

EU Institute in Japan, Kansai (*EUIJ-Kansai*) Workshop

**” National Foreign Policies of the Member States
and External Action of the Cases of
France, Germany and United Kingdom”**

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**EUIJ-Kansai Workshop on
National Foreign Policies of the Member States and External Action
of the Cases of France, Germany and United Kingdom
Kobe University
February 10, 2010**

Opening

Coordinator (Ken Masujima): My name is Ken Masujima, organizer of this workshop. I am very pleased to announce the opening of this workshop on behalf of the politics research group of the EU Institute in Japan, Kansai. We have actually set up several research groups within this organization called EUIJ-Kansai, which was set up with the financial support of the European Commission, to further strengthen our research activities. The EUIJ-Kansai, for those of you who may not know of its existence, is composed of three universities: Kobe University as the steering university, Kwansai Gakuin University, and Osaka University. And we have just started our second phase of the institute, and we try to strengthen this research activity by setting up research groups, of which the politics research group is just one. Our politics research group is actually composed of ten relatively young scholars working in the field of international relations and politics.

Some of our research group members will serve as chairs of the sessions in today's workshop. We have adopted as the theme of this workshop, "National Foreign Policies of the Member States and External Action of the EU: The Cases of France, Germany, and United Kingdom."

Some words are in order to explain why we adopted the theme and also why we took up certain wording.

First, the EU's "external action." Here the EU is considered as the whole of the European Union composed of the EU institutions, like the commission, and the member countries. We could have employed "European" to designate this whole ensemble altogether, but this would have the disadvantage of referring to other European countries outside of the EU, so we stuck to the label "EU" but we take the holistic view of the EU.

Next, "external action." External action is chosen to refer not only to CFSP and ESDP of the council, but also to the commission's various activities, like trade or environment and other foreign affairs-related fields. Here too we could have chosen another word, "foreign policy." We avoided this terminology because most of the time it refers to the CFSP aspect.

And then, our problématique. Our focus is on three member countries of the EU: France, Germany, and the UK, by order of the alphabet, without prejudicing the role of other member countries. The recently promulgated Lisbon Treaty brought about significant changes as regards external relations of the EU, by trying to coordinate or even fuse the two hitherto separate entities in the EU's external action into one. It tried to put CFSP

and various external actions of the community into one by creating a hybrid function, the permanent presidency of the EU and the high representative.

What will emerge from this institutional reform is yet uncertain, but will largely be determined through practice. We will see how member countries' foreign policies, with some countries having their own bilateral interests and membership in international organizations, and the community action interact with each other to produce this practice.

More than 30 years ago William Wallace characterized as compliance, in the case of the UK, defiance, in the case of France, and hesitation, in the case of Germany, their reactions to increasing interdependence in world affairs. Has this changed since then? We will try to answer these questions through discussion today.

We have three sessions devoted each to one of the countries selected and a concluding session to summarize our findings.

First Session (UK)

Chair (Daisuke Ikemoto): Today we have two wonderful guests who came a long way from the United Kingdom to be panelists in our workshop. Thank you very much to Prof. Christopher Bluth and Prof. Crispin Bates for joining us. Let me briefly introduce both of you to our audience.

Sitting next to me is Prof. Christopher Bluth. Prof. Bluth is a professor of international studies at Leeds University and specializes in international security policy, especially nuclear weapons policy and the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. His regional expertise covers an incredibly wide area including Russia, Pakistan, Iraq, Germany, and Northeast Asia, especially Korea. The fact that Prof. Bluth is very familiar with international relations in both Europe and Asia makes him an ideal person as a panelist I think.

Sitting over there is Prof. Crispin Bates. Prof. Bates is a reader of history at the University of Edinburgh but currently on leave and staying in Japan as a visiting professor at the National Museum of Ethnology, *Kokuritsu Minzokugaku Hakubutsukan* in Japanese. Prof. Bates has conducted research on the British Empire for many years, with a focus on the Indian subcontinent.

And I am Daisuke Ikemoto, assistant professor of international relations at Kansai Gaidai University. I will be chair for this first session.

First, Prof. Bluth will make a presentation titled "National Foreign Policy and the EU: The United Kingdom" for about 30 minutes I think, and then Prof. Bates will comment on the presentation for ten or 15 minutes maybe, and after that we will open our discussion to the general audience and any of you can ask questions by raising your hand.

Please start your presentation, Prof. Bluth.

Christopher Bluth: So briefly I want to talk about UK national security policy in general, then apply this to the issues of the global war on terror and the Iraq War, and look at Britain's relationship with the European Union, and CFSP, and it should read ESDP obviously, in particular, and then give some future prospects. I hope to include some rather controversial elements in my thoughts so that we can have some discussion afterwards.

Just to give in very broad strokes the overview over UK national security policy and its so-called "grand strategy" if you like. First of all we have to look at what is termed "the new international order." Now that is actually a very controversial topic and it would be wrong for me say that the British government in particular has a very well-articulated concept of what the new international order is. And as you all will be aware, in the new international relations literature there has been a wide gap, there has been no consensus, if you like, in terms of what constitutes a new international order.

We had a lot of discussion about the fact that the United States in particular has acquired economic and military resources that completely dwarf those of other developed countries, and by contrast we've seen in Europe a complete emasculation of the military capabilities from the time of the Cold War period, the United States has forged ahead as being the preeminent military power in the world today. But what does that actually mean for the international system?

Now the new international order as it was envisaged in the early post-Cold War period was defined by the hope that after the Cold War, which completely prevented any kind of consensus within the United Nations Security Council about international security, it would now move to a new order which would be based on the spread of democracy, the diffusion of international norms, and the United Nations Security Council as an agent of collective security.

And there are many different kinds of views as to whether we have moved into this kind of new era or not, given the fact that we had the Gulf War, we have the Iraq War, we have in fact, paradoxically, when the enormous threat of a strategic nuclear confrontation and a huge military confrontation in Europe disappeared towards the end of the 1980s, instead of a Cold War we've had a series of actual military confrontations rather than military threats.

Now the question of how you define this or how you interpret these military conflicts that broke out in the territory of the former Soviet Union, in the Balkans in particular, I'm leaving out Africa here for the moment, is obviously an important question. I mean, we all remember John Mearsheimer saying soon we will miss the Cold War, and how the realist tradition in international relations interpreted the advent of a multipolar world as one of the most risky of all possible scenarios.

However, I think if we take a step back we realize that the various predictions that John Mearsheimer made in his papers haven't actually come to pass; we haven't seen Germany or Japan, for example, acquire nuclear weapons. We have in fact seen the opposite occur, which is that interstate conflicts have become exceedingly rare.

So what in fact we see is the development of new types of conflicts which are primarily sub-state conflicts, which are regional ethnic conflicts, and it almost seems that the era of inter-state conflict, and in particular the era of conflict between major powers, seems to have passed for the time being and there is an emerging consensus, and I think now that war between the major powers is unlikely in the foreseeable future, that Russia is not reconstituting itself as a military power to threaten the West, and that China, although it's engaged in very substantial programs of military modernization, is really focusing on this concept of the peaceful rise of China and is not seeking to provoke international conflict. In fact, given that China's primary method of domestic control is that of rising prosperity, it seems unlikely that military conflict has any role to play in that.

So we have passed, and I again I say there is no consensus in the international relations literature but it's certainly a point of view that has been expressed, that the end of the

Cold War era really marked a very fundamental transition in the international system, and that we are in a period now where interstate conflict is becoming relatively rare and is confined to very confined geographic locations, and that we are facing these new wars, but what these new wars actually are, how they are constituted and how they can be dealt with, is still open to question, although we understand they are fundamentally related to the failure of states and to the emergence of international terrorism.

Now for the United Kingdom, of course the United Kingdom had based its security policy, and especially since the World War, on the special relationship with the United States. And the question is, to what extent can this relationship endure into the post-Cold War era, into the current era?

During the Cold War, the special relationship really was cemented by the fact that the United Kingdom was the only nuclear power which had kind of approval by the United States, and France was a kind of renegade state in the sense that France left the military integrated framework of NATO and acquired nuclear weapons largely without U.S. assistance and to some extent against the opposition of the American government, whereas in the United Kingdom we remained a partner in nuclear weapons.

The special relationship really had two functions I think: one function was to ensure that Britain could maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent of sorts, and the other function was that it acted as a kind of force multiplier for the United Kingdom, that the United Kingdom could play a diplomatic role in international affairs which went far beyond its actual capabilities otherwise.

The post-Cold War era has posed quite a new issue for the United Kingdom in this respect, which is that if you have a world in which there is really only one superpower, and that is the United States, albeit that the United States is a democratic country which shares its fundamental values with the United Kingdom and the rest of the European Union, how can this country be contained, in other words, how can we ensure that the United States acts within international law for example? How can we prevent unilateral actions by a country that has such military preponderance? And this is an issue that very much played into the Iraq war. I'm going to talk about this a little bit later, that the United Kingdom, it was extremely concerned to ensure that there remained some kind of unity between Europe and the United States, that the United States would not really go out on its own and develop a unilateral policy, and that's why the disdain that the Bush administration had, especially in its first term, for multilateral organizations and its tendency toward unilateralism was considered to be quite alarming and dangerous by other powers.

But nevertheless, I think it also poses the really important question as to who is the international security manager globally? In other words, who is responsible for dealing with crises of international security around the globe? And this is the question, this is the impetus, if you like, that gave rise to ESDP, that the European Union should stop sitting on the sidelines and actually take a proactive role, because if you leave the United States to be the only security manager globally, then you cannot really complain about the

actions that it takes, and that it is not desirable that this should be the case, that the United States should be left not only to carry the burdens of global security but also to be allowed, if you like, to make those decisions unilaterally.

It still remains unclear I think to what extent the special relationship exists and can be maintained, to what extent it's in Britain's interests. A lot of people I think believe that one of the major reasons why Tony Blair agreed to participate in the war against Iraq was to maintain this special relationship. I think from my point of view that's a rather simplistic way of looking at it and there were other factors, and the fact that I just mentioned, which is that because in the case of Iraq the United States was going to bypass the United Nations completely, Britain was extremely concerned that any action the United States would take would be with the consent of the United Nations and would not be seen as a violation of international law.

The third point here on my list of international security issues, which has really risen to the fore quite dramatically since the end of the Cold War, is the issue of nuclear proliferation. I am taking a slightly controversial view perhaps on this issue in that on the one hand, as a nuclear weapons specialist and somebody who has followed nuclear issues for a long time, I do consider nuclear proliferation and the prevention of proliferation a very important issue.

At the same time I think what is remarkable is just how robust the non-proliferation regime has actually turned out to be. In fact, I think it is very clear to me that the non-proliferation regime has become a lot more robust over the last 20 years because many countries since have joined up with the NPT. We've had one defection from the NPT, and in fact only four countries in the world are not in the NPT. So in many respects you could say the NPT is one of the most successful international regimes of any kind.

Countries that were clearly considering to go nuclear, in Latin America for example, have turned away from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We have Libya joining the NPT and giving up its nuclear program. We have South Africa eliminating its nuclear program. We've had the countries of the former Soviet Union, namely, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, giving up their nuclear weapons that were based in the territory and foregoing the option, if you like, of becoming nuclear-weapons states in their own right. So in that sense I think that there is no doubt that the NPT has been very successful.

For Britain there is sort of the issue as to whether Britain should remain a nuclear-weapons state, whether it should give up its nuclear capacity as the issue of the replacement of the Trident system is now coming to the fore. I do not believe that Britain will give up its nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future for the simple reason that if once... Well, let me put it this way. The argument in favor of giving up nuclear weapons is simply twofold. One is that Britain doesn't have any direct nuclear threats at this point in time. Now it may be the case that in the future Iran will have nuclear capability and will have missiles that can reach Britain but this is not the case at present.

So there isn't any specific threat that the nuclear deterrent is focused upon, however, the counterargument is: a) the uncertainty of the future; b) once you have the privilege of being in the P5, that is to say you are accepted as a legitimate nuclear power, it's very, very hard to give up this privilege. So I think that is probably the main reason why the UK will continue to maintain a nuclear arsenal, although there is now a conversation about the possibility of merging this arsenal with France.

There is another point to be taken into consideration which is that as long as China and Russia remain nuclear powers, it is not desirable for Europe that there should be only one Western nuclear power. In other words, if France and Britain were to give up their nuclear arsenals, that would mean that the United States again is bearing the sole security burden and would be the sole Western nuclear power, and that is probably not desirable from the European point of view.

It is often said that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is threatened by the fact that the nuclear powers have not done enough to reduce their own arsenals. I concur with a point of view that, first of all, they have reduced very substantially; Russia and the United States in particular, have reduced their arsenals very dramatically. Secondly, it is not desirable at this point in time, as long as there are nuclear countries outside the NPT, that the P5 should give up their nuclear weapons, and that's an issue we can discuss. But I think that paradoxically, the stability of the NPT depends to some extent on the P5. I think if the United States were not giving nuclear guarantees to Japan, to South Korea, or to Arab states in the Middle East, then the nuclear program in Iran and the nuclear program in North Korea would precipitate the acquisition of nuclear programs and a chain reaction against the NPT in the regions.

The third element of the international security landscape that we have to consider are regional crises, where we had the regional crisis in Europe, when you have the regional crisis in South Asia, we have the regional crisis on the Korean Peninsula, again, very, very confined areas in which there is the largest prospect, if you like, of interstate conflict in the foreseeable future.

Now we have obviously seen therefore a complete shift of security strategy in Europe. I mean, without any doubt it is the case that for Europe collective defense at this point in time is obsolete. And therefore, the use of the word "defense" actually, I mean even in the ESDP the use of defense is somewhat oxymoronic because none of the European states faces military threats from outside. The only threat from outside, if one wants to use that phrase, might be international terrorism, which is not quite the same thing.

And so NATO and the European Union have transformed themselves into looking at intervention in crises outside their own region with issues that don't directly affect their own security but nevertheless are important for international security. And this was a long and painful process, and a process obviously whose legitimacy has to be questioned sometimes, and the question is how it can achieve legitimacy is extremely important.

Moreover, I think the experiences of the Iraq war have raised new doubts about interventionism and the extent to which Europe should intervene in crises and conflicts outside its own territory.

Can we move on to the next slide? Right, thank you. No, no, this one, yes. One of the themes that dominates international security at the moment is of course the war on terror. It's fair to say that a lot of international terrorism is viewed as a serious threat by European states and especially by the United Kingdom. For the United Kingdom the threat of terrorism also resides in terms of domestic internal radicalization and it's from within as well as from without.

Nevertheless, I think the term "war on terror" and the way in which the war on terror has been pursued has been questioned.

First of all, the term "war on terrorism," as you will be familiar, is problematic in the sense that we talk about a war and a phenomenon which gives kind of a boundless and infinite war essentially that doesn't seem to be advisable. I think if you talk in terms of any kind of policy, military policy, you have to define your objectives much more clearly. And moreover, the emphasis that's given on the use of military force also is problematic in the sense that counter-terrorism really consists in different kinds of measures, especially defensive measures primarily rather than offensive measures, and really the actions in Afghanistan are the only area in which the use of military force in any sense is appropriate for the fight against terrorism.

The United Kingdom did not agree with the United States that the Iraq War was part of the war on terror. That was a very important conceptual distinction. The United Kingdom agreed that the war against Iraq was necessary because of the regional security threat that the Saddam Hussein regime posed, but it did not conflate those two because it did not believe that Iraq had any links with Al Qaeda or was in any sense responsible for 9/11 or engaged in that type of international terrorism.

I think what we have seen is, with the coming of the Obama administration and also in terms of the development, if you like, of the language that's being used in Britain, that we have redefined the war on terror really as looking at counter-terrorism on one side; on the other side, dealing with regional security crises in South Asia and Central Asia – rather than looking on the global war on terror in the way in which it was formulated before. This conceptualization of the war on terror is not really appropriate in terms of dealing with the phenomenon that we are dealing with.

The Iraq War obviously created an enormous problem in transatlantic relations because of the enormous opposition, especially in Germany and France, to the Iraq War. And moreover, the manner in which the European Union afterwards refused to take any kind of responsibility for the aftermath also I think was a very bitter experience. I hope that we are now in the position where essentially, especially after the election of Obama, the wounds between Europe and the United States have been healing and there is now greater convergence on international security.

But as I've said, Britain was engaged in my view in the Iraq War for two specific reasons. One is that the British government was really convinced that the Iraqi regime could no longer be contained indefinitely, and that therefore it was absolutely necessary to deal with this regime and its propensity for the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, especially as in future there might be a convergence between Iraq and international terrorism.

And secondly, really I think what we saw, we saw the French and the British adopt a completely contrary kind of strategy, which is that the French wanted to stop the Americans and the British wanted the Americans to do it legitimately, and those two different strategies really negated each other. You see, the French strategy effectively torpedoed the British strategy, because what's happened in the end, that despite resolution 1441, which represented a consensus I think of confronting Saddam Hussein, there was no consensus for a follow-up resolution that might have given the war greater legitimacy.

The focus obviously now has shifted to Afghanistan where Britain is playing a major role and where the important issue has come to the fore, that once again the United States is essentially being asked to bear the major burden of the conflict. And Britain is playing its part in terms of the military engagement, but the European states haven't really borne enough of the military and other burdens in this particular conflict.

Now, again it raises the question, certainly from the American point of view, of how serious the Europeans are in terms of their own security and how this is perceived, and it has to be said that a difference in perspective is quite clear. I think that many people in Europe in particular, they question our engagement in Afghanistan and what the ultimate purpose of that is. And I would also say that Britain and the United States to some extent have articulated this rather poorly.

I think to articulate our engagement in Afghanistan purely in terms of our national security interests is misguided. Clearly, there is a national security interest, clearly there is a terrorist threat that would increase if Afghanistan once again came under the power of the Taliban, but the fact that the destabilization of that region is not in our interests I think is a point that really needs addressed. And in some ways we do owe something to the people of Afghanistan after the intervention in 2001.

Let me very briefly talk about Britain and the European Union, specifically.

As you will all be aware, initially Britain stayed aloof from the European Union. Really I think this obviously had to do with the fact that in the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain really still saw itself as a global power. And as we know, it's not really until the mid-1960s when it really sunk in with the British political elite that the time of the British Empire was over. And the very deliberate turn towards Europe and to join the European Community to focus on relations with Europe itself became the new policy then, leading to Britain's membership in the European Community.

And it was interestingly under Margaret Thatcher that Britain acceded to the Maastricht Treaty and the European Union, although in the end stayed out of the European monetary union, especially after the debacle with the European exchange rate mechanism where Britain essentially was, in a financial crisis, forced to hurriedly leave the ERM.

The Labour government, it was the policy of the Labor government that the United Kingdom should join the euro eventually. That it has never been able to get enough political support for this to happen, and I think this issue is really dead for the time being.

British policy was very much oriented towards widening the European Union as a way of preventing the deepening of the European Union. Now that's not current British government policy, although it may kind of reemerge again. If the Conservatives get elected this year it's very clear that the Conservatives will be opposed to any kind of further European integration, and the Conservatives have now questioned for a very long time whether or not there needs to be further European integration.

The Lisbon Treaty as you know was very controversial. Initially, the British government had committed itself to bring a European constitution to a referendum. With the Lisbon Treaty no longer being officially deemed a constitution, the British government did not bring it to a referendum and the Conservative government also will not be able to do that since the Lisbon Treaty has now come into effect.

In terms of military cooperation with the European Union for quite a long time the British government as well was unwilling to participate in a meaningful way because it essentially, the British government saw NATO as the primary security organization in Europe and therefore did not want to deflect from that. And again I think it really, this attitude was also linked in with the whole attitude towards European integration.

Now that changed under Tony Blair. It changed because of the extraordinarily painful experiences associated with Bosnia and Kosovo where the European Union was really revealed to the world as an impotent actor in international security affairs and where the United States, which had really wanted to stay out of the Balkans conflict and wanted Europe to take a leading role after being so frustrated by the European Union to be unable to act effectively, had to intervene through the instrument of NATO again.

Now that has led to a fairly dramatic change in that we have the development of ESDP which has developed military and civilian instruments of intervention. The military instruments are modest simply due to the fact, as I said, that the military capabilities of military states first of all had important gaps in terms of heavy lift capabilities, intervention capabilities, reliance on the United States for satellite-based capabilities. But nevertheless, through the development of the European Rapid Reaction Force, the forces that have been made available are now capable, and the ESDP has been involved in quite a number of missions, two of which are military missions and one involving quite substantial military deployments. So the ESDP has become a more credible actor in the military field and with the Berlin Plus agreement it also has forged a link to NATO so it can make use of NATO capabilities.

More important and less discussed perhaps are the civilian instruments, the crisis management mechanisms involved in ESDP, which are extremely important and which NATO lacks. And so now an interesting situation has arisen where NATO can still be a provider of military capabilities, but the European Union and the ESDP can be a provider of civilian capabilities for conflict resolution.

And so essentially I think the spat between the United States and Europe over the ESDP has to some extent come to an end where I think we have found an agreement that ESDP is not going to take away from NATO, but in a sense add to NATO.

But I should say that NATO is very much on trial because really the testing ground for NATO currently is Afghanistan, where again, from the American point of view, the Europeans really aren't living up to their responsibilities. And the interesting thing about NATO is that whereas for a very long time the whole purpose of NATO was to keep the Americans in Europe and make sure that the Americans would be committed to the defense of Europe, now the purpose of NATO seems to be to keep the Europeans involved and making sure that the Europeans participate in an active role in international security, as in European countries there is much questioning as to whether Europe should be involved in any of these conflicts outside of its own territories at all.

Very, very briefly now to conclude, go to the next slide please. Of course we may be entering a more difficult period. It's because the Labor party is most likely going to lose the next election and the Conservative government will be Euro-skeptic and resist further integration.

Prospects for British membership of the euro seem to have disappeared now. I haven't seen any academic studies yet in looking at the question of what euro membership would have implied for the financial crisis, but it seems clear that the actions that the British government took, which is essentially to sacrifice the exchange rate in order to save the financial system, would not have been possible if Britain had been in the euro. So suddenly the fact that Britain was not in the euro turned out to be very, very important.

The question of the future of European security and Britain's role in it is very much open. We are now having a new defense review. Britain is still committed to having global intervention capabilities. We are talking about two new aircraft carriers; we are talking about the Typhoon fighter aircraft. Whether those are really appropriate for the kinds of missions Britain is going to be involved in, and given the financial constraints whether these kinds of proposals are really sustainable, very much remains to be seen, but we will have a defense review after the next election.

The other question on the agenda also I mentioned is there going to be European nuclear arsenal? And I think that would be an interesting innovative idea.

Are we going to see an ever close union? What kind of future trajectories are there for Europe? I see at the moment the new British government, which also is not in the centre-

right group in the European parliament, is likely to try and prevent an ever-closer union.
Thank you.

National Foreign Policy and the EU: The United Kingdom



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Chair: Thank you very much, Prof. Bluth, for your stimulating contribution. And then Prof. Bates, please make a comment on the presentation.

Crispin Bates: Thank you very much. Prof. Bluth's presentation was amazingly lucid and frank and covered an extraordinary variety of important issues. Coming from an historical background I am better qualified to contextualize his remarks than to take issue with them with in any particular, although I will come back to some of his comments later on.

To begin with, I think one of the issues I wanted to flag up for consideration is the definition of international security that we are working with today, because it is commonly seen primarily in terms of military and strategic issues. And yet, strengthening international security, as the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq amply demonstrate, is more than just a matter of putting troops on the ground or possessing an overawing military or nuclear force; it is also to do with providing human security, human security being one of the mechanisms and means by which conflicts and terrorism can be averted. I think one of the fundamental failings of the European Union is its inability to respond collectively not only to military conflicts globally but also to simple human crises and natural disasters on a global scale.

One of the largest resources available for dealing with incidents, like the earthquake in Haiti, are the medical corps of the collective armies of Europe. There is no serious move yet to integrate the military forces of Europe, but why has not consideration been given to some sort of integration of the medical corps of the armies of Europe? At present, the only response that Europe collectively can offer is thanks to the entirely voluntary efforts of Médecins Sans Frontières which is clearly inadequate to projecting European humanitarian interests, which are also strategic interests, globally.

One might make a helpful contrast here with the policies of the Japanese government which uses its army, its defense force, literally to build bridges all over the world. In this way Japan projects itself without resorting to engagement in any sort of armed conflict itself. Europe is reluctant so far to learn from this lesson that Japan has taught us. Yet it is surely though one of the major ways in which Europe needs to step forward if it is to project itself in a more united fashion internationally.

Coming to the engagement of Britain in Europe, I would take issue to some extent with Prof. Bluth's comment about the legacies of the British Empire having been laid to rest. It is my personal conviction, having read a great many British foreign ministry documents from the 1940s, '50s, '60s, '70s, that the projection of Britain's power globally is still a major concern for a large part of the British public and of the political elite, and that this part of the legacy of the British Empire is still alive and well. We must not forget that the Conservative Party is most likely to come to power in the not-too-distant future and the Conservative Party is firmly wedded to the idea of Britain as an independent nation. There is even talk of withdrawing from the European Community. I think a significant portion of the Conservative Party would like to actually abandon the Lisbon and Maastricht treaties and for Britain to go it alone as an actor in global affairs.

Now this is entirely impractical for many reasons, but I think this mindset of the possibility of Britain being a global player is still there and plays a large role in British attitudes towards European integration. There is often a benign paternalism in this attitude of course, aspects of which may be commendable. But we should not blind ourselves to its pretensions and historical origins.

I was particularly interested in Prof. Bluth's comment about British policy being to widen the European Union as a tactic to prevent the deepening of the European Union. Now from one point of view, that is a very accurate diagnosis of a great deal of British policy, but I do not think one should necessarily regard that cynically. When one is talking about widening the benefits of the European Union, we're talking about here not only extending the benefits in terms of economy and trade, but also the benefits in terms of international and human security as well.

One of the slightly worrying aspects of the growth of European Union that has taken place in recent years is the reluctance of the Western European powers to extend all of the privileges of European membership to Eastern European countries who as a consequence find themselves somewhat struggling to keep up with the pace of development elsewhere.

The question of Turkey is an especially burning issue. There are very profound international security reasons why Turkey might be usefully integrated into the European Union, but seen from the point of view of 'fortress Europe', of course Turkey becomes a threat rather than an asset in terms of international and human security. Not least of all, because of its size, it would challenge the political dominance of the western European powers.

Regarding Britain's relationship with Europe: ever since Britain joined the European Union there has been a growing convergence in European and British trade. Before British accession to the European Treaty somewhere between 50 and 60 percent of Britain's trade was with Europe. That has now progressively increased; at present I believe that something like 67 percent of Britain's trade is with Europe.

But I think one of the primary reasons why Britain remains interested in global issues and remains committed to free trade on a global scale, and not simply concerned to promote free trade with Europe, is the importance of British investments overseas. Although trade with Europe accounts for 67 percent of Britain's overseas exports, Britain's investments elsewhere in the world are as great if not more substantial than British investments in Europe. I was particularly struck recently, as I was doing some research for today's conference, when I came across a rather striking diagram which illustrates the proportion British investments in Europe compared with other parts of the world.

Until very recently indeed, the largest proportion of all British overseas investments were the United States, not in Europe. And this is probably still the case. So when one speaks about the special relationship with the United States, for Britain I think this is not a

special relationship; it is a special dependence. And I think that was very clearly illustrated by the financial crisis that we have recently undergone. This was very much focused on banks and stock exchanges in London and New York, which I think illustrates the very clearly the intensely close ties between the British and American financial systems. Invariably, in fact, the British economic cycle, of growth and contraction, follows that of the United States and not that of Europe: which is one reason why joining the Euro currency is economically so problematic for Britain.

Now obviously this has historical roots. The British Empire helped to make Britain into a major financial center, but Britain also has very longstanding investments in the United States going way back even to the 19th century. And of course in the years immediately after the Second World War when the British economy was floundering, particularly in the 1960s and '70s, British capital fled abroad at an enormous rate to invest in more profitable ventures overseas.

I am not sure exactly what the current statistics are, but still today we find something like 10 or 12 percent of Britain's Gross Domestic Product (or 'income', broadly) derives from investments overseas, compared with 22 percent from exports. So Britain's investments overseas are tremendously important to the British economy, and a significant portion of those investments lie outside the European Union. Although, as I have said, there is thus a convergence with Europe in trade, in terms of investments, Britain's economic advantage clearly still lies to a significant extent in the global projection and protection of Britain's interests. British priorities lie in the need to promote free trade on a global scale and not simply closer integration with the other European economies (although this too is desirable). This particularly relates to the United States in terms of the scale of British investments in the North American continent.

Returning to the issue of the Iraq War, which Prof. Bluth mentioned, he said that he thought that the special relationship or preserving the special relationship was a rather weak explanation for Britain's involvement in the Iraq War. However, I think there were many other very practical reasons, of the sort I have outlined, which explain why British and American policies are so closely tied. Soon after 9/11, the chairman of British Aerospace spoke about the export of arms to the United States, and the growing involvement of Britain in the American arms industry, as their No. 1 priority. In fact, there was even talk a couple of years ago of possibly shifting the headquarters of British Aerospace and Engineering from London to the United States in order to promote the better sale of Britain's arms abroad. The British arms trade abroad is something like the third-largest in the world, and although it may have only been partially fulfilled, the aspiration to export arms to the United States has certainly been a big part of Britain's purpose in forging a closer relationship with the United States.

In terms of arm sales and military collaboration, Britain does obviously have a unique advantage in that there are very close relationships between the American military and British intelligence. This close relationship extends to the types of communications technology employed right up to the scale of the British nuclear deterrent. It is often forgotten that Britain does not actually own the missiles that constitute its nuclear

deterrent. It owns the submarines and builds the submarines – British Aerospace builds the submarines – and it owns the nuclear weapons that sit on top of the missiles, but the missiles themselves, the Trident missiles, are leased from the United States. There are 58 of them in all. They used to be serviced in the UK but now Britain does not even service its own nuclear missiles. They are now serviced at a place ironically titled Kings Bay in Georgia, alongside the Trident missiles in the American nuclear arsenal. So the integration of military forces and intelligence and the arms industries of the two countries are very strong, as well as enormously lucrative to Britain. Not least of all, it saves a great deal of military expenditure that might otherwise fall on the British taxpayer.

If in addition to that you add the economic interest that Britain has in terms of investments in the American continent, and you will begin to see how, where no matter how enthusiastic Britain might be about closer involvement with the European Union, its economic and strategic self-interest will still draw it inevitably across to the other side of the Atlantic. And I think until Europe can find a better way to project itself internationally through for example the use of soft power, of the sort that I spoke of earlier, projecting the European Union as a force for not only strategic but also human security internationally, Britain is going to be continue to be drawn towards maintaining a close alliance with the United States in order to ensure the efficacy of its nuclear force and Britain's capacity to project itself internationally in defense of its interests.

Chair: Thank you very much, Prof. Bates. Prof. Bluth, would you like to make a reply to Prof. Bates' comments?

Bluth: Very briefly. I don't really disagree with anything that has been said. I think it does give a slightly different perspective and it comes from a different kind of angle to these issues, and I agree that relations between Britain and the U.S. from an economic point of view. But also, talking about weapons, clearly, I mean, Britain is much more able than any of the other European states to operate with the American armed forces and that explains why Britain is cooperating so closely with the United States.

I also agree on the question of new EU member states. I mean, clearly, I think it is a disgrace actually that the Western European states are not extending the full benefits of membership to the new members. Originally I am from Germany, as you may know, and from the legalistic mindset in which I grew up it seems to be totally unacceptable.
[laughs]

Having said that, I think the question of Turkey is extremely complex. First of all, they have enormous financial problems in doing it in the short-term because Turkey is still quite poor. And there are issues about how it affects the weight of voting within the European Union. How to integrate Turkey I think is an enormously difficult problem, and those countries in Western Europe that have a large Turkish populations are elementally against it at this present point in time, but I see the points that have been made here in this presentation as well. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. If I understand correctly, I think both Prof. Bluth and Prof. Bates think convergence of foreign policy between the United Kingdom on the one hand and France and Germany on the other is unlikely in the foreseeable future. That's my understanding. But anyway, now we are going to have discussion with the general audience, and if you have any question, please raise your hand.

Question: My name is Kota Yoshitome. I work at the same university as the chairman. Dr. Bluth has distinguished the British attitude towards the Iraq War as well as the Afghan War from the German-French attitude on the same wars. The distinction suggests that Britain wanted to legitimize these wars, whereas Germany and France wanted to contain or stop the so-called American unilateralism on these wars.

So here's my question. By legitimizing American action, what kind of benefit or interest can Britain expect to receive? So would you tell me this point? That's one question.

The other question is as follows. The UK is involved in the war fighting in Afghanistan and a sort of stabilizing mission in Iraq. I think, we all know that the American perspective of the expected role of NATO and the European Union regarding Iraq. Probably from the American perspective, NATO should subsidize American action, provide more armed forces, and the European Union should do a sort of humanitarian mission. Now, what is the British perspective on the role of NATO or of the European Union in the fields of Iraq or Afghanistan? Thank you.

Bluth: I think it should be said first of all that there is no doubt that Tony Blair believed that the Iraq War was necessary. And so in that sense he supported the Americans, although there were very important differences between the ways in which the British government articulated the threat posed by Iraq as compared to the United States. Nevertheless, I think there was a conviction that first of all the situation of trying to contain Iraq was unsustainable and that Iraq had to be confronted over its defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions and that regime change was the only way to resolve this issue.

But the big problem was that the United States believed that it had the right to do this unilaterally on the basis of casting the threat posed by Iraq as an issue of defense, essentially national defense. Now that is a quite difficult case to make because there isn't any way really in which Iraq could have directly either threatened the United Kingdom or the United States. And it was also within the discussion on preventive or preemptive strikes, again, which raised a lot of questions.

So what the British government wanted to do was to channel this initiative, if you like, through the United Nations so that if it's going to be done it's not going to damage the international system, but it's going to be seen as a response of the United Nations enforcing its own resolutions, essentially which it hadn't done up to this point.

And so in terms of benefits I'm simply saying the British government believed that regime change in Iraq was necessary, but it really wanted to prevent, because if it

happened in this case, it might happen in another case; in other words, it really wanted to make sure that the United States remained committed to the principles of the United Nations and the principles of international law.

As for the question of Afghanistan and EU-NATO, I mean the great frustration of the British and Americans is that they are doing all the heavy lifting with regard to the military aspect of this issue. And the Germans were firmly ensconced in the northern area, where at that time there was very little fighting. This has changed somewhat obviously. And they were seen flying around in Tornados taking pictures rather than confronting the Taliban seriously, at least that's sort of the caricature, if you like. And one really has to ask the question, even from the British point of view, why the military resources that were committed to Afghanistan were at such a low level, because they were clearly inadequate to accomplish the task.

And a lot of it has to do obviously with the simultaneous engagement in Iraq, which of course for Britain has just finished, also a kind of anger really on saying that if we do more we justify the others, the attitude of the others who are not doing enough. It's now, we need more resources but it shouldn't be us that's providing them; it should be the other members of NATO that should be providing them. And essentially that bubble has burst now and Obama is putting in another substantial reinforcement.

In terms of the more general question as I already mentioned, I think after the debacle of the Balkans there has been a sense that Europe should develop more, greater capabilities. I mean, this has been one of the problems which is that the capabilities haven't existed for substantial involvement I think. In fact, the number of troops that the European states now can deploy for very serious military actions is laughably low. If you compare this to the Cold War period when we had hundreds of thousands, or 900,000 forces basically ready to fight the Cold War in the event it turned hot. Military capabilities that can be used in this form have declined very precipitously.

And the ESDP obviously was an effort to change that to some extent, to provide a more serious military capability that can be used, but again, the key thing is it's not used for national defense; this is why I think I put the word defense in inverted commas. It's used for intervention in crisis regions and for so-called Petersberg tasks.

Chair: Does anyone have any question?

(Roche): You were speaking about ESDP. Of course it's not a real process, but it's no longer seen as a total failure. When we look at what Europe is doing in Africa, where we never used to go, in fact you might say that it's no longer a total failure. And the ESDP is becoming, it's not just a reality, but ESDP is changing.

Bluth: I think there is a considerable convergence between Britain and the United States about what constitutes international security threats in the current period, so I'm not sure... Well, I'm not saying there aren't any differences, but I think the differences

between Britain and the U.S. are less sharp than the differences were between Europe, let us say, in the pre-Merkel era, Europe in the pre-Merkel era, in other words, there was a time during the Bush administration when there really was a very substantial difference. I mean, the Europeans for example adamantly opposed national missile defense, whereas Britain was actually collaborating with the United States in ballistic missile defenses.

And so the opposition to this whole preemptive doctrine and so forth that was articulated by the Bush administration, it's rejection of multilateralism, in other words, instead of actually using NATO, the interesting thing is, the NATO Article 5 clause being for the very first time invoked on 9/11, and then subsequently the United States went for the Coalition of the Willing rather than with NATO. Clearly, I think there was a very, very big divergence emerging between European perceptions of international security and the United States, whereas Britain, let us say, was closer to the United States during this period than the rest of Europe.

And really what I'm doing here is just giving an overview of some of the central issues of international security rather than sort of trying to address that particular issue.

As for the future of Afghanistan, I mean I think a total failure in Afghanistan would mean the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan which would be an unbelievable catastrophe I think. And moreover, I think it would put very serious question marks over NATO that already exist. I mean the question of what NATO is for hasn't really been answered ever since the collective defense role of NATO essentially disappeared. Now NATO has reinvented itself in various ways and has sort of maintained a role and continues to maintain a role in European security, but I think if it failed in Afghanistan, that would be a serious question.

Now what consequences does this have for ESDP? I don't think the failure of NATO would be good for ESDP because ESDP actually relies on NATO to some extent, so I think a harmonious relationship between ESDP, where ESDP provides legitimacy and civilian capabilities, and NATO provides some military resources I think is a good thing. I mean the Berlin Plus agreement I think works.

As for what you said about ESDP and its various missions, yes, the ESDP has done in some respects more than NATO since 1999. And the actions in Africa and so forth, yes, they are good; there is more work to be done. I think it needs more. There are still substantial gaps in its military requirements which need to be bridged, but on the whole I agree with you. I don't think ESDP is a complete failure.

Chair: Thank you very much, Prof. Bluth and Prof. Bates. Now I think we have to finish this first session. We have a coffee break between the first session and the second session, and then Prof. Ogawa will chair the second session.

Second Session (Germany)

Chair (Hiroyuki Ogawa): For the second session on Germany, we have Prof. Gunter Hellmann, from the University of Frankfurt. He is a professor of political science at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University at Frankfurt/Main, if my German pronunciation is correct.

Gunther Hellmann: Pretty good.

Chair: He is a professor of political science at Frankfurt with a focus on German and European foreign relations. His primary research fields are German and European foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, and international relations theory. Actually, he came to Japan in 2006 and at that time he gave a talk at the Japanese Association of International Relations in Chiba Prefecture, and also he gave a presentation at the University of Tokyo. But I think according to Senoo-san, it's his first time to come to this better part of Japan, and it is a traditional part of Japan compared to Tokyo. And today he will give us a talk entitled "From a 'Culture of Restraint' to 'Assertive Multilateralism' – Germany's Invention of a New Foreign Policy Tradition."

And after that we have Dr. Senoo to make some comments from his own point of view. He is a fellow of the EU Institute in Japan, Kansai, and he specializes in Germany foreign policy, particularly German *Ostpolitik* during the period of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr.

And after that we greatly welcome other comments and questions from the audience. My name is Hiroyuki Ogawa. I teach British politics and diplomacy at Aichi prefectural university near Nagoya. And so Prof. Hellmann, please give us your talk.

Gunter Hellmann: I would like to briefly sketch how I will proceed. Since we are supposed to talk about different types of foreign policy traditions and European foreign policy, I want to start by clarifying how I understand some of the concepts that were used in the setup of the program. I will then go through a brief overview of my argument in terms of answering two of the questions that are outlined in the invitation. Next, I will have a look at the foreign policy tradition of what has come to be called the Bonn Republic, that is, the Federal Republic before unification. Afterwards, there will be a brief section specifying how unification, understood as "environmental change", and foreign policy adjustment actually introduced a very different setting from which a new type of foreign policy tradition emerged, the foreign policy tradition of the so-called Berlin Republic since unification.

Clarifying concepts. I chose the term "foreign policy tradition" rather than, as is more common in the field of international relations, speaking of "foreign policy theory" or simply "foreign policy" without any additional characterization. I think the term "tradition" is quite aptly chosen, although it is a highly underspecified term in social science theory in general and in IR theory in particular.

In my view, “tradition” is probably best defined as a set of collective beliefs and foreign policy practices which reflect the historical experiences and ambitions of a particular country and result from interaction in a specific environment and with other foreign policy actors. Obviously, this is not a definition of a static phenomenon. Rather, any “foreign policy tradition” is a fluid and adjustable set of collective beliefs which responds to specific situations as they arise and change. Therefore, it is not something that you can tackle with the standard tools and theoretical concepts of the social sciences.

In dealing with foreign policy traditions in the context of national foreign policies in Europe and European external action/European foreign policy, we are faced with two different types of actors – the EU and the nation state. Modern, or as we sometimes call it Westphalian, foreign policy has largely been invented by the European nation state. Therefore, national foreign policy traditions in Europe reach back quite far in European history, and countries such as Britain, France, or Germany have very long lines of foreign policy tradition.

However, the project of European integration has significantly transformed these long-established foreign policy practices. I think this is most obvious if one looks at how diplomatic services have been changing. Adapting structurally to the way that foreign policy is conducted within the European Union, diplomats from France, Britain and Germany interact with each other on the European scene. Second, the European Union as a collective actor also interacts with other foreign policy players on the global scene.

National and EU foreign policy traditions interact. To use a term borrowed from international relations theory: they are mutually constitutive. One cannot think of national German foreign policy in a global setting without taking into account that it is taking place in environment characterized by European integration. German foreign policy both influences its environment and is influenced by it.

To continue the clarification of key concepts, I will try to make sense of the conditions and factors that shape foreign policy traditions in a rather abstract way: I want to go through a list of three structural variables and two actor-oriented variables, i.e., S1 through S3 and A1 and A2. As I go through my presentation, I will illustrate these more abstract and general variables with very specific instances of foreign policy traditions of both the European Union and Germany before and after unification.

The first structural variable (S1) is what, in realist theory, is usually called the distribution of capabilities and balance of power in the international system as a whole. Applying this variable to the European Union, one may ask how the distribution of capabilities on the global scale affects an emerging foreign policy tradition in the European Union. The European Union is a unique type of foreign policy actor. It is different from other types of foreign policy actors (e.g. nation-states) that we know; yet at the same time it is also a fairly powerful and influential actor although it does not behave as unitary state-type actors normally behave.

Another dimension of the systemic structural variable S1 is that Europe is located in an international system which works to its advantage as it renders it fairly secure. There is no immediate threat to the European Union, at least not a classical territorial threat to the EU as a whole. However, as the structures operating on the global level normally put a premium on the ability of great powers, such as the U.S., China, or Russia, to act quickly and decisively, and since such action is not a strength of the European Union, these structures also disadvantage the EU as an international actor.

The second variable that needs to be taken into account when you look into the factors shaping foreign policy traditions is the environment of a foreign policy actor (S2). Alexander Wendt uses the term "culture of anarchy" to describe different possible types of settings in which countries may conceive themselves to be, and which enable them to pursue different types of objectives and goals. For example, we might encounter a classical realist environment: a so-called "Hobbesian" world where war among state actors is possible at any time. This is a specific kind of setting that poses different incentives for action, compared to, for example, a "Kantian" setting in which a war between state actors is almost unthinkable because states perceive each other as friends. Such is the case in Europe, or at least in EU Europe, where it is almost impossible to conceive of a war between Britain and France or Germany and Luxembourg. By enabling certain actions while making other actions unthinkable and, hence, impossible, the kind of setting thus shapes the evolving foreign policy tradition.

This effect of being in a Kantian setting is furthered by institutional density, that is, whether you have a setting which is fairly densely structured by international institutions. Europe obviously is such a place with the European Union, NATO, and other institutions. After the Second World War, these institutions were set up in a different, "Lockean" kind of environment, at best, an environment characterized by very few international institutions and by a dominance of traditional, state-based kinds of political practices.

My third structural variable (S3) is called "institutional structures". By "institutional structures" I mean the kinds of institutions that shape the particular actor. What institutional structures are there in the European Union? There is the imperative of consensus politics, of taking a unanimity view when it comes to foreign policy decision-making, at least in terms of the key decisions being taken. Furthermore, there are multiple centers of power in European foreign policy-making. Although I would argue that Brussels has become crucially important, some big players still believe that it's more significant to call Paris, London or Berlin rather than Brussels. Whenever I attend international conferences where Americans or Russians are present, I'm stunned how little Russians and Americans still understand about the proper operations of the European Union. The importance of the EU's internal structures for its foreign policy must not be underestimated.

My first actor-centered variable (A1) puts an emphasis on historical experience. The assumption is that depending on the experience that a foreign policy actor brings to the case, it will develop different foreign policy traditions. Obviously, the European Union does not have much historical experience, especially when compared to national foreign

policy traditions such as the British or the French one. The European Union is a fairly nascent player when it comes to foreign policy, so in the case of the EU, variable A1 does not hold much explanatory power.

My last actor-oriented variable (A2) looks at the ambitions of the specific foreign policy actor under study. Judging from past behavior and articulations, what will the actor strive for in the future? In the case of the European Union one such ambition is its specific understanding of security. Yesterday, I gave a presentation on this issue in which I argued that in the European Union there is an observable shift from a concept of national security towards a concept of transnational security. In addition, a second ambition of the European Union is that it wants to have a say in global affairs. Anticipating my main argument that the EU influences the foreign policies of its member states, this second ambition is, in my view, key in shaping how the big three, France, Britain, and Germany, position themselves within the European context.

These five variables are the more general, theoretically-inspired conceptual argument. I have tried to concretize this argument by pointing to specific instances of EU foreign policy traditions. To summarize my key theoretical arguments, I will pick up the two questions which were outlined in the invitation to this workshop and offer my answer.

The first question was: "Is the process of Europeanization bound to affect national foreign policies to the point of convergence?" To this, I would answer that European integration in general and the EU's nascent foreign policy tradition in particular, on the one hand, and national foreign policy traditions, on the other, will shape each other, but they will not converge, at least not if by convergence we mean their eventual identity. Following the definition provided before, "traditions" adjust to changing circumstances, but they remain an expression of quite unique sets of collective beliefs and ambitions.

The second question was: "Are foreign policy traditions of member states resilient enough to constrain foreign policy directions of the EU?" Institutionally, the EU's foreign policy continues to be on an expansionary trajectory even if the Lisbon Treaty turns out to be the "final" treaty of the European Union. Nevertheless, national foreign policy traditions will remain influential. Yet because of the recent enlargement of the EU, there are at least 27 different foreign policy traditions and the need for compromise is increasing steadily. If global pressure continues to rise both on the EU as a collective as well as on its individual member states, the resulting adjustments of foreign policy traditions will produce ever more distinct foreign policy practices at the level of the European Union and at the national level.

My expectation for the next two decades is that we will see adjustments in traditions of foreign policy practices both at the national level and at the level of the European Union.

I would suggest that we move on to the foreign policy of Germany. I will first look at the foreign policy tradition of the Bonn Republic, i.e. that part of the Federal Republic's history which is usually framed as reigning from 1949 until unification in 1990.

If one looks into the literature on Germany's foreign policy, there is a consensus about the key elements of the foreign policy tradition of the Bonn Republic. Therefore, I will go through them in a quick and straightforward manner. A first key element is an anti-militarism which puts the Bonn Republic in the same league as Japan. Although there are, undeniably, other differences between the two, anti-militarism as a result of the historical experience of two world wars can be seen as a uniting feature of Japanese and German foreign policy traditions.

The second element is commonly called “instinctive multilateralism” by many German observers. Timothy Garton Ash invented the term “attritional multilateralism”, by which he meant that German diplomats were quite adept in persistently pursuing their own goals in multilateral settings, but at a very low-key level. This latter aspect is usually expressed by the concept of a “culture of restraint” (“Kultur der Zurückhaltung”) which has been a major feature of how the foreign policy elite of the Federal Republic presented itself internationally until the late 1980s.

Not surprisingly, another major element is what is usually called the thorough Europeanization of Germany's foreign policy identity. Alongside France in particular, the Bonn Republic was one of those EU member states which are most entangled in the whole institutional and identity setting of the European Union.

In terms of the substance or the overarching grand strategy of the Bonn Republic, Werner Link, a German colleague of mine, has coined the phrase “Westbindung und Ostverbindungen”: if one had to summarize the grand strategy of Germany it boiled down to integrating with the West, i.e. Western Europe and North America, and cooperating with the East, i.e. Russia and its satellite states. The two terms, integration and cooperation, clearly signal the asymmetry of foreign policy towards the West and the East. There was much closer coordination and, in the following, much deeper integration with Western allies and partners; however, there was “merely” interstate cooperation on a contractual basis with the East. These are three of the key elements of the Bonn Republic's foreign policy tradition.

How did this foreign policy tradition emerge? It is the result of two experiences. Pointedly, one could argue that there was, on the one hand, the need to forget the past (of the “Machtstaat” tradition), while on the other hand, the Bonn Republic needed to get used to and to appreciate its promising future. First, forgetting the past – of the “Machtstaat” tradition - which is the tradition of a foreign policy oriented towards power politics and which was embodied in different versions by Bismarck, Wilhelm I, and Hitler - meant that this tradition was understood as having been an utter failure. This kind of foreign policy was a failure both instrumentally (i.e. in terms of achieving specific foreign policy aims and objectives) and morally. Distancing itself from this past was a major factor contributing to the exact shape of a newly emerging foreign policy tradition in the Bonn Republic.

The second element mentioned before is the project of European integration. This in itself opened the door for German reintegration into the international community and

familiarized a new generation of diplomats with new cooperative practices. Summarizing, there was a past that the Bonn Republic wanted to distance itself from, and there was an opportunity structure in the context of the European Union which provided very enticing and promising incentives to establish a new foreign policy tradition.

What effects did the foreign policy tradition of the Bonn Republic yield for the project of European integration and for Germany itself? For the European Union, German foreign policy and its emerging tradition were instrumental in bringing about the very project of supranational institutions itself. Without Germany, (i.e., without that particular type of centrally-located European player) and its important cooperation with France, European integration would not have been possible. Regarding the effects of German foreign policy on the project of the European integration, building trust and establishing new cooperative practices were an additional benefit which this new foreign policy tradition yielded.

In terms of the effects for the Bonn Republic itself, regaining international respect, recognition, and status was one of the major ambitions of the Adenauer government. If one recalls how Germany was understandably and rightly looked upon in the late 1940s and early 1950s, than being accepted back in the international community was a tremendous achievement which became possible in part due to the further integration of the European Union.

What shaped the Bonn Republic's foreign policy tradition? I will apply some of the more general variables to the specific case of the Bonn Republic. Regarding S1, the international system and the distribution of power and capabilities, it is rather obvious that the Bonn Republic was in a very difficult situation. It was a dependent and a constrained ally. It was dependent because security could only be provided for by its supporting allies, and it was constrained because of the rights of the four victorious powers ("Siegermächte"), which put a brake on any free and independent movement by the Bonn Republic.

In terms of S2, the environment in which Germany was acting, it was fairly clear that during the Cold War Germany would have been the battleground of a possible third world war which would be a war conducted with nuclear weapons. Although there are some people present at this workshop that are much more knowledgeable about this issue than I am, I think what has become clear from the historical record, from the documents that became accessible after the Cold War, is that if war had broken out in Europe, it would have been much quicker in approaching a nuclear threshold than people had expected. Another environmental factor that was shaping the Bonn Republic's foreign policy tradition is the steady rise of the country within Western institutions and the Europeanization I've been alluding to before.

The institutional structures (S3) that shaped the Bonn Republic in terms of its foreign policy are its integration into a Western-type of democracy. Obviously, as European integration proceeded, the Bonn Republic's foreign policy apparatus had to conform to what is expected of a modern Western-type democracy. Once again, the fact that

institutional structures at the national and at the European level are highly intertwined is of vital importance for attributing this causal impact to the institutional structures at the European level.

I have already referred to the importance of historical experience (A1). The power politics state (“Machtstaat”), the Second World War, and the Holocaust are of significance in shaping what had developed into a unique foreign policy tradition after the war.

The national ambition (A2) which found its expression in the Bonn Republic’s foreign policy was to strive towards “Gleichberechtigung” (equal status) in the international realm. This is a theme which has continuously shaped German foreign policy throughout the 40 years of the Bonn Republic, regardless of the political orientation of particular governments. Obviously, the term “Gleichberechtigung” was interpreted in different ways by different governments at different points in time. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example, equal status referred primarily to Germany’s immediate neighbors, so that regaining equal status vis-à-vis Belgium was a major achievement for the Germans in the early 1950s. In the 1970s and 1980s the scope of the policy of “Gleichberechtigung” widened, and Germany joined the G7 and later the G8. Nevertheless, “Gleichberechtigung” was at all times a crucial ambition of the Bonn Republic’s foreign policy.

Another national ambition was that of “Einheit in Frieden und Freiheit” (unity in peace and freedom), a formula which, in a nutshell, summarizes the overarching foreign policy objectives of the Bonn Republic, namely, to try and realize unification at the same time as preserving the internal political structure of the Federal Republic. This structure was a Western-type democracy, and this had to be accepted by Germany’s international partners, its neighbors to the East as well as the West.

If one takes a look at the events of 1989 and 1990, it becomes apparent that, within just one year, the Federal Republic of Germany had realized the two core foreign policy ambitions (equal status and unity in peace and freedom) which I just related to. Germany was united geographically, more secure, and it was much less dependent. Therefore, to expect that a united Germany would merely be a larger Bonn Republic was implausible from the very beginning. Unification, environmental change, and foreign policy adjustments meant a dramatic break that almost forced Germany to reinvent the foreign policy tradition of the Bonn Republic. However, many Germans did not expect a change in Germany’s foreign policy, in contrast to most foreign observers who were at least expecting a reemergence of a more assertive German foreign policy. Not many were going as far as some Anglo-Saxons who predicted a Fourth Reich, but many were quite skeptical, including former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

So what did and what do the Berlin Republic (i.e. Germany after unification) and its emerging foreign policy tradition look like? This is probably easiest to understand by comparing the emerging new tradition to the tradition of the Bonn Republic. In contrast to the anti-militarism of the old days, the Berlin Republic has become what is often called

a “normal ally”. The Berlin Republic may not send as many troops to Afghanistan as the British or the Americans do, yet, German soldiers are dying in Afghanistan. One of the stereotypes that Germany’s allies continue to hold about the German soldiers is that they are not willing to fight. However, while the influence of the historical experience on and the long anti-militarist traditions of German foreign policy still render Germany a different actor in some respects, the Berlin Republic has come a long way, and it is rapidly becoming a normal ally.

Regarding the instinctive multilateralism I have referred to above as one characteristic of the Bonn Republic, it seems as if the multilateral orientation of the Berlin Republic is of a different, more assertive type. This could be illustrated by looking at Germany’s foreign policy behavior both in the context of the European Union and in its ambition to acquire a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.

The culture of restraint so characteristic of the Bonn Republic has been replaced by what former chancellor Gerhard Schröder used to call the “Selbstbewusstsein” (in the double sense of both self-confidence and self-assertiveness) of a middle power. This “Selbstbewusstsein” is a different mindset which is pushing German foreign policy today.

Moving on to the fourth characteristic of the Bonn Republic, I think that Germany today is still a fairly Europeanized state. However, my research on how German foreign policy and European integration have been interacting over the course of the last 20 years also shows a gradual de-Europeanization, or renationalization, in the way that Germany relates to the European Union. This observation is expressed in the formula “de-Europeanization by default”.

Finally, in terms of the substantive goals of German foreign policy already alluded to above, “Westbindung und Ostverbindungen” have been replaced by European leadership and permanent equal status. This refers, for example, to the Berlin Republic’s ambition to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

In sum, the Berlin Republic’s emerging foreign policy tradition is characterized by its becoming a “normal ally”, an assertive multilateralism, its “Selbstbewusstsein” as a middle power, a certain “de-Europeanization by default”, and its new ambitions of European leadership and permanently “equal status”.

How did this foreign policy tradition of the Berlin Republic emerge? Soon after the events of 1989 and 1990, there was a situation one might call “tabula rasa”. As it had achieved essentially all of its foreign policy goals, the new Berlin Republic had to reinvent its foreign policy tradition. This reinvention was shaped by two factors: the expectations held by Germany’s allies, and the capability and willingness of Germany to respond to its allies’ expectations and become a less exceptional, a normal player in international affairs. Last but not least, a generational change within the foreign policy elite also deserves to be mentioned, and foreign policy adjustments as well as the effects on the emerging tradition are already observable.

What effects does the emerging foreign policy tradition yield for the project of European integration and European foreign policy? Partly as a result of how the Berlin Republic positions itself within Europe, most Europeans are settling down into the EU as it is set up in the treaty of Lisbon. This is a “post-federal” EU which has said goodbye to idea cherished by Helmut Kohl and many of his generation to organize the European Union in a federal way. It is a normalizing European Union in the sense that supranational integration is no longer pushed for. At the same time, it is a union which is readjusting to new types of leadership structures such as the coordination among the three biggest members Britain, France, and Germany.

What effects does the emerging foreign policy tradition yield for the Berlin Republic itself? Today’s Germany is assuming a more visible leadership role, and this could possibly provoke modern forms of anti-German balancing. There are a few signs pointing in the direction of such anti-German balancing, e.g. Italy’s reaction to Germany’s ambition for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, or Poland’s reaction to Schröder’s and Putin’s gas pipeline deal. However, this last point is still rather speculative.

In conclusion, what shapes the emerging foreign policy tradition of the Berlin Republic? If one looks at the distribution of capabilities and searches for variables such as a balance of power (S1), Germany has become what Hans-Peter Schwarz has called Europe’s “Zentralmacht”, a centrally-located power which is influential both in decision-making processes with both its Western and Eastern partners. The situation is no longer characterized by the Iron Curtain; rather, the Berlin Republic is “encircled by friends”. Therefore, what is foremost at stake today is no longer Germany’s immediate security and survival – the Berlin Republic has no reason to fear its neighbors – but Germany’s role in the competitive game of global affairs.

The (security) environment (S2) in which Germany is operating is a prosperous and secure Europe on the post-federal trajectory as I explained above.

As far as institutional structures (S3) are concerned, one can observe a certain institutional and mental renationalization, as already alluded to above. By institutional renationalization I mean that in fields where the European level had been more important and influential in the past, the foreign policy elites of the Berlin Republic have taken decisions in order to actually regain leverage at the national level. Mental renationalization is to be understood as a mindset that sees the nation state as a normal institution, providing an important change from the Bonn Republic’s mental set-up.

The historical experience (A1) which has been shaping the emerging foreign policy tradition of the Berlin Republic is the success story of the Bonn Republic. Part of this positive historical experience is also that modern European power politics “don’t hurt”. After the Second World War, power politics were a taboo for they would have reminded both the Germans and their international counterparts of the hegemonic ambitions Germany used to have. However, in the course of the last decades, Germany has learned that it can stand up for and push for its national interests in the modern, European version of power politics. Such behavior, while occasionally provoking insults like Berlusconi’s

exclamation of the Germans being "sons of the Nazis", in general does not trigger the same worried responses as it used to.

Concerning the final variable, the national ambition which is shaping the emerging foreign policy tradition (A2), the Berlin Republic seems to already have become accustomed to a leadership role within the European Union, and it has aimed to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This exemplifies the Berlin Republic's new self-perception of being a normal player in world politics, comparable to France and Britain.

From a „Culture of Restraint“ to „Assertive Multilateralism“. Germany´s Invention of a New Foreign Policy Tradition

Presentation at the EUJ-Kansai Workshop on
*„National Foreign Policies of the Member States and External Action of the EU:
The Cases of France, Germany and United Kingdom“*
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Overview

1. Clarifying Key Concepts
2. Preview of the Argument
3. The Foreign Policy Tradition of the Bonn Republic
4. Unification, „environmental change“ and foreign policy adjustment
5. The Emerging Foreign Policy Tradition of the Berlin Republic

Preliminary Remarks: Clarifying Concepts I

„Foreign Policy Tradition“ - Defined

- A well chosen concept – but one which is highly underspecified
- My definition: a set of collective beliefs and foreign policy practices which ...
 - (a) reflects the historical experience and ambition of a particular country and
 - (b) results from interaction in a specific environment and with other foreign policy actors.

Preliminary Remarks: Clarifying Concepts II

National and EU Foreign Policy Traditions

- Modern („Westphalian“) foreign policy has largely been „invented“ in Europe – as a result ...
- ... national foreign policy traditions in Europe reach back far in European history
- Nevertheless: the project of „European integration“ has significantly transformed long-established political practices, esp. „foreign policy“
- National and EU foreign policy traditions interact / are mutually constitutive

Preliminary Remarks: Clarifying Concepts III

What shapes Foreign Policy Traditions?

Variable (general)	EU case (illustration)
S1: Distribution of capabilities / balance of power	EU as unique <i>but</i> powerful FP actor – secure <i>but</i> hampered
S2: Environment („culture of anarchy“ / institutional density)	„Kantian“ internally / „Hobbesian“ and/or “Lockean“ internationally
S3: Institutional structures	Consensus politics; multiple centres of power
A1: Historical experience	very recent; still nascent player
A2: (national) ambition	secure voice

A Preview of the Argument - I

“Is the process of Europeanization bound to affect national foreign policies to the point of convergence?”

→ My answer: European integration in general and the EU’s nascent foreign policy tradition in particular, on the one hand, and national foreign policy traditions, on the other hand, will mutually shape each other, but they will not converge (if this implies “becoming identical eventually”). “Traditions” adjust to changing circumstances, but they remain an expression of quite unique sets of collective beliefs and ambitions.

A Preview of the Argument - II

“Are foreign policy traditions of member states resilient enough to constrain foreign policy directions of the EU?”

→ My answer: Institutionally the EU’s foreign policy continues to be on an expansionary trajectory *even if* “Lisbon Treaty” turns out to be its “final” treaty. Nevertheless, national foreign policy traditions will remain influential. Yet since there are ever more of them (29) the need for compromise increases. If global pressure continues to rise on the EU collectively (and its member states individually – and I believe it will) the resulting adjustments of foreign policy traditions will produce ever more distinct foreign policy practices at the EU/national level.

Germany’s Foreign Policy Tradition: Bonn Republic I

Key Elements of the Bonn Republic’s Foreign Policy Tradition

- anti-militarism
- instinctive („attritional“) multilaterlism
- „culture of restraint“
- thorough Europeanization
- integration with the West / cooperation with East („Westbindung und Ostverbindungen“)

Germany's Foreign Policy Tradition: Bonn Republic II

How did the FP Tradition of the Bonn Republic emerge?

- mainly as the result of two experiences:
 - (a) **Forgetting the Past:** „Machtstaat“ tradition embodied in different versions by Bismarck/Wilhelm I/Hitler had been an utter failure, both instrumentally (achieving aims) and morally (gaining recognition)
 - (b) **Getting used to and appreciating a promising Future:** The European integration project
 - (i) opened the door for German re-integration into the international community ... and
 - (ii) familiarized a new generation of diplomats with new cooperative practices

Germany's Foreign Policy Tradition: Bonn Republic III

What effects did the FP Tradition of the Bonn Republic yield for the project of European integration and for Germany itself?

- For EU:
 - Instrumental in bringing about a supranational institution
 - Building trust / establishing new cooperative practices
- For Bonn Republic:
 - Regaining respect, recognition and status

Germany's Foreign Policy Tradition: Bonn Republic IV

What shaped the Bonn Republic's FP Tradition?

Variable (general)	Bonn Republic
S1: Distribution of capabilities / balance of power	dependent and constrained ally
S2: Environment („culture of anarchy“ / institutional density)	CW battle ground / steady rise within Western inst. / Europeanization
S3: Institutional structures	Western democracy / Europeanization
A1: Historical experience	„Machtstaat“ / WWII / Holocaust
A2: National ambition	„equal status“ / „unity in peace and freedom“

Unification, „environmental change“ and foreign policy adjustment

1989/1990 as a unique „break“ in the environmental setting shaping the Bonn Republic's FP tradition

- within one year realization of all core FP goals: „unity in peace and freedom“
 - Germany was united, „bigger“, more secure – and much less dependent
- **Therefore:** To expect that united Germany would merely be „a larger Federal Republic“ was implausible (yet widely expected among Germans ← → foreigners, „Fourth Reich“)

Germany's Foreign Policy Tradition: Berlin Republic I

An emerging new FP Tradition viewed against an old foile:
Comparing „Bonn“ and „Berlin“

Bonn Republic	Berlin Republic
anti-militarism	„normal ally“
instinctive multilateralism	assertive multilateralism
„culture of restraint“	„self-confident“ middle power
thorough Europeanization	De-Europeanization by default
„Westbindung + Ostverbindungen“	European leadership and „permanent“ „equal status“

Germany's Foreign Policy Tradition: Berlin Republic II

How did the FP tradition of the Berlin Republic emerge?

- foreign policy „tabula rasa“ and the inevitability of re-inventing a FP tradition of the „Federal Republic“
- „expectations“ vis-à-vis and „responsiveness“ of a normalizing ally
 - Allied „expectations“ raised as early as Kuwait 1990; plus Balkans / Afgh.
 - German responses: European Stab./Growth Pact / permanent UNSC seat
- a new foreign policy generation / FP adjustment

Germany's Foreign Policy Tradition: Berlin Republic III

What effects does the emerging FP Tradition of the Berlin Republic yield for the project of European integration/ European foreign policy and for Germany itself?

- For EU:
 - Getting settled in a „post-federal“ „Lisbon“-world
 - „Normalization“ (instead of supranationalization)
 - Re-adjusting leadership structures (EU3)
- For Berlin Republic:
 - Assuming a more visible leadership role // possibly: modern forms of anti-German balancing (Italy → UNSC; Poland → gas pipeline)

Germany's Foreign Policy Tradition: Berlin Republic IV

What shapes the emerging FP tradition of the Berlin Republic?

Variable (general)	Berlin Republic
S1: Distribution of capabilities / balance of power	Europe's „Zentralmacht“ - „encircled by friends“ / global competition
S2: Environment („culture of anarchy“ / institutional density)	prosperous and secure EUrope on „post-federal“ trajectory
S3: Institutional structures	institutional and mental „re-nationalization“ / EUropean normalization
A1: Historical experience	Success story of „Bonn Republic“ / modern/EU „power politics“ doesn't hurt
A2: National ambition	European leadership and „permanent“ „equal status“

Chair: Thank you very much for Prof. Hellmann's very stimulating and extremely well-structured talk on European and German foreign policy. I think it was very informative from both historical and theoretical perspectives, explaining to us both European and German foreign policy, and on the historical side, and he dealt with both Bonn and Berlin republics. I think it's a very informative historical comparison and it also leads us to understanding of the present and future... And then we will have comments from Dr. Senoo, and then we will have some time to discuss German foreign policy.

Tetsuji Senoo: Thank you for your introduction, Prof. Ogawa, and thank you for your informative presentation, Prof. Hellmann, before lunch. My name is Tetsuji Senoo and I am a fellow of the EU Institute in Japan, Kansai, and from 2003 I was in Germany and I studied international politics and general foreign policy at the University of Bonn, and last year I finished my doctor's thesis about relevant Willy Brandt's Eastern policy, *Ostpolitik*, and CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. And thanks for the presentation by Prof. Hellmann today. I'm sure we can get many ideas for a new perspective for German and European studies.

Prof. Hellmann introduced German and European foreign policy from the perspective of foreign policy tradition and the theories of international relations, IR. His presentation and his recent articles that I read before give us also fruitful information about the interaction of German foreign policy, especially after the unification in 1990, and the theory of IR, which has been developed mainly in the USA.

In the following I would like to discuss some arguments about German foreign policy analysis from not only a theoretical but also an historical perspective. My arguments are formulated by six points.

First, I'd like to mention the similarities between some research themes in the field of IR and traditional analytical frameworks of German foreign policy, such as the so-called Fischer debate, or primacy of domestic politics. In the Fischer debate, German historian Fritz Fischer argued that various pressure groups within German society had ambitions for aggressive imperialist policy in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Thus, he focused on the impacts of domestic politics on foreign policy. In the field of IR theories in the 1960s and '70s, on the other hand, attention was paid to the interaction between domestic and international politics, such as "linkage politics" by James Rosenau or "second level" of Kenneth Waltz's analytical framework, who is one of the founders of neo-realism or structural realism in IR theory. It could be no coincidence that the Fischer debate in the field of diplomatic history and those trends in IR occurred almost in the same period, I mean from the end of the '50s to the '70s. These arguments can also be considered in relation to the field of social history, in German *Sozialgeschichte*, like "social imperialism" by Hans-Ulrich Wehler.

Second, especially in the USA, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the field of so-called Cold War history by using new archival sources. With regard to German unification in 1990, it has been discussed about foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG, in the era of the Cold War. That is, as Prof. Hellmann mentioned,

Westbindung and *Ostverbindungen*, which contributed more to overcoming the division of Germany and Europe: Western integration policy by Konrad Adenauer or Eastern policy by Brandt?

Because of my specific interest in Eastern policy, as mentioned above, I would like to draw attention to the divergent evaluation of its concept "change through rapprochement" by Egon Bahr, who was one of the closest advisers of Brandt. His concepts and Brandt's Eastern policy have been criticized for underestimating the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and Western European integration and for finally delaying German unification. In addition, it is also controversial whether Bahr's concepts should be understood as a reaction or an adaptation of the FRG to American détente policy in the 1960s, or as a more independent active policy lead by Social Democrats. This is also related to the research issue about the interplay between the great, or dominant, power and its junior partner within the ally.

Third, with regard to the Western integration policy lead by Adenauer and his successors, how can the history of European integration be explained from a theoretical perspective? The explicit effort to theorize about the process of European integration began within the field of IR where so-called neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism long remained the dominant schools of thought.

With the relaunching of integration process in the 1980s and '90s, however, IR scholars have begun to approach the study of the European Union using more general theoretical approaches. Is European integration after World War II only a European rescue of the nation state, by Alan Milward? In so far as recent debate among realists, liberals, rational-choice institutionalists, and constructivists regarding the nature of the integration process is concerned, it is worthwhile examining this subject more closely.

Fourth, in his recent article, Prof. Hellmann showed why German foreign policy analysis has received so much attention from the IR scholarship in the decade after unification. He insisted that the "pragmatic" approach can be noted in the way German foreign policy analysis has developed during the last few years. By using this pragmatic approach, however, could the foreign policy analysis tend to be too much status quo-oriented? We may recall that this research problem would be similar to those with realism in IR.

Fifth, at the time of the Schroeder administration from 1998 to 2005, some scholars argued that instead of cultivating the success, the style, and the smoothness of German foreign policy until the unification, red-green administration tried to distance the new Berlin Republic from the old Bonn Republic. According to them, while Chancellor Schroeder appeared to follow a *Sonderweg*, a specifically German in foreign affairs by steering the country from old commitments, estranging the relationship to the United States, and building up a new axis between Paris, Berlin, and Moscow, the grand coalition under Chancellor Angela Merkel has developed a distinct mix of traditional attitudes and new approaches to German foreign policy. Chancellor Brandt, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher have increased German standing and influence in the East, and they did so while bringing the U.S. in.

For quite some time, not the U.S. but Germany was the driving force behind détente and rapprochement with the heart of Europe. Ms. Merkel picks up on this tradition. Merkel seeks a return to Germany's role as an honest broker and mediator in Europe, better relations with the United States, and more responsibility in security matters. Those arguments may be understood as a modified version of what is called *Atlantiker* versus Gaullist in the 1960s. So how can those be explained by the German foreign policy tradition mentioned by Prof. Hellmann?

Sixth, in the end, I would like to mention a possibility of a comparative analysis of German and Japanese foreign policy, as Prof. Hellmann mentioned already. I know that there are many attempts to compare the foreign policies of these two countries, or European and East Asian politics. More than 60 years after the end of World War II, unstable relations in East Asia stand in stark contrast to the situation in Western Europe. Germany is welcomed as a leader in trade and diplomacy, and its military forces fly alongside those of its allies in the UN and NATO operations. In Asia, by contract, Japan's neighbors still keep a mistrustful watch over the country that brutalized them in the early part of the 20th century. Of course, I am aware that there are many differences in the preconditions between German and Japanese foreign policy, but it would be very considerable if we can compare foreign policies of both countries not only from an historical but also theoretical perspective.

These six points are guided only by my personal research interest, but I hope that these are not so much distanced from the arguments presented by Prof. Hellmann. Thank you very much for your attention.

Chair: Thank you very much for Dr. Senoo's comments. I think it's from the historical perspective and also he gives us some comparative insights into our discussion. Prof. Hellmann, do you have some response to Dr. Senoo's comments?

Hellmann: Thank you very much for a very good set of comments. Indeed, I found your observations about the similarities between the Fischer debate, second image reversed, linkage politics and two-level games comparisons very interesting. It was certainly a pity that I didn't have time to go into more detail regarding my "pragmatist" approach to analyzing international politics. Following up on your comments, I would like to make just two points.

First, if I had had time, I would have tried to embed my analysis of the interaction between German foreign policy and European foreign policy in such a pragmatist approach – pragmatism not in its commonplace sense, but in the sense of the American philosophical tradition going back to Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey, and William James. If I had done that I would have emphasized one difference between the Fischer debate and the kind of theoretical concepts that you have mentioned. In my view of the mentioned theoretical approaches, they subscribe at least implicitly to a statist view of analyzing interaction processes. I would claim that a pragmatist approach to analyzing such processes is one which is genuinely interactionist, emphasizing the dynamic

dimension of social action and social interaction. You are nevertheless right in pointing at the similarities of the Fischer debate to theories dealing with the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy and with how the international refers back to domestic politics.

The second point I would like to make relates to your last comment about the Atlanticist versus Gaullist debate in the 1960s and how a similar debate might pop up again in the present time. I wrote an article a couple of years ago on how chancellor Merkel positioned herself internationally vis-à-vis some strands of the Social Democrats, along an axis which included modern-day Atlanticists on the one hand, and what I have called “Eurasianists” on the other. One example for such “Eurasianist” tendencies are some of former chancellor Schröder's publicly-made remarks about the necessity to forge a Euro-Russian alliance explicitly positioned against America, which is quite a stunning statement coming from a former Social Democratic chancellor.

For some time I've thought that former foreign minister Steinmeier would be following a line according to which Germany and the Europeans ought to open up more towards the Russians. In an allusion to what you referred to in terms of Egon Bahr's “Wandel durch Annäherung” (changes through rapprochement), Steinmeier had a member of the foreign ministry planning staff write a memorandum which was supposed to be internal but was leaked to the press, and this memorandum laid out a strategy which was picking up on Egon Bahr's concept, arguing that the modern-day Russians needed to be drawn into ever closer cooperation with the European Union. However, the memorandum was already dropped while Steinmeier was still in office. It seemed to signal, though, perhaps the only major strategic rift within the former government's stance on issues of foreign policy, with Merkel and a modern-day version of Atlanticists on the one hand and a Eurasianist group which thought that the future laid in a more prominent role for Russia on the other hand. The Social Democrats have abandoned the idea of “Wandel durch Annäherung” even before they lost the last federal elections because they had to realize, not least after the war in Georgia, that “Putinism” is here to stay and that a policy of change through rapprochement would inevitably have to fail.

Chair: Thank you very much for Prof. Hellmann's response. And now actually we have about ten minutes to go and we greatly welcome any comments or questions on Prof. Hellman's presentation or any previous discussion between Prof. Hellmann and Dr. Senoo. Yes, please.

Question (Yoshitome): Could I ask you about the theoretical aspect of your presentation? You give us a lot of variables, which can explain the construction of German foreign policy traditions. So I just wondered, are these variables bearing the same values? Can these values be treated as equals, or a capability factor or variables determine the formation process of German foreign policy? So which way is it?

Hellmann: I'm not sure that I understand your question. Is it that you are wondering how many of those variables are actually constants rather than being variables?

Question: So, let me elucidate a little bit more on my point. If you emphasize capability variables, then, external factors or transformation of security environment: like the end of the Cold War or the tension between France and the United States, those external forces mostly affect to construct or reconstruct German foreign policy traditions. That's the way I understood your entire presentation. But there would be a different possibility that this kind of transformation process could be generated within Germany, and in that case the variables could have been very equal in importance. So which way is it?

Hellmann: My point would be – and this is part of the pragmatist approach that I think one ought to take into account when analyzing any type of interaction – that you have to consider any type of change in international politics as being the result of both external and internal variables. I hope that this has become clear throughout my entire presentation, albeit maybe only implicitly.

IR theory often starts from the assumption that there is a certain environment, that there are structures which constrain and enable, which shape how actors behave and position themselves. But at the same time there is an internal motivational drive which we as scholarly observers ascribe to collective actors such as states. We assume that states normally aim for something, irrespective of whether this something is power, influence, or wealth. Sometimes we put more emphasis on either external structures or internal motivations in our empirical analyses. However, my argument is that both are crucial. One cannot take only the motivational side or only the structural side, so throughout my presentation, I have tried to incorporate both structural variables and actor-centered variables. I argue that there are always an external and an internal side to everything.

Question: I see. Thank you for your explanation, and I think now it has become quite clear for me. Then, could I just add on one more question? So if so, I think you distinguish present German tradition or German foreign policy tradition, and previous, or if you like, post-war German foreign policy tradition, I think by the line of unification. The German unification was possible because of I think the end of the Cold War and because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and such and such.

Well, in terms of the timeline, or as far as the timeline is concerned, I think you implicitly understand that environmental factors or external factors sort of determine or are key factors of forming German foreign policy tradition, so how can I connect this timeline stuff and the explanation you've just given me now?

Hellmann: Well, in terms of how we analyze change over time, it first needs to be mentioned that this is a question which international relations as a discipline is unable to answer. We have very few theoretical tools to deal with change in a systematic fashion. Our theories and instruments are biased towards structure and status quo. My presentation was in a way dramatizing a few things which I would have put differently if I had had more time and more space.

For instance, the descriptions I have provided of the foreign policy tradition of the Bonn Republic and the foreign policy tradition of the Berlin Republic are fairly static. But as I

hope to have clarified in the beginning, my conception of tradition is a dynamic one. It is one of continual adjustment between an actor's ambitions and the environment and structural setting within which this actor is acting.

So I would of course not say that change only took place in 1990, but that the events of 1989/90 were a very dramatic instance of environmental change. Such immediate, sudden change is in stark contrast to the gradual change that characterized German foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1980s. I would say that while we as theorists of international relations are fairly good in coming to terms with sudden changes like 9/11, German unification, and the end of the Cold War; we are not good at analyzing incremental change over time. In this sense I would not argue that any of these factors in and of themselves had a determining influence. I prefer to work with the vocabulary of constraining and enabling, which expresses this dynamic view of historical evolution and development much better than the vocabulary of determination.

Bates: I just wanted to appreciate Prof. Hellmann's wonderfully clear presentation and to state the opinion that I find personally the foreign policy of the Bonn Republic to be most appealing. If only more nations pursued that type of self-effacing foreign policy trajectory the world might be a lot more harmonious and peaceful.

Several of my colleagues have commented that Germany is perhaps one of the most mature states in the world today. That is precisely because of the effectiveness with which it has 'forgotten the past'. As a historian of course I am reluctant for people to forget their past, but I think there are lessons that should be learned from the past, but a great deal that should be forgotten about the past as well, and that includes imperialism, and the desire for national aggrandizement.

The Nobel Prize winner, Professor Amartya Sen, recently said that there is too much recollection of the past. What we should be thinking about is how the problems of the past in the present can be solved for future generations, rather than dredging up old grievances. I think in this respect Germany sets itself apart from Britain and from France, and even from Japan I am sorry to say, in terms of the effectiveness with which it has forgotten what needs to be forgotten about the past and has planned in a strategic and very long-term way towards achieving its policies or its objectives through assertive multilateralism in the future. It's a very strong example in that respect.

However I was wondering, in the shift from the Bonn era to the Berlin era whether you see hazards in the increasing assertiveness of German national interests within Europe.

Furthermore, in terms of Germany's export orientation and Germany's particular emphasis on supporting global competition, I wonder whether there might be closer harmonies in the future between British and German foreign policy objectives. It is often forgotten that Britain is a state of three nations. It's also a very multicultural state. And given Britain's global orientation in financial terms, are there perhaps some harmonies in German and British foreign policy pursuits that perhaps we might see flourishing in the future? Because I know in the past there has always been a perspective, at least this is my

impression, that German foreign policy can only be directed or encouraged in consultation with the French: that almost Britain has to go through France in order to talk to Germany about foreign policy questions. Are there possibilities for a different approach from the Berlin government towards British-German relations within the EU?

Hellmann: Maybe one more comment on my use of the term “forgetting the past“ is in order. Of course I did not mean to say that Germany was forgetting the atrocities of the Third Reich, the Holocaust in particular. To the contrary, the very success of post-War West Germany was based on its willingness to face this past and promise never to forget. And undoubtedly this certainly continues to remain a task for many generations to come. What I meant to say when I said that Germany had to “forget the past” was that there was a need to forget the “Machtstaat” tradition, i.e. to forget the particular practice of conducting foreign policy in a hegemonic fashion. In this sense, the Bonn Republic was successful in forgetting a highly problematic part of German history.

As far as the two questions are concerned, I indeed believe that there are hazards in Germany’s increasing assertiveness. Among my German colleagues writing about German foreign policy in Germany, I am one of the few who has been pointing to the possibly hazardous dimension for some time now. To give you just one example of the hazardousness of Germany’s more assertive foreign policy: I’ve done some research on the German government’s ambition for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, and I saw how this ambition has negatively affected German-Italian relations, and how it has negatively affected interaction within the European Union aimed at establishing a joint European policy within the United Nations system. Germany’s position towards the UN in the era of Kohl, Genscher and Schmidt used to be that it was satisfied with the position it had. Former foreign minister Kinkel already began to change the direction of Germany’s foreign policy towards the UN, but it was Schröder in particular who, following the advice of his diplomats, executed the shift. Merkel is following the same political line. This major shift has undermined the cohesion of Europe’s joint stance vis-à-vis the United Nations. This is just one example. There are further dangers in the anti-German balancing that might come about again, in particular within the European Union.

On the question of a closer harmony between Britain and Germany, I think that this hope has resurged time and again with every generational change in the government of either state. Time and again, though, the hopes have been disappointed, and what became of the third way and the ties between Blair and Schröder is just the most recent example of such disappointment.

My own take on this is that there is a fundamental rift between the German conception of where the European Union should go and the British conception. I hope to have made clear that Germany’s image of European integration has undergone quite dramatic changes, but its view as to the finality of the European Union still differs significantly from the British view. For as long as this crucial difference persists, it will be difficult to come to a strategic alliance between Germany and Britain.

Just looking at the triangle, France, Britain and Germany, which is much more in charge nowadays at least as soon as the foreign defense policy at the European level is concerned, there is close coordination between the three. There is still a closer and more influential role for Britain and France to play in that field, but Germany is moving up. The most prominent example of this is the issue of Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Germany has by now been accepted as an equal player regarding this issue, although it is the only one among the P5+1 which is not a permanent member on the UN Security Council. This is a signal of a new development and dynamic among the Big Three.

There are traditional commonalities as far as trade issues are concerned. In the realm of trade policies, Germany and Britain might be said to have more in common than Germany and France. The protectionist orientation of France is still not appreciated by many Germans. Nevertheless, and although their relationship has become more complicated in recent years, on balance I would still say that there is a stronger instinct to try and find common ground with France, because the French and the German vision of Europe are still much more compatible than the German and the British vision.

All this said, however, and from a German point of view, for as long as there is a critical difference between how Germany looks at Europe and how Britain looks at Europe, I don't see how a strategic partnership can emerge.

Bates: That is a very informative answer. When I was talking about forgetting the past I was thinking of the cultural stumbling block that I believe Britain suffers in that it desires still to be a global power. To some extent that remains an obstacle on the British side in cultural and political terms when it comes to relationships with Europe and British attitudes towards the forging of an effective and common EU foreign policy.

Hellmann: I would say that there is still the image of the somehow special relationship between Britain and America. When talking to American and British colleagues, I get the feeling that both sides increasingly see their relationship as less special than it used to be. The British often stumble upon the fact that America is obviously not as interested in Europe any more. The Americans would like to rely on the Europeans as they used to in the past, but in a rather instrumental fashion. They would like to have the Europeans come along and act globally in terms of NATO, but not in terms of the more regionally limited ambitions of the Europeans.

When it comes to Asia, the Europeans are not playing in the same league as the USA, since Asia is not a major field of interest for the Europeans. When there is rivalry between the Americans and China, Japan of course is immediately involved. While Europe has some economic interests, however, China is still fairly far away. Europe does not have a strategic interest in China as Japan or the U.S do. The increasing importance of China is one example of how, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.'s view of the world has shifted significantly I am not an expert on Britain – but my prejudice, if you want to put it that way, is that Britain has not yet realized how dramatically America has shifted, and that Britain's place is in Europe rather than on the global scene.

Bates: If we consider British trade, which I mentioned earlier, 17 percent is with America, and 11 percent is with Asia. But the Asian element is steadily going up and the American element is steadily going down, so one would hope that at some point Britain might begin to appreciate, and maybe Europe as a whole, that Asia is more important and that this is a strategic area towards which we should be collectively orienting ourselves more strongly.

Hellmann: I think that a Conservative government in Britain might help to overcome Britain's reluctance towards Europe. If a conservative government does what it promises and executes an ever-more radical anti-European positioning, this will help to bring the Brits to their senses at some point. The realities of life in Europe are such that you cannot position yourself ever more against Europe if you are not willing to suffer the consequences.

Bates: If the Conservatives pursued that policy, one of the consequences, of course, might be a terrific falling out between the government and British business, since it would be economically so damaging.

Coordinator: I have two questions to Prof. Hellmann. My first question concerns your analytical scheme. In your variables, of course you include what we could call domestic variables. Senoo-san referred to this official debate in historical terms, but such things as party-politics dynamics in German politics or the decentralized nature of Germany can be included in your structure number 3, institutional structures, but where does social change come into play in your analytical schema? For example, when we talk about multilateral or post-modern type of diplomacy, which is prevalent in German foreign policy, we cannot exclude the changing value system held by German people. Where does this come into play in your structure? That is my first question.

And my second question concerns your view about Germany's role in multilateral organizations. You are saying that it is becoming more assertive in multilateral institutions, especially in the EU, but in that case, how successful has been Germany's diplomacy within the EU, to borrow a phrase from political scientists, to "Germanize" the EU? How successful in your view was Germany in "Germanizing" the EU?

Hellmann: Two excellent questions. Regarding the first one, I fully take your point and I would need to revise my scheme here, including something like political culture. Political culture would be a variable which not only touches upon historical experience and future-oriented national ambition, but allows us to include settled beliefs shared broadly amongst society. Social change, as you put it, would probably come in here as well. I would probably add a third actor-oriented variable which would also result in my model being more symmetrical. A very good point, thank you very much.

As regards your second question, there has been a fierce debate about this within Germany itself. There is a phrase by Thomas Mann, "Wir wollen kein deutsches Europa, wir wollen europäisches Deutschland" (we do not want a German Europe, we want a European Germany). I would argue that Germany has increasingly tried to Germanize Europe during the past ten, 20 years. A good example of this kind of Germanization of

the European Union is the Stability and Growth Pact. If you recall the facts, the Stability and Growth Pact was introduced by the Germans in order to control the "damned Italians" who cannot handle their money. Former minister of finance Weigel was pushing very hard for rigid criteria to be established in the Stability and Growth Pact.

What happened? France and Germany were among the first who did not meet the criteria. Surprisingly, the Germans couldn't care less about the rules they had introduced. Upon receiving one of those letters from Brussels that Germany had better play by the rules, former chancellor Schröder said he would just ignore it. There is quite a bit of evidence for mental renationalization rather than Europeanization on the German side, which also points to tendencies of Germanizing the EU. This is an example of the negative side.

However, there are positive effects of a Germanization of the European Union, too. As I tried to lie out in my model, I conceive of the interactions between national foreign policy and European foreign policy in see-saw sense; it's an interactionist perspective. This was developed by my collaborators and me in a project in which we examined European politics and how it affects German policy and how that new type of German policy again shapes and changes European politics. In such an interactionist sense, I would indeed see some traces of the familiar Bonn Republic foreign policy tradition in the way in which the European Union positions itself globally in the security realm. As I pointed out in my talk yesterday, I think that this in part due to structural institutional matters at the EU level, but it also has to do with a certain impact which a small part of the German foreign policy tradition had had on the European side.

In addition, there are German diplomats who are influential at the European level. There are French and Brits as well, and some of them have been able to put their stamp on the way that the EU positions itself. But again, I think that these are processes which we as international relations specialists are not yet able to analyze with sufficient detail in order to grasp their dynamical element.

Question: My name is Nakaya from Aichi Prefecture University. I am a colleague of this session's chairman, our professor, Ogawa. I have a simple question. You use the term normalization. Could you explain more concretely, because in the Lisbon Treaty, for example the EU president, the foreign minister, is a symbol of supranationalization. How do you proceed the future European integration because you use normalization? Could you explain?

Hellmann: Of course "normalization" is a term which has many different connotations depending on the exact context of usage. I should have known that this is not a setting in which all the speakers and listeners are familiar with the connotations and associations that term would have in a German setting.

In a German setting I would argue that most people intuitively understand the term "normalization" in the same way. In a sense no country wants to be called "normal". The Americans are proud to be a distinct country. The same applies to the French [*laughter*]

and the British. I think *The Economist* had an article a few years ago raising the very same point. This is what I meant by saying “no country wants to be normal”.

For the Germans, however, the expressions “normal”, “being normal”, “becoming normal”, “aiming for normalization”, have a different ring. The image of the Bonn Republic was that of an abnormal country which did those things that other countries were not allowed to do or were not willing to do. Soon after unification a discourse evolved in Germany which pushed the elites to become a “normal ally”. This discourse was partly fed from the outside, especially by the Americans, and it implied that Germany get rid of its hesitation to use military instruments and to stand up for its national interests as other countries do, too.

The culture of restraint I alluded to before used to be a source of pride for many Germans. At the same time, Germans considered this culture of restraint to be rather abnormal. The point you made before about the laudability of Germany’s past behavior is, in a sense, also a reflection of the abnormal yet exemplary quality of Germany’s culture of restraint. In this context, “normalization” means getting rid of some of those abnormalities, becoming a normal ally, sending troops to your allies’ support, but also standing up for your national interests in the context of the European Union.

As a matter of fact, the former German ambassador to Britain von Ploetz once said that Germany's European policy had to become more British. Everybody in Germany immediately understood what he meant, namely to stand up for Germany’s national interests as Margaret Thatcher did when she told Brussels: “I want my money back” [*laughter*]. This “normalization” ran counter to the Bonn Republic’s ambitions for Europe, i.e. integration at the European level, supranationalization, and, eventually, a federal Europe.

About five year ago, I attended a presentation by former chancellor Kohl in Frankfurt in which he explicitly said: “I was wrong. I was wrong to call for and imagine European integration to eventually lead to a federal state.” I would never have expected Kohl to acknowledge the futility of his ambition, seeing that he was the most vivid embodiment of the eventuality of a federal European Union. That he has indeed altered his beliefs about this issue is, to me, a strong expression of normalization.

Bates: Can I just throw in a comment there? Of course what might be considered normally desirably from a Western European perspective may not be so desirable from a developing country perspective. Many of my colleagues who have spoken admiringly of the foreign policy of the Bonn Republic were Indians who have, of course, a long experience of European assertiveness and would rather like to see less of it.

(Ogawa): I think we have a very stimulating discussion and we have actually used almost an hour, so I think it's a very stimulating and very important discussion.

Third Session (France)

Chair (Kota Yoshitome): My name is Kota Yoshitome. I am affiliated with Kansai Gaidai University, which is situated in Hirakata city, so it's about one hour from here. Anyway, today I want to introduce Prof. Jean-Jacques Roche and Prof. Masujima. Prof. Roche is going to present us his paper entitled as "The Constants of French Diplomacy." He is a professor of political science at the University of Paris 2, and also he is the head of the Institute for Defense and Arms Industry at the same university. His research interests are methodological aspects of international relations and empirical or practical aspects of foreign policy, especially civil-military relations regarding defense industries (i.e. issues relating to privatization of defense industries).

He has published numerous books regarding international relations. If you Google his name, you see his website and there is a list of varieties of work he has published.

And Prof. Masujima specializes in European politics, with a special emphasis on the French dimension of European integration and European politics. He was actually affiliated with the Japanese embassy in France both as a research staff and a resident researcher who stay there, so I think he is going to give us a sort of Japanese insight regarding French activities in the field of European foreign policy. So Prof. Roche, could you start your presentation, please?

Jean-Jacques Roche: Thank you. Thank you for this invitation. I will manage to make a long story short. Because it's quite difficult to speak about "The Constants of French Diplomacy," I'll begin with General de Gaulle's quotation dated February '60, in which De Gaulle said, "Today we have a stronger and prouder France." Of course it was the day when the first atomic bomb, French atomic bomb, exploded. And in fact, it seems that for French people, it seems that French people are obsessed by grandeur. Maybe this is the reason why President Sarkozy needs his, but we are obsessed by grandeur. In fact, I can admit that for our allies we are an arrogant people, and it will be very difficult for me not to do French bashing and not to be arrogant, so I'll manage to be in the middle of the road, but if I don't succeed, please don't blame me because it's quite difficult.

Introduction

- "*A stronger and prouder France*": telegram from General de Gaulle dated February 13, 1960 at the moment of the explosion of the atomic bomb. All successive governments took up this analysis. Contrary to other countries, like Japan and Germany (qualified as semi-power by Deudney), France showed a deliberate will to act in the international order despite its reduced means.

- The problem presents itself in double:

- How to optimize limited means given to its diplomacy, or how to best use limited means?
- How to coordinate this abstract will with concrete interests, or how to avoid being permanently accused of employing double language?

To resolve these problems, French diplomacy has demonstrated the originality to be relatively free from internal democratic constraints (outside of “miasmas” of polemics, according to Roland Dumas) thus allowing it to tap into two instruments: continuity and consensus

1 – Continuity:

a) The provisional government of the Fourth Republic: it was doomed to disappear essentially because it chose to pursue anti-decolonization options offered by General de Gaulle (A. Grosser)

b) From the Fourth to the Fifth Republic:
- Defense (Memorandum on the atomic bomb, dated May 1955) and Community (for which General de Gaulle did not really envisage independence despite the position of Title XII of the 1958 Constitution)
- Europe: the “confederation” aspect was privileged with respect to sovereignties; Atlantic Alliance: despite withdrawing from the integrated command, a large continuity marked by the rejection of the CED and acceptance of the US nuclear umbrella

c) From the Right to the Left: the President’s new clothes; State-to-State relations and not government-to-government. Despite transfers of power and cohabitations between a president and prime minister of opposing parties, the president’s primacy (updated by Samy Cohen) guaranteed that France possess coherent discourse.

2 – Consensus:

a) On the grand orientations linked to affirmation of French independence and on the means to achieve it (the Community then nuclear)

b) On practices: the reserved domain

And yet, French diplomacy presents itself above all as a quest for influence rather than as a power with more of an ability to say than to do

I – A QUEST FOR INFLUENCE RATHER THAN FOR POWER

A – A Separate voice in the concert of nations

1 – Autonomy

a) Vis-à-vis blocs during the Cold War: dissuasion, the denunciation of the Russo-American *condominium*. Vis-à-vis the dominant ally during the Cold War (transatlantic misunderstanding). Protection of the “cultural exception” that France made Europe adopt in 1993. Vis-à-vis the *hyperpuissance* (H. Védrine) after the Cold War: Villepin’s 2003 speech at the UN against the Iraq invasion.

b) Vis-à-vis the international community: attitude towards nuclear disarmament and conventional negotiations in Europe. During the Cold War, France was fiercely opposed to multilateralism. After the Cold War, France became a defender of multilateralism. Jacques Chirac regarding Kosovo: “An exception, but not a precedent.”

2 – Initiative

a) In European construction: Schuman and Monnet for the European Community of Coal and Steel, the Franco-German couple of 1963 and leadership of Europe: creation of the Euro, stability pact, negotiation of the simplified Lisbon Treaty after the 2005 failure of the referendum.

b) The North-South dialogue: From de Gaulle's trip to Mexico (1964) to the Cancun speech (1981) via the initiation of a North-South dialogue (1974). Today, France's role in the G-20

c) Example of François Mitterand's trip to Sarajevo on June 28, 1992 during the European summit in Lisbon; Chevènement's trip to Iraq in January 1991 to attempt to find an ultimate solution before the hostilities were unleashed. Sarkozy's role in the Georgian crisis during summer 2008.

3 – Mediation

a) Between East and West, socialism and liberalism: Atlantic Europe to the Urals (CSCE);

b) Between North and South: France, spokesman for the South; from the Phnom-Penh speech to support for economic claims from Southern countries: generalist preferences and global negotiation in the context of UNCTAD (plan: Philip). Use of European power to support ACP countries: Yaounde and Lome conventions, current Cotonou agreement.

B – Incontestable Audience

1 – Compensation of an Insufficient Power

a) Privileges of the "bad student" in the Atlantic Alliance

b) Reformism of the international order: shake up the hierarchies without compromising the foundations

2 – The Dust of the Empire

a) Cooperation with Africa: defense accords in the franc zone that resist the Euro.

b) Francophonie: The France with 100 million inhabitants

II – A POWER MORE ABLE TO SAY THAN TO DO

A – The Propensity for Magical Wizardry

1 – The Human Rights Leitmotiv

a) France a "nation of human rights" even if it was necessary to wait until 1989 to finally see a change in attitude regarding totalitarian governments. Problem today when Bernard Kouchner, inventor of interference, questions the usefulness of having a Secretary of State for Human Rights while he is acting Minister of Foreign Affairs

b) The Limits of "France, Land of Asylum": "*we cannot welcome all of the world's misery*" (M. Rocard – 1989)

2 – The North-South Dialogue

a) Limits and weaknesses of the APD: 0.34% far from 0.7%

b) Will to protect the PAC even though South countries that export agricultural products (Cairns group) denounce protections granted to European farmers.

3 – Europe as Vehicle

a) The multiplication of crises (from the Empty Chair to the nomination of the president of the European Central Bank, rejected by referendum from the Constitutional Treaty of 2005)

b) The non-respect of promises: France as the bad student for the transportation of European directives (16 out of 27 in 2008), the non-application of the Stability Pact vis-à-vis public deficits, support for French industry that distorts competition: currently tax on telecommunications to finance France Television condemned by Brussels.

c) Europe as screen for French interests: Mediterranean policy, the cultural exception, and cooperation agreements with ACP countries.

d) All ambiguity surges with the concept of European Defense, which is announced as a French priority. And yet one cannot question the nuclear debate, whereas Germany (our principal ally) does not want to hear about dissuasion. Otherwise, France uses this European Defense regime to promote communal programs in its interest (Airbus 400M) but refuses to cooperate on the Eurofighter to preserve Dassault's autonomy and its Rafale.

B – A Dogmatic Analytic Framework

1 – A Colbertist Vision

a) French state-centrism: a vision that is at once one of public actors and of analysts (Aron yesterday, today Védrine).

b) Consequence 1: difficulty in evaluating the depth of transformations in international norms: example – global security has become the reference of the Defense White Paper but the State remains the unique actor in this security.

c) Consequence 2: the broad principals that incite the multiplication of small accommodations: example: ambiguous attitude towards the privatization of security.

2 – Absence of Public-Private Coordination

a) Decision-making centers are disseminated as soon as one abandons high politics: example: difficulty supporting NGOs due both to the reticence of public agents and the defiance of NGOs.

b) Random decision-making processes: the current example of the *War Room* led by the Secretary General at the Elysée for major contracts (recent failure of the exportation of the EPR reactor to Abu Dhabi; incertitude regarding contract with the Brazilians for the Rafale following the failure of a sale to Morocco).

3 – A Fossilized Expertise

a) Public power traditionally rests on agents trained in its schools designed to teach application (Polytechnique, ENA) and defies other competencies. The place for specialized universities is reduced to zero: in the framework of the drafting of the 2008 Defense and Interior Security White Paper, neither a single academic nor a sole civil servant was present.

b) Demagogic propensity for leaning on the politically correct as soon as it becomes necessary to take stances in the direction of public opinion: example of the role of ecological lobbies in the preparations for the Copenhagen Summit of 2009 (carbon tax), moratorium on GMOs despite the counter-opinion of the European Union...

c) Latent anti-Americanism that spans from the extreme Left to the classic Right.

Conclusion:

France positions itself as an inconvenient Power, even if this means affirming loud and clear intentions it is incapable of following. The positive impact of this diplomacy, beyond the direct advantages of visibility on the international scene, resides in the perpetual warnings addressed to the Big Powers in name only concerning the future of the international system towards greater justice and solidarity. But before all, the issue is about reforming a dominant international order to allow it to resolve its internal tensions. Hence the conservative aspect of France's foreign policy, which is above all declaratory and ideal-type, which leads to a permanent distortion between discourse and practice.

Chair: Thank you, Prof. Roche, for your detailed analysis of French foreign policy traditions and the weaknesses and strengths of the foreign policy-making process. So now Prof. Masujima, can you contribute to us regarding the paper which we just now have looked at? Prof. Masujima, please.

Ken Masujima: Contrary to Germany, France is one of the countries which finds itself at odds with the EU. That is my first point I want to raise. France is one of the most nationalistic and most centralized countries among EU member states. This may be why France is increasingly under pressure to change her old habits of doing things in domestic politics. However, France is a big country and France has still instruments to satisfy her pretensions to project her image as a world power, as a global power, to use the phrase you quoted, "la grandeur de la France." For example, France still has nuclear bombs. France has a seat on the UN Security Council. France has very strong bilateral relations with Africa. As you said, France has Francophonie grouping countries even if Canada or other countries may be competing with France for the direction of the Francophonie. And also France used to have leverage by being a bridge between the West and the East during the Cold War.

But after the end of the Cold War, various instruments that France disposed of came to disappear, and this is why at the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, there are lots of French commentators who talked about the decline of influence of France in the world.

Masujima: Even in Africa these days France tends to prefer to act via the European Union. At the UN Security Council with the talk about reform of the United Nations, a seat in the Security Council is no longer absolutely taken for granted. So France seems to rely increasingly on Europe to project her own policy and her own influence around the globe. According to what you said, France is using Europe as a multiplier of power.

But on the other hand, France seems to be losing ground in the enlarged European Union. This is especially evident after the reunification of Germany, but it has been apparent for some time with each new phase of enlargement.

In terms of substance of policy, Britain, with its own interests and orientations in foreign affairs, especially with regard to its relations with the U.S. and its dislike for further moves for surrendering sovereignty, complicated affairs for France within the EU.

Next in terms of the policy-making process, the EU, which largely reflected the French style of working at the beginning – centralized bureaucracy and so on – changed gradually in outlook, especially with the arrival of the Scandinavians.

And then in terms of working language as well, this may sound trivial, but for example in the DG Development where French has been the dominant language utilized by most officials working in that directorate, they now seem to speak in English.

So as France tries to project her influence, relying more and more on Europe, France is finding it more and more difficult to use that instrument for herself. That is my second point.

By way of my third point I would like to ask the following questions. What is the place of domestic politics in France's relations with the EU? For example, in French politics they seem to begin to pay more attention to environmental problems. Daniel Cohn-Bendit was a candidate in the European election and the French people really talk a lot about environment these days. But this change of agenda in French politics seems to come partly from the interaction with the EU agendas, which have been under influence for example from a country like Germany where interest on the environment has been very strong. So how would you analyze the place of domestic politics in assimilating seemingly European values into French debate about Europe?

And my second question is related to French attitudes towards the Iraq War. French diplomacy for us, for me personally, was always, as you said, eloquence, able to say something, but to do the same is another matter. That was my view, personal view about French policy. But in the case of French attitudes with regard to the Iraq War I thought that that was a deviation because it seemed to be based on the assumption that the world we were living in was already multipolar while in fact it was not the case (at least for the time being). This line of thought was not in line with the very pragmatic (realistic) character of French foreign policy. Could you present your own views about the French attitudes on the Iraq War?

Roche: Thank you, Prof. Masujima. One remark to begin with. About the paradox, you say that we are a nationalistic country, and we are a nationalistic country, but on the other hand, we have nowadays a debate about national identity, and in France we consider that the debate stinks because they have old ideas which are coming back with the idea to reject newcomers, to reject foreigners, and it's not a large debate.

Another example, the flag. You won't have a single French flag on a French house, when you have so many flags in the States of course. But in Denmark for example, for one's birthday we have small flags and we are proud to be Danish, and in France, nobody does that. And I think that is a real contradiction. Of course we look like a nationalist country, but I consider that we don't act as nationalist people.

So concerning the war in Iraq, two points. First of all I think that as a diplomat we don't have to accept the fact that we are living in a unipolar world, and in order to declare that we are living in a multipolar world. The problem is when you are convinced of what you are saying, and I think that it was the problem of Mr. de Villepin. At the same time, we must consider that during the Kosovo war in 1999, the Security Council was not in favor of this intervention, and France totally supported it. And President Chirac said in the UN that Kosovo was an exception but not a precedent. In fact, we did in Kosovo exactly what the Americans did in Iraq.

And finally, about the Iraq War, I must add that Bernard Kouchner, who once more was the French doctor who was at the origin of the notion of intervention, declared that he was in the favor of the principle of this intervention. And so the French attitude at that period is not really clear. And I will add that the French government supported resolution 1511 which transforms the Coalition Force in Iraq into a force of the United Nations, and it is totally ambiguous.

Concerning your first question about the impact of external pressure to internal debate about the Cohn-Bendit and the greens, it is true that it is popular at the present time to be in favor of green parties. And as Mr. Sarkozy won't say – he is a demagogue, he is a politician, it may be the same thing in a democracy, but it's so easy to give to the French public what it's waiting for. It doesn't cost a lot of money. The state creates a new tax, what we call the carbon tax. It's all benefit. And moreover, it can divide the left parties, that is to say, traditionally in France, as in Germany, the ecologists, the green party, is on the left. But today it can divide the socialist parties, so it is all benefit for Mr. Sarkozy.

What is dangerous in fact is that these people consider that they can use the expertise of the green leaders, of Cohn-Bendit for example, of José Bové.

Question: Thank you for your very analytical presentation on French diplomacy. My name is Sakai from Kobe University and I would like to ask one question about Sarkozy's back to NATO's military department. According to your presentation, I think the return to NATO is classified as a mediator between Europe and the U.S., but on the other hand, it would be contradictory to the classification of autonomy. So how can I understand this act?

Roche: In fact, France was not totally aside. France was part of the Atlantic Alliance, and in '66 we decided not to participate any longer in the integrated command, but we were participating in numerous committees. But in fact, today we don't participate in the nuclear committee, and we just decided to come back to the plan committee, and in fact it was purely theoretical. In '66, after the decision of General de Gaulle to leave the integrated command, there was an agreement between the U.S. and France, and according to this agreement, which was secret, the French government gave facilities to the Atlantic Alliance in case of war, just to use its hospitals across the country and so on. So it was purely declaratory.

Bluth: Can I take that up a little bit. I think that seems to be exaggerating a little bit because clearly the infrastructure of NATO and simply the fact that by losing France an enormous degree of strategic depth was lost to the military aspects of the defense of Western Europe at the time, that was a monumental impact on the alliance, so I think we can't really say it was just sort of a technical difference. I think that it did have an enormous impact on the alliance at the time. Now it is true as you say, it didn't mean that France completely left the alliance and was still counted as part of the Western alliance, but I think the consequences of that at that time were a bit larger than you now seem to imply.

Roche: At that time, in the '60s, yes of course.

Bluth: But of course now I think what's happened is this issue of strategic depth is no longer significant because circumstances have changed. I mean obviously it's very welcome to see that France has come back into the integration of the military alliance in NATO, and I think it's especially important for us because France, like Britain, is much more capable in providing military resources than any of the other European states are at this point in time.

Roche: In fact, it's true. In '66 it was a huge mess, and when NATO left Paris to go to Brussels I think it was awful. But finally, the consequences were not so dramatic. One example, atomic cooperation did not stop. There was an atomic, secret atomic operation between France and the U.S. In the '70s for example, France helped the U.S. with the neutron bomb.

So of course at one time and when you have to give weight to public opinion, it was a huge affair, but the situation is more complicated, and on the other hand we must say that the solidity of the Atlantic Alliance was linked to its capacity to support this different treatment. When you look at the attitude of Denmark, no bomb in the straits and so on. It is what we call in France the Spanish hostel, that is, we come with one's own food, and it means that it was not the Warsaw Pact which was very rigid, and this rigidity was the origin of the failure of this pact, but NATO was something very flexible, not rigid at all, and in fact it helped NATO to be transformed at the end of the Cold War.

Hellmann: Thanks a lot for a really fascinating presentation and very insightful comments. In a certain sense it was relieving for me as a German to listen to a very analytical perspective on France delivered by a Frenchman – which is in part also quite cynical [*laughter*] – because some of your assessments overlap with some of the prejudices about France you encounter in Germany.

A comparison of your presentation's main thesis and Prof. Masujima's comment seems to conjure up a central puzzle regarding France and its foreign policy tradition. Specifically, this is the case if one subscribes to the transformational conception of foreign policy tradition I outlined in my own presentation. Your thesis of continuity in France's foreign policy may be correct, but if it is indeed correct, French foreign policy will fail because as the world around it changes radically, France needs to take these changes into account in formulating its foreign policy.

Of course, my transformational conception of foreign policy tradition may be wrong, but for it to be proven wrong, it would be necessary to see some more evidence. Would you – in contrast to Prof. Masujima, with whom I would agree on this matter – argue that the world around France has not changed, that it has essentially remained in a trajectory which allows France to stick with old lines? This argumentation would still be acceptable to someone holding a transformational conception of foreign policy tradition.

However, to me at least it seems that the world around France has changed, too. Therefore, I see a tremendous tension between a radically-changing world around France – the European Union now has 27 member states, including a Germany that has gained power – and the foreign policy of France.

If you wish to argue that France is sticking with its line, my prediction would be that its foreign policy will fail. I assume that France would be capable of adjusting to a changing environment if it wanted to, but in that case, you would also have to adjust your continuity thesis.

Would you please allow me a final illustration of my argument? Ever since I started to focus academically on Germany's foreign policy, I have followed the development of the Franco-German relationship. My reading of that relationship is that it has indeed undergone a significant shift. It is not a shift which is apparent at first sight; rather, it is of an incremental kind. In sum, however, the many gradual changes add up to a major shift in the Franco-German relationship.

Immediately following the reelection of chancellor Merkel, Sarkozy tried to launch a major initiative to reinvigorate the German-Franco relationship by proposing, inter alia, to establish a jointly-appointed minister who would be present both in the French and in the German cabinet, a proposal which was subtly but clearly rejected by Merkel. This proposal is just one illustration of how much France, even under Sarkozy, is changing. It is realizing that, in a longer, strategic perspective, it has lost leverage vis-à-vis Germany. Therefore, it has to invent new measures to bind Germany.

My own interpretation of Germany in this relationship is that Germany is no longer willing to go along with schemes which see France in the driver's seat and Germany playing the role of a supporting actor. Merkel is not the kind of person to publicly bang her fist on the table and exclaim: "I'm going to lead Europe!" But behind closed doors she does exactly this. This is why French diplomacy is slowly realizing that, strategically speaking, they will continue to lose status and influence and power vis-à-vis Germany.

But this is just an illustration of the overarching question. I would like to know whether I am wrong in terms of this more subtle adjustment in French diplomacy or whether you would still stick with the continuity thesis you have been arguing for.

Roche: You know, Edgar Faure was a famous French politician of the Fourth Republic. He used to say, it's not as a weather clock which turns, but the wind, it's different. And it can be applied to France. In fact, France is looking at the transformation of the world, and maybe I'm too pessimistic, but I consider that France is not able to adapt itself to this new world.

We spoke about the Stability Pact and of course you didn't abide by the rules, as we didn't, but you achieve major reforms in Germany which have not yet begun in France, and the result is that we are adding external trade deficit to an increasing debt. But I am quite afraid for the ability of my country to be reformed, to transform itself.

When I look at international attitudes, I thought that... It is always the same thing, that is to say, we use generous ideas but we don't respect what we say. And we behave as if we still are a major power and that other countries are obliged to count on us, to rely on us. But I consider that it's no longer true. Considering the German-French relationship which is quite tied, but you use the word binding. In fact, the main idea in France is to bind Germany, and it will be more and more difficult because we don't have the means.

You are talking about a shift. I don't see it. I do not notice it between Mitterrand and Chirac, and between Chirac and Sarkozy. The forms of course are different, the way of speaking, of ruling the country is totally different, but there is no major reform, and I consider reform, economic reform and structural reform, and if there is no reform we will join Italy rather than stay with Germany.

Hellmann: If I may make a quick point. I think there was a saying by the former British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, that Britain is "punching above its weight". That, at least to me, also seems to be part of a foreign policy tradition. In my reading, the foreign policy traditions of France and Britain include an ambition and a capability to punch above their actual weight in terms of traditional categories of power analysis.

In my view, Germany has been punching below its weight for quite some time. It is moving up in terms of its own self-perception in . In the long term, however, there has to be some correspondence between the kind of punching that you do, the capabilities that you bring to the table, and the sparring partners that you encounter. And in that sense, my feeling is that both France and Britain – albeit for different reasons – may have the

problem of not being able to keep up punching in the same way as they used to in the past. They are inhibited by a changing balance of power in Europe as well as the rest of the world. Therefore, my expectation is that both France and Britain will need to adjust their foreign policies.

Roche: Yes, we are supporting Germany, but don't ask too much. Of course you are careful. You don't ask for a veto. And it means that there will be two categories of members, permanent members. But at the same time we are happy that nothing changes and we prefer to keep the old world rather than anticipating the future world, and that's the reason why... It is not French bashing. You know at the very beginning I told you that it's quite difficult, between arrogance and French bashing, to keep the middle of the road is difficult, but it's not French bashing, but I consider that French elites are not able, are not prepared for the new world, maybe because French education is not preparing these elites for a new world.

Question (Ogawa): Thank you for your stimulating talk. My question is about the relations between multilateralism and multipolarization. And on the first sheet of your second page, according to your talk, during the Cold War France was fiercely opposed to multilateralism, but on the other hand, after the Cold War, France became a defender of multilateralism. It seems to me that France was quite consistently supporting multipolarization, but on the other hand French attitudes toward multilateralism changed so significantly. And so I'm wondering how the relations were between the French attitude towards multilateralism on the one hand and multipolarization on the other.

Roche: We have to be careful: multilateralism doesn't mean a multipolar world. The worlds and the meanings are different. Multilateralism means that legitimacy comes from an international organization. Multipolarization means that there are several major poles in the world. And during the Cold War we were against what we call bipolarity, against the Russo-American condominium. You know what a condominium is. We had a condominium with England on New Hebrides. It was an island in the Pacific. That is to say, the two countries are in charge of the rest of the world. So France was totally opposed to this approach and preferred already at that time a multipolar world. But it was just a conception; it has no affect on reality.

But on the other hand, in that very period, France was totally opposed to multilateralism which was considered as an American concept. For example, in 1960 France was opposed, for good reasons, to the multipolar force the Americans wanted to create, giving to Europe nuclear bombs but on submarines. That was the second step, then it was on surface ships. And France was totally opposed to this multilateral force. France under de Gaulle was totally opposed to the decision of the United Nations to send a mission to the Congo, and France never paid for this mission in the Congo. So you have two worlds which have a totally different meaning; multipolarity and multilateralism don't mean at all the same thing.

Ogawa: I understand that multilateralism and multipolarization are different concepts. I asked about the relations between the two. After the Cold War, France pursued

multilateralism to promote multipolarization. A different case is that during the Cold War, the French opposed to multilateralism so that you can maintain a multipolar world. In other words, to prevent unipolarization or bipolarization of the world ...

Roche: The link between these two terms, these two concepts is a question of legitimacy. It's true that multilateralism deals with legitimacy in an international organization. And it is opposed to decisions which are taken unilaterally by major powers.

Ogawa: During the Cold War, France opposed to multilateralism probably because it was primarily led by the United States. In the Cold War period, that's why France opposed to multilateralism?

Roche: Yes, was opposed to it.

Ogawa: Multilateralism like Multilateral Nuclear Force was supported by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and after the Cold War, on the other hand, the French government under Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin, especially during the Iraq War, they tried to promote multilateralism in order to facilitate multipolarization of the world.

Roche: But in fact the link is anti-Americanism. We were multilateral, we were in favor of multilateralism in 2003, one opposing the United States, and we were opposing multilateralism and the United States through multilateralism in the '60s. So the link between these concepts is anti-Americanism, which is a major constant in French diplomacy. There is a very, very famous study of Philippe Roger about the feelings of the French towards American people, and according to this famous writer, until 1848 the United States was considered as a new haven with solid people going then to live according to their thought, their conscience, but in the middle of the 19th century, public opinion in France changed, and all of a sudden the United States became a territory of violence.

Ogawa: Thank you very much.

Bates: Yes, I began listening to Prof. Roche's dissertation with amusement, and then with concern, and I finally ended feeling rather depressed. Because of course no one wants to see France fail, not least of all because the French constitution is still so widely admired, particularly in the developing world. It embodies many values that other nations seek to emulate. But I suspect, one of the characteristics of French policy is this love of grandeur, and of course this is one of the reasons why France held on to its empire so much longer than Britain. Britain has always been very much more pragmatic in terms of its material interests abroad. I mean, its former empire is still costing France considerable sums of money. You just visit Réunion for example and see how much government money is spent on that particular colony; it is extraordinary...

Roche: Department.

Bates: Sorry, department. I mean, for reasons of grandeur France held on to its empire for a tremendously long time at enormous cost to the republic. And *grands projets* and the French public service are still costing a lot of money. We rather hoped that with Sarkozy's election you might have begun to see some of the economic reforms which we rather painfully experienced under Margaret Thatcher, but that was not to be.

But I wonder whether part of the reason for this is the very consensus which you mentioned in France about foreign policy. Foreign policy is strongly tied up with cultural politics quite uniquely in France's position compared with, for example, the United Kingdom. French foreign policy is partly about the projection of French culture and this is perhaps one of the reasons for the government's extravagantly idealistic stances in foreign policy matters which are then often incapable of being fulfilled in practice.

Roche: But we have the problem of a French-speaking audience in the world. We have a problem, maybe you don't have the same cultural diplomacy, but you have the BBC and we don't have the equivalent in France, in spite of major public investment in that direction. So we are transforming l'Alliance Française on the German mode, that is to say, it will be the Victor Hugo Center, as you have Goethe, the Victor Hugo Institute as you have the Goethe Institute. So even in that field we are considering that it doesn't work so well and we are managing to copy what is better abroad. So l'Alliance Française doesn't work.

(Bates): L'Alliance Française is a huge success.

Roche: It was a huge success, yes of course; it's no longer true. And it was decided to create worldwide television with France vingt-quatre, France 24; it doesn't work.

Question: I just wanted to go back to the anti-Americanism you were talking about. I wanted to make clear when you say that the anti-Americanism spans from the extreme left to the classic right, when you refer to the classic right do you talk about the government party?

Roche: Of course. In the 1950s there was a debate in the French parliament about Coca-Cola, and we were opposed to Coca-Cola, of course the Communist Party, but even the civil servants of the Ministry of Finance because they considered France would spend money buying Coca-Cola instead of buying wine. So you have a huge majority of people in France who consider that the United States is not an example to be followed.

Question: I agree with that but what I mean is that for me, the UMP, the party, the government party and the party of Sarkozy is way more in favor of America than any other parties and they, as you see, I remember you saying to the Secretary of Defense last year, Hervé Morin, how can you join this committee in NATO, the committees in NATO knowing that France is an anti-American country? And I believe that a lot of foreign policy acts that the government has been doing lately are more in favor of America than they were before. So I don't want you to tell me the future but...

Roche: You have more people who vote for the UMP and the right parties and conservative parties, who have a good opinion of the U.S., than for the left parties. But within the conservative parties, you have a large group of people for different reasons who are opposed to the United States. De Gaulle for example was completely opposed to the United States. Chirac was not totally in favor of the United States, and Mitterrand, he said, I like Americans, but I don't like America.

Bates: This could be an example of the rhetoric and the reality being different, because at the same time as France is anti-America., I was reading in *The Economist* recently that McDonald's in France is the most profitable part of the McDonald's global food empire.

(Yoshitome): Actually, on that point, I think from the outsider perspective, Nicolas Sarkozy is quite an interesting person because you know as you mentioned I think his attitude is totally pro-American considering the previous French presidents and prime ministers. He is having holidays in Sr. Bush's Kennebunkport mansion and marrying a wife of Italian nationality, a fashion model and singer, which is quite American, and enjoying a suntan.

So from the French people's perspective Nicolas Sarkozy shows continuity, but from an outsider's perspective, I think he is significantly a different person in action. So especially I think Charles de Gaulle left two legacies in French foreign policy. One is maintaining its own or independent nuclear capability, and the other one is, at least formally, keeping away from NATO that was a symbol of American hegemony, but now Nicolas Sarkozy is contemplating getting back to NATO at least formally, so that shows a clear signal of discontinuity of French foreign policy. So how actually can I think about the reality and the concept which you present now?

Roche: I tried to show you that NATO was not a major problem, but the major problem is capitalism, liberalism. For us in France, NATO is a minor problem; liberalism is a huge problem. You have no liberal in France, considering that the word liberal in France is not the same as in the United States. But liberalism in France is the enemy.

And the United States is considered as a country of pure liberalism, a country of savage capitalism, and France is totally opposed to this conception of social relationship. You will see that the retirement system doesn't work any longer, but never, you won't have one person in France considering that the pension fund, that is to say the American solution, could be used and could be developed in France, no one. And even Sarkozy won't move along toward a pension fund in France.

(Yoshitome): So as far as domestic economic policies are concerned, France sticks with a sort of socialist version of capitalism, but when it comes to actual global economic concerns, France is a sort of major beneficiary of the free movement of capital and free movement of people. For instance, the Japanese carmaker, Nissan, is now subsidized by a French company, so how would you comment on this aspect of the sort of gap between maintaining sort of the social dimension domestically and encouraging freedom of capital movement globally?

Roche: "Glocal" capitalism. You know, in France, EDF, which is the main electricity producer, there is no concurrence in France because foreign companies are not allowed yet to sell power in France, but EDF is buying power plants everywhere in Europe, in England, in Italy. That is the way France considers capitalism and liberalism. Liberalism is forbidden for the others; if it's in my interest I can be liberal for one small part of my activities.

(Chair): Thank you for your presentation, Prof. Roche, and the comments from Prof. Masujima. So let's wrap up this session. Thank you very much to both.

Coordinator: I would like to invite each of you, if you will, to have your final say for this workshop.

Hellmann: If I may start: I found it fascinating to come over to Japan and to talk so much about France, Britain, and Germany in such an inspiring setting.

In conclusion, let me try to pose a final question and perhaps offer some suggestions.

In preparing my own presentation I thought a lot about the relationship between national foreign policy styles and traditions, and European foreign policy. It was quite interesting for me to observe that both the presentation on Britain and the presentation on France said fairly little about a possible interactionist effect from French or British foreign policy on European foreign policy. I guess that this may have to do with the fact that you do not see any form of interdependence here in the sense that French or British foreign policy could be said to be shaping European foreign policy. There does not seem to be a Britonization or a Franconization of European foreign policy which would be comparable to the Germanization of European foreign policy that I touched upon. You didn't mention any such thing, and that may mean that you don't think that it is the case.

But if you talk to people in Brussels, and if you look at the staff in the European Union, you see that there are lots of British and French state officials and diplomats who are actively engaged in shaping European politics as well.

So I'm just wondering, and this is a question that goes to my friend and British colleague as well as to the other participants present here at the conference, do you see any interactionist effects of French and British policy on the way that European foreign policy is operating and vice versa?

As I said, I do see an interactionist, mutually-influential relationship between the national and the European level in the case of Germany's foreign policy. If I had to look at it in an historical perspective, I would say that Germany has been much more on the receiving end of being Europeanized. It has only recently started to exert a greater influence on the

structure of European foreign policy, especially after unification. I'm curious whether my colleagues have any comments on this.

Roche: I would say that there are two different fields. Of course there is integration, and there, of course, there is the Europeanization of French foreign policy, but inside, concerning foreign policy, it is a second pillar, and there, it's just cooperation, and, as you said, we are trying, and it's less and less possible, but we are trying to "francisize" European foreign policy. And we can see quite easily in the ESDP, the different mission plans by this ESDP were operated accordingly to the French standard, not all, but at the present time, in Chad, in the Congo, in Lebanon, it was operated the French way. So there is a difference.

Of course 90 percent of French legislation nowadays comes from Brussels, but this is for public policy, internal public policy. When we look outside, we consider that cooperation matter, and there, I don't notice this influence of Europe on the way France considers its external position.

At the same time, we must say that Europe, the problem of Europe is to create a civil power. France has nothing to do with civil power.

Bluth: Well, if we look at it from a British point of view, I think a lot of the issues that common foreign security policy has been concerned with don't register very high in Britain, especially since Britain is a country in which any policy to do with Europe has to be articulated and justified in terms of the British national interest, which makes it quite difficult sometimes.

But I think the real problem is that it's difficult to see how Europe at this point is really taking ownership of some of the central international security issues in terms of the British foreign policy have been articulated. It really remains the case that in the end, in Iraq and in Afghanistan, it's left to the United States to take ownership for the outcome of whatever policies are put in place and to provide most of the military resources, and so from that point of view, I think that European foreign policy is seen as being of a more marginal significance than it really should be the case.

Bates: I am not an expert in International Relations like the three gentlemen who are sitting opposite me here, but listening to the discussion today, it almost occurs to me that Europe might be better run if Germany was in charge of domestic policy, maybe Britain in charge of foreign policy, and Nicolas Sarkozy was president.

It is very curious to me what Prof. Roche said about France not implementing European directives, because people in Britain often complain about the fact that the British government is extremely methodical and unimaginative in implementing every single European directive, and yet we're not somehow seen as being very pro-European, which is ironic.

But I think one of the reasons for British disinterest is that that Europe still lacks, for Britain at least, "the big idea," which would make it for Britain something to be proud to be a member of. There are not the same pressing cultural and strategic reasons for unity within Europe that are felt by France and Germany. Although we fought with them, we were never invaded by our neighbours, so the benefits of European membership to the British seem too intangible. They are obviously there, and very important, especially the economic benefits, but the British public does not see it, does not feel it.

If there was a humanitarian foreign policy that made Europe a conspicuous force for good in the world, dealing not with security crises but with natural and human catastrophes, this might be one way that Britons might be encouraged to think more positively about the merits and virtues of European membership.

One great chance for European unity and leadership in foreign policy has of course just been lost at the Copenhagen environmental summit. Everyone was geared up to see the spectacular European offer of a 30-percent reduction in carbon emissions and it never materialized. That might have been one of these great gestures that could have given the European project more appeal to the British voter, but the EU completely failed to grasp the opportunity.

Coordinator: Thank you everyone for participating so actively in the workshop. Just, this is a remark off the record, but we have to ask for the approval for holding this workshop to the delegation of the European Commission in Tokyo, and they let us know that this workshop does not reflect the official view of the commission. Thank you very much.