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Rethinking Party System Nationalization in India (1952-2014)

1. Introduction: Rethinking Party System Nationalization in India

Since more than a decade, party system scholars have taken a strong interest in providing comparative measurements for party system nationalization (Jones and Mainwaring 2003; Caramani, 2004; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Bochler, 2010; Golosov 2014). Party system nationalization expresses the degree to which a party system is territorially integrated. Social scientists use party nationalization scores to compare and contrast different party systems or to sketch the evolution of a particular party system over time. More ambitiously, they use party nationalization to explain territorial differences in campaign strategies or to understand why authority migrates from the centre to the constituent units of a nation or vice versa.

Notwithstanding the merits of party system nationalization for social scientific enquiry, party and electoral scholars are not united in how to operationalize the concept. For instance, Jones and Mainwaring (2003: 140) operationalize party system nationalization by comparing vote shares for parties across regions within the state. They first compute the Gini coefficient for each party in the party system (where it is 0, that party received an equal share of the vote across all the units of the state, where it equals 1, that party's vote share is entirely concentrated within a single unit). The Gini coefficient is then subtracted from 1, so that higher values correspond with a more nationalized party. To create the party system nationalization score, the nationalization score for every party is multiplied by its share of the national valid vote and that product is then summed for all the parties (ibid., 143). In a more recent application, Boschler (2010a) builds on Jones and Mainwaring but uses a Gini-coefficient that corrects for the number of units. In comparison, Daniele Caramani (2004: 57-70; 84-85) expresses nationalization a.o by measuring the extent to which a party obtains equal vote shares across constituencies within a polity while in their seminal study on the formation of national party systems in Canada, Great Britain, India and the US, Chhibber and Kollman (2004: 165) measure nationalization by computing measures of party aggregation, i.e they measure the difference between the effective number of national parties at the national level and the average number of parties in the districts (constituencies). Golosov (2014: 6-7) in turn builds his party system nationalization scores on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of concentration, and thus derives it from the standard deviation.

However, what the above studies have in common is that they measure party system nationalization exclusively on the basis of variations in *national or general* election outcomes. Yet, with the rise of regional authority (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel, 2010) across a range of OECD countries since 1950, there is a strong case to incorporate subnational (regional) election results into the conceptual understanding and analysis of party system nationalization. Indeed, measurements of nationalization that are purely based on national election results exemplify 'methodological nationalism' because they give 'a nation-state outlook on society, law, justice and history' (Beck 2002: 52). Broadening our understanding of nationalization to include electoral performance in regional elections enables us to answer questions which the 'traditional' nationalization studies cannot explore. For instance, what underpins a rise in denationalization? Does denationalization primarily result from a growing discrepancy in voting behaviour across the states of a multi-level state in national elections or also in regional elections? Is denationalization triggered primarily by voters switching votes between national and regional elections (dual voting) or simply by wider inter-regional

variations in voting patterns for national and regional elections? Our alternative measures enable us to explore these questions in full.

Recent work by [REF REMOVED] has started to incorporate regional election results into the conceptualization of party system nationalization in Europe. Yet, there is a strong need to extend such analysis to other parts of the world with relatively well institutionalized party systems and regional governments. In this article, we bring in regional election data into the understanding of party system nationalization in India. We believe that India makes an important case-study for a variety of reasons.

Firstly, with an electorate of more than 800 million voters and with (as of 2014) 29 states and 2 union territories with directly elected assemblies, India is the demographically most important democracy in the world. Furthermore, since 1952 and until the general elections of April-May 2014, India has held 16 general elections and 351 regional (state) elections, providing an extremely rich data-set of election results which enable us to track patterns of party system nationalization across time. Voters in India also hold the state and not the central government accountable for a range of important policy issues (Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson, 2004: 339-352). For instance, when asked in a pan-India survey which level of government was responsible for providing a set of public goods, the share of citizens holding the state (and not the central or local governments) responsible varied between 67 and 74% for medical and education facilities, electricity, crime and ration supply; and between 50 and 60% for drinking water, pollution and roads (ibid.: 350). These findings are concurrent with other studies which see the MLA (Member of the state Legislative Assembly) as a more important interlocutor for gaining access to public goods than a national MP (Brass 1994). They also tie in with findings that have attributed a larger role of the states since the 1990s due to the liberalization of the Indian economy (Sinha 2004) and the dependence of central governments on the support of regional parties in the era of national coalition and/or minority government (1989-2014; Arora and Kailash 2012).

Secondly, we add to the literature on the Indian party system, by giving equal attention to electoral dynamics in general and state elections since 1952. Until a few years ago, most studies of the Indian party system focused primarily on national election results, (Yadav 1999: 2393-2399; Yadav and Palshikar 2009a; Shastri, Suri and Yadav, 2010; Palshikar and Suri 2014); state election results (Yadav and Palshikar 2006), or both within a particular state (e.g. Kumar 2013; Harris and Wyatt 2013). Fewer analyses have provided a more systematic link between state and national elections, Arora (2000), Yadav and Palshikar (2008; 2009a: 55-62), and more recently Palshikar, Yadav and Suri (2014: 1-41); Arora and Kailsah (2012) and Kailash (2014b) are exceptions. For instance, tracking state and national election contests in the period since 2004, Yadav and Palshikar (2009a) note a discrepancy between the 'legislative dominance' of the centre and the 'political dominance' of the state arena. They argue that national electoral outcomes 'derive from' 'principal' electoral contests at the state level and critically engage with the 'European notion' of second order elections in the Indian context. Yet, most of these studies focus primarily on developments in the 'post-Congress polity; (1989-present) whereas we propose to track party system nationalization since the first elections in 1952.

Thirdly, our article follows shortly after what many have perceived as a historic general election in April/May 2014. In this context it has been assumed that the outcome of the 2014 general election produced a significant *nationalization* of the Indian party system due to the return of a single party majority at the centre after 25 years of coalition or minority government (mostly even minority coalition government! ; see Sridharan 2012). Yet, as we will argue, the true relevance of the 2014 elections for Indian democracy cannot be fully understood without situating this election in a wider context: longitudinally; by comparing its results with previous general elections, but also vertically, by comparing the 2014 and preceding general elections with previous state elections. Conceived as such, we will argue that the 2014 general election provides more evidence of continuity than change in the Indian multi-level party system.

In what follows we first provide an alternative way of conceptualizing ‘nationalization’ based on four different sets of measurements (section 2). Subsequently (section 3) we apply these measurements to all general and state elections that took place in India between 1952 and 2014 (we take the 2014 general elections as our endpoint). We relate our findings to prevailing conceptions on the ‘nationalization’ and ‘federalization’ of the Indian party system and engage with the Indian party system literature to explain shifts in our measurements over time. In section 4 we contextualize the significance of the 2014 general election result by placing it in a longitudinal and multi-level perspective and by bringing in *party* nationalization scores to examine the extent to which this election has made the BJP the most important national party. In section 5, we produce nationalization measures on the basis of seat not vote shares given that India’s first past the post system often produces major anomalies between vote and seat shares. The conclusion summarizes our main findings and provides avenues for future research.

2. Rethinking Party System Nationalization: Beyond ‘Methodological Nationalism’

In order to conceptualize and measure long terms trends towards (de)nationalization, we conceive the Indian party system as a multilevel electoral system which consists of two tiers of government –state and federal- and which hold two types of elections –state and federal (REF REMOVED 2013a). This means that we can (dis)aggregate party vote shares according to level of aggregation and/or type of election. In table 1 we display four different party vote share types, the first letter denotes the type of election whereas the second letter indicates the level of aggregation.

Table 1. Types of vote shares in a multilevel electoral system

Level of Aggregation	Type of election	
	Federal	State
Federal	FF	SF
State	FS	SS

Regional election scholars generally measure congruence between the federal and state vote by a dissimilarity index which subtracts vote shares won in state elections from those won in federal elections, takes absolute values and sums them over the number of parties and divides the sum by two because one party’s gain is the loss of another party. An often overlooked aspect of the dissimilarity index is that one can vary the type of vote share which is put into the formula (REF

REMOVED 2013b). The following formula allows us to vary the type of election and the level of aggregation in the dissimilarity index:

$$\text{Dissimilarity index} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_i^n |X_{ijk} - X_{ijk}|$$

Whereby X represents a vote share for party i in a particular type of election j (state or federal) and aggregated to level k (state or federal). The dissimilarity index varies from a minimum of 0 percent – completely similar or full congruence- to 100 percent –completely dissimilar or full incongruence (note that there is an inverse relationship between the dissimilarity index and the degree of congruence). We develop four measures of congruence on the basis of the dissimilarity index whereby one either varies the type of election (j) or the level of aggregation (k) or both (see table 1). A detailed overview of how the various measures are operationalized can be found in the online-appendix.

- *Party system congruence (FF-SS)*: this measure evaluates the extent to which a particular state party system is different from the federal party system and it is the result of two sources of variation: the extent to which *a state electorate* is different from the *federal electorate* (level of aggregation) combined with the extent to which the state electorate switch their vote between *state and federal elections* (type of election). How a state electorate votes in a state election, closest to a federal election is compared with how the federal electorate voted in that federal election. Because electorates and type of election are different, it logically is the measure for which we anticipate the highest dissimilarity. Arguably, it also is the measure which gives the most holistic expression to how nationalized or de-nationalized the multi-level party system is. To tease out both sources of variation (electorates and type of election) we also consider the following measures;
- *Electorate congruence state elections (SF-SS)*: electorate congruence seeks to measure to what extent a particular state electorate is different from the federal electorate. Put differently, the type of election is held constant (state elections), but the electorate (level of aggregation) is not; hence we compare and contrast the voting behaviour of the electorate of a specific state in state elections, with the voting behaviour of all state voters (including the electorate of the state concerned) *across the polity* in the same cycle of state elections. State (and federal) elections can be held at different dates and to match state elections to each other (and to federal elections) we found for each federal election the closest in time state election. Put differently if a federal election takes place every five years, then we compare the results of state elections that were held within 2.5 years (30 months) before and after that federal election. We compare individual state results with the aggregate of all state elections held within that cycle. The online appendix provides details on how state elections are clustered.
- *Electorate congruence federal elections (FF-FS)*: this measure is the ‘federal election’ variant to the above, i.e. we compare and contrast the voting behaviour of the

electorate of a specific state in *federal elections* with the behaviour of all voters in the polity (including the state electorate concerned) in the same federal election(s). In some sense, it is the measure which comes closest to Chhibber and Kollman's (2004) understanding of nationalization since it is purely based on how electors in a state vote differently from each other in the same type of election, i.e. the national or federal election.

- *Election congruence (FS-SS)*: this measure evaluates the extent to which a state electorate votes differently in state than in federal elections; hence the electorate (level of aggregation) is held constant but not the type of election. As such it is an appropriate measure to express the extent to which voters switch their vote in between federal and state elections (dual voting).

By using party system congruence as a proxy for party system nationalization, we acknowledge that the nationalization of a party system is a reflection of at least three distinctive phenomena: (1) the extent to which the electorates of all state and union territories vote similarly in the same general election; (2) the extent to which the electorates of a state or union territory vote similarly in the election of their particular state or union territory assembly compared with how the other states and union territories vote in their state or union territory assembly elections; (3) the extent to which the electorate of a particular state or union territory switch their vote between a federal and state assembly election. (2) and (3) bring in state election outcomes in the conceptualization of nationalization, thus providing a more holistic measurement of nationalization. Furthermore, by breaking down party system nationalization in its component parts (electorate congruence and election congruence) we can determine the most important contributory factor of nationalization. For instance where election congruence is much higher than electorate congruence, voters in a particular state tend to vote mostly for the same party irrespective of the type of election they are voting in, but they vote differently compared with voters in other states or union territories. Our understanding of nationalization is different from the set of authors to whom we referred in the introduction. Electorate congruence for federal elections is the measure which comes closest to how party nationalization is understood by Chhibber, Kollman and others, because it is based *exclusively* on territorial variations in voting behaviour in one type of election, i.e. the national or federal election.

We also link party system nationalization to patterns of nationalization for individual parties within the party system. We felt it necessary to provide that information for India, because the dominant narrative of the 'regionalized party system' since the 1990s is very much tied up with the gradual decay of the Congress Party as the pre-eminent Indian party. To express state variations in party electoral support we have applied the Bochsler (2010) party nationalization scores as they express the extent to which a party obtains similar vote shares across the various states. It ranges from 0 -completely regional, i.e. a party only gains votes in one state- to 1 completely nationalized, a party gains identical vote shares in all of the states. Therefore, the size of the party does not matter, only the state distribution of its vote shares. As for congruence measures, party nationalization measures can weigh for the size of the states (e.g. in India larger states such as Uttar Pradesh are much more important in the nationalization index than small ones such as Mizoram) and for the number of states (e.g. not irrelevant in the Indian case given that the number of states has varied over time).

3. Denationalization in India: a long term perspective (1952-2014)

In what follows we apply our different nationalization measures to the Indian multi-party system, thereby moving beyond an understanding of nationalization which purely relies on general elections results. Figure 1 below projects the evolution of our congruence measures since the first Indian general elections in 1952. Congruence measures are calculated on the basis of *vote shares* and each state or union territory electorate is given a weightage in proportion to the size of its electorate in the overall electorate. We track the evolution of party system congruence first and subsequently turn to electorate and election congruence.




Figure 1: Congruence between federal and state election vote shares from 1952 until 2009. See the main text for an explanation of the measures.

3.1. Party System Congruence

Based on the graphic presentation of the party system congruence measure in Figure 1, we observe a gradual de-nationalization of the Indian party system which accelerated during the 1990s. Since 1952 state electorates have diverged increasingly from each other in federal and state elections. If we leave aside a temporary rise in party system congruence around the 1977 federal elections and a historic drop around the 1980 federal elections three years later, party system congruence has come

down gradually since the first federal and state elections in 1952.¹ Although this decrease in nationalization complies with Chhibber and Kollman's observations (2004: 199-209), the path of denationalization that we observe is more gradual. Both authors (2004: 166) link the denationalization of the Indian party system primarily to developments since 1991 as their 'party aggregation score' doubles from 2 to 4 between 1991 and 1998. Our data confirm a process of further party system denationalization in that period but not at such a fast pace. In fact party system congruence has decreased as much between 1971 and 1989 as in the period between 1989 and 2009. By bringing state election results into the conceptualization of nationalization, our measures account for the growing divergence across state electorates in state elections during the 1970s (see our separate measurements of electorate congruence for state elections); a phenomenon which Chhibber and Kollman cannot capture. The gradual de-nationalization of the Indian multi-level party system is easier to understand when it is unpacked in its component parts.


3.2. Party System Congruence Unpacked I : Shifting Trends in the Evolution of Electorate Congruence

Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that the drop in party system congruence is in line with a steady decline in electorate congruence (for state and central elections). The uncoupling of state and federal elections made that decline initially more pronounced for state than for general elections, but in time the electorate congruence for state and general elections dropped with comparable values. How can the gradual rise in electorate congruence be explained? Our data point us to two important factors (1) the rise of regional or non-state wide parties, sometimes as breakaway factions of polity-wide parties especially Congress; (2) the inability of new parties with country-wide ambitions to retain a pan-Indian electoral following. Jointly they produced distinctive (yet often concentrated) party systems at the level of the states but a highly fragmented party system at the centre (on this point, see also Sridharan 2010). As party systems have increasingly diverged from one state to the other (not necessarily in the number of parties but in *which* parties compete where) electorate congruence has gone down. We touch upon both of these factors in turn.

During the first federal elections, the Congress Party was dominant across a majority of the Indian states (with the exception of the South of India). This generated relatively homogeneous patterns of party competition across the Indian states and territories. From 1962 onward state parties (i.e. parties which *participate* in elections in only one state) and non-polity-wide parties (i.e. parties which *participate* in more than two but less than half of the Indian states) started to make headway

¹ We know from the party literature on India that the temporary rise in party system congruence around 1977 can be attributed to the relatively uniform swings away from the dominant Congress Party in the federal election of 1977 and in proximate state elections in response to Congress's imposed National Emergency (1975-77) which suspended all federal and state elections. Conversely, the sharp drop in congruence in 1980 is due to the disintegration of the Janata Party in various state splinter parties, as reflected by the historically low election congruence figures: i.e. voters who still supported Janata in state elections between 1977 and 1980 cast a preference for its state splinter or Congress in the 1980 federal election (Sridharan, 2012).

(see Figure 2).² Around 1962, the average vote (across states) for state parties was 4.1 per cent in state elections and 2.8 per cent in general elections. For non-polity wide parties the figures were respectively 3.9 and 4.9 per cent. By 2014, the average vote share in state elections had shot up to 13.2 per cent for state parties and to 17.0 per cent for non-polity-wide parties (for the 2014 general election the figures stood respectively at 12.3 and 15.1 per cent). Our data show that the rise of state and non-polity-wide parties in this period is linked to the decreasing vote share for independent candidates (from 13.7 per cent of the vote in state elections around 1962 to 7.2 per cent of the vote in state elections around 2014; and from 10.7 percent of the vote in the 1962 federal elections to 3.1 per cent in the 2014 federal elections; see also Mayer, 2013: 182-183 who links a drop in independent candidates to a rise in party candidates, mostly from state and non-polity-wide parties). Our data also show that polity-wide parties (parties which *participate* in more than half of the Indian states) find it increasingly difficult to hold on to a large pan-Indian vote base during this period. In state elections around 1962, they still capture 78.3 percent of the vote, a percentage which dipped below 62.6 per cent in state elections around 2014. In federal elections their vote share also dropped from 81.6 percent (1962) to 69.5 per cent (2014).



² We acknowledge that our definition of state and polity-wide parties does not fully correspond with how these parties have been operationalized in the Indian party literature. For instance, the Election Commission of India conceives a party as 'national' (polity-wide) where it gains 2% of seats (11) in the Lok Sabha from at least 3 different States; or in general or assembly elections the party polls 6% of votes in four States and in addition it wins 4 Lok Sabha seats; the party is recognized a state party in at least four states (Election Commission of India. The BJP, INC, BSP, CPI, CPI (M) and NCP qualify as national on this basis. Our definition is more in line with the international comparative literature on what constitute 'national' (polity-wide), 'regional' or 'state' based parties' (for a recent application to India, see Kailash 2014a).




Figure 2. Average vote share in federal (2A) and state (2B) elections for (1) parties participating in more than half of the regions (polity-wide), (2) parties participating in more than one but less than half (non polity-wide), (3) parties participating in one state (state parties), and candidates with no party affiliation (independents).

Why did state and non-state wide parties become more prominent in time? The extensive literature on politics in post-independent India highlights three important reasons.

First, the gradual rise of the state as a key unit for political mobilization within the Indian polity, to the detriment of the centre. This rise is linked to the reorganization of the states, initially along linguistic lines, and later also on the basis of tribe or territorially expressed socio-economic grievances (Tillin 2014). Consequently, voters came to identify more with the state level (cf Yadav and Palshikar 2008; 2009a; Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson, 2004), for instance, resulting into higher turnout rates for state than for general elections. The uncoupling of federal and state elections since 1971 added to the autonomy of state elections.

Second, the gradual decay of the Congress Party and the inability of a single polity-wide party to reclaim a core part of its social base which in turn has been explained by three important factors: (1) the party's dwindling vote pulling appeal as the natural party of governance due to its fading association with India's Independence struggle as time moved on; (2) the deepening of Indian democracy, or what Jaffrelot (2003) has referred to as a 'Silent Revolution' in Indian politics linked with the mobilization of the backward castes in the populous Hindi belt of North India (Jaffrelot, 2003). As a result, the Congress party could not accommodate lower caste or regional dissent within its own ranks; its local structures reflected 'vertical' caste hierarchies, and did not offer direct representation to lower caste groups; (3) the party's centralist organizational structure (Hasan 2012; REF REMOVED 2013) which left insufficient room for the accommodation of regional challengers. Indira Gandhi had suspended democratic party elections and had transformed the party from a multi-level democratic

party into a dynastic pyramid (Kochanek 1976) in which party functionaries first and foremost became answerable to the Gandhi dynasty and the select few of the central working committee (central party executive). Even after Indira Gandhi's assassination, Congress retained a dynastic and highly centralized organizational template, notwithstanding a limited degree of decentralization in practice.

Equally important however is the inability of a single polity-wide party to reclaim the eroding social base of the Congress. For instance, the Janata Party united the anti-Congress opposition, but quickly disintegrated into its component parts ahead of the 1980s elections after just one term in central government. The key successors to the Janata Party were the Lok Dal (split in Lok Dal A and Lok Dal B after the death of Charan Singh in 1988); the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Janata Party led by Chandrashekar (Brass, 1994: 85). Ten years after the Janata Party came to power at the centre, the Janata Dal dislodged Congress from central office. Yet, like the Janata Party before, the Janata Dal quickly disintegrated into various state splinters such as the Rashtriya Janata Dal and the Samati Party -later Janata Dal United- in Bihar, the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh, the Biju Janata Dal in Odisha and the Janata Dal Secular in Karnataka. Only the Bharatiya Janata Party has been able to buck this trend somewhat during the 1990s and more recently in its performance during the 2014 federal elections (see below).

Third, the ascendance of the states and the emergence of a 'post-Congress' polity changed the dynamics of Indian party competition at the centre, especially since 1989, when no single party had obtained an outright legislative majority. Hereafter parties with a state based following realised that they could still be 'federally competitive' (i.e. be a coalition partner at the centre or at least exert significant blackmail potential at that level; Kailash, 2014b: 190), without having to seek a polity-wide following. It is in this sense that Arora (2000), Arora and Kailash (2012) and Kailash (2012, 2014a, 2014b) not just referred to the denationalization of the Indian party system but also to its *federalization*. Federalization induced behavioural changes among the single state and non-polity wide parties. State parties took national elections seriously as they could enter federal alliances or coalitions, just as polity-wide parties (Congress and the BJP) took state and non-polity-wide parties seriously in their role as coalition-makers. Single state parties gradually learned that they could share central power by forging pre-election seat sharing arrangements or post-election coalition deals with state-wide parties. The leaders of these state and non polity-wide parties frequently coveted particular central ministerial posts such as the ministry of railways, power, telecommunications or rural development (e.g. Guha Thakurta and Raghuraman 2007: 340). They used the centre's access to discretionary grants to disburse resources in these areas in a way which disproportionately benefited their state or state constituents (Wilkinson 2007). In turn, by gaining the prospect of participating in central government, voters had a stronger incentive to support state or non-polity wide parties in general elections also. This enhanced the career prospects of dissenting but ambitious party figures within centralized polity-wide parties such as Congress by breaking away (Ziegfield 2012). Recent examples of such breakaway parties are the Nationalist Congress Party, the Trinamool Congress Party or the YSR Congress Party.

3.3 Party System Congruence Unpacked II: Shifting Trends in the Evolution of Election Congruence

By breaking down party system congruence in electorate and election congruence we can try to find out which of both factors has the strongest impact on the de-nationalization of the Indian multi-level party system. Since 1984, the general drop in party system congruence is linked primarily

to a rise in electorate congruence and less so to election congruence (a rise in dual voting). Hence state party systems diverge more from each other, but voters vote more similarly in state and national elections. This marks a clear departure from developments in the period before when election congruence was often lower than electorate congruence (see figure 1).

As anticipated, the de-coupling of state and general elections in 1971 initially sparked a rise in dual voting.³ Voters had clear incentives to perceive general elections through a different frame at that time in view of the personalization of electoral politics by Indira Gandhi and the implications of a vote in federal elections for state politics.⁴ Yet, although Gandhi intervened heavily in the politics of Punjab shortly after resuming office in 1980, she had become more tolerant in accepting regional diversity across the rest of India, a pattern that was replicated under her successor Rajiv Gandhi (Bose 2013). This may have boosted voters' to frame federal elections through the lens of state politics and to vote for non-Congress (and often single state parties) in state *and* federal elections. Put differently, as state party systems started to diverge more from each other, state electorates also displayed more uniform voting patterns in state *and* general elections. Hereafter, we observe a modest increase in dual voting between 1989 and 1998, but a sharper drop thereafter until 2009. As explained above, by 1998, the opportunity structure of the Indian multi-level electoral arena had transformed in such a way that voters no longer felt excluded when supporting a single state or non-polity-wide party in *federal* elections also (instead of in state elections only) and this contributed to a relative drop in dual voting (or modest rise in election congruence between 1998 and 2014).

4. The 2014 election as a possible turning point?

At first sight, the 2014 general election result does not exemplify in any way a move to party system nationalization, as party system congruence reaches on overall low. A closer look at figure 1 reveals that *all* underlying dissimilarity indices in the lead up to the 2014 general elections are on the rise. Yet, despite the overall emphasis on continuity in the de-nationalizing trajectory of the multi-level party system, two elements could point at the 2014 general election result as the *possible* starting point of long-term change. First, the rise of dual voting, reflecting a surge in BJP support across most of the Indian states compared with preceding state elections. Second, the more even territorial spread of the BJP vote compared with Congress. We turn to each of these points below.

A short term rise in dual voting?

A first 'departure' from recent trends in the 2014 general election concerns an increase in dual voting (which in the short term contributes towards a 'denationalization' of the multi-level party system according to our operationalization). Given that election congruence drops more sharply than electorate congruence for federal elections, dual voting is now once more the strongest contributory

³ Our data show that dual voting was surprisingly high when state and federal elections were still held simultaneously because of the stronger presence and electoral success of Independent candidates in state than in general elections (which we attribute to the smaller constituency size and lower campaign cost in state compared with general elections).

⁴ The sharp rise in dual voting around 1980 is due to voters switching support from the Janata Party in the 1977 general elections to Congress or the Janata splinter parties in state and federal elections until 1980.

factor to the overall drop in party system congruence. We attribute this to a strong federal anti-incumbency effect (and a strong anti-state incumbency effect in states controlled by Congress and non state-wide but non- 'regionalist' parties). Another factor is the 'presidentialization' of the campaign by BJP Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi (see Palshikar and Suri 2014; Kailash 2014a; Shastri and Syal 2014: 77) and the capacity of Modi to attract a large number of 'mobilizers' capable of bringing out the BJP vote (Chhibber and Osterman 2014). For instance, in the CSDS/Lokniti 2014 general election survey, 27% of BJP voters report they would have supported a different party if not Modi but another leader had been the party's Prime Ministerial candidate (Palshikar and Suri 2014: 42). This short term surge in dual voting could produce long-term nationalization if the BJP were to replicate its result in forthcoming state elections, i.e. if voters were to support it in lieu of non-state wide or regional parties. Although election results in Maharashtra, Haryana (October 2014) and Kashmir (Jammu at least) have reinforced the BJP surge, it is too early to tell if this pattern will be replicated, especially in states where the party traditionally had a weaker presence (see Kailash 2014a).

The Bharatiya Janata Party as the new Congress?

As highlighted above, the denationalization of the Indian multi-level party system is linked with the electoral decline of the Congress Party and the inability of an alternative polity-wide party to assume its place. Since the 1980s however, the BJP emerged as a new 'national political force' to be reckoned with although its territorial spread of the vote was lower than that for the rivalling Congress Party. Figure 3 compares the nationalization (territorial spread) of the vote for both parties on the basis of Boschler's (2010b) party nationalization scores, standardized according to the number of regions so that the scores are comparable over time. It shows that the 2014 general election result is historic insofar as it produced only the second election result in which BJP electoral support was spread more evenly than that for Congress. This happened only once before (1998 general election)




Figure 3: Party nationalization for the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in federal and state elections (1952-2014).

At the same time, Figure 3 shows that the more even geographic spread of the BJP reflects a long term trend. A decision to contest more seats in general and state elections since 1991 enabled the party to break out of its initial strongholds in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra. Coupled with its 'Mandir' mobilization politics⁵, the BJP established (temporary) strongholds in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Himachal Pradesh amongst others. Furthermore, the inability of the BJP to craft a majority on its own after the 1996 general election contributed to the party's realization that it could not govern the centre without programmatic (for instance toning down its Hindutva agenda) and strategic adjustments (for instance by forging seat sharing or coalition alliances with a range of regional parties across India ahead of and following these elections). Hence, in the 1998 general elections, the BJP alliance consisted of 13 pre-election and 10 post-election allies (parties). Combined the BJP strengthened its influence in South and East India, areas largely outside its reach in the 1996 elections (Sridharan 2010: 125). In 1999 (following early elections after the withdrawal of the AIADMK from the coalition), the BJP entered the federal elections as a coalition (National Democratic Alliance) consisting of 20 pre-election allies and a common national platform. Congress required two further federal election defeats (1998, 1999) before it accepted the same predicament (Yadav and Palshikar 2009b). Although in time, single state parties have swapped costly pre-election seat sharing arrangements for more lucrative post-coalition deals, it is striking that in the build up to the 2014 general elections, 22 small or state-based parties entered seat-sharing arrangements with the BJP, against only 10 with Congress (Sridharan 2014: 31). This not only accelerated the party's electoral losses, but it also made Congress support more territorially concentrated, i.e. confined to those states where the party could still win (more or less) on its own.

5. The Nationalization of the Party System based on Seat Shares, not vote shares

Our conceptualization of nationalization is based on vote shares, not seat shares. However, in India's first past the post electoral system there is a much closer connection between who governs and the *seat share* of parties. To account for this limitation, Figure 4 below displays nationalization scores based on party seat shares.

At first sight, the nationalization scores based on seat shares do not undermine the overall trajectory of gradual denationalization of the Indian multi-level party system. Even when breaking down party system congruence in its component parts the previous analysis largely holds: party system congruence has gradually declined since the 1980s (until 2009), reflecting a much sharper drop in electorate congruence than in election congruence. Yet, nationalization scores based on seat shares mark out the so-called 'transformative elections' more clearly; party system congruence and all its component measures decline more sharply in 1967 when Congress lost significantly in seats in general and state elections and particularly since 1980; reflecting the entrenchment of distinctive regional

⁵ The BJP's 'Mandir politics' propagated a unified Hindu nationalism and was meant to stop the fragmentation of Hindus across caste groups caused by the Other Backward Caste (OBC) agitation following the implementation of the 'Mandal' commission (administrative reservations for OBC). It was linked to the symbolic act of reconstituting a Hindu temple ('mandir') at the location of the birth place of Hindu God Ram where the Mughals had constructed a Mosque (the Babri Masjid) in the 16th century.

party coalitions or parties in state elections. Similarly, the 1989 federal election stands out because of a sharp drop in electorate congruence, consolidating the formation of regionally distinctive party systems, even in a federal election!




Figure 4: Congruence between federal and state election seat shares for 1952 until 2014. See the main text for an explanation of the measures.

Just as the seat share data make the ‘turning’ points in the development of the multi-level party system more visible; so figure 4 accentuates the critical nature of the 2014 general election: the BJP benefited from an *unprecedented* vote-seat multiplier effect (the party added 1.67 percent of seats for every percent of votes – Sridharan 2014: 20), whereas Congress (and some of the regional parties) encountered the opposite effect (Congress added only 0.4 percent of seats for every percent of votes, illustrating an unprecedented ‘negative vote-seat multiplier effect’ for the party). Since the rise of the BJP in state elections only gained momentum after the Gujarat state election in December 2012, election congruence based on seat shares dropped sharply in the build up to the 2014 general elections. Although in the short term this sharp spike in dual ‘seat representation’ contributes to a further decline in party system congruence or nationalization overall, at least on one measure we observe a tendency toward nationalization, i.e. electorate congruence for federal elections (lowest dissimilarity score since 1989). Whether this signifies a trend towards more durable nationalization remains to be seen. Much will depend on the ability of the BJP to keep its heterogeneous social coalition alive in forthcoming state elections, but also on the capacity of Congress to re-invent itself. For the first time, Congress dipped below 20 percent at the national level. Evidence from state elections shows that the party lost its pivotal position in state party systems where its support dropped below that level (Palshikar 2014). Although state parties held up reasonably well (Kailash 2014a), non-polity wide parties such as the BSP, SP, JD (U) and RLD also performed poorly. Recent efforts to reunite the erstwhile members of the ‘Janata Parivar’ ahead of the 2015 Bihari state elections can be

interpreted as an attempt to provide a stronger electoral fist against the BJP, especially in the wake of a much enfeebled Congress.

6. Conclusion: The denationalization of the Indian Party System and the 2014 general election

This article made the case for incorporating subnational or 'state' electoral results into conceptualizing the 'nationalization' of party systems in multi-level polities with directly elected subnational assemblies. We demonstrated that existing party nationalization studies, apart from suggesting different ways of operationalizing 'nationalization,' all excluded sub-national electoral results from their conceptualization of nationalization. By doing so, we argued that these studies unwillingly engaged in 'methodological nationalism.' Instead, we offered a different and more holistic understanding of nationalization compared with previous studies which also builds on electoral behaviour in sub-national (or state) and not just national (or federal) elections.

This broader conceptualization of nationalization has found its way in recent studies on European party systems; but we are the first authors to apply it to India, the world's most populous democracy with strong and politically significant states (and union territories) and directly elected state assemblies. We applied our measurements to India's 16 general elections and 351 state elections between 1952 and 2014.

Although our findings are not too dissimilar from what a previous nationalization study (based on general election results) by Chhibber and Kollman (2004) had shown for India; bringing in state election outcomes into the conceptualization of party system nationalization nonetheless generates a comparatively more gradual pattern of denationalization and weakens the relevance of the 1989 general election outcome as a critical juncture in denationalization post-Independence. Furthermore, compared with earlier studies, we can identify the key sources of denationalization more clearly: electorate congruence (the extent to which state electorates diverge from each other in state and/or federal elections) or election congruence (the extent of dual voting). Although we observe a gradual drop in congruence across each of the four measurements, we showed that this drop has been steeper for electorate congruence than for election congruence, confirming the continuous growing apart of the Indian state party systems. We also show that this process (at least for the past 30 years but not including the 2014 general election) has gone hand in hand with a decrease in dual voting as state electorates were increasingly keen to support the same (often state or non-polity wide) parties in state and federal elections. In this sense, our findings corroborate the 'federalization' thesis propagated by Arora (2000) and Arora and Kailash (2012).

Our longitudinal and multi-level approach to party system nationalization also enabled us to properly contextualize the 2014 Indian general election outcome, which in view of the BJP majority at the centre which it produced has been perceived as 'nationalizing'. In contrast, we show that based on how people *voted* the 2014 results continue a trend of *de-nationalization*. This result is the outcome of two phenomena: (1) despite the almost territorially uniform swing towards the BJP, compared with voting behaviour across state elections in the build-up to the 2009 federal elections and in that general election, state electorates voted *more* differently from each other in state elections prior to the 2014 general elections and in that general election; (2) the strong swing towards the BJP in the 2014 general election also pushed up dual voting; reducing election and party system congruence in the short run.

However, the 2014 general election results contain some seeds of potentially more durable party system change and party system nationalization. Whether such nationalization effectively materializes will depend very much on the BJP's ability to hold on to the broad, but very heterogeneous coalition of voters underpinning its current national mandate and on the party's capacity to replicate its success in vote and seat shares in future state and federal elections. Yet, because our data suggest that the Indian state party systems have never diverged more from each other in terms of vote shares than in 2014, the consolidation of the BJP as the pre-eminent and nationalizing force in the Indian multi-level party system, though not impossible, will remain a very tall order.

Finally, although the key purpose of our paper was to introduce a set of new measurements for studying the (de-)nationalization of the Indian multi-level party system, our analysis can form the basis of explorative research in which the (de)nationalization of the Indian party system is linked to denationalization or the federalization of the state. By reconceptualising nationalization, the causal direction which Chhibber and Kollman (2004) propagate between shifts in authority migration within the state and the nationalization of the party system may have to be reconsidered. Nationalization measures for the party system as a whole could also be linked with the campaign or organizational strategies of individual parties within the party system or the dynamics of party competition more generally.

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ONLINE Appendix

Conceptualization and Measurement of Party System Nationalization in Multilevel Electoral Systems

Party system nationalization expresses the degree to which a party system is territorially integrated. Most scholars conceive a highly nationalized party system as one whereby parties receive equal vote shares across the territory whereas a denationalized party system is characterized by parties which receive all or most of their vote share in a particular territory. Social scientists use party nationalization scores to compare and contrast different party systems or to sketch the evolution of a particular party system over time. Typically, measurements of party nationalization take the party as a unit of analysis and are exclusively applied to federal (national) elections. This research has undoubtedly produced interesting findings but it represents a limited outlook on party system nationalization in multilevel electoral systems.

A multilevel electoral system is defined as holding elections to at least two tiers of government. India is an example of a multilevel party system because it holds federal and state elections (in addition to local or municipal elections). Party system nationalization obtains a broader meaning when applied to elections at multiple levels. In addition to studying the extent to which parties are able to win equal vote shares across the territory one may also explore the degree to which *states* are nationalized or territorially integrated. In other words, the unit of analysis not only includes the party but also the state. Furthermore, a multilevel electoral system perspective allows for an exploration of party system nationalization in federal as well as in state elections.

In this appendix we discuss our measurements of nationalization in multilevel electoral systems. First we will discuss measurements of nationalization of *parties* and subsequently we will elaborate on the indicators for the nationalization of *states*. Then we proceed with a discussion on the different kind of insights the various indicators may generate with regard to the causes of party system nationalization.

We will explain our measurements according to an example displayed in figure A1. The top box with solid lines displays the results for one federal election and the bottom box with solid lines presents the outcomes of four state elections. The measures for *party* nationalization (PNSS) are presented within the double solid line boxes. Our indicators for the nationalization of *states* (congruence) are shown in the boxes with the dashed lines. The measurements of nationalization rely on different types of vote shares. Federal election results can be aggregated to the federal (FF) or disaggregated to the state level (FS). Similarly, one can look at state election vote shares in a particular state (SS) or at the federal level (SF). Below we explain how we clustered state election results in order to obtain state election results at the federal level. There are four parties (P_A through P_D) and four states (S_W through S_Z) and in this example we assume that each state has an equal number of voters.

The nationalization of parties

A party is highly nationalized when it receives equal vote shares across the territory whereas a denationalized party wins votes in one or few areas in the country. Most measurements of party system nationalization take the party as a unit of analysis and in this article we apply the party nationalisation score standardized by the number and weight of territorial units (PNSS; Bochsler 2010b). In our example (table A1) all four parties win 25 per cent of the federal vote at the federal party system level (FF) but receive varying vote shares in the states (FS; the cells in table A1). Party A (P_A) obtains equal vote shares across the states and receives the highest score of 1 (PNSS-F). The vote shares for the other three parties (P_B , P_C , and P_D) are unequally distributed across the states and therefore receive lower scores (respectively, 0.32, 0.20, and 0.20).

Figure A1: Nationalization of party systems, parties and states in federal and state elections

Federal election: cells display FS					
	S_W	S_X	S_Y	S_Z	FF
P_A	25	25	25	25	25
P_B	0	50	50	0	25
P_C	0	0	25	75	25
P_D	75	25	0	0	25

State elections: cells display SS					
	S_W	S_X	S_Y	S_Z	SF
P_A	0	25	25	25	18.8
P_B	0	50	50	0	25
P_C	0	0	25	75	25
P_D	100	25	0	0	31.3

Election congruence FS-SS					
	S_W	S_X	S_Y	S_Z	\bar{X}
P_A	25	0	0	0	
P_B	0	0	0	0	
P_C	0	0	0	0	
P_D	25	0	0	0	$\bar{X} =$
DIS	25	0	0	0	6.3

Party system congruence FF-SS					
	S_W	S_X	S_Y	S_Z	\bar{X}
P_A	25	0	0	0	
P_B	25	25	25	25	
P_C	25	25	0	50	
P_D	75	0	25	25	$\bar{X} =$
DIS	75	25	25	50	43.8

Electorate congruence federal election FF-FS					
	S_W	S_X	S_Y	S_Z	\bar{X}
P_A	0	0	0	0	
P_B	25	25	25	25	
P_C	25	25	0	50	
P_D	50	0	25	25	$\bar{X} =$
DIS	50	25	25	50	37.5

Electorate congruence state elections SF-SS					
	S_W	S_X	S_Y	S_Z	\bar{X}
P_A	18.8	6.3	6.3	6.3	
P_B	25	25	25	25	
P_C	25	25	0	50	
P_D	68.8	6.3	31	31	$\bar{X} =$
DIS	68.8	31.3	31.3	56.3	46.9

PNSS-F					
	1.00				
	0.32				
	0.20				
	0.20				
\bar{X}	= 0.43				

PNSS-S					
	0.62				
	0.32				
	0.20				
	0.18				
\bar{X}	= 0.30				

A multilevel party system perspective lead us to apply the PNSS to federal (PNSS-F) as well as to state (PNSS-S) elections. In our example, vote shares are similar between federal and state elections for all states except for state W (S_W). P_A receives 25 per cent in the federal but zero per cent in the state election whereas P_D increases its vote share from 75 to 100 percent between the federal and state elections. As a result, the PNSS scores for P_A and P_D are lower for state elections (respectively 0.62 and 0.18) than for the federal election (respectively, 1.00 and 0.20) indicating lower degrees of party nationalization in the state election.

PNSS-scores can also be derived at the party system level by taking a weighted average across parties (\bar{X} weighted by their vote shares at the federal level, i.e. FF or SF). Party system nationalization is higher for the federal election (\bar{X} PNSS-F = 0.43) than for the state elections (\bar{X} PNSS-S = 0.30). Since the unit of analysis underlying PNSS-scores is the party we can relate the denationalization of state elections to lower party nationalization scores for P_A and P_D .

The nationalization of states

The PNSS –as many other nationalization indicators- are particularly apt to measure the nationalization of parties but they do not inform us about the extent to which states are nationalized. A highly nationalized state is one in which the vote is similar to the other states whereas a denationalized state is characterized by a completely different party system than for the rest of the country. Figure A1 introduces four measures on the nationalization of states (congruence) which are based on a dissimilarity index:

$$\text{Dissimilarity index} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_i^n |X_{ijk} - X_{ijk}|$$

Whereby X represents a vote share for party i in a particular type of election j (state or federal) and aggregated to level k (state or federal). The dissimilarity index varies from a minimum of 0 per cent – completely similar or full congruence- to 100 per cent –completely dissimilar or full incongruence (note that there is an inverse relationship between the dissimilarity index and the degree of congruence).

Our measures of state nationalization (congruence) vary on the type of vote shares which are plugged into the dissimilarity index. There are four types of vote shares: federal election results at the federal level (FF) and at the state level (FS) and state election results at the federal (SF) and state level (SS). Our indicators are based on comparisons between different types of vote shares. In a box below we give an example of how four types of congruence scores (DIS) can be calculated for state W.

Box: example calculation congruence measures for state W (S_w)

Party system congruence	Electorate congruence federal election
$\frac{1}{2} * [P_A FF-SS + P_B FF-SS + P_C FF-SS + P_D FF-SS]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [25-0 + 25-0 + 25-0 + 25-100]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [25 + 25 + 25 + 75] = 75$	$\frac{1}{2} * [P_A FF-FS + P_B FF-FS + P_C FF-FS + P_D FF-FS]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [25-25 + 25-0 + 25-0 + 25-75]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [0 + 25 + 25 + 50] = 50$
Election congruence	Electorate congruence state elections
$\frac{1}{2} * [P_A FS-SS + P_B FS-SS + P_C FS-SS + P_D FS-SS]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [25-0 + 0-0 + 0-0 + 75-100]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [25 + 0 + 0 + 25] = 25$	$\frac{1}{2} * [P_A SF-SS + P_B SF-SS + P_C SF-SS + P_D SF-SS]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [18.8-0 + 18.8-0 + 25-0 + 31.3-100]$ $\frac{1}{2} * [18.8 + 18.8 + 25 + 68.8] = 68.8$

Party system congruence seeks to measure the extent to which state party systems are different from the federal party system (a comparison between FF and SS). This indicator informs us about the extent to which state party systems are nationalized (or integrated). Two sources of variation underlie party system congruence since we are comparing, at the same time, different types of elections (j) and different levels of aggregation (k). To tease out the two sources of variation we differentiate between electorate and election congruence.

Electorate congruence keeps the type of election constant but varies the level of aggregation and seeks to measure to what extent a particular state electorate is different from the federal electorate. Hence, this indicator gauges the degree to which state electorates are nationalized. Since we have two types of elections we may derive electorate congruence for federal elections (a comparison between FF and FS) and for state elections (a comparison between SF and SS).

Election congruence keeps the level of aggregation constant but varies the type of election. This indicator assesses the extent to which an electorate votes similarly in state and federal elections (i.e. dual voting). This measure can be interpreted as the degree to which a state electorate is to a similar extent nationalized for federal and state elections. There are two levels of aggregation and vote switching can be explored in a particular state (a comparison between FS and SS) as well as at the federal level (a comparison between FF and SF). However, federal level election congruence is not very informative with regard to the territorial heterogeneity of the vote since it does not vary at the state level.

Congruence scores can be derived for individual states which can be subsequently averaged (weighted by state size; in our example each state contains 25 per cent of the total electorate) in order to obtain a score for the whole party system (\bar{X}). The average dissimilarity score for party system congruence (\bar{X} FF-SS) equals to 43.8 per cent which means that almost half of the vote is different between federal and state party systems.

Party system nationalization in multilevel electoral systems

Most studies on nationalization use indicators with parties as a unit of analysis. A state-level perspective broadens our analytical lens and induces us to ask new and unexplored questions with regard to the causes of nationalization. We obtain a holistic view on party system nationalization in multilevel electoral systems when we consider both measures of party and state nationalization.

Indicators for party nationalization inform us about the extent to which parties are able to win equal vote shares across the territory. A multilevel electoral system perspective invites us to apply indicators to state (PNSS-S) as well as federal elections (PNSS-F). From the example displayed in Figure A1 one may observe that party vote shares are more unequally distributed across the territory for state (\bar{X} PNSS-S = 0.30) than for federal elections (\bar{X} PNSS-F = 0.43). Hence, an exclusive focus on federal elections would overestimate the extent of nationalization.

A closer look at individual parties reveals that only P_A and P_D are confronted with lower nationalization scores in state elections whereas P_B and P_C obtain equal vote shares in federal and state elections. This result may direct the attention of the researcher to the question why P_A and P_D are confronted with different voter support bases.

The indicators for state nationalization generate different kinds of insight. From the example in Figure A1 we may observe that party system congruence (\bar{X} FF-SS = 43.8) can be broken down into election congruence (\bar{X} FS-SS = 6.3) and electorate congruence for federal elections (\bar{X} FF-FS = 37.5). In other words, we gain insight into the causes underlying denationalization of the vote. Is denationalization (decreasing party system congruence FF-SS) triggered primarily by voters switching votes between federal and state elections (dual voting; decreasing election congruence FS-SS) or simply by wider inter-state variations in voting patterns for federal elections (decreasing electorate congruence FF-FS)?

Electorate congruence for federal (FF-FS) and state elections (SF-SS) informs us about the extent to which the vote differs across the states. These two indicators closely resemble the party nationalization measurements (respectively PNSS-F and PNSS-S) with one important exception. The unit of analysis is the state for the congruence measures whereas it is the party for the party nationalization scores. The congruence measures reveal insight into the question which state electorates tend to vote differently whereas party nationalization scores inform us about which parties are differently favoured across the territory.

Comparing federal to state elections

In many federal countries –including India- state elections are held at a different date than federal and other state elections. Apart from electorate congruence for federal elections (FF-FS) and party nationalisation scores applied to federal elections (PNSS-F), our indicators of party and state nationalization contrast federal to state election outcomes. Hence, the question arises which elections should be compared to each other?

There was vertical and horizontal simultaneity for the federal elections of 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967 which poses no problem in comparing the federal vote to the state vote. For elections post 1967 we take a federal election and we match it to state elections held closest in time either before or after the federal election. The federal elections of 1971 and 2014 are exceptions to this rule. State and general elections were de-coupled in 1971 and we compare the federal election of 1971 to state elections which are held later. Our analysis stops with the federal election of 2014 and we compare these results with previously or simultaneously held state elections. The table below shows which elections are compared when calculating scores on our indicators of party and state nationalization.

Table A1: Comparison of federal and state elections in India underlying the congruence measures

FEDERAL	10/1971	03/1977	06/1980	12/1984	11/1989	05/1991	05/1996	03/1998	10/1999	05/2004	05/2009	04/2014
Andhra Pradesh	03/1972	02/1978	02/1978	05/1985	11/1989	11/1989	12/1994	09/1999	09/1999	04/2004	04/2009	04/2014
Arunachal Pradesh	—	02/1978	03/1980	12/1984	02/1990	02/1990	03/1995	10/1999	10/1999	10/2004	10/2009	04/2014
Assam	03/1972	02/1978	02/1978	12/1985	05/1991	05/1991	04/1996	04/1996	05/2001	04/2006	04/2011	04/2011
Bihar	03/1972	10/1977	05/1980	05/1985	02/1990	02/1990	03/1995	02/2000	02/2000	02/2005	11/2010	11/2010
Chhattisgarh	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12/2003	11/2008	11/2013
Delhi	03/1972	10/1977	10/1977	05/1983	06/1993	06/1993	11/1998	11/1998	11/1998	12/2003	11/2008	12/2013
Goa	03/1972	01/1977	03/1980	12/1984	11/1989	11/1989	11/1994	06/1999	06/1999	05/2002	06/2007	03/2012
Gujarat	03/1972	05/1975	05/1980	05/1985	02/1990	02/1990	02/1995	02/1998	02/1998	12/2002	12/2007	12/2012
Haryana	03/1972	10/1977	05/1982	06/1987	06/1987	05/1991	05/1996	05/1996	02/2000	02/2005	10/2009	10/2009
Himachal Pradesh;	03/1972	10/1977	05/1982	05/1985	02/1990	09/1993	02/1998	02/1998	02/1998	02/2003	12/2007	11/2012
Jammu and Kashmir	03/1972	06/1977	06/1977	05/1983	03/1987	—	09/1996	09/1996	10/2002	10/2002	12/2008	12/2008
Jharkhand	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	02/2005	12/2009	12/2009
Karnataka	03/1972	02/1978	02/1978	05/1985	11/1989	11/1989	11/1994	09/1999	09/1999	03/2004	05/2008	05/2013
Kerala	09/1970	03/1977	01/1980	03/1987	06/1991	06/1991	06/1996	06/1996	05/2001	05/2006	04/2011	04/2011
Madhya Pradesh	03/1972	10/1977	05/1980	02/1985	02/1990	02/1990	11/1993	11/1998	11/1998	12/2003	11/2008	11/2013
Maharashtra	03/1972	02/1978	05/1980	05/1985	02/1990	02/1990	02/1995	09/1999	09/1999	10/2004	10/2009	10/2009
Manipur	02/1972	02/1974	06/1980	05/1985	12/1990	12/1990	02/1995	02/2000	02/2000	02/2002	02/2007	01/2012
Meghalaya	03/1972	02/1978	02/1978	02/1983	02/1988	02/1993	02/1998	02/1998	02/1998	02/2003	03/2008	02/2013
Mizoram	04/1972	05/1978	04/1979	04/1984	11/1989	11/1989	11/1993	11/1998	11/1998	11/2003	12/2008	11/2013
Nagaland	02/1974	11/1977	11/1982	11/1982	11/1989	02/1993	02/1998	02/1998	02/1998	02/2003	03/2008	02/2013
Odisha	03/1971	10/1977	05/1980	05/1985	02/1990	02/1990	03/1995	02/2000	02/2000	04/2004	04/2009	04/2014
Pondicherry	02/1974	10/1977	03/1980	05/1985	02/1990	06/1991	04/1996	04/1996	05/2001	05/2006	04/2011	04/2011
Punjab	03/1972	10/1977	05/1980	09/1985	02/1992	02/1992	02/1997	02/1997	02/2002	02/2002	02/2007	01/2012
Rajasthan	03/1972	10/1977	05/1980	05/1985	02/1990	11/1993	11/1993	11/1998	11/1998	12/2003	12/2008	12/2013
Sikkim	—	12/1979	12/1979	05/1985	11/1989	11/1989	11/1994	10/1999	10/1999	05/2004	04/2009	04/2014
Tamil Nadu	03/1971	10/1977	05/1980	12/1984	01/1989	06/1991	02/1996	02/1996	05/2001	05/2006	04/2011	04/2011
Tripura	03/1972	12/1977	12/1977	05/1983	02/1988	02/1993	02/1998	02/1998	02/1998	02/2003	02/2008	02/2013
Uttarakhand	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	02/2002	02/2002	01/2012
Uttar Pradesh	02/1974	10/1977	05/1980	05/1985	11/1989	05/1991	09/1996	09/1996	02/2002	02/2002	05/2007	03/2012
West Bengal	03/1972	10/1977	05/1982	05/1987	06/1991	06/1991	07/1996	07/1996	05/2001	05/2006	05/2011	05/2011

