



THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

Edinburgh Research Explorer

Residential concentration and political engagement among racialized Canadians

Citation for published version:

White, SE, Bilodeau, A, Turgeon, L & Henderson, A 2023, 'Residential concentration and political engagement among racialized Canadians: The moderating role of intragroup contact', *Political Geography*, vol. 107, 102971. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102971>

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

[10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102971](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102971)

Link:

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

Document Version:

Peer reviewed version

Published In:

Political Geography

General rights

Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



Abstract

Does living in communities with others from the same racialized minority background help or hinder political engagement? What role does social interaction with members of the same racialized minority group (intragroup contact) play? This paper addresses these questions with a systematic empirical investigation of political engagement in a large sample of racialized Canadians. Prior research assumes greater residential concentration of racialized group members leads to intragroup contact, but there is disagreement about whether the consequence is higher or lower levels of political engagement among members of racialized minority groups. We find no evidence that the residential concentration of Canadians from racialized groups has any independent effect on the political attitudes of racialized Canadians from the same groups. However, there is strong evidence of a more complex, conditional dynamic: if racialized minorities exhibit substantial intragroup social ties, then higher local concentrations of people from the same racial background leads to greater levels of political engagement among racialized minorities; however, if racialized minorities exhibit weak intragroup social ties, then higher local concentrations of people from the same racial background results in lower levels of political engagement among racialized minorities. Moreover, we find that, in part, this dynamic may be an indirect consequence of the ways in which non-racialized populations respond to local racial diversity. The findings may help to account for the incongruent results of previous studies of the effects of residential concentration on the political engagement of members of racialized minority groups.

Keywords: political engagement; diversity; race; spatial concentration

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 INTRODUCTION
9

10 There have been profound demographic shifts in many long-established liberal
11 democracies over the last several decades. For example, the number of migrants from
12 Asia and Africa residing in Europe and North America more than doubled between 1990
13 and 2020 (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021: 61, 74). More numerous than ever,
14 racialized populations in these liberal democracies nevertheless face distinctive
15 challenges because of their minority status. Hence, whether to protect hard-won gains, or
16 to combat marginalization, systemic discrimination, and unequal social and economic
17 outcomes, political engagement is an essential means by which people from racialized
18 minority backgrounds can defend and promote their political interests. Political
19 engagement includes not only participation in political activities, but also the
20 psychological motivations that lead people to pay attention to and want to take part in
21 politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995: 272; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry, 1996:
22 17).
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 Among the factors critical to the political engagement of racialized minority
34 populations, the spatial distribution of such populations has received considerable
35 scholarly attention. In many liberal democracies, notably in “traditional countries of
36 immigrant settlement” (Freeman, 2006) like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
37 United States, people from racialized minority backgrounds are more likely to live
38 relatively closely together in large urban areas (Johnston, Poulsen, & Forrest, 2007). The
39 accumulated evidence suggests that place matters when it comes to political engagement.
40 Many studies in different national settings find greater residential concentration of ethnic
41 and racial minority groups has a positive effect on their political participation
42 (Schlichting, Tuckel & Maisel, 1998; Leighley, 2001; Barreto, Segura & Woods, 2004;
43 Ramakrishnan, 2005; Bilodeau, 2009; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a, 2008b; Bhatti and
44 Hansen, 2016). Other researchers, however, have observed that racialized minorities are
45 less involved in politics when they live in areas with a higher concentration of people
46 from the same racialized group (Massey and Denton 1993; Cho, Gimpel, & Dyck, 2006;
47 Gidengil and Roy 2016). The reasons why residential concentration is associated with
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 greater political engagement in some places, but weaker engagement in others, have yet
5 to be identified.
6

7
8 In this study, we examine the role of intragroup social ties in moderating the
9 relationship between residential concentration and the political engagement of members
10 of racialized groups, focusing on psychological engagement with politics. Some studies
11 suggest intragroup social ties are more likely to emerge in places where racialized
12 populations reside in larger numbers (see Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a, 2008b). However, it
13 is possible that residential concentration might not increase intragroup social ties in all
14 contexts or for all groups, and although a number of studies examine the effects of
15 residential concentration on the political engagement of ethnic and racial minorities (see,
16 for example, Leighley, 2001; Barreto, Segura & Woods, 2004; Ramakrishnan, 2005;
17 Bilodeau, 2009; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a, 2008b; Bhatti and Hansen, 2016), and others
18 assess the effects of intragroup social ties on levels of political engagement among ethnic
19 and racial minorities (Berger et al. 2004; Togeby, 2004; Klandermans, van der Toorn, &
20 van Stekelenburg, 2008; Sanders et al. 2014), there is scant evidence of the
21 relationship(s) between all three factors at the individual level.
22
23

24
25 This study addresses the relationships between residential concentration,
26 intragroup social ties and psychological engagement with politics in a large sample of
27 racialized minorities living in the four Canadian provinces with the largest racialized
28 minority populations, namely Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta. Canada
29 has transformed into one of the most diverse places in the world in the last several
30 decades, and Canadians of colour now make up more than one fifth of the country's
31 population (Statistics Canada, 2017). Together with the growing number of racialized
32 Canadians is the emergence of a clear residential pattern. In 2016, 94 percent of
33 racialized Canadians resided in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, or BC, and two thirds lived in
34 the “gateway cities” of Montreal, Toronto, or Vancouver (Statistics Canada, 2018).¹
35 Moreover, within those three cities, residential concentration has also increased: the
36 proportion of racialized Torontonians and Vancouverites living in “enclaves” (areas
37 where a single ethno-racial minority group comprises the largest share of the population)
38 – 14 and 19 per cent in Toronto and Vancouver, respectively, in 1996 – reached 32 per
39 cent in both cities by 2011 (Hiebert, 2015). Canada thus would seem to be an ideal setting
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 to examine the relationship between residential concentration, intragroup social ties and
5 political engagement among members of racialized minority groups.
6
7

8 Contrary to many studies in other national contexts, we find no evidence that
9 residential concentration of Canadians from particular racialized groups has any
10 independent effect, positive or negative, on the political engagement of racialized
11 Canadians from the same groups. However, there is strong evidence of a more complex
12 dynamic, where intragroup social ties moderate the relationship between residential
13 concentration and political engagement. On the one hand, if racialized minorities exhibit
14 substantial intragroup social ties, then higher local concentrations of people from the
15 same racial background leads them to greater political engagement. On the other hand, if
16 racialized minorities exhibit weak intragroup social ties, then higher local concentrations
17 of people from the same racial background leads them to lower levels of political
18 engagement. The findings may help explain the disparate results in previous studies of
19 the effects of residential concentration on the political engagement of members of
20 racialized minority groups.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 33 RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATION AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

34 Many studies examine the relationship between residential concentration and political
35 engagement, but they propose different explanations and generate conflicting results.
36 Some researchers have suggested people from racialized backgrounds might be less
37 involved in politics when they live in areas with a higher concentration of people from
38 the same racialized group. Indeed, the limited evidence from Canada suggests residential
39 concentration may well hinder political engagement. Examining data from the Canadian
40 Election Studies 2000-2008, Gidengil and Roy (2016: 261) find that higher percentages
41 of “visible minorities” in federal electoral constituencies are linked to lower levels of
42 political party membership among all residents, less political discussion and political
43 knowledge among immigrants, and less frequent political protest among racialized
44 immigrants. Their study is consistent with a body of research linking the negative effect
45 of residential concentration on political engagement to the consequences of isolation.
46 Indeed, Massey and Denton (1993) argue “hyper-segregation” leads to a more general
47 social, economic, and political isolation of minority groups. Cho, Gimpel and Dyck
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 (2006), speculate that members of ethnic and racial minority groups might not develop
5 participatory attitudes and behaviours for a number of reasons, including “retreat from
6 the larger social environment” (Cho, Gimpel, & Dyck, 2006: 159). Indeed, Putnam’s
7 (2007) “hunkering down” thesis goes even further, suggesting greater ethnic and racial
8 diversity leads to withdrawal and isolation, and lower interpersonal trust, among *all*
9 members of the community. We refer to this as the *demobilization hypothesis*. If political
10 mobilization “is the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce
11 other people to participate” (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003: 26), then the demobilization
12 hypothesis suggests greater residential concentration of racialized minority groups
13 decreases the likelihood of political engagement.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22 However, a number of studies across different national settings find the opposite,
23 with greater residential concentration of ethnic and racial minority groups associated with
24 a positive effect on their political participation (Schlichting, Tuckel & Maisel, 1998;
25 Leighley, 2001; Barreto, Segura & Woods, 2004; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Bilodeau, 2009;
26 Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008a, 2008b; Bhatti and Hansen, 2016). In a study of two U.S.
27 cities, Schlichting, Tuckel, & Maisel (1998) demonstrate that Black voter participation is
28 higher in places where the surrounding area is more heavily populated by Black residents.
29 Leighley (2001) and Barreto, Segura, and Woods (2004) show Latinx participation is
30 more likely in areas with people from the same background, and Ramakrishnan (2005)
31 shows the same with respect to both Latinx and Asian immigrants in the U.S. In Britain,
32 Fieldhouse and Cutts find that electoral registration is higher among Muslims in areas
33 where Muslims are concentrated (2008a), and that turnout among Muslim, Hindu, and
34 Sikh religious minorities is higher in areas where those communities are concentrated
35 (2008b). In a study of Australia, Bilodeau (2009) finds that immigrants from southeast
36 Asia and southern and eastern Europe are more likely to discuss their vote intention,
37 work for a candidate, or attend a political meeting when they live in federal electoral
38 constituencies with larger concentrations of immigrants from the same country of origin.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53 This latter body of research generally emphasizes the role of social networks and
54 organizations to account for positive effects of residential concentration. First, it suggests
55 that residential concentration is associated with larger, denser social networks among
56 people from racialized and marginalized ethnic communities. Living in areas with people
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 from the same racial and/or ethnic background strengthens interpersonal trust and group
5 consciousness (Laurence & Heath, 2008; Wu et al., 2018), both of which, in turn, boost
6 civic engagement (Leighley 2001, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008a, 2008b, Bhatti and
7 Hansen 2016). Leighley (2001), employing a concept from Uhlaner (1989), uses the term
8 “relational goods” to describe these products of social interaction: they are benefits that
9 arise from relationships between people who share specific characteristics, and “can only
10 be ‘possessed’ by mutual agreement” (Uhlaner, 1989: 254). These relational goods
11 provide the motivation for political engagement, but also information that reduces the
12 costs of political activity. Social interaction may also be a way that minority group
13 members enforce pro-engagement political norms among their fellow members, a
14 phenomenon White and Laird (2020) refer to as *racialized social constraint* in their
15 explanation for strong Democratic Party support among Black Americans.
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Second, higher concentrations of members of racialized groups and their larger and denser social networks also create opportunities for political mobilization through greater numbers of civic associations (Bilodeau, 2009). Organizations with significant resources can emerge and grow within larger racialized communities, and there is some evidence that involvement in these organizations encourage political engagement among group members by direct and indirect means (Berger et al. 2004; Togeby, 2004; Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Sanders et al. 2014). Such organizations are sites where “relational goods” flourish, and members of racialized communities who participate in these organizations should therefore be more likely to develop intragroup trust and group consciousness. Ethno-racial minority group organizations also directly provide community members with political information and opportunities to engage in politics (Leighley, 2001). Political parties may also provide a pathway to political mobilization via ethno-racial minority community leaders. Uhlaner (1989) argues that leaders within ethno-racial minority communities mobilize their members to support candidates for particular parties; in exchange, the candidates support policies benefitting those communities (see also Bilodeau, 2009). As Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck (2006: 158) observe, parties focus their outreach and mobilization efforts on identifiable social groups, and that kind of strategy is more feasible when groups are geographically concentrated.

1
2
3
4 Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008a, 2008b) refer to this perspective, which emphasizes
5 relational goods and mobilizing organizations, as the mobilization hypothesis. The crucial
6 factor linking relational goods and mobilizing organizations is intragroup social ties, or
7 those social interactions between members of the same ethno-racial group. In many
8 respects, that assumption is consistent with research on social networks showing that
9 social connections are more likely to form in closer spatial proximity (propinquity), and
10 among those who share characteristics (homophily) (Kadushin, 2012: 18). In fact, ethno-
11 racial minorities show high degree of homophily (for a review, see McPherson, Smith-
12 Lovin & Cook, 2003).

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 The existing research thus suggests an uncomplicated set of relationships between
22 residential concentration, intragroup contact, and political engagement: greater residential
23 concentration leads to more intragroup contact, which, in turn, either fosters political
24 engagement (the mobilization hypothesis) *or* hinders political engagement (the
25 demobilization hypothesis). Yet, these relationships might not always be so
26 straightforward, as demonstrated by the divergent findings across different studies.
27 Indeed, there is wide variation among individual members of ethno-racial minority
28 groups with respect to the social ties they choose to foster, determined by individual
29 agency and multiple contextual factors (Berry, 1997). Berry's model of acculturation
30 contends that in plural societies, individuals from minority groups must work out
31 strategies concerning whether and how to maintain their cultural identities, as well as the
32 desirable amount of intragroup and intergroup contact (Berry, 1997: 9). Berry identifies
33 four strategies: *assimilation* (a weak desire to maintain identity combined with a strong
34 desire for intergroup contact rather than intragroup contact), *separation* (a strong desire
35 to maintain identity combined with a strong desire for intragroup contact rather than
36 intergroup contact), *integration* (a strong desire to maintain identity combined with a
37 desire for both intergroup and intragroup contact), and *marginalization* (a weak desire to
38 maintain identity combined with weak desire for any contact) (Ibid.). A significant body
39 of subsequent research has confirmed that different individuals from racial and ethnic
40 minority backgrounds adopt different strategies (Berry et al., 2006). In Canada, the
41 evidence is that integration is the predominant strategy among racialized immigrants
42 (Hou, Schellenberg, and Berry, 2018) and their children (Berry and Hou, 2017), but
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 *assimilation* is the preferred approach of a significant minority (Berry and Hou, 2016).
5
6 Accordingly, perhaps it should not be assumed that spatial proximity necessarily leads to
7
8 greater intragroup contact: members of minority groups take up varying approaches to
9
10 intergroup and intragroup contact.

11
12 Relaxing the assumption that spatial proximity necessarily leads to greater
13
14 intragroup contact opens other possibilities. In a study of the political participation of
15
16 immigrants in Amsterdam, Tillie (2004) proposed an explanatory model that considers
17
18 the interaction between the social ties and organizational memberships of individual
19
20 immigrants, and the contexts in which those individuals are situated. Tillie's argument
21
22 was that the social capital provided to immigrants by their social networks depends on
23
24 both the extent to which the individual immigrant is integrated in a network in a local
25
26 area, and the features of that network (Tillie, 2004: 539). In a neighborhood-level study
27
28 of Detroit, Marschall and Stolle (2004) found that the degree of social contact and the
29
30 racial composition of local neighbourhoods interacted to shape interpersonal trust among
31
32 Black residents. Like Marschall and Stolle (2004), we believe the relational goods that
33
34 emerge from social contact are determined by both context and individual characteristics.

35
36 We refer to this as the conditional mobilization hypothesis. Our core claim is that
37
38 the effects of residential concentration on political engagement depend on an individual's
39
40 level of intragroup contact. We propose two distinct mechanisms: one related to the
41
42 positive effects of intragroup contact, and another related to the negative effects of
43
44 residential concentration in the absence of intragroup contact.

45
46 Consistent with the mobilization hypothesis, we assume that intragroup contact is a
47
48 key channel through which racialized individuals become politically engaged, and that
49
50 the conditions for mobilization are better in settings with larger numbers of people from
51
52 the same racialized background (where more robust networks and community
53
54 organizations exist). However, we do not assume residential concentration and intragroup
55
56 contact go hand-in-hand. To the extent that these two factors are independent of one
57
58 another, one will not have a positive impact on political engagement without the other: a
59
60 higher-concentration context provides the conditions that make intragroup mobilization
61
62 possible, and frequent intragroup contact increases the probability of mobilization; they
63
64 jointly foster greater political engagement. Accordingly, we expect that more frequent
65

1
2
3
4 intragroup contact is more likely to raise political engagement among racialized
5 individuals in settings with high concentrations of people from the same racialized
6 background than in settings with very few people from the same background.
7
8

9
10 Drawing on claims from the demobilization hypothesis, we propose that the effects
11 of residential concentration are conditional on intragroup contact for another, very
12 different reason. Specifically, the possibility of racialized individuals becoming
13 mobilized politically through any channels *outside* of intragroup social networks
14 diminishes as the concentration of people from their racialized background increases.
15 That is, as the local size of a racialized group increases, the local environment beyond the
16 networks linked to that racialized group become less and less hospitable to political
17 engagement. We posit that infrequent intragroup contact is therefore more likely to
18 hamper political engagement in settings with high concentrations of people from the
19 same racialized background than in settings with very few people from the same
20 background.
21
22

23
24 The observable implication should be a divergence in the effects of residential
25 concentration: whereas racialized residents with frequent intragroup contact benefit from
26 the growing abundance of intragroup relational goods that comes with greater residential
27 concentration of their racialized group, racialized residents with little or no contact with
28 members of their own racialized group are disadvantaged by the growing scarcity of
29 *intergroup* relational goods that comes with greater residential concentration of their
30 racialized group. Since relational goods are psychological in nature (Uhlener, 1989: 255),
31 we formalize this reasoning in two hypotheses focused on the attitudinal antecedents of
32 political participation (psychological engagement with politics):
33
34

35
36 Hypothesis 1a: Psychological engagement with politics *increases* as the share of
37 the local population from the same racialized group increases, on
38 the condition that racialized individuals have *frequent* contact with
39 members of the same racialized group.
40
41

42
43 Hypothesis 1b: Psychological engagement with politics *decreases* as the share of
44 the local population from the same racialized group increases, on
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 the condition that racialized individuals have *infrequent* contact
5 with members of the same racialized group.
6
7
8
9

10 As a next step, we explore why residential concentration might be associated with
11 political disengagement when racialized individuals have infrequent intragroup contact.
12 We contend the crucial factor is the response of the *non-racialized* population to greater
13 diversity. Although Putnam (2007) suggested greater local diversity might lead to
14 withdrawal and isolation among all community members (“hunkering down”), most
15 research suggests a negative relationship between local diversity and social and political
16 engagement is more likely to be observed in ethnic and racial *majority* populations:
17 greater ethnic and racial diversity at the local level inhibits civic engagement among
18 those in the majority. In the United States, for example, Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) find
19 majority “Anglo” populations in areas with larger minority populations respond to greater
20 diversity by withdrawing from, rather than engaging in, costly, conflictual politics (see
21 also Oliver 1996, Leighley, 2001: 146). Similarly, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010)
22 demonstrate greater neighbourhood diversity is associated with lower social capital
23 among white, but not racialized, populations in both the United States and Britain. In
24 Canada, Wu et al. (2018) show interpersonal trust tends to increase among racialized
25 Canadians when they live in areas with more people from the same racialized group,
26 whereas interpersonal trust among white Canadians *declines* in areas largely populated by
27 one racialized group.
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43 How might this negative response to greater local diversity by white populations
44 affect racialized individuals who have minimal contact with members of their own
45 racialized group? We believe it restricts racialized individuals’ pathways for political
46 mobilization outside of their own co-ethnic networks. For an overwhelming number of
47 racialized Canadians, the white local population is either the majority or the single-largest
48 group outside that racialized individual’s own group.² If white populations in areas with
49 high concentrations of racialized residents are systematically disengaged from politics,
50 then the social environment for racialized residents outside of their co-ethnic networks is
51 unlikely to foster political engagement.
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Hypothesis 2: White individuals’ psychological engagement with politics
5
6 decreases as the proportion of the local population that is racialized
7
8 increases.
9

10
11 Although it is not possible with our data to demonstrate a direct link between
12
13 levels of political engagement among white local populations and individuals from
14
15 racialized groups, empirical support for hypothesis 2 would be consistent with the idea
16
17 that the environment in more racially diverse areas is less likely to encourage political
18
19 engagement outside of intragroup contact.
20

21 22 23 24 DATA AND METHODS

25
26 This investigation employs survey data from a study of mass opinions, attitudes, and
27
28 behaviours of Canadians, focused on issues of identity and attachment, federalism,
29
30 ethnocultural diversity and immigration.³ The survey, conducted online in January and
31
32 February 2014, includes a representative sample of the adult Canadian population
33
34 (n=6400), as well as a special sample of 1600 respondents from racialized backgrounds in
35
36 Canada’s four most diverse provinces: Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia (n
37
38 = 400 in each province). We restrict our analysis to this latter sample of racialized
39
40 Canadians to assess hypotheses 1a and 1b. We employ the main sample to assess the
41
42 relationship between local diversity and the attitudes of white Canadians (hypothesis 2).
43

44 For the purposes of this study, our definition and measurement of racialized
45
46 individuals is consistent with the Statistics Canada definition, following Canada’s
47
48 *Employment Equity Act* of “visible minority of person.” This is defined as “persons,
49
50 other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour”
51
52 and “consists mainly of the following groups: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West
53
54 Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, Japanese and Korean” (Statistics
55
56 Canada, 2023). In this study, we restrict the analysis to self-identified members of only
57
58 these groups. Indigenous peoples in Canada are also “racialized,” but deserve separate
59
60 consideration because of their unique history and constitutional position.
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Data for local area characteristics are drawn from the 2011 National Household
5 Survey (NHS). These data are aggregated at the Forward Sortation Area (FSA) level,
6 geographic units containing an average of 8,000 households (range 0-60,000) (Census
7 Canada, 2011). The NHS data are matched to 1407 racialized respondents in a total of
8 507 FSAs in the sample of racialized Canadians, and to 5192 white respondents in a total
9 of 1216 FSAs in the main sample. The median and mean number of racialized
10 respondents per FSA is 2.00 and 2.78, respectively (standard deviation = 2.69); there are
11 220 FSAs with only 1 racialized respondent, and the maximum number of racialized
12 respondents in a single FSA is 22.
13
14

15
16 The dependent variables in the analysis represent three key attitudinal dimensions
17 of psychological engagement with politics. The first is interest in politics, defined by
18 Luskin (1990) as the internal motivation to “notice” and “think more seriously” about
19 political information. The second, sense of civic duty, concerns a particular norm of
20 citizenship, and captures individuals’ beliefs about whether they have an obligation to
21 participate in politics (Dalton, 2008). The third, external efficacy, is an individual’s belief
22 that those in power will be responsive to citizens (Lane, 1959). Each represents a
23 different feature of the individual’s subjective connection to the political sphere, and each
24 has been empirically linked to political activity (see Clarke & Acock, 1989; Verba,
25 Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Blais, 2000).
26
27

28
29 The dependent variables are summarized in Table 1. Three features of these
30 variables should be noted. First, our measure of civic duty applies only to citizens, and
31 who are therefore eligible to vote in Canadian elections.⁴ Second, given that Canada is a
32 federal system, each measure is a composite of two indicators: one for which federal
33 politics is the attitude object, and another for which provincial politics is the attitude
34 object. Third, our efficacy measure is, in effect, a measure of *inefficacy*, and will be
35 interpreted accordingly.
36
37

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54 - Table 1 About Here -
55
56

57
58 In testing hypotheses, our approach is to compare levels of political engagement
59 of individuals from racialized backgrounds who reside in local areas with varying
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 concentrations of persons from the same background. This is accomplished by pairing
5 each survey respondent with FSA-level NHS population data. Survey respondents were
6 asked to select one or more “racial or ethnic groups” to which they belong, from a set of
7 categories matching those of the NHS.⁵ NHS population counts for the relevant FSA
8 were then matched to respondents. Our measure of the residential concentration of
9 racialized groups is group size: the population count of each respondent’s group in each
10 respondent’s FSA, divided by the total population count in each respondent’s FSA. To
11 capture the non-linear effects of group size in our analyses, we also employ a quadratic
12 term (group size squared).
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21 The survey and NHS data related to racialized groups, and their residential
22 concentration, is summarized in Table 2. The racialized sample data are weighted by
23 sociodemographic characteristics (sex, age, education, language, and race/ethnicity) to be
24 representative of populations within provinces. Accordingly, the distribution of racialized
25 respondents in the weighted sample data largely corresponds to that of the population,
26 and therefore sample bias is unlikely to significantly affect the results of our analysis.
27
28 Table 2 shows a modest under-representation of Filipino, Arab, Latin American,
29 Southeast Asian, and West Asian populations, and slight over-representation of Chinese,
30 Black, Japanese, and Korean populations in the weighted data (Appendix table A3, which
31 presents a detailed demographic comparison of the unweighted and weighted sample, and
32 the population, shows that even the unweighted sample largely reflects the population⁶).
33
34 The sizes of the groups vary considerably, with South Asian and Chinese respondents
35 each constituting approximately one quarter of the sample. Residential concentrations
36 also show marked variation within and across respondent groups. Mean group population
37 as a percentage of the total local population exhibits a pattern similar to group size and is
38 highest for South Asian and Chinese respondents.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52 - Table 2 About Here -
53
54

55
56 Intragroup contact is measured by the self-reported frequency with which
57 racialized individuals’ interact with members of the same group. Survey respondents
58 were asked how often they engage in a number of different social activities, one of which
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 was “[s]pend time with people of the same ethnic background as you (aside from your
5 family).” Responses were coded from zero to three, with “not at all” coded zero, “only a
6 few times a year” coded one, “once or twice a month” coded two, and “every week”
7 coded three. We note that one limitation of using this measure is that it leaves
8 respondents to interpret for themselves the meaning of “same ethnic background as you.”
9 This measure is “noisy” to the extent that respondents’ interpretations do not match their
10 self-reported racial identities.
11

12
13
14
15
16
17 The data reveal that residential concentration and intragroup contact are weakly
18 related. Table 3 reports respondents’ frequency of intragroup contact by the size of their
19 group (as proportion of the population) living in the local area (divided approximately
20 into quintiles). Contact does increase as the proportion of the population from the same
21 racialized group increases. The percentage of respondents with weekly intragroup contact
22 nearly doubles, from 13.7 to 24.4 per cent, as the proportion of the population from
23 respondents’ group increases from two to five percent to five to ten per cent. However, a
24 significant number of respondents have no contact at all with others from the same
25 background regardless of the level of residential concentration in their local area, and
26 many have weekly contact irrespective of where they live. Thus, the link between
27 residential concentration and intragroup contact appears to be modest (Spearman’s $\rho =$
28 0.13), underscoring the need to examine whether and how intragroup contact moderates,
29 rather than mediates, the relationship between residential concentration and political
30 engagement.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44 - Table 3 About Here -
45
46
47

48 We employ a multivariate approach. At the individual level, we control for
49 standard sociodemographic influences on political engagement: education, income, age,
50 and gender. We also hold constant individual-level factors that are particularly relevant to
51 racialized populations. First, because many racialized residents of Canada are foreign-
52 born, we control for citizenship status and length of residence in Canada. Second,
53 because Canada’s South Asian and Chinese origin populations are by far the most
54 concentrated groups, we include controls for differences between these and other
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 racialized individuals. We also control for frequency general interpersonal contact, as we
5 want to isolate the effects of contact with one's own racial group from social contact in
6 general. At the local level, we control for the share of the population with post-secondary
7 education, median income and the share of the population with low incomes, and
8 province.⁷

9
10
11
12
13 We use a similar, but simplified, approach to test whether the political
14 engagement of white individuals decreases as the share of the local population who are
15 racialized increases (hypothesis 2). The hypothesis is motivated by the idea that members
16 of racialized groups in different local contexts face different social environments outside
17 of their same-group networks. Specifically, racialized individuals encounter white
18 populations with systematically different political attitudes, depending on the local
19 context: in areas with smaller racialized populations, white residents will be relatively
20 engaged politically, but in areas with large racialized populations, white residents will be
21 relatively disengaged. Accordingly, the relationship of interest is the zero-order
22 relationship between white individuals' engagement and the size of the local racialized
23 population; controls are unnecessary. Our measure is the proportion of the local
24 population from the single largest racialized group. To capture the non-linear effects of
25 the size of the racialized population in our analyses, we also employ a quadratic term.⁸

36 37 38 39 RESULTS

40
41 Our analysis starts by examining the mobilization hypothesis: the idea that greater group
42 residential concentration leads to more intragroup contact, and in turn greater political
43 engagement. We employ linear regression, with standard errors clustered within FSAs, to
44 estimate the effects of: 1) the share of the population in each local area from the same
45 background as the respondent; 2) frequency of intragroup contact; and 3) both. Separate
46 regression models are estimated for each of the three dependent variables. For each
47 model 1 in Table 4, the group share parameter is positively signed, and the quadratic
48 parameter, group share², is negatively signed, indicating a non-linear relationship.
49 However, the joint p-values of these parameters, ranging from 0.13 (civic duty) to 0.96
50 (inefficacy), show that these effects are not statistically different from zero. Contrary to
51 the findings of many studies in other national settings, there is no evidence that the
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 political engagement of racialized Canadians increases with residential concentration of
5 racialized persons from the same background. Moreover, although greater intragroup
6 contact is positively associated with political engagement, the evidence is modest at best.
7
8 As seen in model 2, intragroup contact has no statistically significant effects on interest in
9 politics, sense of civic duty, or inefficacy (although as table A1 shows, it does have a
10 modest positive effect on civic duty when only residential concentration is held constant:
11 $b = 0.17, p < 0.001$). The combined effects of these (model 3), tell essentially the same
12 story.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21 - Table 4 About Here -
22
23

24 At first blush, a reasonable interpretation of these results is that residential
25 concentration has no discernible effect because the crucial mechanism in the mobilization
26 hypothesis, intragroup contact, turns out to be of little consequence. In sum, there is no
27 evidence of independent effects of residential concentration or intragroup contact on the
28 political engagement of racialized individuals, and further, there is no evidence
29 residential concentration and intragroup contact are connected.
30
31
32
33
34

35 Our expectation, the conditional mobilization hypothesis, is that the effects of
36 residential concentration on political engagement are moderated by intragroup contact: if
37 an ethno-racial minority group comprises a significant proportion of the local population,
38 then the political engagement of individuals from that group should depend on the
39 frequency with which they interact with members of that group. An empirical test of this
40 expectation requires introducing multiplicative interaction terms to the regression model
41 (intragroup contact*group share, and intragroup contact*group share²). These allow us to
42 estimate if, and how much, the relationship between residential concentration and
43 political engagement changes as levels of intragroup contact change. The most important
44 evidence from the model estimates, presented in Table 5, is the joint p-values of the pairs
45 of interaction terms. These indicate whether the difference in differences – the difference
46 in the effect of intragroup contact at different values of group share – is statistically
47 significant. The results show that the interaction effects for political interest and sense of
48 civic duty have joint p-values below 0.01.
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4
5
6 - Table 5 About Here -
7
8
9

10 The two interaction parameters capture the non-linear interaction between group
11 share and intragroup contact, but they defy straightforward interpretation. Recall that our
12 hypotheses suggest there are two possible mechanisms at work: residential concentration
13 might be more likely to foster political engagement when intragroup contact is high
14 (hypothesis 1a), or residential concentration might be more likely to produce
15 disengagement when intragroup contact is low (hypothesis 1b). One, or both, of these
16 mechanisms could be at work. To interpret the interaction effects, we use the estimates in
17 table 5 to derive the marginal effects of group size on political interest and sense of civic
18 duty, at different levels of intragroup contact. Moreover, the evidence in table 5 also
19 indicates these relationships are non-linear, such that the magnitude of the effects of
20 group size change as group size increases. Accordingly, we also derive the marginal
21 effects of group size at varying group sizes. We express group size in percentage terms,
22 rather than proportions, in order to illustrate the marginal effect of a one percent increase
23 in residential concentration.
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35 The estimates presented in figures 1 and 2 show that for two of three outcomes of
36 interest, the effects of residential concentration are powerfully conditioned by intragroup
37 contact. These figures report the marginal effects of residential concentration at varying
38 levels of residential concentration under two conditions: no intragroup contact and
39 weekly intragroup contact. The data in both figures tell essentially the same story: among
40 racialized minorities who have no intragroup contact, the effect of residential
41 concentration on racialized group members' interest in politics and sense of civic duty
42 becomes increasingly *negative* as the concentration of racialized minority groups
43 increases (panel A of figures 1 and 2, respectively); conversely, among racialized
44 minorities who have frequent intragroup contact, the effect of the residential
45 concentration on interest in politics and sense of civic duty becomes increasingly *positive*
46 as the concentration of racialized minority groups increases (panel B of figures 1 and 2,
47 respectively).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 - Figure 1 About Here -
5
6
7

8 - Figure 2 About Here -
9

10
11 Residential concentration has statistically significant (positive and negative) effects, but
12 only when residential concentration is relatively high. Among racialized minorities who
13 have weekly intragroup contact, residential concentration has a discernible positive
14 impact on an individual's interest in politics when the same-group proportion of the local
15 population reaches about 35 percent (approximately one tenth of the sample resided in
16 areas with a concentration of people from the same racialized background that is at least
17 this high). Likewise, residential concentration has a positive impact on an individual's
18 sense of civic that is statistically different from zero only when the same-group
19 proportion of the local population reaches about 30 percent (approximately 12.5 percent
20 of the sample resided in areas with a concentration at least this high). Among racialized
21 minorities who have no intragroup contact, residential concentration has no statistically
22 significant negative impact on an individual's interest in politics until the same-group
23 proportion of the local population is about 30 percent, and no discernible negative impact
24 on an individual's sense of civic duty until the share of the population from the same
25 racialized group is 24 percent (about one fifth of the sample resided in areas with a
26 concentration at least this high).
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 Most importantly for the purposes of this study, the estimates reported in figures 1
43 and 2 show that residential concentration is more likely to foster political engagement
44 when frequent intragroup contact is high (hypothesis 1a), whereas residential
45 concentration is more likely to produce disengagement when there is lack of intragroup
46 contact (hypothesis 1b). Put differently, there is strong evidence that higher
47 concentrations of racialized groups promote political engagement, but only among
48 racialized individuals who have social contact within their racialized communities.
49 Among racialized individuals without those intragroup ties, higher residential
50 concentration appears to discourage political engagement.⁹ One potential weakness of
51 these results is the possibility the interactions between intragroup contact and
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 concentration are confounded by some other interaction, involving intragroup contact and
5 a third variable, or residential concentration and a third variable. However, we hope to
6 provide further empirical support for the conditional mobilization hypothesis with our
7 second empirical test.
8
9

10
11 Our second empirical test focuses on the white population, which is a numerical
12 majority in most local areas in Canada. Our final expectation, hypothesis 2, relates to
13 how higher residential concentration of racialized groups reduces political engagement of
14 members of those groups who have no ties to their racialized communities. We argue the
15 social environment outside of co-ethnic networks is unlikely to foster political
16 engagement in local areas with high concentrations of racialized residents because of the
17 way white populations respond to local diversity. The results of the analysis reported in
18 table 6 and illustrated in figure 3 are consistent with hypothesis 2: the larger that the
19 single largest racialized group is as a proportion of the local population, the weaker white
20 residents' political interest (panel A in figure 3) and sense of civic duty (panel B), and the
21 greater their political inefficacy (panel C). Wherever specific racialized communities are
22 strongest in number, white populations are more likely to be *disengaged* politically. In
23 fact, the slopes of the relationships in figure 3 are strikingly similar to those of racialized
24 individuals with low intragroup contact in figures 1 and 2. This is consistent with the idea
25 that racialized individuals living in local areas with large numbers of members of the
26 same racialized group are less likely to encounter alternative channels to political
27 mobilization outside of their racialized communities. The concentration of racialized
28 groups has a statistically significant negative impact on white individuals' political
29 attitudes when the residential concentration of at least one racialized group reaches about
30 30 percent. Only 2.5 percent of the white sample, but 22 percent of the racialized sample,
31 resided in areas with a concentration at least this high. It turns out that white residents
32 and *some* racialized residents in highly diverse areas exhibit attitudes consistent with
33 "hunkering down" (Putnam, 2007). The clear exception is racialized residents with
34 frequent intragroup contact, for whom a high residential concentration of members of
35 their own group encourages political engagement.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

59 - Table 6 About Here -
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4
5
6 - Figure 3 About Here -
7
8
9

10 CONCLUSIONS

11 A number of studies show people from racialized backgrounds are more involved in
12 politics whenever they live in areas with a higher concentration of people from the same
13 racialized group. Most of these studies suggest intragroup contact is an important
14 mechanism by which residential concentration works to boost political engagement:
15 residential concentration leads to more opportunities for intragroup contact, which in turn
16 increases the likelihood of political engagement. None have empirically assessed the
17 relationships between intragroup contact, residential concentration, and political
18 engagement using individual-level data. The first contribution of this study has been to
19 engage in an empirical examination of these relationships using a combination of
20 individual-level and contextual data that has allowed us to match racialized respondents
21 from various backgrounds (for example, Black, Filipino, Korean) to the proportion of
22 people from the same group in the place those respondents reside.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 Our second contribution has been to advance, with empirical support, the
34 conditional mobilization hypothesis: an argument that intragroup contact and levels of
35 residential concentration interact to influence political engagement among racialized
36 populations. The assumption of most research is that residential concentration and
37 intragroup contact are related. However, members of racialized groups adopt a variety of
38 approaches to living together, which are not necessarily linked to how many co-residents
39 share their racial background. Consequently, we explore the implications of assuming
40 residential concentration and intragroup contact are independent. In so doing, we heed
41 Tillie's (2004) more general call for researchers to examine the interaction between
42 individual members of minority groups and the local context. Our results show that
43 whether residential concentration matters or not really depends on individuals' intragroup
44 contacts, and vice versa. Far from being a problematic source of political marginalization
45 for racialized Canadians, so-called "enclaves" have the potential to empower members of
46 ethno-racial minority groups who have frequent contact with members of their racialized
47 communities. For these individuals, living in settings with larger numbers of people from
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 the same racialized background fosters political engagement. Racialized Canadians
5 without any contact with others from the same racialized background are more likely to
6 become marginalized when they live in “enclaves.” In the absence of intragroup contact,
7 political engagement among members of racialized groups would be much weaker in the
8 very places where racialized populations are most concentrated. The findings also suggest
9 residential concentration affects the political engagement of a relatively small fraction of
10 racialized Canadians, namely those living in areas with particularly dense concentrations
11 of co-residents from the same racialized background (that is, areas in which perhaps one
12 quarter or more of residents share the same background). Nevertheless, the potential
13 impact of residential concentration in the future is considerably larger, as both the size
14 and spatial concentration of racialized populations continue to grow.

15
16 The third contribution of this study has been to highlight the potential
17 significance, with respect to the political mobilization of racialized individuals, of the
18 response of non-racialized populations to local diversity. The ways in which non-
19 racialized, national majority populations react to local demographic change may have
20 important, indirect contextual effects on the attitudes and behaviours of racialized
21 individuals. We explored one possible effect, demonstrating that white populations in
22 areas where a large proportion of the local population are members of a racialized group
23 exhibit relatively low political engagement. This may partially explain why racialized
24 individuals without strong intragroup ties are less engaged politically, especially when
25 they live in areas with high concentrations of people from the same racialized
26 background: outside their racialized community, there are fewer avenues for political
27 mobilization. Moreover, it suggests a partial explanation for some of the contradictory
28 findings across different studies of the effects of residential concentration: the extent to
29 which the residential concentration of racialized and ethnic minority groups has positive
30 or negative effects on the political engagement of those groups may depend on the
31 strength of the relationship between residential concentration and intragroup contact. In
32 contexts where the latter relationship is strong, we might expect to find a positive
33 relationship between the residential concentration and political engagement of racialized
34 and ethnic minority groups. In contexts where residential concentration and intragroup
35 contact are weakly related, like Canada, we might expect to find a weak or negative

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

relationship between the residential concentration and political engagement of racialized and ethnic minority groups. This complex relationship between majority and minority populations and the local context merits further study.

1
2
3
4
5
6 REFERENCES
7
8
9

10 Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura, and Nathan D. Woods. "The mobilizing effect of
11 majority–minority districts on Latino turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98, no.
12 1 (2004): 65-75.
13
14

15
16
17 Berger, M., Galonka, C., and Ruud Koopmans. 2007. "Political engagement by a Detour?
18 Ethnic Communities and Social Capital of Migrants in Berlin." *Journal of Ethnic and*
19 *Migration Studies* 30, no. 3 (2007): 491-507.
20
21

22
23
24 Berry, J.W., 1997. "Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation." *Applied psychology* 46,
25 no. 1 (1997): 5-34.
26
27

28
29
30 Berry, John W., Jean S. Phinney, David L. Sam, and Paul Vedder. "Immigrant youth:
31 Acculturation, identity, and adaptation." *Applied psychology* 55, no. 3 (2006): 303-332.
32
33

34
35 Berry, J. W., & Hou, F. (2016). Immigrant acculturation and wellbeing in
36 Canada. *Canadian Psychology/psychologie canadienne*, 57(4), 254.
37
38

39
40
41 Berry, J. W., & Hou, F. (2017). Acculturation, discrimination and wellbeing among
42 second generation of immigrants in Canada. *International Journal of Intercultural*
43 *Relations*, 61, 29-39.
44
45

46
47
48 Bhatti, Yosef, and Kasper M. Hansen. "The effect of residential concentration on voter
49 turnout among ethnic minorities." *International Migration Review* 50, no. 4 (2016): 977-
50 1004.
51
52

53
54
55 Bilodeau, Antoine. "Residential segregation and the electoral participation of immigrants
56 in Australia." *International Migration Review* 43, no. 1 (2009): 134-159.
57
58
59
60
61
62

1
2
3
4 Blais, André. *To vote or not to vote?: The merits and limits of rational choice theory*.
5
6 University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2000.
7
8

9
10 Census Canada, "2011 National Household Survey, Forward Sortation Area (FSA) Level
11 [custom tabulation]", <http://hdl.handle.net/10864/10517> Map and Data Library,
12
13 University of Toronto [Distributor] V3 [Version]
14
15

16
17 Cho, Wendy K. Tam, James G. Gimpel, and Joshua J. Dyck. "Residential concentration,
18 political socialization, and voter turnout." *Journal of Politics* 68, no. 1 (2006): 156-167.
19
20

21
22 Clarke, Harold D., and Alan C. Acock. "National elections and political attitudes: The
23 case of political efficacy." *British Journal of Political Science* 19, no. 4 (1989): 551-562.
24
25

26
27 Fieldhouse, Edward, and David Cutts. "Mobilisation or marginalisation? Neighbourhood
28 effects on Muslim electoral registration in Britain in 2001." *Political Studies* 56, no. 2
29 (2008a): 333-354.
30
31

32
33 Fieldhouse, Edward, and David Cutts. "Diversity, density and turnout: The effect of
34 neighbourhood ethno-religious composition on voter turnout in Britain." *Political*
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

66
67 Fieldhouse, Edward, and David Cutts. "Does diversity damage social capital? A
68 comparative study of neighbourhood diversity and social capital in the US and
69 Britain." *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science*
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

101
102 Freeman, Gary P. "National models, policy types, and the politics of immigration in
103 liberal democracies." *West European Politics* 29, no. 2 (2006): 227-247.
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

1
2
3
4 Gidengil, Elisabeth, and Jason Roy. "Is There a Racial Divide? Immigrants of Visible
5 Minority Background in Canada." *Just Ordinary Citizens? Toward a Comparative*
6 *Portrait of the Political Immigrant* (2015).
7
8
9

10
11 Hiebert, Daniel. Ethnocultural minority enclaves in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.
12 Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2015.
13
14
15

16
17 Hou, F., Schellenberg, G., & Berry, J. (2018). Patterns and determinants of immigrants'
18 sense of belonging to Canada and their source country. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 41(9),
19 1612-1631.
20
21
22

23
24 Johnston, Ron, Michael Poulsen, and James Forrest. "The geography of ethnic residential
25 segregation: A comparative study of five countries." *Annals of the Association of*
26 *American Geographers* 97, no. 4 (2007): 713-738.
27
28
29

30
31 Kadushin, Charles. Understanding social networks: Theories, concepts, and findings.
32 Oxford University Press, 2012.
33
34
35

36
37 Klandermans, Bert, Jojanneke Van der Toorn, and Jacqueliën Van Stekelenburg.
38 "Embeddedness and identity: How immigrants turn grievances into action." *American*
39 *Sociological Review* 73, no. 6 (2008): 992-1012.
40
41
42

43
44 Laurence, J., & Heath, A. (2008). *Predictors of community cohesion: multi-level*
45 *modelling of the 2005 Citizenship Survey*. Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local
46 Government.
47
48
49

50
51 Leighley, Jan E. *Strength in numbers?: The political mobilization of racial and ethnic*
52 *minorities*. Princeton University Press, 2001.
53
54
55

56
57 Leighley, Jan E., and Arnold Vedlitz. "Race, ethnicity, and political participation:
58 Competing models and contrasting explanations." *The Journal of Politics* 61, no. 4
59 (1999): 1092-1114.
60
61
62

1
2
3
4
5
6 Luskin, Robert C. "Explaining political sophistication." *Political behavior* 12, no. 4
7
8 (1990): 331-361.
9

10
11 Martin, N. "Are British Muslims alienated from mainstream politics by Islamophobia and
12 British foreign policy?" *Ethnicities* 17, no. 3 (2016): 350-370.
13
14

15
16
17 Marschall, M. J., & Stolle, D. (2004). Race and the city: Neighborhood context and the
18 development of generalized trust. *Political behavior* 26(2): 125-153.
19
20

21
22 Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. *American apartheid: Segregation and the*
23 *making of the underclass*. Harvard University Press, 1993.
24
25

26
27
28 McAuliffe, M. and A. Triandafyllidou (eds.), 2021. *World Migration Report 2022*.
29 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva.
30
31 for Migration (IOM), Geneva.
32
33

34
35 Miller McPherson, J., Smith-Lovin, L. and Cook, J.M. "Birds of a feather: Homophily in
36 social networks." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, no. 1 (2001): 415-444.
37
38

39
40
41 Oliver, J. Eric. "The effects of eligibility restrictions and party activity on absentee voting
42 and overall turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* (1996): 498-513.
43
44

45
46 Putnam, Robert D. "E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty- first
47 century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian political studies* 30, no. 2
48 (2007): 137-174.
49
50

51
52
53 Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick. *Democracy in immigrant America: Changing demographics*
54 *and political participation*. Stanford University Press, 2005.
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. *Mobilization, participation, and*
5 *democracy in America*. Pearson Education, 2003.
6
7
8
9

10 Sanders, David, Stephen D. Fisher, Anthony Heath, and Maria Sobolewska. "The
11 democratic engagement of Britain's ethnic minorities." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37, no.
12 1 (2014): 120-139.
13
14
15

16
17 Schlichting, Kurt, Peter Tuckel, and Richard Maisel. "Racial segregation and voter
18 turnout in urban America." *American Politics Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (1998): 218-236.
19
20
21

22 Statistics Canada. Visible Minority (15), Age (15A), Sex (3) and Selected Demographic,
23 Cultural, Labour Force, Educational and Income Characteristics (900) for the Population
24 in Private Households of Canada, Provinces and Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas
25 and Census Agglomerations, 2016 Census - 25% Sample Data [Data Table]
26
27 [https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-
28 eng.cfm?TABID=2&LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&G
29 C=933&GK=10&GRP=1&PID=112451&PRID=10&PTYPE=109445&S=0&SHOWAL
30 L=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2017&THEME=120&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=
31
32
33
34
35
36
37 \(Accessed August 3, 2022\)
38
39
40](https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/dt-td/Rp-eng.cfm?TABID=2&LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=933&GK=10&GRP=1&PID=112451&PRID=10&PTYPE=109445&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=2017&THEME=120&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=)

41 Statistics Canada. "Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity: Key Results from the 2016
42 Census. (October 25, 2017) [https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/daily-
43 quotidien/171025/dq171025b-eng.pdf?st=pbUN3Ifu](https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/daily-quotidien/171025/dq171025b-eng.pdf?st=pbUN3Ifu) (Accessed August 3, 2022)
44
45
46
47

48 Statistics Canada. "Visible Minority of Person."
49 <https://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p3Var.pl?Function=DECI&Id=62026>
50
51
52 (Accessed May 24, 2023)
53
54

55 Tillie, Jean. "Social capital of organisations and their members: Explaining the political
56 integration of immigrants in Amsterdam." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30,
57 no. 3 (2004): 529-541.
58
59
60
61
62

1
2
3
4
5
6 Togeby, Lise. "It depends... how organisational participation affects political
7 participation and social trust among second- generation immigrants in
8 Denmark." *Journal of ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3 (2004): 509-528.
9

10
11
12
13 Uhlaner, Carole Jean. "'Relational goods' and participation: Incorporating sociability
14 into a theory of rational action." *Public choice* 62, no. 3 (1989): 253-285.
15
16
17

18
19 Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. *Voice and equality: Civic*
20 *voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press, 1995.
21
22

23
24 White, Ismail K., and Chryl Nicole Laird. *Steadfast Democrats : How Social Forces*
25 *Shape Black Political Behavior*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2020.
26
27
28

29
30 Wu, Zheng, Feng Hou, Christoph Schimmele, and Adam Carmichael. "Co-ethnic
31 concentration and trust in Canada's urban neighbourhoods." *Urban Studies* 55, no. 10
32 (2018): 2159-2178.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Table 1. Dependent Variables

Variable	Item wording	Construction and coding
Interest in politics	“On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no interest at all and 10 means a great deal of interest, what is your level of interest in [federal politics/the politics of your province]?”	Mean value of responses to both questions ^a 0 = no interest at all at both levels 10 = a great deal of interest at both levels
Sense of civic duty	“I would feel very guilty if I didn't vote in a [federal/provincial] election.” (0=strongly disagree, 1 = somewhat disagree, 2= somewhat agree, 3 = strongly agree)	Mean value of responses to both questions ^a 0 = low sense of duty 3 = high sense of duty
Political Inefficacy	People like me don't have much say in what the [federal/provincial] government does. (0=strongly disagree, 1 = somewhat disagree, 2= somewhat agree, 3 = strongly agree)	Mean value of responses to both questions ^a 0 = low sense of inefficacy 3 = high sense of inefficacy

^aWhere a response to one question is missing (unable or refused to answer), the score on the other is assigned to the respondent.

Table 2. Distribution of Racialized Canadians and Group Residential Concentration
(Survey and NHS Data)

	% of sample (Weighted ^a)	% NHS	Group Population as a % of Local (FSA) Population	
			Sample mean (Weighted ^a)	Maximum
South Asian	26.7	26.7	19.1	60.3
Chinese	25.4	22.5	20.3	74.5
Black	16.5	15.6	9.7	29.6
Filipino	6.7	9.5	6.7	20.6
Arab	5.4	6.4	4.7	32.3
Latin American	5.0	6.4	3.2	16.7
Southeast Asian	4.7	5.2	2.3	10.9
Japanese	3.8	1.5	0.5	3.1
Korean	3.1	2.7	2.1	7.9
West Asian	2.7	3.5	4.2	19.2

^a unweighted N = 1588

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Table 3. Intragroup Contact by Residential Concentration (Racialized Respondents)

Contact with others from same ethnic background:	Group Population as a % of Local Population:				
	0-2%	2-5%	5-10%	10-25%	25%+
Never	19.6	15.0	16.3	14.5	13.9
Only a few times a year	40.0	40.5	31.6	30.0	28.5
Once or twice a month	29.9	30.8	27.6	31.2	34.3
Every week	10.5	13.7	24.4	24.3	23.3
(Unweighted N)	(299)	(270)	(250)	(294)	(222)

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Table 4. Political Engagement by Residential Concentration and Intragroup Contact, Racialized Respondents (Linear Regression Coefficients with Clustered Robust Standard Errors)

	Interest			Civic Duty			Inefficacy		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Group share	1.37 (2.25)		1.28 (2.23)	-1.26 (0.86)		-1.29 (0.86)	0.19 (0.67)		0.23 (0.67)
Group share ²	-3.16 (3.66)		-3.03 (3.64)	1.42 (1.52)		1.45 (1.52)	-0.30 (1.26)		-0.36 (1.27)
Joint p-value [Grp. share & Grp. share ²]	0.57		0.57	0.13		0.12	0.96		0.94
Intragroup contact		0.07 (0.13)	0.07 (0.13)		0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)		-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Intercept	2.59** (0.86)	2.55** (0.84)	2.57** (0.87)	0.23 (0.34)	0.04 (0.33)	0.23 (0.34)	1.94*** (0.27)	1.96*** (0.27)	1.84*** (0.07)
Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.02	0.02	0.02
Unweighted N	1157	1157	1157	943	943	943	1127	1127	1127

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

^a Geographic unit-level controls: pct. low income, median income, pct. post-secondary education, province; Individual-level controls: other interpersonal contact, income (high, middle, low), education (less than post-secondary, some post-secondary, bachelor's degree, graduate degree), gender, age, citizenship (Canadian vs. other), birthplace (recent immigrant, settled immigrant, Canadian-born), language spoken at home (Any other language vs. French or English), racialized group (South Asian, Chinese, or another group).

Table 5. Political Engagement by Residential Concentration and Intragroup Contact, Racialized Respondents (Linear Regression Coefficients with Clustered Robust Standard Errors)

	Interest	Civic Duty	Inefficacy
Group share	9.41* (4.64)	1.44 (1.54)	-0.02 (1.08)
Group share ²	-20.6** (7.91)	-5.03 (2.72)	-0.54 (1.88)
Joint p-value [Group share & Group share ²]	0.005	0.006	0.69
Intragroup contact	0.31 (0.20)	0.10 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)
Intragroup contact*Group share	-5.23* (2.39)	-1.83* (0.81)	0.14 (0.58)
Intragroup contact*Group share ²	11.4** (4.31)	4.38** (1.43)	0.17 (0.97)
Joint p-value [contact*share & contact*share ²]	0.007	0.0003	0.31
Intercept	2.11 (0.92)	0.09 (0.37)	1.99*** (0.28)
Adjusted R ²	0.09	0.18	0.02
Unweighted N	1157	943	1127

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001


^a Geographic unit-level controls: pct. low income, median income, pct. post-secondary education, province; Individual-level controls: other interpersonal contact, income (high, middle, low), education (less than post-secondary, some post-secondary, bachelor's degree, graduate degree), gender, age, citizenship (Canadian vs. other), birthplace (recent immigrant, settled immigrant, Canadian-born), language spoken at home (Any other language vs. French or English), racialized group (South Asian, Chinese, or another group).

Table 6. Political Engagement by Residential Concentration, White Population
 (Linear Regression Coefficients with Clustered Robust Standard Errors)

	Interest	Civic Duty	Inefficacy
Largest Racialized Group share	3.24* (1.44)	1.17* (0.52)	-1.60** (0.52)
Largest Racialized Group share ²	-18.94** (3.46)	-2.76** (1.04)	3.35** (1.23)
Joint p-value [Group share & Group share ²]	0.035	0.028	0.009
Intercept	6.57*** (0.07)	1.98*** (0.03)	1.99*** (0.02)
Adjusted R ²	0.002	0.001	0.005
Unweighted N	5129	5023	5067

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001


1
2
3
4 Figure 1. The Effect of Group Concentration on Racialized Canadians' Interest in
5 Politics, by Intragroup Contact[†]
6
7
8
9



10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40 [†] Calculated from estimates in Table 5. The data points represent marginal effects. The vertical bars
41 represent the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Figure 2. The Effect of Group Concentration on Racialized Canadians' Sense of Civic Duty, by Intragroup Contact[†]



[†] Calculated from estimates in Table 5. The data points represent marginal effects. The vertical bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

Figure 3. White Canadians' Political Engagement by Local Concentration of Largest Racialized Group[†]



[†] Calculated from estimates in Table 6. The data points represent predicted values. The vertical bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

Appendix
 Table A2. Political Engagement by Residential Concentration and Intragroup Contact,
 without Individual-level and Geographic Unit-level Controls
 (Linear Regression Coefficients with Clustered Robust Standard Errors)

	Interest	Civic Duty	Inefficacy
Group share	7.24 (4.76)	1.18 (1.55)	0.05 (1.06)
Group share ²	-16.5* (8.27)	-3.86 (2.71)	-0.47 (1.88)
Joint p-value [Group share & Group share ²]	0.026	0.021	0.831
Intragroup contact	0.35 (0.21)	0.18* (0.08)	-0.03 (0.06)
Intragroup contact*Group share	-4.03 (2.64)	-0.86 (0.89)	0.25 (0.61)
Intragroup contact*Group share ²	9.09 (4.65)	2.61 (1.59)	0.06 (1.02)
Joint p-value [contact*share & contact*share ²]	0.029	0.012	0.206
Intercept	5.54*** (0.38)	1.55*** (0.13)	1.89*** (0.10)
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.03	0.00
Unweighted N	1157	943	1127

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

Table A3. Sample Characteristics vs. National Household Survey (NHS)

Characteristic	Quebec			Ontario		
	NHS	Weighted Sample	Unweighted Sample	NHS	Weighted Sample	Unweighted Sample
Female	50.8	50.9	49.2	51.7	51.5	54.1
Immigrant	69.7	70.0	73.2	69.2	66.5	67.2
Age 25-34 [†]	28.9	36.4	32.3	23.8	39.2	38.8
Age 35-44 [†]	29.2	37.5	38.6	25.5	29.6	30.7
Age 45-54 [†]	20.1	18.4	20.1	23.3	17.8	17.4
Age 55-64 [†]	12.1	5.3	6.6	14.7	7.3	8.1
Age 65+ [†]	9.7	2.4	2.4	12.6	6.2	4.9
South Asian	9.8	11.1	4.6	29.5	28.9	30.1
Chinese	9.7	12.2	9.4	19.2	21.2	30.8
Black	28.7	28.8	26.4	16.4	17.2	17.5
Filipino	3.7	3.7	2.2	8.4	7.4	4.1
Latin American	13.7	13.7	15.3	5.3	5.4	3.9
Arab	19.6	16.7	28.3	4.6	4.0	3.6
Southeast Asian	7.7	7.8	6.5	4.2	4.0	4.1
West Asian	2.8	2.4	1.2	3.7	3.5	1.9
Korean	0.8	0.5	0.5	2.4	2.8	1.2
Japanese	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.9	4.1	1.9

[†] NHS age categories include individuals under 15 years of age, and those 15-25 years of age, whereas the sample includes individuals 18 years of age and older. To facilitate age comparisons in this table, we have excluded respondents under 25 years of age from the calculation of percentages.

Table A3. (continued)

Characteristic	Alberta			British Columbia		
	NHS	Weighted Sample	Unweighted Sample	NHS	Weighted Sample	Unweighted Sample
Female	50.3	50.6	54.6	52.1	52.0	52.9
Immigrant	69.2	62.6	63.8	69.8	66.1	63.8
Age 25-34 [†]	28.6	28.2	22.6	23.1	24.4	22.6
Age 35-44 [†]	28.4	26.5	29.4	23.5	29.3	29.4
Age 45-54 [†]	20.8	20.0	26.3	23.1	25.8	26.3
Age 55-64 [†]	12.5	11.9	13.1	15.8	12.7	13.1
Age 65+ [†]	9.6	13.6	8.7	14.6	7.8	8.7
South Asian	23.9	22.9	17.1	26.5	26.0	12.4
Chinese	20.3	26.5	46.6	37.1	40.4	56.8
Black	11.3	10.4	8.1	2.8	2.8	2.2
Filipino	16.2	9.2	6.3	10.7	8.3	6.8
Latin American	6.3	3.0	1.5	3.0	2.8	3.4
Arab	5.3	5.4	2.4	1.2	0.8	0.7
Southeast Asian	6.3	6.3	4.9	4.4	4.1	2.9
West Asian	2.4	1.7	1.5	3.3	2.9	1.5
Korean	2.3	2.6	2.4	4.6	5.0	3.4
Japanese	1.9	2.4	3.9	3.2	3.5	6.8

[†]NHS age categories include individuals under 15 years of age, and those 15-25 years of age, whereas the sample includes individuals 18 years of age and older. To facilitate age comparisons in this table, we have excluded respondents under 25 years of age from the calculation of percentages.

Table A4. Independent Variable Coding

Group share	<p>For each respondent, the group share is the proportion (from 0 to 1) of the local population (the FSA) from the same racial background as the respondent.</p> <p>This variable was constructed by first identifying each respondent’s racial group using the following survey item:</p> <p><i>You may belong to one or more racial or ethnic groups on the following list. You may select more than one. Are you...</i></p> <p>Responses:</p> <p><i>White</i> <i>South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan)</i> <i>Chinese</i> <i>Black</i> <i>Filipino</i> <i>Latin American</i> <i>Arab</i> <i>Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Malaysian, Laotian)</i> <i>West Asian (e.g., Iranian, Afghan)</i> <i>Korean</i> <i>Japanese</i> <i>First nations or aboriginal</i> <i>Other (specify)</i> <i>I don't know</i> <i>I prefer not to answer</i></p> <p>Then, that group’s proportion of the local population at the Forward Sortation Area (FSA) level was matched to the respondent, using NHS data. The NHS asks a “population group” question with precisely the same categories, but also classifies some “write-in” responses in these categories (for example, the write-in response “Pakistani” is classified as South Asian).</p>
Intragroup contact	<p><i>For each of the following activities, would you say you do them every week (3), once or twice a month (2), only a few times a year (1) or not at all (0)? Spend time with people of the same ethnic background as you (aside from your family)</i></p>
Other interpersonal contact	<p>For each respondent, the mean score of the following five items (0 to 3 scale):</p> <p><i>For each of the following activities, would you say you do them every week (3), once or twice a month (2), only a few times a year (1) or not at all (0)?</i></p> <p><i>Spend time with parents or other relatives</i> <i>Spend time with friends</i> <i>Spend time socially with colleagues from work</i> <i>Spend time with people at your church, mosque or synagogue</i> <i>Spend time with your neighbours</i></p>
Gender	Female =1; male =0
Age	Age in years

Citizenship	1= Canadian citizen (including dual citizenship); 0 = non-citizen
Recent Immigrant	In Canada for up to 10 years
Settled Immigrant	In Canada for more than 10 years
Language	Language most often spoken at home English or French = 0; “Other language” = 1
High Income	Household income of \$100,000 or more = 1; less than \$100,000 = 0
Low Income	Household income of Less than \$30,000= 1; \$30,000 or more = 0
University education	“Some university” and “Bachelor’s degree” = 1; all others = 0
Postgraduate degree	“Master’s degree” and “Professional degree or doctorate” = 1, all others = 0
Proportion low income (NHS data)	Proportion of the population in the FSA who fall below the after-tax low-income measure, which is set at half the median of adjusted household after-tax income in the country.
Median income (NHS data)	The median income for individuals in the FSA
Proportion with postsecondary certificate, diploma, or degree (NHS data)	The proportion of the population in the FSA with a Registered Apprenticeship certificate; Other trades certificate or diploma; College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma from a program of 3 months to less than 1 year; College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma from a program of 1 year to 2 years; College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma from a program of more than 2 years; University certificate or diploma below bachelor level; Bachelor's degree; University certificate or diploma above bachelor level; Degree in medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine or optometry; Master's degree; Earned doctorate.
Largest racialized group share	For each respondent, this is the proportion (from 0 to 1) of the local population from the largest racialized group in the FSA.

¹ Percentages calculated by the authors from Statistics Canada Census tables.

² In 2011, even in Toronto and Vancouver – the two cities with the largest concentrations of racialized Canadians – most racialized residents (56 and 63 percent in Toronto and Vancouver, respectively) lived in neighborhoods where the white population was the majority or the single-largest group (Hiebert, 2015). In our survey sample of racialized individuals, 55.8% lived in majority white areas, and a further 24% lived in areas with no majority, but where the white population was the largest racial group.

³ Respondents received an e-mail invitation to participate in the 25-minute online survey. Each invitation e-mail contained a unique link (URL) that could only be used once. Respondents were all members of an internet panel of more than 400,000 people living in Canada at the time who were recruited randomly over the phone (61 percent) or through various other means. The annual recruitment rate for the panel is approximately 15,000 new members a year, while about 10,000 to 12,000 panelists are removed from the panel or opt out each year. Panelists are rewarded for their participation over time with a series of financial incentives. No specific response rate can be calculated for an online survey because, unlike telephone surveys, it is not possible to evaluate whether people refused to participate or did not read or receive the invitation. For the sample of racialized Canadians, 13,549 invitations were sent and 1,647 respondents (12 percent) completed the survey. The data are weighted using a post-stratification technique to be representative of the sociodemographic characteristics (sex, age, education, mother tongue and ethnicity) of each province, using the 2011 National Household Survey as the point of reference. The data are also weighted to ensure the proportional representation of each provincial sample according to its demographic weight within Canada. The survey was offered in English and in French.

⁴ Many members of racialized groups in Canada are foreign-born, and although naturalization rates are high in Canada, some do not hold Canadian citizenship. In our sample, 4% of the sample indicated they were not eligible to vote.

⁵ In both the NHS and the survey, respondents were given the option of choosing multiple categories. Our analysis relies on only the first category mentioned. Only 2.6% of respondents in the sample of racialized individuals selected multiple categories. Those who selected “other” (3.58% of the sample) cannot be classified and are excluded from the analysis. A significant difference is that the NHS allows write-in responses, some of which are later classified (for example, the write-in response “Pakistani” is classified as “South Asian”).

⁶ In the unweighted data there is overrepresentation of individuals from Chinese origin (the largest group racialized group) and underrepresentation of all other racialized groups in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario; there is also underrepresentation of older (55-64 and 65+) in Quebec and Ontario, and to a lesser extent BC and Alberta. Foreign-born respondents are slightly underrepresented in the unweighted data in Alberta and British Columbia.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

⁷ The results without these controls (presented in table A2 in the appendix), are virtually the same.

⁸ Data presented in Fieldhouse and Cutts' examination of Muslim electoral registration in Britain (2008a: 341), as well as their study of voter turnout among ethno-religious minorities in Britain (2008b: 539), suggests a non-linear relationship between local religious and ethnic group concentration and political engagement.

⁹ We also considered an alternative specification of these models, using the proportion of people from any racialized group in the respondents' local area as our measure of residential concentration. The results showed a weak and statistically insignificant interaction between contact and concentration, which suggests it is the concentration of persons *from an individual's own racialized group*, and not merely *diversity*, that matters.