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“Prison of the Nations?” Union and Nationality in the United Kingdom, 1870–1925*

Alvin Jackson

The United Kingdom of the late nineteenth century was, and is, frequently seen as a unitary state, and sometimes even (at least in terms of the island of Britain) as a relatively homogeneous national territory. At different times successive central governments of the kingdom pursued integrationist or assimilationist projects toward this end; and indeed, the different “acts” of union (1535, 1542 for Wales, 1707 for Scotland, 1801 for Ireland) may credibly be seen in this light.¹

Parliamentary union in 1707 and 1801 was effectively (if not explicitly) a device for converting the hard power of a militarily, economically, and demographically preeminent nation, England, into nominally voluntary forms of soft power over weaker, neighboring polities and peoples. The precise vocabulary of “majority” and “minority,” in these applications, would not gain significant currency until the twentieth century, but there was still a related language of authority, influence, and interest, which in turn was bound with military, economic, and demographic strength. The latter of course was being defined with increasing precision through the census data which were being accumulated in Britain from 1801. Moreover, if the language of majority and minority was not yet explicit, then the union intentionally recast a predominantly Catholic Ireland within a new, and predominantly Anglican and British, state.

Some additional reflection on vocabulary and definitions needs to be briefly offered at this stage. This chapter deploys the idea of “minority nationality”—though it does so with caution, and with the recognition that there is a temptation here toward (debatable) normative assumptions. Of course, the notion of “nationality” is generally recognized and understood as a nineteenth-century construct, while (as noted) that of “minority” came later: thus, the overall idea of “minority nationalities” gained traction in the early twentieth century. Equally, the specific language of “subject” or “subsidiary” nationalities was applied in the later twentieth century, not least in terms

* The chapter generally focuses on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The dates in the title refer to the period spanning from the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland (and the first significant modification of the Irish union) to the conclusion of the Boundary Commission between the United Kingdom and the new Irish Free State (and the effective toleration of the land border between Northern Ireland and the Free State).

of those Central and Eastern European states bound to the USSR. It should also be emphasized that nationalist movements within wider empires did not see themselves as “minorities” within their own perceived national territory. However, while the specific vocabulary has evolved, and has also been contested, the related idea that unions and empires have embraced hierarchies of power and privilege in terms of their component peoples was very firmly rooted in the late nineteenth century, and indeed long before. As an extensive literature now recognizes, nineteenth-century empires (and unions) were predicated on the basis of an array of—supposedly—scientifically constructed ethnic and other rankings.

With the establishment of union, successive central governments often treated or imagined the “minority” peoples of the United Kingdom as undifferentiated extensions of (southeast) England. Wales was certainly enfolded within the structures of English government until at least the late nineteenth century. To a lesser extent, so too was Scotland. The union of 1707 permitted the continuation of a range of distinctive institutions, and (as in Ireland) there was much use by Westminster of delegated authority, but otherwise Scotland was well integrated within a centralizing and (imagined) unitary state: indeed, until the early twentieth century (and sometimes beyond) Scotland was regularly designated, for postal and other purposes, as “North Britain.” Ireland (like Scotland and Wales) was governed inconsistently and without any grand plan, but assimilationist strategies were periodically deployed until 1921—and indeed afterward, within Northern Ireland.² Northern Irish devolution was suspended in 1972 under the (generally) assimilationist “direct rule” regime. One telling instance of the associated mindset, much misquoted, was Mrs. Thatcher’s provocative declaration in 1981 that Northern Ireland was “part of the United Kingdom—as much as my constituency is” (her constituency being Finchley in northwest London). But Thatcher’s dictum (while contradicted by some of her government’s subsequent actions) certainly reflected a centralist and undifferentiated view of the union state.

Scholars, too, for long defined the nineteenth-century United Kingdom, or rather nineteenth-century Britain, in terms of a unitary model, and alongside other centralized and homogenizing nation-states. While it is obvious that the national histories of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have stimulated much distinctive scholarship, the historical literature on the detailed functioning of the United Kingdom as a complex multinational union state remains relatively underdeveloped, as does any sustained comparison between it and other multinational unions and empires across late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe.³

This chapter suggests a range of alternative approaches to understanding the relationship between the component nationalities of the unions and the survival of the latter. First, it looks to identify some of the limits to the vision and substance of the asymmetrical unions of the United Kingdom, which were forged in 1707 (between England and Scotland) and in 1801 (between Great Britain and Ireland). That is to say, it seeks to establish some of the practical limits to any homogenizing tendency—some of the “centrifugal” pressures upon the unions of the United Kingdom and their related hold (or lack of it) upon the “minority” nationalities.

Yet the union between England and Wales has lasted for over 500 years, if one takes the legislation of 1535 and 1542 as starting points. The union of England and Scotland

has survived for over 300 years; and the union of Great Britain and Ireland survived from 1801 to 1922 and has continued in a truncated form from 1922 to the present day as the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. So, a second major theme of the chapter is longevity: while there were some constraints and some oppression, the union managed for long to hold the different nations of Britain and Ireland together within one complex multinational state. Again, the chapter seeks to identify some of the “centripetal” dimensions to the unions of the United Kingdom—some of the agencies and institutions binding the minority nationalities to union.⁴

It may be immediately clear to some readers that the chapter deploys an analytical schema used originally for other forms of (federal) union by James Bryce, and adapted by the historian of Habsburg “dissolution,” Oszkár Jászi. Each of these sought to identify the “centripetal” and “centrifugal” (or “aggregative” and “segregative”) forces at play in the making and unmaking of, respectively, federal polities, and the great composite monarchy of Central Europe, that of the Habsburgs.⁵ But, critically, for Jászi at least, there could not always be a neat taxonomy of union, since centripetal forces might also function in a centrifugal manner.⁶ Bearing this caution in mind, the chapter sets out some of the centrifugal aspects of the union state, especially in terms of its different national constituents, while then shifting the focus and emphasis to the centripetal.

Linked with this, an additional, and third, central theme of the chapter is comparison. However, the comparisons suggested here are not between Britain and contemporary European nation-states (or aspirant nation-states), but rather between the multinational United Kingdom and other multinational European unions and empires such as (primarily) Austria-Hungary. In particular, these comparisons focus largely on the relationship between the dominant nationalities of these polities, the *Staatsvölker*, and the “subsidiary” (or “minority”) nationalities.

There is obviously a case for caution in pursuing any comparison.⁷ These polities could certainly be different forms of union—personal, accessory, and imperial—and they often sat in very different places on a spectrum of intensity. But the analytical challenge here is not so much in comparing wholly different types of union—constitutional “apples” and “oranges.” It rather rests with comparing different types of hybrids, which (at the same time) were each relentlessly evolving. Moreover, the United Kingdom merits comparison with other “unions” partly because they were all contemporary or near-contemporary creations, rooted in continental warfare, and rooted too in traditions of personal union. Each was an asymmetrical union of large and small partners, and much of the resultant chemistry arose from these imbalances. Each was a mix of contemporary strategic or geo-political exigency and historic linkage. And, finally, contemporaries frequently made comparisons. It is true that some British unionists (like Albert Venn Dicey) gloried in the supposedly unique brilliance of the British constitution, but many Liberals (pre-eminently Gladstone) and Irish constitutional nationalists (like John Redmond) looked to the Dual Monarchy both for analogies with the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland as well as possible models of reform.⁸ In addition, Arthur Griffith, the patriarch of the Sinn Féin movement in early-twentieth-century Ireland, famously invoked “the resurrection of Hungary.”⁹ The *Ausgleich* relationship between Austria and Hungary—and also

the *Nagodba* between Croatia and Hungary—were much discussed in the context of Britain’s successive Irish home rule crises.¹⁰ Comparing the United Kingdom of the nineteenth century, and its minority nationalities, with other multinational unions and their peoples makes sense because Victorians envisioned their polity, and its reform, in comparative terms.

The Limits of Union

The late-nineteenth-century United Kingdom was ostensibly a unitary state, with a union parliament at Westminster for all of the constituent nationalities, and an overarching monarchy and crown forces, together with a (sometimes) shared external imperial project. However, in numerous respects the union state was problematic either in terms of structure and homogeneity, or in terms of its conceptualization; and this in turn created space for (or indeed provoked) the articulation of “minority” national identities, evidently at odds with the British enterprise, but in practice sometimes either partly assimilated within it, or locked into a mutual dependency. Here, I want to review an array of arguments reflecting on the conceptualization and operation of union in Britain and Ireland, although constraints of space have necessitated some tough choices about those areas which have received attention and emphasis.

The nineteenth-century United Kingdom state of Great Britain and Ireland was “under-imagined”: it lacked an origins myth, a statement of principle or purpose, and it also lacked an associated commemorative culture.¹¹ The United Kingdom, forged in 1707 and 1801, did not at the beginning reflect a coherent vision or an ideal—in comparison with some nation-states or federal unions. It was originally a set of pragmatic bargains binding the English parliament and its Scots counterpart (in 1707), as well as the British and the Irish ascendancy elite (in 1801), and it was principally concerned with immediate commercial and military realities. Financial crisis and international warfare were critical contexts and drivers to union in 1707 and 1801. The Scots and Irish economies, especially the public finances, were in disarray in the context of war and (in the Irish case) rebellion. Furthermore, continental European warfare constituted a significant threat to English stability at both times. This is not to say, of course, that the origins of other forms of state may not be situated in warfare or economic upheaval. But it is to suggest that the formation of the United Kingdom may be distinguished from the elaborate or abstract ideals such as partly impelled (for example) the American or French (or Irish) revolutions.¹²

It is true that Great Britain, created in 1707, and to a much lesser extent the United Kingdom, created in 1801, built upon an older set of British identities imagined from at least the sixteenth century. But there was no model transition from intellectual propagation through elite conversion to popular conversion: the promotion of any British project, whether by King James VI and I at the beginning of the seventeenth century, or by Oliver Cromwell in the 1650s, involved top-down initiatives which met resistance even in the metropolitan center.¹³ The development of a more popular Britishness had to wait until the eighteenth century, as will be discussed below, though

whether this constituted a national identity as opposed to an overarching dynastic identity, as with *Habsburgtreue* in the Dual Monarchy, is (at the very least) open to debate.¹⁴ There are in fact some comparisons to be made here with other multinational union states or empires, such as indeed the Dual Monarchy, or the United Kingdoms of Sweden-Norway (1814–1905), or the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815–30)—all of which were essentially pragmatic arrangements which reflected a set of economic, strategic, and geopolitical realities and which were vulnerable to their revision.

Closely linked with this, the United Kingdom lacked a unifying moral imperative—in contradistinction to several of the emergent nation-states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, the perennial problem with many unions is that, given their often contingent and opportunistic origins, they have lacked either a founding expression of aspiration or an overall vision binding component nationalities. Many constitutional scholars have emphasized that constitutions are not merely sets of rules, but also an embodiment of a nation or society's values: as Vernon Bogdanor has remarked, "almost all codified constitutions are enacted to mark a new beginning."¹⁵ But, however much the formation of the United Kingdom may have marked "a new beginning," its lack of a formally codified constitution underlined the absence of a vision of purpose.

Moreover, in the case of both Scotland and Ireland, the birth of their respective unions has been lastingly associated with corruption, the black arts of political management, and the specter of military threat. Each of the unions was attained in the context of expressions of English or British military ascendancy (in the Irish case in the immediate aftermath of the epically bloody suppression of the 1798 Rising). The negotiations accompanying each of these unions were characterized by an extraordinarily lavish (judged by contemporary norms) distribution of official patronage in the form of the distribution of aristocratic titles, government office and cash. The skillful historical interrogation and contextualization of these origins have not substantially affected their negative popular standing amongst the constituent—"minority"—nationalities of the union state.¹⁶ It is true that the wider envisioning of Britishness by Scots from the sixteenth century onward sometimes helped to counterbalance this otherwise bleak reckoning of union. But on the whole, the dubious nativity of both the Scots and Irish unions has been a central and sustained aspect of the popular "under-imagining" of the United Kingdom.

These complex origins narratives were also, however, a feature of other contemporary unions. This was clearly the case with Austria-Hungary: no amount of self-congratulation could disguise the fact that the great redesign of the Habsburg lands achieved through the *Ausgleich* of 1867 was precipitated by the Empire's defeat by Prussia at Königgrätz/Sadowa in July 1866.¹⁷ As with the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland, Austria-Hungary was born in the context of not only military challenge, but also financial threat.¹⁸

In addition, the United Kingdom lacked an overarching culture of state commemoration. Apart from occasional short-lived initiatives, there was (and is) remarkably little celebration of the anniversaries of the creation of Great Britain or the United Kingdom. The coronations, birthdays, marriages, and jubilees of the monarch, as head of the union state, have been routinely celebrated, but not the

birthday or anniversaries of the state itself. Linda Colley has famously commented on the importance of George III (r.1760–1820) to the formation of Britishness. Similarly, Victoria (r.1837–1901) was central to the elaboration of British imperialism, while Elizabeth II (r.1952–2022) may well be viewed as critical to the sustaining of union.¹⁹ There was no Union Day, but between 1902 and 1958 there was instead an increasingly desultory commemoration of “Empire Day,” held on Victoria’s birthday, 24 May, each year.²⁰ More recently, Gordon Brown broached the idea of a “British Day” in 2006 and instituted “Armed Forces Day” in that year: he also sanctioned some commemoration of the tercentenary of union in 2007. Boris Johnson appeared to be investigating similar unifying stratagems during his premiership. But this has all been a matter of starting late in the day, and largely from scratch. There remains no equivalent in the United Kingdom of Independence Day or Bastille Day or the Russian Victory Day—or indeed any equivalent of the individual national days and focused national celebrations of the constituent polities of the United Kingdom.

This deficit was a feature of other union polities. In general, the foundation of union states was vastly overshadowed by the celebration of the related ruling dynasty—Habsburg, Orange-Nassau, or Hanover and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.²¹ Supranational commemoration in the Dual Monarchy focused largely upon the Habsburgs, and in particular (by the end of the nineteenth century) upon the aging patriarch of empire, Franz Joseph. There was also some memorialization at this time, often by German liberals, of the reforming and centralizing emperor, Joseph II.²² However, much of the commemorative culture of the Dual Monarchy centered on the ruling emperor-king, whose golden jubilee (in 1898) and diamond jubilee (in 1908) stimulated elaborate celebrations. In addition, Franz Joseph’s periodic tours of his domains were associated with carefully choreographed displays of loyalty to the supranational monarchy. In both Austria and the United Kingdom, there was a shared absence of what Jászi called “civic education”; and in particular there was a relative absence of any overarching propagation, commemoration, or celebration of the values and purpose of the state.²³ Generally speaking, therefore, multinational union states have facilitated the creation of dynastic loyalty, rather than any supranational loyalty to the polity itself. Generally speaking, too, unions have sustained a riskily high symbolic investment in monarchy.

This leads to a further argument: the nineteenth-century United Kingdom did not possess a strong national identity which was able to thoroughly unify all of the “minority” nationalities. Britain and Britishness were of course conceptualized at an elite level long before 1707. But—in Dicey’s terms—“the Union did not originate in the sort of feeling which is now called ‘nationalism,’ though it resulted in the creation of a new State of Great Britain.”²⁴ A complex popular British national identity arose only in the wake of the union between England and Scotland in 1707, drawing strength (in the argument of Colley) from Protestantism, the monarchy, and foreign wars.²⁵ In some arguments, this identity was critically bolstered in the late nineteenth century through the consolidation of a global empire, and the fabrication of a popular British imperialism.²⁶

British national identity clearly continues to be a tenacious and significant—if declining—phenomenon amongst both the Scots and other, “minority,” nationalities of the union. But this Britishness had been largely established before the union with

Ireland in 1801. Moreover, in the eighteenth century, Britishness had been defined partly against the Catholic “Other” in terms of the wars against continental enemies such as France. This created a workably inclusive, overarching identity for the primarily Presbyterian Scots, as well as for the Welsh, who were shifting decisively from Anglican to non-conformist Protestantism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Yet in 1801 Britain and Britishness became bound, through union, with a primarily Catholic polity, Ireland. After 1801 the United Kingdom state and Britishness somehow had to accommodate this Catholic “Other,” at least in its Irish formulation. There was thus an ongoing tension between the state and its supposedly unifying political identity; and this was fateful so far as the relationship between union and constituent nationalities was concerned.

However, union did not obliterate the component minority national identities of the state. Indeed, in certain senses the union state may even have helped to define the shape and content of its component nationalities. Scottishness was largely accommodated within the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century by various agencies, including the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, as well as the distinctive national legal system and civil society.²⁷ Welshness was similarly accommodated, and Welsh historians have laid emphasis both on the overwhelmingly cultural (as opposed to political) definition of Welsh nationality, and on the assimilationist impact of empire on Welsh patriotism at the end of the nineteenth century.²⁸ But on the whole Irishness was much less effectively embraced, although there is evidence of impact in terms of not only Irish unionists but also imperially minded nationalists like John Redmond and his followers.²⁹ English national identity was resurgent in the late nineteenth century but, as the *Staatsvolk* of the United Kingdom, the English were largely indistinguishable from, and interchangeable with, Britain and Britishness. However, this consolidation of Englishness was clearly linked to the expression of other (Irish, Scots, Welsh) national identities in the union state. Indeed, it was reciprocally bound with their consolidation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (as well as in the early twenty-first century). Moreover, threats to the United Kingdom have come not only from the “minority” nationalities, but also (occasionally, as in the late nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries) from this resurgent Englishness. And in a similar way, perhaps, Austria-Hungary was periodically threatened, not only by Czech or Italian nationalist claims on the periphery, but rather by the reinforcement of German Austrian and Magyar identities within the political core (as during the First World War). For Oszkár Jászi, famously, “the Austrian system was entirely incapable of establishing any kind of a popular state consciousness whereas the Hungarian civic education was overdoing Magyar national consciousness.”³⁰ Ultimately—in Jászi’s argument—the dynastic patriotism of the Habsburg state proved to be “powerless against the popular enthusiasm of the exuberant national individualities,” including those at the heart of the *Ausgleich*.³¹

The issue of British (and indeed Habsburg) identity was deeply intertwined with that of religious profession. And these links between supranational identities and the churches broach, in turn, the wider relationship between religion and the United Kingdom (and other multinational unions) in the nineteenth century. The British and Irish union was associated with, originally underpinned and ultimately curtailed by,

religion—by Protestantism, especially in the sense of the two national churches, the United Church of England and Ireland, and the Church of Scotland. The argument for union in 1707 was originally associated, of course, with the acceptance of a Protestant Hanoverian royal succession, and it was bolstered by the contemporary guarantees given to the Church of Scotland. And indeed, in the case of Britain and Ireland, the new United Kingdom of 1801 was (as Stewart J. Brown has deemed it) “a semi-confessional state,” endowed with an ostensibly new enterprise, the United Church of England and Ireland, even if in practice the two Churches of England and Ireland continued pretty much as before.³² The United Church of the union state was funded in part by tithe, or taxation, payments, levied on various forms of agricultural income, and imposed on all, regardless of whether they were members of the Church or (as in the majority of cases beyond England) not.³³

Religion worked across the United Kingdom as a centrifugal and a centripetal force at once. Calvinism in Scotland and Wales, associated with the Church of Scotland and Welsh Methodism, was linked with both national distinctiveness, and with a degree of separation from the “semi-confessional” Anglican union state. In Wales, in particular, Protestant non-conformity was associated with Welsh radical liberalism and patriotism at the end of the nineteenth century. But Scots Presbyterianism and Welsh non-conformity in general were simultaneously distinctive markers of their respective peoples, while also being highly fissiparous phenomena. In both polities Presbyterianism, whether of the Kirk or Free Church or Calvinistic Methodism, was certainly a shared badge of difference, but this was mitigated in various ways—not least in Scotland because, while the Presbyterian Kirk was clearly not the Church of England, it was nonetheless an established church and thus entangled within the British union state. Moreover, in general terms Protestantism and Britishness were correlated. Thus, while Welsh non-conformism and the Scottish Kirk might not have been part of the union church (the United Church of England and Ireland), they were still embraced within British Protestant identity. In short, both Scots and Welsh Calvinism served simultaneously to express “minority” national difference, as well as some of the limits of that difference.

In Ireland, union became effectively associated with Protestant ascendancy in 1801, in the context of the absence of the promised Catholic emancipation. The key point here is that in Scotland the Presbyterian faith of the majority of the Scots population was effectively reconciled with union through careful diplomacy in 1707, while in Wales Protestant non-conformity broadly helped to bind a Welsh patriotic identity within a set of British and imperial frameworks. In Ireland, however, union was achieved on the back of a negotiation between the British government and the dominant Irish Ascendancy elite within the exclusively Protestant Irish parliament and the suggested linking of union with Catholic civil rights, or Catholic emancipation, never materialized. Thus, where union and religious faith were broadly reconciled in Scotland and Wales, union and faith were separated by a gulf of perceived betrayal and oppression in Ireland.

In short, the British union state of the nineteenth century had some significant confessional features which excluded large sections of the population, and in particular Irish Catholics. Religious distinctiveness in Ireland, Wales, and Scotland

was associated in each case with well-defined national identities. But only in Ireland did this ultimately prove incompatible with the union and wider empire.

Just as the effort to link religion with union state-building ultimately proved problematic in Britain, so this was the case in central Europe and elsewhere. Just as Anglican Protestantism was promoted as the established church of the union state in the early nineteenth century, so the Roman Catholic Church was famously one of the most solid pillars of the Habsburg dynasty.³⁴ Indeed, the relationship between the dynasty and the Church was peculiarly and lastingly intimate. It has also been conventionally acknowledged that "it was their [Habsburg] task to uphold the true faith against the two threats of the infidel and heretic."³⁵ The ceremonial associated with the Habsburg monarchy emphasized its Catholic fidelity (for example in the annual Corpus Christi processions) and the Austrian episcopal hierarchy responded to imperial and royal patronage with a lavish reciprocal loyalty. However, complementing this relationship was a parallel association between national sentiment and those subjects of the Dual Monarchy who were not Catholics: Lutherans and Calvinists, for example, assumed disproportionate influence within the leadership of Slav and Magyar nationalism.³⁶ Slovak nationalism gestated within the Lutheran lycée system.³⁷ Czechs—Catholics and Lutherans—signified their repudiation of Habsburg dominance through the memorialization of the reformer Jan Hus, while the corollary of celebrating Hus was the overthrow of Catholic imagery specifically associated with the suppression of Bohemian autonomy.

In short, the multinational states of the nineteenth century were associated with the imposition of legally privileged or state churches, whether the United Church of England and Ireland, or the Church of Scotland, or the Catholic Church in Austria. Those excluded from this sanction constituted a potential base for opposition—whether in terms of covenanters, Episcopalians and the Free Church in Scotland, Catholics in Ireland, Lutherans in Bohemia, Calvinists in Hungary. Only in the later decades of the nineteenth century were these threats partly addressed, whether in terms of disestablishment in both Ireland (1869) and Wales (1914–20), or through the enhanced religious freedoms associated with the new Dual Monarchy after 1867.

Centripetal Forces and Union

Thus far the emphasis has been on some of the limitations of the unions of the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century, as well as on the related imaginative and conceptual space available to the component nationalities of the kingdom. But it also needs to be emphasized that (with one major secession, in 1921) the United Kingdom has survived.

Given the emphases on the consolidation of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, and the attainment of statehood in Ireland, this obvious longevity is often overlooked in Irish and British historiography, where the teleology is (generally and understandably) one of decline and disunity. Yet there are other approaches and I have sought elsewhere to examine the theme of longevity in the context of the Irish and Scottish unions.³⁸ There are parallels in the historiographies of other polities, too. The Habsburg Dual

Monarchy survived for over half a century and the analytical focus over the past thirty years or so has shifted from the preordained “doom of the Habsburgs” toward health, strength, and contingency.³⁹ How, then, can the longevity of the unions of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—their apparent hold over a range of subsidiary and minority nationalities—be illuminated?

This longevity can certainly be understood in terms of a range of overarching institutions supporting the United Kingdom. Thinking about the Dual Monarchy, Jászi identified a range of “centripetal” institutions and agencies. Jászi’s view overlapped with the earlier, more demotic, view of the physician and revolutionary, Adolf Fischof, who famously envisioned a Dual Monarchy supported by four “armies”—standing (the military), sitting (the bureaucracy), kneeling (the Church), and crawling (the secret police). All of these were relevant to the United Kingdom, but, while the role of the “crawlers” (the active intelligence gathering of the Royal Irish Constabulary) should be mentioned, as well as the importance of the “sitters” (the expanding union bureaucracy of the later nineteenth century), the focus here is on the monarchy, as well as its “standers” and “kneelers.”

The monarchy has been a central unifying institution within the United Kingdom, though it has not functioned in a uniform manner across all of its constituent polities. The institution itself played an important role in the construction of the early medieval English kingdom, and it was associated with periodic assertions of authority over the whole of Britain. However, the parallel creation of a relatively unified Scottish state together with its own monarchy in the early Middle Ages ultimately created the basis for a wider “British” crown. The two thrones were connected by periodic intermarriage, and were finally unified in 1603, when the Scottish king acceded by right of inheritance to the crown of England. The Scottish royal house, the Stuarts, ruled Britain until 1714. The subsequent Hanoverian and Saxe-Coburg-Gotha dynasties came to identify very strongly with Scotland, a critical development being improved transportation and mobility, and the establishment (by 1856) of a royal residence at Balmoral, in the Cairngorms. There has continued to be a sustained tradition of intermarriage between the royal family and the Scottish aristocracy. Queen Victoria’s daughter, Louise, married Lord Lorne, later ninth Duke of Argyll, while King George VI, as Duke of York, married Lady Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon, daughter of the thirteenth Earl of Strathmore.

However, the relationship between the British monarchy and the Irish and Welsh had other complexities.⁴⁰ Royalist sympathies or frameworks of thought were deeply embedded within the Catholic Jacobite and Gaelic traditions in Ireland. And there is plenty of evidence for the period up to the 1880s to suggest that the monarchy had at least the potential to serve as a reconciling force between Catholic Ireland and a reformed union state (as with the clear loyalty of successive generations of constitutional nationalist politician to the crown—from Daniel O’Connell to John Redmond). It is also evident that the monarchy retained the sympathetic interest of many Irish people until the eve of the Great War: George V (r.1910–36), for example, undertook a successful coronation visit to Ireland as late as July 1911, less than five years ahead of the Easter Rising.

At the same time, however, the British monarchy did not make the same sustained effort with Ireland as it had done with Scotland. There were certainly occasional royal tours in Ireland under the union: Queen Victoria visited four times, and her successor, Edward VII (r.1901–10), visited three times. But, critically, there was no permanent royal residence in Ireland (unlike Scotland), and therefore no established pattern of travel and engagement. Moreover, there was no sustained royal identification with Irish culture in the same way that there has been with Scottish culture: there was no Irish equivalent of Queen Victoria's best-selling rhapsody on her Scottish life, *Leaves from the Journal of Our Life in the Highlands* (1868), no Irish equivalent of her embrace of the tartan and of the Presbyterian Kirk.⁴¹

The Welsh, like the Scots, but unlike the Irish, had part-ownership of the British monarchy and its associated institutions. Wales was associated with a loyalism, which was in part linked to the Welsh origins of the Tudor royal dynasty (1485–1603). On the other hand, it would be wrong to suggest that an uncomplicatedly rosy set of relationships prevailed between the Welsh and Scots and monarchy, and an uncomplicatedly bleak set of relationships between it and the Irish. The royal coat of arms, for example, incorporated heraldic references to Scotland and Ireland, but not to Wales (and the disputes within other European multinational monarchies on perceived heraldic slights—in Austria-Hungary and also Sweden-Norway—illustrate the potential combustibility of such apparently marginal issues).⁴² It is notable, too, in terms of the key area of titles and honors, that while there were distinctive Scots and Irish orders of chivalry (the orders of the Thistle and St. Patrick, respectively), there was no Welsh equivalent (though it is true, of course, that the Order of St. Patrick was yet another Irish national institution which exclusively served the interests of the ascendancy elite in the years of union).

Moreover, judged purely from the perspective of Victoria's reign, the Welsh came off worse, in terms of royal handling, than even the Irish. Victoria embraced Scotland and the Stuarts, while barely doing her duty in Ireland, and scarcely setting foot at all in Wales: the calculation is that, through her long reign, she spent a total of seven years in Scotland and managed only seven days in Wales.⁴³ Victoria, supreme governor of the Church of England, enthusiastically embraced Presbyterianism while in Scotland; but she regarded the non-conformity of her Welsh subjects and the Catholicism of the Irish with much less comprehension or sympathy.

In terms of the Welsh, however, there was a critical counterweight. The Welsh had ownership of monarchy, not simply through dynastic antiquity, but also through the princes of Wales. The designation of the heir apparent to the monarch as "Prince of Wales" from the time of Edward I ultimately created a direct association between Wales and the crown. This of course was cemented by the invention of the tradition of investiture, first deployed for Prince Edward (the future Edward VIII) at Caernarfon Castle in 1911, and revived for Prince Charles in 1969. The ceremony at Caernarfon in 1911 has been seen as sealing an alliance between middle-class Welsh non-conformity and the British royal establishment.⁴⁴ Indeed, as in Scotland, so in Wales, contentious and divisive national histories were reframed in more ecumenical terms by successive monarchs: just as the house of Hanover annexed and detoxified its Stuart heritage, so its

successors performed a similar function in Wales, turning (what was) an appropriated historical title into an expression of national unity.

In short, if Scotland and Wales were effectively bound within Britishness, then they were also effectively bound within, and possessed part ownership of, key institutions of Britishness such as the monarchy. This was less true for Ireland, but even here the monarchy was capable of generating some dynastic loyalty. Indeed, just as a widespread attachment to the Habsburg monarchy, or *Habsburgtreue*, constituted a key supranational bond within Austria-Hungary, so there was always a similar potential with the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha in all of the Celtic nations of the Atlantic archipelago.⁴⁵

Moreover, an array of institutions associated with the monarchy served to consolidate these binding functions.⁴⁶ The crown forces, especially the army, could (and did) serve to suppress dissent, whether in Scotland (as with the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745–6) or in Ireland (as with separatist insurgency in 1798, 1848, 1867, and 1916), but these forces also helped to tie Scots to the cause of monarchy and union in particular in the second half of the eighteenth century and afterward.⁴⁷ In fact, both the Scots and the Irish served in disproportionately strong numbers in the army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Both the Scots and the Irish were distinctive and disproportionate presences in the nineteenth-century British army (the Irish comprised 42 percent of the army in 1830, when they were only one-third of the United Kingdom's population). However, the Scottish military tradition was much more comprehensively celebrated in the Victorian army than its Irish equivalent—under the patronage of key Scottish commanders such as Sir Colin Campbell and Lord Clyde.⁴⁸ Moreover, with the death of Jacobitism, and despite the large numbers of Irishmen in its ranks, the army was more frequently in direct conflict with the Irish population than with the Scots or Welsh. Historically the strength of Scottish support for the crown and for the crown forces has represented an argument or a bolster for union.

Loyalty to the monarchy proved to be a binding sentiment both in the United Kingdom and in Austria-Hungary. Yet the loyalist cultures which were thereby generated naturally focused on the person of the monarch—particularly so in the cases of Franz Joseph and of Victoria—and there is a distinction to be drawn between loyalty to individual rulers and loyalty to the wider institution of monarchy. In other words, the transition from long-lived monarchs like Victoria or Franz Joseph to their respective successors made a difference. Moreover, the complex and composite nature of each crown meant that there was no automatic equation between a unifying loyalism and a unifying statist sentiment: Austro-Hungarianness or United Kingdomness was not the obvious by-products of these dynastic sympathies.⁴⁹ Jászi pointed out nearly a century ago that there could not always be a neat taxonomy of union, since centripetal forces might also function in a centrifugal manner. In fact, in both the Habsburg Empire and the United Kingdom, the respective monarchies have served simultaneously to bind and subvert the two states. On the one hand, as has been rightly observed, “the symbolic language of monarchy often cloaked new forms of governance and government obligation in reassuringly familiar terms.”⁵⁰ On the other hand, this reassurance wilted somewhat when “familiar” royal faces disappeared.

Multinational unions survived partly through active agencies, institutions, and loyalties (and force). They also survived because of indifference. Here one can scarcely do better than to look to the reflection on this question offered within recent Habsburg scholarship in terms of the identification of "national indifference": "in studying nationalism in this period," Pieter Judson has argued, "it helps to avoid seeing people as consistently belonging to one or another defined nation in the way that nationalists did ... it helps to approach questions of identification by thinking more in terms of particular practices that expressed feelings of loyalty or commitment rather than in terms of people's fixed identities."⁵¹ In his contribution to this volume, Judson adds that such an approach "moves us away from ideas of fixed, authentic, or even fluid identities. Instead, it invites us to evaluate *why* the idea of nation might be important in one situation and not in another?"⁵² While it is clearly possible to take these insights too far with the United Kingdom, it is also the case that they chime with a disparate array of Irish historical scholarship, embracing work on Irish local electoral politics in the nineteenth century, as well as with some more recent studies of the 1916 Rising and the revolution.⁵³

In highlighting new approaches to the understanding of the Dual Monarchy and other nineteenth-century multinational unions, such work implicitly broaches the case for considering a wider reconceptualization of the United Kingdom. In essence this involves reintroducing into the history of the United Kingdom (and other unions) the notion of the citizen who (in the context of seismic political or economic events) was primarily concerned with negotiating her or his own daily life rather than with the activation of any of the constituent, minority, or majority, nationalisms of the union. In both the Habsburg Empire and the United Kingdom the proliferation and pragmatism of such individuals help to illuminate the otherwise paradoxical survival of these "prisons of the nations."

In fact, this is already an implicit, if unremarked, theme across much Irish historical scholarship on the union. Thus, Theo Hoppen's work on Irish elections and society in the mid-nineteenth century has, as a subsidiary theme, an emphasis upon the extent to which Irish politics remained highly localized—this in an age of national mobilization.⁵⁴ The research of numerous scholars, based partly on new material from the Bureau of Military History archives in Dublin, has identified many striking new themes, but not least the impatience of some national activists with their more relaxed or passive compatriots, as well as the vocabulary of indifference ("shoneen," "West Brit").⁵⁵ Brian Hughes's study of the ways in which the Irish Republican Army sought to enforce its authority between 1919 and 1921 usefully underlines the "indifference, indecision or cynicism" that often prevailed beyond the communities of separatist activism. Indeed, Hughes presents case studies on Ireland which effectively chime with Jeremy King's work on Budweis/České Budějovice in terms of the contingent—or "situational"—nature of political choices: particularly striking in this respect is Hughes' evocation of those who simultaneously applied to both the Irish Free State and the British authorities for compensation arising out of the struggle of 1919–21. His work illustrates crisply the kinds of ambiguous, alternate, or sequential loyalties—or, alternatively, survival instincts—which characterized many as the first Irish union came to an end.⁵⁶

Such pragmatists made judgments based upon personal or wider economic advantage. More generally, economic growth has clearly helped to underpin pragmatic support for the union between England and Scotland in the eighteenth century. The economic plight of Scotland in the 1690s and in the aftermath of the Darien adventure in Panama (1698–9) provided a compelling argument for union in 1706–7, as did the chaotic public finances of Ireland in the 1790s.

The substantial growth of the Scottish economy and of urban Scotland after the mid-eighteenth century was credited by Scots to the tariff and parliamentary union with England. Equally, Wales' economic and industrial growth in the same period owed much to its close relationship with England, and to both English capital and English labor. There was no simple correlation, however, between wealth and unionism: spatial and temporal relativities were also important insofar as (for example) rivalries between the condition and treatment of individual polities, as well as between different regions of individual polities, fed into national and regional resentments, even though economic conditions overall might have been buoyant. In the case of both south Wales and the northeast of Ireland economic growth was associated not merely with prosperity, but also with immigration from England, which simultaneously promoted unionism as well as stimulating patriotic and particularist responses.

However, taken in the round, Scotland and Wales' economic growth and industrialization in the nineteenth century were convincingly ascribed to union, where Ireland's condition was quite different. Here, outside eastern Ulster, the union did not bring spectacular economic gains. Indeed, the reverse was emphatically the case, given the devastating failure of the potato crop in 1845 and succeeding years. The Great Famine (1845–52), which resulted in more than 1 million deaths through starvation and disease, and an even greater number of additional migrants, was almost from the start ascribed to the limitations of government policy under Lord John Russell—and indeed the broader failure of the union state to effectively redistribute resource from areas of plenty to the starving Irish cottier class. Union, growth, and prosperity—and “modernization”—were conventionally interlinked for much of Scotland and Wales: union, famine, and migration were just as readily interlinked for most of Ireland beyond the industrialized northeast.

The economic experience of complex multinational states like the United Kingdom was therefore variegated. Of course, it is not possible to argue that there was a simple equation between stability in union states and economic success. It has been persuasively suggested that the political crises of the Habsburg monarchy—and (it might be said) also of the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland—were not “the result of stagnation, but [rather] of lop-sided development.”⁵⁷ By the later nineteenth century, despite widespread growth, some Hungarians (like many Irish in relation to Britain) argued that they were kept in semi-colonial servitude through their tariff union with Austria. At the same time, however, the north-east of Ireland enjoyed growth driven by heavy industry and textiles which was dependent upon access to British and imperial markets, and which was linked with an increasingly organized unionist movement. These Irish unionists complained about the agrarian preoccupations and outlook of nationalists in the south and west of the island. And if Ireland complained

about Britain, and the north of Ireland complained about the south, then Hungary complained about Austria, and Croatia in turn complained against Hungary. The Scots student of the Dual Monarchy, Robert Seton-Watson, expressed some of this anger in arguing against the chauvinism of Budapest's railway development policies: "The railway policy which Budapest has advocated and enforced for many years past is the chief factor in checking Croatia's natural economic development and hence also the political development of the southern Slavs."⁵⁸ He also believed that "the whole southern Slav world is at present the victim of a selfish policy of monopoly and favoritism directed from Budapest."⁵⁹

It need hardly be emphasized that similarly contentious issues of taxation and benefit, and of asymmetric economic development, have plagued the histories of Britain and Ireland since the formation of the two unions in 1707 and 1801. Here too, union has meant the controversial sharing of large national debts, disputes about the withholding of resource (again, most controversially during the catastrophic Great Famine in Ireland), and arguments over the appropriate levels of taxation (most clearly during the Irish financial relations controversy of the mid-1890s). The funding algorithm, the Goschen formula (1888–1978), through which public funds were distributed across the constituent nations of the United Kingdom, was disputed—and indeed it initially privileged England and Wales at the expense of Ireland. Equally, issues of taxation and resource have had traction in Scotland, and in particular since the discovery and successful extraction of North Sea gas and oil from the mid and late 1960s.⁶⁰

On the whole, therefore, while there has been an association between the economic benefits of union and its stability, these benefits have always been mitigated by evidence (real or sometimes exaggerated) of inequality or disparity. Union polities such as the United Kingdom have long been characterized by regional disputes over the allocation of resource, or the balance between taxation and benefit, which have frequently served to fuel national resentments, and which have occurred in the context of wider prosperity. Here, again, following Jászi's famous insight, the centripetal may be simultaneously, or sequentially, the centrifugal.

Last, in terms of this taxonomy of cohesion within the union state, the unions of the United Kingdom were relatively flexible and relatively incomplete and therefore offered space for the expression of "minority" patriotism. The historian Richard Lodge argued that the "Scots union was at its origin illogical, and will probably be illogical at its end. It may well be that this is the secret of its success."⁶¹ The success certainly of the union of England and Scotland arose partly from the fact that it was parliamentary and fiscal. But it was not a judicial, educational, or religious union: the distinctive educational, judicial, and fiscal establishments in Edinburgh survived 1707 and provided a vehicle for Scottish national pride within the union. Much of civil society in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Scotland functioned in fact as a vehicle for patriotism inside the union.⁶²

Thus, the Scots and Welsh unions were able to embrace their respective patriotisms. The Irish largely did not. After the promulgation of the Irish union in 1801 distinctive Irish institutions remained, but—in the absence of full Catholic civil rights—these continued for long to rest in the hands of the Irish Protestant ascendancy (the Castle administration, the judiciary, the privy council, ministerial positions). They therefore

did not wholly function as a medium of assimilation for the mass of the people. In Scotland there were key local institutional focuses for patriotic feeling, while it was still possible to participate fully in the union state.

In addition, the United Kingdom state did not consistently or systematically seek homogeneity through the "British Isles." As has been stressed, the union settlements between England and Scotland and between Britain and Ireland (1801) were negotiated compromises which from the start failed to deliver exactly symmetrical unions or a wholly unitary state. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, it is true, British policy aimed at the creation of a more uniform polity, with (for example) the maintenance of an Anglican state church in England, Wales, and Ireland and, of course, a unitary parliament and executive. But intermittently, from the 1830s onward in Ireland and especially in the last quarter of the nineteenth century throughout the "British Isles," successive union governments strove to create a polity which reflected the particular circumstances of each of the constituent nations. The Anglican Church was disestablished in Ireland in 1869–70, while land legislation and other reforms were tailored to meet the specifics of the Irish case, especially after 1881. This malleability extended as far as the issue of administrative devolution, which was cautiously and incrementally pursued in Ireland and Scotland by both conservative and liberal governments, as well as wider legislative autonomy, which was attempted by the liberals for the benefit of Ireland in 1886, 1893, and 1912. In Scotland, distinctive land legislation, modeled on Irish precedents, was applied in the 1880s to the western highlands and islands. Ultimately, home rule was seriously considered for Scotland, as in Ireland, in the years immediately before the First World War.

Wales was more thoroughly assimilated into England. Here too, however, the union state responded flexibly and effectively to the growing Welsh patriotism of the second half of the nineteenth century through special legislation and the foundation of Welsh national institutions. Where both Ireland and Scotland were long used to separate legislative and administrative treatment, Wales had to wait until the 1880s for the first specifically Welsh legislation since the mid-seventeenth century, achieved (like Irish disestablishment) on the back of denominational mobilization—the Sunday Closing (Wales) Act (1881) and the Wales Intermediate Education Act (1889). The gradual creation, from the late nineteenth century onward, of a swathe of grand national institutions—the University of Wales (1893), the National Museum of Wales in Cardiff (1905–7), the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth (1907) together with Welsh local government (1889), the Central Welsh (Education) Board (1896), the Welsh Department of the Board of Education (1907)—sent mixed messages. While these were props of a Welsh national infrastructure, they also signaled the extent to which Welsh national identity was bound in with the British state. Certainly, one of the key advocates of each of these enterprises was David Lloyd George, who had securely anchored Welshness, indeed Welsh non-conformist radicalism, to the heart of the British establishment.⁶³

But this issue of flexibility is also linked to the fact that the unions of the United Kingdom were not part of, or bolstered by, a codified written constitution.⁶⁴ The question of the flexibility of union therefore broaches the benefits or otherwise of a

codified British constitution in terms of the overall stability of the United Kingdom, as well as the relationship between "minority" nationalities and the union state.

On the one hand, the fact that the basis of union in the United Kingdom was regular parliamentary legislation, capable of easy review and easy supersession, has permitted a political mobility which (on balance) has helped to sustain the union. There was no legal obstacle to (for example) Gladstone modifying the constitution of the union—whether through disestablishing the Church of Ireland in 1869–70, or seeking to legislate for home rule in 1885–6 and 1893. Equally, there was no legal impediment to parliament voting for the devolution and partition settlement of 1920, or (in effect) the termination of the first United Kingdom through Irish independence in 1921. Nor has there been any legal obstacle to parliamentary majorities enacting many other constitutional refinements, including devolution, since the 1990s. Flexibility has been one factor in the periodic revision and renewal of the unions of the United Kingdom.

On the other hand, there were obvious costs to this flexibility. It was not employed consistently against a clear set of principles. Instead, either it has been invoked sometimes by narrow political considerations or it has been brought about by popular mobilization against an otherwise resistant parliament. Indeed, if significant constitutional change hinged upon a simple parliamentary vote, then pressure politics, including militant mobilization, was effectively incentivized. In some senses this—the achievement of reform, but only after mass mobilization—is the essence of the history of Ireland under the union, and it is a history which has not been lost upon later Scottish nationalists.⁶⁵

Conclusion

Why then have the unions of the United Kingdom either failed to embrace their constituent nationalities (in the case of Ireland) or faltered (as in the case of Scotland and Wales)? The Scottish and Welsh unions have survived so far because they have in fact been able to contain and represent much of the patriotic feeling which has been expressed by these "minority" nationalities. The compromises demanded by the reconciliation of an Anglican monarchy, an English-dominated British state, the vested interests within Scottish and Welsh society, and the claims and rights of the Scottish and Welsh people have hitherto proved manageable within the flexible structures of the union state. Equally, the Irish union of 1801 lasted for as long as it did (until 1921) partly because the accommodating influences relevant to Scotland and Wales were sometimes relevant to some of the Irish as well. It ultimately failed, however, because it could neither lastingly accommodate nor wholly overwhelm a distinctive Irish national sentiment.

The union itself was incomplete, vitiated, pragmatic, and confessional—rather than visionary or aspirational or wholly civic. These were not fatal difficulties, however, since the union (like the Dual Monarchy) was also relatively malleable. By the later nineteenth century, led by Gladstone (who in turn borrowed from earlier exemplars), there was a transition toward greater responsiveness and flexibility

concerning the Irish—a transition reflected in the disestablishment of the union church in Ireland, special land legislation, and ultimately in the Liberal party’s embrace of home rule for Ireland. Moreover, while addressing originally the sectional needs of the Irish Protestant landed classes, the central institutions of union (such as the monarchy or the army) also sometimes accommodated some majority Catholic conviction and ambition.

Linked with this, the notion of “national indifference” within Habsburg historiography is conceptually relevant to Ireland and the other constituent nations of the United Kingdom. It is of course true that both Irish nationalists and their minority unionist opponents swiftly came to define their politics primarily in terms of nationality, and specifically that by 1913 the notion of “two Irish nations” had begun to gain traction.⁶⁶ In reality, however, there was a strong Irish tradition of accommodation to the British state which was not simply a matter of Irish Protestantism and unionism. This was most clearly expressed in terms of Irish service in the army, within the police force (the Royal Irish Constabulary) and within the Empire. Different forms of Irishness were loosely linked by a form of dynastic loyalty, which was clearly evident within some aspects of constitutional Catholic and nationalist politics.⁶⁷

Of course, the compromises demanded by reconciling a semi-confessional “majority” British Protestant state with the claims and rights of its “minority” Irish Catholic population ultimately proved overwhelming. But, just as with the Dual Monarchy, so it took the First World War to expose the wheezes and dodges inherent in the Irish union—and thereby to deliver the death of the “first” United Kingdom.⁶⁸

Notes

- 1 For the oscillations of British policy in Ireland, see K. Theodore Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia: British Politicians and Ireland, 1800–1921* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). The Welsh measures came, by the late nineteenth century, to be defined as “acts of union,” comparable to their Scots and Irish counterparts—see, for example, William Llewellyn Williams, *The Union of England and Wales, Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion: Session 1907–8* (London: Cymmrodorion Society, 1909).
- 2 Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia*. See also Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000* (London and New York: Weidenfeld and Oxford University Press, 2003).
- 3 Steve Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1815–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 212. Comparison has, however, been much broached—see, for example, Laurence Brockliss and David Eastwood, eds., *A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles, 1750–1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 3.
- 4 See Alvin Jackson, *The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707–2007* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
- 5 Oszkár Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1929); James Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1901).
- 6 Often highlighted, but see most recently Beller, *Habsburg Monarchy*.

- 7 Deborah Cohen, “Comparative History: Buyer Beware,” in *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective*, ed. Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (New York: Routledge, 2004).
- 8 For Redmond see John Redmond, *Historical and Political Addresses* (Dublin: Sealy, Bryers & Walker, 1898), 191, 237–8. See also Albert V. Dicey, *England’s Case against Home Rule*, 3rd ed. (London: John Murray, 1887); A. V. Dicey, *A Leap into the Dark: Or Our New Constitution* (London: John Murray, 1893), 161.
- 9 Arthur Griffith, *The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland*, 3rd ed. (Dublin: Whelan, 1918).
- 10 For example, British Library, Gladstone Mss, Add.MS. 44148, f.127: Gladstone to Hartington, September 8, 1885; Richard Shannon, *Gladstone: Heroic Minister, 1865–98* (London: Penguin, 1999), 378; Robert W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* (London: Constable, 1911).
- 11 Colin Kidd, *Union and Unionisms: Political thought in Scotland, 1500–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
- 12 Jackson, *Two Unions*.
- 13 See Bruce Galloway, *The Union of England and Scotland, 1603–1608* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986); Miroslav Hroch, *Social Conditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Hroch, *European Nations: Explaining their Formation* (London: Verso, 2015).
- 14 The classic text is Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
- 15 Vernon Bogdanor, *The New British Constitution* (Oxford: Hart, 2009).
- 16 G. C. Bolton, *The Passing of the Irish Act of Union: A Study in Parliamentary Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); Patrick Geoghegan, *The Irish Act of Union: A Study in High Politics, 1798–1801* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1999); Christopher Whatley, *Bought and Sold for English Gold: Explaining the Union of 1707*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001).
- 17 In terms of other union states, the birth-narrative of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands is discussed in Friso Wielenga, *A History of the Netherlands, from the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); see also Joep Leersen, “Retro-fitting the Past: Literary Historicism between the Golden Spurs and Waterloo,” in *The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Britain and the Low Countries*, ed. Hugh Dunthorne and Michael Wintle (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 111–31.
- 18 Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 121.
- 19 See Colley, *Britons*.
- 20 Jim English, “Empire Day in Britain, 1904–58,” *Historical Journal* 46, no. 1 (2006): 247–76.
- 21 For the Bernadotte monarchy see, for example, Thomas K. Derry, *A History of Modern Norway, 1814–1972* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 92; Raymond Lindgren, *Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion and Scandinavian Integration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 49.
- 22 See, for example, Nancy Wingfield, “Emperor Joseph II in the Austrian Imagination to 1914,” in *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy*, ed. Laurence Cole and Daniel Unowsky (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 62–85.

- 23 Jászi, *Dissolution*, 435, 438, 447, 449. Jászi's critique of Austrian civic education (through the schools) was juxtaposed against his portrayal of the very different Hungarian system: in the former the school system was "permeated by the old dynastic and patrimonial conception of the state," whereas in the latter Hungarian civic education repeatedly hammered home Magyar national consciousness. *Ibid.*, 435. As a result "the strangeness of the people to each other was the cause of the downfall of the old Austria and our school system did nothing to prevent it." *Ibid.*, 438.
- 24 Albert V. Dicey and Robert S. Rait, *Thoughts on the Union between England and Scotland* (London: Macmillan, 1920), 112.
- 25 Colley, *Britons*.
- 26 Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism* (London: Verso, 1977); Tom Nairn, *After Britain: New Labour and the Return of Scotland* (London: Granta, 2000).
- 27 Graeme Morton, *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–60* (East Linton: Tuckwell, 1999).
- 28 Much discussed but see, for example, Thomas E. Ellis and Annie J. Ellis, *Speeches and Addresses by the Late T. E. Ellis* (Wrexham: Hughes, 1912), 85–118; Kenneth O. Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales, 1880–1980* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 33–4.
- 29 For a discussion of the anti-imperial theme within the formation of modern constitutional nationalism see Paul Townend, *The Road to Home Rule: Anti-Imperialism and the Irish Nationalist Movement* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 2006).
- 30 Jászi, *Dissolution*, 435, 447.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 449.
- 32 Stewart J. Brown, *Providence and Empire, 1815–1914* (Harlow: Routledge, 2008).
- 33 Stewart J. Brown, *The National Churches of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1801–46* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
- 34 Jászi, *Dissolution*, 163.
- 35 Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (Seattle: Washington University Press, 1981), 23.
- 36 Robin Okey, *The Habsburg Empire, c.1765–1918: From Enlightenment to Eclipse* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), 101; Beller, *Habsburg Monarchy*, 16.
- 37 Okey, *Habsburg Empire*, 108.
- 38 Jackson, *Two Unions*.
- 39 The acme of new approaches of this kind has been Judson, *Habsburg Empire*. The notion of "doom of the Habsburgs" comes from the eponymous work by Henry Wickham Steed (London: Arrowsmith, [1937]).
- 40 James H. Murphy, *Abject Loyalty: Nationalism and Monarchy during the Reign of Queen Victoria* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001); James Loughlin, *The British Monarchy and Ireland: 1800 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); James Loughlin, "Royal Agency and State Integration: Ireland, Wales and Scotland in a Monarchical Context, 1840s–1921," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 3 (2013): 1–26.
- 41 Queen Victoria, *Leaves from the Journal of Our Life in the Highlands from 1848 to 1861* (London: Smith Elder, 1868). For Scotland and the monarchy, see the work of Richard Finlay, "Queen Victoria and the Cult of Scottish Monarchy," in *Scottish History: The Power of the Past*, ed. Edward J. Cowan and Richard J. Finlay

- (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002); “Scotland and the Monarchy in the Twentieth Century,” in *Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1900 to Devolution and Beyond*, ed. William Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- 42 Alvin Jackson, “Union States, Civil Society and National Symbols in the Nineteenth Century: Comparing United Kingdoms,” *Scandinavica: an International Journal of Scandinavian Studies* 58, no. 2 (2019): 58–75.
- 43 Loughlin, “Royal Agency and State Integration,” 383.
- 44 John S. Ellis, “The Prince and the Dragon: Welsh National Identity and the 1911 Investiture of the Prince of Wales,” *Welsh History Review* 18, no. 2 (1996): 272–94; Ellis, “Reconciling the Celt: British National Identity, Empire and the 1911 Investiture of the Prince of Wales,” *Journal of British Studies* 37, no. 4 (1998): 391–418. See also John Ellis, *Investiture: Royal Ceremony and National Identity in Wales, 1911–1969* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2008).
- 45 For different assessments of the role of *Habsburgtreue* see, for example, Judson, *Habsburg Empire*; Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans? A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
- 46 Though see Jackson, *Two Unions*, 121–215 for a fuller exploration.
- 47 See, for example, Andrew Mackillop, *More Fruitful than the Soil: Army, Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715–1815* (Edinburgh: Tuckwell, 2000).
- 48 See, for example, Edward Spiers, *The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854–1902* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).
- 49 Though “Ukania,” echoing Robert Musil’s “Kakania” (from “*k(aiserlich) und k(öniglich)*”), has been suggested by Tom Nairn: see Krishan Kumar, *The Making of English National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.
- 50 Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 341.
- 51 Judson, *Habsburg Empire*, 312; Tara Zahra, *National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–48* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Tara Zahra, “Imagined Non-communities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” *Slavic Review* 69, no. 1 (2010): 93–119.
- 52 See Pieter Judson’s chapter in this volume, 29.
- 53 See, for example, Hoppen *Elections, Politics and Society*; Jackson, *Home Rule*; Fearghal McGarry, *The Rising: Ireland, Easter 1916*, updated edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Brian Hughes, *Defying the IRA: Intimidation, Coercion and Communities during the Irish Revolution* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016).
- 54 Hoppen *Elections, Politics and Society*.
- 55 For example, McGarry, *The Rising*.
- 56 Hughes, *Defying the IRA*; King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans?*. See also Brian Hughes’ chapter in this volume.
- 57 Okey, *Habsburg Empire*, 335, 360.
- 58 Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question*, 329.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 334.
- 60 See Christopher Harvie, *Fool’s Gold: The Story of North Sea Oil* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994).
- 61 In Peter Hume Brown, ed., *The Union of 1707: A Survey of Events* (Glasgow: Glasgow Herald, 1907), 173–4.
- 62 Morton, *Unionist Nationalism*.
- 63 Brian Harrison, *The Transformation of British Politics, 1860–1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 112.

- 64 Linda Colley, "Empires of Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 1776–1848," *Law & History Review* 32, no. 2 (2014): 237–66.
- 65 Alvin Jackson, "Shamrock and Saltire: Irish Home Rule, Independence, and the Scottish Referendum, 1914–2004," in *Uncertain Futures: Essays about the Irish Past for Roy Foster*, ed. Senia Paseta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 257–69.
- 66 William F. Monypenny, *The Two Irish Nations: An Essay on Home Rule* (London: John Murray, 1913).
- 67 For more detail on loyalism in the Irish Republic, see Brian Hughes' chapter in this volume.
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