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Part I

Making Victorian Subjects

Chapter 1

State Formation in Victorian Jamaica

Diana Paton

When Victoria came to the throne in 1837, Jamaica was at the center of imperial debates about empire. Its institutions of government were undergoing substantial change, as everyone sought to adapt to the abolition of slavery. Colonial state systems of power in the island and on an imperial scale were directed toward controlling a population that was in the process of establishing itself as free and toward ensuring the continuing extraction of wealth under transformed political and social conditions. If, to frame the problem in Marxist terms, the state is the means by which a ruling class projects its interests as the interests of the whole of society, it is worth noting that at this transitional moment, “society” in Jamaica did not yet include the majority of the population. That majority was held in the transitional state of “apprenticeship”: neither enslaved nor free. The state did not, in either its imperial or its colonial form, claim to embody the interests of the population; rather, the imperial government claimed to protect the interests of people who were as yet unable to represent their own interests. The distinction is small but significant.

In the early years after 1837, the political system shifted toward partial inclusion of some former slaves in “society.” During this period, representative bodies spoke for a broader constituency than before. Those included were men who had become property owners or had established the security of rental tenure.¹ These men were imagined as

embodying the interests of the families they were said to head in a manner analogous to how the state was said to embody the interests of the people as a whole. To a limited extent, their new free status created a space that allowed some freed people to demand that state authorities act in their interests.² In practice, although electoral campaigns solicited the votes of freed people with the implication that legislators would work on their behalf, legislators had little power to make change in the interests of the newly free. Those possibilities that did exist were largely closed off after the Morant Bay rebellion, in 1865. The rebellion was followed by a shift to direct colonial rule in the form of Crown Colony government, which entailed the abolition of the elected Jamaican Assembly and its replacement with an unelected Legislative Council. This process of “de-democratization,” in Mimi Sheller’s terms, was only partially mitigated by the addition of elected members to the Legislative Council in 1884.³ As Thomas Holt argues, by the late nineteenth century it had been established that “for the colonies, the corollary of satisfying economic grievances at the expense of political demands was the renunciation of political self-rule in return for economic assistance.”⁴ In Jamaica, that is, the limited social and economic gains of the poor in the late nineteenth century came in tandem with, and not necessarily in spite of, political disfranchisement. The experience of the postemancipation period was that direct action in the form of rebellion led to a decline in direct political power, but, because it also produced a shift in state policy designed to prevent further violent confrontation, it brought some social gains.

By the time Victoria died, in 1901, Jamaica and the wider Caribbean region had become marginal to British debates about empire, which were preoccupied with India and South Africa and with the new colonies acquired in the late nineteenth century. British commentators increasingly understood Jamaica, and the Caribbean more

generally, as a drain on imperial resources, rather than as a contributor to imperial wealth. Within the colony, political power was organized on a largely unrepresentative basis. Nevertheless, some state initiatives, such as the Jamaica International Exhibition of 1891 and the associated and subsequent promotion of the island as a destination for both tourism and settlement, worked by invoking the interests of the Jamaican people as a whole or as a unit within a wider imperial fraternity. The organizers of the exhibition believed the “interests” of the people to be embodied in the arrival of white settlers, who would be placed above the majority population within Jamaica’s racial hierarchy.⁵ There had been a substantial change in dominant conceptualizations of the state’s relationship to the “people,” despite overall continuity in the working of the state system.

We can identify, then, a long-term trend in state formation: from a state conceptualized as embodying the interests of a society made up of only a tiny minority of the population to one that claimed to represent the people as a whole. Contrary to interpretations of the period between the end of slavery and the 1930s as one of uniform “neglect,” genuine changes took place during this time.⁶ Particularly significant, and the focus of this chapter, was the moment immediately after the Morant Bay rebellion of 1865. This was the third period of revolutionary violence in Jamaica in a century, preceded by what Vincent Brown calls the ‘Coromantee War’ of 1760, and by the rebellion led by Sam Sharpe in 1831.⁷ In 1760, 1831, and 1865, popular uprisings were put down by extreme state violence. The suppression of each rebellion was followed by periods of expansive governmental activity, extending in two apparently contradictory directions: repression and protection. In reality these approaches worked together to enhance the stability of power relations within Jamaica.

After each rebellion, steps were taken to develop the state's capacity to repress opposition: new forms of militia, new police forces, new legal restrictions on enslaved people's activities, and/or new or better organized prisons were put in place. Over a slightly longer period, responses to rebellion involved the development of limited legal protection or social provision for the majority. Such periods were also characterized by intervention by the imperial government and its representatives, the colonial governors, who increasingly assumed the advantages of a more systematized and bureaucratic state, which they pressed local power holders to accept. Thus, the late period of slavery saw the institution of a minimal level of legal protection against abuse by slaveholders, as a response both to pressure from the British imperial government and to rebellions like Tacky's and the fear of further rebellions. Sharpe's rebellion helped advance the end of slavery itself. In the period after 1865, Crown Colony government was instituted and measures were taken to extend state activity in many directions, including health provision and limited land reform. Changes to the less directly coercive elements of state activity focused on the provision of education and medical services, some public health measures, and modifications to the regimes regulating land, family law, and taxation. These measures aimed to incorporate the Jamaican majority into society in the hope of creating greater social stability and imperial loyalty. The very establishment of an area of encounter between poor Jamaicans and state practice that was not primarily coercive was significant in itself.

The sociologist Philip Abrams argued in 1977 that "the state does not exist"; instead, Abrams claims, we should investigate the "state idea" and "state systems."⁹ A couple of years later and from a different scholarly tradition, Michel Foucault asserted that scholars should not "accept a priori the existence of things like the state, society,

the sovereign, and subjects” but instead should investigate the working of these terms as discursive entities.¹⁰ Neither Abrams nor Foucault was thinking about colonial contexts, but if anything, in settings like Jamaica “the state” was even more of an ideological projection than it was in the metropolis. Its claims to authority required the imagining of networks of power projected across large blocks of space and backed up by the regular use of violence. Within Jamaica, “the state” was formed through everyday encounters at toll gates, in court rooms and schoolrooms, in reformatories and prisons, in dispensaries, and on the streets. Such encounters contributed to the racing and gendering of the population, the distribution of resources, and the constitution of power. Perhaps most importantly, though much less visibly, state formation took place through the propagation of norms of property holding and transmission that sustained the concentration of land in a few hands while permitting and at times facilitating the emergence and reproduction of small-scale landholdings. In examining state formation, then, we need to investigate this linked network of everyday practices and embodied encounters. We must also attend to the limited but significant processes by which some individuals from the Afro-Jamaican majority, who themselves or whose parents or grandparents had experienced slavery, came to embody elements of the state system, in roles such as police constables, teachers, dispensers (pharmacists), and toll collectors. Accepting these premises means focusing on the production of state systems and state ideas over time.¹¹

State formation in Victorian Jamaica can also be viewed as part of the development of a network of state activity that was concurrently taking place in other colonies and within metropolitan Britain itself. In Britain, this period saw expanding concern about public health and sanitation, increased state intervention to regulate

working hours and conditions, greater regulation of sexuality, and the expansion or founding of institutions such as workhouses, prisons, and reformatories. Much of this activity has been interpreted as molding or disciplining subjects in oppressive ways. Nevertheless, with present-day attacks on all forms of state regulation of business practices in mind, it is worth emphasizing that in metropolitan Britain, increased state regulation of, for instance, workplaces and the food supply was in many cases a response, at least in part, to popular pressure.¹² In Jamaica, as a colonial site, this dynamic played out rather differently. As in Britain, state bodies sometimes had to respond to popular pressure even when the people had little or no electoral power. Black Jamaicans were able to put limited pressure on government through popular action such as the antitaxation riots in 1848 and the destruction of toll gates in Westmoreland in 1859.¹³ But in a colony, the direction of state activity was determined by many more competing pressures, from the metropolis as well as from within the colony. Such external pressures were present in the metropolis but much less dominant.

Between the end of slavery and the Morant Bay rebellion, the leitmotif of discussions about the state in Jamaica was anxiety about spending. Repeated crises developed around the alleged need for “retrenchment,” that is, cuts in expenditure—what would today be described as “austerity.” Between 1838 and 1865, these crises were products of the tension between the local elite, as represented by the assembly, and the imperial government, represented by the governor. At moments of political conflict such as the passage of the imperial West India Prisons Act of 1838 and for several years following the passage of the imperial Sugar Duties Act of 1846, the assembly either refused to pass bills to pay for state spending or drastically cut amounts to be spent.¹⁴ Crises over retrenchment took place almost annually in the late 1840s and

early 1850s. State spending had to be authorized by annual revenue bills, giving the assembly considerable power to disrupt the smooth functioning of state activity. The Police Act of 1846, for instance, cut the number of people in the police force almost in half, while building work on the new General Penitentiary in Kingston ground to a halt in 1849 as a result of the refusal of the assembly to pass a revenue bill authorizing taxation.¹⁵ In 1851 the colony-wide police force was disbanded in favor of a force organized at the parish level, although an island-wide force was reestablished the following year.¹⁶ State projects that aimed to transform the culture of the Jamaican population, such as the provision of schools, tended to stumble on the desire to limit spending.

The Morant Bay rebellion was interpreted in imperial Britain as a sign of the problems caused by the Jamaican elite's approach to colonial government. Crown Colony government was established, with Sir John Peter Grant appointed as the first new governor after Edward Eyre. Grant's governorship, from 1866 to 1874, saw significant changes in the scope of the Jamaican state's imagined powers. Under Grant, there was still a great deal of concern about finance; indeed, after he took over as governor, his early reports emphasized the dire state of Jamaican finances and the need to balance the books.¹⁷ However, in contrast to his predecessors, Grant's approach was to expand state revenues through duties and taxation rather than to cut expenditure. These additional revenues were raised largely by measures that disproportionately affected the poor, such as increased duties on rum and the extension of a house tax to all except resident estate laborers.¹⁸ Grant made only relatively small cuts in spending, notably by disestablishing the Church of England. In other ways, too, Grant and his immediate successors extended state expenditure, in a period during which, Roy Augier

wrote sixty years ago, “the administrative apparatus of a modern state” was established.¹⁹

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Grant’s reforms were a direct response to the Morant Bay rebellion and, in particular, to a series of problems that were perceived as its causes: conflict over land, lack of trust in the courts, disaffection with local elites. But they were also part of a wider pattern of reformulation of state policy that was taking place throughout the British Empire and within Britain itself. Across the empire, colonies were establishing new police forces, implementing new systems of health care and taking public health measures, funding schools for young children, changing laws regarding land tenure to try to stimulate capitalist agriculture, and revising taxation to ensure greater funds for state projects. Metropolitan Britain also saw a significant growth in state institutions and authority in this period, despite official ideologies of laissez-faire.²⁰ In some of these measures, Jamaica in the 1860s led the way; in some, Jamaica followed other colonies, notably Ireland and India. The Crown Colony system fostered the growth of state activity while leaving the people without access to the political system.

In *The Problem of Freedom*, Thomas Holt emphasizes the significance of the example of Ireland in stimulating colonial policy toward Jamaica in the late nineteenth century. Holt argued that a series of influential thinkers and politicians understood the “Irish problem” of rural insurgency to be caused by land hunger. The solution proposed for Ireland was the redistribution of small plots of land, but not of political power, on the understanding that this step would lead to significant reductions in unrest, a form of so-called beneficent despotism. Holt argues that this Irish policy was adopted in, and to some extent adapted to, late nineteenth-century Jamaica. Holt is right to draw attention

to the connection between Jamaican and Irish colonial policies, but also important is another, equally significant, set of colonial links, discussed only briefly by Holt: those between Jamaica and India.²¹

Prior to being appointed as governor of Jamaica, Grant had been lieutenant-governor of Bengal from 1859 to 1862, after a longer career in the Indian colonial service. His posting to Jamaica at this critical point in the colony's history was based on the assumption that his Indian experience made him particularly good for this new role. The conservative Earl of Carnarvon, the colonial secretary, wrote to Grant immediately after his appointment as governor, emphasizing that "the experience of administrative functions which you have obtained during your service in Her Majesty's Eastern possessions . . . will afford you the best guidance in your new field of duty."²² Grant had experience in administering a colony in the aftermath of insurrection, having been at the heart of the British effort to reformulate colonial power in Bengal in the wake of the 1857 rebellion. He was sent from England to Jamaica with instructions to attend to a panoply of concerns: poor relief; education; the judicial system; policing; "the repression of praedial larceny" (the theft of agricultural produce or livestock from an estate or farm); land and its occupation, especially the "problem" of "squatting"; taxation; administrative reform; and "the introduction of capital and labour."²³ His successor as Jamaican governor, Sir William Grey, was also a former lieutenant-governor of Bengal.

In Bengal, Grant had been involved with new policies regarding land, the judiciary, policing, education, public health, and the administration of the state. In Jamaica, he oversaw similar policies, in particular in relation to land. Grant's land policy in Bengal had restrained the absolute power of landowners by enforcing commercial

laws. The Bengal Rent Act of 1859 also facilitated the increase of rents charged on peasant farmers who held their land under customary agreements.²⁴ His Jamaican policy was similarly oriented toward the promotion of commercial agriculture. Several new laws passed in 1867 combined to enable the Crown to repossess land held by big planters but not used productively. In both India and Jamaica, then, Grant faced hostility from some major landowners, who perceived him as too favorable to the local peasants. Grant's sympathy was, in reality, for relatively successful peasant landholders along with productive planters, and he accompanied it with attacks on those who made a living through more marginal means. The most dramatic and immediate effect of Grant's land policy was the eviction of "squatters"—many of whom had substantive legal claims to their lands—which took place on a significant scale in the late 1860s and early 1870s.²⁵ Grant's governorship also saw a major change in the law of trespass, following a campaign by large landowners who complained of unjustified peasant suits about the trespass of livestock on their land. The new law shifted responsibility for fencing land against livestock disturbance from the owner of the animals to the owner of the arable land, preventing such suits and revealing the limits of Grant's sympathy for peasant farmers.²⁶

Grant's approach to land policy is illustrated by his intervention in a conflict over landownership between a large landowner and small settlers at the Hartlands estate, near Spanish Town. The case indicates the complexity of relations around land in postemancipation Jamaica. Hartlands had, according to those living there, been sold off in small plots by its owner, Mr. Hart, in the early years after emancipation, but the purchasers had no written title to the land they worked. Some of those resident may well not have paid for the land but still felt entitled to it on the basis of the labor that

they had put into it. In the 1860s another Mr. Hart, the son of the original seller, wanted to “resume possession” of what Grant described as an “abandoned” estate. In March 1866, before Grant’s arrival in Jamaica, Hart acquired a court order to enable the land to be surveyed. The residents resisted the surveying party but were forced to accede to it when Acting Governor Storks sent a force of 150 soldiers to back up the police. The settlers backed down but managed to secure a series of meetings between their representatives, Hart, and Storks himself, which (at least according to their later testimony) resulted in a promise to establish a process of independent adjudication. Soon after Grant’s arrival, however, Hart managed to get an eviction order from the regular court. The settlers petitioned Grant, noting their grievances, but his reply ignored the content of their complaints, stating instead that “the petitioners may be quite certain that whatever force of police, and, if necessary, of military, is required to support the law will be employed, and that all who unlawfully resist will be apprehended and punished with the utmost severity of law.”²⁷ The case echoed the transition that Grant had overseen in India toward enforcing a system of land that required written titles.

The Hartlands case illustrates the connections among Grant’s multiple policies. His report on the incident emphasized the need for a stronger police force, a conclusion that was also drawn from the Morant Bay rebellion. Although the Hartlands settlers were successfully repressed, Grant was concerned to discover that very few policemen were available for this suppression. His experience with the Hartlands dispute bolstered his case for his initial focus on security. In 1867 he founded the Jamaica Constabulary Force, a new paramilitary police force modeled on the Royal Irish Constabulary. The new force required considerable additional resources, costing around £40,000 a year,

significantly more than the £25,000 annual expenditure on the old Jamaican police.²⁸

Grant and his successors introduced a series of other security-focused innovations, many of them concerned with the problem of the so-called habitual criminal. People identified as such were registered after 1870 and routinely photographed after 1873.²⁹ He also merged some prisons into larger institutions, closing the county jail in Kingston, for instance, and transferring the prisoners there to the equivalent jail in Spanish Town.³⁰

Grant also oversaw changes to the court system, reorganizing the old courts into new district courts and introducing many more salaried judges trained in the United Kingdom. The stated purpose of the new court system was to make the courts more accessible to the population, especially for civil matters, and to remove them from the control of the local plantocratic magistracy.³¹ These reforms also had the effect of making the judiciary more centralized and more dependent on metropolitan education and experience, a characteristic move of Crown Colony rule. In addition, the boys' and girls' reformatories, both of which had been established by private charitable organizations in the 1850s, were expanded under Grant's governorship (see Shani Roper's discussion in chapter 5).³²

Grant's governorship also saw significant changes in the areas of both curative medicine and public health. In these areas, too, he was influenced by his Indian experience, with public health a major concern in his last years as a civil servant. The Royal Commission into the Sanitary State of the Army in India, known as the Sanitary Commission, sat from 1859 and reported in 1863. Although the commission was primarily concerned with military health and medicine, stemming from security concerns about the prevalence of disease among British troops that had limited their

ability to suppress the 1857 rebellion, its recommendations had important consequences for the organization of public health throughout India.³³ Grant arrived in Jamaica with similar concerns about the health of the population. He created the Central Board of Health to oversee new parish-level local boards of health, which were responsible for improving local sanitary systems.³⁴ His government established compulsory vaccination of children for smallpox, following British policy, which had introduced compulsory vaccination in 1853.³⁵ In line with policy around the British Empire at the time, he opened a lock hospital, which treated venereal disease, to confine women said to be prostitutes.³⁶ Grant also established a system in which district medical officers were appointed for regions across Jamaica, an innovation that took place before the equivalent position was created in Britain.³⁷ The district medical officers received a salary, in exchange for which they were responsible for providing free medical care to those deemed to be “indigent.” They could supplement this income with private practice but were required to treat people who could not afford full fees at reduced rates.³⁸ This system was in 1875 organized into the more centralized Island Medical Service. Given their relatively small budgets, the medical services introduced by Grant inevitably reached a relatively small proportion of the population. Furthermore, to the extent that government-paid doctors did treat poor Jamaican patients, their understanding of that work was framed by interpretations of medical care that were dismissive of or hostile to popular Jamaican treatment practices and explanations for ill-health. Such confrontational rather than cooperative approaches must have made the care that European doctors were able to offer less effective than it might otherwise have been. Yet at the same time, the establishment of the district medical officers made a claim that was largely new: that the state should take responsibility for the health of the

population. This view was not simply about preventing suffering; it was infused with a sense of the population as a labor resource that must be safeguarded for the benefit of planters and other potential employers, and, ultimately, for the benefit of the imperial economy.

The early period of Crown Colony government also saw significant changes in family law. In 1869 the legislature passed a maintenance law, making parents of “illegitimate” children financially responsible for their children to the same extent as parents of children born to married parents. Although posed as being about parents, this law was in fact directed at fathers. Grant argued that it would remove a counterincentive to marriage, assuming that low rates of marriage derived from men’s reluctance to take responsibility for their children.³⁹ During the tenure of Grant’s successor, Sir William Grey, a good deal of additional family-related legislation was passed, dealing with marriage, divorce, and the registration of children and their maintenance.⁴⁰ These shifts in family law, like changes to the system of public health, implicitly asserted the inclusion of poor Jamaicans in “society.” The new legal arrangements recognized the difference between Jamaican and middle-class British family forms (through the extension of responsibility to the “illegitimate”) but retained the assumption of the superiority of British norms.

Historian James Patterson Smith has noted the “racial reasoning” that underlay many of Grant’s policies and in particular his overall assumption that centralized and unelected Crown Colony government was necessary for the Caribbean. Black Jamaicans, Grant claimed, were “ill-suited” for self-government because they possessed “not one Anglo-Saxon characteristic.”⁴¹ But he also justified Crown Colony rule on the basis of the limitations of the white planter class. To him, the Morant Bay rebellion demonstrated

the failure of their government, just as the 1857 Rebellion in India indicated the failure of Company rule (direct government by the East India Company). In both cases, a more centralized form of government was now necessary. Without autocracy, Grant believed, the reforms necessary to develop colonial societies and secure them against popular discontent could not be implemented. His policies, and those of his successors in Crown Colony government, created significant changes in the nature of the Jamaican state. Even though the shift to Crown Colony government decisively declared that Jamaicans could not represent themselves through electoral politics, the development of new state activities in the second half of the Victorian period, especially medical services and public health provisions, and shifts in family law suggested a different way of conceptualizing the relationship between government and population. A new form of colonial community was in the making.

Notes

¹ For analysis of Jamaican electoral politics in this period, see Thomas C. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 215–342, and Gad Heuman, *Between Black and White: Race, Politics, and the Free Coloreds in Jamaica, 1792–1865* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), parts 2 and 3.

² Swithin Wilmot, “Race, Electoral Violence and Constitutional Reform in Jamaica, 1830–1854,” *Journal of Caribbean History* 17 (1982): 1–13.

³ Gad Heuman, “The British West Indies,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 486–87; Mimi Sheller, *Democracy after Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 6.

⁴ Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 332.

⁵ Krista A. Thompson, *An Eye for the Tropics: Tourism, Photography, and Framing the Caribbean Picturesque* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), 87–91.

⁶ For an example of a work that takes such a perspective, see John Harrison, "The Colonial Legacy and Social Policy in the British Caribbean," in *Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy*, ed. James Midgley and David Piachaud (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 59–60.

⁷ On the events of 1760, see Maria Alessandra Bollettino, "Slavery, War, and Britain's Atlantic Empire: Black Soldiers, Sailors, and Rebels in the Seven Years' War" (PhD thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 2009), 195–234; Vincent Brown, 'Slave Revolt in Jamaica, 1760-1761: A Cartographic Narrative', revolt.axismaps.com/project.html last accessed 14 July 2017; Trevor Burnard and John Garrigus, *The Plantation Machine: Atlantic Capitalism in French Saint-Domingue and British Jamaica* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), pp. 122-136; Michael Craton, *Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), 125–39. The best account of the 1831 rebellion remains Mary Turner, *Slaves and Missionaries: The Disintegration of Jamaican Slave Society, 1787–1834* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 148–77.

⁹ Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State," (1977) [How is this date operating here—omit?], *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1988): 58–89.

¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.

¹¹ This approach is modelled on Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). See also Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994).

¹² See, for instance, Robert Gray, *The Factory Question and Industrial England, 1830–1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹³ Gad Heuman, *"The Killing Time": The Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica* (London, Macmillan Caribbean, 1994), 40–42.

¹⁴ The West India Prisons Act of 1838 was intended to transfer responsibility for overseeing West Indian prisons from colonial legislatures to governors, thus reducing the power of the legislature. See Diana Paton, *No Bond But the Law: Punishment, Race, and Gender in Jamaican State Formation, 1780–1870* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), chap. 3. The Sugar Duties Act of 1846 ended preferences in the taxation system for sugar produced within the British Empire. On the regular retrenchment crises, see Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 209–11.

¹⁵ Charles Edward Grey to Earl Grey, no. 5, Jan. 18, 1847, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, U.K., CO 137/291; Grey to Grey, no. 41, March 27, 1849, TNA CO 137/302.

¹⁶ Charles Edward Grey to Earl Grey, no. 29. (no. 46), June 7, 1851, in "Despatches Relative to the Condition of the Sugar-Growing Colonies, Part II, Jamaica," *Parliamentary Papers (PP)* 1852–1853 (76) LXVII, 66–70.

¹⁷ See, for instance, Grant's address to the Jamaican Legislative Council, Oct. 16, 1866, enc. in J. Peter Grant to Earl of Carnarvon, no. 7 (no. 31), Oct. 23, 1866, in "Further Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Jamaica," *PP* 1867 [3859] [3909], XLIX, 8–9.

¹⁸ Grant to the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, May 9, 1867, no. 28 (no. 90), in "Further Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Jamaica," *PP* 1867 [3859] [3909], XLIX, 58–62.

¹⁹ F. R Augier, "Crown Colony Government in Jamaica 1865–1884" (PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, 1953), 178.

²⁰ See, for instance, Dorothy Porter, *Health, Civilization and the State: A History of Public Health from Ancient to Modern Times* (London: Routledge, 1999), 110–46.

²¹ Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 318–32 (on Ireland), 327, 336–37 (on India).

²² Earl of Carnarvon to Sir J. Peter Grant, Aug. 1, 1866, no. 3 (no. 32), in "Further Correspondence relative to the Affairs of Jamaica," *PP* 1867 [3859] [3909], XLIX, 88.

²³ Earl of Carnarvon to Sir J. Peter Grant, Aug. 1, 1866.

²⁴ Ram Suresh Sharma, *Bengal under John Peter Grant (1859–1862)* (Delhi: Capital Publishing House, 1989).

²⁵ Veront M. Satchell, *From Plots to Plantations: Land Transactions in Jamaica, 1866–1900* (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1990), 72–78.

²⁶ Simon Stevenson, "Open Field or Enclosure? Peasants, Planters' Agents and Lawyers in Jamaica, 1866–1875," *Rural History* 12, no. 1 (2001): 41–59.

²⁷ Henry T. Irving (on behalf of John Peter Grant), response to memorial of James McCleod, William Tongue, John Lyon, Joseph Brown, Daniel McFarlane, Archibald Hamilton, and Samuel Lewin, Sept. 25, 1866, enc. in Grant to Carnarvon, Oct. 9, 1866, no. 2, "Further Correspondence," *PP* 1867 [3859] [3909], XLIX, 3. For earlier developments, see H. P. Storks to Edward Cardwell, March 16, 1866, no. 10 (no. 62), in "Papers relative to the affairs of Jamaica," *PP* 1866 [3595] [3749], LI, 66–67, and Storks to Cardwell, June 30, 1866, no. 2 (no. 139), "Further Correspondence," *PP* 1867 [3859] [3903], 2–3. Veront M. Satchell, *From Plots to Plantations: Land Transactions in Jamaica, 1866–1900* (Mona, Jamaica: Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1990), 77, discusses the earlier stages of the case, noting Storks's involvement, but not the later events under Grant's governorship.

²⁸ Jonathan Dalby, "A Cinderella Service: The Organization and Personnel of the Jamaican Police before and after 1865," unpublished paper, 2008, citing Grant to Buckingham, no. 248, Oct. 24, 1868, TNA CO 137/436.

²⁹ Dalby, "Cinderella Service," citing Law 16 of 1870, "A Law for the More Effectual Prevention of Crime," also known as "The Habitual Criminals Law," and *Daily Gleaner*, April 24 and 28, 1873.

³⁰ Grant to Buckingham, no. 122, July 9, 1867, TNA CO 137/425.

³¹ V. J. Marsala, *Sir John Peter Grant, Governor of Jamaica, 1866–1874: An Administrative History* (Kingston, Institute of Jamaica, 1972), 43.

³² See "The Reformatories Law 1869," in *A Supplement to the Digest of the Laws of Jamaica, Containing those Passed in the Year 1869*, William Rastrick Lee, 78–81 (Kingston: M. de Cordova, 1870).

³³ David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Mark Harrison, *Public Health and Preventive Medicine in British India, 1859–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

³⁴ Marsala, *Sir John Peter Grant*, 48, 104. This central board of health was, in fact, a recreation. A central board of health had been created as a temporary measure during the cholera epidemic of 1850–1851; it was disbanded after the epidemic.

³⁵ James C. Riley, *Poverty and Life Expectancy: The Jamaican Paradox* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 50; Nadja Durbach, *Bodily Matters: The Anti-Vaccination Movement in England, 1853–1907* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005).

³⁶ Darcy Hughes Heuring, "Health and the Politics of 'Improvement' in British Colonial Jamaica, 1914–1945" (PhD thesis, Northwestern University, 2011), 24. For comparison, see Phillippa Levine, *Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

³⁷ Riley, *Poverty and Life Expectancy*.

³⁸ Riley, *Poverty and Life Expectancy*, 49–50.

³⁹ Grant to Carnarvon, Nov. 8, 1869, no. 262, TNA CO 137/444. See also Eileen Boxill, "Developments in Family Law since Emancipation," *West Indian Law Journal* 9 (1985): 9–20.

⁴⁰ Brian L. Moore and Michele A. Johnson, *Neither Led nor Driven: Contesting British Cultural Imperialism in Jamaica, 1865–1920* (Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2004), 122.

⁴¹ Grant to the Dissenting Ministers of Falmouth, April 19, 1869, TNA CO 137/441, quoted in James Patterson Smith, "The Liberals, Race and Political Reform in the British West Indies, 1866–1974," *Journal of Negro History* 79, no. 2 (1994): 140.