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### Migration and ethnicity in Scotland's 2022 Census

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## **Migration and Ethnicity in Scotland's 2022 Census**

### **Abstract**

Migration is a multi-dimensional and multi-level process which is difficult to record and monitor even for the most well-resourced governments and organizations. The 2022 decennial census's (attempted) enumeration of the entire population thus offers a valuable means of assessing the degree and manner of the impact migration has on Scotland. While sub-national migration may reflect sociologically and politically significant phenomena such as urbanization, gentrification and rural depopulation, this article focusses upon cross-border migration and its legacies: specifically, migration between Scotland and other parts of the UK; migration from overseas; and ethnicity, which may reflect people's own migration but also that of their parents, grandparents or more distant ancestors.

**Keywords:** Scottish Census 2022; migration; ethnicity.

**Ross Bond** is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of several articles concerning immigrants and minorities in Scotland, and of *Understanding International Migration: Social, Cultural and Historical Contexts*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

## Migration and Ethnicity in Scotland's 2022 Census

Migration is a multi-dimensional and multi-level process which is difficult to record and monitor even for the most well-resourced governments and organizations. The decennial census's (attempted) enumeration of the entire population thus offers a valuable means of assessing the degree and manner of the impact migration has on Scotland. While sub-national migration may reflect sociologically and politically significant phenomena such as urbanization, gentrification and rural depopulation, in this paper I focus on cross-border migration and its legacies: specifically, migration between Scotland and other parts of the UK; migration from overseas; and ethnicity, which may reflect people's own migration but also that of their parents, grandparents or more distant ancestors.

The National Records of Scotland oversees Scotland's Census and publishes reports and data via the <https://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/> website, including short reports concerning migration and ethnicity. While I will refer to some of the key information in these reports, my main objective is to present a more detailed analysis of these topics, using publicly available information from the aforementioned website. My main focus will be on 2022 data, but I also include some comparison with the 2011 and 2001 censuses in Scotland, and 2021 census data for England and Wales, generated by the Office for National Statistics and freely available online<sup>1</sup>. Primarily because its population has been much less influenced by migration from overseas than have other parts of the UK, I do not include comparison with Northern Ireland. After a brief introduction which locates migration in Scotland within global and historical context, I focus initially on census data based on country of birth as a measure of migration to Scotland from both other parts of the UK and overseas, and then discuss the status and identities of people in various key ethnic groups that reflect both historic and ongoing migration to Scotland.

### *Scotland and (global) migration*

For much of its history Scotland has been a country more characterised by *emigration* than immigration (Anderson, 2016), which has given rise to periodic reflection concerning the anticipated negative effects of depopulation and population ageing. But in more recent decades especially *immigration* to Scotland has become a more prominent phenomenon. As suggested above, this includes migration from other parts of the UK, most significantly from England, and this has given rise to a substantial historical and sociological literature concerning 'the English' in Scotland (see e.g. Bond et al 2010; Devine 2018; McIntosh et al 2008). While *international* migration and its various consequences is of course a prominent feature of contemporary public and political discourse, only about 3.5% of the world's population are international migrants (McAuliffe and Oucho 2024). However, this figure rises to around 12% in the world's most developed countries (McAuliffe and Oucho 2024) and, as we shall see below, Scotland's current population structure is (broadly) consistent with that figure. Moreover, sub-nationally, specific places are even more strongly influenced by migration than these headline figures would suggest, and this dimension will also be considered below.

Limiting analysis of international migration only to those who have themselves moved across borders also obscures its wider impact and legacies, including non-migrants' ethnic identities. The Census facilitates comparison of the status of different ethnic groups along various dimensions as a means to (potentially) highlight relative (dis-)advantage, and this will be done below particularly with respect to education and employment. I stress here that it is not my aim to evaluate (negatively or positively) the 'integration' or 'assimilation' of migrants and/or their descendants. These are complex and contested concepts (see e.g. Spencer and Charsley 2021), and care is necessary in the language we use in relation to migration and ethnicity as well as a sensitivity to how the analysis we present on these themes may be read and employed by others. A related danger is that migrant-minorities generally or specific ethnic groups are homogenised, obscuring their complexity, and while that is not completely avoidable as we must work with the Census categories originally employed, a key objective in presenting the analysis below is precisely to highlight variation both within and between different groups on various dimensions.

### *Migration to Scotland: Country of birth*

Table 1<sup>2</sup> shows how the proportions of people born in Scotland, other parts of the UK, and overseas have changed over the last three censuses and how these data for the most recent census in Scotland compare with England and Wales. The proportion born in Scotland has declined steadily since 2001 and most of this change is attributable to increased migration from overseas. While the proportion of people living in Scotland who were born in other parts of the UK has also increased, whereas in 2001 around 70 per cent of all migrants from beyond Scotland were born in other parts of the UK, by 2022 this only applied to a narrow majority. As the report on demography and migration for the 2022 Census in Scotland makes clear<sup>3</sup>, most of the overall population growth in Scotland between the 2011 and 2022 censuses is accounted for by migration from overseas. This report also records that in 2022 Poland was the most common non-UK country of birth (as it was in 2011) followed by India and then Pakistan. The other dimension of comparison shown in Table 1 – with England and Wales – shows that Scotland is quite similar to England in terms of the proportions of people born in these respective nations, but in contrast Scotland's population is more strongly influenced by intra-UK migration than is England's, which is in turn more affected by migration from overseas. In contrast, Wales has proportionately more migration from the rest of the UK than does Scotland (not surprisingly, in both these nations the vast majority of that migration comes from England) but less from overseas.

<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.

Table 2 focuses more specifically on people living in Scotland in 2022 who were born overseas, and shows how they are grouped according to their age when they first arrived in the UK and how long they have been living there<sup>4</sup>. Although some will have initially migrated from overseas to another part of the UK before moving on to Scotland, generally speaking we may still conclude that international migration to Scotland is typically undertaken by children and young adults: collectively, the three youngest arrival age groups (i.e., all those aged under 35 upon initial arrival) account for more than 83 per cent of all international migrants in Scotland. Another notable feature of the data

is how evenly distributed migrants are across these three age groups, such that migration by people in a specific age group does not predominate. Nearly half of international migrants in Scotland have been living in the UK for 10 years or more, and the census report on demography and migration notes that these longer-term migrants have more than doubled in number since 2011. Hence not only is migration to Scotland by those born overseas increasing, so too is the proportion of those migrants who may be characterised as long-term.

<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.

While around one in ten of Scotland's overall population was born outside the UK, as we might expect, this obscures higher sub-national proportions, not least in urban areas. Table 3 shows the ten electoral wards in Scotland which have the highest proportions of migrants from beyond the UK and from outside Scotland<sup>5</sup>. As we might expect, many of these geographical areas appear in both top ten lists, but there is variation both in which areas are included and in their rank ordering, showing how some places are more influenced by intra-UK migration and others by international migration. For those in the latter group, the single country of origin accounting for the largest proportion of international migrants is also shown.

<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.

All but one of the electoral wards with the highest proportion of residents born outside the UK are in Scotland's three largest cities. The figure for the Anderston/City/Yorkhill ward in Glasgow (more than 41 per cent) is higher than the percentage of the population of London born outside the UK in 2021. While no one country of origin accounts for anywhere near a majority of international migrants in any of these neighbourhoods, the most prominent country of origin in each ward shows likely variation in the character of migration in different places. Those wards in Glasgow and Edinburgh where China provides the highest number of migrants of any single country outside the UK are likely characterised by large numbers of international students, among whom Chinese people are very prominent in Scotland (see Table 7 below). Student migration also likely accounts for the only ward outside the main cities which has a high number of non-UK residents: St Andrews, where the prominent US population is likely accounted for mainly by students at the local university. Polish and Pakistani migrants in the three cities, on the other hand, are more likely to have moved for the purposes of employment rather than study.

Many of the same wards are among those ten with the highest proportions of their populations born *outside Scotland*, and for five of these this applies to a majority of their populations. This is also true of North Isles in the Orkneys, one of two wards that do not appear in the ten with most non-UK residents. Indeed (and not surprisingly) in this relatively remote rural area only about 5 per cent of the population were born overseas, but nearly 43 per cent were born in **England**. The other exception in this list is Morningside in Edinburgh. In contrast to North Isles, this ward does have a non-UK population much higher than the Scottish average (more than 23 per cent) but a similar proportion (22 per cent) were born in England. It is likely that both figures are influenced to some extent by proximity to some of Edinburgh's main university campuses.

### *The legacies of migration: minority ethnic groups*

Country of birth does not give a complete picture of how migration has shaped Scotland's population, principally because birthplace does not help us differentiate the children (or grandchildren, etc.) of previous migrants to Scotland if these children were born in Scotland. Many of these people do, however, continue to identify with their parents' or more distant ancestors' places of origin via their ethnic group. Unlike birthplace, ethnicity is (partly) subjective, so not all descendants of migrants will reflect this status in their self-defined ethnicity, and because the census does not record parental birthplace, we cannot specifically analyse the ethnicity of all people in Scotland who have a (recent) migration background through ancestry rather than personal birthplace. Nevertheless, analysing data on ethnicity provides an additional means of reflecting the broader impact of migration on the population.

Similarly to Table 1 above, Table 4 compares the contemporary ethnic structure of the Scottish population both with the two immediately previous censuses in Scotland and the most recent census in England and Wales. Some groups have been excluded or combined for reasons of brevity and comparability, hence column percentages do not sum to 100, although the vast majority of people are represented. The ways some specific groups are labelled in the data (or indeed whether they are included at all as a distinct category) sometimes vary between different censuses (according to year and/or country). The (Black) Caribbean category in the table is particularly complex in that regard, but essentially includes all those who identify as Black but not as African.

<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.

To the degree that we may measure ethnic diversity in terms of the proportion of the population who do not identify with the 'majority' ethnic group (in this instance White British, etc.) we can see that contemporary Scotland is not as diverse as England, where more than one in four of the population do not identify as White British, but more diverse than Wales, where fewer than one in ten fall into this category. This proportion has also increased steadily and substantially in Scotland since 2001, once more reflecting the growing influence that migration has had and is having on the population. Proportions in nearly all of the specified minority groups also show steady increase, albeit this is more marked for some than others. Although not shown in the table, analysis of the ethnic structure of different age cohorts in Scotland in 2022 also shows that while 94.4 per cent of those aged 50 or over identified as White British (including White Scottish), this applied to only 81.8 per cent of the under 50s. Thus, even setting aside the effects of future migration, the influence of previous migration on the ethnic profile of Scotland's population means that natural change will lead to further decline in the percentage of the 'majority' population.

Ethnic diversity is also, as one would expect, more pronounced in Scotland's largest cities and in particular neighbourhoods within these urban areas. In both Edinburgh and Glasgow fewer than three-quarters of people (71.6 and 72.8 per cent respectively) identify as White Scottish or one of the other White British categories, proportions which are slightly lower than a number of cities in England and Wales (Leeds, Liverpool, Newcastle, Sheffield and Cardiff). However, the impact of migration on these Scottish cities is still nowhere near as marked as in Birmingham, Leicester, London

and Manchester, all of which are now ‘majority-minority’ cities (see, e.g., Crul, 2016) in which the White British (national) ‘majority’ account for less than half of the population.

Table 5 shows the ten electoral wards in Scotland that have the lowest proportions of White Scottish (or other British)<sup>6</sup> people. In all of these areas more than one-third of the population belong to a minority ethnic group and in two of the Glasgow wards this proportion is close to one half. In only one of these areas does a single ethnic group account for a majority of those who do not identify as White Scottish (or other British): Pollokshields in Glasgow, where nearly a quarter of the population overall are Pakistani. This is also the only neighbourhood in Table 5 that is not also among those with the lowest proportions of UK-born residents (see Table 3 above).

<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.

Table 6 shows that ethnic groups differ in important ways in terms of their migration trajectories. Fundamentally, there is great variety regarding whether people in these groups may be defined as migrants at all based on their birthplace. Not surprisingly, a very large majority of those who identify as White Scottish/British were born in the UK, and this also applies to clear majorities of Gypsy/Travellers, Irish and Pakistanis, as well as nearly half of the Caribbean or Black group. But in the other groups a minority are UK-born, and sometimes these minorities are very small, most notably for the White Polish and Other White. There is also considerable variation in the proportion of people in each group who moved to the UK from overseas in the year preceding the census. Not surprisingly, this represents a minority in all groups, but, e.g., the comparatively high figure (nearly one quarter) among the Chinese likely reflects ongoing substantial student migration in this group, whereas the low figure for the Polish gives some indication of how Brexit has probably curtailed previously substantial migration from some other EU countries.

The data in Table 6 for age at arrival among migrants and their length of residence in the UK show that not only were the vast majority of White Scottish/British people born in the UK, people in this group who have migrated to the UK most often did so as children and have become relatively long-term residents. This most probably reflects a phenomenon of people born abroad to White British parents who returned to the UK when their children were young. But for some other groups there is more contrast than similarity in the data for age at arrival and length of residence. For example, the White Polish are relatively unlikely to have moved to the UK as children but are among the groups in which people are most likely to have been there for a relatively long period. This most likely shows that Polish people in Scotland are often long-term labour migrants.

Table 6 also illustrates that groups which are superficially similar may in fact have rather different characteristics. For example, both the Pakistani and Indian groups could be characterised as South Asian and/or British/Scottish Asian. But the data show that the Pakistani group in Scotland seems more well-established: the majority were born in the UK (50.5 per cent *in Scotland*), or among those not born there, very few migrated in the pre-census year and more than two-thirds are relatively long-term residents. In contrast, less than a third of people in the Indian group were born in the UK (less than a quarter in Scotland), a sizeable minority moved there in the year before the census, and only a minority are long-term residents.

<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE.

Finally, diversity among and between different ethnic groups may also be assessed via measures of social status which may in turn reflect relative (dis)advantage and inequalities. Table 7 shows how education qualifications and social class (for those aged 16 or over only) vary between groups. For education I simply show the proportions in the extreme categories: those with no qualifications and those educated to degree level. For social class a 9-category version of the Office for National Statistics' NS-SEC socio-economic classification is employed.

With the marked exception of the White Gypsy/Traveller group and, more marginally, Pakistanis, those in the minority ethnic groups are typically *less* likely to have no educational qualifications than are people in the 'majority'. A broadly similar (converse) pattern is observable at the other extreme: people in nearly all minority groups (including Pakistanis) are *more* likely to be educated to degree level than are people in the White Scottish/British group. It should be noted here that disaggregating the 'majority' into those who identify as White Scottish and those who place themselves in other White British ethnic groups reveals substantial differences. The data shown in the table reflect the educational status of the *White Scottish* group quite accurately, but among the other White British only 10.4 per cent have no qualifications and 47.1 per cent are degree-educated, hence differences with minority groups are less obvious. To some degree this will likely reflect *intra-UK* migration, most obviously that those who have moved from England to Scotland are both less likely to identify as White Scottish (24.4 per cent, compared to 67.7 per cent identifying as other White British) and more likely to be well-educated (10.7 per cent have no qualifications and 46.3 per cent are degree-educated).

While migrant and minority groups of various kinds are generally *advantaged* compared to the White Scottish population in terms of education, how this relates to social class is rather more complex. If we combine proportions in the first two (managerial/professional) categories in Table 7, initially it seems that those in the 'majority' (White Scottish/British) group are more likely to be in these most obviously middle-class occupational categories than are people in most minority groups. However, if we combine the semi-routine and routine categories, then it also seems that the 'majority' group also has a higher proportion in the more working-class categories than most minority groups<sup>7</sup>. This apparent anomaly may be explained partly through the high percentages of full-time students in many minority groups. However, even leaving aside that effect there are some exceptional groups worth highlighting. For example, both the White Irish and Indian groups show a higher proportion in the middle-class categories *and* a higher percentage of full-time students than do the 'majority'. The White Polish, on the other hand, show a lower proportion of students than most other groups and also a rather more working-class than middle-class profile: the high percentage in this group who are in routine occupations is particularly noticeable. This suggests that for many White Polish people their educational qualifications are not reflected in their occupational status.

Another aspect of the data worth highlighting is the relatively high proportions in the never worked or long-term unemployed category among some ethnic groups, most obviously White Gypsy/Traveller, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. This also a gendered phenomenon among some of these groups: for example, 27.1 per cent of Pakistani women aged over 16 are in this category compared to 7.3 per cent of Pakistani men. Overall, as it was for their migration trajectories (Table 6 above),



the contrast between the Indian and Pakistani groups in terms of their educational and occupational profiles is quite striking. More than two-thirds of Indians are degree-educated and nearly three-quarters are either in middle-class occupations or full-time study. In contrast, less than 40 per cent of Pakistanis are degree-educated and a similar minority are either in middle-class occupations or full-time study. Compared to Indians, Pakistanis are also more likely to be self-employed<sup>8</sup> or not in any kind of employment or study.

<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE.

Not all potential dimensions of (dis)advantage across and within ethnic groups have been considered here, and indeed census data do not always lend themselves to analysis of all such dimensions. This is true, for example, with respect to the direct experience of racism on the part of (some) migrants and their descendants. A notable feature of post-devolution political discourse in Scotland has been a broad elite consensus that stresses the positive features of migration and diversity (Bond, 2020; Nicolson & Korkut 2022), but it would be naïve and inaccurate not to recognise that this is often paralleled by more negative and discriminatory attitudes and behaviours among the wider population of Scotland with respect to issues related to immigration and ethnicity (Arshad, 2016; McCollum, 2020; McCollum et al, 2014).

### *Conclusion*

Migration – and more specifically *immigration* – is having an ongoing and increasing impact on Scotland's population. This is likely to endure: indeed, a recent projection by the Office for National Statistics suggests that by around the time of the next census in Scotland, its population will have increased further by more than 4 per cent, and all of this increase will be attributable to net migration<sup>9</sup>. My analysis shows that people who move to Scotland from overseas are typically children and young adults who often become relatively long-term residents. The impact of this migration is particularly marked in specific (usually urban) neighbourhoods, but analysis of these places reflects differences in the origins and character of migration. Comparison between the different ethnic groups that often arise from migration also indicates considerable variation in typical migration trajectories and substantial heterogeneity both within and between groups: this also extends to differences within the 'majority' group which will be related in part to *intra*-UK migration. Finally, although the analysis does not suggest any substantial disadvantage for most minority groups in Scotland with respect to education and employment, this does not mean that there is no such disadvantage in other domains of social life or in the everyday experience of prejudice and discrimination, including racism.

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## TABLES

**Table 1: Country of birth (Scotland 2001, 2011, 2022; England and Wales 2021)**

	<b>Scotland 2001</b>	<b>Scotland 2011</b>	<b>Scotland 2022</b>	<b>England 2021</b>	<b>Wales 2021</b>
	%	%	%	%	%
Scotland <sup>a</sup>	87.1	83.3	79.4	80.3	70.9
Other UK	9.1	9.7	10.4 <sup>b</sup>	2.3	22.2 <sup>b</sup>
Non-UK	3.8	7.0	10.2	17.4	6.9
<i>N</i>	<i>5,062,011</i>	<i>5,295,403</i>	<i>5,439,842</i>	<i>56,490,051</i>	<i>3,107,499</i>

<sup>a</sup> For England and Wales % born in these respective nations is shown

<sup>b</sup> 9.3 % of the population in Scotland and 21.2% in Wales were born in England

**Table 2: age of arrival and length of residence in UK for those *not born in the UK* (Scotland 2022)**

<b><i>Age of arrival</i></b>							
	<b>&lt; 16</b>	<b>16-24</b>	<b>25-34</b>	<b>35-49</b>	<b>50-64</b>	<b>65+</b>	<b><i>N</i></b>
%	27.9	28.4	27.6	12.9	2.6	0.6	<i>554,883</i>
<b><i>Length of residence</i></b>							
	<b>Less than 2 years</b>	<b>2 years or more, but less than 5</b>	<b>5 years or more, but less than 10</b>	<b>10 years or more</b>	<b><i>N</i></b>		
%	16.7	14.9	18.6	49.8	<i>554,883</i>		

**Table 3: Ten electoral wards with highest proportions of population born outside the UK and Scotland (Scotland 2022)**

<b>Ward (Local authority)</b>	<b>% born outside UK</b>	<b>Most common non-UK country of birth (%)</b>	<b>Ward (Local authority)</b>	<b>% born outside Scotland</b>
Anderston/City/Yorkhill (Glasgow)	41.4	China (6.7)	City Centre (Edinburgh)	60.4
George St/Harbour (Aberdeen)	37.8	Nigeria (6.2)	Southside/Newington (Edinburgh)	56.1
City Centre (Edinburgh)	36.3	China (5.7)	Anderston/City/Yorkhill (Glasgow)	54.4
Tillydrone/Seaton/Old Aberdeen (Aberdeen)	34.9	Poland (11.2)	St Andrews	53.9
Southside/Newington (Edinburgh)	33.4	China (6.1)	Leith Walk (Edinburgh)	50.6
Southside Central (Glasgow)	32.3	Pakistan (9.4)	North Isles (Orkney Islands) <sup>a</sup>	50.4
Leith Walk (Edinburgh)	31.8	Poland (3.1)	Morningside (Edinburgh) <sup>a</sup>	48.0
Sighthill/Gorgie (Edinburgh)	29.8	India (6.0)	George St/Harbour (Aberdeen)	47.9
St Andrews	29.1	USA (9.0)	Hillhead (Glasgow)	44.0
Hillhead (Glasgow)	28.4	China (3.1)	Tillydrone/Seaton/Old Aberdeen (Aberdeen)	43.5

<sup>a</sup> 42.7% of the North Isles population and 22.2% of the Morningside population were born in England.

**Table 4: Ethnicity, Scotland (2001, 2011, 2022), England and Wales (2021)**

	<b>Scotland 2001</b>	<b>Scotland 2011</b>	<b>Scotland 2022</b>	<b>England 2021</b>	<b>Wales 2021</b>
	%	%	%	%	%
White British <sup>a</sup>	95.5	91.8	87.1	73.5	90.6
White Irish	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.4
White Gypsy/Traveller	N/A	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
White Polish	N/A	1.2	1.7	1.0	0.7
Other White	1.5 <sup>b</sup>	1.9	3.0	5.6	2.0
Mixed or Multiple	0.3	0.4	1.1	3.0	1.6
Pakistani	0.6	0.9	1.3	2.8	0.6
Indian	0.3	0.6	1.0	3.3	0.7
Bangladeshi	< 0.05	0.1	0.1	1.1	0.5
Chinese	0.3	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.5
Other Asian	0.1 <sup>c</sup>	0.4	0.6	1.7	0.7
(Black) African	0.1	0.6	1.1	2.6	0.6
(Black) Caribbean	< 0.05	0.1	0.1	1.6	0.2
Arab	N/A	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.4
<i>N</i>	<i>5,062,011</i>	<i>5,295,403</i>	<i>5,439,842</i>	<i>56,490,048</i>	<i>3,107,494</i>

<sup>a</sup> Also includes White Scottish, English, Welsh and Northern Irish. In Scotland in 2022, 88 per cent of this group identified as White Scottish

<sup>b</sup> includes all those who do not identify as either White British (including Scottish etc.) or White Irish, hence is not comparable with data for Other White in the other censuses in the table.

<sup>c</sup> in Scotland 2001, 'Other South Asian'

**Table 5: Ten electoral wards with lowest proportions of population identifying as White Scottish/British (Scotland 2022)**

<b>Ward (Local authority)</b>	<b>% White Scottish/British</b>	<b>Most populous ethnic minority (%)<sup>a</sup></b>
Anderston/City/Yorkhill (Glasgow)	51.3	Other White (9.7)
Southside Central (Glasgow)	51.9	Pakistani (18.5)
George St/Harbour (Aberdeen)	58.3	Other White (11.8)
Pollokshields (Glasgow)	58.5	Pakistani (23.2)
Tillydrone/Seaton/Old Aberdeen (Aberdeen)	59.6	White Polish (13.2)
City Centre (Edinburgh)	60.2	Other White (13.7)
Southside/Newington (Edinburgh)	61.4	Other White (12.3)
Hillhead (Glasgow)	61.4	Other White (9.2)
Leith Walk (Edinburgh)	62.6	Other White (13.7)
Sighthill/Gorgie (Edinburgh)	65.2	Other White (8.9)

<sup>a</sup> 'Other White' does *not* include White Irish, Gypsy/Traveller, or Polish

**Table 6: country of birth, migration into the UK during year preceding census, age of arrival and length of residence by ethnic group, Scotland 2022**

	% Born in UK	% Migrated to UK in year pre-census	% Arrived aged < 16 <sup>a</sup>	% Resident 10 years or more <sup>a</sup>	<i>N</i>
White Scottish/British	98.3	0.2	69.5	78.7	4,737,319
White Irish	63.1	3.3	35.4	66.7	56,877
White Gypsy/Traveller	89.1	1.3	25.1	27.3	3,343
White Polish	18.2	0.9	18.0	61.0	90,736
Other White	12.9	7.5	13.0	38.2	163,600
Mixed or Multiple	70.5	3.6	38.7	37.8	60,899
Pakistani	58.5	2.3	27.7	67.4	72,871
Indian	30.5	15.0	20.6	39.2	52,951
Bangladeshi	35.6	5.9	28.5	45.3	6,934
Chinese	25.7	23.5	14.7	37.3	47,075
Other Asian	20.2	12.7	23.7	45.5	32,187
African	23.8	14.7	29.5	36.5	58,636
Caribbean or Black	46.8	4.8	28.4	45.6	6,778
Arab	22.3	9.4	31.6	24.3	22,304

<sup>a</sup> Percentages in this column are based only on those **not** born in the UK, and thus smaller sub-populations than those shown in the final column of the table.

**Table 7: Educational qualifications and Occupational Social Class by ethnic group, Scotland 2022 (aged 16+ only)**

	White Scottish/ British	White Irish	White Gypsy/ Traveller	White Polish	Other White	Mixed/ Multiple	Pakistani	Indian	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Other Asian	African	Caribbean or Black	Arab
<b>% with No qualifications and % educated to degree level or higher</b>														
<b>No qualifications</b>	17.6	10.9	43.8	9.5	5.7	5.9	18.2	6.1	15.0	14.7	13.3	8.3	9.6	18.6
<b>Degree or higher</b>	29.7	54.2	15.0	40.6	59.0	48.7	38.1	68.2	45.3	54.6	50.7	57.0	43.7	46.9
<b>Occupational Social Class (NS-SEC simplified into 9 categories)</b>														
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Higher managerial/ professional</b>	11.8	20.0	3.6	6.8	17.2	14.6	9.8	23.8	10.0	11.0	9.5	10.0	10.8	11.8
<b>Lower managerial/ professional</b>	21.7	28.3	10.6	11.9	18.9	18.4	12.9	16.4	11.0	10.1	14.9	14.2	19.4	9.2
<b>Intermediate</b>	12.3	9.1	5.2	7.1	8.1	8.5	8.2	6.7	6.1	4.7	6.8	8.0	10.3	4.1
<b>Self-employed</b>	7.9	6.7	12.2	12.1	8.3	6.1	14.4	6.4	10.7	7.0	7.4	5.4	6.4	6.9
<b>Lower supervisory &amp; technical</b>	7.3	4.7	6.7	9.8	6.0	4.4	4.2	4.0	6.5	6.7	5.6	3.8	5.2	4.0
<b>Semi-routine</b>	11.6	7.0	10.8	10.3	7.4	7.3	10.2	6.1	8.2	5.0	10.2	10.4	9.8	4.3
<b>Routine</b>	13.8	8.3	17.1	27.3	11.4	8.3	6.1	5.7	10.5	7.7	10.8	9.1	11.9	6.5
<b>Never worked; long-term unemployed</b>	6.8	4.0	25.3	2.5	3.3	5.2	17.1	7.1	15.2	7.5	10.0	8.4	7.3	22.0
<b>Full-time student</b>	6.8	12.0	8.2	12.1	19.4	27.3	17.1	23.8	21.7	40.2	24.8	30.8	19.0	31.1
<b>N</b>	3,993,517	53,930	2,668	71,135	144,747	36,019	52,159	40,831	4,856	39,473	25,814	40,211	5,523	15,187



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<sup>1</sup> See <https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/sources/census>. The different UK censuses normally take place simultaneously, but the 2021 census was postponed for one year in Scotland owing to the Covid-19 pandemic.

<sup>2</sup> Data in all tables are rounded to one decimal place.

<sup>3</sup> See <https://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/2022-results/scotland-s-census-2022-demography-and-migration/>

<sup>4</sup> Note that the Census does not record age at arrival or length of residence *in Scotland*. These data are also based on *initial* arrival date, so we cannot assume that people have been living in the UK more or less continuously since they first arrived.

<sup>5</sup> Populations of these wards in the larger urban areas are typically around 25,000-35,000, but St Andrews only had a population of around 18,000 and North Isles (Orkney) only a little over 2,000.

<sup>6</sup> Henceforth, in the interests of brevity, I will refer to this group as White Scottish/British when it is considered as a whole rather than disaggregated.

<sup>7</sup> Again there are substantial differences between the White Scottish and other White British: in the latter group around 44 per cent are in managerial and professional categories and only about 17 per cent in the semi-routine and routine combined.

<sup>8</sup> Again a noticeably gendered phenomenon: nearly four times as many Pakistani men are self-employed than are women, even though the ethnic Pakistani population in Scotland is very evenly divided between men and women.

<sup>9</sup> See

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c05l9y56773o#:~:text=Net%20migration%20into%20the%20UK,as%20a%20long%20term%20average>.