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François Mitterrand and the Emergent Grey Zone of Vichy France

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Key Words

Bourdieu, complicity, exculpation, grey zone, Mitterrand, political field

Abstract

This article re-examines the 1994-1995 controversy surrounding President Mitterrand’s past involvement with Vichy France through the concept of “the grey zone”. Differing from Primo Levi’s grey zone, the concept here refers to the language which has emerged in France to

capture the hitherto neglected complex complicity of bystanders, beneficiaries, ideological acquiescence, or indirect facilitation of injustice. Re-examining the Mitterrand-Vichy affair is a useful illustration of the nuances and different modes of usage of this idiom of the grey zone, both for indictment and defense. Conversely, paying attention to this discourse of the grey zone allows us to understand the logic and stakes of both the criticisms of Mitterrand and his responses to them, particularly in terms of upholding and transgressing boundaries of republicanism. These competing claims are examined using Bourdieu's concept of political scandal and his broader theorization of the political field.

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“I work in shades of grey,” President Mitterrand remarked in 1995. “There are black threads and white threads. I weave them together and with that I make grey.”¹ Such was his approach as he neared the end of his second term in office, and indeed of his life, and was forced to account for his Second World War experience in controversial circumstances. This past was thrust back into the spotlight with the publication of *Une jeunesse française: François Mitterrand, 1934-1947* by Pierre Péan. As *Le Monde* recently recollected, “curieusement, tous deux sous-estiment le choc que va causer le voile levé sur les dernières zones grises de son itinéraire.”² Overshadowing his later Resistance record, the subsequent furor in the media drew public attention to the ambiguity of Mitterrand’s prior role during the War in the grey zone of Vichy positions and connections, his pre-war flirtations with the far right, his post-war relations with figures tainted by Vichy, and his less than convincing explanations for a seemingly shady past that extended into his Presidency.

This grey zone is not Primo Levi’s.³ Instead, it refers to the language of greyness stressed by historians like Henry Rousso and Olivier Wieviorka, which emerged in France over the last decades to capture the positions of people who were located between the previous “master narrative” categories of heroes and victims.⁴ Rather than legal culpability, this concerns the complex complicity of bystanders, beneficiaries, ideological acquiescence, or those who made abuses possible without necessarily acting as co-principal wrongdoers. Yet, the nuances of this idiom of greyness, and its modes of application, and implications for French politics require greater further investigation and specification. The 1994-1995 Mitterrand affair is a particularly illuminating example, demonstrating how this idiom facilitated interrogating expanded conceptions of complicity below the level of culpability, but also that the grey zone cut both ways; it could be put at the service of exculpation. Conversely, considering the Mitterrand controversy in the context of discourse about the grey zone helps us to understand its nature and intensity, particularly in terms of the upholding of the borders of republicanism.

In drawing out this multifaceted nature of the discourse of the grey zone or its equivalents in relation to Mitterrand, the article engages with Pierre Bourdieu's understanding of the nature of political scandal. This offers insight into the logic and stakes of both the charges made against Mitterrand, and his responses to them as an outgoing and dying President. Bourdieu's broader theory of the political field and political capital in turn allows us greater precision in mapping the terrain that at once curtailed and provided the resources for Mitterrand's counter-arguments. I examine how Mitterrand reacted to these claims by mobilizing propitious discursive resources and positioning himself in relation to other political actors. This involved, first, pointing to his republican credentials, including the institutional authority of the Presidency of the French Republic; second, harnessing dominant modes of memory discourse and emphasizing his own Resistance record; and, third, crucially, repurposing or diverting the very language of the grey zone to defend himself.

As we will see, the grey zone can also be invoked in the sense of epistemological and moral uncertainty, which are not easily parsed out. Indeed, there are three discernible, albeit closely connected, senses of the grey zone that Mitterrand put to work in his defense. These were, firstly, an appeal to the grey zone in the sense that nothing was clear at Vichy, so intransigent retrospective moral indictments are misplaced or invalid; Vichy was an insufficiently clear situation for most people to act with requisite lucidity to meet the threshold for any meaningful sense of complicity. Second, that Vichy was not a bloc and was a singularly complicated phenomenon, and that current commentators, in their blinkered black and white thinking, missed this. They thereby failed to understand or accept that there were all sorts of ways that republicanism was upheld and Resistance was in fact being actively undertaken at and under Vichy. And third, an invocation of the grey zone in the sense of the depersonification of wrong-doing and complicity, the abstraction of which precluded moral indictments being convincingly or appropriately applied to individuals.

The article will first review the Mitterrand-Vichy controversy before turning to the relevance of Bourdieu's conceptions of political scandal and the political field. I then examine how these concepts mapped on to the historical conjuncture in France at the time of the scandal, pointing in particular to the prominence of the language of republicanism, including its neo-republican inflection, as well as hegemonic ways of thinking about the past in general, and the Vichy past in particular. I then analyze how Mitterrand himself played this political field in relation to the scandal and his own priorities as an outgoing and dying president. This includes his emphasis on his republican credentials, presenting his Resistance record, and, crucially, his instrumentalization and repurposing of the very language of the grey zone to exculpate himself.

The 1994-1995 Controversy

A key moment in the development of the controversy regarding Mitterrand's Vichy past and present was the 1994 publication of *Une jeunesse française: François Mitterrand, 1934-1947*. Although written by the journalist Pierre Péan, Mitterrand participated in its execution, receiving Péan for extensive interviews. As his interviewer on France 2, Jean-Pierre Elkabbach put it, "Cette fois, Monsieur le Président, c'est vous qui avez, en quelque sorte, mis le feu aux poudres."⁵ Much of the story Péan told was already known but, supplemented by new material, was brought back into the public eye at a particularly sensitive time, around the fiftieth anniversary of the Liberation and of the end of the Second World War. This conjuncture and Mitterrand's profile overdetermined his singling out as a "Vichysto-Résistant", though he was far from unique in working within the Vichy administration before turning to the Resistance.⁶

While Mitterrand was by and large happy with Péan's job the story quickly took on a life of its own, crystallizing into queries and accusations regarding Mitterrand's relationship to the grey zone of Vichy.⁷ Taken as whole, four key elements of the scandal can be identified, which pointed to Mitterrand's complicity with Vichy in various ways and varying degrees: 1. Mitterrand's pre-war politics; 2. His time working at Vichy; 3. His post-war association with Vichy figures; 4. In his conception of France's historical responsibility.

1. Mitterrand's Pre-War Politics

Longstanding claims that Mitterrand had been in Action française were refuted, as were stories that circulated in the 1950s of his direct involvement in a right-wing conspiracy in 1937, when the secret network of officers and politicians called Cagoullards plotted to overthrow the Republic.⁸ However, as a student in Paris in the mid-1930s, Mitterrand mixed in other ideological circles that would feed into and celebrate Pétain's National Revolution at Vichy. He joined the Volontaires Nationaux – the youth division of Colonel de la Roque's Croix de Feu, wrote articles for the very conservative *L'Echo de Paris*, took part in rightist demonstrations against *les métèques* in February 1935 – the racist nature of which Mitterrand now claimed not to remember⁹, and against Gaston Jèze, the Jewish law professor who had defended the Negus of Abyssinia against Mussolini at the League of Nations, in March 1936. His royalist sympathies took him to visit the Comte de Paris, pretender to the throne, in Belgium in 1939. Notwithstanding, these aspects of the President's biography induced much less comment and controversy than his role in the Vichy regime and his relationship to its legacy.

2. Mitterrand at Vichy

In his 1969 *Ma part de vérité*, Mitterrand invoked his mobilization into the French army and subsequent capture and then escape from a POW camp in Germany in late 1941: “Rentré en France, je devins résistant sans problème déchirant.”¹⁰ Then his account skipped from the end of 1941 to December 1943 and his meeting as a representative of a Prisoners of War resistance group with de Gaulle in Algiers without mention of his presence at Vichy, where he had gone in early 1942, shortly after his return to France. In 1994, however, Mitterrand’s Resistance story was overshadowed by the emergence of the fuller story of his taking up a position as, first, a documentarist of the French Legion of Combatants, from January to April 1942, and second, as a press officer for the southern zone at the Board of Rehabilitation of Prisoners of War and the Repatriated, from May 1942 to January 1943. Mitterrand was dismissive of the implications of his first position, in an organization created by Xavier Vallat, Vichy’s first commissioner for Jewish Questions, with responsibility for producing and disseminating propaganda for the regime, much of it anti-Jewish.

3. *Post-War Vichy Associates and Connections*

Perhaps the crux of the Mitterrand controversy in 1994 was not what he had done as a young man a lifetime before, but his connections with Vichy, which persisted through to his Presidency. Ammunition for that case was provided by Mitterrand’s practice of laying a wreath at Petain’s grave annually from 1986 until 1992. He insisted this was a tradition that previous French presidents had observed to honor the Pétain of Verdun, but to eschew being a source of division for the French people he had discontinued the practice. Nonetheless, the inclusion on the front cover of the Péan book of the young Mitterrand meeting Pétain at Vichy inevitably reopened this wound, as did the publicity for Mitterrand’s 1943 Francisque award for service to the Maréchal, and extracts of youthful writings expressing enthusiasm for his leadership.¹¹

In terms of Mitterrand's direct, personal connection to Vichy figures, the most controversial was René Bousquet – secretary-general of the Vichy police from April 1942 to December 1943, and a central figure in the organization of the infamous Vel d'Hiv round-up of Parisian Jews in July 1942. Mitterrand himself stoked this controversy by adding to suspicions that he had protected Bousquet from prosecution during his presidency when he repeatedly inveighed on the admirable qualities of his old associate.¹² In his live interview on France 2 on 12 September 1994, for instance, Mitterrand was unyielding and highly defensive about his connection to Bousquet, who, he later insisted to Elie Wiesel, was “intelligent, even brilliant [and] physically courageous.”¹³

Bourdieu on Political Scandal and the Political Field

A useful framework through which to make sense of the explosiveness of the controversy and the doggedness of Mitterrand's response is Pierre Bourdieu's understanding of political scandal. In turn this connects to his conception of the political field, which refers to the area of struggle to maintain or challenge positions of power by employing political capital.¹⁴ Rather than necessarily cynical calculation, political practice is driven by pre-reflective dispositions of those who have attained a specific competence, learned through experience, of how to behave politically in an effective manner. The players also have the requisite – yet differential – political capital to participate in the game of politics. Politics is “a game in which the stakes are the legitimate imposition of the principles of vision and division of the social world.” This involves the doxa of a social order – a “pre-reflexive agreement”, or “primordial political belief”, which are rooted in the incorporation of the dominant vision of order in the dispositions of individuals' habitus.¹⁵ One of the effects of a political field is the

delimitation of possible ideas from which ordinary citizens can choose. Several key features of Bourdieu's political field bear further explication since they are especially pertinent to the analysis of Mitterrand here.

1. *Symbolic Capital as Political Capital*

Bourdieu veered between two understandings of political capital, one of which is that which is homologous to his conception of symbolic power, which he described as "the social authority to impose symbolic meanings and classifications as legitimate".¹⁶ He continued: "individuals and groups can accumulate through public recognition of their capital holdings and positions occupied in social hierarchies. Symbolic capital is a form of credit and it takes symbolic capital accumulated from previous struggles to exercise symbolic power."¹⁷ Political capital of this kind refers to a "particular kind of symbolic capital", "a reputational capital linked to notoriety" that is "linked to the manner of being perceived".¹⁸ He noted that maintaining and increasing political capital involves much political labor to secure the trust, or credit, and avoiding the discredit of the supporting group.¹⁹ Indeed, he argued that the political field operates according to a logic of credit and credence: "Political capital is a form of symbolic capital, *credit* founded on *credence* or belief and *recognition* or, more precisely, on the innumerable operations of credit by which agents confer on a person (or on an object) the very powers that they recognize in him (or it)."²⁰

Political scandal, then, comes to a head with the violation or transgression of collective interests in favor of personal self-interest.²¹ Whereas in other fields failure to fulfil expectations or promises might be perceived as a mistake, in the political field it is far more liable to be conceived of as *betrayal*. It is because this specific capital is

a pure *fiduciary* value which depends on representation, opinion, belief, *fides*, that the man of politics, like the man of honour, is especially vulnerable to suspicions, malicious misrepresentations and scandal, in short, to everything that threatens belief and trust, by

bringing to light the hidden and secret acts and remarks of the present or the past which can undermine present acts and remarks and discredit their author.²²

This involves “unceasing work both to accumulate credit and avoid discredit.”²³ This form of capital is “supremely *free-flowing*” – its investment and divestment is distinctly unrestrained.

Bourdieu further claimed that there are different modes of holding authority, or, distinctive avenues into power. He invokes the example of de Gaulle to illustrate alternative ways of attaining political capital. Rather than the slow and continuous accumulation of capital typical of the *notable*, the likes of de Gaulle accrue capital from a heroic or prophetic inaugural action “performed in a crisis situation, in the vacuum and silence left by institutions and apparatuses”.²⁴ Mitterrand’s long-standing rivalry with de Gaulle maps closely onto Bourdieu’s distinction here, with implications, as we will see, for Mitterrand’s interventions in 1994-1995.

There is also a marked future-orientation to political strategizing in Bourdieu’s account, in which “political propositions, programmes, promises, predictions or prognostications” figure centrally.²⁵ Yet, Mitterrand was something of an anomaly as an incumbent President who was nearing the end of his life at an advanced age and suffering from cancer. His interventions were much less about future political campaigning – even in terms of his legacy to the *Parti socialiste* – than wanting to take stock of his life and career. Indeed, Philip Short notes that, “Mitterrand’s principal goal in the months that remained was to burnish the image he would leave behind.”²⁶

To work through the metaphor of (vulnerable) credit in the politician as a carrier of words and ideas, the Mitterrand-Vichy controversy arose at a time when, with his impending exit from the political field, the President’s priority was to cash out his political capital and bequeath it to his legacy, in the sense of historical reputation. This was disrupted, however, by a dispute regarding the nature and sum of his historical balance and debt or liabilities to be

detracted in light of, among other perceived shortcomings, the Vichy revelations. Given the time remaining to him, Mitterrand had no recourse to the typical ex-presidential practice of writing a memoir, and thus had no unmediated, univocal accounting of his balance. Short notes how Mitterrand used his interviews in this period as a proxy for this, although he was dissatisfied with the results.²⁷

2. Social Capital as Political Capital

The other sense of political capital in Bourdieu's work is more akin to his concept of social capital – rather than reputation, this is about the authority accruing from delegation to political office or within political institutions, often involving the power of official consecration. It also pertains to holding resources such as parties, prominent occupations or positions in the media. At stake here was not Mitterrand's claims per se, but the authority with which they were backed. As Bourdieu argued, "what creates the power of words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and of those who utter them. And words alone cannot create this belief."²⁸ This is relevant to the auditing of Mitterrand's symbolic political capital in the context of the duties and expectations of the French presidency on the one hand, and the deference he commanded through that institution, on the other; likewise, the clout of countervailing critical media outlets, notably *Le Monde* under the new leadership of Jean-Marie Colombani and Edwy Plenel.²⁹

3. Relational Nature of Political Practice

Bourdieu stresses the inherently relational nature of practice. Any political actor takes into account the position of other actors. Political action, stances, and programs are understood in terms of oppositions and affinities between the various participants within the political field. Taking a political position follows a relational logic in which each act is defined "in and

through difference” in terms of the universe of competing positions within the political field. As Bourdieu put it, “the field as a whole is defined as a system of deviations on different levels and nothing, either in the institutions or in the agents, the acts of the discourses they produce, has meaning except relationally, by virtue of the interplay of oppositions and distinctions.”³⁰ Furthermore, “in order to understand a political stance, programme, intervention, electioneering speech, etc., it is at least as important to know the universe of stances currently offered by the field [...] adopting a stance, a *prise de position*, is, as the phrase clearly suggests, an act which had meaning only relationally, in and through difference.”³¹ By extension, there are internal and external fields at work here, as, for instance, within a political party and between a political party and its competitors. As we will see, the relational aspect of Mitterrand’s interventions in 1994-1995 was manifest, particularly with regard to the *Parti socialiste* and in terms of the inevitable comparisons drawn with de Gaulle.

The French Political Field and the Mitterrand-Vichy Affair

What, then, were the key features of the political field and political doxa curtailing, shaping and providing the discursive resources for Mitterrand’s reaction and interventions? One can schematically divide these up into the languages of Republicanism and of memory discourse. The first encompassed national unity and consensus, and expectations of the office of the Presidency of the Republic, particularly in terms of guaranteeing and promoting national unity. The second pertains to the way Mitterrand defended himself by mobilizing his Resistance credentials, and his positioning within current trends in historiography and modes of remembrance and commemoration.

First, a key political coordinate in situating Mitterrand's defense was the political language of republicanism, including its neo-republican inflection precisely at this moment in the mid-1990s. As Emile Chabal shows, this trend of thought originated in declining economic fortunes from the early 1970s with the fading of the *trente glorieuses*; growing friction over "immigration"; and the fading of the grand ideologies that had governed post-war French politics – Gaullism, socialism and Communism – as France's self-proclaimed crisis showed no signs of reversal or resolution.³² Chabal argues that it was at this point that some public figures renovated the language of republicanism – "not as a historical passion confined to the pages of history books, but as a living political ideal that could offer real solutions to intractable socio-economic and political problems. By the 1990s, republicanism and the Republic had become unavoidable reference points in French political discourse."³³ The muscular national narrative typical of neo-republicanism put distinct stress on national unity and citizenship based on consensus (sometimes manifested through an idealization of the Third Republic).

Chabal also argues that it is not by chance that this revival of interest in republicanism coincided with the longest period of left-wing rule in French history with Mitterrand's presidency.³⁴ Not that he characterizes Mitterrand himself – who was, after all, formed politically in an earlier generation – as a neo-republican. Rather, there was something of a convergence, even mutual bolstering, of Mitterrand's political trajectory and this intellectual trend as he shed his more radical promises, first with the famous 1982-1983 U-turn on Keynesianism, his marginalization and deposition of his erstwhile allies in the PCF, and the general turning away from the language of class struggle to that of national unity and consensus. The latter was given additional impetus in the pivotal year of 1989 with the bicentenary celebrations of the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall.³⁵

Having invested so heavily in the legitimating language of republicanism, Mitterrand naturally saw it as a guarantee against the Vichy claims. Conversely, they were by the same

token particularly damaging for Mitterrand, given the common sense understanding of the Vichy regime as the rejection of the heritage of 1789 and the very antithesis of the Republic.³⁶ This tension permeated Mitterrand's varying instrumentalizations of the language of the grey zone.

As if to belie, or perhaps symptomatic of, such a stress on consensus and unity in the republican idiom, various antagonisms characterized the French political scene, and indeed were presented to Mitterrand side by side with the Vichy scandal as topics in his interviews. One of the most important stakes of Mitterrand's entanglement in the grey zone of Vichy was its implications for his attendant discourse about France, the nation and the Republic. This connection was forged by the inclusion in Mitterrand's interviews of questions about contemporary politics as well as the Vichy issue so that there was, to a certain degree, a sense of juxtaposition. Issues included notably the *banlieues* – shorthand for immigration and integration worries and persistent and steep unemployment.

The suggestion here is not simply that Mitterrand faced additional political pressures and challenges which were added to the weight on his shoulders with the eruption of the Vichy revelations. And clearly there is no sense in which these forms of exclusion were commensurable with Vichy's racial persecution. But nonetheless his insistence on radical dichotomy between a French Republic premised constitutively on inclusion, and a Vichy regime of exclusion – with which, as a stalwart of the former, he parried accusations of complicity with the latter – was additionally strained by the persistence of conspicuous antagonisms in contemporary France.

Relatedly, the auditing of Mitterrand's political capital involved a contestation over the duties and expectations of a president, and conversely, the deference he could command. In Mitterrand's interviews, this dynamic of competing claims, condemning or exculpating his

Vichy past, was certainly apparent. On the one hand, there was an express request for Mitterrand to give an account of his Vichy past and connections in view of his role as President. As the journalist Jean-Pierre Elkabbach put it to the president at the start of the France 2 interview on 12 September 1994 with reference to the Vichy revelations: “Les Français veulent donc comprendre, et comprendre d’autant plus qu’il s’agit du Président de la République, c’est-à-dire du garant de l’unité de la Nation, du garant de la mémoire de la Nation.”³⁷ Likewise, Duhamel pointed out the institutional pitfall of any attempt to present a personal narrative: “Once a Head of State talks of his past, what he says becomes not only a personal historical account but also a political message. The historical importance of Mitterrand also explains the scale of the controversy. In France the Head of State *is* the nation.”³⁸ All the more so given the personalization inherent to the presidential system of the French Fifth Republic, an aspect of the national political life exacerbated by Mitterrand’s famed monarchical demeanor and style.³⁹ But by the same token, the French presidency exacts distinct deference, as noted by historians of France like Judt and Stanley Hoffmann. This remained the case even taking into account a certain licentiousness on the part of the press during this affair, not having to fear reprisals from the Elysée, where a fading and outgoing President resided in late 1994. That Wiesel was a personal friend explains why this was not so evident in their interviews, and it is no coincidence that it was he who pressed Mitterrand the most, especially on his association with Bousquet.⁴⁰

Secondly, Mitterrand’s positioning had to engage with the doxa of memory, both in regard to Vichy specifically, and memory discourse in general. Regarding the former, Mitterrand staked out his position by leveraging the authority granted in common sense thinking to Resistance veterans, necessarily reinforcing the de Gaulle comparison. Doing so, however, needed to be calibrated with shifting trends in memory discourse and historiography, which were a significant backdrop to the Mitterrand revelations. Debt to the past arose as a question on the occasion of landmark anniversaries from 1989 to 1995, including occupation

and liberation, as well as events like the 1942 Vel d'Hiv round-up. If handled adeptly, these commemorations were conducive to the accumulation of political capital.⁴¹ The acceleration in the proliferation of discourse about these events can be gleaned by Mitterrand's bemusement and even irritation that: "On n'a jamais mis autant en accusation Vichy qu'au cours de ces deux ou trois dernières années. Moi qui ai vécu toute la période Vichy, la période de la Résistance, la période qui nous mène de 1945 à 1990, on n'a jamais autant entendu parler de Vichy que récemment."⁴²

The historiographical consensus was also an aspect of the ideological terrain Mitterrand had to negotiate in his response to concerns about his complicity. As Robert Paxton put it at the time,

[Mitterrand] is wagering his historic reputation that most of the French public rejects the hard, judgmental contours of the current scholarly consensus in favor of his fuzzier, kinder Vichy: the Vichy of grandpapa, businessman or *fonctionnaire* or *syndic communal* of the Peasant Corporation, good people doing their best in a difficult time, sharing space in the Vichy *pétaudière* with more dubious types but really resisters at heart, engaged in a *double jeu*, innocent of the crimes forced upon Vichy by the Nazi occupation.⁴³

In short, a greyed Vichy. Hoffmann notes certain tendencies in the mainstream of historiographical debate which are prone to support such positions, notably René Rémond's emphasis on the internal heterogeneity and complexities of Vichy.⁴⁴ Mitterrand in fact referenced Rémond, as well as Eric Conan and Henry Rousso's 1994 *Vichy: un passé qui ne passe pas*, to support his own position.⁴⁵

Crucially, a fundamental touchstone for thinking about Vichy by the 1990s was the notion of the grey zone or its equivalents in explicit or implicit understandings of nuanced degrees between guilt and innocence, involving being complicit, a beneficiary, or a bystander. This emerged in relation to the crimes and injustices of the Vichy years roughly from the late 1960s and early 1970s. As Henry Rousso puts it, "instead of a (false) version in black and white,

there now prevailed a picture in uniformly dirty grays.”⁴⁶ If hitherto clearly delineated villains could be quarantined, thinking about complicity in the Vichy years began to beg the question of quotidian life. Rousso would object that this could manifest in an unattractive censoriousness of younger generations open to simplistic or sensationalist “revelations” and to being scandalized. But it equally meant an increased openness to the notion that delineating the French generally from the injustices of the Vichy regime was not so simple. And as Mitterrand staked out his position about his Vichy past, a related shift in the idiom of memory was that from an antagonistic to a cosmopolitan mode of remembering. Moral categories of good and evil are operable in both, but in the first mode apply to particularistic tales of “victims” and “perpetrators”, whereas the second prioritizes a de-historicized and abstract opposition between good and evil.⁴⁷ One of the senses in which Mitterrand instrumentalized the grey zone to defend himself closely paralleled this reasoning.

The Grey Zone and Mitterrand’s Playing of the French Political Field

Mitterrand responded to the accusations and aspersions against him in a series of interviews from the Autumn 1994 into 1995: with *Le Figaro*, published on 8 September 1994,⁴⁸ the interview broadcast on television on France 2 on 12 September,⁴⁹ and a series of interviews published in 1995 in book form with Elie Wiesel and the young journalist Georges-Marc Benamou respectively.⁵⁰ Mitterrand’s public line can also be reconstructed from historian Ronald Tiersky’s presentation of notes provided to him by the President’s staff, detailing instructions on how to deal with questions about Mitterrand’s wartime record (hereafter referred to as the Elysée staff notes).⁵¹

Republican Credentials

A prominent aspect of Mitterrand's approach during this episode was to insist on his impeccable republican credentials. Rather than a new departure, this was more a ramping up of his ongoing investment in the legitimating language of Republicanism, including the claim that there was an unbridgeable divide between the Republic and Vichy. Both in his 14 July 1992 interview and 12 September 1994 on France 2, Mitterrand insisted that the Republic, and even France, had no responsibility for atrocities like the Vel d'Hiv round-up. If in one way this French Republican triumphalism befitted the historical moment, in another it appeared a white-washing, and conspicuously offended figures like Jean Kahn, the president of CRIF.⁵² Furthermore, Mitterrand's stance suggested that French complicity with such crimes could be wholly detached from the post-war French state despite the unspoken but intuited continuity of administrative, police, civil service and official personnel in Vichy France and the post-war Republics.⁵³

However, Mitterrand also invoked the grey zone of Vichy, suggesting that it was a "*pétaudière*" where the division between Republicans and Vichyites was not so clear after all. Andrieu neatly explicates the implications for what was an affront to the doxa regarding the memory of complicity with Vichy:

as he did not engage in self-criticism and as he minimized Vichy's responsibilities by presenting this antirepublican regime as a "bedlam," "*une pétaudière*," he seemed to promote a new historical legitimacy for France. He erased the legitimacy founded on the symbol of the appeal of June 18, 1940, and on the idea of the perpetuation of France-as-Republic through the Resistance. At the same time, he seemed to refound France on a Vichyist-republican mix. For those who thought that Vichy and the Republic were mutually exclusive, Mitterrand's interview looked like a symbolic coup.⁵⁴

This is indicative of the important and under-examined aspect of the Mitterrand-Vichy affair: the clamor it gave rise to needs to be situated in this kind of boundary transgression, all

the more flagrant since Mitterrand insisted so resolutely on that division. To adapt Ann Stoler's argument in the case of colonial history, the grey zone he assumed and invoked equated to a kind of boundary zone, which tends to draw inordinate attention for its offending or disrupting a sense of social order.⁵⁵ This was a transgression of a doxa underpinned by the ideological currents of neo-republicanism and a certain kind of centrist liberalism, whose prescriptions for a muscular national narrative were in the ascendancy, in spite of, or because of, various prominent fractures in Mitterrand's France. Mitterrand's intentions were here somewhat contradictory, as our examination of his varying invocations of the grey zone will indicate.

Evoking Bourdieu's conception of political capital in the sense analogous to social capital, Mitterrand instrumentalized the institution of the presidency of the Republic. As important as the concept of the official story, then, is the officialization of the story, including those parts of the story which invoked his three uses of the grey zone to exculpate himself.⁵⁶ Perhaps depending on an older doxa of the authority of political office, Mitterrand, in this sense, performed the official story, making visible the hierarchy between himself and interviewers. Hence the significance of the presidential pomp on display in the France 2 TV interview – the statesman-like classic interior of the Elysée, Mitterrand sat at his presidential desk with French tricolor, or the significance-saturated date of 14 July for the annual press interview. This was the kind of political performance that Bourdieu described as political representatives representing themselves as good representatives.

By the same token, it is striking that Mitterrand refuted criticism of his association with Bousquet by appealing to the official nature of the clearing of Bousquet in his 1949 trial in the High Court of the Fourth Republic, as well as the esteem in which he was held by political notables with impeccable republican credentials. The peremptoriness of officialdom here set aside the expansion of legal capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, and overrode historiography.⁵⁷

What of the duties, roles and responsibilities of the President, identified by Elkabbach as the repository of the unity and the memory of the nation? As we have seen, Mitterrand emphasized that what might have appeared like grey zone complicity by association with figures like Bousquet, or at least in neglecting to bring the full weight of the Presidential office behind bringing them to justice, was in fact a commitment to reconciliation and national unity. To return to Bourdieu on political scandal, Mitterrand here reasserted his commitment to the collective good and rebutted notions of personal corruption whether careerist or ideological. In the France 2 interview he intimated that, “Moi, depuis de longues années, j'estime que je dois tenter d'apaiser les éternelles guerres civiles entre Français.”⁵⁸ In response to Wiesel's line of questioning about Bousquet, Mitterrand asserted, “Mais comprenez ces choses. La France est un pays d'une diversité déconcertante. Ma mission, en tant que Président de la République, est de rassembler et de réunir les éléments d'un pays qui, sans un effort constant, tendraient à demeurer épars; c'est d'exprimer et d'assurer l'unité de ce pays, d'en garantir l'indivisibilité.”⁵⁹

Mitterrand, Vichy and his Resistance Credentials

In a 1993 interview with the historian Olivier Wieviorka, Mitterrand repeatedly demurred in response to the question as to whether his Resistance record conferred legitimacy and authority on him as President.⁶⁰ A year later, however, Mitterrand made ample recourse to the authority of his Resistance credentials – putting into circulation this political capital, as it were – as one part of his strategy to deflect criticisms of his entanglement with the grey zone of Vichy.

In the first instance, Mitterrand insisted that he had nothing to hide, and categorically rebuked the notion that his account was a confession, or a rehabilitation of Vichy.⁶¹ He stressed that his captivity in Germany was the decisive turning point away from the baggage of his conservative, petit bourgeois upbringing, quickly culminating in his exalted Resistance record.⁶² In addition, the Elysée staff notes emphasized that his time at Vichy was brief and in an innocuous administrative capacity, in contrast to the length and riskiness of his Resistance service. Such a move was dangerous and not made by many. As such, rather than Vichy being trivialized by Mitterrand, as his detractors had it, it was the latter who were trivializing Mitterrand's rare commitment and brave contribution.⁶³

The specter of de Gaulle inexorably loomed over talk of Resistance authority. Mitterrand had voiced to Wieviorka his disapproval of the credit that de Gaulle yielded in post-war France from his resistance credentials, as a resister of the first hour, the myth of the man of 18 June 1940. He commented further that it was inevitable that they be compared, as two longstanding presidents of the Fifth Republic.⁶⁴ But, now in 1994, Mitterrand risked coming off much the worse in this inevitable juxtaposition.

Bourdieu's distinction between the political capital of the *notable*, slowly accumulated over time, and that of the charismatic leader who emerges in crisis akin to de Gaulle, corresponds to Wieviorka's observation that the Vichy affair jarred with Mitterrand's painstaking work to build up his reputation since the Liberation.⁶⁵ Hence Mitterrand needed to minimize the distinction between himself and de Gaulle if his use of his Resistance credentials to parry the Vichy allegations was to hold water. And hence the urgency of the claim that the Gaullist myth held out a black and white representation of the Resistance that was discordant with the historical reality. The Resistance records of the likes of Mitterrand were no less worthy of validation – what counted was where he ended up, not his origins at Vichy, however grey these might appear.

The success of the first aspect of this strategy was perhaps further limited by the trend that Rebecca Clifford describes. She argues that precisely in this immediate post-Cold War period, as myths of mass resistance faded, the issue of national responsibility for wartime crimes began to emerge in public discourse. Flagging up his own resistance record was, plausibly, increasingly out of sync with shifting understandings or visions of the Resistance. The emerging doxa, in line with the emergence of the cosmopolitan mode of memory, privileged not the Resistance fighter motivated by patriotism, but the humanitarian resister driven by the protection of human rights.⁶⁶ Mitterrand's emphasis on his resistance feats and denial that he knew anything about Vichy's Jewish laws – whether true or false – and his mischaracterization of them in hindsight, was arguably dissonant with the common sense of this 1994 generation.

Internally, Mitterrand's political capital accruing from his Resistance record was yielded in his defense against rising dissent within the ranks of the *Parti socialiste*, already divided over the record and direction of the party and increasingly open to the jettisoning of the Mitterrand legacy. In the France 2 interview he voiced his concern that, “je ne veux pas qu'ils croient que mon passé ou que mon action présente pourraient en quoi que ce soit diminuer la valeur de notre combat.”⁶⁷ Mitterrand was more forceful in asserting himself in relation to the party itself, though, and this was plausibly a defining factor in his resolution in the France 2 interview to continue until the end, even if there started a campaign to compel him to resign.

He told Benamou that his youthful conservatism and distaste for the Third Republic was to be seen in the context of lack of sources of political inspiration – a Stalinised PCF was unpalatable, and, “comment aller vers une SFIO molle, divisée, et qui, en 1940, fut pour partie, et malgré Blum, complice du meurtre de la République?”⁶⁸ At a stroke, then, Mitterrand reminded the party faithful of his role in resuscitating and renovating the defunct SFIO as the

PS, and taking it to power. If the Vichy controversy undermined the party's carefully constructed memorial edifice, Mitterrand reiterated that the PS's reclaiming of that Resistance heritage was his patrimony. As Wieviorka points out, Mitterrand's investment in his image as a Resistance fighter – through initiatives like his 1985 revisit to the Pointe de Beg-an-Fry, from where he had embarked for London in 1943 to shore up his Prisoners of War Resistance movement – facilitated a socialist reclaiming of the Resistance legacy, which had been dispossessed them by the Gaullist and Communist narratives.⁶⁹

He was not without important allies in the party, however – luminaries like Jack Lang voiced their support for their leader. For Lang, the France 2 interview was a “moving lesson in courage, intelligence and truth... (he) gave us all the elements that must now close the debate.” On the other hand, he had to shore up his personal and political reputations against prominent detractors. Lionel Jospin expressed on TV that, “on voudrait rêver d'un itinéraire peut-être plus simple et plus clair, pour l'homme qui fut le leader de la gauche dans les années 70 et 80 [...] La seule chose que je ne peux vraiment comprendre, c'est les liens qui ont été maintenus, y compris dans les années 80, avec un certain nombre de personnages, particulièrement avec Bousquet.”⁷⁰ Dominique Strauss-Kahn worried about the effects of the episode given that anti-fascism was a bedrock of the French left, while he expressed fear that the Péan book amounted to “un commencement de réhabilitation de Vichy”.⁷¹ Damningly, Daniel Cordier – Jean Moulin's former secretary – voiced his sadness that, “le président de la République n'avait jamais rompu avec le milieu trouble des années d'occupation, dont la figure symbolique est René Bousquet”. Staking out his position explicitly as a resister and citizen, as well as evoking Bourdieu's sense of the specificity of the vulnerability of political capital, he said he had the feeling of having been betrayed [*trompé*].⁷²

Mitterrand's Repurposing of the Language of the Grey Zone

Apart from appealing to his own resistance and republican credentials and authority in his defense, Mitterrand played the political field by himself conspicuously drawing on, but refashioning, the very language of the grey zone. He did so in at least three ways, albeit often overlapping. First, Mitterrand repeatedly referred to Vichy as a *pétaudière* – a shambles of a situation, and so a grey zone both morally and epistemologically. Second, a more specific claim was that Vichy now tended to be seen in black and white rather than the grey zone it was. Thus contemporary commentators all too often failed to see all the ways that republican values were upheld and resistance undertaken, even in Vichy itself. And third, his appeal to the shifting of judgement from the personal level to the abstract – a grey zone where complicity or wrongdoing operate according to a logic which is distorted the moment one tries to assign them to individuals. Let us unpack each in turn.

Mitterrand referred more than once to Vichy as a *pétaudière* – a shambles or “cauldron of confusion”,⁷³ whose chief characteristics were incoherence and lack of transparency. He clarified to Benamou what he meant by this, rejecting his suggestion that to describe Vichy as such was to banalize it. Pétain, he explained, was an utterly diminished figure, and in his capacity as head of state was a thin veneer over far-right figures like Vallat, Alibert or Darquier de Pellepoix, who took advantage of this *pétaudière* to impose their fanaticism on the government by operating in the atmosphere of obscurity.⁷⁴ If Mitterrand had faith in Pétain in the early days of Vichy, it was because this lack of transparency prevented him from seeing the real situation. This generalized to the country as a whole – on his return to France from a German prisoner of war camp, he told Benamou,

J’ai découvert un pays où régnait, dans tous les domaines, la confusion. Aucune structure ne tenait. Rien ne fonctionnait. En zone occupée comme en zone sud, les Français vivaient au jour le jour, évitant de parler politique et de se prononcer en faveur de tel ou tel camp. La prudence prévalait et, hormis les collaborateurs notoires, il était très difficile de savoir ce que pensait

votre interlocuteur. Il n’existait plus d’opinion publique à l’exception de quelques cercles qui déjà s’affirmaient dissidents mais restaient sur leurs gardes.⁷⁵

The connotation of Mitterrand’s claim was that Vichy as a center of government and the eponymous regime were quintessentially a grey zone. Morally, people acted under duress and in exceptional circumstances, so that intransigent, retrospective moral judgements were impossible. As he told Wiesel, “it was an exceptional period, complex and terribly dangerous.”⁷⁶ Epistemologically, his claim referred to both the Vichy period and the present day. It was highly problematic to hold individuals accountable, much less to insist on putting them on trial, given how difficult it was to know who did what, or to what extent or in what way individuals contributed to the systemic crimes and wrongs of the regime. All the more so given the lived sense of temporality in which only the here and now counted, and the lack of social connections through which to articulate dissent. Mitterrand himself claimed that the confusion of the historical conjuncture was disabling as it induced in him a tremendous pessimism.⁷⁷ And if the government was a shambles, it was very difficult to know what was going on – nothing was clear enough to be able to make informed judgements about one’s comportment. For Mitterrand, complicity has little meaning without a clear sense of what one is complicit with – a transparency that this *pétaudière* precluded. In short, no complicity without lucidity.

In stating his essential agreement with the claim that “it is unjust to judge people on mistakes that are to be explained by the atmosphere of the time”,⁷⁸ Mitterrand contested the present-day doxa about complicity with injustice as incommensurable with the singularity of this exceptional episode in French history. At times this verged close to affirming the republican-Vichy mix that Andrieu identified as a prominent way in which his interventions were received, and the transgression of which was key to the clamor around the whole controversy. Mitterrand remarked to Wiesel, for instance, that “Vichy was not a bloc, nor was

the interior Resistance. Between the two, depending on the time, the borders were sometimes porous. The fight against the occupier could take on different forms.”⁷⁹

Mitterrand’s second sense of the grey zone was similar to the first claim, but was more specific, and, crucially, worked to close down any suggestion of a Vichy-Republic interconnection that he had opened up. Fundamentally, this second invocation of the grey zone charged many contemporary views on Vichy with being blinkered, black and white in their judgements. Failing to grasp the complexity, even contradictoriness of Vichy, they were unable to see how republican values were uncompromisingly upheld by many at Vichy, and how resistance was undertaken: “most of our contemporaries”, he told Benamou, “are ignorant of the history of the war, of the Occupation, and of the Resistance.” Mitterrand was especially insistent that this misinformation and myth obscured the reality that ideological contamination did not follow from spatial proximity in working at Vichy – “sharing space with in the Vichy *pétaudière* with more dubious types but really resisters at heart”, as Paxton rendered it.⁸⁰ The greyness of Vichy, then, was a superficial one – difficult to penetrate for the uninitiated, but beyond which distinct and uncontaminated categories of Republicanism and Vichy collaboration held fast.

Similarly, in connecting to his insistence on his Resistance credentials, Mitterrand was vociferous in maintaining that, however much obscured, at Vichy, “il y avait des résistants reels. C’était aussi anarchique que ça. C’était une *pétaudière*.”⁸¹ Equally, he derided as “false and absurd” the idea that he had belonged to the “Vichy system.”⁸² In the same vein, he dismissed distinctions in rationales of support for Pétain between Pétainists and Maréchalists since, “ce sont des subtilités qui m’échappent, qui doivent signifier la même chose. Collaborateurs ou pas collaborateurs: ça, c’était clair ! Moi, je sais qu’à l’époque il y avait ceux qui marchaient avec l’ennemi et ceux qui marchaient contre lui. Je marchais contre.”⁸³

Mitterrand's third use of the language of the grey zone drew from the changes in memory discourse described above in the outline of the contemporary French political field. Namely, it involved a shift from thinking about judgement in personal terms, thinking instead of wrong-doing and complicity in depersonalized and abstract terms. This view of the flight into abstraction through the depersonalization of the experience of Vichy and the Occupation precluded moral indictments being convincingly applied to individuals. If this logic did not extend to Mitterrand's guarding his Resistance story in terms of personal heroism, it was all the more striking in his defense, or at least fudging account, of Bousquet. Wiesel suggested that Mitterrand had painted Bousquet in terms which granted him a humanity he did not deserve, that he was evil. Mitterrand replied that, "vous dites qu'il incarne le Mal. Mais le Mal ne s'incarne qu'exceptionnellement dans un homme, pas plus que le Bien, d'ailleurs. Les monstres sont aussi rares que les saints."⁸⁴ Mitterrand had already gestured in this direction in the 1993 Wieviorka interview, when he denied any kind of equivalence between Paul Touvier – who, the following year, would be the first Frenchman convicted of crimes against humanity for his role in Vichy – and Bousquet. Whereas he considered Touvier to be a collaborator to the core, Bousquet was a "un haut fonctionnaire qui a été pris dans un engrenage."⁸⁵

Here judgment on the personal level was elided into a prioritization of the abstraction of complicity. Navigating through the obscurity of this grey zone of history by trying to pin down complicity to individuals only led to greater disorientation, both moral and epistemological. The further implication was that Mitterrand in turn could himself be attributed no connivance with the likes of Bousquet for refusing to turn his fire on him, and complicity was shaded into loyalty, just as in his insistence on the complexity of Vichy adding historiographical nuance and sophistication could put to the service of exculpation.

Conclusion

Reflecting on Mitterrand's comment on his propensity to weave grey threads, Philip Short concluded that unfortunately, at this time, "France did not want to be reminded of the grey in its past."⁸⁶ This, however, is a hasty judgement. Stanley Hoffmann argued that the idea that French people are averse to looking the past in the face is something of a very outdated cliché. Rather, the problem lies in *mastering* the past, taming its hotly contested nature. In drawing out and exploring the emerging concept of the grey zone in relation to the Mitterrand-Vichy controversy, this paper has perhaps illuminated one factor behind this – we have seen how the grey zone cuts in multiple ways; if it allows one to broaden out the categories and individuals who can be interrogated as to their historical responsibilities, it is also a resource in claim-making to refute such claims by mobilizing its inherent epistemological and moral ambiguity and obscurity. There is a feel of attrition to these claims and counter-claims, something akin to a war of position unfavorable to the kind of conclusive or cathartic reckoning that would allow one to master the past.

We have examined these processes of claim-making and counter-claim-making around the specific historic context of Mitterrand's desire to draw up and cash out with a positive balance sheet of his political career, and the requirement to do so within the broader political field, understood in Bourdieu's sense. His three-pronged approach comprised mobilizing his Republican credentials, brandishing his Resistance record, and responding to allegations of his being in the grey zone of Vichy by instrumentalizing and redirecting the very language of the grey zone. This repurposing of this emergent way of thinking about complicity with Vichy in turn took three forms: first, by appealing to the grey zone to say that nothing was clear at Vichy, so moral indictments, especially fifty years later, were wrong-headed; second, contemporary detractors in their blinkered, black and white denunciation of Vichy failed to grasp that within

Vichy's complexity all sorts of resistance was actually being undertaken and Republicanism resolutely upheld; and thirdly, an appeal to the grey zone in the sense of paralleling the shift away from personification in judgement, to a sort of abstraction of wrongdoing, complicity or evil, so as to claim that moral indictments no longer can be fixed to individuals convincingly or appropriately.

Certainly there were conspicuous tensions in his narrative: speaking both personally and for the institution of the Presidency; his resort to the capital to be yielded from officialization of his narrative in an age of diminishing trust in or indifference to political authority; personalization and abstraction of qualities of heroism and goodness on the one hand, villainy or evil on the other; and, perhaps most strikingly, between a radical dichotomization of Vichy and the Republic and a sort of merging of the two on the other with a kind of overlapping grey zone.

Ultimately, however, Mitterrand negotiated this historical conjuncture that foregrounded the grey zone of Vichy with liabilities largely deferred and his political capital not badly depleted. Opinion polls at the time and subsequently held up in his favor.⁸⁷ Yet, the issues raised about the grey zone and Vichy did not recede at all in the controversy's aftermath. One of Jacques Chirac's first exercises as the new French President was to recognize French responsibility in the deportation of Jews to German death camps. The questions that the Mitterrand episode gave rise to in terms of the dynamics of political claim-making in relation to the grey zone of Vichy, including its attendant questions of relational discourse, claims on political capital – particularly in terms of mobilization of officialdom – and the relation of accounting for the grey zone of Vichy through the prism of conceptions of France and the Republic, are all questions whose pertinence did not subsequently diminish.

¹ Quoted in Philip Short, *Mitterrand: A Study in Ambiguity* (London: The Bodley Head, 2013), 567.

² Ariane Chemin & Raphaëlle Bacqué, “Le jour où... Mitterrand suspendit son abonnement”, *Le Monde*, 22 May 2014. Some might charge *Le Monde* with cynical revisionism here, since it was seen as a key instigator of the scandal in 1994. Eric Conan and Henry Rousso, for instance, located *Le Monde*’s coverage not in any “duty to remember”, but rather the disillusionment of its editorial team with Mitterrandism. Eric Conan & Henry Rousso, *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past*, trans. Nathan Bracher ((Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998), 153-154.

³ See Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (New York: Vintage, 1989). However, for an example of Levi’s use of the term in debates about French complicity under Vichy, see “Images. Zone grise”, *Le Monde*, 24 April 1992.

⁴ Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA. & London: Harvard University Press, 1991), ix; Olivier Wieviorka, *Divided Memory: French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present*, trans. George Holloch (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 141; Christoph Kalter, *The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization and the Rise of the New Left in France, c.1950-1976*, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 106-111.

⁵ “Interview de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, à France 2 le 12 septembre 1994, sur son état de santé, les options politiques de sa jeunesse et la polémique autour de ses relations avec René Bousquet”, downloadable at <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/947012500.html>. (Hereafter, France 2 interview).

⁶ See Bénédicte Vergez-Chaignon, *Les Vichysto-Résistants de 1940 à nos jours* (Paris: Perrin, 2016).

⁷ In the France 2 interview and elsewhere, Mitterrand pointed out that he did not necessarily agree with every single one of Péan’s analyses, but nonetheless had great confidence in his biographer’s abilities. Péan was indeed meticulous in reserving judgement in what he wrote. And it is striking that he echoed the views of Mitterrand when he assailed historians like Robert Paxton for depicting Vichy in homogenously black terms.

⁸ “Interview de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, accordée au Journal ‘Le Figaro’ le 8 septembre 1994, sur l’élection présidentielle et les candidats en lice, sur l’argent, le capitalisme et les inégalités sociales, sur le PS et les affaires et sur son passé pendant l’Occupation.” Downloadable at <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/947012000.html>. (Hereafter *Le Figaro* interview).

⁹ France 2 interview.

¹⁰ François Mitterrand, *Ma part de vérité: de la rupture à l’unité* (Paris: Fayard, 1969), 20.

¹¹ These were dissected in *Le Monde* at the height of the controversy in an account unfavourable to Mitterrand by historian Claire Andrieu, “Questions d’une historienne”, *Le Monde*, 15 September 1994.

¹² One of Mitterrand’s few criticisms of Péan was his framing of his relationship with Bousquet, which, Mitterrand charged, had placed far too much significance on it. See Mitterrand, *Mémoires interrompus*, 93-94.

¹³ France 2 interview; Mitterrand & Wiesel, *Mémoire à deux voix*, 108.

¹⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, “Political Representation: *Elements for a Theory of the Political Field*”, in *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 171.

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- ¹⁵ Idem., “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field”, *Sociological Theory* 12/1 (March, 1994), 15.
- ¹⁶ Find ref.
- ¹⁷ Idem., “Social Space and Symbolic Power”, *Sociological Theory* 7/1 (Spring, 1989), 23.
- ¹⁸ Idem., “Conférence: Le champ politique”, in *Propos sur le champ politique* (Lyon: Presse Universitaires de Lyon, 2000), 64, 65.
- ¹⁹ Idem., “Political Representation”, 192-193.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 192.
- ²¹ Swartz, *Symbolic Power, Politics, and Intellectuals*, 76.
- ²² Bourdieu, “Political Representation”, 192-193.
- ²³ Ibid., 193.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 194.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 191.
- ²⁶ Short, *Mitterrand*, 565.
- ²⁷ Ibid., find page.
- ²⁸ Bourdieu, “On Symbolic Power”, in *Language and Symbolic Power*, 170.
- ²⁹ On *Le Monde*’s treatment of the 1994 Vichy episode and the ensuing frosty relations between the newspaper and the Elysée, see Patrick Eveno, *Histoire du journal Le Monde 1944-2004* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004), 507-511.
- ³⁰ Bourdieu, “Political Representation”, 185.
- ³¹ Ibid., 177.
- ³² Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic: Nation, State and Citizenship in Contemporary France* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 18.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 57.
- ³⁵ Another highly significant event in 1989 was the *affaire du foulard* in October, when three girls were suspended by their headmaster for refusing to remove their headscarves in class. In November a manifesto “Profs, ne capitulons pas!” appeared in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, warning of a “Munich of the republican school.” See *ibid.*, 62-63.
- ³⁶ Mitterrand’s republican credentials were also called into question by Jacques Chirac regarding the former’s opportunistic facilitation of the electoral advance of the Front National. See Richard J. Golsan, *Vichy’s Afterlife: History and Counterhistory in Postwar France* (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 198n. Conan and Rouso argue that Mitterrand’s much-publicized lament of France’s “150 years of errors” can be interpreted as a pacifist argument referring to 1792, rather than a critique of the Republic of 1789. See Conan & Rouso, *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past*, 138.
- ³⁷ France 2 interview.
- ³⁸ Duhamel, “François Mitterrand between Vichy and the Resistance,” 225. See also Andrieu, “Managing Memory”, 17.
- ³⁹ See Sheryl Kroen, “Is the King Dead? Performing Sovereignty in the Modern Era”, *French Politics, Culture and Society* 21/3 (2003), 127-138.
- ⁴⁰ See Mitterrand & Wiesel, *Mémoires à deux voix*, 101-111.
- ⁴¹ Cf. Rebecca Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust: The Dilemmas of Remembrance in France and Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11.
- ⁴² France 2 interview.
- ⁴³ Stanley Hoffmann et al, “A Symposium on Mitterrand’s Past”, *French Politics and Society* 13/1 (1995), 20.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 13.
- ⁴⁵ Mitterrand, *Mémoires interrompus*, 73; France 2 interview.
- ⁴⁶ Rouso, *The Vichy Syndrome*, ix.
- ⁴⁷ See Anna Cento Bull & Hans Lauge Hansen, “On Agonistic Memory”, *Memory Studies* 9/4 (2016), 395 & *passim*.
- ⁴⁸ *Le Figaro* interview.
- ⁴⁹ France 2 interview.

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- ⁵⁰ François Mitterrand & Elie Wiesel, *Mémoires à deux voix* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1995); Mitterrand, *Mémoires interrompus*.
- ⁵¹ Ronald Tiersky, "Document: Elysée Replies to Questions About Mitterrand's Wartime Record", in Hoffmann et al, "A Symposium on Mitterrand's Past", 28-35.
- ⁵² "La controverse sur le passé de M. Mitterrand et les réactions à ses déclarations sur France 2. Le PS veut mettre fin au débat dans ses rangs", *Le Monde*, 15 September 1994.
- ⁵³ Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust*, 5.
- ⁵⁴ Andrieu, "Managing Memory", 17.
- ⁵⁵ Ann Laura Stoler, "Sexual Affront and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia", in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 198-237.
- ⁵⁶ Bourdieu, "Political Representation", 173.
- ⁵⁷ Tony Judt, "Truth and Consequences", *The New York Review of Books*, 3 November 1994. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1994/11/03/truth-and-consequences/>.
- ⁵⁸ France 2 interview.
- ⁵⁹ Mitterrand & Wiesel, *Mémoire à deux voix*, 109.
- ⁶⁰ Olivier Wieviorka, *Nous entrerons dans la carrière: de la Résistance à l'exercice du pouvoir* (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 343-345.
- ⁶¹ France 2 interview.
- ⁶² Ibid.
- ⁶³ Mitterrand, *Mémoires interrompus*, 75; Tiersky, "Document", 29-30.
- ⁶⁴ Wieviorka, *Nous entrerons dans la carrière*, 345-346.
- ⁶⁵ Idem., *The French Resistance*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Cambridge, MA. & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 463.
- ⁶⁶ Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust*, 17; Robert Gildea, *Fighters in the Shadows: A New History of the French Resistance* (London: Faber & Faber, 2015), 474.
- ⁶⁷ France 2 interview.
- ⁶⁸ Mitterrand, *Mémoires interrompus*, 77.
- ⁶⁹ Wieviorka, *Divided Memory*, 129-130. Conan and Roussio also point to the PS's ambiguous handling of the aftermath of the Occupation. Conan & Roussio, *Vichy: An Ever-Present Past*, 128.
- ⁷⁰ "Les révélations sur la jeunesse de François Mitterrand et ses relations avec l'ancien secrétaire général à la police de Vichy. Les réactions", *Le Monde*, 9 September 1994.
- ⁷¹ Ibid.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Ronald Tiersky, *François Mitterrand: The Last French President* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), 56.
- ⁷⁴ Mitterrand, *Mémoires interrompus*, 75.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid., 63.
- ⁷⁶ Mitterrand & Wiesel, *Mémoire à deux voix*, 103.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., 126.
- ⁷⁸ France 2 interview.
- ⁷⁹ Mitterrand & Wiesel, *Mémoire à deux voix*, 103.
- ⁸⁰ Hoffmann et al, "A Symposium on Mitterrand's Past", 20.
- ⁸¹ France 2 interview.
- ⁸² Mitterrand, *Mémoires interrompus*, 71.
- ⁸³ Ibid., 80.
- ⁸⁴ Mitterrand & Wiesel, *Mémoires à deux voix*, 108-109.
- ⁸⁵ Wieviorka, *Nous entrerons dans la carrière*, 350.
- ⁸⁶ Short, *Mitterrand*, 567.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., 581.