Introduction

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Abstract: this introductory article lays out some of the key intellectual, therapeutic, political, and social concerns where religion, science and the psy disciplines have come together – including what we ‘do’ with our experience of the world, and of ourselves; the means we choose to use in ordering our thoughts and emotions; the language(s) we deploy in doing so; and the authorities we look to for guidance. Short introductions are offered along the way to the work of scholars in this emerging field including Ashis Nandy and Nikolas Rose, alongside illustrative comparisons drawn from the Indian and Japanese contexts in the modern era. These latter span a range of concerns: the extension of interventionist ambitions by the modern state to include the utilization of the psy disciplines – theories, practitioners, institutions; the appearance of language associated with these disciplines in everyday life, sometimes using the health of individuals as a putative barometer of society’s health more broadly; and the power of entrepreneurial individuals to steer these disciplines in personalized directions, thanks both to their relative newness and the liminal nature of their subject matter. The chapter goes on to offer a survey of the articles featured in this special issue of South Asian History and Culture, contextualizing them and laying out the principal aims of the issue.

Keywords: mind sciences; psy disciplines; Sigmund Freud; Inoue Enryō; Girindrasekhar Bose.

The early 1950s, near Washington DC. A young man from South India, Kannu Rajan, sits with his analyst, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann. After all this time in analysis, suggests Fromm-Reichmann, surely Rajan now sees that his so-called ‘conversion experience’ some years before was merely the outcome of a powerful neurotic need that had built up over time? She receives an answer she doesn’t expect. ‘[Well] what else did God have to use but my neurosis?’, says Rajan. ‘He didn’t wait until I was a well-adjusted man to come to me’. Fromm-Reichmann perseveres, tut-tutting at this ‘oriental’ way of looking at things. ‘No, it isn’t’, said Rajan, ‘it’s the Gospel, the New Testament.’ And he quotes from Paul’s letter to the Romans (5:6): ‘While we were yet sinners, Christ died for the ungodly’. Fromm-Reichmann brings the day’s analysis to an abrupt halt.

The emergence of the modern mind sciences, and their encounters with cultures all around the world – other cultures, perhaps one should say: psychiatry, psychology, and psychotherapy in its various modalities are all, themselves, ‘cultures’ of a kind – have deep roots in a single human capacity, or dilemma: interpretation. What do we ‘do’ with our experience of the world, and of ourselves, from the moment-by-moment to what we sense of the past and of possible futures? How do we order our thoughts, and our emotions? Do we talk of minds or hearts, or both? Do we look for guidance to the past, to some particular community or sub-culture; some authority present to us in a text or a discipline, in person or in the politics of the day? And what if our thoughts and emotions are primarily ordered for
us? Choice is, after all, one aspect of human experience that is brought into question by the mind sciences and their counterparts – old and new – in global religious and philosophical systems.

The essays that make up this special edition of *South Asian History and Culture* all flow, in their own ways, from such problems and clashes of interpretation, as they have arisen in the context of dialogue and exchange on topics of mind, science, and self between thinkers and thoughts of the old ‘East’ and ‘West’. Does mystical experience offer us analytical purchase on the world – and, to reverse the question, is the world of analytical thought capable of gaining any purchase on the mystical? Of what ultimate value are the emotions that music stirs in us, and should they be categorised and regulated? Are they safe, might they mislead? How does one assess and apply the insights of mind sciences that emerge in individualistic cultures in those where families and relationships have different sorts of significance? How well do mind-science ‘discoveries’ and the assumptions that underpin them travel, in general? Are they so close that we end up just needing to iron out subtle differences between one lexicon and another, or do we struggle even to find a shared basis from which to begin a discussion? Is interpretation less about ‘culture’ in the sorts of place-bound or language-bound senses that can, with much labour, be overcome, and instead more about something rather more difficult to share and shape: sensibility? Is this what Sigmund Freud meant when he confessed to the French poet and mystic Romain Rolland that “To me mysticism is just as closed a book as music”?

* A survey of the territory staked out in the essays that follow in this themed edition of *South Asian History and Culture* should perhaps start with what appears to be a striking absence. Where is politics? Where is the state, and those who would criticize, resist, or seek to overthrow it? The answer: nowhere – and everywhere. For all that modern states, up to the mid-twentieth century, clearly took an interest in what citizens thought and felt, worried about and aspired to, historians of the mind sciences outside Europe have struggled to find much evidence to back Michel Foucault’s suggestive claim, decades ago: that the institutional and ideological potential of psychiatry for social control – policing the boundaries of the normal and the acceptable – has been eagerly harnessed as yet another dimension of state prerogative and power. Broadly speaking, states either did not have the resources to do this – as was the case under British colonialism in India and French colonialism in Africa – or if they did (or nearly did), then they could afford to use other, more straightforward, means towards achieving similar ends.

Perhaps the prime Asian example of a relatively well-resourced and deeply ambitious state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was Japan – worth dwelling on a little here for the rarely utilized comparative potential that it offers us. Japan’s governing elite certainly showed an interest in deploying newly imported mind sciences – academic psychology and psychiatry in particular – as part of their modernizing project. Just as Buddhist reformers like Inoue Enryō helped battle the attachment of gūmin (‘common’ or ‘stupid’ people) to the ghosts and monsters of the pre-modern past, by psychologizing such things as problems of flawed perception, it was hoped that academic psychiatry, in defining its objects of enquiry in neurobiological terms, would complement the government’s
educational and legislative attempts to rid Japan of ideas about animal possession, shamanism, and other religious healing rites.

So it was that leading mind science practitioners like Tokyo University’s Kure Shūzō, one-time student of Inoue Enryō and famed as Japan’s ‘father of psychiatry’, found themselves on the frontline of state attempts to forge a modern citizenry: expected to help draw new boundaries of reasonableness in thought and conduct, to tackle social deviancy (even to weed out incipient criminality), and to facilitate psychological self-help by engaging in tsūzokuka, or ‘popularization’ of relevant findings from their disciplines. Kure himself was assiduous in offering lectures to groups like the Greater Japan Women’s Hygiene Association, writing for popular magazines on mental hygiene, participating in the state’s Child Study Association, and helping the Ministry of Justice to train prison officers.

The mind sciences here, were not involved in overt acts of regulation or repression – Japan possessed Peace Preservation Laws that were broad enough in their terms (immorality, offence towards the Emperor, etc) and effective enough in the way they were policed, such that there was little psychiatrists could add (though some were, on occasion, called upon to testify in court). Rather, the mind sciences helped provide a language – backed by modern science – using which the people of Japan might regulate themselves. Their particular potency here lay in the way that they intersected, in ideological and professional terms, with the intimacies of the everyday: with behaviour, morality, motivations or pathologies of which the ‘owner’ him or herself might not be aware. One could say, even, that the mind sciences provided first the doubt and then the language – or, as some aspired to make it, the meta-language – with which to contest the coherence of rival worldviews. A given mind-science discipline or theory (one thinks immediately of Carl Jung, in this regard) could be an arbiter of rationalities. The implications of this are spelled out by the sociologist Nikolas Rose, in his work on the mind sciences – or ‘psy disciplines’, as he and others have called them – and governmentality. He notes a late twentieth-century trend away from traditional, external modes of surveillance and coercion towards more internalized forms, which feel as though they have been freely chosen by us for our own good:

Through self-inspection, self-problematization, self-monitoring and confession, we evaluate ourselves according to the criteria provided for us by others. Through self-reformation, therapy, and the calculated reshaping of speech and emotion, we adjust ourselves by means of the techniques propounded by experts of the soul.5

In the South Asian context, Ashis Nandy (The Intimate Enemy; The Savage Freud) is amongst those who have tracked analogous processes under colonialism. Here, as in the Japanese context, we find that the modern mind sciences do not necessarily introduce some brand new element to politics or state power. Often, they need only pick up where history has left off. Mental health and illness continued, in modern Japan, for example, to be as freighted as before with moral implications. The leaders of the new state, tending to regard people as a resource – body and soul – such that their psychological health was a collective as well as a private imperative, had only to allow a Tokugawa-era (1603 – 1868) ethic of ‘self-cultivation’ to continue unobstructed. This ethic encompassed what in the West tended to be separated into ‘religion’, ‘morality’, ‘divination’, ‘health’, and ‘education’.6 Left intact as a holistic ideal, it prevented mind science practitioners from operating as though they were
stitching cuts or setting bones: it charged them instead with a role in safeguarding individual and collective ‘health’ on a far grander scale.

And just as we find the mind sciences being used, in advanced modern states like Japan, to shape and monitor public discourse, so we see them contributing to public anxiety about the kinds of societies and people that ‘modernity’ creates. A range of conditions, from neurasthenia through to anxiety and depression, made their way into the public consciousness around the world not simply as medical disorders but as human experiences that testified to the extreme tiredness brought on by the pressures of modern life, to acute concern or pessimism about contemporary values and about the future, and to a declining ability to socialize comfortably as torrents of strangers pouring into growing cities slowly replaced old familial bonds. For some, this was more or less as it should be. Progress came at a cost. Japanese authorities in colonized Korea, noting a rise there of rates of mental illness, concluded that this was a sign of success in their project to free that country from its Sino-shackles and form it instead in Japan’s own image, as the non-white world’s quintessential modern nation.

Thought about in these terms, we will find politics everywhere in the essays that follow. It plays out not so much in terms of violence (whether actual or threatened), the law, or organized groupings of the powerful or disenfranchised, but instead amidst a swirl of the personal and the personality-driven. And at stake are not economic resources or opportunities, per se; rather, we find a clash of rationalities. Similarly, our protagonists are not grouped by old binaries of place or race; instead, students of modern South Asian history will find here vivid illustrations of just how global, cosmopolitan, and complex that history has been.

Kannu Rajan’s ability to stand up to Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, even as she turned the psychoanalytic thumbscrews, came as a great relief to a Canadian psychiatrist by the name of Florence Nichols. Based at Christian Medical College (CMC) in Vellore, Nichols was hoping to recruit Rajan to her institution. His analysis with Fromm-Reichmann was costing him $180 per month (at early 1950s rates), so it was a reasonable hope that his faith would outlast his finances, and that he might be amenable to work at a Christian institution upon his return to India. In the end, Rajan found himself working not at CMC but another Christian-run facility: Nur Manzil Psychiatric Center in Lucknow.

Before she was hounded out of her job over allegations that she was offering private LSD therapy to a patient (who was also her lover), Nichols’ mental health initiative at CMC stood alongside Nur Manzil as two of very few facilities for mental healthcare available to Indians of less than lavish means in the early years after Independence. The East India Company had established the country’s first asylum, in Calcutta, in 1787. A rise in institution-building followed after 1858, in line with British efforts to secure their general social and economic, as well as political, foothold on the subcontinent. But facilities were always inadequate, usually segregated (Indians from Europeans), and by the time of Independence their services and general conditions were bordering, in places, on the scandalous. A government survey in 1946 found around 10,000 beds available for 400 million people: a ratio of one bed per 40,000 people, compared with one for every 300 in England at the time. Most of India’s mental health institutions, with the exception of Ranchi
and Mysore, were deemed out of date and oriented still towards custody rather than cure or care. Many Superintendents and most staff had no psychiatric training whatsoever, and the Punjab Mental Hospital in Lahore was said to be worse than most Indian jails. The report recommended better training, promotion of occupational therapies, separate child psychiatry units, and closer relationships with the community.

As in Japan, where state interest in providing mental healthcare remained limited until the mid-twentieth century, so in India: individuals possessed of an entrepreneurial spirit – intellectually, commercially, or both – stepped in to address psychological distress. To add to thriving worlds of urban private medical practice (Ayurveda, Unani, and Western biomedicine), from the early 1900s Indian mind science specialists began to emerge. This is a history very much still in the process of being teased out. Waltraud Ernst has uncovered the remarkable, therapeutically pioneering work of J.E. Dhunjibhoy, as superintendent of the Ranchi Indian Mental Hospital. Christiane Hartnack, Amit Basu, Shruti Kapila, Ashis Nandy, and – in our collection here, Soumen Mukherjee – have all delved into the life and thought of the equally path-breaking Calcutta psychoanalyst Girindrasekhar Bose.

This work, and that of our contributors to this collection, opens our eyes to a landscape of such ambitious and far-reaching intellectual and therapeutic creativity within the mind sciences as to require a little explanation. First, one could point to the natural liminality of the mind sciences: a crossing point between biological medicine, the inner life, social expectations, and cultural norms. Second, their stand-out status within medicine and science, as a set of disciplines which, historically, have struggled to clarify their object of enquiry – brain, nervous system, mind, person, soul? – and to offer (perhaps at least until the advent of new drug treatments in the 1950s) broadly effective therapies. Third, the appearance of successive waves of psychotherapeutic modalities where, for a time, one could flourish as what Andrew Barshay has called a ‘pre-professional’: delighting in a discipline whose precise boundaries and standards are yet to be set. Finally, as reflected in a number of the essays in this collection, one of the periods of greatest activity in the building up and diversification of ‘mind sciences’ – a span running from the 1900s through to the 1940s – coincided with philosophical and literary currents expressing profound doubt about such nineteenth-century shibboleths as progress and modernity.

Creative interest taken in Freud in particular, both in South Asia and around the world from Argentina to China, surely rests – in part at least – on the fact that he is every bit as much at home (probably more so, these days) in a philosophy textbook as a psychology one. For those uneasy about what Europe seemed to be offering the world in the early 1900s – Europeans and non-Europeans alike – he was an irresistible figure. Here, as Ashis Nandy has pointed out, was a European intellectual undermining so much of what earlier European intellectuals had built. All that certainty and civilization, those political lectures and loudly-trumpeted moral standards, that grand meta-historical talk of progress: behind it all – even better, underneath it – lurked unspeakable desires of the most violent and sexual sort.

What’s more, if Freud could provide a stick with which to beat Europe, or at least tame it of the excesses of its self-belief, he could also himself serve as a focal point for criticism. Here, after all, was someone in whom a naïve nineteenth-century scientism survived until the end: despite the twists and turns of his theorizing and relationships with the fractious bunch of doctors, intellectuals, and pseuds who gathered around him, Freud always insisted that psychoanalysis was a science, which would proceed via the collection of data and the trial-and-error testing of it. Moreover, he had ambitions for psychoanalysis that could
be described as quasi-colonial or quasi-missionary – marvelling at the interest shown in it in ‘far-flung’ corners of Asia.13

Whether personally, or via the broader influence of his psychodynamic framework for understanding mankind, Freud provided a foil for a great many of the thinkers explored in our essays here. In Soumen Mukherjee’s contribution, for example we discover Girindrasekhar Bose staking a central, oft-repeated claim for South Asia’s mind sciences: that India’s philosophical traditions have long had a deep and effective psychological dimension – in comparison to which, so goes the implication, Europeans have turned up late, offering little (but loudly). So much so that, as Mukherjee points out, it really won’t do for us to try to understand India’s mind sciences – or ‘psy disciplines’ – in terms of the analytical categories offered by Western science. Nor of course, one might add, should we be content to employ old frameworks of Western dissemination and non-Western uptake and adaptation within which until relatively recently the history of science often proceeded.

Instead, Mukherjee’s essay sets out alternative ways of thinking about India’s psy disciplines, by delving into the Indian sources of Bose’s worldview, along with that of the psychologist Indra Sen. He does this by asking a question too often over-looked: precisely which dimensions of India’s philosophical ‘tradition’ were of interest to Bose? Only by extending our investigations in this way can we avoid simply repeating the old claim of ‘natural’ affinities between Indian philosophy and the modern mind sciences. Mukherjee’s parallel exploration of the work of Indra Sen helps to bring Bose’s efforts into relief: Sen was a student of Indian philosophy whose influences ranged from Martin Heidegger in Germany (whose seminars he attended while working on his PhD) to Sri Aurobindo in Pondicherry.

Does it make sense, then, to call someone like Bose a cultural nationalist of sorts? Though his career parallels that of India’s modern nationalist movement, from the 1920s onwards, Bose doesn’t appear to have intended his work as philosophical fodder for those wanting to underscore to the British the rich intellectual foundations upon which an independent India could be swiftly and effectively built.

Elsewhere, however, we do find striking examples, of the mind sciences possessing rich potential for cultural assertion. The more spurious of these claims – such as the Arya Samaj’s contention, featuring here in Ankur Barua’s paper, that ancient Vedic civilization in India had been home to steam engines, electricity, and aerial vehicles – only serve to remind us of the importance to cultural nationalists in India of the mind sciences, for the more solid territory they offered. As Barua puts it, in his piece on ‘The Science of the Self’:

Modern apologetic Hindu interrogations of, and engagements with, European worldviews sometimes involve the claim that there is a deep resonance, harmony or consilience between classical Hindu teachings and science, unlike the case of post-Enlightenment Europe which is said to be locked in a mortal conflict between ‘religion’ and ‘science’.

We see in Swami Vivekananda, discussed in Barua’s essay, and in a kindred spirit in Japan, Inoue Enryō, similar moves being made against Western culture, and against Christianity in particular as its supposed inspirational core. Christian missionaries’ apparent hypocrisy in Asia (their gospel versus their treatment of Indians and Japanese) is taken alongside the scientific evidence now stacking up against Christianity in Europe – from Darwin to the fossil record to biblical criticism – to suggest that global scientific and moral progress alike were moving humanity decisively beyond Christianity, certainly as an institution. Even if Christianity had contributed to the West’s remarkable scientific progress –
a claim that many missionaries and not a few colonial officials in India either made or acquiesced in as a general assumption – its time had been and gone. It was outdone in both the scientific and moral spheres by the Vedanta or by Japanese Buddhism (which Inoue contrasted, it should be pointed out, with degraded and superstitious forms of the religion elsewhere, notably including India): in the former sphere, Swami Vivekananda pointed to cause and effect, among other things, while Inoue gleefully pointed out how much less of a problem Darwin was for Japanese Buddhism than for Christianity.

Barua helpfully asks us to consider Vivekananda’s aim here in terms of ‘enfolding’ empirical science into Vedantic science – or Science EMP into Science VED: both are progressive, but where Darwin’s Science EMP is non-teleological, Vivekananda’s Science VED is deeply, spiritually so. It is worth pointing out that these themes of foreshadowing or paralleling – between Indian philosophy and Western mind sciences – continue across the twentieth century and into the present day. So one finds J.K. Trivedi writing in the Indian Journal of Psychiatry in 2000, describing the Bhagvad Gita as a ‘classical example of crisis intervention in psychotherapy’. Dealing with the senses and the passions is no easy task: as Krishna points out to Arjuna, human beings are at war with themselves much of the time. Yet it is a vital task. At one end lies peace and integration; at the other, madness:

When man dwells in his mind on the objects of sense, attachment to them is produced. From attachment springs desire and from desire comes anger.

From anger arises bewilderment, from bewilderment loss of memory; and from loss of memory, the destruction of intelligence and from the destruction of intelligence he perishes.

Similarly, another classical Indian text, the Ramayana, is said through its account of the relationship between Rama and his wife Sita to be a study in interpersonal and intrafamilial relationships. This makes sense, if one takes Trivedi’s point about epic stories such as the Mahabharata and the Ramayana playing a central role in shaping selves and relationships in India over centuries. One of India’s leading post-Independence psychiatrists, N.N. Wig, was particularly influential in calling for more mental health professionals in India to make use of Indian mythology as a therapeutic resource.

The nationalist potential of the mind sciences is not limited to a sense of having got there first, and/or probed the inner life more deeply and systematically than modern Western counterparts. The question also arises, in several of our contributions here, of sensibility and sensitivity. Barua points us to Keshub Chander Sen’s contention that ‘Hindus are particularly sensitive to and receptive of the workings of the Spirit’. In Sen’s own words:

The subtle Hindu mind has always been distinguished for its spirituality. It penetrates the hard surface of dogmatic theology, and evolves and deals with the deeper realities of faith ... The idea of perceiving the Indwelling Spirit, far from being foreign, is eminently native to the primitive Hindu mind.

Barua shows us Vivekananda following in a similar vein:

Touch him on spirituality, on religion, on God, on the soul, on the infinite, on spiritual freedom, and I assure you, the lowest peasant in India is better informed on these subjects
than many a so-called philosopher in other lands. I have said ... that we have yet something to teach to the world'.

Once again Japan offers a useful comparative case – here in the form of a cautionary parallel. The idea developed there in the early twentieth century – amongst advocates of everything from Zen Buddhism to the tea ceremony to Japanese literature – that somewhere along the line Western technological achievements had been purchased at the cost of the Western soul. Witness their slavery to the tragically inefficient means of processing life that is the one-thought-at-a-time plod of sequential reasoning! Marvel at their inability to convey a sentiment without first converting it into words! Peer, if you dare, into a world where some of them still perform elaborate supplications to a non-existent ‘God-the-Father’ (how did an unlikely ruse to excuse an unwanted pregnancy ever give rise to a world religion?) – all because these people have lost the ability to be quiet and see what is in front of them?

Novelists weighed in. Tanizaki Junichiro claimed that Westerners see only dark or light – as though living in a room with no windows where the light is either off or on. Japanese, in contrast, experience life as though a candle were in the centre of that room: shades, shadows, flickerings – all firing the imagination and feeding the spirit. Within a few years of Tanizaki’s comments – though by no means should we attribute this to him alone, of course – these ideas had made their way into the minds of young military officers and on to debates about military doctrine. Why spend money on the latest technology, some asked, when Japanese soldiers possessed the purity of heart to do the job in Asia and further afield – spreading the compassion of the Buddha, as some saw it – with swords alone?

Freud’s claim that mysticism and music are both ‘closed book(s)’ to him may have been an attempt to shield himself from too much criticism from the likes of Romain Rolland, but the latter wanted none of it. Freud and his ilk have a trust problem, Rolland seemed to suggest: people like Freud ‘get’ the point, but somehow don’t accept it. The depth psychology tradition since Freud has been rather more accommodating in its evaluation of mystical experience, and there have even been attempts to rescue Freud as somewhat misunderstood when it comes to his views on religion and spirituality. Clearer in his interest here was, of course, Freud’s erstwhile colleague and later antagonist, Carl Jung. Subject to a wide range of assessments of his extra-European interests – an essay by Farhad Dalal, entitled ‘Jung: A Racist’, probably needs little elaboration – Jung is found in our collection here, by Claudia Richter, to be a man in search of Europe’s lost soul. There are overlaps of a sort with the Indian and Japanese critiques of the West explored above, but Jung’s approach aims at integration rather than critical one-upmanship.

This integrative intent comes across most clearly, in Richter’s essay, in Jung’s desire to retain the ego as a centre of gravity – both in terms of human selfhood and his own analytical schema. Freud might mistake the nature and significance of the ego, Jung seems to imply, but for their part Indian traditions like that of Patañjali err in their own way, in suggesting that it is done away with completely in ultimate, mystical experience. For Jung, intuition or pure perception must necessarily run alongside other psychological functions like feeling and thinking. Jung’s ‘core message and therapeutic approach’, then, as Richter sees it, involves ‘looking for what the self wants you to do in the world’.  

This might strike some, Richter suggests, as rather an individualistic approach. And indeed, a number of Western psychological theories and therapeutic modalities have been criticized on the basis that they are sociologically specific – whether their creators realize it or not – to Western (and possibly middle-class) circumstances of life. Freud’s Oedipus Complex theory has, partly for this reason, travelled relatively badly, facing either rejection or serious reworking in India, China, and Japan. And yet we find via Jung here an important
feature in the relationship between spirituality and the mind sciences. Some thinkers make
more or less global, or ‘human’, claims for the insights they offer – insisting on universal
contemporary applicability, even if the particular sources of their ideas are advertised as
being very local and very old. Others, however – and Jung is one – identify a particular place
or moment, as a locus of suffering or at least inadequacy, and seek some integration of the
spiritual and the ‘psy’ that may help.

In Jung’s case, he sets out to combat the legacy of what he calls Protestantism’s
‘chronic iconoclasm’, which has led of late to desperate raids being made on distant cultures:

_We have let the house our fathers built fall into decay, and now we try to break into Oriental
palaces that our fathers never knew. Anyone who has lost the historical symbols and cannot
be satisfied with substitutes, is certainly in a very difficult position today: before him yawns
the void, and he turns away from it in horror. Even worse: this vacuum is filled with absurd
depolitical and social ideas, all of which are marked by spiritual barrenness._ 19

Jung himself tends to be placed in the category of a raider of sorts, with a mini-industry
growing up around the exposure of his racialized thinking and the debunking of his takes on
Asian culture, from Zen to the I Ching. But though one doesn’t have to search far in Jung’s
writings on India or Africa to find comments that many would now find objectionable, the
spirit in which Jung pursued his global psycho-spiritual quest seems less so. As Richter
points out, here was a man both saddened and shaped by his Protestant culture: aware of its
lonely, word-bound flaws and yet assiduously working away at a spiritual diary. Jung
managed also, at times at least, to avoid the twin sins of a twentieth-century European
abroad: boasting about one’s culture, and belittling it. Instead, Richter shows us a man whose
forays into South Asian philosophy and spirituality left him creatively chastened: India was
for him, Richter suggests, a disillusioning yet healing experience.

Here, perhaps, was dialogue in its truest form: a willingness to acknowledge
difference as real and important – pluralism, then, rather than a consequence-free relativism –
and a willingness too, at least to some extent, to open oneself up to the possibility of being
radically changed by what one finds.

We find a distinct take on relativity, relativism and epistemology in Jeffrey D. Long’s
piece, in this collection, on the Jain tradition. Long finds that Jain doctrines of consciousness
manage to navigate between absolutism on the one hand, and relativism on the other, in a
way that seems to offer a foundation for the kind of pluralism that true dialogue calls for – a
centuries-old feature of South Asian intellectual and cultural life that now appears, once
again, to be under threat.

Champions of Jung credit him with bringing to the Western mind sciences, partly
through his encounters with traditions outside Europe, the element of subtlety – of a certain
spiritual sensibility – that critics in South Asia and elsewhere accused them of lacking. Our
final contribution to this collection, offers us a fresh take on this question of sensibility.
Sajjad Alam Rizvi introduces us to the Sufi practice of _samā’_ ("listening," "hearing,
"audition"): ‘listening to music, singing, chanting and measured recitation designed to bring
about emotions such as joy, sorrow and ecstasy’. Here we find a debate, going back centuries
but tracked here from the eighteenth into the twentieth century, about how music achieves its
effect of shaping our emotions, whether this kind of shaping, achieved in this way, is
permissible, and what sorts of emotions are to be held in high regard.

Music, then, here performs a much-needed function and favour for this field. It offers
a vivid example of how an encounter, between spirituality/philosophy and the mind sciences
(or psy disciplines), which is too often regarded straightforwardly as a two-way conceptual
‘dialogue’ has in fact been, in most times and places, a rather busier and even richer conversation.

Notes

1 * Email: Christopher.Harding@ed.ac.uk

2 Christian Medical College Archives, 20th July 1951, Florence Nichols to Hilda Lazarus; see Harding, ‘Christian Psychiatry’.

3 Parsons, Oceanic Feeling, p. 175.

4 Mills, ‘Modern Psychiatry in India’; Ernst, Mad Tales from the Raj; Keller, ‘Madness and Colonization’; Mahone & Vaughan (eds), Psychiatry and Empire.

5 Rose, Governing the Soul, p. 11.

6 See Sawada, Practical Pursuits, p. 3.


8 Krishnamurthy, Venugopal, and Alimchandani, 'Mental Hospitals in India'.

9 Mukharji, Nationalizing the Body.


12 Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan, p. 39

13 Harding, ‘Introduction’.


16 Wig, 'Hanuman Complex'.

17 See Barua, this issue.

18 The italics are Richter’s. See Richter, this issue.

19 See Richter, this issue.

Bibliography


