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The Paradox of Militaristic Remembrance in British Sport and Popular Culture

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Introduction

The position and utility of sport in cementing military and civil relations are well established.¹ It is beyond doubt that since the post-September 11 2001 invasions/liberations of Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent American-led “war on terror” (WoT), Britain (along with others) has mirrored the United States in placing nation-state and state-sponsored militarism at the center of cultural and civic society in ways that encourage and facilitate public engagement and universal support for nation-state, state militarism and the WoT. From 2003 onwards both the United States and Canada set up government departments devoted to providing propaganda opportunities for their military. The United States’ *Operation Tribute to Freedom* noted on its website that it seeks “media opportunities” for soldiers “to share their experience with their local communities in an effort to ensure the public maintains a direct connection to today’s army.”² *Operation Connection*, the Canadian equivalent, exercises similar aims and coordinates identical activities seeking to manufacture public consent for the Canadian military.³

Whilst the British government has no outwardly facing department overtly engaged in such propaganda initiatives, many of the same activities and discourses orchestrated by the American and Canadian departments have been replicated in Britain in what has become a multi-agency approach to encourage and facilitate British citizens to

“appreciate and understand” the military.⁴ The British government has been open and explicit about two particular initiatives. In 2012, **it was announced that £2 million would be used to fund the *Military in Schools* project partly aimed at transforming military personnel into school ‘teachers’ to ensure children “can benefit from the values of a military ethos.”**⁵ This was supplemented by the government using the Libor banking fines, imposed on banks for unscrupulous and illegal banking practices, to boost military charities. There is irony in the British government funding military charities primarily because the government does not provide sufficient care to vulnerable (ex)soldiers⁶ in the first place. Of course, by making such a public donation (from funds taken from disdained bankers), unlike direct and inconspicuous government funding, this permits the accumulation of ideological capital and (real or perceived) public support for the military to occur in ways that normal government funding may struggle to achieve.

Paralleling the United States and Canada, a central feature of Britain’s multi-agency strategy involves encouraging citizens to view nation-state, state militarism, and the WoT as inextricably interwoven into the fabric of their virtuous nation. Gee observed state militarism being represented as necessary, noting:

the redemptive value attached to [British and U.S. military] violence reinforces facile assumptions that our security depends on military force, rather than on structural justice and an ecology of mutual relationships.⁷

Yet, despite these two latter causes being justly valued, it is about more than presenting British militarism as indispensable surrogates for structural injustice and unequal international relationships. Implicitly embedded in these overarching

militaristic discourses is not merely that ‘our’ *security* requires military force but the idea that military force together with ‘our’ quest for democracy and justice are essential constituents of the nation-state, ergo *making* Britain Britain. These are represented as requisite elements which define the country and enable the citizens within the imagined community of the nation to re-imagine themselves as direct descendants of those who defeated Hitler then Communism and currently face a heroic crusade against ‘Islamic’ terror.

British sport has featured heavily as a site for such imaginings. The nature of the sport and military nexus can be broadly categorized into four overlapping areas

1. Sports people paying respect to the military
2. Injured military personnel becoming athletes
3. Sports uniforms becoming militarized
4. Sponsors using sport to support the military.⁸

British sports fixtures have increasingly observed minute silences and conducted additional ceremonial activities around the annual November Remembrance Day activities in the lead up to Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday around 11 November each year. British sports events have also been incorporated into paying respect to the military with high-profile annual events featuring injured soldiers being welcomed onto the field of play to receive fans’ support and applause and occasionally the State’s official thanks and recognition⁹. Additionally, soldiers have increasingly been provided support to become prominent athletes. In Britain, The Invictus Games has joined the American Warrior Games to offer a sporting platform for injured military personnel to compete and elicit public support. This public support is bolstered by sports clubs (like Bolton Wanderers FC, Raith Rovers FC and

Millwall FC) adapting their sporting uniforms to resemble military uniforms and/or include military camouflage designs. These sport-related initiatives have been joined by a plethora of emergent military charities, some of which have partnered up with sporting organizations to seek ideological and financial support from the British public. For example, in 2010, the new charity Help for Heroes sponsored the [English] Football League, allowing the charity high levels of visibility, while another new charity Tickets for Troops enables similar visibility and free tickets for serving soldiers for a whole range of high-profile sports occasions.

These events have contributed to a subtle, yet powerful, shift in focus from Remembrance representing sorrowful regret for war victims to glorifying British/Western militarism in the name of an assumed heroic and justified WoT. Whilst it is undeniable that British Remembrance has always had a clear militaristic focus (with military uniforms, military insignia and the performance of militarism accompanied by salutes and marching battalions), historically there has been a veneer of sorrow and regret transcending the narrow confines of pure militarism. This post-WoT re-articulation of Remembrance unequivocally connects it to current wars and narratives of ‘heroes’ “serving the country”. For example, the national football (soccer) team shirts of both Scotland and England have recently had specially adapted souvenir shirts to include the Earl Haig poppy sewn into the breast and juxtaposed alongside the phrase “serving their country: The British forces & Scotland [England] national team.” This re-contextualizes the Earl Haig poppy from its historic grounding in WWI and WWII remembrance and anchors it in the present to those currently engaging in military violence today – illustrated by the verb (serving) being applied in the present tense; there is more that could be written on the choice of verb and its

patriotic and non-violent connotations, which sanitizes much of the work being ‘serviced’ but this is beyond the limits of this chapter. Moreover, this military-focused Remembrance has grown to become a year round series of omnipresent “support the troops” events into which British citizens are incorporated by proxy and subsequently expected to dogmatically endorse.¹⁰ British sport and popular culture events have been shown to be key arenas in helping facilitate and reinforce this ideologically loaded remembrance.

It is within these wider contexts that this chapter considers a number of inconsistencies relating to the sport and civil society nexus in Britain, specifically in relation to the paradox of militaristic Remembrance in British sport and popular culture. The discussion begins by introducing what I call the *corporate culpability paradox*, the overarching inconsistency from which a further three interconnected inconsistencies flow. The corporate culpability paradox involves four key elements of militarism: *ideological cause*; *actor*; *action*; *outcome of action*. Their meanings and their relationship to one another are central to understanding this paradox and its related inconsistencies. For example, their relationship to one another is shown to be articulated differently by mainstream British cultural-political opinion formers (government, politicians, corporate media, official civic organizations and so forth) depending on the ideological cause and actors involved in doing the ‘remembering’—according to whether the ideological cause and actor are deemed worthy of the nation’s support. This overarching paradox is outlined before illustrating the three related inconsistencies, the third and final one of which focuses on a sporting case study that exposes the political and ideological basis permeating the overarching paradox.

Corporate culpability paradox

The inconsistencies surrounding British ‘remembrance’ relate specifically to how actors carrying out violence in the name of an ideological cause are viewed in the UK. These are underpinned by the relationships articulated between the four aforementioned variables: *ideological cause; actor; action; outcome of action*. When the ideological causes and/or¹¹ actors connected with military violence are supported by key opinion formers, some of these four variables can be thought of as legitimately separate and unrelated – illustrated by common soundbites such as: “*Support the troops not the war.*” Thus British military actors can be supported and simultaneously and seamlessly separated from some or all of the three related variables (*ideological cause; action; outcome*). Conversely when the ideological cause and/or actor are not deemed legitimate by government and/or opinion formers – when associated with or carried out by those branded terrorists for instance - these four variables are inextricably connected and we are told that the actors cannot be separated from the ideological cause, their actions and the outcomes of their actions.

Therefore, minority (and/or demonized) groups are often held partly responsible for the terrorist cause, terrorists, terrorist violence and the death and destruction resulting from terrorist acts, and if someone betrays a hint of ‘support’ for terrorist actors, this is articulated as supporting terrorism and murder. This is often illustrated by politicians and media demanding action and the reprimanding of violence by “Muslim leaders” when ‘terrorist’ atrocities occur (discussed in a later section). Thus, unlike ‘terrorism,’ British violence can be separated from soldiers and politics as demonstrated by common soundbites such as, “*I didn’t agree with going into Iraq but*

they're our troops and we must support them.” Such is the power of this narrative that individuals and organizations risk major criticism if they do not “*support the troops.*” The few times when there is dissent or merely non-conformity towards British military endeavors, the non-conformers/dissenters risk being symbolically annihilated revealing the extent to which conformity and dogmatic support for British military and their ‘work’ is expected.¹²

Thus, the overarching paradox consists of British military violence being (or encouraged to be) universally and dogmatically supported whilst claiming a sense of ontological detachment. This is facilitated by the separation of the *ideological cause, the actors, the actions and the outcomes* of such action. Yet violence conducted by others is to be demonized whilst claiming ontological attachment as illustrated by an unbreakable and seamless connection between the *ideological cause, the actors, the actions and their outcomes*. This paradox leads, moreover, to a further three subsequent and related inconsistencies and it is to these the chapter now turns.

Citizens’ culpability for terrorists but not for armies

Despite British violence being conducted on the alleged behalf of a nation, performed by soldiers sent by a democratically elected government and funded by British citizens’ taxes, British citizens are encouraged by respected opinion formers to detach themselves from the violence and its consequences; hence the popularity of slogans such as “support the troops not the war.” Yet terrorists – who by definition act without a mandate – are encouraged to be seen as partly representative of minority groups. Furthermore, these minority groups are often held partly culpable for terrorism and routinely told they “*must do more to prevent ‘radicalization’ in their*

own communities.” For example, Imams within mosques and Muslim leaders more generally are expected to check for and actively work to prevent ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’. Wider Muslim populations are regularly held to be partly responsible for terrorism. Britain’s foreign secretary Philip Hammond expressed this clearly in the aftermath of the Paris attacks of 2014, holding a number of groups and organizations responsible for violence, stating, “[A] huge burden of responsibility also lies with those who act as apologists for them [terrorists].” As the BBC stated, Hammond specified that among those apologists bearing a huge burden of responsibility were “parents, schools and community workers [who] all had responsibilities.”¹³ British Culture Secretary, Sajid Javid and British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed similar sentiment, with the former stressing:

All communities can do more to try and help deal with terrorists, try and help track them down, but I think it is absolutely fair to say that there is a special burden on Muslim communities, because whether we like it or not, these terrorists call themselves Muslims.¹⁴

British citizens’ democratically elected government equips British military actors with hi tech weaponry British citizens have paid for, sending them to fight and kill on the (alleged) nation’s behalf. Therefore, unlike the Muslim minorities and ‘Islamic’ ‘radical/terrorists,’ for which no identifiable financial support nor democratic mandate exist, British citizens are undeniably implicated in supporting the *actor*, *action* and *outcome of action*. Unlike the British military, terrorists have no democratic mandate and have not been funded by the broad Muslim community. Yet, the overarching corporate culpability paradox treats both groups differently and, it would appear, illogically.

Incorporating by proxy

These calls to publicly reject and demonize the terrorists and those branded their supporters relates to the implicitly acknowledged power of propaganda. This fear of “radical” websites and effective propaganda carried out by amateurs and “extreme radicals” reveals that governments do in fact believe propaganda works. It seems reasonable to assume that officially sanctioned, generously funded, culturally valued and widespread sport (and other popular cultural) activities, in conjunction with their culturally revered sacred sites (Six Nations rugby, World Cups, cricket Test Matches, Premiership football stadiums), provide much more powerful and effective propaganda for western militarism than “radical” websites or “extremist” preachers do for “Islamic” terrorism. Indeed, if this was not the case, the aforementioned *Operation Tribute to Freedom* and *Operation Connection* government departments in the United States and Canada would have little justification for existing or for using much needed tax monies to operate.¹⁵ These inconsistencies are compounded when considering the active and powerful hero-fication of the British militarism process that has been ongoing since at least 2007, with British citizens being *incorporated by proxy* into supporting British troops and conflating remembrance with current ‘wars’.¹⁶ Sport and popular culture events have been widely used as stages for British citizens to “show their support”. In addition to the aforementioned sporting examples, beauty contests, prime time Saturday night television shows, military-related music albums, military branded food products, newly formed charities, recently invented traditions such as Armed Forces Day and homecoming parades have all combined to ensure a multi-agency hero-fication and celebritization of the British military.

Incorporating British citizens by proxy into supporting the British military, Lord Mawhinney, chairman of the [English] Football League, leaves little room for doubt when describing the aforementioned Football League and Help for Heroes partnership:

The contribution being made by our armed forces around the world is truly humbling. The football for heroes week will provide an excellent opportunity for supporters to show their appreciation for the outstanding work being done.¹⁷

Similarly, whilst also representing British military action ideologically as virtuous, Prime Minister David Cameron incorporated British citizens into giving their support to soldiers, in promoting Armed Forces Day:

These initiatives have the full support of the nation ... [Armed Forces Day is] an opportunity for the nation to pay respect to those fighting for our freedom and way of life.¹⁸

These combined comments unequivocally frame British troops as defending “our” freedom and engaging in humbling and outstanding work. Despite the ontological detachment discussed earlier – “*Support the troops not the war*” – much of the official pronouncements actually make the connections between supporting the troops and the war unequivocal. Revealingly, they connect *current* military violence to wider remembrance, the historic war against fascism and also to an ideological and highly subjective political statement that such current “work” is defending freedom. But, a key point here is that in addition to these ideological connections being made explicit, British citizens are told that they are supportive and appreciative; they are

incorporated by proxy into fully supporting and endorsing the WoT (*ideological cause*), British soldiers (*actor*), British military acts of violence (*action*) and the resultant deaths, injuries, and movements of peoples from their homes (*outcome of action*) whether they actually do support these or not.¹⁹

Remembrance: neutral sorrow or active support?

Perhaps one of the most revealing and controversial examples where these paradoxes fuse is in Scotland and involves an alternative and equivalent expression of remembrance being enacted in public by football (soccer) supporters. The example exposes how the relationship between *ideological cause*, *actor*, *action* and *outcome of action* is judged differently depending on whether or not the remembrance is supported by key powerful opinion formers in Britain. In 2012, the Scottish government introduced a new *Offensive Behaviour at Football Bill* apparently designed to tackle ethno-religious bigotry (or “sectarianism”²⁰ as it is commonly referred to in Scotland). “Sectarianism” in Scotland is often perceived to be a football related problem mainly involving the supporters of the two biggest football clubs, Celtic Football Club and Rangers Football Club²¹, each with a dual Scottish-Irish/Ulster identity. Celtic has traditional ethno-religious connections to Irish-catholicism and Rangers has traditional ethno-religious connections to Ulster-protestantism. This often results in their supporters singing traditional songs that support either the Irish nationalist cause (Celtic) or the Ulster loyalist cause (Rangers). While there are necessary discussions to be had around this Bill more broadly, this chapter limits analysis to contextualizing the illustrative example of an act of Irish nationalist remembrance (in Scotland) to reveal the paradoxical nature of how remembrance is framed in Britain. Specifically, the discussion deals with

supporters of Celtic Football Club, many of whom are descendants of Irish immigrants. Sections of Celtic's supporters sing the Irish song *Roll of Honour* at Celtic games. *Roll of Honour* remembers the ten Irish nationalist Hunger Strikers who died in 1981 during their protests against the British state's treatment of Irish nationalist and British loyalist prisoners whilst incarcerated in British prisons for activities deemed by the British State as "terrorism".²² The crucial point for this chapter is the contrast between how two expressions of remembrance are treated by comparing how these Celtic supporters are treated differently from other citizens in Britain in relation to their respective remembrance. But more pointedly, it is the basis on which value judgments are made and how they are made by applying the criteria differently, depending on whether or not the remembrance is about those "serving" Britain and officially endorsed by powerful British opinion formers or those "serving" alternative and oppositional groups and not endorsed by powerful British opinion formers. Put simply, just as with some wider Muslim communities in the aftermath of "Islamic terror", the relationship between *ideological cause*, *actor*, *action* and *outcome of action* are judged to be intimately connected when it applies to football supporters singing about their (Irish nationalist) remembrance in contrast to how these four elements are often judged to be unconnected when they apply to officially acceptable remembrance in Britain. This illustrative example is particularly revealing because it deals specifically with two examples that relate to respective Rolls of Honour.²³

A note of caution is necessary at this point. Comparing British remembrance and the Roll of Honour song remembrance is not comparing British military acts with Irish nationalist acts (irrespective of the fact that many more people have died as a result of

the former). It is comparing the *relationship* between an act of remembrance and its *ideological cause, actors, acts, outcomes of these acts* to show that one example (British Remembrance) is presented as *relationship neutral* in contrast to the Irish nationalist Roll of Honour remembrance which is presented as *relationship active* - supporting and endorsing the *actors, actions* and *outcomes*. Irrespective of who is doing the remembrance and what it claims to remember, it is inconsistent to claim that the relationship between the *actors, actions* and *outcomes* differs according to whose remembrance has the most supporters or whose is officially sanctioned by the state. In other words, given that discourses in Britain often stress British (military related) remembrance is not necessarily supporting the *ideological cause, actors, acts* or *outcomes* of such acts (illustrated by “support the troops not the war”), then the remembrance behaviors of others must also be considered potentially non-supportive of the *ideological cause, actors, actions, and outcomes*. Indeed, to claim otherwise is to confirm that one’s judgment is not based on logic but on (im)moral, political and subjective value judgments and is, therefore, open to legitimate debate and dissent.

In both the enforcing and endorsing of this Bill, the authorities and wider opinion formers in Scotland have facilitated the policing of the Roll of Honour song as though it incites terrorist activities and/or supports terrorism. Moreover, much of the basis on which the legal system justifies its attempted prosecutions is predicated on connecting these variables proving that singing about remembrance is equivalent to supporting and endorsing the *actors, acts* and *outcomes* of such acts. Here, the inconsistent application of interpreting remembrance is visible. Celtic fans sing Roll of Honour and they are told they are supporting the IRA and the actions and outcomes of the IRA (despite no mention in the song of this group or any other paramilitary

organization and despite three of the individuals remembered in the song not being members of the IRA). It is also worth noting that two of the Hunger Strikers remembered in the song were democratically elected political representatives whilst prisoners of the British state. And for these football fans (and others potentially), they are being criminalized with the help of a paradoxical and inconsistent application of the meaning of remembrance that is politically motivated. This is not about dead children and innocent civilians per se. It is about making politically motivated judgments about what opinion formers in British society deem to be politically justified and politically unjustifiable.

The situation is exacerbated when one considers that there already is a precedent in Britain for how to interpret remembrance and how these four elements (*ideological cause; actor; action; outcome of action*) relating to it should be interpreted and connected. Despite occurring with military uniforms, being performed in militaristic fashion and being wrapped in the paraphernalia of the armed forces, Remembrance Sunday in Britain is implicitly assumed by the government and the media not to be about justifying or supporting the ideology, actors, acts or outcomes of such acts. A major partner organization in British Remembrance, The Royal British Legion, explicitly connects Remembrance to peace and understanding, highlighting its organization as being “committed to helping young people understand the issues of Remembrance, conflict and the importance of peace.”²⁴ Yet despite this, and the ubiquity of phrases such as “*support the troops not the war*” being accepted as legitimate when applied to the British military, key opinion formers often attempt paradoxically to make these connections explicit for their political ends when incorporating citizens by proxy into appreciating and supporting the “outstanding

work bring done” as expressed by Lord Mawhinney and David Cameron.

Conclusion

British opinion formers articulate British Remembrance differently compared to other varieties of remembrance. On the one hand, British citizens are incorporated by proxy into supporting some or all of the four variables. Yet even when some British citizens show dissent about the war (*ideological cause*) and/or deaths and destruction (*outcome*), they are still encouraged and expected to “support the troops” in ways that are articulated as relationship neutral and ontologically detached. British remembrance can be articulated as both relationship neutral and relationship active to suit the specific agenda of those representing the remembrance and to fit the narrative of remembrance in particular contexts.

Alternative expressions of remembrance such as “Islamist” and Irish nationalist remembrance are articulated as always being connected to the *ideology*, *actions* and *outcomes*. Indeed, a class-based activity I do with students illustrates this clearly. When discussing British militarism, sport and ideology, I begin the session with a role play scene that attempts to “make the foreign familiar,”²⁵ in this case, by attempting to collect money from the students for a fictitious charity called *Money for Martyrs*. My charity bucket has clear Islamic insignia on it and I explain to the class that donated monies will go towards “supporting the children and dependents of those left behind by dead suicide bombers who have given their life for a cause they passionately believed in.” This scenario mirrors numerous real charitable scenes involving British military related organizations including *Help for Heroes*, *Combat Stress*, *The British Forces Foundation* and others.²⁶ Once the students get over their

initial shock and realize this is role play, they universally and publicly proclaim, without exception, that they would not donate to this charity because it “would be supporting terrorists and terrorism.” Despite my best role play efforts to promote the view that their monetary gift would not represent support for terrorism or terrorist atrocities, this position is overwhelmingly rejected by the class. The unbreakable connection, therefore, between supporting terrorism (*action*), terrorists (*actor*) and deaths (*outcome*) are both unquestionable and irremovable to students in this example. These students quite clearly interpreted donating money to this charity as contributing much more than a monetary gift. It would represent support for and endorsement of terrorists, terrorist activities and the outcome of such terrorism. Indeed, students agreed it would also be reasonable to assume such donations would imply support or sympathy for Jihad (the ideological cause) too. In direct contrast, when considering British military charities, British citizens are often viewed as neutral and detached from the *ideological cause, the actors, the actions and the outcomes (of action)*, yet actors carrying out alternative acts of violence (such as those labeled terrorists carrying out terrorism) or indeed, those who may engage in some form of remembrance of these actors, are always connected to some or all of the other three variables²⁷. *It is this central paradox that exists every time a football supporter is arrested for singing Roll of Honour*. Meanwhile, the British people, who have elected those who are responsible for the killings on its alleged behalf are excused from being held responsible for its killers and victims despite the fact that these killers are supposedly acting on the British people’s behalf and despite the overwhelming evidence revealing both ideological and material support for and endorsement of these actors and actions (and the outcomes resulting from them). When British citizens are connected to the killings and victims, it is often during official public pronouncements

by politicians and leaders using euphemistic vernacular to proclaim the support of the nation while framing this support for the killings and destruction as “appreciation and understanding of the outstanding work being done for our freedom.” And sport, as an undoubted sacred cultural practice, is one of the major sites in which this occurs.

This analysis has implications for all groups who wish to remember or honor those whom they consider their war dead or martyrs. There are contradictions and paradoxes in how popular, moral and legal judgments are made regarding what is problematic and what is acceptable (if not desirable in fact) in relation to remembrance and its public expression in Britain. There either exists a relationship between the four variables or there does not. One cannot simply apply one set of relationship rules when one disagrees with a cause and apply another set of rules when one agrees with a cause. To do so, is to be illogical. Moreover, in doing so, Scotland is criminalizing and demonizing a generation of football supporters. In British society, the perceived relationship between these variables changes according to whether the cause and actor are deemed legitimate. Benedict Anderson’s oft-cited account of Imagined Communities highlights the ideological power of militaristic symbols such as the Cenotaph and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in London, explaining, “yet void as these tombs are of identifiable mortal remains or immortal souls, they are nonetheless saturated with *ghostly national imaginings*.”²⁸ It is precisely because of this void of actual remains and any identifiable life history that such rich re-imagining and manipulation are able to give re-birth²⁹ and fill an ideological vacuum with the idea of an “heroic and necessary sacrifice”. Current imaginings have extended this to ensure British (and Western) militarism is remembered in such a fashion which helps to reinforce an undeniable political,

ideological and ultimately subjective interpretation of military-civic relations that is exposed by the corporate culpability paradox.

¹ Michael Butterworth, "Ritual in the 'Church of Baseball': Suppressing the Discourse of Democracy After 9/11," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 2, 2 (2005): 107–29

Butterworth, "Fox Sports, Super Bowl XLII, and the Affirmation of American Civil Religion," *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 32, 3 (2008): 318–23

Butterworth, "Major League Baseball Welcomes Back Veterans, and the Rhetoric of 'Support the Troops,'" in *The Politics of Baseball: Essays on the Pastime and Power at Home and Abroad*, ed. Ron Briley (Jefferson: McFarland, 2010), 226–40.

Sue Curry Jansen and Don Sabo, "The Sport/War Metaphor: Hegemonic Masculinity, the Persian Gulf War, and the New World Order," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 11, 1 (1994): 1–17.

John Kelly, "Popular Culture, Sport and the 'Hero'-Fication of British Militarism," *Sociology* 47, 4 (2012): 722–738.

Kelly, "Western Militarism and the Political Utility of Sport," in *The Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics*, eds. Alan Bairner, John Kelly, Jung Woo Lee (London: Routledge, 2017).

Samantha King, "Offensive Lines: Sport-State Synergy in an Era of Perpetual War," *Cultural Studies - Critical Methodologies* 8, 4 (2008): 527–539.

Michael Silk and Mark Falcons, "One Day in September/A week in February: Mobilizing American (Sporting) Nationalism," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 22 (2005): 447–71.

Carl Stempel, "Televised Sports, Masculine Moral Capital, and Support for the US Invasion of Iraq," *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 30, 1 (2006): 79–106.

Jay Scherer and Jordan Koch, "Living with War: Sport, Citizenship and the Cultural Politics of Post-9/11 Canadian Identity," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 27 (2010): 1–29.

Tricia Jenkins, "The Militarization of American Professional Sports," *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 37, 3 (2013): 245–260.

² Operation Tribute to Freedom, accessed in 2010. Last accessed on 5th November 2011. <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28876>

³ See Scherer and Koch, "Living with War".

⁴ See Kelly, "'Hero'-fication of British Militarism; And 'The Political Utility of Sport'".

⁵ Michael Gove, "Military in Schools get £2 million Boost," BBC News Online, December 7th 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-20642796>

⁶ Soldier/s is used as a shorthand term throughout this chapter to describe all full time and reservist military related personnel who carry out actions on behalf of any of the main military groups (army, navy, airforce) legitimized by nation-states.

⁷ David Gee, *Spectacle, Reality, Resistance: Confronting a Culture of Militarism* (London: Forces Watch Press, 2014); 45.

⁸ See Kelly, “The Political Utility of Sport” for detailed discussion of these intersections.

⁹ British royalty are often utilized to carry out such work – for example, in 2010, British princes William and Harry greeted injured military personnel as the guests of honor onto the field of play at the annual Six Nations rugby union fixture between England and Wales.

¹⁰ In addition to the aforementioned football shirt example, the music collective Military Wives used the Earl Haig poppy at Christmas and other times of the year (outside of official Remembrance periods around November 11th) in conjunction with Help for Heroes.

¹¹ The actor (British soldier) is almost always universally supported by the British establishment, so this is usually a given. The ideological cause is usually supported too (whether it is labeled war or necessary self-defense) but the cause does not *need* to be supported for the claim to stand.

¹² See Kelly “‘Hero’-fication of British Militarism” for detailed discussions of a couple of case studies where non-conformers were symbolically annihilated in the corporate British media and by sporting organizations too (when it related to sport).

¹³ See “Terror ‘Apologists’ Must Share Blame – Hammond,” *BBC Online*, March 10, 2015.

¹⁴ Steven Swinford, “David Cameron: Muslims Must Do More To Tackle Terrorism in Wake of Paris Shootings,” *The Telegraph Online*, January 12, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/11340004/David-Cameron-Muslims-must-do-more-to-tackle-terrorism-in-wake-of-Paris-shootings.html>

¹⁵ In 2016 it emerged that the US government had been paying sport clubs monies totaling millions of dollars to buy support and endorsement for American military.

¹⁶ See Kelly “‘Hero’-fication of British Militarism”

¹⁷ Sun Online, “Footie Clubs Unite For Heroes,” March 2, 2010, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/2874672/Footie-clubs-unite-for-heroes.html

¹⁸ Sky News, “Armed Forces Day Sees Parades and Fly-Pasts,” June 29, 2013, <http://news.sky.com/story/1109432/armed-forces-day-sees-parades-and-fly-pasts>

¹⁹ Of course, there may be humanitarian acts and liberating outcomes too, but the point is that these are entirely debatable, ideologically subjective and, occur alongside (and because of) widespread death, destruction and violence.

²⁰ See Flint and Kelly's (eds.) "Bigotry, Football and Scotland" introduction for an explanation of why 'sectarianism' is a questionable choice of word when discussing these ethnic, religious and political identities. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 3-18.

²¹ In 2012 Rangers Football Club went into administration and subsequently liquidation. The old club's assets were bought and a new Rangers emerged with its supporters claiming to be the original club. What is undoubted is that many Rangers fans of the old club support the new club and view it as their original club, hence many of the same traditions and identities exist.

²² It is worthwhile to discuss the minute details of this song when dealing with the Offensive Behavior at Football Bill but this is beyond the scope of this chapter. Additionally, it is not necessary to go into detail about the song or its meaning to show the paradoxical way the singing of Roll of Honour is treated compared to British equivalents of remembrance. Common discourses of British remembrance seldom require equivalent dissection precisely because British remembrance is articulated as having no necessary relationship between *ideology-actor-action-outcome*.

²³ Roll of Honour is, of course, a common and well-known reference to military actors ("the fallen") who have died in violent combat. In fact, The Sun newspaper used the phrase Roll of Honour as a strap line when reporting a WoT memorial service in which they criticized the Archbishop of Canterbury for raising some questions around the "war". See "You're a Disgrace Your Grace," *The Sun Online*, accessed March 17, 2012, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/2675598/Archbishop-of-Canterburys-war-rant-mars-troops-tribute.html

²⁴ Schools and Learning, *The Royal British Legion*, May 1, 2016, <http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/remembrance/schools-learning/>

²⁵ George, E. Marcus and Michael, J. Fischer, *Anthropology as Cultural Critique* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 137.

²⁶ Unlike Help for Heroes, Money for Martyrs does not make any ideological value judgment of the actors other than facts. It does not label anyone heroic.

²⁷ A measure of the power of this ideological is that the same students who reject giving money to Money for Martyrs on the grounds it would be supporting terrorism and terrorists, are among the majority of the same group who in the same session, assert that giving money to British military charities does not constitute supporting British military violence, its outcomes or the WoT.

²⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); 9.

²⁹ Paul Willis, "Women in Sport in ideology," in *Sport, Culture and Ideology*, ed. Jennifer Hargreaves, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 117-135.