Notes on the Subaltern: Or, How Postcolonial Critique Meets the Perpetrator

Let me begin with an image: the body of a child, drained of life and color. Its mouth slightly parted; white, unblinking spots where there were once, perhaps, seeing eyes. Its torso – broken flesh, broken bone – encased in broken stone.¹

Then the story: December 3rd, 1984. The populace of the city Bhopal in central India is gassed with 27 tons of methyl isocyanate that leaked from a pesticide factory: “It felt like somebody had filled our bodies up with red chillies, our eyes tears coming out, noses were watering, we had froth in our mouths” (Champa Devi Shukla, quoted by International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal 2014). Within 24 hours, this city-turned-gas-chamber claimed over two thousand lives, devastated over 150,000 bodies, thousands of which were – which are – yet to be born. The next morning, a father buries his child. “Unable to bear the thought of never seeing her again”, we are told, “he brushed away the dirt for one last look”.

The catastrophe in Bhopal has been described as an act of corporate killing (Jones 1988), the effect of a moral disregard for socioeconomically subjugated populations (Mukherjee 2010; Fortun 2000). Thus, the image represents not only the violation of a particular child but also the many bodies similarly devastated, and those yet awaiting this fate. The destruction of the body, the irruption of organic matter, visible in the image, then, speaks the singular and historical act of killing. To think the event as such – i.e. as killing – evokes the question of perpetration. That is, it compels us to ask after the performers and performance of act(s) of injury. Following this line of inquiry, some studies of Bhopal have produced a detailed account of particular actors, corporate and political, involved in the variety of decisions that precipitated the leak, thereby tracing a line between doer(s) and deed (cf. Ali 1987; Chouhan et al. 1994). Others have taken a broader view, seeking to historicize the event through a consideration of the socio-political and economic particularities that engendered the event (cf. Guillette 2008; Shrivastava 1987). To be sure, each of these approaches is concerned with the question of accountability not merely for the purpose of redress but also to think through the possibilities of preventing similar disasters in the future. Yet, evaluations of accountability are contingent upon the location of agency – whether within individual or structural contexts – so that investigations of perpetration are concerned, in fact, with agency as the condition of possibility for the act.

In this chapter, I interrogate the significance of agency in contexts such as Bhopal. In particular, I focus on Bhopal as activity against the subaltern and outline the implications of asking the question of perpetratorship therein. Insofar as perpetrator studies is concerned with the figure of the perpetrator, it assumes the agency of a self-knowing subject whose performative capacity is embedded in particular ethico-political rationalities (cf. Feldman 1991). Moreover, given that scenes of violation are constituted through the triangulation of subject, object and act, the rationale that describes agency simultaneously describes its object. For instance, in the case of Bhopal, the rationalization of agency lies between the poles of economic fundamentalism,¹¹ and economic and political expediency.¹³ Accordingly, the victims of the leak are either ill-fated objects of rescue or expendable objects of contempt. Within the contemporary global regime of human rights, the latter description seems inadmissible so that the figure of the perpetrator is approached as a transgressor against an established moral order. Yet, the image of the child, I suggest, is a representation not merely of transgression but, more crucially, of repetition. That is, as I will argue in this chapter, whereas perpetration as transgression signifies a wrongful rupture in the moral order, the perpetration of violence against subaltern bodies is part of an ongoing history of killing, whose rationality flows from the description of the subaltern as
expendable. Thus, acts of violence against subaltern bodies are a repetition of killing as constitutive of the moral order.

Understanding violence against the subaltern as such requires us to re-think approaches to perpetration. In order to do so, I will introduce the figure of the subaltern and outline how postcolonial studies can contribute to the encounter between perpetrator studies and the subaltern. Thereafter, I will use the concept of agential separability to critique our (possible) investments – as witness/researcher/writer – in the figure of the perpetrator and acts of perpetration, especially in relation to the violation of subaltern bodies.

I begin, however, with a brief outline of the imperative to re-think approaches to perpetration.

Re-encountering perpetrator studies

As already noted, perpetrator studies generally seeks to address the figure of the perpetrator and to comprehend the conditions that facilitated associated acts of perpetration. This approach tends towards the evental wherein historical consideration focuses largely upon the context for the acts rather than their own historicity. To consider the historicity of an act is to recognise not only its material but also its onto-epistemic lineage. Such an approach would necessitate a shift away from the figure perpetrator towards the signifying effects of perpetration. In particular, it requires a rethinking of the relation between doer and deed. Most accounts of agency posit a causal relation between doer and deed, wherein the doer is imagined separate from, and prior to, the deed. This description of agency follows from the notion of action as an effect of will.

Contrary to this view, Nietzsche’s oft-cited critique of agency asserts that “there is no “being” behind the doing, acting, becoming” he writes, ““the doer” has simply been added to the deed by the imagination - the doing is everything” (1956, 178–79; added emphasis). This follows from his postulation of will not as an effect of reason (as per Kant) but as “simply a matter of commanding and obeying, on the groundwork… of a society constructed out of many “souls”” (2002, 20; see also 1956, 190-191). Here, soul is a “subject-multiplicity” or “a society constructed out of drives and affects” (2002, 14; added emphasis). Thus, Nietzsche views the idea of will as that which “merely captures the idea that mental entities have an urge to be realised” (Risse 2007, 65). All activity, then, is simply actualisation.

For Nietzsche, the agent is not the source of an act but is rather a rationalising myth that serves the purpose of identifying a contemporaneous origin or source of injury. As such, the appending of doer to deed is an effect of the law of contract that requires a responsible subject in order to dispense punishment for the infliction of suffering (1956, 194–98). This approach to agency as invention signals a rejection of the Kantian notion of morality as a system of a priori principles, the understanding and abiding of which are imperative for the ethical (or human) subject. Instead, Nietzsche argues, “morality [must be] understood as a doctrine of the power relations under which the phenomenon of “life” arises” (2002, 20; added emphasis). That is, morality is a system of ends, one that seeks to formalise the subjugation of certain affects and drives that, through a dominating power, come to be described as evil to others that come to be described as good. It is through this dynamic of valorization that the appearances of an ideal life and moral world are created. It is also, therefore, within this context alone that any interpretation of activity and ascription of accountability becomes possible.

If we accept this proposition, then focusing on the figure of perpetrator and the singularity of perpetration inhibits our ability (1) to interrogate the historicity of the moral framework that
evaluates action as perpetration and (2) to comprehend perpetration as a historical force, or drive, that produces the world as we perceive it. A concern, instead, with the signifying effects of perpetration would provide insight into the creation of the contemporary global moral order and the significance of the drives that have been suppressed therein, drives that are ultimately unleashed in perpetrative activity.

As already indicated, in this chapter I seek to approach violence against subaltern bodies, such as that evidenced in Bhopal, as iterative activity that rehearses their institution as expendable objects. If, as Nietzsche proposes, it is only a moralising force that demands that the suppression of “bad” drives in relation to the “good”, then it is this same force – the judgement of a moralistic order – that mistakenly anticipates the life of the subaltern and laments its death. I substantiate this proposition in the next section through an engagement with this figure. Thereafter, I propose postcolonial critique as a methodology that can help us approach perpetration as the actualisation of the subaltern as expendable.

**Encountering the subaltern**

In 1968, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) (a subsidiary of the U.S. Union Carbide Corporation), set up its Pesticides and Formulations plant in Bhopal, at the behest of the Indian government. The development of this plant was in keeping with India’s post-independence industrialisation project intended towards economic growth and national prosperity. The choice of Bhopal as the site for this production facility was deliberate due to its status as a fledgling city and the capital of the relatively “undeveloped” state of Madhya Pradesh. Given this circumstance, the government required opportunities to expand employment as well as to create a confidence-building precedent that could attract greater foreign investment.

The state’s push towards industrial growth was concomitant with the devalorization of traditional methods of agriculture, resulting in an economically untenable rural to urban migration. Indeed, a substantial portion of the communities outside the factory walls were made up of first and second generation migrants displaced from their rural communities by the imposition of mechanized agriculture (Mukherjee 2010). These people, who were lured to urban areas for the economic betterment promised by the state’s development visions, settled in colonies outside the factory “without papers”. This precarious situation coerced a silence that they hoped would protect them from evacuation by the city (Chouhan et al. 1994). Eventually, in order to improve its own image, UCIL handed out land deeds to some in these communities despite the fact that they had failed to establish the necessary safety zones. But the residents themselves had little idea that “the plant was producing one of the most dangerous compounds ever conceived by the chemical industry” (Guillette 2008, 174). In fact, a project manager for the plant described the development of this project as “analogous to planting a bomb near where people live and children play” (Fortun 2001, 117).

The pain and suffering that unfolded in the aftermath of the Bhopal gas leak epitomize the experience of suffering as “actively created and distributed by the social order itself” (Das 1995, 138). Whether it be the physical pain described by survivors like Champa Devi Shukla (quoted above) or the spectacular representation of pain on the child’s body in Rai’s image – each iteration is ultimately an embodied “stamp of the authority of society upon the docile bodies of its members” (1995, 138). That is, pain is the actualization of an originary epistemic injury that instituted the subaltern within the economy of death. I substantiate this further by describing how the subaltern is constituted as a collection of traces.
An engagement with the figure of the subaltern may begin with a consideration of the Gramscian definition of subalternity as the condition of being subjugated by hegemonic power. Specifically, subalternity demarcates a political location that is sharply distinct from and in strong opposition to elite domination. Furthermore, this distinction may be understood as the basis for the formation of a unified subaltern identity and hence of collective action (cf. Guha 1981; Green 2010). Within the postcolonial, and specifically Indian, context, this description of the subaltern was appropriated by The Subaltern Studies Collective in an endeavor to recuperate the historical agency of the underclasses – and the Indian peasant, in particular – from their suppression within colonial and national/ist historiography. Through this historicization, the work of the Collective came to record the mis-/displaced representations of the subaltern wrought by hegemonic (colonial and bourgeois nationalist) ideals. In so doing, these writings were able to present the subaltern as “that impossible thought, figure, or action without which the dominant discourse cannot exist and which is acknowledged in its subterfuges and stereotypes” (Prakash 1994, 1483). In other words, even though the writings of the Collective were committed to historical rectification and recovery, their account of the subaltern implicated the violent, and violating, itinerary of colonial, and ultimately “Western”, power in absenting the subaltern. Their work thus anticipated the condition of the subaltern as trace.

The trace may be understood as the mark of an erasure enacted in the constitution of a given object (Derrida 1973; Derrida 1997). An object emerges qua object – i.e. functions as signifier – by entering into a “system of differences” (1973, 145). In particular, the object is structured through the erasure of all that is different or other. This is the condition of possibility for the appearance of objects as such. The trace, then, is the “silent mark” (1973, 132) – the mark of that which has been rendered absent, invisible – in the production of appearances. To be sure, this mark is contained, albeit elided, in the appearance, so that trace is, in fact, constitutive of the it. Indeed, the trace belongs to the structure of the object, it is that which “opens appearance and signification” (1997, 65).

The “postcolonial turn” in subaltern studies, and specifically the work of literary theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, takes up this notion of the trace to offer a critical description of the subaltern. While the Subaltern Studies Collective undertook to describe the historiographic and materialist erasure of the subaltern under colonialism, Spivak’s work furthers this description through a consideration of the subaltern as an effect of onto-epistemic erasures. Specifically, she draws attention to the erasure of particular modes of existence that are the condition of possibility for the emergence of the human as phenomenon. As such, the subaltern is the mark of these erasures, indeed is “a site of unlisted traces” (1999, 6), that constitutes the human. Practically speaking, then, the subaltern appears as “a position without identity” constituted through an exclusion from “institutional [onto-epistemic and, hence, sociopolitical] infrastructure” (Spivak 2005, 476). This exclusion the renders the speech of the subaltern unhearable and its activity unrecognizable as such. Spivak’s description of the subaltern thus recognises this figure as an effect of onto-epistemic disappearance.

Now, in Derrida’s view, the fidelity of an object is contingent upon the continued erasure – i.e. the guarantee of the non-exposure – of the trace. For the irruption of the trace would bring into crisis not only the coherence of the object as signifier but also its primacy in relation to its others.3 Moreover, in the instance where a trace does become revealed, its constitution as object – as a nameable and knowable entity – always already effects new erasures. That is, insofar as the trace is the condition of possibility for the emergence of objects, the apparent liberation of
Accordingly, insofar as the subaltern is the trace that constitutes the human, the suppression of subalternity – its continued invisibility – is the condition of possibility for the appearance of humanity. Furthermore, the irruption of subalternity as disappeared difference already threatens the signification and primacy of humanity. The perpetual material and epistemic effacement of the subaltern guarantees the ontological security of the human. As such, expendability is the essential characteristic – the ontological condition – of the subaltern.

Thus, in the case of contemporary activity against the subaltern, focus on the figure of the perpetrator as agent of injury elides both the originary and iterative violence. In order to remain faithful to the subaltern as trace, it is necessary to comprehend activity against the subaltern as an ongoing doing, the realisation of an urge, albeit conditioned, to expunge subalternity so as to assure the unfolding of humanity. Killing, then, is merely the manifestation of a drive that realises the subaltern as expendable. In the following section I propose postcolonial critique as a methodology that facilitates this recognition.

The methodology of postcolonial critique

Over three decades on, the chemical plant in Bhopal still stands as a toxic reminder of the events of 1984. Even as its after-effects continue to wreak havoc on the lives of survivors, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC, now Dow Chemicals) has been excused from formal liability for the leak. However, as an expression of moral responsibility, UCC contributed approximately $130 million to various emergency, health and vocational funds. During this period, it simultaneously argued against the litigation of any claims against it, and especially so within the U.S. judicial system. This move was substantiated by assertions of an unresolvable “cultural difference” between India and the U.S., one that imputed deficient, indeed perverse, moral-cultural “values” (Fortun 2001).

This circumstance had serious implications for any possibility of justice for the workers and residents of Bhopal. The presumed cultural deficiencies of survivors rendered them unreliable sources who produced exaggerated accounts of injury. Moreover, the inability of survivors to translate injury into scientific/medical language removed their own experiences and understanding from carrying juridical import, thereby subjugating self-knowledge to institutional claims to scientific and legal expertise (cf. Das 1995; Jasanoff 2007). Consequently, in a performance of moral duty, the Indian government and UCC undertook to negotiate a settlement under the principle of parens patriae. In so doing, they deprived victims of the leak the right to represent themselves, and to opt out of proxy representation. Instead the government viewed this curtailment of the rights as “[t]he appropriate response… such that the largest good of the largest number is served. Justice, then, was a utilitarian quantification” (Fortun 2001, 40).

This circumstance epitomizes how, for the subaltern, every appearance is a disappearance. In the first instance, the subalternity of the survivors of Bhopal always already denied them the sociopolitical infrastructure required to be seen and heard (Spivak 2005). Moreover, absent access to this infrastructure, they lacked recognisable agency, where agency names “institutionally validated action, assuming collectivity” (2005, 475). It is this apparent lack of agency that validated the state’s paternalistic intervention. Moreover, in order to reclaim agency, it became necessary for survivors to “metonymise/synecdochise [themselves], understand the part by which [they were] connected to that abstract whole so that [they could]
claim it” (2005, 483). This is evident in the requirement to narrate injury through the rational discourses of science and law. This refiguring of speech is the re-enactment of an originary erasure – i.e. the negation of any existential difference. In other words, in order to make themselves seeable and hearable, survivors had to disappear their onto-epistemic selves. Every appearance is a disappearance.

The repetition of epistemic pain evident herein is authorized by the juridical imperative to designate a “doer” and “deed”. That is, in order to arrogate accountability and provide redress, the state must identify a wrong doer – here, UCC – as the source of material injury – and indicate wrongful act – here, negligence. Yet, material and epistemic pain are not related as cause and effect. Rather, given the ontological condition of the subaltern, material injury is merely the repetition of the originary onto-epistemic injury that produced the subaltern as the other of the human. Moreover, the ongoing onto-epistemic suppression of survivors rehearses the rendering of the subaltern as trace. The material and epistemic pain evidenced in Bhopal are thus entangled – i.e. they “lack an independent, self-contained existence” (Barad 2007, ix).

As such, material and epistemic pain are not separate but can be made to appear as if separate (non-mutual) through the intervention of the figure of the perpetrator. More importantly, this apparent separation absents the epistemic violence inherent in material injury. In the next section, I will propose an underlying purpose for the investment in material injury and the associated imperative for accountability as it emerges in perpetrator studies. In this section, however, I focus on how postcolonial critique remains faithful to the subaltern by asserting the material and epistemic pain as entangled.

If colonialism names “the historical process whereby the ‘West’ attempts systematically to cancel or negate the cultural difference and value of the ‘non-West’” (Gandhi 1998, 16), then postcolonial critique marks an opening towards these negations that approaches what is lost therein. Specifically, it signals an attentiveness to subjugations, or foreclosures, of particular modes of knowing and existence as effected by the universalising of “Europe” – i.e. the institution of a spatio-temporally specific ontoepistemology as world historical. Consequently, postcolonial critique is the practice of traveling the “fault lines [of dominant discourse] in order to provide different accounts, to describe histories revealed in the cracks of the colonial archaeology of knowledge” (Prakash 1994, 1486). This archaeology entails an accounting of humanism, the fundamental proposition of Enlightenment that enabled the imposition of universality as the condition of ontoepistemic subjugation. Colonial subjugation is the institution of native modes of existence and knowing as differentially human. In this context, postcolonial critique advances itself through anti-humanist contention.¹²

In particular, the method of postcolonial critique, consists of historicizing the subaltern. To be sure, such historicization does not merely entail the rectification of and recovery from the edifice of history but rather necessitates a confrontation with “sites of legitimation and authorization” (Feldman 1991, 2) that suppress subalternity. Insofar as the figure of the human is designated as the agent of History, to historicize the subaltern is to ask after the historical practices that have foreclosed her from this phenomenon of the human. Below I engage Hortense Spillers’ account of violence perpetrated against the African body under coloniality as an instance of such historicization.¹²

In her text ‘Mama’s baby, Papa’s maybe’, Spillers notes that the African slave trade with/in the Americas is generally regarded as a case of “high crimes against the flesh” (1987, 67). Here, injury is seen to proceed through flesh in its “seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted to the ship’s hole, fallen, or “escaped” overboard” (1987, 67). Flesh, according to Spillers, is the primary medium through which the body is written as text – before body there is flesh – so
that the violation of body is the disintegration of a text and thus the dissolution of person to
mere matter. She explicates this circumstance as the “theft of the body” (1987, 67) that
inaugurated the New World order. During the Middle Passage the body qua body is in
suspension – dissolved of all its indigenous signification and produced as undifferentiated mass
it awaits a new inscription – through name, identity, signification – that will be gained only
upon reaching land at the other end (1987, 72). As such, the relation between body and person
is severe through material violation from which follows the external imposition of meanings
and uses. This represents a theft, a “severing of the captive body from motive will and desire”
(1987, 67). Spillers’ account of injury thus affirms how the instrument of torture, wielded
by/for the slave master upon flesh, also effect onto-epistemic effacement.

Moreover, the distinction between body and flesh, according to Spillers, is the primary
distinction between liberated and captive subject-positions. To wit, the black female body, as
the objectified other, is produced through instruments of torture, through acts of material
wounding. The markings of torture thus effected – what Spillers refers to as a “hieroglyphics
of flesh” – become invisible once the body materializes within a cultural code organized
through skin colour. Yet, despite this invisibility, the hieroglyphs are transferred across
generations so that the body, marked by colour and other culturally identifiable determinants,
remains vulnerable to “protocols of “search and destroy”” enacted by and for the state (1987,
67). The liberation of the black female from captivity and her restoration as subject is thus
always already an impossibility. Indeed, the unfolding of violation follows from the imperative
to keep the black female body, and all that it has been made to signify, as the absented presence
– the trace – that constitutes humanity. So that all ongoing activity against this figure is a
historically authorized doing of an originary material and onto-epistemic deed. All activity
against the subaltern is thus a signifying performance.

Insofar as postcolonial critique recognises these enactments as such, it demands an
attentiveness to the historicity of perpetration, the replication of a practice exemplified in
Spillers’ account above. Such historicization reveals how the emergence of the subaltern and
the subject as, respectively, external to and the objectification of the human are an effect of “a
doctrine of the power relations” (Nietzsche 2002, 20). Indeed, these power relations effect, and
are effected by, material practices that affirm a specific articulation of morality – one that posits
the figure of the subaltern as ethically degraded and hence expendable. Consequently,
postcolonial critique insists on recognizing acts of injury against the subaltern not as
transgressions against, but instead fundamental to, the contemporary moral order.

To comprehend activity against the subaltern through the figure of a perpetrator, then, is to
fundamentally misapprehend her. Such readings of perpetration betray a faith in the moral
order of liberal humanism, in the liberalized fiction of the human. Liberal humanism seeks to
liberate the subaltern as trace – that is, to make forms of existence previously ejected from
humanity appear as such. In other words, liberal humanism assumes the possibility of rendering
the figure of the subaltern as subject. Only then can activity against the subaltern can be held
as immoral and/or unlawful, so that the designation of a perpetrator becomes viable. Yet, as
evidenced above, the condition of possibility for the (institutional) appearance of the figure of
the subaltern as a legible entity is its (onto-epistemic) disappearance. The subaltern, thus, is not
an easily recuperable subject-position. Accordingly, one becomes compelled to ask what
purpose a concern with the figure of the perpetrator and an ensuing demand for accountability
serves in relation to activity against the subaltern.

In order to attempt a response, the final section of this chapter advances an ethical concern with
the notion of agential separability.
Agential separability: How postcolonial studies meets the perpetrator

The case of Bhopal, as outlined in this chapter, reveals how for the subaltern recuperation is the re-enactment of annihilation. The subaltern qua subaltern has no place within humanity; to make it occupy such a space is to deny its essence. Concerns with “responsibility” and “accountability” within the contemporary human rights regime compel the legibility of the subaltern. Such legibility, however, is merely a legitimisation of the human, one that rehearses the subaltern as the mark of death.

Recalling the Nietzschean description of morality as a system of ends, it may be argued that the pursuit of accountability for the subaltern as an object of perpetration becomes imperative primarily in order to institutionalize appearances of “good” and “evil”. The pursuit of accountability, however, is not identical to the pursuit of justice. From the perspective of postcolonial critique, this necessitates, in the first instance, staying with the subaltern as trace. In the previous section, I suggested that such faithfulness to subaltern makes imperative a practice of historicization that comprehends perpetration as a signifying gesture.

Furthermore, the possibility of justice for those abandoned by humanity – those that remain unseen and unheard within it – lies not in some form of restoration that “deal[s] with a past [but rather with] retribution [that] seeks to create a certain kind of present moment and future”, a moment that can begin to “build [community] anew where it never before existed” (Stauffer 2015; added emphasis). That is, justice entails repair intended towards a renewed form of relations rather than mere redress (i.e. “fixing” that which has been destroyed to some imagined original form). This form of reparative justice requires, in the first instance, creating anew the conditions for seeing and listening. This makes imperative the turning of the gaze from the subaltern back onto ourselves as observers in an attempt to comprehend our own relationality with the subaltern. To do so, we must recognise ourselves as separable from subalternity.

Agential separability is a condition of “exteriority within (material-discursive) phenomena” (Barad 2003, 825). Barad offers this concept as a critique of the ontological determinism that establishes differences as fixed. Agential separability affirms difference as neither a priori nor an absolute distinction, but rather the consequence of an agential cut made by instruments of observation and comprehension that produces separation within phenomena (2007, 140). Thus, for instance, agential separability allows us to comprehend how the notion of rational agency produces a cut within the phenomenon of the human in order to produce the subaltern as different from the subject and external to the human.

Crucially, agential separability reconfigures the notion of agency as “not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world” (2003, 818). That is, agency is not a causal force acting between entities – i.e. between a subject who has agency and an object that lacks it – but rather designates a relational force that facilitates the mutual becoming of separable entities. It is “a matter of intra-acting: it is an enactment, not something that someone or something has…. It is the enactment of iterative changes to particular practices…” (2007, 178 original emphasis). Agency, then, does not presume action according to a motive will exercised by already constituted entities. Rather, it lies in the iterative performance of material-discursive practices that affirm entities as different. Thus, reading activity against the subaltern through the figure of the perpetrator – specifically, through a causal description of agency – is itself a part of the violent “doing”.

Alternately, a refiguration of agency – one that moves away from a juridical concern with causality to an ethical concern with separability – allows us to recognise how the liberal
humanist order produces a cut between the figure of the perpetrator as wrong doer and the observer as judge to establish them as morally distinct entities. This separation allows the observer to distance themselves not only from the perpetrator but also from the act of perpetration. Insofar as perpetration is iterative activity, the observer is also able to disregard their existence as an effect of the originary cut that ejected the subaltern from the field of humanity. This, I propose, is the tacit investment in grasping the figure of the perpetrator in relation to activity against the subaltern.

Given its ethical investment in historicizing the subaltern, postcolonial critique forces a recognition of the observer as separable from, and hence a co-produced effect of, the observed. It thereby compels a self-implicating reckoning with onto-epistemic complicity in ongoing activity against the subaltern. It is as such that postcolonial critique meets the perpetrator.

References


‘Burial of an unknown child’, captured by the Indian photographer, Raghu Rai.

Specifically, the faith in developmentalism as key to social, and indeed human, progress.

In his study of the crisis, Paul Shrivastava describes Bhopal as ‘a textbook example of a rapidly developing city that sought – and obtained – sophisticated Western-style industrialization without making a commensurate investment in industrial infrastructure or rural development’ (1987, 57). Indeed, the state’s push towards industrial growth through the concomitant devalorisation of traditional methods of agriculture resulted in an economically untenable rural to urban migration. Moreover, the location of the Union Carbide factory violated the city’s own zoning codes. But Union Carbide sought to appease these concerns by funding a public park. In return, Municipal Commissioners who sought to move the factory were replaced by those who were more amenable to state and corporate aspirations (Ali 1987, 175). The promise of economic growth thus seemed to warrant the expedient execution of business deeds.

The Subaltern Studies Collective was initially comprised of the historians Ranajit Guha, Shahid Amin, David Arnold, Partha Chatterjee, David Hardiman and Gyanendra Pandey. The first volume of their collected works was published in 1982. Guha’s 1983 text “Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency in colonial India” is generally viewed as the foundational text of this project.

“All the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is constructed”, notes Derrida, emerge of “a necessity such that one of the terms appears as… the other as “differed” within a systematic ordering of the same” (1973, 149).

To quote Derrida:

The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace. Effacement must always be able to overtake the trace; otherwise it would not be a trace but an indestructible and monumental substance. In addition, and from the start, effacement constitutes it as a trace – effacement establishes the trace in a change of place and makes it disappear in its appearing…” (1973, 156).

In a statement commemorating the anniversary of leak, the then-CEO of UCC, Warren Andersen noted:

We saw Bhopal for what it was – a terrible tragedy involving real people who had either lost family members or had suffered injuries, in some cases serious injuries. They needed medical relief, prompt aid in any form possible, and an early settlement which would help restore their lives and bring long-term relief. They didn’t need what they ultimately got – armies of lawyers and politicians who spent years claiming to represent them and deciding what was in their best interests. We saw Bhopal in moral – not in legal – terms. Although we had good legal defences – the plant wasn’t ours and it later was established that the tragedy had been caused by employee sabotage – we didn’t want to spend years arguing those issues in court while the victims waited. We therefore said immediately that Union Carbide Corporation would take any moral responsibility for the disaster. (printed in Fortun 2001, 99; emphasis added)
Arguing for the dismissal of claims filed by survivors of the leak in U.S. courts, the defense for UCC sought to highlight the practical impossibility for American courts and juries, imbued with US cultural values, living standards and expectations, to determine living standards for people living in the slums or ‘hutments’ surrounding UCIL, Bhopal, India, [thus] confirming that the Indian forum is overwhelmingly the most appropriate. Such abject poverty and the vastly different values, standards and expectations which accompany it are commonplace in India and the third world. They are incomprehensible to Americans living in the United States. (Amnesty International 2004, 51; emphasis added)

Indeed, the invocation of such difference enabled UCC to advance a sabotage theory that relied on the image of ‘a typical worker – stupid, vindictive, prone to lying’ (Chouhan et al. 1994).

This description of ‘postcolonial’ differs from the more common temporal understanding of the term. For a critique of this temporal association, see Shohat 1992.

Although Spillers’ work focuses on blackness and sits firmly with the tradition of black thought, her account of the violence of slavery as subalternising violence has much to offer the project of postcolonial critique. It is as such that I engage her work without any allusion of uniformity or agreement between black and postcolonial history and critique.