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United in Separation? Lozi Secessionism in Zambia and Namibia

Citation for published version:

Zeller, W & Melber, H 2018, United in Separation? Lozi Secessionism in Zambia and Namibia. in L de Vries, P Englebert & M Schomerus (eds), *Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment*. 1 edn, Palgrave Series in African Borderland Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 293-328. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7>

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

[10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7)

Link:

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

Document Version:

Peer reviewed version

Published In:

Secessionism in African Politics

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Zeller, Wolfgang and Henning Melber (2018): *United in Separation? Lozi Secessionism in Namibia and Zambia*. In: de Vries, Lotje; Pierre Englebert; Mareike Schomerus (eds.): *Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Introduction

The Lozi/Barotseⁱ kingdom was colonized and partitioned by Britain, Germany and Portugal from the late 19th century onwards. Its political and economic heartland along the floodplains of the upper Zambezi fell under British rule in 1890. Until Zambian independence in 1964, the territory was administered under the name Barotseland as a more or less integral part of the colony of Northern Rhodesia. In 1969 Barotseland was renamed the Western Province of Zambia. The German- and, after 1914, British- and South African-ruled part of the former Lozi kingdom became the Caprivi Region of Namibia at independence in 1990. In August 2013, the Namibian government announced a name change to Zambezi Region.

Western Province and the Zambezi Region have more in common than their precolonial Lozi history and the Zambezi river, which demarcates most of the shared border of the two sovereign states they are part of. Both areas have given rise to separatist movements. Short-lived incidents of militant secessionist action have constituted major national crises both in postcolonial Zambia and Namibia. This chapter addresses both cases of Lozi separatism in a comparative fashion.

In the run-up to Zambian independence the British government, the Lozi leadership, and the Zambian transitional government signed the 1964 Barotseland Agreement. The treaty spelled out the terms under which Barotseland would be incorporated into the Republic of Zambia: as a province with far-reaching autonomy and special powers for the *Litunga* (the Lozi King) and his elaborate administrative apparatus of *induna* (headmen) assembling in various *kuta* (formal decision-making councils of headmen) on regional and local levels under the heading of the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE). A 1969 decree by the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) under President

Kenneth Kaunda to change the name of the territory to Western Province added insult to injury to the Lozi leadership. Soon after independence Kaunda's government had also reversed most of the special regulations in the 1964 agreement. Kaunda's decision had some support among the younger generation of Lozi migrants who had left Barotseland to work in the mines and urban centres of Southern Africa, and who had adopted the Zambian nationalist stance represented by Kaunda's UNIP. From the BRE's point of view, however, this amounted to an open abrogation of a legally binding treaty and caused irreparable damage to the good faith in which they had voluntarily signed the 1964 agreement. Since then, the Lozi leadership has consistently demanded more political autonomy and the reinstatement of the 1964 agreement. That itself is not a secessionist demand. However, politically radical minority groups among the Lozi, and in so far two instances of acute crisis also within the mainstream of BRE all the way to its *Ngambela*ⁱⁱ, have openly argued for the secession of Barotseland/Western Province from Zambia as a measure of last resort.

In the Caprivi Region, a secessionist movement gained momentum in the mid-1990s and on August 2nd 1999 a radical core group launched an armed attack against Namibian government installations in Caprivi. The movement's mastermind Mishake Muyongo and other leading members belong to a lineage of regional headmen, who had been originally appointed by *Litunga* Lewanika in the 1880s to administer this peripheral, but strategically important, former province of the Lozi kingdom. As one aspect of their self-legitimation, Muyongo and his associates have consistently highlighted what they call "cultural" and "historical" differences to the ethnic groups inhabiting the rest of Namibia, especially the Oshivambo-speaking majority. Significantly, this group constitutes the bedrock support for Namibia's ruling party, the former liberation movement South West African People Organisation SWAPO (United Democratic Party 2005). The Caprivi secessionists thus used implicit references to Lozi history for their own political ends. They did not succeed in establishing an independent state of Caprivi and instead their rather pedestrian actions of August 1999 were quickly and violently crushed by the Namibian security forces. The leadership of the secession has since then died, fled into exile, or been arrested and put on trial for high treason in controversial Namibian court

cases bogged down by endless technicalities. But the issues which drove Caprivi secessionism have continued to stir debate and political confrontation in Namibia into the present day.

The Caprivi secessionist attacks in August 1999 caused 15 deaths as a result of combat actionⁱⁱⁱ and this number was exceeded by those dying in detention in the ensuing trials. The attacks constitute the most severe national political crisis Namibia has faced in its post-independence history and resulted in the first and so far only declaration of a state of emergency. Concerning Barotseland, it has been the explicit wish of the majority of the Lozi leadership, including their radical factions, to secede by peaceful means instead of guns. The Lozi line of argument has consistently been a legalistic one, ceaselessly insisting on the contractual facts (and their own interpretation) of the 1964 agreement. The following table^{iv} is useful in comparing and gauging the significance of the two cases.

	area in km ²	% of national	population	% of national
Western Province	126,386	16.8%	881,524	6.8%
Caprivi/Zambezi Region	14,785	1.8%	90,100	4.2%

Western Province's size and population is roughly 10 times that of Caprivi/Zambezi, but both are home to a similar share of inhabitants of the nation's overall population. Both territories are undoubtedly of significant importance for their countries in terms of geostrategic and socioeconomic value, in particular transport access, water, timber and land for cultivation.

The question arises whether separatism by Lozi-speakers in both Zambia and Namibia constitutes evidence that a people divided by colonial boundary- and state-making has, in

the postcolonial period, been reunited in opposition against the inclusion of its ancestral lands in the two respective independent states. Are both separatist movements at least partially motivated by a shared wish to re-establish the greater Lozi kingdom? Our answer to both questions is a clear “no”. And this is exactly why we feel that comparing both cases in one single chapter is interesting. Both cases have precolonial roots in the former Lozi kingdom. They share the experience of colonial partitioning by the same boundary, of indirect rule through hierarchically organized Lozi-speaking authorities in the area, and the borderland population continues to have close kinship ties today. In our view, however, supposedly deep-rooted ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ identities and grievances, which are often cited as reasons for the radicalisation of political opposition in Africa (Cf. Lemarchand 1972; Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010), do not offer an adequate framework to understand and compare separatism in these two parts of the former Lozi kingdom. We will instead highlight a number of reasons why the two separatist movements did not join in a united cause of pan-Lozi nationalism, despite their shared roots. We group these reasons into four thematic clusters:

1. A different status of what is now Western Province and the Caprivi/Zambezi Region in the precolonial period of the Lozi kingdom, and the consolidation of this difference by colonial boundary-making and administration.
2. Different times and circumstances of the processes of decolonisation in Zambia and Namibia and, related to these, differences in secessionists’ claims of ‘betrayal’ by their respective postcolonial governments.
3. Different regional and national politics in the postcolonial era for each case with different roles of the local actors in or vis-à-vis the central state.
4. Differences in the way the post-colonial state authorities in both countries have reacted to expressions of separatist agendas at different times.

We argue that those with a separatist agenda on both sides have never united behind a pan-Lozi secessionist cause because they involve descendants of rather different people arguing over fundamentally different issues at different times and under different circumstances. The two cases we examine tell two rather distinct stories of opposition against postcolonial state formation, despite their shared roots in one single case of precolonial African statehood.

As we have indicated, in both cases actors at the centre of the respective secessionist movements derive some or most of their legitimacy from claims to represent traditional authority. We will give further details regarding the background and relevance of these claims, but there is no room for a deeper engagement with the academic debate on traditional authority in general or in Caprivi and Western Province in particular (cf. Zeller 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Melber 2009). For the record, our use of the term ‘traditional’ throughout this chapter incorporates the element of creative (re-) invention of so-called ‘tradition’ by actors with vested interests, with an expressed understanding by these actors of themselves as both representing continuity of the past and as being able to evolve and adapt in the present (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Mamdani 1996; Forrest 2004).

Our chapter will first outline the historical processes through which the Lozi kingdom was partitioned and gradually transformed into Barotseland and the Caprivi Strip during the colonial period. We will then examine how decolonisation planted the seeds of Lozi separatism in Western Province and the secessionist movement in Caprivi, and how these evolved after Zambia's and Namibia's independence. A final section will trace the initial thawing and subsequent renewed freezing of relations between successive central governments and separatists in the Zambian case, as well as the high treason trial and further contestations which defined the aftermath of the Caprivi secession in Namibia from the 1999 attacks until the time of writing.

The Birth of the Kingdom in the Floodplain

Territories outside Zambia's Western Province, in particular in Western Angola and North-eastern Namibia, have previously been under the waxing and waning rule of Buluzi (the Lozi kingdom) to a considerable though varying extent. Lozi oral history and current scholarship locate the origins of their ancestors among the Luyi people of the Katanga Region of present-day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). From there a 17th-18th century migration led the Luyi groups to the upper Zambezi's fertile floodplains, which could support a relatively high population density. Through military defeat and

assimilation of other population groups living in the floodplain and its hinterlands, the kingdom gradually grew into a complex patchwork of intermarried kinship and language groups. Some were masters, some were servants with varying degrees of status and loyalty to one or several competing Luyana power centres in the floodplains. From there, the Luyana kings steered an increasingly sophisticated political economy through an elaborate network of senior chiefs and their councilors (Mainga 1973; Caplan 1970; Gluckman 1959; Trollope 1937, 19; Flint 2003).

An invasion by the Kololo people reached the Luyana kingdom in the early 1840s. It resulted in a political and cultural cross-fertilization, from which the root of the Lozi kingdom and its *lingua franca* Silozi emerged. After the demise of the Kololo in the 1860s Bulobi remained in turmoil for the next two decades. In 1884, however, Lubosi Lewanika, born into one of the Luyana royal lineages, emerged as a new leader with a strong and ruthless hand. After killing off his main rivals Lewanika embarked on an elaborate project of administrative reforms and the careful crafting of a unified Lozi nation and state with himself as the sole and sovereign *Litunga* (Gluckman 1955, 1965; see also Sumbwa, 2000). Trade, tribute, slave labour and raids on the kingdom's peripheral groups soon became insufficient to sustain the cost of the sprawling administrative system and royal grandeur that went with the strengthened centre. By the late 1880s Barotse royalty increasingly relied on the goods, revenue and skills acquired from European traders, frontiersmen and missionaries in exchange for hides, ivory and the granting of permanent settlements (Caplan, 1970; Mainga, 1973, 139). Bulobi's volatile southern provinces Sesheke and Linyanti gained importance as a gateway for the Lozis engaging the Europeans and their entrepreneurial, technological and military resources (Flint 2003, 402-410; Mainga 1973, 132f; Gluckman 1941, 96). Lewanika had a robust administrative arrangement to secure these strategic areas: At the town of Linyanti, inside what is today the Caprivi/Zambezi Region, he placed Simataa Kabende Mamili, a tried and tested ally. At today's town of Mwandu in Western Province's Sesheke District, he placed his own son Letia.

Engaging the Europeans: British and German Interests in Bulobi

Following the counsel of French missionary Francois Coillard, on 27 June 1890 Lewanika signed a treaty with Frank Lochner, an agent of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC). The so-called "Lochner Concession" was later amended by several follow-up contracts. Their conditions were more lenient than those the BSAC offered any other indigenous rulers in what is present-day Zambia (Caplan 1969). Bulozhi became a British protectorate exempted from white settlement and with a large degree of autonomy in administration and taxation (Mainga Bull 1995, 5). BSAC's resources were thinly spread across southern Africa and diplomacy was a more realistic strategy than coercion. Rather than an imposed colonial yoke, Lozis today regard *Litunga* Lewanika's alliance with the British as a mature voluntary decision, which provided a degree of internal stability Bulozhi had not seen during most of the 19th century (Flint, 2004, 119). However, Lewanika did enter into an irreversible process, gradually trading the kingdom's sovereignty for political-military protection by the British (Mainga 1973, 171). Between 1890 and 1893, Anglo-German and Anglo-Portuguese contracts in effect truncated Lewanika's territory, initially without the knowledge of the *Litunga*.

On 1st July 1890, only four days after the Lochner Concession, the British and German governments signed the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty.^v With the so-called Caprivi Strip (named after the German chancellor in office at the time), one of the most recognizable legacies of colonial boundary-drawing on the map of Africa was created. The so-called "access corridor to the Zambezi"^{vi} was motivated by ambitious German hopes to establish a viable transport connection from the protectorate of *Deutsch Südwest Afrika* (DSWA) via the interior of Southern Africa to the German territories in East Africa. DSWA also needed water and labor resources, which seemed available in great abundance via the access corridor. Reality soon grounded such colonial fantasies. The distance and terrain between the established German outposts and the Zambezi were simply too challenging. Lewanika's appointees Mamili and Letia continued to administer and extract tribute for themselves and the *Litunga*. After an arduous three-month journey through the Kalahari the German flag was finally hoisted in February 1909 by Hauptmann Kurt Streitwolf at a place he named "Schuckmannsburg" after DSWA's governor at the time.^{vii} To his superiors, Streitwolf reported Caprivi had no valuable minerals, a dangerous climate for

European settlement but a moderate potential as a labor reserve, albeit restricted by the difficult transport access (Streitwolf 1911, 229-234).

Like the Germans, BSAC initially had only speculative interests and limited administrative muscle in their part of the Lozi kingdom. The company's main objective was the maintenance of order in a large territory with minimal financial input (Mainga Bull 1996, 5; Mainga 1973, 161; Caplan 1970, 74-118). The first decade of mutual engagement by the Lozi and the British consolidated the power of Lewanika's inner circle of power and his administrative setup, thereby resulting in increased political stability for the heartland of Buluozi and considerable material wealth for its ruling elites. The Lozi leadership were not only passive recipients of the power projected outward by the British colonial system but creatively engaged the colonizers for their own personal advantage. More fundamental changes were to come, however.

From Remote Hinterlands to Labour Reserves

BSAC saw Barotseland as unsuitable for white settlement. Its key assets were a large native labour force and linked potential for tax revenue. The Lozi leadership was willing to cooperate and strong enough to control an ethnically diverse range of subject people via feudalistic power and ownership structures. In 1903, BSAC divided Barotseland into five districts with resident District Commissioners commanding an armed native police force of ca. 600 men. In the following years, they formally abolished slavery and introduced a hut tax. Lewanika grudgingly settled for a ten per cent share of the revenue, a small portion of which would trickle down to lower-level chiefs at his own discretion (Caplan 1970, 86f). The material base of the Lozi elites thus shifted from direct extraction of tribute and labour to monetary income allocated to them by the British authorities. The broader Lozi population had to find sources to earn cash income. The conditions were set for labour migration and by the early 1910s thousands of Lozi men were working in the mines, on commercial farms and the railway lines in the Rhodesias and South Africa (Van Horn 1977, 164; Gluckman 1941, 164). Lozi royalty increasingly adapted to the luxuries and etiquette of a European lifestyle as their offspring were educated in missionary schools and groomed to take their place in the bureaucracy of Indirect Rule (Mainga 1973, 206). In 1911, the Company amalgamated the existing

territories of Barotseland-North-Western-Rhodesia with Northern-Eastern-Rhodesia to establish the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. Barotseland's relative administrative autonomy continued, but BSAC kept the province as a largely rural native reserve, from which taxes and labour for industrial production, and from 1914 onwards for the war effort in East Africa, were extracted (Mainga Bull 1996, 6).

Upon his arrival in the Caprivi Strip, the most delicate task for Hauptmann Streitwolf was the setting up of a functioning administration with minimal resources in this large and remote territory. He eventually managed to convince the population that they were now under the protection of the German Kaiser, and no longer required to deliver labour or tribute to the Lozi leadership on the other side of the Zambezi (Streitwolf 1911, 110). Inspired by the British system of Indirect Rule, the German resident confirmed Chief Mamili as the representative leader of the inhabitants of the western parts of Caprivi, mainly the Mafwe people and several associated - but importantly rather distinct - subject groups^{viii}. Streitwolf then oversaw the appointment of Chief Chikamatondo as a caretaker for the eastern parts inhabited by the Masubiya people. The affirmation of the Mafwe chieftaincy and the creation of the Masubiya chieftaincy broke the existing chain of command and allegiance between the previously subordinate peoples in Caprivi and their Lozi overlords. These events affirmed the partitioning of Bulobi along the colonial boundary from a mere line on maps to a fact of daily life. Chiefs Chikamatondo and Mamili had seized the opportunity to safely dissociate themselves from Lozi rule and build their own power base. Apart from this legacy, effective to this day, the results of German colonial rule in Caprivi are rather modest. On 21st September 1914, the commanding officer at Schuckmannsburg surrendered to advancing British forces, ending the brief period of Germany's actual administration of the Caprivi Strip.

After Lewanika's death in 1916 his son Yeta III became *Litunga*, a position he held until 1945. BSAC's rule in Barotseland ended in 1924 when the Colonial Office took over the administration of the British Protectorate Northern Rhodesia. After intensive lobbying by Yeta III, Barotseland was granted a special status and officially declared a protectorate within a protectorate (Mainga Bull 1996, 6). As large-scale industrial mining took off in

the Copperbelt in the late 1920s the economic centre of gravity within Northern Rhodesia shifted further away from Barotseland and contract labour migration increased. In the late 1920s the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) and other labour bureaus were hiring thousands of men who worked and lived in ethnically segregated communities in all major mining centres of South Africa and the Rhodesias. In some districts, Lozi-speakers amounted to as much as half of all able-bodied men (Caplan, 1970, 145). In 1936 the Barotse Native Authority (BNA) was established with a treasury and far-reaching responsibilities in the fields of land- and natural resource management, jurisdiction and law enforcement. Owing to its considerable administrative capability, the powers of the BNA were greater than those granted to any other Native Authority within Northern Rhodesia and this remained unchanged until the end of the British colonial period.

The Conference of Versailles brought the Caprivi Strip, along with the rest of South West Africa (SWA), under the League of Nations Mandate handed to South Africa. Between 1919 and 1939 responsibility for the administration of all or parts of Caprivi was passed back and forth several times between South Africa, SWA, Bechuanaland and Northern Rhodesia. This illustrates both the low priority and the continuing difficulties to access the territory during that period. However, the League of Nations continued to consider Caprivi as part of SWA. In 1937 a new administrative centre was established near the Zambezi's Katima Mulilo rapids. In 1939, administration of the eastern Caprivi Strip was once again transferred, this time to South Africa. The strategic location of the strip in the heart of southern Africa was central to Pretoria's interests at the outbreak of the Second World War (Kangumu 2000; 2011). Caprivi was declared a Native Reserve and from 1940, the South African Defence Force (SADF) used the first airfield at Katima Mulilo for training exercises while WNLA used its own aircraft to transport Caprivi men to the mines near Johannesburg. Caprivi remained inaccessible over land from the other parts of SWA until the mid-1960s. The government in Pretoria perceived the Caprivi Strip as unsuitable for white settlement, sought to minimize expenditure, encouraged labour migration, and implemented its policies via indirect rule through the Mafwe and Masubiya chieftaincies under the supervision of one white government officer. The

borderland population throughout this period maintained close relations across the Zambezi and elder residents today recall that the border was virtually open. As in Barotseland, and in contrast to SWA the language of schooling in Caprivi was English, both provinces worshipped in Silozi and ran their clocks on the same time zone as the surrounding British colonies South Africa: one hour ahead of SWA. Like Barotseland, Caprivi's status as a remote province run through special administrative arrangements was thus consolidated.

What Kind of Independence? South African Bantustan and Zambian Province

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was imposed in 1953 against the expressed opinions of the majority of its black population. Under the leadership of Mwanawina, a son of Lewanika and highly controversial *Litunga*, the Lozi leadership however gave its lukewarm support for the federal scheme (Caplan 1970, 168ff). In return, Barotseland's special status as a protectorate was further entrenched by an Order-in Council of the British Government (Mainga Bull 1996, 9; Caplan 1968, 346f).

By the late 1950s the Lozi leadership had become accustomed to actively cultivating their self-image of Barotseland as an independent state. This stance was nevertheless increasingly irreconcilable with the realities of Zambia's approaching independence and rising black African nationalist sentiments. Educated Lozis and labour migrants had become politically sensitized and openly questioned the sole authority of the *Litunga* and his leadership apparatus, which was reeling from internal succession disputes at the time. Conservative British forces meanwhile regarded sustaining the Lozi leadership as the solution to stave off popular demands for black self-rule in the colony (Caplan 1968, 350f; Mulford 1967, 212ff). Under these circumstances nationalist forces gained the political upper hand in Barotseland in the run-up to independence. Educated Lozi candidates of Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP overwhelmingly defeated the Barotse National Party sponsored by *Litunga* Mwanawina in three successive elections in 1962, 1963 and 1964 (Sumbwa 2000). The weakened Lozi leadership embarked on a two-pronged strategy: They focused on securing the autonomy of Barotseland within an independent

Zambia while secretly attempting to strike deals with old allies in sympathetic colonial administrations in South Africa, Rhodesia, Portugal and France. In an attempt to increase BNA's revenue base *Litunga*, Mwanawina's nephew Lubita was sent to Johannesburg to negotiate a raise in WNLA's attestation fee for Lozi workers. WNLA were at the time recruiting 5-6000 Lozi men annually to work in the Rand mines. Lubita also conducted negotiations in March 1964 at Katima Mulilo with representatives of South Africa's Verwoerd government over military and financial assistance to "free" Barotseland from Zambia (Caplan 1968, 355). What looks like an attempt to create a Barotseland Bantustan, probably including Caprivi, and thus re-uniting a large share of the Lozi kingdom, did not become a reality. Instead, the Lozi leadership accepted the incorporation of Barotseland into the independent state of Zambia under the terms of the Barotseland Agreement 1964. This document was the result of three-party negotiations between the BNA, the British and Northern Rhodesian governments. It was signed in London on May 18 that year by UNIP's president Kenneth Kaunda, *Litunga* Mwanawina and Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys. UNIP promised to recognise the special status of Barotseland beyond Zambian independence and to preserve the *Litunga's* powers to make laws over a wide range of regional and local government matters in Barotseland. These included land and natural resource management, the judiciary and finances. The Barotseland Agreement 1964 was however not formally enshrined in the new republic's constitution and therefore technically a legal document of inferior relevance (Mainga Bull 1996, 12).

In the months before Zambian independence Kenneth Kaunda gave written and verbal assurances that his government had "no wish to interfere with the day to day running of the internal affairs of Barotseland".^{ix} Yet, after independence on 24th October 1964, the UNIP government no longer concealed the fact that they intended to do away with what they regarded as a reactionary colonial anachronism (Caplan 1968, 356). The BRE was then and is still today an elaborate and vast network of chiefs from the various Lozi royal lineages and their bodies of senior advisers with duties in specific resorts like land management, jurisprudence and ceremonial affairs. It is an administrative system using all the signature elements and symbols of state bureaucracy: stationery and flags,

uniforms and administrative buildings, written permits and formal meetings held in official languages^x, security forces and official holidays.

The ruling UNIP party's strong electorate and their nationalization of the copper mining industry provided the muscle to strip the Lozi leadership of much of their formal fiscal and administrative powers. The British parliament briefly debated the abrogation of the agreement in December 1966 but the position of the Labour government at the time was "once a country becomes independent these matters become issues for its own internal decision".^{xi} By 1969 all major institutions of Barotse administration were either dismantled or had their funding streams re-routed through Lusaka. The salaries of the *Litunga* and the royal family were now paid by the president's office. Kaunda's administration also prohibited all further recruitment by WNLA in Buluzi. With its two-thirds majority in parliament, UNIP in 1969 amended the constitution to cancel the 1964 agreement and rename "Barotseland" as "Western Province". Fast-paced development in the Copperbelt, Lusaka, and along the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) train route to Dar es Salaam were shifting Zambia's economic and political centre of gravity further away from the Zambezi. Cash-crop plantations and other 'white elephant' projects introduced by central government in Western Province were incompatible with the floodplain ecosystem and became bogged down in the day-to-day resistance against government policy by Lozi administrators on the ground (Flint 2004, 167f).

In some sense, the situation for Western Province under UNIP was not unlike the earlier relationship between BSAC and the Lozi leadership. UNIP did little to develop the area while a small group of high-ranking and well-educated Lozis were receiving state salaries and appointments to ministerial positions or parastatal companies, sufficient to discourage them from full-blown opposition to central government. A marked difference, however, lay in the role of Lozi 'tradition' and 'culture'. The British authorities had carefully sustained and re-invented ideas and administrative practices of precolonial Lozi authority to maintain social stability as part of Indirect Rule in Barotseland (cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The Zambian government sought to relocate and isolate them from the realm of everyday administration into a sphere of depoliticised 'folklore'. This project was never completed. In the absence of efficient state structures the Lozi

system of administration continued to play a central role in many aspects of daily life in Western Province, in particular the management of land and its natural resources. The controversy over the 1964 agreement remained unresolved.

By 1964, domestic and international pressure was mounting on the South African regime to extend development and greater administrative and political autonomy to its black population. For Caprivi, the Odendaal Commission^{xiii} recommended a roadmap towards a self-governing homeland and with great financial input, Pretoria began to implement ambitious development plans. As Zambia gained independence, Katima Mulilo became the fast-growing designated seat of a future Caprivi bantustan government. These plans were not unopposed though. The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) had been formed in 1963 with the purpose of achieving self-government for the Caprivi Strip. Like their fellow Lozi-speakers from Barotseland, many of the early CANU members had formed ideas of black emancipation while abroad as migrant labourers or on education programs. Not surprisingly, the apartheid authorities closely watched CANU's activities. Its first president Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye was arrested in 1964 and subsequently held in detention at various locations in SWA before he disappeared entirely in 1972 under dubious circumstances (Flint 2004, 174; Kangumu 2011, 214 ff). Another leading figure of CANU was Albert Mishake Muyongo, a prominent young member of the Mafwe royal family and direct descendant of Simataa Mamili (Fisch 1999,42). Following Simbwaye's arrest and a bloody crackdown on a CANU meeting at Katima Mulilo, Muyongo and other CANU activists fled to Tanzania and Zambia. In November 1964 they met with Sam Nujoma and other leading members of SWAPO in Dar Es Salaam and discovered they were fighting for a common cause: independence from white minority rule for the territory of the former German colony DSWA. Muyongo agreed to a SWAPO-CANU merger and thereafter held various positions^{xiii} in SWAPO before he was expelled in 1980. Muyongo's 1964 move was partially consistent with the stated wish by Simbwaye, expressed in a letter he managed to secretly send in 1968 from detention in Warmbad to the Zambian government. In this letter^{xiv}, he explains that his motivation to form CANU was "not to start a secessionist movement" that would push for Caprivian independence separate from the rest of SWA, but that his intentions differed from those

of SWAPO in that he was advocating against the use of violence to liberate the country, not what country should be liberated.

The internal politics within SWAPO in exile were at the time strongly driven by (not unfounded) fears of assassinations and covert operations by South African and other security and intelligence agencies. SWAPO had originally emerged from the Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO), a contract worker based movement. This Northern, most densely populated part of SWA was home to more than half of the country's total population. External threats and inner pressure from a younger generation of militant activists joining the organization in exile challenged SWAPO's established leadership from the early 1970s onwards. The organisation's inner circle developed mistrust against non-Ovambo members. Muyongo became one of many victims of the liberation struggle's internal power politics. He nowadays maintains that he and SWAPO President Sam Nujoma on 5th November 1964 signed a document formally sealing the SWAPO-CANU merger on condition that Caprivi would be granted either special political status or complete autonomy after Namibia's independence (United Democratic Party 2005; Flint 2004, 188). Muyongo claims to have a copy of what could be called the 'Caprivi 1964 agreement' but says he will only produce it "when time spells for the right opportunity".^{xv} SWAPO disputes this claim and conclusive or convincing evidence has never been produced by either side. According to the website of the secessionist movement, the document contains among others the following clause: "At the attainment of independence, the people of the Caprivi must be asked whether they want to join Namibia or remain independent" (Caprivi Freedom 2013). This contested issue became a key reference point in the allegations of betrayal made by the Caprivi secessionist movement in the late 1990s.

Despite the emerging political opposition, the apartheid regime's push for development in Caprivi continued through the 1960s with significant projects in all sectors of public service and infrastructure. The Strip finally became accessible by road and in 1969 postal and telegraph services were directly connected to South Africa. The East Caprivi homeland was finally inaugurated in 1972, while the western part of the strip between the

Mashi and Kavango rivers was declared a nature reserve. Four years later the Caprivi bantustan was granted self-government and its name changed to “Lozi”. A government was formed, complete with a constitution, regulations for Lozi citizenship, a national anthem, and a state flag depicting two elephants. These were supposed to symbolize the Legislative Council consisting of the Mafwe and Masubiya chiefs, their *Ngambelas* and ten councillors each (South Africa 1964). The council’s de facto powers were very limited, and all important funding and policy decisions were made in Pretoria.

The wave of developmental change rolling over Caprivi from 1964 onwards was from the outset accompanied by the apartheid regime’s political and military strategic concerns. These gradually came to take centre-stage after SWAPO’s military wing launched a guerilla insurgency in Caprivi in the late 1960s. South Africa responded with a heavy build-up of military installations and troops. By the late 1970s the rear bases and main operations of SWAPO’s guerrilla war had shifted to southern Angola. Although Caprivi remained strategically relevant, the apartheid regime’s ability to sustain the costly efforts introduced during the 1960s decreased as the security-driven development paradigm lost its momentum. Governmental services in Caprivi contracted and Pretoria transferred the administration of Caprivi back to SWA in 1980 when legislation established a three-tier system of local, regional and central “ethnic” government. After elections Caprivi’s Second-Tier Legislative Assembly was composed equally of Masubiya and Mafwe councillors. A rift over the supposedly rotating chairmanship soon emerged between the two sides. Although it was settled in court shortly before Namibian independence, the ethnic animosities in Caprivi were to continue (Fosse 1996; Kangumu 2011).

In 1989 a negotiated settlement between the United Nations, the South African government, and SWAPO paved the way for Namibia’s independence on March 21st 1990 (Cf. Melber and Saunders 2007). In the first free elections in November 1989 SWAPO emerged as the strongest party with 57 per cent of the overall votes nationally, while the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) received 29 per cent. DTW had been established in the 1980s as an umbrella for black political organisations with the blessings of the apartheid authorities. Mishake Muyongo had returned from exile in 1985, formed

the United Democratic Party (UDP) and soon afterwards merged it with DTA. He thus became a DTA member of Namibia's first independent parliament.

In December 1972 a constitutional amendment act declaring a one-party state under UNIP marked the beginning of Zambia's Second Republic. By its end in 1991 Zambia's economy contracted by over 30 per cent (Virtual Zambia 2008). Key reasons were gross mismanagement of the copper industry and a dramatic fall in the world price of copper. Throughout this period Zambia also supported liberation movements throughout southern Africa and consequently lost its access to the ports of Durban and Maputo. Zambia took major loans from commercial banks overseas and the World Bank, which defaulted in the mid-1980s. Banks and donors pressured the Zambian government to re-introduce multiparty democracy and implement a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Attempts to follow suit met with internal opposition and the deteriorating economic situation led to food riots. As UNIP's power was waning in the late 1980s Kaunda made several attempts to appease the Lozi leadership. In 1988 he appointed *Litunga* Ilute to the Central Committee of UNIP. This and other moves in the run-up to the multi-party elections of 1991, however, failed to secure Kaunda the necessary votes to win the elections.

Calls to Arms: Rising Separatism in the 1990s

The winner of Zambia's 1991 parliamentary elections, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), announced in its campaign manifesto: "We are committed to a policy whereby traditional rulers regain the enjoyment of their traditional powers. The institution of chieftaincy shall be given its rightful and respectable role, drawing support from government" (MMD 1991). After years of Kenneth Kaunda's dogmatic rejection of traditional leaders' role in government these were re-emerging as important players in rural and national governance during the presidency of MMD's Fredrick Chiluba. The reformed 1996 constitution created a national House of Chiefs to act as an 'advisory body' to the government. President Chiluba also secured the support of selected individual chiefs (and their voting subjects) through the distribution of personal gifts in the form of cars and cash (Times of Zambia 2003, 31 January). An overwhelming

majority of the Lozi electorate had voted for Chiluba and MMD in 1991. Party campaigners had led the Lozi leadership and broader population to believe that an at least partial restoration of the 1964 agreement would be conceivable under their government (Englebert 2005, 29-59; Sumbwa 2000, 115f). These expectations were thoroughly disappointed. In early 1993 the MMD government officially recognized a Nkoya chief in Kaoma, considered by BRE a renegade province trying to break away from the Lozi umbrella (Mainga Bull 1996, 8; Sumbwa 2000, 116). During the same period the fallout from SAPs and a general breakdown of public services throughout the country were sorely felt in Western Province. Zambia experienced political turmoil as the Chiluba government persecuted a senior member of the Lozi royal family on dubious high treason charges. In early 1995 parliament passed a new law aimed to strip BRE of its power to allocate land. Despite the 1969 Land Act, BRE had never ceased to execute this function and continued to extract a significant part of its revenue from it (Sumbwa 2000, 117).

Already in July 1993 some 5000 Lozis had assembled at the *Litunga's* residence demanding to challenge the Zambian government in court with the aim to secede the province based on the 1964 agreement. President Chiluba had refused to enter into dialogue and instead promised to crush any uprising. In July 1995 tensions came to a head when the presidential motorcade was blocked by stone-throwing Lozis upon a visit to Mongu, the capital of Western Province. In preparation against expected government retaliation, Lozis from all districts followed a ritual call to arms and formed a militia to protect their *Litunga* (Sumbwa 2000, 119f). During ensuing raids state security forces seized rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, hand grenades and land mines from radical Lozi separatists. Government alleged these had been obtained from UNITA forces in neighbouring Angola (Minorities at Risk 2003). The Lozi leadership reacted by convening a Barotse National Conference (BNC) in November 1995. The BNC is the highest decision making body of BRE and only convened on extraordinary occasions. It passed a resolution demanding government recognize the 1964 agreement and incorporate it into the constitution. The resolution text further threatened "if the government continues to be obstinate, the people of the Barotse shall have the right to self-determination by reverting to the original status of Barotseland before 1964" (Barotse National Conference 1995). Importantly, BRE and its highly trained lawyers did

not directly threaten with secession but pointed out that they were considering their options. Despite the clash between BRE and the MMD government, neither side implemented their threats in full. Government did not give in to Lozi demands regarding the 1964 agreement, but the implementation of the Land Act remained superficial. BRE did not renege on its demands for the restoration of the 1964 agreement, but did not proceed to challenge the MMD government in court either. While claiming that Barotseland had a right to secede from Zambia, BRE publicly rejected the idea of pursuing the secessionist option by force. *Litunga* Ilute Yeta stated “we shall not secede from Zambia” while simultaneously denouncing the government for its “perpetual enslavement of Barotseland” (The Post 1994; Englebert 2005). The *Litunga* and his *Ngambela* distanced themselves publicly from demands made by more outspoken agitators for Lozi separatism. They instead chose to ally with their former enemy, endorsing Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP in the 1996 elections. Some junior Lozi royals and associated activists continued to take a more radical stance but eventually toned down their rhetoric as the political climate cooled off once again. Among these, Prince Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika who in 1996 contested the Zambian presidential elections on a moderately separatist platform publicly endorsed the Caprivi separatists’ cause in 1999. Possible direct links or material support for Muyongo’s movement had not been credibly established, however, and seemed never to be part of the BRE’s public rhetoric (Englebert 2005; compare with Mbikusita-Lewanika 2001; Barotse Patriotic Front 2004).

In the run-up to Namibian independence expectations of rapid economic change as a dividend of the end of apartheid were high among the black majority population. In the first elections in 1989 the Namibian population voted the SWAPO party to power with a strong majority in most regions except Caprivi. Here DTA held on to a slowly declining majority vote in all elections until the 1998 local authority elections. Mishake Muyongo had become the party’s leader in 1992, and in 1994 ran for president against Sam Nujoma.^{xvi} Caprivi was Muyongo’s personal power base where a group of educated and politically active Caprivi men formed around the veteran politician. Many of these had spent their formative years in training and employment for Caprivi’s apartheid era

administration. For them, Namibian independence was yet to deliver the material and symbolic benefits they had experienced during the bantustan period. Muyongo's support in Caprivi was, however, roughly split along the region's ethnic divide which Streitwolf's recognition of two chieftaincies had helped to create and which regional politics during the bantustan period had deepened.^{xvii} The Mafwe under their chief Bwima Mamili, a cousin of Mishake Muyongo were largely voting DTA while the Masubiya generally supported SWAPO. In the post-independence climate of competition for scarce opportunities within Caprivi the existing rift soon broke out more openly and turned violent (Fosse 1996,165-8; Flint 2004, 244, 66). Mafwe residents alleged that the distribution of government employment and other benefits unfairly favoured the Masubiya population and other supporters of the ruling party from outside of Caprivi (Fosse 1996,165). Muyongo and his followers claimed that 'tribalist' attitudes among the core leadership and voters of SWAPO, as well as post-independence politics in Caprivi were the continuation of the Ovambo dominance Muyongo and others allegedly had experienced in exile (Fisch 1999, 20). The politics of the independence struggle thus continued.

Another issue of hot contestation emerged soon after independence: The recognition of chiefs in Caprivi by the SWAPO government. Streitwolf's administrative arrangement based on a separate Mafwe and Masubiya chieftaincy had essentially functioned continuously since 1909. In the case of the Masubiya, a rather coherent identity and internal hierarchy had been constructed and continues to exist to the present day. The Mafwe chieftaincy was less homogenous from the start. Several groups with more or less clearly pronounced ideas of a separate identity traced their existence back to the times before 1909 (Compare with Streitwolf 1911, 126). In August 1992, a Mafwe breakaway faction unilaterally elected their own chief. Violent confrontations soon took on a party-political dimension as the SWAPO government officially recognized the new Mayeyi chieftaincy. Eager to beat the main national opposition leader's party on his home ground, SWAPO ran a powerful campaign in Katima Mulilo in the 1998 local authority elections and overturned DTA's previous majority (Soiri 2002, 201). Muyongo alleged irregularities but failed to take legal action. Instead, he and his supporters questioned the

inclusion of Caprivi in the Namibian state formation project and began to openly identify with an alternative: The idea of a separate and sovereign Caprivi state within the borders of the earlier bantustan. While Muyongo's own statements never indicated a wish for this state to become part of a resurrected Lozi kingdom (see also Flint 2003, 427) the Lozi heritage provided a powerful background in terms of which secessionists could label alleged 'Ovambo invaders' as 'foreigners'. Leading members of the secessionist movement had been educated and groomed for careers in the administration of the Caprivi bantustan. Both the kingdom's and the bantustan's lingering histories appear to have provided fertile ground for the secessionists' ideas to take root at a time when the Namibian state formation project had not yielded the results they desired.

After the 1998 election defeat these ideas ripened and led to organised action. Namibian security forces discovered a training camp of the newly formed Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) in a Mafwe-dominated area of Caprivi near the Botswana border later that year. The largely Oshivambo-speaking security force members used heavy-handed methods on the civilian population in the surrounding region in their search for suspected members and sympathisers of the CLA. Allegedly escaping torture, rape and intimidation, some 2500 people subsequently fled to Botswana where they found shelter in the Dukwe refugee camp. Mafwe Chief Bwima Mamili as well as Mishake Muyongo and Caprivi Governor John Mabuku were among them. Mamili and Muyongo were soon transferred to Denmark as political refugees under UNHCR protection, while several hundred others were voluntarily repatriated to Namibia in the following months. A majority remained in Botswana, however, and a hard core of several dozen CLA members managed to regroup on Angolan and Zambian territory. On 2nd August 1999 they launched poorly coordinated armed attacks on government installations, such as the national broadcaster's station and airport in Katima Mulilo. Although they were caught completely by surprise, the Namibian army and police quickly regained control. In total, fifteen casualties (Namibian security forces, rebels and civilians) were officially recorded. President Nujoma declared a state of emergency for the region, which lasted for three weeks. Namibian state security forces were pursuing and interrogating suspect secessionist sympathizers throughout Caprivi. Hundreds of arrests were made in- and outside

Namibian territory, involving torture and unauthorized extradition in several cases (Amnesty International 2003a). The Caprivi secession had failed and the radical core members of the movement were either dead, in exile or in custody. But while the new Millennium in some respects brought a new deal to both the Namibian and Zambian parts of the former Lozi kingdom, the grievances which underpinned separatism in both areas did not simply go away.

Contestation Continues

On May 13th 2004, a new road bridge across the Zambezi at Katima Mulilo closed the last gap in a 2524 km-long asphalt route called the 'Trans Caprivi Corridor' (TCC), connecting Zambia's Copperbelt with Namibia's sea-port of Walvis Bay. The bridge and refurbished sections of the TCC were largely financed by foreign donors but gave the governments of Zambia and Namibia an opportunity to showcase their commitment to bringing economic development to the rural provinces following the separatist incidents in the previous decade. While the new infrastructure and investment opportunities provided the backdrop for a political rapprochement between BRE and the new MMD administration of Chiluba's successor Levy Mwanawasa (cf. Zeller 2007b, 2010) during his period in office (2002-2008), the SWAPO government of Namibia showed no signs of compromise regarding its tough stance against the Caprivi secessionists.

Caprivi/Zambezi

After their arrest in the aftermath of the August 1999 attacks, the more than 140 imprisoned Caprivi secessionists were charged with high treason and 274 other counts. Among the accused was a remarkable portion of teachers and other educated former civil servants. The authorities initially refused to provide legal aid for the accused but the Namibian Supreme Court ruled in mid-2002 that they were entitled to adequate legal representation at the expense of the state. The treason trial finally opened in 2004 and after numerous delays the prosecution closed its case in mid-2013. The delay in judicial procedures collides with Article 12(1)(b) of Namibia's Constitution, which stipulates that trials should "take place within a reasonable time, failing which the accused shall be released". Several bail applications by some of the accused - motivated by deteriorating

health conditions and the need for special medical treatment - were refused. During the trial, the number of prisoners who died in detention exceeded the death toll during the attacks.

In early August 2003, Amnesty International published a critical report on the treatment of the detainees (Amnesty International 2003a). It expressed deep concern about the violation of pre-trial rights of the accused, which might undermine their right to a fair hearing as defined in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR). It observed violations against the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the failure of the authorities to investigate and prosecute allegations of torture. AI expressed concern over the misuse of the "common purpose" doctrine under which all the defendants were charged among others with high treason, murder and sedition. In a press release it called on the Namibian authorities "to immediately and unconditionally release all prisoners of conscience and ensure that the remaining defendants are tried in a fair manner" (Amnesty International 2003b).

The Namibian government instead continued with the uncompromising full prosecution of the accused. It has also shown no willingness to address the political root causes of the separatist attempt and instead treated it as an issue of maintaining law and order. The SWAPO government's method of trying to eliminate political challenges through declaring them illegal is also evident in their decision to ban, with effect as of the 1st September 2006, the revived UDP which promotes self-rule in Caprivi (afrolNews/IRIN 2006).

In February 2013, 43 of the accused in the high treason trial had been dismissed as a result of lack of evidence. The acquitted have launched legal action suing the government for compensation, amounting close to N\$ 1.2 billion in total (Menges 2013). From the originally 143 accused 12 were released prior to the opening of the trial in 2003, another one in August 2012. 22 accused died while in custody, 10 among these between their

arrest and the opening of the trial. Of those remaining accused, 13 identified as ringleaders refuse to recognize the jurisdiction over them (Analysis Africa 2013).^{xviii} Ever since the trial started, the secessionists' agenda of a separate Caprivian State continued to make occasional headlines in the Namibian press.^{xix} The main trial finally ended with a verdict on 8 December 2015. Of the remaining accused, around 30 were found guilty and received long jail sentences, while most others had their charges dismissed. Many of them had spent up to 16 years in prison. The judge harshly criticised the police for using torture to force those arrested to implicate others and to confess. Since then, several among those found not guilty, have laid charges against the Namibian state and claim for compensation.

Refugees that had been living in the Dukwe camp in Botswana since the late 1990s were gradually returning to Namibia with the assistance of both the UNHCR and the Namibian government. But despite appeals by the Namibian Commissioner for Refugees close to one thousand refugees were at the end of 2013 still reluctant to accept the offer and preferred to stay in Dukwe (Sankwasa 2013). Until mid-2016 the repatriation process proceeded slowly and with interruptions. It was marred by suspicions among those who had fled that upon return they might be punished. By 2017, still some 900 refugees had remained in the Dukwe camp. Namibia's state budget for 2017/18 allocated more than 10 million Namibian Dollar for their repatriation (Sasman 2017). A few political asylum seekers were also living in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the United States. Upon enquiry of some of these they were informed that the government's willingness to provide returnees a home without prosecution would be strictly limited to Namibian refugees registered with the UNHCR in their host countries and not to asylum seekers (Namibian Sun 2013).

Mishake Muyongo continues from his Danish exile home at the outskirts of Copenhagen to execute leadership as president of the UPD through a virtual, albeit distant presence with annual New Year messages on the party's website, including appeals to continue the "struggle to liberate the Caprivi Strip".^{xx} But in recent years others have increasingly

taken on the task of pronouncing themselves on behalf of UDP, not least as members of an exiled group resident in and operating from Canada.

Although it has been declared illegal, UDP remains active in Caprivi. It now explicitly denies having a secessionist agenda and currently demands: 1) a political dialogue between Namibian President Pohamba and UDP president Muyongo; 2) the unconditional release of all Caprivi political prisoners; and 3) a referendum on the Caprivi political dispute (without any specific definition of ‘the dispute’ or the nature of the ‘referendum’). It insists on using only peaceful means and emphasizes its wish to “prevent the recurring of 2nd August 1999”.^{xxi} In April 2012 UDP activists planned a demonstration in Katima Mulilo with the aim to hand a petition stating the above demands to the Caprivi Governor. The petition also made reference to the shared historical roots of Caprivi and Barotseland, claiming that both became part of their respective countries without the consent of their inhabitants. It did not, however, argue for a re-united Lozi kingdom. Permission for the planned demonstrations and demands was categorically denied by the Namibian authorities but they are continually debated in (largely closed or anonymized) social media fora and letters to newspaper editors.^{xxii}

The internal logic of a former guerrilla movement organized through a military hierarchy and chain of command, and its fear of enemy infiltration still appear to be central to the way many of Namibia’s ruling party members work and think today.^{xxiii} Over two and half decades after independence an unofficial view is widespread from the national leadership down to the party foot soldiers that the SWAPO party, the Namibian government, and the Namibian state are identical and indivisible. According to the official paradigm, SWAPO has “brought democracy”^{xxiv} as well as “development and progress” (The Namibian 2008)^{xxv} to Namibia, and any form of opposition is undermining the “peace and unity” needed for the nation-building project to continue.

Consistent with this logic is the SWAPO government’s announcement in August 2013 to re-name the Caprivi region ‘Zambezi’. While the responsible government minister described the decision as an articulation of “the wishes of the people” there was

significant, though not unanimous opposition within the region against the name change (Mutenda 2013). This is consistent with findings that, across ethnic, political and generational lines within the region “Caprivian” exists as a category of self-definition which also includes a sense of being “different”, though not necessarily separate from the rest of Namibia (Guijarro 2013). The name change accordingly struck many as an offensive external imposition. A newly formed “concerned group” alleged at a press conference in Katima Mulilo on 20 August 2013 that the name change “is destined to destroy our identity and history” (Sanzila 2013). Similar concerns and objections were raised in this and similar letters to the local print media:

Being a Caprivian is our identity, culture, and way of life; it is who we are as a people sharing similar cultural norms and social values. (...) The word Caprivian is what unites the (...) tribes of the Caprivi. This is similar to the Ovawambo, though they are amongst themselves OvaKwanyama, OvaNdonga, OvaMbalantu etc. They find unity and pride in being commonly known as Ovawambo. (Ngoshi 2013)

An opinion article observed “the people of Caprivi accepted that name as part of their collective historical memory and remembrance; its colonial origin notwithstanding”. He claimed that colonial history is part of the country’s collective history. “One cannot just erase it by using tippex” and “‘Caprivi’ will remain a contested territory” (Kaure 2013). The editorial in a local weekly suspected “that the reasons for changing the name Caprivi have less to do with its colonial roots than the symbolism it holds for secessionist sympathies in the region.” (The Windhoek Observer 2013)

Barotseland/Western Province

After his election in 2002, Zambia’s President Mwanawasa earned back the majority of Lozi votes for his MMD party, by directing investments and warm rhetoric towards Western Province. The thawing of relations between Zambia’s central government and BRE was commented upon in 2004 by Inyambo Yeta, a direct descendant of Lewanika and senior Lozi chief of one of the seven administrative sub-units of BRE. Yeta was at

the time vice-chairman of Zambia's Constitutional Reform Commission, as well as chairman of the Zambian House of Chiefs, and had been appointed to both positions by the president:

President Mwanawasa [. . .] is a personal friend of mine. We both are lawyers. That does not necessarily mean that there is recognition of the institution I represent. The minute you get a chief who is not in good books with the president, he will be just ignoring the Royal Establishment and say: "Oh no, those people there, we don't have any time for them (Inyambo Yeta interview, 14.6. 2005).

Yeta's assessment proved to be accurate. The National Constitutional Conference set up by Mwanawasa rejected the submission by BRE to reinstate the 1964 agreement^{xxvi} and following Mwanawasa's death in office in 2008 relations under his successor, MMDs Rupiah Banda turned back to confrontational. On 14th January 2011 the first violent clashes occurred since 1995 between Lozi activists and security forces in the provincial capital Mongu, resulting in two deaths and numerous injuries. 120 persons were arrested on treason charges and jailed for up to nine months. Among them was the 92-year old former *Ngambela* Maxwell Mututwa, who died soon after his release from prison.^{xxvii} Lozis, both radical and moderate, were outraged but on 10th February a high-powered Lozi delegation led by Chief Yeta met with President Banda to assure him that BRE had no intention to secede from Zambia, stressing that the 1964 agreement was not a secessionist issue but one of negotiated terms of integration.^{xxviii}

Michael Sata and his Patriotic Front (PF) party won Zambia's 2011 elections and Lozi activists allege that while on the campaign trail in Western Province Sata promised to restore the 1964 agreement if elected. Yet once in power, the president rejected the findings of a commission of inquiry into the 14th January 2011 riots as well as the restoration of the 1964 agreement. Echoing the crisis of the mid-90s, Lozis accused Sata of "consciously calculated electoral deception"^{xxix} and on 26th and 27th March 2012 some 2000 delegates attended a Barotse National Conference at Limulunga. Their resolution stated: "Barotseland is now free to pursue its own self-determination and destiny. We are committed to a peaceful disengagement with the Zambian government".^{xxx} The

conference resolution declared that they now accepted successive Zambian government's consistent failure to heed the 1964 agreement and, since Barotseland had only become part of Zambia on the conditions stipulated in this document, they were in fact not seceding but merely confirming the non-existence of a union between the two. The establishment of a Barotse Government, complete with defence forces, ministries and various other bodies were also decided, and soon thereafter a mushrooming of websites and pages on facebook and other social media indicated that these decisions had at least some results in the virtual world. While the conference could hardly have taken place without at least passive tolerance by *Litunga* Lubosi Imwiko II (in power since 2000), the royal palace soon started taking a different line. The *Ngambela* who had presided over the 2012 Barotse National Conference, Clement Wainyae Sinyinda, resigned his position in November 2012, citing lack of protection from the office of the *Litunga*. He was arrested on treason charges on April 14th 2013, the same day President Sata visited the *Litunga* at his residence. Hardline Lozi secessionists accused the *Litunga* of treachery and openly threatened with regicide, a highly unusual but not unprecedented event in Lozi history. These and other developments have exposed existing rifts between different factions within BRE and a number of separatist groups in Western Province. Many of these differences have deep roots and echo the pre-colonial diversity and internal divisions of the Lozi kingdom.

For a large share of the non-Lozi Zambian public, events throughout the first 5 decades after independence have led to a widely held opinion that the Lozis in Western Province are in essence tribalists living in their own imagined past of lost glory, that their internal and separatist politics are fundamentally pre-modern and cannot be taken seriously. Still, the political grievances and the seasoned Lozi lawyers who express them through legally sophisticated language have not only outlasted the 50th anniversary of Zambian independence in October 2014. They have since become part of what could be called the new Zambian political mainstream of deep political division expressed by all sides through references to ethnic and geographic distinction of a perceived ruling Bemba/northern regime against the south and west of the country. Edgar Lungu took over the leadership of the PF party following Sata's death in October 2014 and in presidential

by-elections in January 2015 narrowly defeated UPND candidate Hakainde Hichilema. Since then, the space for open political debate in the country has shrunk dramatically. A large share of the electorate, opposition leader Hichilema, and several election observation missions have not accepted the officially proclaimed outcome of the August 2016 presidential elections, which again saw Lungu narrowly ahead of Hichilema (by a 2.68% margin). Since then, there have been well-documented allegations of collusion between PF and the Electoral Commission, important parts of the free and independent press have been stifled by arrests, court cases and expropriations targeting journalists and editors. In a bizarre road rage incident in April 2017, the presidential and opposition leader's respective motorcades were racing each other en route to the annual *Kuomboka* ceremony in Mongu. Both had been invited by *Litunga* Lubosi Imwiko II, who continues to be widely unpopular among the Lozi electorate. Lungu subsequently had Hichilema arrested from his home at night and jailed on high treason charges for endangering the life of the president. In June 2017 the president of the Zambian Catholic bishops' conference and other senior religious leaders publicly decried "the muzzling of people's freedoms and human rights violations", and alleged that Lungu is "creating a new dictatorship" (Luxmoore 2017). In the same period various informants in Western Province as well Lusaka openly raised the prospect of "civil war", something previously unheard of in post-independence Zambia.

Conclusion

We have found no evidence to suggest that the cases of Lozi separatism in Namibia and Zambia are in any meaningful way directly linked beyond a few isolated expressions of mutual solidarity in the past. There has been no ethnically motivated pan-Lozi separatist cause since independence. While the two cases are related through their shared historical roots, we have argued that the trajectories and aims of separatists in both countries are fundamentally different in a number of aspects, which allow for fruitful comparison.

Today's Western Province includes the historical centres of the Lozi kingdom's power while the area of Caprivi/Zambezi was in the precolonial period a peripheral and at times volatile province of Buluzi. Although Lewanika had established more firm control over Caprivi, the area's population had at best a weak allegiance to the kingdom. When the

opportunity for a closer linkage occurred in 1909, they were not unhappy to dissociate from Lozi power, especially since the maintenance of daily relations across the colonial border was, at least initially, not impeded. Separate administrative arrangements for the rest of the colonial period consolidated these differences.

Decades apart, the different circumstances of the negotiated processes of decolonisation in Zambia and the armed liberation struggle for Namibia have resulted in different separatist claims of ‘betrayal’ and goals aiming towards the establishment of a more autonomous, self-governing authority. The factual status of the two 1964 agreements is hardly comparable: While one is a fully established detailed legal document bearing the signatures of the former colonial power and the leader of Zambia’s incoming postcolonial government, the claimed but hitherto unproven existence of the other between SWAPO and CANU is at best a disputed anecdotal footnote of the liberation struggle, and quite possibly a re-invention of historical facts to serve a vested interest. It definitely directly contradicts the written wish of CANU founder Simbwaye who in 1968 explicitly rejected the idea of secession/separate independence of Caprivi from the rest of Namibia. The declared primary objective of Lozis in Zambia has, apart from statements made by radical factions or at the height of severe tensions, not been secession but the inclusion of Barotseland/Western Province in Zambia as a semi-autonomous region with special privileges, and therefore not entirely unrealistic. In contrast, the Caprivi secessionists’ goal to ‘liberate’ their territory and create their own sovereign state was highly unrealistic, not only considering the size, location and resources of the area, but especially given the fact that a considerable share of the population within the Caprivi/Zambezi Region is actually very clearly in support of the Namibian government and its firm stance against the secessionists. But even among those, as the protest against the new name of the region seems to suggest, are many who have identified with being ‘Caprivians’.

Both cases examined in this chapter contain strong elements of national, regional and interpersonal political issues that have nothing to do with separatism being played out on a national stage. The postcolonial politics of recognizing traditional leaders, the Mafwe-

Masubiya dispute and Muyongo's own personal history are as much part of the Caprivi secessionist story as Zambian party politics, the factional in-fighting within BRE, and competition within the spectrum of more radical advocates for secession are elements and drivers of the Barotseland issue. While these make comparison between the two cases interesting, the issues at hand are not factors uniting the two movements behind a common cause.

Finally, there are important differences in the way the post-colonial state authorities in both countries have reacted to expressions of separatist agendas. Although the Barotseland case has elements of violent confrontation, both central government and BRE have so far always allowed room for negotiation. The overall more tranquil manner in which the Barotseland issue has been argued by BRE and handled by all central governments so far is consistent with Zambia's peacefully negotiated independence transition and postcolonial history. The inverse assessment of the same facts, of course, would be that the issue at hand never seems to get settled one way or the other, and events since 2016 have even put Zambia's long-term legacy of peaceful democratic transition and governance in question. In contrast, the SWAPO government's harshly coercive reaction to the secessionists in 1999 left no room for negotiation. This in itself and the judicial debacle of the excessively long high treason trials have raised questions as to how committed SWAPO is to the principles of rule of law and democratic process. SWAPO's way of dealing with the Caprivi secession has ultimately led to the same result as in the Zambian case: The issues at hand never appear to fully go away and instead keep poisoning the political climate, on a local, regional and national level in both countries.

This last point motivates us to add to our analysis a note of caution. From various other cases of political dispute and indeed secessionism in Africa (and elsewhere) it is evident that historical facts are a rather fluid commodity. Collective memory, the interpretation of facts, and even the claims over their actual existence can change significantly over time. So far, the sporadic occurrence of 'hot' separatist action in Western Province and the Caprivi/Zambezi region, against a background of simmering discontent, have been

largely out of synch. But if the socioeconomic causes as well as the handling of the political issues by both the Namibian and Zambian central governments were to aggravate grievances in both regions *simultaneously* at some point in the future, there may well be scope for a pan-Lozi separatist cause to become articulated.

Who is likely to articulate it? Judging from past events in both case study regions, these would probably be educated persons with affiliations to what is left of the Lozi system of 'traditional' authority, and who have been cut out of the deals which have led their fellow - or rival - compatriots to buy into supporting the central state. They would need to be able to mobilize sufficient support among disenchanted youths to back their arguments with any significant concrete action. If the socioeconomic situation in both regions does not improve tangibly, there should be no shortage of those, especially if access to and control over the local natural resource base would promise a better living.

Are they likely to succeed? We do not think so, if "success" is defined as "accomplishing secession". But if those who articulate the secessionist argument see a chance that this may force the central state authorities to do anything else but ignoring them, then getting noticed may well be good enough a reason for them to keep the secessionist demand and mobilisation on their agenda.

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ⁱ The terms Lozi and Barotse are synonymous.

ⁱⁱ In the Lozi administrative hierarchy the *Ngambela* is the most senior councillor who communicates decisions between the *Litunga* and the *khuta*, as well as the public. In obvious relation to the Westminster Model, he is often referred to as “Prime Minister”.

ⁱⁱⁱ The exact number is disputed but this is the verifiable minimum number of casualties.

^{iv} WP: 2010 Zambia national census; Caprivi: 2011 Population and Housing Census.

^v The English name of the document is ‘Anglo-German Agreement of 1890’.

^{vi} Anglo-German agreement of 1890, Article III. 2.

^{vii} The population of the area referred to the place as ‘Luhonono’ and in August 2013 the Namibian government announced that this would replace ‘Schuckmannsburg’ as its official name.

^{viii} Two of these groups claimed autonomous chieftaincies in the post-independence period and their official recognition by the SWAPO government infuriated the core leadership of the Mafwe.

^{ix} Kenneth Kaunda in a speech at Lealui on 6 August 1964, cited in Sumbwa (2000, 114).

^x Silozi is used for regular administrative proceedings, Siluyana for royal and ceremonial affairs.

^{xi} MP Mrs Judith Hart <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=1966-12-13a.227.9&s=barotse#g229.4>

^{xii} In 1963 the South African government published the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, commonly known as the Odendaal Report after its chairman, Fox Odendaal. Its official purpose was to make recommendations on the

best ways to promote the socioeconomic development of Namibia's black majority population, but it is widely regarded as an attempt to fend off anti-Apartheid critics.

^{xiii} Muyongo served as SWAPO Representative in Zambia (1964-'65), Educational Secretary (1966-'70), and Vice-President (1970-'80).

^{xiv} The said letter was only discovered in 2017 in the Zambian National archives. The authors wish to thank Dag Henrichsen from the Baseler Afrika Bibliographien for making it available.

^{xv} <http://www.caprivivision.com/who-has-the-power-to-revive-canu/>

^{xvi} Muyongo was the DTA Vice President from 1987 until 1992 and DTA President from 1992 to 1999. http://www.klausdierks.com/Biographies/Biographies_M.html. Accessed 30 June 2008.

^{xvii} As Soiri (2002, 200) notes, it is difficult to establish whether politics entered into ethnicity or vice versa.

^{xviii} The overall figures slightly differ according to sources and cannot be verified beyond any doubt. As the report also concludes: "Many have been tortured, and the state now faces potentially huge civil claims from the 43 men set free by the court after spending 13 years in jail." See also *The Namibian* of 2 February 2002 and of 16 June 2007, reporting on the claims of some of the accused to be 'Caprivians' and not 'Namibians' and hence refusing to accept the jurisdiction of the Namibian courts.

^{xix} Examples include a pro-secessionist opinion piece published in Caprivi Vision 1 September 2005, the controversy over the revival and subsequent banning of the United Democratic Party (UDP) (*The Namibian*, 28 July and 8 September 2006; *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 September 2006; *New Era*, 4 and 5 September 2006. Caprivi separatists claim

that this (hitherto undisclosed) document proves that the 1964 CANU-SWAPO merger was agreed on the condition that Caprivi would become an independent state separate from Namibia (*The Namibian*, 24 January 2007), the re-installment of CANU by locals and the repeated public claims by accused and acquitted high treason suspects that Caprivi is historically ‘not part of Namibia’ (*The Namibian*, 2 February 2005; 17 January, 17 April and 14 June 2007 respectively).

^{xx} <http://www.caprivifreedom.com/news.i?cmd=view&nid=1198>

^{xxi} <http://www.caprivifreedom.com/news.i?cmd=view&nid=1185>; see also www.capriviconcernedgroup.com

^{xxii} <http://geocurrents.info/news-map/war-and-strife-news/continuing-tension-in-namibias-caprivi-strip#ixzz2VXa0UJv5>;

http://www.thevillager.com.na/news_article.php?id=1439&title=Caprivi%20rises%20%20again

^{xxiii} The ruling party’s handling of the SWAPO detainee issue and the National Society for Human Rights and, the emergence of opposition parties Congress of Democrats and Rally for Democracy and Progress are prominent examples.

^{xxiv} “Reader’s Letter.” 2008. *The Namibian*, accessed at:

<http://www.namibian.com.na/2008/March/letters/08ED201395.html>

^{xxv} See also: “Pohamba at political rally.” 2008. *The Namibian*, accessed at:

<http://www.namibian.com.na/2008/February/national/08EB20FA4F.html>.

^{xxvi} http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=25516

^{xxvii} http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=21897

^{xxviii} http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=18135

^{xxix} <http://www.ukzambians.co.uk/home/2012/02/28/president-satas-reaction-to-barotse-report-a-u-turn-or-a-consciously-calculated-electoral-deception/?695d7100>

^{xxx} http://www.barotseland.info/Freedom_Resolution_2012.htm