
Therefore, a hence let we have \( g(2^e) \). Check from the definitions that \( a \leq t \). Let 
\[
M_t = p(a_t M^2 + (1 - a_t - g_t) M + g_t) = a_t M^2 + (1 - a_t - g_t) M + g_t,
\]
where \( a_t = pa_u \) and \( g_t = pg_u + pe_t \). Since \( p \geq r_t \) and \( a_u \geq \lambda s_u \geq \lambda s_{t-1} \), we have \( a_t \geq \lambda s_t \). It is easy to check from the definitions that \( e_t \leq e_0 s_{t-1} \). Indeed, \( \log e_t = -d_0(2N)^t \), while \( \log(e_0 s_{t-1}) = \log e_0 + (2N-1) \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} \log e_j = -d_0((2N)^t - 2N + 1) \). Since \( g_u \leq u e_0 a_u / \lambda \) and \( e_t \leq e_0 s_{t-1} \leq e_0 s_u \leq e_0 a_u / \lambda \), we have \( g_t = pg_u + pe_t \leq p(u + 1) e_0 a_u / \lambda \leq te_0 a_t / \lambda \).

Therefore, for all \( t \) we have \( M_t \leq a_t M^2 + (1 - a_t - g_t) M + g_t \), where \( a_t \geq \lambda s_t \) and \( g_t \leq te_0 a_t / \lambda \). Let \( t \) be an index with the maximum \( M_t \), i.e., \( M = M_t \). Then \( M \leq a_t M^2 + (1 - a_t - g_t) M + g_t \), hence \( a_t M^2 - (a_t + g_t) M + g_t \geq 0 \). That is, \( (a_t M - g_t)(M - 1) \geq 0 \). From Claim 6.4, \( M < 1 \). Therefore, \( a_t M \leq g_t \). Thus, \( M \leq g_t / a_t \leq te_0 / \lambda \leq \epsilon \).

This concludes the proof of the theorem.

From the constructions in the proof of the theorem we have the following:

**Corollary 6.6.** Suppose the algorithm in Figure 3 outputs the set \( F \) when it terminates. Let \( S := X - F \).

1. There is a randomized static strategy \( \sigma \) for the max player (maximizing non-reachability) such that for all variables \( x_i \in S \), we have \( (g_{\sigma, x_i}^*)_i > 0 \).
2. For all \( \epsilon > 0 \), there is a randomized static strategy \( \tau_\epsilon \), for the min player (minimizing non-reachability), such that for all variables \( x_i \in F \), \( (g_{\tau_\epsilon, x_i}^*)_i \leq \epsilon \).

**Proof.** This follows directly from the strategies \( \sigma \), and \( \tau_\epsilon \), constructed in the proof of Theorem 6.2.

**References**


