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Illuminating a State: State-Building and Electricity in Occupied Iraq

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Introduction

On April 9, 2003, Baghdad fell to the United States occupiers and their allies. The country soon became the subject of a massive occupation-led project of state-building. On May 16, a retired American ambassador, L. Paul Bremer III, signed the first regulation that established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, which he headed, as the entity that

shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development.¹

The transformative nature of the United States-led occupation took the form of state-building in which Iraq approximated a laboratory.² “Pure” hypothetical rules about how the state and economy are best designed were implemented as if the country existed in a controlled lab environment. Extreme measures were taken in the span of one year to reshape the political, governmental, and financial institutions. Sweeping CPA orders covered details of Iraqi life from taxes to the dissolution of state and government institutions and organizations, most infamously the armed forces.³ Projects, mostly carried by American private contractors, were launched to implement various elements of this radical vision.⁴

Bremer went on to sign a series of orders and regulations over the next thirteen months that aimed to help reshape Iraqi state, economic, and political institutions into a liberal democratic role model for the rest of the Middle East.⁵ However, the dream of a radical transformation quickly vanished. In August 2003, a violent insurgency erupted and began to spread across the country. Shortly after the transfer of sovereignty from the occupiers to an Iraqi interim government in June 2004, Iraq witnessed its first civil war since its establishment as a British League of Nations’ mandate in 1920. In the absence of strong state institutions and a functioning modern financial transactions system, political and criminal groups with access to cash and means of violence dominated Iraq’s economy.⁶ What started as a massive project of transformative state-building, aimed at the Iraqi state in 2003, instead contributed to

the emergence of a state later characterized by many state-building experts as fragile, and sometimes as failed.⁷ With the advancement of Sunni militias in capturing territories in northern and western Iraq in late June 2014, Iraq is currently facing renewed threats of civil war and possible partition.

This essay will not ask why the United States' project failed, or how it could have succeeded, or why it should not have been attempted to begin with. While these questions are important, they do not illuminate a fundamental problem of a current form of political engineering. Given its ambition and scale, the United States' project in Iraq is instead used in this essay to interrogate what the expertise of state-building means for our understanding of the "state" at a time when it is normal to think of the state as an object of measurement, management, design, and building. I answer this question by looking at how state-building experts conceived, implemented, and evaluated the reconstruction of the Iraqi electrical national grid.⁸

Limited Critique

The U.S. experience in Iraq was criticized for numerous reasons, but these critiques are all limited by the conceptual framework of state-building and thus are not able to offer an understanding of the performative nature of the state-building phenomenon.⁹ Thus the United States' project and its subsequent failure were dismissed as the outcomes of an imperialist project; an ambitious implementation of a universalist Liberal Peace paradigm; or as a failure that could have been avoided given better strategies or implementation policies.¹⁰ What these critiques have in common is their view of the object of intervention: a reified and abstracted notion of the "state." State-building literature carries similar understandings of their object of intervention, which will be elaborated upon later in this essay. Francis Fukuyama, a lead academic articulator of state-building, defines it as "the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones" in states that are weak, that is, have weak institutional capacities.¹¹ But by starting our investigation from the desired end result of state-building—a reified state—it becomes difficult to see how state-building, as a set of practices and expert knowledge, assembles its object and maintains it (successfully or not).

One way to understand forms of intervention as they took place in occupied Iraq is to follow formal procedures, institutional changes, and political negotiations over the new order.¹² However, by doing so, one overlooks two dimensions of the situation. First, such an inquiry starts from the presupposition that these interventions are external to the political field on which they act. Treating these interventions as external (either as an imposition or as welcome intervention—both distinctions are mostly normative) reifies their self-representation as a body of expertise that is autonomous from the subjects of intervention.

Second, these interventions do not simply occur at the levels of institutional and legal arrangements and political alliances; they also occur on material objects and abstracted representations. That is, they act on all aspects of the state's life: national narratives; legal, financial, security, and political institutions; and the material objects that make the state viable, such as buildings to house state functions, pipelines to feed the economy, weapons and barricades to protect "sovereignty," sewage systems to

maintain public health, paper to print currency on, and, among much else, an electrical grid to generate and carry an electrical current that illuminates spaces and powers economic and social activities.

I propose to begin from a site in which material objects, institutions, technologies, narratives, relations of violence, electrical currents, energy supplies, and expert knowledge are constantly assembled and maintained to help produce a new stately order: the electrical grid. Under the United States occupation (April 2003–June 2004), the electrical sector received the largest amount of reconstruction aid.¹³ Electricity was crucial not just for generating power to hospitals, business, street lights, and households but also for oil production—the country’s main source of income. The grid connected the country in a network of wires, transmitters, transformers, and generators through which electrical power was generated, moderated, and circulated. During the state-building process, experts had to replace and re-assemble parts of this power network and connect it to various forms of expertise, material objects, relations, narratives, and technologies that in turn were assembled together in the process of (re-)building the state. Before moving to the sites of assemblage, the following two sections will place state-building in a historical context as a form of political technology that has deep affinities with academic knowledge production.

The Emergence of State-Building

State building has a recent history that is connected with the United Nations (UN) peace-building strategies of the 1990s and their subsequent elaborations and articulations in developmental policies and academic writings. The emergence of this political technology and its sustainment over time was partly due to the circulation of experts and their ideas and methods of measuring states, predicting their failures, and managing them.

It should be noted that state-building is not synonymous with “state formation.” State formation evokes a historical mode of inquiry into political struggles that carved, negotiated, and continuously maintained and defined (always loosely) the parameters of states.¹⁴ In contrast, state-building is a technical term. Fukuyama’s definition is indicative of the technical manner in which this process is conceived of as a problem-solving or management technique: “The creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones,” in weak or failed states, which are considered the “root of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism.”¹⁵

During the 1990s, the remedy to failed states was articulated in a set of UN practices and policy documents that came to be known as “peace through democracy.” The early success of the UN mission in Namibia, which had an active role in setting national elections and securing a stable transition, “inspired a programmatic model of ‘peace through democracy.’” “Democracy as a political technology of peace-engineering” was elaborated in a policy document by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then the UN secretary general. The document, *Agenda for Democratization*, connected formal democratic institutions with peace and illustrated kinship with “a vulgarized ‘liberal peace’ theory.” “Liberal peace” is an idea that witnessed a post–Cold War revival. It “explicitly and elaborately theorized a causal connection between a particular kind of

domestic order [liberal democracy], and peace and cooperation between sovereign states.”¹⁶

The United States–led efforts in Iraq are seen by some as an exception to the recent history of state-building, which they view as emanating from and continuing to resemble the post–Cold War UN peace-building projects. Iraq, in this view, was an intervention on behalf of an interested external political power rather than one undertaken by the objective UN system. However, as argued by Wolfram Lacher, techniques used in Iraq resemble, albeit at extreme levels, many that are implemented in more ‘typical’ cases, particularly in the Balkans. More broadly,

there is a significant continuity underlying the rationale of post-conflict reconstruction now [post–Cold War] and then [Cold War]: that is, the transformation which the target state is to undergo aims at the reproduction of the international order. The state to be built is a response not primarily to domestic circumstances but to external exigencies ranging from security and economic considerations to general conceptions about the functions of state. Today, these conceptions can be summarized in the notion of liberal market democracy, providing us with a grid of intelligibility for the analysis of Iraq.¹⁷

As a form of intervention that is attached to a specific set of cultural and technical meanings and practices and reified in a clear term, state-building is therefore a relatively young innovation that began by circulating in academic and policy circles. The object of state-building is a fragile, weak, or a failed state (adjectives that describe levels of the same problem: lack of a strong state). These states, referred to in such terms, are different from the “weak states,” an analytical label that emerged in the 1980s in the discourse of the academic discipline of comparative politics to describe possible levels of autonomy in a state-society relationship.¹⁸ The context of the “fragile” and “failed” (sometimes also “weak,” though again, in a sense quite different from that the term had in comparative politics) states of the 1990s was a product of the post–Cold War conflicts. And such “fragile,” “failed,” or “weak” states were conceptualized academically in the discipline of international relations and legal scholarship circles rather than in comparative politics. Conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia in particular prompted the emergence of “failed states” as an organizing term that describes states that lost their capacity to prevent or stop violent internal conflicts that undermine the state’s monopoly over the means of violence. In other words, it is a “label that often describes countries at risk of civil conflict or already mired in conflict.”¹⁹ By the late 1990s, “the problem of failed states had become a core element—indeed, part of the organizing doctrine—of the U.S. national security strategy.”²⁰

That the transformative occupation of Iraq took the form of state-building should therefore be understood as emerging from a historical context in the 1990s in which the state had become an object of international intervention. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the “fragile” and “failed” states of the world then became the object of another, perhaps more intrusive, form of intervention: state-building. Like “peace through democracy,” state-building also considers the institutions of state as a basic unit of intervention. But, unlike peace through democracy, state-building carried a different

meaning and, thus, a different set of agendas. Before 9/11, “peripheral states with sovereignty deficits [were regarded in the United States and the north] as a humanitarian matter . . . This strategic calculus changed dramatically” after 9/11. A “new preoccupation with spillovers from weak or failed states has driven a slew of . . . U.S. policy pronouncements and institutional innovations spanning the realms of diplomacy, development, defense, intelligence, and even trade.”²¹ For example, in 2006 the U.S. State Department linked aid funding with an initiative of “transformational diplomacy” that sought to bring good governance and sustainable democracy.²² Similar initiatives were taken by the Department of Defense and the CIA. The UN, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom followed a similar path.²³

State building became the subject of academic articulation in the early 2000s with leading scholars like Fukuyama and donor organizations such as the OECD producing studies that attempt to understand, theorize, and organize interventions and to repair state failure.²⁴ In 2007 a specialized academic peer-reviewed journal dedicated to state building was founded, the *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*. The state as an object of engineering had to have its capacity assessed, measured, ranked, compared, and, perhaps most important, predicted in terms of its future levels of “collapse.” This operation is often performed through the creation of indexes based on certain indicators of “stateness.” The earliest, and perhaps most famous, attempt at such a compilation began in 1994 with what is now known as the Political Instability Task Force, a project sponsored by the CIA and carried on by leading American political science departments and scholars.²⁵ Such efforts then proliferated in the early 2000s: the 2004 Report of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security; the Failed States Index, produced by the Fund for Peace and published in *Foreign Policy* magazine; and the Country Indicator for Foreign Policy (CIFP) Project, based in Carleton University and sponsored by the Canadian Government. The USAID produced its own index in 2006 but did not make its findings public. In 2007, Susan Rice, the former U.S. national security advisor and envoy to the UN during the Obama administration, co-authored an index on state weakness with Stewart Patrick.²⁶ This circulation of experts and their innovations within the academy-policy-government networks contributed to the sustainment of state-building as an accepted and viable political technology.

The State in State-Building

How does a state become an object of technical intervention? The answer lies partly in North American political science doctrines. State-building is concerned with enhancing a state’s capacity to avoid its collapse. At the same time, in both theory and practice enhancing a state’s capacity is often accompanied by the limiting of the scope of state functions.²⁷ On this conception, state capacity lies within the ability of state institutions to perform assigned functions. State-building clearly carries the same assumptions about the state as new institutionalism—an approach in American political science.²⁸

There are variations of new institutionalism, but they all share two basic assumptions: “that political and legal institutions can explain different political outcomes in different contexts, and that certain institutional forms can produce desired social and

political behaviors across nations.”²⁹ The extent of state power, seen through the lens of institutionalism, is defined by the extent to which its institutional boundaries delimit an autonomous and coherent actor. This understanding of the state made it a powerful explanatory concept, argued Theda Skocpol—one of the main promoters of the new institutionalist understanding of the state—in 1985. The title of her much-cited anthology, *Bringing the State Back In*, came to define this moment in American political science, in which the state became a political actor and a concept with explanatory power.³⁰

From the components of the new institutionalism in the late 1970s and 1980s, the institutions of the state then became the site of massive projects of political engineering in the 1990s. Institutional design was used in that decade by the UN missions in their Peace through Democracy, democratization, and institutional capacity-building efforts that emerged with state-building in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The circulation of these ideas about the state, from academic publications to the realm of policy, was made possible by the paradigm’s basic suppositions: if institutions can explain and shape political outcomes, then one can influence political outcomes at a large scale by intervening in the institutional design of the state.

At the same time that the conceptual sharpness of the institutional state actor made it easier to imagine forms of massive political interventions, it obscured the nature of these interventions and their objects. This was precisely the opposite of what proponents of the institutionalist state had thought of their innovation. Instead, proponents of the state as an actor that exhibits qualities of autonomy and cohesion (as defined by its institutional boundaries) saw its explanatory power as an answer to an older trend in American political science in the 1940s and 1950s, when political life had been understood through the lens of “political systems.” The problem with the political systems approach, argued the later new institutionalist state promoters, was its conceptual vagueness: it was unable to capture important aspects of political processes.³¹ But “bringing the state back in” did not resolve the problem of porous, mobile, and elusive boundaries between state and society. As illustrated by Timothy Mitchell, a statist approach depends analytically on the distinction between state and society. This distinction is made sharper and narrower by new (institutionalist) definitions of the state with a “residual” reference to the “customary Weberian definition of the state” that “present[s] the state as an autonomous entity whose actions are not reducible to or determined by forces in society.”³² Once an empirical or historical case is examined through such a framework, the distinction between where the state ends and society begins becomes less clear, undermining the explanatory power of this approach, even when equipped with a sharper definition of the state concept.

The reified state not only makes an intervention like state building possible; it is also an idea that we all recognize in our daily lives. The state is commonly spoken of as if it were a person: the state is taxing/ withdrawing/ policing/ collapsing. This apparent boundedness of the state as an actor is something that is taken seriously by many critics of the institutionalists’ approaches to the state. Such critics also interrogate the processes through which this appearance is produced.³³ For Mitchell, for example, while the state might appear as an abstraction (of laws, structures, organizations, planning, and policies) that transcends the concrete realm of material politics

(or society), “the distinctions between abstract and concrete, ideal and material, and subjective and objective, which most political theorizing is built upon, are themselves partly constructed in those mundane social processes we recognize and name as the state.”³⁴ Joel Migdal and Klaus Schlichte call these processes “doing” the state—a phenomenon that once interrogated reveals a process that is contradictory, incoherent, and highly contingent.³⁵ By this account, the process of “doing” makes possible “seeing” the state as a coherent and autonomous actor. These processes, or “doing,” include “special organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance.”³⁶ State-building is precisely a process of “doing” a (new) state. It aims to place new ways of doing state business within institutions and among them, redefining the scope of institutional functions. Interrogating this political technology might therefore give us some clues about how to understand the state beyond its reified “self.”

Things of States

States must be imagined, but they must also be built.³⁷

Taking seriously the apparent boundedness of the state while interrogating the processes that make it possible might be helpful for an alternative conceptualization of state-building, countering its depiction by state-builders and their academic basis of knowledge. Instead of taking the abstract idea of “institutional capacity” as a starting point, what if we start from a more concrete, more physical, and more tangibly “malleable” site? What if we start from the “objects” of states and see how they become articulated, assembled, and ordered in the processes of building and maintaining the bounded abstraction of what we recognize as a state?

Studying the relationship between things and states is not a novel endeavor. James Scott showed how state projects of material social engineering that aimed to improve people’s lives have led to disastrous outcomes, making living conditions worse than their pre-intervention condition.³⁸ But while placing the state in material engineering projects (of cities, maps, modern farms, and so on), Scott still maintains an assumption of a reified state that acts, in this case, like an engineer.

Knowledge about the state as an object of engineering is one that circulates with the experts of state-building and at the same time maintains a status of universality that allows it to be powerful. The engineers, and other experts, of state-building therefore arrive at their site of engineering to *implement* “principles [that are held by the experts to be] true in every country.”³⁹ This is not to suggest that knowledge about the state is static or that its movement is unidirectional. The Iraqi experience, for example, has witnessed the implementation of techniques that were developed in the Balkans, namely, the introduction of sectarian and ethnic representational politics in most political processes, and the planning for Iraq took into account the U.S. experience in Afghanistan.⁴⁰ Almost one decade after the end of the U.S. occupation, the U.S. experience in Iraq remains a subject for reflection among state-building experts both in the field and in the corridors of academic and political power. However, state-building experts, as illustrated in the earlier sections, maintain the main principles—of institutional design and limited state scope—as true and universal.

To investigate the “universal” knowledge about the state and its promoters, articulators, and implementers requires that we step outside the reification of the state—the image that is necessary and at the same time is a product of various processes/“doing”—and enter it as a site of engineering. Let us begin by following the footsteps of the first wave of state-building experts who entered Iraq and trace their projects as they took off to participate in the building of the new state. The first team arrived a few days after the fall of Baghdad and took charge of restoring essential infrastructure services: electricity, water, and sewerage.

Merging Landscapes

As politics became more electrified, electricity became politicized.⁴¹

The predecessor of the Coalition Provisional Authority was the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). It was established in January 2003 as the body that would administer occupied Iraq. Within days of the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, American engineers arrived as part of the first ORHA team in charge of restoring electricity, water, and sewerage systems. To them, the electrical grid presented a difficult technical challenge. A comprehensive map of the transmission and distribution networks did not exist. The grid seemed to them like an idiosyncratic patchwork of old, sometimes obsolete technologies. Local stations ran on spare parts from different manufacturers, using different codes and standards. A CPA and Army Corps of Engineers official, Lieutenant General Carl Strock, described the grid as “essentially held together with ‘Band-Aids and rubber bands.’”⁴² To restore the grid, it had to be mapped, with the help of Iraqi engineers, and standardized. Standardization, in turn, required rehabilitation of the entire grid.⁴³

The way U.S. engineers described the landscape of the national electrical grid as a patchwork of improvised solutions was not very different from how many state-building and political experts described the political landscape of Iraq. The narratives about these two landscapes should not be seen as analogies of each other but were acting on the same sites, as will become clear below. In extreme cases, Iraq was described as a patchwork of three main ethno-sectarian groups (Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs) that ought to separate from each other if any of them were to be viable and if justice was to be served.⁴⁴ A more moderate version of this view saw possible redemption through giving justice to groups that were excluded from the political process in the past, namely, the Kurds and the Shi’a Arabs.⁴⁵ This latter is the view that became adopted by the occupation authorities, which introduced a consociational political system based on an ethno-sectarian quota in all major political processes and institutions, including the constitution-making process, the transitional government, and representative bodies.⁴⁶

The electrical and demographic landscapes of Iraq as understood (and acted upon) by the American state builders did not exist in separate domains nor did they act as simple analogies of one another. To borrow from a description of the politics of infrastructure in South Africa, “technologies and infrastructures are not merely *symbols* or *tools* for political expression; rather, technology itself becomes a *political terrain* for the negotiation of moral-political questions.”⁴⁷ Before the invasion of Iraq, the electrical grid produced 4,075 megawatts per day. This number collapsed to 711 megawatts

immediately after the invasion. Prior to leaving office, Bremer promised to increase the productivity of the national grid to 6,000 megawatts. He could not keep this promise. At the time of the transfer of sovereignty in June 2003, the production level was 3,621 megawatts. These numbers suggest a failure of the CPA's efforts at the rehabilitation of the electrical grid. The RAND Corporation, however, offered a different reading of the situation. In 2009, it published a history of the CPA's tenure that attributed a different meaning to this episode:

Bremer also allocated available electricity more fairly throughout the country. Under Saddam, Baghdad had enjoyed more-or-less continuous service, while less favored areas of the country experienced frequent blackouts. Now these shortages were more evenly distributed. Unfortunately, most political leaders and nearly all foreign journalists lived in Baghdad, so the impression of an overall degradation in service gained currency.⁴⁸

The report's narrative reconstructed the failure to rehabilitate the electrical grid as a moral victory for consociational justice; as if the electrical grid was not only a carrier of electrical flows but also provided a space in which consociational justice circulated. This reading is plausible if one sees the historical, physical, and political map of Iraq through a static ethno-sectarian lens. However, tracing the movement of population before and after the invasion presents a different picture. Prior to the civil war (2007) and its subsequent population displacement, Baghdad was both the most densely populated area and the most "mixed" in terms of ethno-sectarian affiliation. It is therefore not self-evident that the CPA's mode of distribution was more equitable than the previous mode of distribution. The picture drawn by RAND reflects a new reality in which, due to the sectarian violence that followed the invasion and culminated in a civil war, a more clearly marked segregation of sects and ethnicities along neighborhood, town, city, and governorate boundaries has developed. This also resulted in the decrease in Baghdad's population concentration from being home to 23.4 percent of the population in 2002, to just 18 percent in 2012.⁴⁹

This report is significant not only because of its narrative but also because of who wrote it. The book's lead author, James Dobbins, is a universal expert in state-building. He is a U.S. diplomat who co-authored a number of books on state and nation building while at RAND as the head of the corporation's International Security and Defense Policy Center, such as *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building* (2007) and *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (2003). He served as a special U.S. envoy for Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia: all countries with state-building projects in which the United States has been involved. From May 2013 to July 2014 he was a special United States representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, according to a state-building expert par excellence, the Iraqi grid was the technology that delivered political justice and, at the same time, reified a new political history of the country that reflected the vision of the new state builders of Iraq as a consociational democracy.

Order, Maintenance, and Sabotage

The new stately order not only had to be built; it also had to be maintained. RAND's account of the circulation of consociational justice via the grid was one way in which

attempts were made to imagine, extend, and articulate the space for that new order. But the grid was also a space in which opposition to the new order was expressed, punished, excluded, and discouraged. For the new stately order to succeed, these assemblages of expertise, objects, energy supplies, institutions, networks of infrastructure, among others, had to be maintained. Once the assemblage is maintained, it can be articulated into a bounded abstraction—what we recognize as a “state.”

The grid also became a militarized terrain for both the sabotage and the maintenance of the new state order. Its own material qualities enabled both acts of sabotage and deterrence.⁵⁰ For instance, the possibility of using electrical current as a way of inflicting pain on bodies has been deployed as a tactic of political punishment since the eighteenth century. During the Tacky’s Rebellion against British rule in 1760, strong electric shocks were used on rebel slaves in common sight in an effort to “inspire spectacular terror.”⁵¹ An American version of that “spectacle” of electricity-induced pain in Iraq was materialized by leaked pictures of Iraqi political prisoners. In May 2004, a leaked picture from Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad was printed along the cover page of the *Economist* magazine with the headline “Resign, Rumsfeld.” The picture was that of a man with a shabby sack draped over his upper body and down to his knees. His head and face were hooded. He was standing on a box, with his arms extended to the side and his body connected to electric wires.

The Abu Ghraib image of the man with wires became one of a number of iconic images of the United States occupation in Iraq. It is associated with the brutal practices of torture carried out by the United States military in its effort to curb a growing insurgency. As the United States and its international and local allies embarked on their project of remaking Iraq, they faced numerous sources of resistance, of which an escalating armed insurgency was one.⁵² A number of tactics were used to contain the insurgency, with varied levels of success. As we learned from leaked documents and pictures, detention accompanied by practices of torture was one method of counterinsurgency.⁵³ The electrical wires in the picture, whether used to electrocute the prisoner or not, came to represent these acts of torture. These acts were part of an effort to consolidate and maintain the new order. Electricity no longer circulated solely to deliver justice in the newly conceived consociational democracy and to illuminate spaces; it also became at once a symbol that traveled across the globe through television and Internet screens, and a physical, immediate medium for the violent enforcement of the new political order.⁵⁴

While electrical currents became a form of deterrence and punishment, their circulation along the grid was incorporated into the sabotage strategies of insurgents. But this circulation was heavily interdependent with the circulation of oil. This interdependence was part of an assemblage through which the “doing” of the state would, and did, take place: mainly by securing the circulation of electrical and fossil energies through the country’s electrical grid and oil pipelines. Battles to extend competing political agencies were fought along the grid-pipeline terrain. These battles were occasionally intensified by criminal activities motivated by the material gains of capturing and selling the metals that compose the grid.

Indeed, the first acts of sabotage along the grid were of a criminal nature. Within weeks of the occupation, the country’s oil production dropped significantly (from

4,075 megawatts pre-war to 711 post-invasion), to the point where it could not keep up with domestic consumption of gasoline and cooking gas, and the CPA had to import refined petroleum products to solve the immediate problem.⁵⁵ The radical and sudden drop in the production of electricity was due to looting of the precious metals that constituted the grid. In contrast to fifty electrical transmission towers damaged due to the pre-invasion bombing, looters who sold precious metals to Iran and Kuwait had by mid-June 2003 destroyed seven hundred such towers.⁵⁶

The oil-electricity interdependency was partly shaped by Iraq's recent history. Before the 2003 invasion Iraq had limited refinery capacity due to years of interstate wars and subjection to comprehensive international economic sanctions for over a decade, starting in the early 1990s. This resulted in producing an excess of a residue known as "heavy fuel oil." Heavy fuel was used to run thermal power plants and produce 54 percent of Iraq's electricity at the time.⁵⁷ At the same time, the oil industry (extraction, refinery, and transportation) was and still is powered by electricity, making the country's oil and gas industry "the largest industrial customer of electricity in Iraq."⁵⁸ As late as 2013, the expansion of the oil industry's capacity in Iraq was partially held back by the insufficient supply of electrical power.⁵⁹

Insurgency attacks under the occupation incorporated the interdependence of oil and electricity into a weapon. During the first three years of the occupation, it is estimated that the oil and electricity infrastructure was subjected to over three hundred attacks.⁶⁰ In military terms, the grid-pipeline was a "force multiplier" to the insurgents.⁶¹ In other words, once an insurgent group is able to locate spots along the grid-pipeline landscape where the flow of both oil and electricity can be disrupted, a single attack can cause damage that affects a larger number of the population than if the attack occurred at a different spot where the two infrastructures do not connect. June 12, only few months after the establishment of the CPA, witnessed the first attack on the oil-electricity terrain: the target was a pipeline that carries oil to Turkey.⁶² Attacks on the grid and oil pipelines continued throughout the CPA's tenure and beyond, illustrating the power that the interdependence of these two networks holds. For example, before the handing over of sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, a pipeline near Beiji, south of Baghdad, was bombed. This pipeline fueled the Musayyib power plant in Baghdad and its damage cut the country's electricity production by 10 percent.⁶³ Continuous attacks on the grid and on the contractors and technocrats who worked to repair the grid led to the diversion of a considerable amount of reconstruction funds to providing private security along the path of the grid.⁶⁴ Due to the continuous sabotage of the electricity infrastructure, electricity production barely reached its pre-war levels by the end of the CPA's fourteen months tenure. Electricity generation and supply continued to be influenced by insurgent attacks and did not improve until after the end of the civil war in 2008. In 2013, the national grid, even supported by significant amounts of imported electricity from neighboring countries, was only expected to meet consumption demands by 2015.⁶⁵

Un-Doing the State

The grid-pipeline-insurgent/criminal landscape did not emerge automatically with the occupation. The expansion of these agencies, and the withdrawal of the state's agency

as the presumed upholder of law and order, were connected to a series of contingencies that allowed for adaptive calculations. Despite objections within the United States Department of Defense, the number of invading troops on the ground was low. In Baghdad, for example, there was one soldier for every 250 residents and no existing police force. On the eve of the occupation, all Iraqi police and armed forces disappeared, leaving the terrain open for looting.⁶⁶ Members of the Iraqi armed and security forces did not just abandon their posts on the eve of the occupation; they were also dismissed and the institutions in which they served were dissolved by CPA Order 2 of May 23, 2003. Members of the dissolved Iraqi army took to the streets demanding that they be paid and re-employed by the new authorities, but to no avail until many months later. From May until the end of the summer, Iraq was left with no significant “state”-policing apparatus, and an attempt to build a new Iraqi army did not take place until the end of the summer (CPA Order 22).

The inability to protect the grid-pipeline was due to the absence of an effective policing power of the state (and its builders). By dissolving all military, security, and paramilitary forces and dismissing many bureaucrats because of their Ba’th Party membership, the CPA dismantled what Migdal and Schlichte call the “doing” of the state. That is, the personnel and structures of policing, surveillance, and deterrence that had been organized and maintained before the occupation and that successfully prevented the emergence of widespread disorder were dismissed. With their dismissal, a network of security, local, and professional knowledge was freed from an assemblage that composed parts of the state. The dismantling of this assemblage opened a new space in which crime could be organized and insurgencies could grow. The inability to restore order, even in the relatively calm southern province of Missan, prompted a local leader to shout at CPA officers at a meeting, “You are the government. Act like one.”⁶⁷ Describing the lawlessness in her neighborhood where “machine guns [now] solve problems,” a Baghdadi woman summarized the situation to me by saying, “Now there is no state!”⁶⁸

Former security and army personnel who were “freed” from the assemblages of the state kept with them knowledge acquired in their former connections with the state. This knowledge made certain sabotage calculations and actions possible. For instance, growing insurgent groups gained access to large caches of weapons created across the country by the former regime to support an anti-occupation resistance. However, a clearly formed and organized resistance did not emerge immediately. Different groups with various political loyalties formed gradually, taking advantage of the new space and the available weapons and expertise. “This was not planned ahead of time and reflected neither a desire to restore the past nor ideological attachment to Baathism; rather, these cells developed gradually, initially drawing individuals angered by dim prospects, resentful of the occupation and its indignities, and building on pre-existing party, professional, tribal, familial or geographic—including neighborhood—networks.”⁶⁹ The porous borders also meant that foreign fighters were entering the country, mostly through Syria, adding to the violent landscape of sabotage.⁷⁰

The engineers in charge of rebuilding the grid found themselves working on a terrain that became a political battlefield: their initial budget had to be reconsidered to account for private security services to carve out a safe space for their work on the

grid. The grid thus emerged as a site at which agencies can be extended or limited in a manner contingent on adaptive calculations that considered material and social connections, technical and local knowledge, and opportunities to organize violent criminal and insurgent groups.

Conclusion: Translating Success

The rehabilitation of the electrical grid and the attempts to standardize its structure and function and maintain the flow of electrical currents through it was one aspect of translating state-building into empirical projects. However, it was also important for the state-builders to translate the outcomes of projects such as electricity restoration into abstractions that could describe how the rehabilitation of the Musayyib power plant, for example, reflected levels of success in building stateness. This abstraction came in the form of megawatts, a unit that measured the rate of energy conversion.

Paul L. Bremer III promised to increase the production level to 6,000 megawatts by June 2004. Megawatts did not have to be the official measure. Some U.S. experts who were working on the grid disagreed with the use of megawatts as a measuring unit of success (or failure). Their argument was that fixing a number of megawatts to be produced by a particular deadline as an indicator for (state-building) success would create an incentive for quick fixes rather than the long-term rehabilitation of the entire grid. Even if this number were to be achieved, a weakened grid would suffer from collapses if made to carry this increased amount of power. They were proved right when in October 2003 the system produced 4,000 megawatts but suffered from multiple collapses—many were due to an overload of the deteriorating grid. They also argued that 6,000 megawatts is not a reliable number because it is based on a projection of future demand based on consumption levels in a time of short supply. Once electrical supply increases, the expectations and demand for higher consumption levels would also rise.⁷¹ This point was proved true ten years later when the expected demand was measured at 22,000 megawatts.⁷²

The megawatt was not the only abstraction that measured the successful levels of establishing stateness. The *New York Times*, in collaboration with the Brookings Institute, published a periodical chart called “The State of Iraq: An Update” from early 2004 (covering the CPA period in 2003) until the summer of 2007.⁷³ The chart, which gave an update on the “state of Iraq,” was a collection of numbers that count the number of foreign troops, U.S. troop deaths, Iraqi security forces and their deaths, attacks by insurgents, prisoners held by the United States, daily U.S./Iraqi patrols, Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced persons, barrels of oil produced per day, gigawatts of electricity produced, percentage of unemployment, dollars going from Baghdad to other provinces, and the percentage of Iraqis supporting a strong central government. The stateness of the Iraqi state was thereby translated into numbers that measured, among other things, centralized violence and its insurgent contenders, oil and electricity production, and the general attitude of the population. These measurements of the state are but one example of a larger industry of measuring different aspects of the state that feature in indicators about “state failure” and “fragility” that were discussed earlier.

The first regulation of the occupation authorities, which established the CPA and

defined the scope of its tasks, made it clear that the United States–led occupation was embarking on a transformative project that took the state as its main object. Iraq was turned into an open laboratory of a political engineering technology. This technology, called “state-building,” emerged and was sustained as a powerful organizing thought in part due to the circulation of experts and their inventions among academic centers, policy centers, NGOs, developmental agencies, and even civil occupation authorities. The possibility of imagining, and acting upon, the state as an object of engineering was in large measure the result of formulations that took place in North American political science, in which the state became understood as a bounded and autonomous entity that can explain and (thus) influence political outcomes. While this abstraction is a necessary condition of the conception of a grand program such as state building, once translated into empirical projects the state boundaries give way to concrete, material, and tangibly “malleable” sites. In this particular site, objects, expertise, narratives, electrical currents, and relations of violence were constantly assembled and maintained to help produce an order that resembles what we recognize in our daily lives as the state.

NOTES

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1. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Regulation 1, Section 1, accessed May 17, 2016, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf.

2. On the idea of experiments “in the wild” (outside science laboratories), see Michel Callon, “What Does It Mean to Say That Economics is Performative?,” in *Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics*, ed. Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Michel Callon and Vololona Rabeharisoa, “Research ‘in the Wild’ and the Shaping of New Social Identities,” *Technology in Society* 25, no. 1 (April 2003): 193–204.

3. See <http://www.iraqcoalition.org> for full list and texts of all CPA orders and regulations (accessed May 17, 2016).

4. Nida Alahmad, “Rewiring a State: The Techno-Politics of CPA’s Iraq,” *Middle East Report* no. 266 (Spring 2013): 14–19; Christopher Parker, “From Forced Revolution to Failed Transition: The Nightmarish Agency of Revolutionary Neo-Liberalism in Iraq,” *Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation*, Universidad Complutense Madrid, Discussion Paper 12 (2006). See UNISCI website, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/UNIS/article/viewFile/UNISO606330081B/28062>; Kevin Begos “Faded Dreams of Contracted Democracy,” *Middle East Report* no. 234 (Spring 2005): 24–27; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (U.S. Army, United States Government, 2013).

5. See these memoirs, for example: Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2005); and Paul L. Bremer III with Malcom McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

6. Pete Moore and Christopher Parker, “The War Economy of Iraq,” *Middle East Report* no. 243 (Summer 2007): 6–15.

7. World Bank, “Twenty Fragile States Make Progress on Millennium Development Goals,” Press Release, May, 2013, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/05/01/twenty-fragile-states-make-progress-on-millennium-development-goals>. See also Douglas A. Ollivant, “Renewed Violence in Iraq: Contingency Planning Memorandum no. 15,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 2012, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/renewed-violence-iraq/p28808>.

8. One of the earliest and most influential studies of the history of electricity and electrification is Thomas P. Hughes’s work, which is framed within the parameters of systems theory. *Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993 [reprint]).

9. On the origins of the concept of “performativity” in philosophy and its subsequent migration to the social sciences as well as the complexity of the concept, which does not simply refer to an automatic translation of ideas into reality but rather to “multiple [forms] of performativities,” see Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu, “Introduction,” in *Do Economists Make Markets?*, 1–19. A detailed discussion of performativity in economics is in Michel Callon, “What Does It Mean to Say That Economics is Performative?,” in *Do Economists Make Markets?*, 54–86.

10. Naomi Klein, “Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia,” *Harper’s Magazine*, September 2004; Toby Dodge, “Intervention and Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq,” *Review of International Studies* 39 (December 2013): 1189–212; Andrew Arato, *Constitution Making under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); and Diamond, *Squandered Victory*.

11. Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State-Building,” *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 17. Also in Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), ix.

12. For a discussion of the constitution-making process under the United States’ auspices, see Andrew Arato, *Constitution Making*. Descriptions of various political negotiations and institutional designs are depicted in memoirs of expert participants such as Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, and Rory Stewart, *The Prince of the Marshes, and Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 2007); politicians such as Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007); and Bremer, *My Year in Iraq*.

13. At the inception of the CPA’s tenure, Congress allocated \$5.56 billion for the rehabilitation of the electrical sector in Iraq under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2004. This put electricity as the first recipient of reconstruction money followed by “water resources and sanitation” and “security and law enforcement” respectively. After the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, there was a reallocation of resources that moved electricity to the third rank in terms of appropriation money at \$5.465 million in June 2004. For details on allocation mechanisms, including the uses of Iraqi funds, and reference to the figures cited here, see SIGIR, *Hard Lessons*, esp. chap. 4, “Staging in Kuwait,” 46–52, and chap. 16, “Charting a New Course,” 69–77.

14. See, for example, Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992* (Cambridge: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992). Discussing different approaches to studying the state and

state formation, see Patrick Carroll, "Articulating Theories of States and State Formation," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 22 (December 2009): 553–603.

15. Fukuyama, "The Imperative of State-Building," 17; also in Fukuyama, *State-Building*, ix.

16. Nehal Bhuta, "Against State-Building," *Constellations* 15, no. 4 (December 2008): 522–24. A discussion that highlights major works, arguments, and criticisms of "Liberal Peace" was published in the Forum section of the *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (August 2005): 453–72.

17. Wolfram Lacher, "Iraq: Exception to, or Epitome of Contemporary Post-Conflict Reconstruction?," *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 2 (February 2007): 242.

18. See, for example, Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

19. Roland Paris, "Ordering the World: Academic Research and Policymaking on Fragile States," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 58.

20. *Ibid.*, 62.

21. Stewart Patrick, "'Failed' States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas," *International Studies Review* 9, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 645.

22. For a discussion of the connection among "good governance," "liberal peace," "failed states," "peace through democracy" and "state building," see Bhuta, "Against State Building."

23. Patrick, "'Failed' States," 645–46.

24. Fukuyama, *State-Building*; OECD, "Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience," *Journal on Development* 9, no. 3 (2008).

25. "Political Instability Task Force," accessed May 17, 2016, <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home/>.

26. Patrick, "'Failed' States."

27. Fukuyama, *State-Building*; and Robert Bates, *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009).

28. For a critical discussion of the implications of institutionalism in both policy and academic U.S. circles, see Bhuta, "Against State-Building," 528–30; Lacher, "Iraq," 241, discusses the employment of institutional interventions in policy formulations post-9/11. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, for example, is critical of the institutionalist approach to state building, which he convincingly shows to be based on the institutionalist understanding of the state in political science. His main critique, however, collapses in the face of empirical evidence. That critique is that institutionalist state building misses the "nation" aspect of the state—which is the basis of the political legitimacy. As pointed out by OECD, "Concepts and Dilemmas," most state-building projects are often accompanied by "nation building"—or projects that aim to bring forms of national cohesion or civil peace based on a new national identity. Lemay-Hébert mentions Iraq as an example in which institutional designs, in the absence of nation building, led to sectarian tension. But this reading is inaccurate, for there was a (unsuccessful) project in Iraq for nation building, based on the Balkan model (see Lacher, "Iraq," 241), in which the country's national identity was purportedly remade to reflect its ethnic and sectarian composition. The fact that the new national design was implemented precisely through institutional means (elections, quota systems, etc.) undermines Lemay-Hébert's assumption that institutional designs would by definition exclude "nation" building. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, "Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no. 1 (March 2009): 21–45.

29. Bhuta, "Against State-Building," 529. For a discussion of the variations of New Institutionalism, see Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies* 44 (1996): 936–57.
30. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3–38.
31. Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (March 1991): 78–81.
32. Mitchell, "Limits of the State," 82.
33. See, for example, Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (March 1988): 58–89; Pierre Bourdieu, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," trans. Loïc J. D. Wacquant and Samar Farage, *Sociological Theory* 12, no. 1 (March 1994): 1–18. To situate this literature within the wider literature on state theories and state formation, see Carroll, "Articulating Theories of States."
34. Mitchell, "Limits of the State," 95.
35. Joel S. Migdal and Klaus Schlichte, "Rethinking the State," in *The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination*, ed. Klaus Schlichte (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
36. Mitchell, "Limits of the State," 95.
37. Patrick Carroll-Burke, "Material Designs: Engineering Cultures and Engineering States-Ireland, 1650–1900," *Theory and Society* 31, no. 1 (2002): 80.
38. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).
39. This phrase is borrowed from Timothy Mitchell, "Principles True in Every Country," in *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 54–79.
40. For the impact of the Balkan state-building experience on the introduction of consociationalism in Iraq, see Lacher "Iraq," 241. For the discussions about the Afghanistan experience during the planning phase prior to the Iraq war in the United States departments of State and Defense, see SIGIR, *Hard Lessons*, 8.
41. This is a description of the American Revolution in James Delbourgo, *A Most Amazing Scene of Wonders: Electricity and Enlightenment in Early America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 143.
42. SIGIR, *Hard Lessons*, 146.
43. The case of the repair of electricity in Iraq under the U.S. occupation appeared in more details and in connection to later attempts by the USAID to restore the grid in Alahmad, "Rewiring a State."
44. One of the most vocal proponents in U.S. policy circles of the division of Iraq into three separate entities reflecting ethnic and sectarian composition of the country was Peter Galbraith. See, for example, Peter W. Galbraith, "What Are We Holding Together?," *Washington Post*, November 7, 2005; Peter W. Galbraith "Make Walls, Not War," *New York Times*, October 23, 2007; Peter W. Galbraith, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). Then a senator in the United States Congress, Joseph Biden, who would become President Barack Obama's vice president, wrote an article the content of which became known in many Iraqi circles as the "Biden Plan," in which he called for the

creation of three autonomous regions in Iraq. Joseph R. Biden and Leslie H. Gelb, "Unity through Autonomy in Iraq," *New York Times*, May 1, 2006.

45. I make the distinction "Shi'a Arabs" because the predominantly Muslim Kurdish population includes Shi'a and Sunni sects.

46. This view of Iraq's composition is so common among United States state-building experts and policy commentators on Iraq that it is rather difficult to find a contrary account. See, for example, the account of Iraqi history as dominated by sectarian tensions due to the Sunni control of the country's key political positions in the opening of SIGIR, *Hard Lessons*. Hanna Batatu offers a different account of Iraq's history that illustrates the strong class struggles in Iraq during the Monarchical period, which cut across sectarian lines. Batatu's remains one of the richest historical works on Iraq due to his unusual access to the archival materials of Iraqi state and police documents. Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communist, Ba'thists and Free Officers* (1978; London: SAQI, 2004).

47. Antina von Schnitzler, "Traveling Technologies: Infrastructure, Ethical Regimes, and the Materiality of Politics in South Africa," *Cultural Anthropology* 28, no. 4 (2013): 671 (emphasis in original).

48. James Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2009), xxvii.

49. According to a population density map based on 2002 estimates and produced by the CIA, Baghdad had the largest population concentration of any Iraqi city with a population of 5.6 million, 23.4 percent of the total population of 24 million. It was followed by Mosul (1.7 million), Basrah (1.3 million), and then Erbil (840,000). "Iraq: Country Profile," January 2003, accessed May 17, 2016, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_pop_2003.jpg. These numbers had changed significantly by 2012. Baghdad remained the most populated city with 5.751 million—18 percent of a population of 31.9 million, followed by Mosul (1.5 million), Erbil (1 million), and Basrah (923,000). See "2013 The World Fact Book," accessed June 4, 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>.

50. On how qualities of matter (such as pipelines, oil, and coal) can provide some possibilities for action and not others, see Timothy Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil* (London: Verso, 2011); and Andrew Barry, *Material Politics: Disputes along the Pipeline* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

51. Delbourgo, *A Most Amazing Scene of Wonders*, 127. According to Delbourgo, in addition to torture, experiments with illumination and electrification were used in demonstrations as a form of entertainment in eighteenth-century America. Electrical shocks had also been used in Ba'thist Iraq as a form of torture. Author's interviews with former Iraqi prisoners. Baghdad, May 2003.

52. For firsthand account of difficulties facing civil occupation authorities at a local level, see, for example, Stewart, *The Prince of the Marshes*.

53. For a political sociology of incarceration in the course of a counterinsurgency carried on by liberal powers, including the United States in Iraq, see Laleh Khalili, *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2013).

54. A series of 2010 Wikileaks documents suggest that the use of electricity and sexual abuse as forms of torture used by the U.S. occupation forces continued to be employed by Iraqi forces on detainees, some of whom were handed over by U.S. troops. Human Rights Watch, "Iraq: Wikileaks Documents Describe Torture of Detainees. U.S. Handed Over Detainees Despite

Systematic Abuse by Iraqi Forces,” October 23, 2010, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/24/iraq-wikileaks-documents-describe-torture-detainees>. Five years prior to the Wikileaks-released documents, Human Rights Watch issued a report on the same subject, Human Rights Watch, “The New Iraq? Torture and Ill-Treatment of Detainees in Iraqi Custody,” January 25, 2005, accessed June 4, 2014, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/01/24/new-iraq>.

55. SIGIR, *Hard Lessons*, 139–40; 162.

56. *Ibid.*, 144–47.

57. For a discussion of the impact of the sanctions on Iraq’s oil industry, see Alahmad, “Rewiring a State.” The U.S. plan, which continues to be executed today, was to gradually shift electricity generation from heavy fuel to natural gas. But due to a deteriorated oil and gas infrastructure, the capturing of natural gas remains a problem. See, for example, U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Iraq, Country Report,” April 2, 2013, accessed March 10, 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Iraq/iraq.pdf>.

58. *Ibid.*, 3.

59. *Ibid.*

60. For a list of individual attacks during that period, see Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pipeline Watch,” March 27, 2008. See Institute for the Analysis of Global Security website, accessed May 17, 2016, <http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm>.

61. “[A] capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplished.” Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994, 151, accessed March 11, 2014, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/joint_staff/jointStaff_jointOperations/913.pdf.

62. A chronology of major attacks during that year is in Anthony H. Cordesman and Emma R. Davis, *Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 43–44.

63. Todd Pitman, “Iraq Power System under Frequent Attacks,” *Associated Press Online*, June 11, 2014; and Danica Kirka, “Saboteurs Blow Up Iraqi Oil Pipeline Cutting into Scarce Electricity Output,” *Associated Press*, June 9, 2004.

64. Alahmad, “Rewiring a State.”

65. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Learning from Iraq—a Final Report from SIGIR*, March 2013, 79.

66. For more details, see Alahmad, “Rewiring a State.”

67. Stewart, *Prince of the Marches*, 157.

68. Author interview, July 2003, Baghdad.

69. International Crisis Group (ICG), “In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency,” *Middle East Report* no. 50 (February 2006): 5.

70. For a discussion of the growing insurgency during the first year of the occupation and its connection to U.S. policies on the ground, see Cordesman and Davis, *Iraq’s Insurgency*, chap. 3, “Postconflict to Initial Insurgency: May 1 2003–End 2003,” 42–75. For a description of the gradual and politically diverse emergence of Iraqi insurgent groups, see ICG, “In Their Own Words.”

71. SIGIR, *Hard Lesson*, 149–50.

72. SIGIR, *Learning from Iraq*, 79.

73. See this chart, for example, in Jason H. Campbell and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “The State of Iraq: An Update,” September 4, 2007, accessed July 10, 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2007/09/04iraq-campbell>.