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A Retargetable System-Level DBT Hypervisor

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System-level Dynamic Binary Translation (DBT) provides the capability to boot an Operating System (OS) and execute programs compiled for an Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) different to that of the host machine. Due to their performance-critical nature, system-level DBT frameworks are typically hand-coded and heavily optimized, both for their guest and host architectures. While this results in good performance of the DBT system, engineering costs for supporting a new, or extending an existing architecture are high. In this paper we develop a novel, retargetable DBT hypervisor, which includes guest specific modules generated from high-level guest machine specifications. Our system simplifies retargeting of the DBT, but it also delivers performance levels in excess of existing manually created DBT solutions. We achieve this by combining offline and online optimizations, and exploiting the freedom of a Just-in-time (JIT) compiler operating in a bare-metal environment provided by a Virtual Machine (VM) hypervisor. We evaluate our DBT using both targeted micro-benchmarks as well as standard application benchmarks, and we demonstrate its ability to outperform the de-facto standard QEMU DBT system. Our system delivers an average speedup of 2.21× over QEMU across SPEC CPU2006 integer benchmarks running in a full-system Linux OS environment, compiled for the 64-bit ARMv8-A ISA and hosted on an x86-64 platform. For floating-point applications the speedup is even higher, reaching 6.49× on average. We demonstrate that our system-level DBT system significantly reduces the effort required to support a new ISA, while delivering outstanding performance.

CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Virtualization and security; • Hardware → Simulation and emulation; • Software and its engineering → Simulator / interpreter; Just-in-time compilers;

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Virtualization, Hypervisor, Dynamic Binary Translation

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1 INTRODUCTION

System-level DBT is a widely used technology that comes in many disguises: it powers the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) Emulator for mobile app development, provides backwards compatibility for games consoles [52], implements sandbox environments for hostile program analysis [41] and enables low-power processor implementations for popular ISAs [17]. All these applications require a complete and faithful, yet efficient implementation of a guest architecture, including privileged instructions and implementation-defined behaviors, architectural registers, virtual memory, memory-mapped I/O, and accurate exception and interrupt semantics.

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The broad range of applications has driven an equally broad range of system-level DBT implementations, ranging from manually retargetable open-source solutions such as QEMU [4] to highly specialized and hardware supported approaches designed for specific platforms, e.g. Transmeta Crusoe [17]. As a de-facto industry standard QEMU supports all major platforms and ISAs, however, retargeting of QEMU to a new guest architecture requires deep knowledge of its integrated Tiny Code Generator (TCG) as it involves manual implementation of guest instruction behaviors. Consequently, retargeting is time-consuming and error-prone: e.g. the official QEMU commit logs contain more than 90 entries to bugfixes related to its ARM model alone.

In this paper we present Captive, our novel system-level DBT hypervisor, where users are relieved of low-level implementation effort for retargeting. Instead users provide high-level architecture specifications similar to those provided by processor vendors in their ISA manuals. In an offline stage architecture specifications are processed, before an architecture-specific module for the online run-time is generated. Captive applies aggressive optimizations: it combines the offline optimizations of the architecture model with online optimizations performed within the generated JIT compiler, thus reducing the compilation overheads while providing high code quality. Furthermore, Captive operates in a virtual bare-metal environment provided by a VM hypervisor, which enables us to fully exploit the underlying host architecture, especially its system related and privileged features not accessible to other DBT systems operating as user processes.

The envisaged use of Captive is to provide software developers with early access to new platforms, possibly hosted in a cloud environment. To facilitate this goal, ease of retargetability is as important as delivering performance levels sufficient to drive substantial workloads, i.e. software development tool chains and user applications. Whilst we currently focus on a single-core implementation, the key ideas can be translated to multi-core architectures.

We evaluate the implementation of Captive using a 64-bit ARMv8-A guest model and an x86-64 host. From a description comprising just 8100 lines of code\(^1\) we generate a DBT hypervisor outperforming QEMU by a factor of 2.21× for SPEC CPU2006 integer applications, and up to 6.49× for floating-point workloads. This means Captive is capable of hosting a full and unmodified ARM Linux OS environment while delivering around 40% of the performance of a physical system.

\(^1\)Compared to 17766 LoC for QEMU’s ARM model plus a further 7948 LoC in their software floating-point implementation.
Fig. 2. x86 protection rings. Ring 0 is the most privileged (kernel mode), and ring 3 is the least privileged (user mode). QEMU operates in ring 3, whereas Captive takes advantage of a host VM to operate in ring 0 and ring 3. The hypervisor component operates outside the host virtual machine, in VMX root mode.

comprising a 2.0GHz server-type Cortex-A57 processor, when running on an Intel® Xeon® E5-1620 @ 3.5 GHz host machine.

1.1 Overview and Motivating Example

Figure 1 shows a high-level overview of Captive: an ARMv8-A² architecture description is processed by an offline tool to produce a platform-specific DBT module. Already at this stage optimizations are applied, which aid later JIT code generation. The software stack on the x86-64 host machine comprises a Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM)-based DBT hypervisor, operating on top of the host’s Linux OS. This provides a virtual bare-metal x86-64 Host Virtual Machine (HVM) in which Captive together with the previously generated DBT module and a minimal execution engine reside to provide the Guest Virtual Machine (GVM), which can boot and run an unmodified ARMv8-A Linux kernel image. Since the JIT compiler in our system-level DBT system operates in a bare-metal HVM it has full access to the virtual host’s resources and can generate code to exploit these resources.

For example, consider Figure 2. A conventional system-level DBT system hosted on an x86-64 architecture, e.g. QEMU, operates entirely as a user process in protection ring 3 on top of a host OS operating in ring 0. This means that any code generated by QEMU’s JIT compiler, either guest user or system code, also operates in the host’s ring 3, which restricts access to system features such as page tables. Such a system operating exclusively in ring 3 needs to provide software abstractions and protection mechanisms for guest operations, which modify guest system state. In contrast, Captive operates in VMX root mode, and provides a bare-metal HVM with rings 0-3. Our execution engine and DBT operate in the virtual machine’s ring 0, and track the guest system’s mode. This enables us to generate code operating in ring 0, for guest system code, and ring 3, for guest user code. This means we can use the HVM’s hardware protection features to efficiently implement memory protection or allow the hypervisor to modify the HVM’s page tables in order to directly map the GVM’s virtual address space onto host physical memory.

Porting to a different host architecture can be accomplished by utilising similar features offered by that architecture, e.g. Arm offers virtualization extensions that are fully supported by KVM, and privilege levels PL0 and PL1, which are similar to x86’s ring 3 and ring 0, respectively. These similarities also enable our accelerated virtual memory system to work across platforms.

²Or any other guest architecture, e.g. RISC-V.
Table 1. Feature comparison of DBT systems. Brackets indicate partial support.

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1.2 Contributions

Captive shares many concepts with existing DBT systems, but it goes beyond and introduces unique new features. We provide a feature comparison in Table 1, and present further information on related work in Section 4. Among the contributions of this paper are:

1. We develop a generic system-level DBT framework, where the effort to support new guest platforms is reduced by using high-level architecture descriptions.
2. We use split compilation in a DBT, combining offline and online optimization to reduce pressure on the performance critical JIT compiler while maintaining code quality.
3. We pioneer a DBT approach where the integrated JIT compiler is part of a DBT hypervisor and can generate code that takes full advantage of this execution context.

Captive has been released as an open-source project, to enable community-driven development and independent performance evaluation.³

2 RETARGETABLE DBT HYPERVISOR

2.1 Overview

In this section, we describe the key concepts of Captive, which comprises two main components:

1. An offline generation component.
2. An online runtime component.

The offline phase involves describing the target machine architecture, and is discussed in Section 2.2. In this phase, modules for inclusion in the runtime component are generated. Complex architectural behaviour (such as the operation of the Memory Management Unit (MMU)) are described in regular source-code files, and compiled together with the generated source-code. The online runtime component is discussed in Section 2.3, and comprises a further two sub-components:

1. A user-mode application, which activates and configures a KVM Virtual Machine.
2. A unikernel that runs inside the KVM VM, and implements guest instruction translation and general guest machine execution.

³See https://gensim.org/simulators/captive
The DBT system itself runs inside a VM with no standard OS support. Normally, a virtual machine provides a bare-metal environment in which an OS is loaded, and then user applications are executed. We instead skip the OS entirely, and implement our DBT on the virtual bare-metal hardware. Whilst this adds complexity to the implementation of the DBT, it also allows the DBT to directly use host architectural features, without having to negotiate with an OS. This is in contrast to the majority of other system-level DBTs, which typically run as user-mode applications in an OS. The trade-off here is that Captive relies on KVM, reducing host operating system portability.

### 2.2 Offline Stage

#### 2.2.1 Architecture Description.
The guest machine architecture is described using a high-level Architecture Description Language (ADL) that defines instruction syntax (i.e. how to decode instructions) and instruction semantics (i.e. how to execute instructions). The ADL is also used to describe architectural features, such as the register file size and layout, word sizes, endianness, etc.

The ADL is based on a modified version of ArchC [1], and our offline generator tool processes the description into an intermediate form, performs some optimization and analysis, before finally producing modules for the DBT as output.

Instruction semantics (the functional behavior of guest machine instructions) are described in a high-level C-like language. This Domain Specific Language (DSL) allows the behavior of instructions to be specified easily and naturally, by, e.g. translating the pseudo-code found in architecture manuals into corresponding C-like code.

Figure 3 provides an example description of an add instruction that loads the value from two guest registers (lines 2 and 3), adds them together (line 4), then stores the result to another guest register (line 5). This example shows how a typical instruction might look, and how its behavior can be naturally expressed. Of course, this is a simple example: most ‘real-world’ instruction descriptions contain branching paths to select specific instruction variants (e.g., flag-setting or not), more complex calculations, and floating point and vector operations, all of which can be handled by the ADL.

#### 2.2.2 Intermediate SSA Form.
During the offline phase, instruction behavior descriptions are translated into a domain-specific Static Single Assignment (SSA) form, and aggressively optimized. The optimization passes used have been selected based on common idioms in instruction descriptions. For example, very few loop-based optimizations are performed, since most individual instructions do not contain loops. Optimizing the model at the offline stage makes any simplifications utilized by the designer in the description less of a performance factor in the resulting code.

The domain-specific SSA contains operations for reading architectural registers, performing standard arithmetic operations on values of integral, floating-point and vector types, memory and peripheral device access and communication, and a variety of built-in functions for common architectural behaviors (such as flag calculations and floating point NaN/Infinity comparisons).
Additionally, meta-information about the SSA is held, indicating whether each operation is *fixed* or *dynamic*. Fixed operations are evaluated at instruction translation time, whereas dynamic operations must be executed at instruction run-time. For example, the calculation of a constant value, or control flow based on instruction fields is *fixed*, but computations which depend on register or memory values are *dynamic* [46]. Fixed operations can produce dynamic values, but dynamic operations must be executed as part of instruction emulation.

In the example shown in Figure 3, the SSA instruction `struct` on line 3 produces a *fixed* value, because it accesses a field in the decoded instruction. This value is known at instruction translation time because it comes directly from the raw instruction word itself, and so the result of this can be used as a constant throughout the translation. Conversely, the SSA instruction `bankregread` on line 4 produces a *dynamic* value, because it reads the value of a guest register; an operation which is part of the instruction’s *runtime* behavior.

Figure 4 shows the direct translation of the instruction behavior (from Figure 3) into corresponding SSA form. A series of optimizations (given in Figure 5) are then applied to this SSA, until a fixed-point is reached. Figure 6 shows the optimized form of the SSA.
bool generator::translate_add (const test_decode_test_F1& insn, dbt_emitter& emitter) {
    basic_block * __exit_block = emitter.create_block ();
    goto fixed_block_b_0;
    fixed_block_b_0: {
        auto s_b_0_1 = emitter.load_register (emitter.const_u32 ((uint32_t) (256 + (16 * insn.a))),
            dbt_types::u64);
        auto s_b_0_3 = emitter.load_register (emitter.const_u32 ((uint32_t) (256 + (16 * insn.b))),
            dbt_types::u64);
        auto s_b_0_4 = emitter.add (s_b_0_1, s_b_0_3);
        emitter.store_register (emitter.const_u32 ((uint32_t) (0 + (8 * insn.a))), s_b_0_4);
        goto fixed_done;
        fixed_done: 
    }
    if (!insn.end_of_block) emitter.inc_pc (emitter.const_u8 (4));
    return true;
}

Fig. 7. Generator function produced from ADL code shown in Figure 3. The emitter object is the invocation DAG builder, and method calls on this object add nodes to the DAG.

The offline optimizations allow the user to be expressive and verbose in their implementation of the model, whilst retaining a concise final representation of the user’s intent. For example, dead code elimination is necessary in the case where helper functions have been inlined, and subsequently subjected to constant propagation/folding, which eliminates a particular control-flow path through the function.

2.2.3 Generator Function. The domain-specific SSA itself is not used at runtime, but instead is used in the final offline stage to build simulator-specific generator functions. These functions are either compiled in, or dynamically loaded, by the DBT, and are invoked at JIT compilation time. The generator functions call into the DBT backend, which produces host machine code. When an instruction is to be translated by the DBT, the corresponding generator function is invoked.

Figure 7 shows the corresponding generator function, produced from the optimized SSA form in Figure 6. The generator function is clearly machine generated, but *host* compiler optimizations (in the offline stage) will take care of any inefficiencies in the output source-code. Additionally (and not shown for brevity) the offline stage generates source-code comments, to assist in debugging.

2.3 Online Stage

![Online flow including decoder, translator, register allocation and instruction encoder.](image)

The online stage of Captive involves the actual creation and running of the guest virtual machine. This takes the form of a KVM-based DBT hypervisor, which instantiates an empty *host virtual machine*, which then loads the *execution engine* (a small, specialized unikernel) that implements the DBT. The KVM-based portion of the hypervisor also includes software emulations of guest architectural devices (such as the interrupt controller, UARTs, etc). The DBT comprises four main phases, as shown in Figure 8: *Instruction Decoding*, *Translation*, *Register Allocation*, and finally *Instruction Encoding*. 

Fig. 9. Example Arm assembly, and the corresponding (uncollapsed) DAG built during translation. Nodes (a), (b), (c), and (d) have runtime side effects, causing the emission of low-level IR based on the tree rooted at that node.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ENTRY} & \quad \text{STORE} \quad \text{add} \ x0, \ x0, \ #1 \\
\text{ENTRY} & \quad \text{STORE} \quad \text{mov} \ x1, \ x0 \\
\text{ENTRY} & \quad \text{STORE} \quad \text{bl} \ 0x100c \\
\text{EXIT} & \quad \text{STORE} \quad \text{add} \ x0, \ x0, \ #1 \\
\text{ENTRY} & \quad \text{STORE} \quad \text{mov} \ x1, \ x0 \\
\text{ENTRY} & \quad \text{STORE} \quad \text{bl} \ 0x100c \\
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 10. As each node with side-effects is inserted into the DAG, low-level IR is emitted that implements that node. This IR represents host instructions, but with virtual registers instead of physical registers.

2.3.1 Instruction Decoding. The first phase in our execution pipeline is the instruction decoder, which will decode one guest basic block’s worth of instructions at a time. The decoder routines are automatically generated from the architecture description during the offline stage, utilizing techniques such as Krishna and Austin [27], Theiling [43].

2.3.2 Translation. During the translation phase, a generator function (that was created in the offline stage) is invoked for each decoded instruction. The generator function calls into an invocation Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) builder, which builds a DAG representing the data-flow and control-flow of the instruction under translation. Operations (represented by nodes in the DAG) that have runtime side effects (i.e. those that mutate the state of the guest processor) result in the collapse of the DAG at that point, and the emission of low-level Intermediate Representation (IR) instructions representing the collapsed nodes. An example of this is shown in Figure 9.

A node with runtime side effects is one through which control-flow cannot proceed without the state of the guest being mutated in some way. For example, a STORE node is considered to have side-effects, as the guest machine register file has been changed. In general, every guest instruction will have a side-effect (even guest NOP instructions) because part of their behavior will be to advance the program counter.

During emission, the tree rooted at that node is traversed, emitting IR for the operations required to produce the input values for that node. This feed-forward technique removes the need to build an entire tree then traverse it later. Collapsing nodes immediately to IR improves the performance of the DBT, as instructions are generated as soon as possible.
This strategy enables high-level operations to take place on transparent values, and implements a weak form of tree pattern matching on demand. When a node is collapsed, specializations can be made depending on how the tree is formed at the node. For example, the STORE node ((d) in Figure 9) that updates the PC by incrementing its value, can be emitted as a single x86 instruction. Instruction selection also takes place at this level, where the generator can utilize host instructions, such as fused-multiply-add when available.

In the case of an x86 host machine, the low-level IR is effectively x86 machine instructions, but with virtual register operands in place of physical registers, as shown in Figure 10. For other host machines, the IR is similar.

2.3.3 Register Allocation. After the low-level IR has been produced by the translation phase, the register allocator makes a forward pass over these instructions to discover live ranges, and then a backward pass to split live ranges into live intervals. During live-range splitting, host machine registers are allocated to virtual registers, and conflicts are resolved. Whilst not producing an optimal solution, the register allocator is fast. The allocator also marks dead instructions, so that at encoding time those instructions are ignored. Our register allocation algorithm is similar to the simplified graph-coloring scheme from Cai et al. [9], but with additional dead code elimination.

2.3.4 Instruction Encoding. After register allocation is complete, the low-level intermediate form of instructions can be directly lowered into machine code. The list of instructions is traversed for a final time, and the machine code is generated directly from the instruction’s meta-data, into a code buffer. Any instructions that were classified as dead during register allocation are skipped.

Once machine code emission is completed, a final pass is made to apply patches to relative jump instructions, as this value is only known once each instruction has been emitted, and therefore sized.

2.4 Exploiting Host Architectural Features

System-level DBT naturally involves emulating a range of guest architectural components, most notably the MMU. Traditionally, this emulation is performed in software, where each memory access must perform an address translation that takes a virtual address, and translates it via the guest page tables to a corresponding guest physical address. In Qemu, a cache is used to accelerate this translation, but in Captive we utilize the host MMU directly by mapping guest page table entries to equivalent host page table entries. This reduces the overhead of memory access instructions significantly, as we do not need to perform cache look-ups, and can work with the guest virtual address directly. Larger guest page sizes are supported by the host MMU directly, as multiple host pages can represent a single larger guest page. In the case of smaller guest pages, we must emulate memory accesses carefully to ensure permissions within a page are not violated. By default, we support a software-based approach where additional checks are made in translated code. However, this increases the runtime overhead, and is unavoidable without additional techniques or hardware support. We intend to investigate Intel EPT-based subpage write-protection support, to mitigate this overhead in certain cases. In general, Captive supports an \( n : m \) mapping between guest and host page sizes, where \( n, m \) are powers of 2.

This technique is not possible with a DBT that runs in user-mode, as the OS retains control of the host MMU page tables (although attempts have been made to emulate this by using the \texttt{mmap} system call [51]). However, with Captive, we are operating in a bare-metal environment (see Figure 1), and are able to configure the host architecture in any way we want. By tracking the protection ring of the guest machine, and executing the translated guest code in the corresponding host protection ring, we can take advantage of the host system’s memory protection mechanism, for efficient implementation of guest memory protection.
We also take advantage of the x86 software interrupt mechanism (invoked using the `int` instruction), the x86 port-based I/O instructions (`in` and `out`), and the x86 fast system call instructions (`syscall` and `sysret`). These features are used to accelerate implementations of instructions that require additional non-trivial behaviors, e.g. accessing co-processors, manipulation of page tables, flushing Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs), and other operations specific to system-level DBT.

### 2.5 Floating Point/SIMD Support

In order to reduce JIT complexity, QEMU uses a software floating-point implementation, where helper methods are used to implement floating-point operations. This results in the emission of a function call as part of the instruction execution, adding significant overhead to the emulation of these instructions. Figure 11 gives an example of two ARM floating-point instructions, which are translated by QEMU to the x86 code in Figure 12, and by Captive to the code in Figure 13. Whilst QEMU implements the `fmov` directly (lines 1–3), in much the same way as Captive, QEMU issues a function call for the floating-point multiplication (`fmul`). In contrast, Captive emits a host floating-point multiplication instruction, which operates directly on the guest register file.

Not all floating-point operations are trivial, however. Notably, there are significant differences with the way floating-point flags, NaNs, rounding modes, and infinities are handled by the underlying architecture, and in some cases this incompatibility between floating-point implementations

---

**Fig. 11. Arm floating-point input assembly**

```
1:10 T. Spink et al.

1: fmov d0, #1.5 ; Store constant 1.5 in d0
2: fmul d0, d1, d2 ; Multiply d1 with d2, and store in d0
```

**Fig. 12. Qemu output assembly for the instruction sequence in Figure 11.**

```
1: movabs $0x3ff8000000000000,%rbp ; Store const FP value
2: mov %rbp, 0x8c0(%r14) ; of 1.5 in guest
3: movq $0, 0x8c8(%r14) ; register file.
4: lea 0x8d0(%r14), %rbp
5: mov %rspb, %rdi
6: mov $0x3bd, %esi
7: xor %edx, %edx
8: callq 0x55d337b70220 ; call gvec_dup8 helper
9: lea 0x2b68(%r14), %rbp ; Prepare arguments for
10: mov 0x9c0(%r14), %rbx ; invocation of FP
11: mov 0xac0(%r14), %r12 ; multiply helper
12: mov %rbx, %rdi ; function.
13: mov %r12, %rsi
14: mov %rbp, %rdx
15: callq 0x55d337bd0050 ; Invoke helper
16: movq $0, 0x8c8(%r14) ; Store result in
17: movq $0, 0x8c0(%r14) ; guest register file.
```

**Fig. 13. Captive output assembly for the instruction sequence in Figure 11.**

```
1: movabs $0x3ff8000000000000,%rax ; Generate constant FP value of 1.5
2: mov %rax,0x100(%rbp) ; Store into guest register file
3: movq $0x0,0x108(%rbp) ; Increment PC
4: add $0x4,%r15 ; Increment PC
5: movq $0x10(%rbp),%xmm0 ; Load the FP multiply operand from guest register.
6: mulsd 0x120(%rbp),%xmm0 ; Perform multiplication directly on another guest register.
7: movq %xmm0,0x100(%rbp) ; Store the result back to the register file.
8: movq $0x0,0x108(%rbp)
9: add $0x4,%r15 ; Increment PC
```

Table 2. Differences in behavior between the x86 and Arm-v8 square-root instructions. Both instructions compute the square-root of a 64-bit double precision floating point, but differ in the way the sign-bit for NaNs is computed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>x86 (SQRTSD)</th>
<th>Arm-v8 (FSQRT)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−0.0</td>
<td>−0.0</td>
<td>−0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∞</td>
<td>∞</td>
<td>∞</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−∞</td>
<td>NaN</td>
<td>NaN</td>
<td>Sign-bit differs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−0.5</td>
<td>NaN</td>
<td>NaN</td>
<td>Sign-bit differs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NaN</td>
<td>NaN</td>
<td>NaN</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−NaN</td>
<td>−NaN</td>
<td>−NaN</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Differences in behavior between the x86 and Arm-v8 square-root instructions. Both instructions compute the square-root of a 64-bit double precision floating point, but differ in the way the sign-bit for NaNs is computed.

needs to be accounted for. In these cases, Captive emits fix-up code that will ensure the guest machine state is bit-accurate with how the guest machine would normally operate. Captive only supports situations where the host machine is at least as precise as the guest. This is the most common scenario for our use cases, but in the event of a precision mismatch, we can either (a) use the x86 80-bit FPU (to access additional precision), or (b) utilise a software floating-point library.

A particular example of where a fix-up is required is shown in Table 2. This figure shows the behavior of both the x86 and Arm-v8 square-root instructions when given a particular input. The difference arises in the sign-bit of the NaN returned, when the instruction encounters a negative input. In x86, the SQRTSD instruction will return a negative NaN when taking the square root of a negative number (or negative infinity), but on Arm-v8, the corresponding FSQRT instruction will return a positive NaN in the same situation.

The majority of the time, the emulation can be performed one-to-one, with a host x86 instruction directly emulating the behavior of a guest Arm instruction. However, to maintain bit compatibility, the output needs to be fixed-up when encountering the corner-cases.

Like QEMU, Captive emits Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions when translating a guest vector instruction, however QEMU’s support is restricted to integer and bit-wise vector operations whereas Captive more aggressively utilizes host SIMD support, extending it to floating-point operations.

2.6 Translated Code Management

Captive employs a code cache, similar to QEMU, which maintains the translated code sequences. The key difference is that we index our translations by guest physical address, while QEMU indexes by guest virtual address. The consequence of this is that our translations are retained and re-used for longer, whereas QEMU must invalidate all translations when the guest page tables are changed. In contrast, we only invalidate translations when self-modifying code is detected. We utilize our ability to write-protect virtual pages to efficiently detect when a guest memory write may modify translated code, and hence invalidate translations only when necessary. A further benefit is that translated code is re-used across different virtual mappings to the same physical address, e.g. when using shared libraries.

2.7 Virtual Memory Management

2.7.1 Address Translation. System-level DBT necessarily requires virtualizing the guest MMU, and as such complicates the emulation of guest memory access instructions. In particular, when
executing an instruction that accesses guest memory, the guest virtual address must be translated into a corresponding guest physical address, which is then used to access the emulated guest memory through a host virtual address. Figure 14 shows how a guest virtual address eventually accesses the emulated physical memory, in a typical system-level DBT.

Translating a guest virtual address to a guest physical address typically requires traversing guest page tables, and evaluating any memory access permissions (e.g. read-only, supervisor-only). This is a costly operation, since multiple indirect memory accesses must be made, along with the actual checking of the access permissions. Performing such a translation on each memory access is clearly sub-optimal, so hardware implementations of MMUs include specialized components to perform this lookup. They also generally include TLBs to cache the results for faster subsequent accesses, however software implementations are restricted to implementing this behavior in software.

2.7.2 Address Translation in Existing DBTs. A popular approach (used in e.g. Qemu) to mitigate the performance penalty is to implement a software cache that behaves like a hardware TLB. When a guest instruction accesses memory, the guest virtual address is used to index a cache, which will (usually at guest page granularity) contain a pointer to the corresponding host virtual address. If the cache is empty, a full page table walk (utilizing a software implementation of the guest MMU) must be performed, to populate the cache. DBT systems can take advantage of the fact that physical hardware generally requires TLB flushes to notify processing units when their TLB caches have become invalid (e.g. due to a change in the underlying page tables). Intercepting such flushes enables the DBT to flush its own software TLB, thus maintaining functional correctness.

2.7.3 Address Translation in Captive. Since Captive has full control of a bare metal platform, it is free to configure the host virtual machine’s page tables as it wishes, and uses this to its advantage. DBT systems that operate in user-space do not have this freedom, as the host operating system is generally in charge of the page tables, and limits page table manipulation to system calls such as mmap and mprotect. But, inside the host VM, Captive can arbitrarily create host page table entries, and organize the virtual memory layout as it wishes.

Our approach to accelerating virtual memory accesses in the guest involves splitting the host virtual address space into two halves, and dedicating the lower-half to the guest machine, and the upper-half for use by Captive. On x86-64, the virtual address space is 48-bits (albeit accessed via 64-bit pointers), yielding effectively two 47-bit virtual address spaces. This configuration is shown in Figure 15.

The host virtual machine’s page tables are populated by taking corresponding guest page table entries, and turning them into equivalent host page table entries on demand. When a guest memory access occurs for the first time, an entry will not be present in the host page table. This will cause
Fig. 15. The physical memory of the host virtual machine contains the emulated guest physical memory regions, and the code and data segments of the Captive unikernel. The host page tables are set-up to map guest physical memory and runtime memory into the high virtual address space, and are updated on-demand to map guest physical memory pages into the low virtual address space.

Fig. 16. Captive utilises the MMU of the host virtual machine to translate guest virtual addresses directly to host physical addresses. If Second-level Address Translation (SLAT) is used (e.g. Intel EPT, or AMD NPT), the intermediate translation to host virtual address is bypassed.

a page fault, and Captive will handle the fault by performing a walk of the guest page tables. If an entry is found in the guest (and access permissions are satisfied), a corresponding entry is inserted in the host, and the memory operation is resumed. If an entry is not found, a page fault is propagated to the guest machine.

This approach enables guest memory access instructions to be implemented highly efficiently, as in some cases they can operate on unmodified guest virtual addresses, and so directly translate to a single host instruction. This particular situation is possible when virtualizing a 32-bit guest machine, on a 64-bit host machine, as the entire guest virtual address space fits within the lower-half of the host virtual address space. Figure 16 shows how the hardware MMU takes charge of translating a guest virtual address to a host physical address, in contrast to a software-based approach shown in Figure 14.

Second-level Address Translation (SLAT) is a hardware virtualization feature implemented in most processors that directly maps guest physical addresses to host physical addresses, removing the need for an additional translation between guest physical and host virtual addresses. This feature takes the form of a second set of page tables, which map virtualized guest physical addresses
to host physical addresses. This feature is generally always enabled when available on the host system (as it is supported in KVM), and thus Captive benefits from this acceleration.

2.7.4 Changes to Guest Page Tables. If the guest machine changes its page tables, then it is required to issue a TLB flush instruction. Like the software-based approach, we intercept the TLB flush, and use it to invalidate the page table entries on the host machine. On x86-64 hosts, this is an efficient operation, as we only need to invalidate the first 256 entries on the top-level page table (the PML4), and flush the host TLB. This invalidation involves clearing the present bit of the page table entry.

Any subsequent memory accesses will now cause a page fault, and hence resume the host page table population logic, based on the new guest page tables.

2.7.5 Virtual Address Space Sizes. Although the described technique works well for guest machines with virtual address space sizes of 47-bits or fewer (e.g. 32-bit guest platforms), this requires extra work for address space sizes greater than 47-bits (e.g. 64-bit guest platforms).

In the 32-bit case, guest memory access instructions can be implemented by a single host memory access instruction, since the guest virtual address does not need to be modified, however, in the 64-bit case, an unmodified guest virtual address could reference parts of the host address space that either do not exist, or are reserved for Captive.

Our approach is to insert additional checking on a guest memory access, to determine whether or not the guest virtual address extends beyond the host virtual address space split.

If this situation occurs, the host page tables are switched to a different set of tables that correspond to the higher virtual address mapping, and the guest virtual address is masked before the memory instruction continues to keep it in the lower half of the address space.

This approach unfortunately incurs the cost of a host TLB flush when switching page tables between the lower and upper address space mapping, which could be quite expensive if a series of memory access instructions alternate between address spaces.

In practice, this situation is rare due to the way operating systems normally arrange their virtual memory spaces, but the problem can actually be ameliorated by utilising Process Context Identifiers (PCIDs). PCIDs were designed to prevent page table switches from having a performance impact on the system when context switching between processes. Each entry inserted into the TLB would be tagged with the current process ID, and would remain resident in the TLB across context switches (unless overwritten due to aliasing).

We can exploit this hardware feature by treating the lower half and upper half address space mappings as separate “processes”, instead of performing a full TLB flush when switching address spaces, we instead only switch the current process ID, allowing existing entries from the previous address space to remain resident in the TLB.

2.7.6 Memory Access Widths. In general, normal memory accesses can be directly emulated as access sizes a typically consistent across architectures (e.g. 8-bit, 16-bit, 32-bit, 64-bit, etc). Even larger accesses (e.g. 128-bit) can usually be emulated directly, as such host architecture support normally exists.

However, for guest memory accesses that have larger access widths (a notable example being Arm-v8 load-pair, or load-element instructions), multiple accesses must be made.

3 EVALUATION
Performance comparisons in the DBT space are difficult: most of the existing systems are not publicly available, and insufficient information is provided to reconstruct these systems from scratch. Furthermore, results published in the literature often make use of different guest/host
architecture pairs and differ in supported features, which prohibit meaningful relative performance comparisons. For example, Harmonia [31] achieves a similar speedup of 2.2 over QEMU, but this is for user-level DBT of a 32-bit guest on a 64-bit host system whereas we achieve a speedup of 2.2 over QEMU for the harder problem of system-level DBT of a 64-bit guest onto a 64-bit host system. For this reason we evaluate Captive against the widely used QEMU DBT as a baseline, supported by targeted micro-benchmarks and comparisons to physical platforms.

3.1 Experimental Set-up

While we support a number of guest architectures, we choose to evaluate Captive using an ARMv8-A guest and an x86-64 host. We conducted the following experiments on the host machine described in Table 3, and performed our comparison to native architectures on a Raspberry PI 3B, and an AMD Opteron A1100 (Table 4). We utilized both the integer and C++ floating-point benchmarks from SPEC CPU2006. Our comparisons to QEMU were made with version 2.12.1.

3.2 Application Benchmarks

We have evaluated the performance of Captive and QEMU using the standard SPEC2006 benchmark suite with the Reference data set. As can be seen in Figure 17, we obtain significant speedups in most Integer benchmarks, with a geometric mean speedup of 2.2×. The two benchmarks where

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4 Additional RISC-V and x86 models will be released together with Captive.
we experience a slow-down are 456. hmmer and 462. libquantum, which can be attributed to suboptimal register allocation in hot code. Figure 18 shows the speed up of Captive over QEMU on the C++ Floating Point portion of the benchmark suite. Here we obtain a geometric mean speedup of 6.49×. This large speedup can mainly be attributed to QEMU’s use of a software floating point implementation, while we use the host FPU and vector units directly.

3.3 Additional Guest Architectures
We also have descriptions in our ADL for other guest architectures, detailed in Table 5. However, with the exception of ARMv7-A, these implementations currently lack full-system support. This is due to the sheer amount of (non-trivial) work necessary to implement system-level functionality (e.g. the MMU behavior, system instructions, interrupt/exception handling protocols, etc). For the ARMv7-A case, we have observed similar average speed-ups of 2.5×, and up to 6× across the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite using Captive.

3.4 JIT Compilation Performance
Captive is on average 2.6× slower at translating guest basic blocks than QEMU. This is due in part to the more aggressive online optimizations we perform, but additionally QEMU’s DBT has had years of hand-tuning, and benefits from a monolithic implementation.
Table 5. Architectures currently supported by Captive, and the architecture-specific challenges that required special attention for implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMv8-A</td>
<td>64-bit guest on 64-bit host emulation</td>
<td>Additional techniques for MMU emulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMv7-A</td>
<td>If-then-else blocks, possibly spanning page boundaries</td>
<td>Complex control-flow handling in the JIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x86-64</td>
<td>Complex instruction encoding, requiring stateful decoder</td>
<td>Use of an external decoder library [23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISC-V</td>
<td>No significant challenges</td>
<td>None required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI TMS320C6x DSP</td>
<td>VLIW instructions, nested branch delay slots</td>
<td>Extensions to decoder generator, control-flow recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm Mali-G71 GPU</td>
<td>Complex instruction bundle headers</td>
<td>External &quot;pre&quot;-decoder for bundle headers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 20. % time spent in each compilation phase: Decode, Translate, Register Allocation and Encode.

However, the previous results clearly indicate that our compilation latency does not affect the runtime of the benchmarks. In fact, the extra effort we put into compilation ensures that our code quality surpasses that of QEMU’s, as will be demonstrated in Section 3.6. Figure 19 shows that indeed, when using the SimBench micro-benchmark suite [47], the Large-Blocks and Small-Blocks benchmark indicate that our code generation speed is 65% and 85% slower, respectively. These benchmarks are described in Section 3.5.

Figure 20 provides a further breakdown of the time spent for JIT compilation: instruction translation (including invocation DAG generation and instruction selection) takes up more than 50% of the total JIT compilation time, followed by register allocation (including liveness analysis and dead code elimination), then host instruction encoding. Guest instruction decoding takes up 2.75% of the compilation pipeline.

We have also collected aggregate translation size statistics for 429.mcf. We found that Captive generates larger code than QEMU, with Captive generating 67.53 bytes of host code per guest instruction, compared to QEMU’s 40.26 bytes. This is due the use of vector operations in the benchmarks: while QEMU frequently emits (relatively small) function calls for these operations, Captive emits vector operations directly. In particular, vector load and store operations require that vectors are packed and unpacked element by element, each of which can require 2–3 instructions.
3.5 Targeted Micro-Benchmarks

As well as using the SPEC benchmark suite, we have also evaluated the performance of both Captive and QEMU using SimBench[47]. This is a targeted suite of micro-benchmarks designed to analyze the performance of full system emulation platforms in a number of categories, such as the performance of the memory emulation system, control flow handling, and translation speed (in the case of DBT-based systems).

Figure 19 shows the results of running SimBench on Captive and QEMU, in terms of speedup over QEMU. Captive outperforms QEMU in most categories, except for code generation (Large-Blocks and Small-Blocks) and Data Fault handling. Captive’s use of the host memory management systems results in large speedups on the memory benchmarks, but when confronted with the Data Fault benchmark exhibits a slow-down. This particular benchmark repeatedly accesses a memory location that is unmapped, triggering a page fault in the guest. Due to the manner in which Captive’s infrastructure handles page faults, and the book-keeping required to figure out which virtual address caused the fault, the overhead leads to a slow-down when compared to QEMU. Although we hope to address this performance impact in future work on the memory-management subsystem, we acknowledge that this benchmark’s behavior is not a typical workload.

3.6 Code Quality

We assess code quality by measuring the individual basic block execution time for each block executed as part of a benchmark. For example, consider the scatter plot in Figure 21, where we show the measured aggregated block execution times across the 429.mcf benchmark for Captive and QEMU. In order to limit the influence of infrastructure components of both platforms we have disabled block chaining for both platforms. Block execution times have been measured in the same way for both systems using the host’s rdtscp instruction, inserted around generated native code regions representing a guest block.

A regression line and 1:1 line are also plotted in the log-log scale plot. Most points are above the 1:1 line, indicating that the vast majority of blocks are executed more quickly on Captive than on QEMU. In fact, we observe a code quality related speedup of 3.44 for this benchmark, represented by the positive shift of the regression line along the y-axis.

Further investigation reveals that Captive emits and executes, on average, 10 host instructions per guest instruction in addition to any block prologue and epilogue.

3.6.1 Impact of offline optimizations. Our offline generation system has four levels of optimization (01–04), although in practice we only use the maximum optimization level. These optimizations directly affect the amount of source code generated in the offline phase, where lower levels (e.g. 01) emit longer code sequences in the generator functions. This translates to more operations to perform at JIT compilation time, and therefore (a) larger JIT compilation latency, and (b) poorer code quality.

At the 01 optimization level, only function inlining is performed, and results in the ARMv8A model comprising 271,299 lines of generated code. At 04 (where a series of aggressive domain specific optimizations are performed), there is a reduction of 56%, to 120,162 lines of generated code.

3.6.2 Hardware Floating-point Emulation. In contrast to QEMU, Captive utilises a hardware emulated floating-point approach, where guest floating-point instructions are directly mapped to corresponding host floating-point instructions, if appropriate. Any fix-ups required to maintain bit-accuracy are performed inline, rather than calling out to helper functions. This increases the complexity of host portability, but significantly improves performance.
Table 6. Related Work: Feature comparison of existing DBT systems.

Table 7. Related Work: Individual compilation techniques for Binary Translation systems.
To determine the effect of this, we utilised a microbenchmark that exercised a small subset of (common) floating-point operations, and observed a speed-up of $2.17 \times$ of Captive (with hardware floating-point emulation) over QEMU (with software floating-point emulation). We then replaced our DBT’s floating-point implementation with a software-based one (taken directly from the QEMU source-code), and observed a speed-up of $1.68 \times$. This translates to a speed-up of $1.3 \times$ within Captive itself.

### 3.7 Comparison to Native Execution

We also compare the performance of Captive against two ARMv8-A hardware platforms: a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B and an AMD Opteron A1170 based server (see Table 4). The results of this comparison can be seen in Figure 22 and enable us to compare absolute performance levels in relation to physical platforms: across the entire SPEC CPU2006 suite Captive is about twice as fast as a 1.2GHz Cortex-A53 core of a Raspberry Pi 3, and achieves about 40% of the performance of a 2.0GHz Cortex-A57 core of the A1170. While outperformed by server processors it indicates that Captive can deliver performance sufficient for complex applications.

Finally, we compare the performance of Captive against native execution of the benchmarks compiled for and directly executed on the x86-64 host. Across all benchmarks we observe a speedup of 7.24 of native execution over system-level DBT, i.e. the overhead is still substantial, but Captive has significantly narrowed the performance gap between native execution, and system-level DBT.
4 RELATED WORK

Due to their versatility DBT systems have found extensive interest in the academic community, especially since the mid-90s. In Table 6 we compare features and highlight specific contributions of many relevant DBT systems and techniques presented in the academic literature. The vast majority of existing DBT systems only provide support for user-level applications, but there also exist a number of system-level DBT approaches to which we compare Captive. In addition, numerous individual compilation techniques have been developed specifically for binary translators. Those relevant to our work on Captive are summarized in Table 7.

Captive is inspired by existing system-level DBT systems and we have adopted proven features while developing novel. Like Shade [13], Embra [53], and QEMU [4] Captive is interpreter-less and uses a basic block compiler with block chaining and trace caching. Our binary translator, however, is not hand-coded, but generated from a machine description. This allows for ease-of-retargeting comparable to Pydgin [29], but at substantially higher performance levels. Unlike Walkabout [12], Yirr-Ma [44], or ISAMAP [38], which similarly rely on machine descriptions, Captive employs split compilation and applies several optimizations offline, i.e. at module generation time, rather than relying on expensive runtime optimizations only. Instead of software emulation of floating-point (FP) arithmetic like QEMU or unsafe FP implementation like HQEMU [21], our FP implementation is bit-accurate, but still leverages the host system’s FP capabilities wherever possible. Similar to IA-32 EL [28, 54] Captive translates guest SIMD instructions to host SIMD instructions wherever possible, but this mapping is generalized for any guest/host architecture pair. Like QuickTransit [26] or HyperMAMBO [15] Captive operates as a hypervisor, but provides a full-system environment rather than hosting only a single application. Captive shares this property with MagiXen [10], but provides full support for 64-bit guests on a 64-bit host rather than only 32-bit guests on a 64-bit host (which avoids address space mapping challenges introduced by same word-size system-level DBT).

5 SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

In this paper we developed a novel system-level DBT hypervisor, which can be retargeted to new guest systems using a high-level ADL. We combine offline and online optimizations as well as a JIT compiler operating in a virtual bare-metal environment with full access to the virtual host processor to deliver performance exceeding that of conventional, manually optimized DBT systems operating as normal user processes. We demonstrate this using an ARMv8-A guest running a full unmodified ARM Linux environment on an x86-64 host, where Captive outperforms the popular QEMU DBT across SPEC CPU2006 application benchmarks while on average reaching 2× the performance of a 1.2GHz entry-level Cortex-A53 or 40% of a 2.0GHz server-type Cortex-A57.

5.1 Future Work

Our future work will consider support for multi- and many-core architectures, heterogeneous platforms, and support for various ISA extensions, e.g. for virtualization or secure enclaves, inside the virtualized guest system. We also plan to investigate possibilities for synthesizing guest and host architecture descriptions in the spirit of Buchwald et al. [8], or using existing formal specifications. We are also investigating a tiered compilation approach, to aggressively optimize hot code, and adding support for host retargeting, by using the same ADL as for our guest architectures.
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A Retargetable System-Level DBT Hypervisor


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