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Fragmented Forces: the Development of the Gambian Military

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This article provides a detailed look at the history of the Gambian Armed Forces (GAF), a military that has received very little academic attention within the study of African state security forces. It identifies key turning points in the GAF's history and highlights the vastly different role the military played in the state under President Jawara (1965-1994) and President Jammeh (1994-2017). Yet, it also highlights important similarities regarding internal patterns within the armed forces and shows the ways these continuities may challenge attempts to restructure the security sector. The article draws on archival research as well as interviews conducted with retired and active duty Gambian military personnel, government officials, and Gambian scholars.

On 1 December 2015, Gambia Radio and Television Service aired a telephone call in which President Jammeh congratulated opposition leader Adama Barrow on winning the presidential election. Jammeh wished Barrow 'all the best' and joked that he will spend his political retirement farming.¹ This light-hearted announcement of Jammeh's defeat was met with astonishment, in part because it contradicted the tense election period. In the run-up to the 2016 election two opposition figures were tortured and killed by state security forces after partaking in a demonstration calling for electoral reforms. Dozens of others were also arrested.² Tragically, these cases were not exceptional but follow a pattern of intimidation, imprisonment and murder of journalists, activists, and opposition figures under Jammeh's rule.

Yet, just one week after conceding defeat Jammeh retracted it and alleged 'serious and unacceptable abnormalities' in the election process.³ Opposition parties, professional organisations, and religious groups across The Gambia condemned this announcement. Furthermore, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) all criticized the move and publicly backed Barrow as the winner of the election. Despite his isolation, both within The Gambia and internationally, Jammeh refused to accept defeat. The international community, with ECOWAS in the lead, attempted numerous rounds of negotiation. The escalating tensions peaked when

ECOWAS sent a 7,000 troop contingent to the borders of The Gambia with threats to force Jammeh to accept defeat. After additional negotiations, Jammeh ultimately agreed to concede and left the country for exile in Equatorial Guinea on 21 January 2017.⁴

Throughout the weeks of the tense election standoff, Jammeh's key ally was the armed forces. When Jammeh initially conceded defeat, the head of the army, General Badjie, also congratulated Barrow and offered his allegiance. However, when Jammeh backtracked, so did Badjie. The armed forces shortly after seized the headquarters of the electoral commission. In many ways it is unsurprising that the armed forces stood by Jammeh. Under his rule, personal loyalty was the central tenant of the military, emphasized much more than professional achievements, time-in-service or education. Yet, as the article will demonstrate, this strategy has also led to a fragmented force.

One of Barrow's first moves as president was to request ECOWAS forces to provide security in The Gambia for his first 6 months in office.⁵ The request sent a clear sign that Barrow was reluctant to trust the Gambian armed forces. As will be detailed, a wariness towards the military by political leadership has been a consistent trend throughout the history of the Gambian Armed Forces (GAF).

This article provides a detailed look at the history of the Gambian Armed Forces, a military that has received very little academic attention within the study of African state security forces. The study of the Gambian military experience adds to an understanding of the complex and varying trajectories of militaries in the region. It shows ways that the development of armed forces is shaped by the interplay of internal political motivations as well as international engagements.

The article identifies key turning points in the GAF's history and highlights the vastly different role the military played in the state under President Jawara (1965-1994) and President Jammeh (1994-2017). Whereas the military could be considered marginal under Jawara, it was central to Jammeh's rule. His highly personal involvement in the security services represented a pattern seen throughout the African continent of personal rule contributing to weakened military professionalism.⁶ Yet, there are also significant continuities within the armed forces under Jawara and Jammeh. While the differences are easier to observe, the similarities require an in-depth look at internal patterns within the armed forces. The article shows that both leaders were distrustful of the military and intentionally limited the development of a

professional officers corps. The article will conclude by showing the ways in which historical patterns in the Gambian Armed Forces will challenge Barrow's attempts to restructure the security sector.

The analysis draws on archival research carried out in the Gambian National Archives. It also uses interviews conducted with retired and active duty Gambian military personnel, government officials, and Gambian scholars. The article focuses primarily on the Gambian Armed Forces, which is the military of The Gambia. However, attention will also be paid to the wider security structures that were established under Jammeh. These include an intelligence agency and a paramilitary force, both of which became notorious within The Gambia. Situating the GAF within the broader security structure demonstrates the ways that the GAF grew under Jammeh but was also counterbalanced.

The Creation and Early Years of the Gambian Armed Forces

Unlike most states in the region, The Gambia did not immediately create a military upon independence in 1965. Security was the responsibility of a small paramilitary force, called the Field Force, alongside a police force. The Field Force, formed in 1958 out of the Gambian regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), totalled only 140 men at independence and increased to around 500 by the early 1980s.⁷ There was little concern over the absence of a military at the time due to The Gambia's small size and its generally peaceful relationship with its only neighbour, Senegal. Additionally, a defence agreement was signed in 1965 between The Gambia and Senegal, which provided mutual assistance in the face of an external threat.⁸

While this arrangement worked well through the 1960s and 1970s, it was first seriously tested in 1981 when Jawara experienced a coup attempt and the country suffered its most violent upheaval to date. The attempt to overthrow Jawara was orchestrated by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a civilian who had been an unsuccessful candidate in the 1977 parliamentary election and known for espousing radical leftist views.⁹ While several members of the Field Force were involved, they were not the majority of the leaders. The remaining individuals varied in their educational

background and professions, with a sizeable number working as taxi drivers, giving the event the nickname 'the taxi driver coup.'¹⁰

After breaking into the Field Force armoury, the rebel elements released all prisoners from Mile Two prison and distributed rifles and ammunition to anyone they felt was on their side.¹¹ Instead of supporting the rebels, many who had acquired weapons carried out personal vendettas, further undermining the efforts of the rebels who already lacked widespread support.¹² The coup plotters took other extreme measures that surely led to a loss of credibility such as holding Jawara's wife and eight children hostage and threatening them live over the radio.¹³ Kukoi and his co-conspirators soon lost control of the situation and the plan to take Banjul was sidetracked by widespread looting, robbery, and killing.¹⁴ The majority of the Field Force was not quick to counter the rebels; instead they remained neutral and waited for the dust to clear before choosing a side.

Jawara requested the assistance of Senegal under the mutual defence agreement. Senegal responded quickly, sending in hundreds of soldiers including airborne and sea assault units.¹⁵ In four days the coup was aborted but cost the lives of 33 Senegalese soldiers and an estimated 500 Gambians, many of whom were civilians uninvolved in the fighting. This coup attempt contrasts with general patterns that show that coups in Africa are usually short in duration and cause limited immediate loss of life.¹⁶ The severity of the situation, especially in contrast to The Gambia's history of stability, can help explain the major changes enacted by the government following the attempt.

The coup attempt helped prompt the creation of the Gambian Armed Forces. Only a few months after the incident, President Jawara and President Diouf of Senegal signed the Kaur Declaration leading to the creation of the Senegambia Confederation. This confederation aimed to integrate the security forces of Senegal and The Gambia as well as create an economic and monetary union and would serve to coordinate issues of foreign policy.¹⁷ In order to integrate the two countries' armed forces, Gambia had to first create a military.

It is important to note that Jawara had been in power for 17 years before establishing a military and prior to the coup attempt believed an army was not necessary for The Gambia. Although he appeared supportive of the Senegambia Confederation, he never seemed fully comfortable with the idea of the Gambian Armed Forces and emphasized that the military should be kept 'as small as

possible.’¹⁸ His unease was probably due to regional and continental patterns of military interventions into politics. At the time of the creation of the Gambian military, the majority of West African states were under leaders who came to power through a military coup. Jawara surely recognized the pattern and likely viewed the military from its inception as a potential threat.

The Gambian National Army (GNA) was developed by merging the existing loyal members of the Field Force with new recruits and officially came into existence with the passing of the Gambian Armed Forces Act in 1985.¹⁹ The new organization was set up and trained by a British training team. Around the same time, the Gambian National Gendarmerie (GNG), a force separate from the GNA, was established based on a French military model and trained primarily by the Senegalese.²⁰ This hybrid of British and French military structures used to create the Gambian Armed Forces led to confused roles and an often-contentious relationship between the army and gendarmerie.²¹ Within five years of the 1981 coup attempt, Gambia went from having little more than a police force to having armed forces comprising an army and gendarmerie alongside the police.

The Senegambia Confederal Agreement created a Confederal Army, separate from the regular armed forces of Senegal and The Gambia. The Confederal Army was made up of two-thirds Senegalese soldiers and one-third Gambian soldiers with the ability to deploy anywhere within the confederation. Gambian soldiers chosen for the Confederal Army were given the same pay grade as the Senegalese soldiers, which was significantly more than the normal pay rate for the Gambian military.²² This ‘financial advantage made it the dream assignment of every Gambian soldier.’²³ However, it caused disparities in pay within the new Gambian army and soldiers ‘complained of gross differences in income and privileges’ as a result of the Confederal Army.²⁴ One former soldier explained, ‘We were seeing that some of us are treated better than others and that is very dangerous in the army.’²⁵ Furthermore, it was a pay scale that the Gambian military could not sustain after the Senegambia Confederation disbanded in 1989.

There were also accusations of favouritism and nepotism in the selection process for the Confederal Army.²⁶ The Senegalese military at the time had a longer history and higher standards for recruitment and Gambian soldiers selected for the Confederal Army were supposed to match the standard.²⁷ However, former soldiers noted that in reality the way to get chosen for the Confederal Army was to know one

of the Gambian selecting officers. In an interview with a former Confederal Army soldier he laughingly said, “if it was not for corruption, I would not have been in the [Confederal] army.” He explained that he did not meet the standard criteria but he knew someone that assigned him a spot.²⁸ This favouritism, which began from the very start of the Gambian Armed Force’s existence, likely undermined the integrity of the officer corps. Furthermore it weakened the hierarchical structures by providing privileges based on personal links rather than on rank or merit, a pattern that has continued within the GAF.

Even when the Gambian soldiers joined the Senegambia Confederation, they were junior to their Senegalese colleagues as a result of their newly appointed ranks. Due to the vastly different size of the Gambian and Senegalese populations, Senegal also contributed more resources and troops.²⁹ Furthermore, the key tasks of guarding the airport, port, and Gambian president were given to Senegalese troops.³⁰ Gambian soldiers said that at the time they saw potential personal benefits to the Confederal Army, but some also saw it as an insult to their national pride not to have full responsibility of protecting the nation.³¹ Political opposition parties claimed the confederation was a threat to national sovereignty and economically disadvantageous to the Gambian citizens.³²

Individuals with doubt about the agreement did not have to wait long for the Condeferation to come to an end, which is did suddenly in 1989, over a dispute regarding the rotation of the Confederal presidency.³³ In August of 1989 Senegal removed the 300 Senegalese troops stationed in The Gambia as part of the Senegambia Confederation without prior warning.³⁴ President Jawara explained that he only found out about the withdrawal of troops when he arrived at work and found that there were no Presidential Guards present.³⁵ The Senegalese Minister of Defence justified the withdrawal by reasoning that the Senegalese soldiers were needed to deal with an emerging issue on the border with Mauritania.³⁶ Gambia responded by initiating the legal measures to dissolve the confederation.³⁷ Thus the Senegambia Confederation ended less than seven years after it was formed.

The withdrawal of the Senegalese troops meant Jawara was finally dependent on his armed forces for both internal and external protection. This was the first time since the army’s creation that it had not been under foreign leadership. Gambia’s involvement in the Confederal Army, especially in the early stages of the military’s existence may have sowed the initial seeds of discontent within the military. It

created divisions within the armed forces by giving some soldiers more pay and prestige. Additionally, the accusations of corrupt practices within the officer corps during Confederal Army period did not end with the termination of the Senegambia confederation.

Warning of Growing Discontent

At the same time that the Senegambia Confederation was winding down, insecurity in Liberia was intensifying. In 1990 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which The Gambia is a member, decided to send troops to Liberia under the title ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In August 1990, 105 Gambian soldiers were deployed to Monrovia, alongside Ghanaian, Nigerian, Guinean, and Sierra Leonean troops.³⁸ This was the Gambian military's first involvement in a peacekeeping mission and the deployment was a controversial issue within The Gambia. Newspapers questioned the goal of the mission and some military members expressed doubt as to whether the military was adequately prepared.³⁹

The Liberia mission was difficult and dangerous for even the experienced militaries in the region and the Gambian military was further disadvantaged by its infancy. A former Commander of the GNA explained that the Gambian peacekeeping unit was inexperienced and underprepared, while another former officer noted that the unit stood no chance against rebels who were trained and motivated to fight.⁴⁰ During the initial deployment, two Gambian soldiers, Corporal Modou Bojang and Private Sama Jawo, were killed.⁴¹

The first Gambian ECOMOG contingent returned home on April 13, 1991. Two months after their return soldiers from the unit took to the streets, arriving at State House in Banjul to express their dissatisfaction, primarily over claims that they had not been paid their due deployment allowances.⁴² This was the first mutiny in The Gambia and President Jawara quickly agreed to meet with the soldiers about their complaints.⁴³ He promised to pay the mutineers the allowances they were owed and to look into their other requests.⁴⁴ Additionally, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the Gambian National Army, Colonel Momodou Ndow Njie was retired directly following the mutiny, indicating that the government took the revolt seriously.⁴⁵

While the peacekeeping mutiny appeared to be handled efficiently, decisions that followed from the event marked a turning point in the Gambian Armed Forces. Less than a month after news of Njie's departure, the government announced that the Nigerian Army Training Assistance Group (NATAG) would soon be arriving in The Gambia to help train and equip the army. The especially unusual aspect of the NATAG arrangement was that the top Nigerian officer, Colonel (later promoted to Brigadier General) Abubakar Dada was appointed Commanding Officer of the Gambian National Army. Soldiers at the time remember being 'shocked' by the decision.⁴⁶ The move to bring in another foreign contingent was a controversial one from the start and the idea of having the national military headed by a foreign officer was especially contentious. Gambian media at the time criticized the decision. For example, one paper listed every individual in the Gambian military from the rank of Captain and above, pointed out their long and decorated service and then posed the question 'Is the government telling us that none of these people are competent enough to head the army?'⁴⁷ The departure of Colonel Njie was due to the fact that he had lost the confidence of his men. However, Jawara did little to restore this confidence or develop leadership within the Gambian military. Instead he appeared more comfortable with having foreign military personnel lead the Gambian Armed Forces.

Although the government announced the NATAG plan almost immediately after the mutiny in June of 1991, it took about nine months for the seventy-nine member contingent to arrive.⁴⁸ In the meantime The Gambia endured its second mutiny. This event was a near repeat of the first mutiny. It involved the second contingent of peacekeepers to return from Liberia and their complaints mirrored those of the first group of mutineers.⁴⁹

The mutinying peacekeepers in 1991 and 1992 were the first to publicly expose the growing sense of distrust within the ranks and between the military and government. The peacekeepers did not believe the government's claim that they did not have the money available to pay the peacekeepers, but rather they thought that 'the senior officers were robbing them.'⁵⁰ The complaints about deployment payments was specific to the ECOMOG soldiers but their accusations of corruption and mismanagement resonated with others in the military, particularly junior officers. Promotions were often seen to be based on favouritism, which further eroded the soldiers' confidence in the hierarchy.⁵¹ One former soldier stated that the senior officers 'did not have control and we did not respect them.'⁵² The accusations by the

soldiers were similar to complaints circulating in the civilian sector concerning ‘widespread disapproval with the regime, in part due to increased corruption.’⁵³

In addition to these general complaints were more specific grievances related to the NATAG presence. Lt Col (Ret.) Sarr explains ‘the final straw was when the government reduced us to nonentities and brought in Nigerians to command and control us.’⁵⁴ Gambian officers complained about the better accommodations, cars, and pay the Nigerians received as well as other fringe benefits such as free fuel.⁵⁵ The Gambians were not just envious of the Nigerians’ material benefits; they felt that their presence was directly detrimental to their own careers. The Nigerians held all of the highest positions, with no Gambians above the rank of a Major.⁵⁶ In addition to the public displays of dissatisfaction, there were other indications of morale problems in the military at the time. For example, Gambian media in 1993 reported on the ‘alarming’ number of soldiers who were voluntarily leaving the military after a short period of service.⁵⁷

One other important aspect of discontent among many Gambian military personnel at the time was the disbanding of the Gambian National Gendarmerie. While the gendarmerie and army trained separately they were relatively equally funded and served as a counter weight to each other.⁵⁸ For example, it was the gendarmerie who countered the 1991 and 1992 mutinies amongst army members. However, in 1992 the government decided to disband the gendarmerie and merge the members into a unit within the police force called the Tactical Support Group (TSG).⁵⁹ For those personnel who were in the gendarmerie, this was an unpopular decision because the police received less funding and equipment than the army and was generally seen as less prestigious.⁶⁰ Soldiers blamed the decision to disband the gendarmerie on the Nigerians, who were advising the Gambian government on military matters at the time.⁶¹ Furthermore, Gambian soldiers have retrospectively blamed the Nigerians for over-arming the Gambian National Army.⁶² Numerous former soldiers argue that disbanding the gendarmerie caused the 1994 coup to be a ‘fait accompli’ because there was no counterweight against the army.⁶³

The mutinies in 1991 and 1992 had given Jawara two warnings of the problems within the military but more drastic measures were taken on the third revolt, which occurred in 1994. On the morning of July 22nd 1994 President Jawara was at his office in State House when he received a report that armed soldiers were on their

way to State House. The soldiers far outnumbered and out armed the small contingent of Presidential Guards at State House that day and Jawara quickly fled.

The soldiers briefly exchanged fire with the TSG and after overpowering the police quickly moved to Banjul.⁶⁴ Therefore with limited internal resistance and a president who had already departed, the soldiers had no trouble taking over the state. The whole affair was over by midday, with no bloodshed. The soldiers made the obligatory announcement over the radio that the constitution was suspended and a curfew was in place. Thus marking 'the demise of the longest continuously surviving multiparty democracy in Africa' at the time as well as unseating the continent's longest serving national leader.⁶⁵

New Leadership with New Emphasis on the GAF

Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh was announced as the head of the new ruling council, named the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). The initial press announcement listed 'rampant corruption and the retrogressive nature of the country' as the cause of the coup.⁶⁶ While Jammeh marketed the coup as an action that was necessary to protect the national interest, it was also likely motivated by a desire to protect the interests of the military and fuelled by personal aspirations.

When Jammeh first came to power in the 1994 coup, decision-making was grounded in the AFPRC, which consisted of five junior military officers (including Jammeh).⁶⁷ While civilians were appointed to many of the ministerial and cabinet positions, decisions were regularly issued through military decrees, of which at least 70 were made in the first two years following the coup.⁶⁸ After twenty-six months in power, Jammeh retired from the military and was elected as president of The Gambia in 1996. Even before this election he had begun to replace his public image as a military commander in fatigues with one of a religious figure in traditional robes.⁶⁹ Despite this image shift, Jammeh remained consistently engaged with the military. Jammeh had served in both the GNG (1984-1991) and GNA (1991-1996), first joining the military as a private and later commissioned as an officer. In an interview with a junior soldier at the military headquarters in Banjul in 2012, regarding Jammeh the soldier stated 'he is one of us, you know what we say, once a soldier always a

soldier.⁷⁰ This is a good representation of how the military viewed Jammeh and likely how Jammeh viewed himself.

Whereas Jawara was accused of neglecting the military, the same cannot be said about Jammeh. Upon coming to power, Jammeh immediately set out to ease some of the dissatisfaction within the military that had built up during the Jawara years. Promotions and pay raises were awarded to the armed forces and improvements were made to the Yundum barracks.⁷¹ Additionally, the Gambia Army Revolving Loan Scheme was developed to provide cheap loans to soldiers.⁷² Military personnel were offered educational opportunities and security forces received special treatment over the allocation of land for residential purposes.⁷³ The NATAG contingent that had been unpopular within the military under Jawara left The Gambia following the coup.⁷⁴

In addition to material perks, Jammeh expanded the Armed Forces structure. This pattern began almost immediately upon coming to power and has continued later into his time in office. For example, in 1995 Jammeh announced his intention to establish a Navy and the organisation came into fruition in 1997.⁷⁵ More recently, The Gambia Armed Forces Bill of 2008 established the National Guards along with several specialized units under their structure. The new units were reported to be a response to emerging security threats, such as terrorism and cross-border crimes.⁷⁶ However, in practice they were more associated with providing protection for President Jammeh. Under Jammeh the Gambian Armed Forces included the Army, Navy, and National Guards. The GAF is led by the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) with the president as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. While the exact size of the GAF is difficult to determine, experts on the Gambia such as David Perfect have estimated it at 2,500 as of 2016.⁷⁷

Jammeh remained focused on the military during his twenty-two years in power and on a material level the military appeared well taken care of. This is in part due to financial assistance from foreign partners. Jammeh maintained various defence partnerships, which provided the military with training, education, and material benefits. Gambia's diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, which began soon after the coup and lasted until 2013, had many benefits for the military. Taiwan provided regular training to the Gambian forces and scholarships for Gambian officers at Taiwanese military academies. They donated uniforms, high-speed boats, and funded the building of a new training centre and improvements to the Yundum barracks.⁷⁸

Turkey has also been a key defence partner for The Gambian Armed Forces. The Turkish-Gambian partnership began under Jawara but increased under Jammeh's rule. Turkish trainers were involved in training an estimated 5,000 Gambian troops between 1991 and 2005 and around 60 Gambian officers and NCOs were sent to Turkey for training.⁷⁹ While the formal training agreement ended in 2005, new bilateral training and security agreements were signed between Turkey and Gambia in 2014, with particular emphasis on the Navy. The new agreement also involved a donation of \$US600,000 to assist the Gambian Armed Forces with logistics.⁸⁰

In recent years Western governments have become increasingly focused on strengthening West Africa's efforts to combat transnational crimes such as smuggling and terrorism. As a result the Gambian Armed Forces have been involved in regional and international training and exercises. For example, they have hosted British and American military training teams and Banjul was the main exercise site for the African Endeavour Exercise organized by U.S. Africa Command in 2011. Since the early 2000s The Gambia has roughly 200 troops deployed at any given time on international peace operations. In the early 2000s Gambian troops participated in missions in Liberia (first under ECOMIL and then UNMIL) but since 2004 their involvement is almost exclusively with the UNAMID mission to Darfur, Sudan.⁸¹ Generally opportunities to participate in multinational exercises and peace operations are seen in a positive light by military personnel as they provide international engagement and at times additional supplemental pay.

An Expanded Force with Increasing Divisions

While the military was never central to the way Jawara led, the military became vital to the Jammeh regime. It would be easy to assume that Jammeh's past as a military officer made the organisation his most preferred ally. However, a closer look at the wider security sector and the internal workings of the armed forces suggests a more complex picture.

While Jammeh expanded the GAF, as described above, he has also created additional security services, which likely serve to balance if not counter the strength of the military. In 1995 he ordered the creation of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The decree stated that NIA's purpose was to 'obtain and provide the

Government with information relating to actions or intentions of persons which may be a threat to state security.’⁸² The organization reported directly to the President, and had surveillance and arrest authority. The NIA was initially suspected to have been created to monitor dissent within the GAF.⁸³ Yet, the organization soon began to focus on all form of opposition to Jammeh. The NIA became notorious and is marred with accusations of numerous well-documented cases of human right violations.⁸⁴ The UN Special Rapporteur who investigated torture in The Gambia in 2014 ‘found that torture is a consistent practice carried out by the National Intelligence Agency. In cases where there is a real or perceived threat to national security there is a corresponding increase in acts of torture and ill-treatment during the detention and arrest process.’⁸⁵

There have also been numerous reports by journalists and human rights organisations, including the UN, regarding the existence of a paramilitary referred to as the ‘Jungulars.’⁸⁶ The Jungulars were not officially part of the GAF or NIA and their exact role or numbers is unclear but they were alleged to have worked directly for Jammeh. In international media reporting and interviews they have been referred to as a ‘hit squad’, ‘personal security force’ for Jammeh, and an ‘assassination team.’⁸⁷ These terms give an indication of the brutality and extrajudicial nature of this unit. They were suspected to have worked directly for Jammeh.

The opaque nature of the NIA, and especially the Jungulars, is indicative of the way the security forces have developed under Jammeh. While there is a level of secrecy surrounding the security sector in most states, there has been a particular lack of transparency under Jammeh. This is partially due to a decrease in press freedoms. During the Jawara’s leadership military issues or opinion pieces about the armed forces were often reported in the press. Even military court martials were often open to the public. However under Jammeh it was rare to see independent reporting about security matters in the Gambian media. This makes it very difficult to determine the relationships between the various security entities. International human rights reporting also regularly discusses abuses within the security services, without differentiating between the military, NIA, or paramilitary forces. The confusion between the various arms of the security services also extends within The Gambia and many Gambians came to view all security forces with trepidation. Yet more clarity about the actions of the Jungulars and NIA may be on the horizon. Within weeks of Barrow coming to office, several members of the NIA, including the head of the

organisation, and member of the Jungulars were arrested.⁸⁸ These arrests may bring to light new details about the inner works of these organisations and their domestic or international links.

An examination of patterns within the GAF also indicates that while Jammeh may be a 'military man' he had a tumultuous relationship with the force. Although the security services were key to limiting opposition and criticism of Jammeh, the GAF were also the most serious threat to his position. Charges of disloyalty within the military began almost immediately after Jammeh came to power. One of the first and most severe allegations of internal dissent within the armed forces occurred in November of 1994 when Jammeh announced that armed factions within the military had attempted to overthrow the president.⁸⁹ The attempt was said to have been orchestrated by junior officers and resulted in the death of around thirty soldiers.⁹⁰ The government claimed the soldiers were killed by loyal forces during an operation to counter the attempt but there is widespread belief that they were executed.⁹¹ Just months after this alleged attempt, military divisions at the highest level were exposed in January 1995 when two members of the AFPRC were arrested and charged of plotting to assassinate Jammeh.⁹²

Accusations of plots against Jammeh cannot be attributed to the uncertainty of the period following the coup; it is a trend that persisted. Additional coup plots and attempts were reportedly uncovered in 1996, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2014. This list of alleged coup attempts and plots likely includes both imagined attempts, which served as a way for Jammeh to purge potential opposition, but also include actual threats to Jammeh's position from within the armed forces. The 2006 plot is a strong example of the latter. It allegedly involved both the Army Chief of Defence Staff, Colonel Ndure Cham, and Director of the NIA, Mr. Daba Marenah, symbolizing divisions and dissatisfaction at the top levels of the hierarchy. While Colonel Ndure Cham escaped at the time, Mr Daba Marenah along with at least four military personnel accused of involvement were allegedly executed while other accused were given prison sentences and reportedly tortured.⁹³

The 2014 attempt to overthrow Jammeh illustrated that the grievances against him extend well beyond the military. This coup attempt was allegedly funded and organized by several members of the Gambian diaspora in the US and carried out by Lt.Col. (Ret.) Lamin Sanneh.⁹⁴ Sanneh had previously served as Commander of the National Guards from 2012 to 2013 before he was removed from the position and

emigrated to the US. Sanneh and three other former members of the Gambian Armed Forces were killed by soldiers loyal to Jammeh when they attempted to enter State House.⁹⁵ While Jammeh labelled the incident a 'terrorist attack' by foreign dissidents, suspicion regarding involvement from within the military led to arrests and court martials of Gambian soldiers.⁹⁶ Along with the military detentions, dozens of civilians were arrested including members of Sanneh's family.⁹⁷

The aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 attempts to oust Jammeh were indicative of the general pattern of mass arrests and disappearances of military personnel (and at times civilian) that usually followed coup attempts in The Gambia. The lack of transparency in trials of accused coup plotters, manipulation of 'confessions,' and/or lack of trials completely (at times due to quick executions/disappearance of accused) makes it difficult to unravel the truths from allegations, rumours, and half-truths concerning plans to oust Jammeh.

Positions and promotions were important tools for rewards and punishments, particularly among the officers corps. Jammeh was suspected to have been heavily involved in most of the decisions regarding appointments, highlighting the personal nature of his relationship with the Gambian Armed Forces. Key positions in the military were typically appointed to those most loyal to Jammeh. Additionally, there are numerous examples of promotions involving jumping ranks (even being promoted from enlisted to officer ranks) rather than progressing gradually through the standard rank structure.⁹⁸ However, just as soldiers were often quickly promoted, demotions were also a regular occurrence. This manipulation of the rank structure likely created an intentional sense of insecurity within the military and further emphasized loyalty over merit or time in service.

Although rapid promotions allowed some favoured individuals to reach the top of the hierarchy quickly, senior positions in the security services were far from secure. Jammeh's suspicions of military leadership, even those he was closest with began almost immediately upon taking power. Just days after assigning cabinet positions, Jammeh had two of his ministers (both military officers) arrested for allegedly remaining loyal to Jawara.⁹⁹ The pattern continued and regular dismissals or circulation of positions for senior officers were an ongoing trend within the Gambian armed forces under Jammeh. This was likely meant to keep any individual from becoming too powerful and threatening Jammeh's position. While it may sound like a risky strategy to dismiss top generals, many of those 'dismissed' from the

military were given civilian jobs within the government, at times in lucrative positions abroad. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Army, NIA, and Police have all at times been headed by retired military officers, providing former officers with continued influence and opportunities after their military retirement.¹⁰⁰

Jammeh often gave preference to his own ethnic group, the Jola, for top jobs within the GAF. For example, many of the individuals who have held the position of Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) have been Jola, including Baboucarr Jatta (1999-2004), Lang Tombong Tamba (2005-2009) and Ousman Badjie (2012-2017). A similar pattern can be found with the leadership positions of the NIA and police, as well as divisions of the GAF like the Navy and National Guards.¹⁰¹ The favouritism is alleged to continue down the chain of command with claims that Jolas junior ranks receive disproportionate opportunities for overseas assignments such as positions on peacekeeping missions.¹⁰² The Jola are a small ethnic group in The Gambia, with 2003 estimates suggesting that they make up around eleven percent of the population.¹⁰³ Thus the high number of Jola in senior positions is suspected to have created internal divisions and resentment in the military between the Jola and non-Jola.¹⁰⁴ Ethnic favouritism is another way in which the military changed between the Jawara era and Jammeh, as ethnicity was not previously considered to be a main point of contention in the GAF under Jawara.¹⁰⁵

While the Jola were considered preferred within the security services, they were not above suspicion. There are cases of Jola officers being arrested and tried for perceived infractions. One of the most high-profile examples is the treason trial against Jola former CDS Lang Tombong Tamba. In 2011 he was convicted for withholding information about a coup plot and remained in prison until 2015, when he was pardoned by Jammeh.

There have also long been rumours that part of Jammeh's loyalty campaign involves recruiting Senegalese members of the rebel group *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC) into the Gambian security forces. The MFDC is a separatist rebellion based in the Casamance region of Senegal dominated by Jola. Jammeh has been accused of arming the MFDC and harbouring members of the group, which resulted in a significantly strained relationship between The Gambia and Senegal.¹⁰⁶ While rumours of recruitment of Jola MFDC into the GAF and Jungulars are hard to prove, they would fit with the larger pattern of ethnic preference in the security forces. It is alleged that these individuals were the most faithful to

Jammeh as they do not identify as Gambians and are less likely to be swayed by political opposition or international criticism.

Jammeh has often been described as erratic, unpredictable, and even crazy in part due to a tendency for surprising announcements. For example, in the final years of his rule he announced the country's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the International Criminal Court. He declared the The Gambia an Islamic state, changed the workweek to four days and ordered the end of English as the official language. In many ways the constant rotation of security personnel may also seem to be linked to this pattern of rash decisions. Yet, when looked at across time, Jammeh's endless reappointments firings, and trials within the security forces are not hasty choices but rather was part of a careful manipulation of the state security structure, which emphasized loyalty while limiting the power of any individual officer who could threaten Jammeh's position.

Conclusion

In many ways the Gambian Armed Forces played very different roles under the leadership of President Jawara and President Jammeh. Jawara appeared reluctant to create an armed forces and when he did the military was kept small and marginal. Jawara was unengaged with military matters and kept the military focused externally, with involvement in the Senegambia Confederation and deployments to West African peace operations. Jammeh, however, took the opposite approach. He expanded the structure of the Gambian Armed Forces and added other security agencies. He was personally engaged in military affairs, giving the sense that he micro-managed many of the internal matters, particularly appointments. Significantly, the state security sector, including but not limited to the GAF, was heavily focused internally and largely served as regime protection. Whereas there were few indications of a negative civil-military relationship during Jawara years, the security services under Jammeh has been accused of numerous abuses against the civilian population in Gambia.

Despite the changes, there are also continuities within the GAF under both administrations. Both leaders were suspicious of the armed forces during their time in office and each put measures in place that prohibited the development of a cohesive military and professional officers corps. Jawara responded to his unease by remaining

aloof to military matters and relying on international military leadership. This resulted in limited career progression within the army and ultimately was a factor in the coup against him. The structures under the Confederal Army and the NATAG agreement created early divisions and resentments within the GAF, which continued into later years.

Jammeh's approach to the military was more intimate and elaborate. In his twenty-two year reign Jammeh expanded the GAF and developed additional security agencies such as the NIA and a paramilitary. Yet this expansion intentionally created divisions in the armed forces. The various sectors of the security services served as a counter to each other while a murky network of informants kept many soldiers wary. Additional divisions centred on ethnic preferences and related resentments. Frequent trials against military personnel regularly pitted officers against each other, further dividing the military and weakening chains of command. Yet just as security officers were highly scrutinized under Jammeh, he was also responsible for pardoning and reappointing those who had earlier been accused. This precarious state likely led to a mixed sense of fear and gratefulness. Careers were primarily advanced through loyalty to Jammeh, not through officer's skills or military achievement.

Barrow has inherited a security structure built on loyalty to Jammeh and thus his early reluctance for ECOWAS forces to leave is understandable. Within the first few weeks he announced plans for changes to the security forces. For example, Barrow said he would not disband the NIA but would rename the organisation and remove their arrest authority. He also declared the appointment of former CDS Masaneh Kinteh as his military aid to advise on military matters, as Barrow does not have any previous military experience. There has been some criticism that the changes are not radical enough to improve the image of the security services and rebuild the public's trust in the forces. Yet early moves demonstrate a measured response that acknowledges the need for change without hasty decisions that could isolate or further divide the forces. This will remain a delicate balance for Barrow, especially as proposed ideas for a truth and reconciliation programme will likely highlight the many abuses by security forces. Any overhaul of the security services will remain a long-term project as a 'new' structure will have to mend and reconcile what have become very fragmented forces.

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- ⁴² *West Africa*, February 10, 1992; Author interview with former officer, 2012.
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- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ Hughes and Perfect, *A Political History of The Gambia*, 283.
- ⁴⁶ Author interview with former enlisted soldier, 2012.
- ⁴⁷ *Foroyaa*, July 15, 1991.
- ⁴⁸ *The Point*, March 23, 1992.
- ⁴⁹ A public court martial was held for the soldiers involved in the mutiny in 1992. The soldiers were charged with eleven accounts including breaking out of barracks, conduct contrary to good order, insubordination, and wilfully obstructing police officers. The court martial, made up of three officers, deliberated for 2 days and found most soldiers guilty of at least some of the eleven accounts. The sentences varied from dismissals to fines.
- ⁵⁰ Author interview with former officer, 2012.
- ⁵¹ Author interview with former officer, 2012.
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- ⁵³ Author interview with Dr. Abdoulaye Saine, 2012.
- ⁵⁴ Sarr, *Coup d'état by the Gambia National Army*, 33.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., 50.
- ⁵⁶ Author interview with former officer, 2012; Sarr, *Coup d'état by the Gambia National Army*, 19.
- ⁵⁷ *The Point*, August 23, 1993.
- ⁵⁸ Sarr, *Coup d'état by the Gambia National Army*, 47; Chongan, *The Price of Duty*, 31.
- ⁵⁹ *The Gambia Weekly*, February 28, 1992.
- ⁶⁰ When the gendarmerie was converted into the TSG, many gendarmes requested a transfer to the army. One such individual was Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh.
- ⁶¹ Chongan, *The Price of Duty*, 32.
- ⁶² Sarr, *Coup d'état by the Gambia National Army*, 47; Author interview with Gambian former officer, September 2012.
- ⁶³ Author interview with Gambian former officer, August 2012; Chongan, *The Price of Duty*, 32; Author interview with Gambian former enlisted soldier, October 2012.
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- ⁶⁵ Wiseman and Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d'état in The Gambia," 53.
- ⁶⁶ A text of the radio announcement can be found in *Foroyaa*, July 24, 1994.
- ⁶⁷ The five officers leading the AFPRC included Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh, Second Lieutenant Sana Sabally, Second Lieutenant Sadibou Hydara, Second Lieutenant Edward Singhateh, and Second Lieutenant Yankuba Touray. Touray was added several days after the initial council was formed.
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- ⁷² Wiseman, "Military Rule in the Gambia," 923.
- ⁷³ Ibid.
- ⁷⁴ *The Point*, August 16, 1994.

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- ⁷⁶ *Daily Observer*, April 9, 2008.
- ⁷⁷ David Perfect, *Historical Dictionary of The Gambia*, 171; 'The Military Balance', produced by International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the size in 2015 to be just 800. However, their reports show the same 800 estimate for at least 17 years and thus should be viewed critically. For example, there was almost certainly an increase in the armed forces around 2008 following the Gambian Armed Forces Bill.
- ⁷⁸ *The Daily Observer*, September 16, 2013; *The Daily Observer*, October 24, 2013; *Taipei Times*, March 7, 2011; *Taipei Times*, April 22, 2011.
- ⁷⁹ Abdul Kadir Varoglu, Mehmet Cakar, and Nejat Basim, "An unusual bi-national military cooperation: The case of Turkish-Gambian relations," in *Military Cooperation in Multinational Peace Operations: Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response*, ed. Joseph Soeters and Philippe Manigart (New York: Routledge, 2008): 122-128.
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- ⁸¹ Annual contribution rates can be found at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml (accessed 16 February 2017). Small numbers of usually less than 5 troops have also partaken in other missions such as MINUSMA in Mali in 2013. In addition to troops, The Gambia also contributes police forces and a small number of military observers.
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