Governing Diversity in South Asia

Citation for published version:
https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjx058

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1093/publius/pjx058

Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer

Document Version:
Peer reviewed version

Published In:
Publius: The Journal of Federalism

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GOVERNING DIVERSITY IN SOUTH ASIA:
EXPLAINING DIVERGENT PATHWAYS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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Abstract: This article applies a comparative-historical analysis (critical junctures and multiple-orders framework) to understand how and why India and Pakistan chose different strategies for the management of diversity after Partition, despite their common colonial roots. After identifying several strategies for the management of diversity the article traces the factors which account for a predominantly group-dominant approach to diversity in Pakistan and an integrationist approach in India. The analysis highlights the relevance of structural antecedent conditions during colonial times: namely the accommodationist tradition within Congress, and the absence thereof in Pakistan (Muslim League) and the group-dominant legacy of the military and civil service. The comparison also draws attention to gradual processes of change within a dominant path and nuances the relevance of elections as sufficient mechanisms for strengthening accommodation. For elections to fulfil this accommodationist potential they need to be embedded within a liberal constitutional framework.
India and Pakistan are among the most diverse countries in the world (Alesina et al. 2003). Their diversity pertains to language, caste/biraderi, religion or tribe and has underpinned various forms of territorial and non-territorial mobilization (Adeney 2007; Bhattacharyya 2010, Jaffrelot 2015; Jayal 2014; Stepan et al. 2011; Talbot 2012). Until independence in 1947 Pakistan and India were part of British India, and as such were governed by the Government of India Act (1935) until each had adopted its own indigenous constitution. Yet, despite common colonial and constitutional roots, India and Pakistan developed different strategies for the management of their diversity. For much of its history, Pakistan adopted a ‘group-dominant’ strategy in which the Punjabis (and to a lesser extent Muhajirs) exercised disproportionate influence in the institutions of the state whereas India, (leaving aside temporal and territorial exceptions), adopted an integrationist strategy which contained certain elements of group-specific accommodation.

This article seeks to explain why both countries developed such different trajectories in the management of diversity, adopting the framework of comparative-historical analysis (CHA). In particular, I draw on critical junctures and path dependency (punctuated equilibrium) and processes of incremental institutional change (or a Multiples-Orders Framework, hereafter MOF) to explain why these differences emerged and how they evolved over time (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). In doing so, this article seeks to make an original contribution in four regards.

First, it adds empirical flesh to analyses which seek to integrate a critical junctures approach with endogenous driven processes of change by emphasizing how both matter and complement each other when studying the management of diversity in India and Pakistan across time. A critical junctures approach helps explain why and how Partition weakened the accommodationist arrangements that were in place during the late colonial period. Yet, in India that shift was less outspoken, reflecting the resilience of an accommodationist tradition within
the Congress Party and its ability to shape constitutional outcomes. In comparison, in Pakistan the lack of accommodationist tradition within the Muslim League and the party’s disintegration foreclosed an early constitutional settlement after Partition, creating an institutional void within which inter-regional rivalries produced group dominance or ‘state capture’ by the Muhajirs and especially Punjabis.

A MOF helps to understand how emerging frictions between the social and ideational layer and the institutional set-up gradually built up pushing both countries to adopt more accommodationist arrangements in recent decades in relation to language, territory (and in the case of India also caste and tribe). Equally, a MOF helps to shed light on the rise of religious nationalism and its implications for the protection of religious minority rights.

Second, based on the literature of conflict management in divided societies I draw up a continuum for the institutional management of diversity, ranging from group-dominant at one end to accommodationist at the other end. This enables me to locate the institutional approaches to diversity with regard to a specific source or dimension of diversity at a particular moment in time and trace their movement across time. Based on the overall approach to the management of diversity, it then becomes possible to align both countries with a dominant strategy for governing diversity at any given point of time.

Third, the article provides a different angle to most India-Pakistan comparisons which have focused primarily on the relatively successful democratization of the former and the hybrid or militarized nature of the latter (Talbot 2000; Jaffrelot 2002; Adeney and Wyatt 2004; Oldenburg 2010; Tudor 2013). These studies take regime stability (democracy versus authoritarianism or civilian versus military rule) as their dependent variable but focus less on the implications thereof for the management of diversity. Important scholarly contributions, especially by Adeney (2007) and Stepan et al. (2011), which have focused on differences in ethnic conflict regulation between both countries or among countries in the region have done
so primarily with the aim of relating these to broader theories of ethnic conflict management. In comparison, in this article I adopt CHA to explain why certain strategies were adopted at certain moments in time and how they influenced later decisions. This approach can shed light on the feasibility of institutional design options by identifying the level of social or ideological support for a particular strategy and/or the strength of institutional veto-points facilitating or hampering its implementation. Examples here could be the division of Pakistani Punjab to reduce the power of a hegemonic unit in the federation, the deepening of the secular nature of India, the furthering of asymmetric territorial arrangements in India or the extension of an India-style language policy to multilingual Pakistan.

Finally, the analysis demonstrates that elections are not a sufficient mechanism to foster accommodation. In India, elections have helped to accommodate linguistic, caste and territorial divisions, but they have not been conducive for the accommodation of minority religions. Similarly, in Pakistan the first polity-wide elections in 1970 merely accentuated the stand-off between West and East Pakistan and ultimately triggered the breakaway and formation of Bangladesh. This suggests that the embeddedness of elections within a democratic framework which also provides ideological and institutional (constitutional) support for liberal rights are crucial for elections to work as a potentially accommodationist devise.

In the remainder of this article I first operationalize different strategies for governing diversity, specify how CHA will be applied, and identify critical junctures in each of the case-studies. Subsequent sections then discuss the management of diversity in both countries since 1947, applying CHA. For each case, I distinguish between the effect of critical junctures and processes of gradual institutional change on the chosen institutional arrangements for the management of diversity and seek to attribute changes to emerging frictions between the social, ideological and institutional layers.
Diversity in India and Pakistan can relate to many dimensions: it can be territorial, linguistic, ethnic (caste, biraderi, tribe), religious or a combination of the above (see Gopal Jayal 2006; Adeney 2007; Chandra 2006 for why the term ‘ethnic’ should not be used as a common label). The comparative literature on governing divided societies identifies a number of approaches for the management of diversity. These can be slotted along a continuum which ranges from a fully group-dominant approach at one end to a fully accommodationist approach at the other end. (McGarry et al. 2008; Adeney 2007; Basta et al. 2015). Table 1 identifies the main features of each approach in relation to the key sources of diversity underpinning the Indian and Pakistani societies.

A ‘group-dominant’ approach to diversity implies that state power is ‘captured’ or ‘controlled’ by one or at the most a few groups in the state, reducing the political, social and civic rights of members belonging to groups who do not share the same language, religion and/or caste affiliation of the dominant elite. Usually, but not always, the group in control of the state presents a demographic majority, which is why the term ‘majoritarianism’ is sometimes used (Adeney 2015). An ‘integrationist approach,’ on the other hand, recognizes the right of individuals to profess their choice of religion or express their caste, tribal or linguistic identity in the private sphere, but does not see a need for group-targeted policies (McGarry 2008). Finally, accommodationist approaches take the cleavages within a society as given and propagate group-specific policies to address them, such as territorial pluralism or, where the sources of diversity are not territorially marked, consociationalism (Basta et al. 2015;
McGarry et al. 2008; Lijphart 1977). Affirmative action or quotas are also examples of group-specific strategies even though they fall short of consociationalism. Unlike the latter they do not propagate executive power-sharing or give minorities a veto-right, but merely seek to enhance their representation within the legislature or public sector more generally.

States do not necessarily adopt comparable strategies for the management of different sources of diversity. For instance, they may adopt an accommodationist approach in relation to caste; an integrationist approach with respect to language, but a group-dominant approach in relation to religion. States may also move from the left to the right or in the opposite direction on one dimension without necessarily altering their dominant approach to the management of diversity. For example, the reintroduction of provincial boundaries (to some extent along linguistic lines) in the 1973 Pakistani constitution made Pakistan more accommodationist in the management of territorial and linguistic diversity, but this did not necessarily undermine the country’s largely group-dominant approach. State power in the civilian government and military heavily continued to underrepresent certain groups and the regime as a whole became more Islamist in orientation.

To assess how and why India and Pakistan developed different pathways for the management of diversity I employ Comparative-Historical Analysis. CHA combines insights from a ‘punctuated equilibrium model’ with more recent approaches for capturing incremental or gradual institutional change. The punctuated equilibrium model assumes the occurrence of external shocks or critical junctures, which typically unfold over a ‘relatively limited period of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agent’s choices affect the outcome of interest’ (Cappocia and Kelemen 2007, 348). Critical junctures are important exogenous shocks which temporarily heighten the influence of agents over structure. Even so, the choices which agents make during critical junctures can be shaped in part by ‘structurally antecedent conditions’ (Cappocia 2015, 156). As Cappocia and Kelemen assert (2007, 352)
what sets critical junctures apart is the ‘structural fluidity and heightened contingency’ even where these may eventually produce a *recalibration* of the institutional set-up. Therefore, critical junctures merely open the *possibility* of one or several different pathways being taken, but they *can* also result in the reproduction of an existing path; as I will discuss, a feature which applies to Pakistan post 1971.

Irrespective of the outcome which they generate, critical junctures usually set in a much longer period of path-dependency or continuity, in a sense that ‘causal processes [in this later period] are highly sensitive to events that [took] place in the early stages of the overall historical sequence’ (Mahoney 2000, 510). This is so because as Pierson (2017, 131) puts it, the political contestation which underpins the formation of an institution is not merely reflecting ‘a battle to gain control over political authority’ but also ‘a struggle to use political authority to institutionalize advantage’, i.e. not just ‘to exercise’ but possibly also to ‘generate power.’

Those who control the agenda in the set-up of an institution also determine the rules of the game. Building in procedural veto-points (such as super-majorities for institutional change) may block regime change further down the line. Alternatively, ruling elites may perpetuate power through privileged access to military and financial resources (possibly generated by a state-led economy). These sources can be used to suppress violence or to canvass the support of disadvantaged groups e.g. through patronage, clientelism or development politics.

Despite the path-dependency which follows on from a critical juncture, incremental change within a chosen path is likely. In recent work Mahoney and Thelen (2010; 2015) have developed a theory of gradual or incremental change which recognizes that institutions are often built on compromises, even where they reflect relative power asymmetries between the actors involved. Compromises are inherently instable, e.g. when one of the parties in a democracy increases its relative power (this may happen through vote gains in an election) or when new parties enter the institutional set up (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 14). Such relative
power-shifts are common and may produce incremental instead of wholesale institutional change which unlike a critical juncture is primarily endogenous in nature. A ‘multiple-orders framework’ (MOF) focuses on such ‘processes of gradual or incremental change that play out within a set of path-dependent institutions and ideas’ (Broschek 2011, 543-54). Historically constructed institutional arrangements and the ideational (normative) or social context in which they are embedded shape the contours within which agents can pursue change. The social context refers to a set of social cleavages which political elites activate to secure institutional continuity or provoke change. The ideational layer refers to ‘a set of cognitive and normative ideas… that serve to legitimize its institutions’ (Broschek, Petersohn and Toubeau, this special issue). These can shape alterations in the institutional layer which comprises the formal and informal rules underpinning a strategy for dealing with diversity. If we take the institutional layer as the dependent variable, then institutions often change slowly, because the social causes triggering change may unfold over a slow period (for instance demographic pressures for change may build up over decades), or political actors may subscribe to hegemonic ideas which are slow to erode (for instance the support for a market instead of a state-led economy). In a multiple-orders-framework change still unfolds, but emanates from emerging frictions between the social, ideational and institutional layers.

In the next sections, we trace the evolution of India and Pakistan’s strategies for governing diversity by analysing the impact of Partition (and in the case of Pakistan also the secession of Bangladesh) as critical junctures first. The break-up of (British) India in two states was an important exogenous shock. It was accompanied by millions of refugees and around one million casualties resulting from predominantly Muslim-Sikh-Hindu violence (Talbot and Singh 2009). Partition was most disruptive for Pakistan: the scale of the refugee crisis was larger as was the effect of migration patterns on economic development. Hindus dominated the businesses, banking and insurance industries of West Punjab and these had to be built up from
scratch (Wilkinson 2015, 196). Pakistan also felt strategically more insecure, especially since most of Kashmir fell into Indian hands (1947-8).

Partition affected the main actor constellations defining the management of diversity in both countries. Until August 1947, the future of British India was determined by a trilateral relationship involving the Congress, the Muslim League and the British colonizer. After Partition, Congress and the Muslim League dominated the Constituent Assemblies of India and Pakistan respectively and thus shaped the (initial) debates on the making of a new constitution and the preferred formula for the management of diversity. Yet, the leaders of both polities did not operate in a political vacuum but ‘inherited’ the provisions which had come about in the final decades of British India. For instance, following the Morley-Minto reforms, the Government of India Act (1909) accepted the principle of separate electorates and reservations for Muslims, whereas the Poona-Pact (1932) sanctioned a similar provision for Scheduled Castes or Dalits. These provisions were echoed in the Government of India Act (1935) which operated as the interim-constitution of India and Pakistan and provided both countries with a relatively centralized constitution. In it, the union government controlled most of the fiscal and legislative powers and the centre supervised the autonomy of the provinces through the appointment of governors and the presence of Emergency provisions which could suspend their autonomy (Kumarasingham 2013).

In the case of Pakistan, the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 can be understood as a second critical juncture. Following a short but intensive war with India, the country lost more than half of its population and the erstwhile East Pakistani representatives were removed from the federal Parliament. Therefore, debates on the 1973 constitution were shaped by (West)-Pakistani representatives alone, predominantly representing the Pakistan People’s Party, a new ‘actor’ which was entirely absent from the constitution-making process in the 1950s. In the following sections I first pay attention to change in the governance of
diversity after each critical juncture and subsequently turn to processes of gradual change which occurred outside these critical junctures. The analysis for India is presented first, followed by Pakistan.

THE MANAGEMENT OF DIVERSITY IN INDIA

Partition and the push towards integration

Table 2 summarizes the main strategies for the management of diversity during the late colonial period and the extent to which the first indigenous Indian constitution displaced or altered several of its provisions. The table demonstrates that following Partition, the members of the Indian constituent assembly pushed the management of diversity into an integrationist direction, yet also held onto several accommodationist institutions or postponed the implementation of more integrationist devices until later. How can we explain the continuity of accommodationist resilience in some areas and their displacement with more integrationist features in others?

[Insert Table 2 About Here]

First, we can observe a noticeable but partial shift in the sources of India’s diversity. Partition reduced the share of the Muslim minority in India from about 23.8 percent in 1941 (Adeney 2007, 48), to just 9.8 percent in the first census after independence (Census of India, 1951). However, in terms of India’s linguistic, tribal, caste or territorial diversity little had changed (Gopal Jayal 2006).

Reflecting the sharp drop in the Muslim population and religion as the leitmotiv underpinning Partition, the social and ideational support for abolishing separate electorates and
legislative seats for religious minorities was strongest. In other domains, the change was less radical (as in the case of caste or tribal reservations); the more integrationist option was preferred (as in the continuation of the centralist provisions of the Government of India Act rather than the more confederal alternatives of the Cabinet Mission Plan); or – potentially radical changes – such as the imposition of Hindi as the national language were kicked in the long grass (Chandhoke 2007; Lerner 2012).

Second, although the Congress Party was no longer needed to compromise with the British or the Muslim League there was a strong degree of actor continuity. The popular mobilization for independence by a broad-based movement-turned-party in the decades leading up to Partition had forced Congress to adopt an accommodative approach in relation to several sources of diversity (Tudor 2013). The catch-all nature of the movement provided ideational support for accommodationist strategies within the party (ideology and organization) and the state even after Partition (Kothari 1964; Lijphart 1996).

For instance, despite its growing national success and profile, the Congress had defended a federal, albeit rather centralized India. The party’s organizational structure had been amended in 1920 through the creation of twenty-one vernacular units in the form of Provincial Congress Committees, recognizing the importance of regional languages (Chandhoke 2007). Gandhi had also actively campaigned against discrimination based on caste (at least in public), especially by advocating the removal of untouchability.

Admittedly, the advocacy of some accommodative policies was sometimes more pragmatic (as a means to keep the movement together) than ideologically embedded. Indeed, in the sometimes hefty contestation which preceded their acceptance in the late colonial period lay the seeds for a more integrationist shift which was brought about by Partition. For instance, Congress had vehemently opposed separate electorates for ‘the depressed classes’ (granted in 1932 in the Poona Pact) as these were seen to reify caste cleavages and divide the majority
Hindu community (Tudor 2013, 76). Similarly the competing struggle between a Hindu nationalist orientation of the state and a more ‘composite’ one (Stuligross and Varshney 2002, 434-5) was not fought out between a Hindu nationalist party (such as the Jan Sangh or the later Bharatiya Janata Party) and a secular party, but took place within the Congress Party itself. In this sense, the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru contributed to curbing the assimilationist or Hindu control strategies that were proposed by his Deputy Patel or Hindu nationalists within the party (Talbot 2000, 168; Khilnani 1997, 31). However, Nehru did not support separate electorates for Muslims and this stance in turn facilitated their concurrent abolition for Scheduled Castes.

Third, the authority of Congress to impose its ideological and institutional preferences on the institutions of the state (due to its control of the constituent assembly and ‘one-party-dominant’ status in subsequent elections) helped to undermine the centrality of two imbalanced institutions: the civil service and the military. The colonizers had introduced competitive examinations for entry into the highly prestigious British Indian Administrative Services with separate cadres for each of the provinces. Nonetheless these quotas did not relate to caste, tribe or religion (Gopal Jayal 2006). Especially ‘backward’ castes and tribes were underrepresented in these institutions. Similar imbalances in representation applied to the army. As Wilkinson (2015, 37-52) has shown, the British primarily recruited troops from the allegedly more loyal ‘martial races,’ especially from Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (N-WFP). By 1929 Punjabis alone made up 54.4 percent of recruits in the British Indian army. Shortly after Partition, the Indian army still drew disproportionately from its Punjabi Sikh community and a range of other martial races (especially Dogras, Jats, Marathas and Rajputs). Regiments from the South and East of India were heavily underrepresented (Wilkinson 2015, 91). However, the new Indian government quickly took steps to open up officer recruitment to other Indian
regions, and the share of Punjabis in the army overall shrunk as a result of the Partition of Punjab (Wilkinson 2015, 107-110).

Gradual Change since 1950: Caste, Territorial and Linguistic Accommodation but a move toward religious majoritarianism

Despite the integrationist impulse from Partition, Table 3 demonstrates how since the enactment of its constitution in 1950 India has edged closer to the accommodationist end of the diversity continuum based on its arrangements for the management of linguistic, territorial and caste diversity. The same does not hold for religion. How can a multiple-orders framework shed light on this partial shift towards accommodation?

[Insert Table 3 About Here]

Overall, I argue that in the case of India, democracy has been an important mechanism enabling social and ideological pressure for accommodation along the lines of territory, caste and tribe. India not only introduced universal suffrage, but with democracy also comes the right to (non-violent) mobilization or protest and the possible need to accommodate new demands as a result of party competition. In turn, strong democratic impulses can generate quick adjustments in India’s approach to diversity due to the weakness of institutional veto-points in the institutions of the centre. Indeed, the amendment of several constitutional provisions only requires a federal bicameral majority. This even applies to state reorganization, which –unlike in Pakistan- only informally requires the consent of the (affected) states. This for a federal state unusually flexible decision-making rule, so Tillin (2015) argues, reflects the ‘holding’ as opposed to ‘coming-together’ nature of the Indian state (Stepan 1999). It frees the polity of
‘demos-constraining’ veto-points which would preclude the flexible adjustment of the country’s federal structure should circumstances require (Tillin 2015, 633).

Territorial and linguistic accommodation was accomplished first following widespread protests and death of a Congress activist in 1952. Between 1953 and 1966, new states emerged in the South and North-West of India built around Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Kannada, Maharathi and Gujarati-speaking majorities. The territorial reorganization of Punjab took longer as it generated a Punjabi-speaking and Sikh-dominated state (now separated from Hindi and Hindu-dominated Haryana). By strengthening the congruence between linguistic and state boundaries Congress was logically consistent with its own internal organizational structure since the 1920s. Put differently, territorial reorganization resolved the existing friction between the ideological layer (internal Congress support for linguistic federalism strengthened by social mobilization) and the institutional layer. In the case of more recently created states (such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttarkhand and Telangana), not language but tribal concerns or a sense of relative social and economic deprivation provided the source on which some state party elites built a case for state formation (Tillin 2013; Bhattacharyya et al. 2017). Yet, parties in central office have embraced the formation of new states when they were expected to generate electoral and policy pay-offs. Hence, the timing of their creation did not always coincide with a peak in popular support therefore on the ground (Tillin 2013).

Linguistic mobilization, sometimes invoking the rising support of state-based parties such as the DMK (Tamil Nadu) also pushed the centrally-ruling Congress Party into a more accommodative national language policy (Chandokhe 2007; Stepan et al. 2011). In time, the number of official languages was extended from fourteen at independence to twenty-two at present. State governments can use these languages in their official dealings and promote their use in the administration, economy and cultural sectors of the state, alongside Hindi or English
The Official Languages Act (1967) retained English as a ‘connecting’ or ‘associate official language.’

Rising frictions between the social and institutional layer also facilitated further accommodation in the politics of caste. Democratization and the gradual rise in levels of literacy, educational attainment and economic self-reliance gradually emboldened the demands of the ‘Other Backward Castes’ (OBC). This ‘rise of the plebeians’ (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009) eroded electoral support for the Congress Party which offered lower castes mainly tokenist representation. OBCs who were denied administrative and educational reservations within the party and the state flocked increasingly to caste-based regional parties. When Congress lost the general elections of 1989 to a National Front of opposition parties, OBC reservations were swiftly implemented. In other words, with the weakening of one-party dominance, the mechanism of accommodation increasingly transferred from the ‘intra’ to the inter-party arena (coalition government).

Apart from linguistic federalism (which merely changed the number of units in the federation), the self and shared rule properties of Indian federalism have been strengthened since the 1990s, albeit only in practice (not by constitutional amendment). This is the result of three factors. First, the gradual displacement of a planned or command economy paradigm with a liberal or market economy paradigm. This ideological shift forced an adjustment in the state structure to reduce the scope of central economic regulation and increase the freedom of state actors to pursue inward investment (Sáez 2002; Sinha 2005). In this context the capacity of the central state to ‘discipline’ the states through financial or policy inducements was also weakened (Sharma 2017). Second, in time the adoption of linguistic federalism facilitated the rise of state based parties as caste identities coalesce more easily within than across linguistic (state) boundaries (Yadav and Palshikar 2008; Schakel and Swenden 2016). This became relevant especially in the 1990s when caste emerged as a prime focus of electoral mobilization.
and furnished the transformation of the Indian states from ‘federal units’ into ‘territorial political communities’ (Keating 2013) with which citizens more readily identified. Finally, the rise of state politics (in tandem with the institutional decay of the Congress Party) pluralized the party system and at least between 1996 and 2014 gave state-based parties an important input in the running of broad-based coalition governments at the centre (Kailash 2014). In turn, the ability for state-based, yet “centric-regional” parties (Stepan et al. 2010, 54) to participate in central government promoted the formation of similar parties elsewhere (Ziegfeld 2016) and created favourable conditions for the Indian Supreme Court to strike down the application of President’s Rule (the temporary suspension of state self-rule) for party political purposes (since its Bommai judgement in 1994). In sum, the change from a command to a market-driven economy, linguistic reorganization and the pluralization of the party system reinforced the self-rule properties of the Indian states and weakened the scope for central political interference.

However, there are two important limits to this gradual shift towards accommodation and the extent to which democracy has furnished it. The first limit concerns the strengthening support for a group-dominant approach in relation to religion. The second limit pertains to red lines which the Indian state is not allowed to cross and would put the country squarely on an accommodationist path. I discuss each of these in turn.

First, there is little evidence of further accommodation of minority religious groups beyond norms that were institutionalized in the aftermath of Partition, in particular, the retention of religious personal law (instead of its (envisaged) replacement with a Universal Civil Code), religious educational autonomy as well as the special constitutional provisions which apply to the predominantly Muslim-populated state of Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, most of these provisions are contested due to the rise of Hindu nationalism, especially so since the late 1980s and 1990s. Ideologically, Hindu nationalism propagates a majoritarian understanding of the nation, centred on Hinduism (the religion of roughly 80 percent of the
Indians) and (to a lesser extent, given the linguistic heterogeneity of the Hindu community) the Hindi language. Politically, Hindu nationalism is linked with the Bharatiya Janata Party and the wider web of Hindu organizations of the Sangh Parivar. One causal factor for the growing support for Hindu nationalism is the gradual rise of the lower castes as explained above. Hindu upper castes can use Hindu nationalism as a strategy to secure their hold on power as they seek to reunite a religious group increasingly divided on the basis of caste (Jaffrelot 1999). Relatedly, Blom Hansen (1999) sees a link with economic liberalization which intensified around the same time: in the absence of strong social safeguards, market liberalization has destabilized social hierarchies and increased the support base for nationalist and majoritarian ideologies. In a context of such rising social insecurity, Hindu voluntary organizations can step in to provide minimum social relief to the (Hindu) downtrodden, and in the process ‘convert’ the beneficiaries thereof to the ideology of Hindu nationalism, as Thachil (2014) has shown.

Frictions have emerged between the support for a ‘majoritarian democracy’ and the secular and liberal constitutional set-up. Thus far, institutional veto points, such as the Rajya Sabha (second chamber) or Supreme Court, and political veto players, (secular parties which dominate several state governments and the second chamber) pre-empted the possibility of constitutional amendments that would push the Indian polity into a formally less accommodative direction in terms of religion. However, the sustainability thereof depends very much on the capacity of said parties to retain the required political majorities and of those actors who man the ‘institutional checks’ such as the court system to adhere to non-majoritarian interpretations of the law. The Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party unexpectedly occupied a majority of seats in the 2014 lower house elections. Since forming the federal government, the BJP has enabled steps in the pursuance of a Hindu nationalist ideology where these veto-points do not apply. For instance, it has worked to roll out beef-bans across BJP ruled states; rewrote national education curricula and interfered in how centrally funded universities are run.
It has also promoted the more widespread use of Hindi at the expense of English and framed viewpoints which defend minorities or are critical of the government’s policy in relation to Kashmir as ‘anti-national.’ What is at play here is an attempt by the ruling party to wield its power and social resources to provoke an ideational shift in support of its - in religious terms - group-dominant worldview.

Second, despite moves towards accommodation in terms of caste, tribe and territory, overall India has stayed within a predominantly integrationist path. In fact, the institutional management of diversity transformed India into what Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010; 2011) have labelled as a ‘state-nation’, but India is not a consociational state nor did it adopt territorial pluralism. Indeed, my analysis supports Wilkinson’s (2000) observation that India has become more accommodationist since the decay of the one party dominant system in 1989 (and arguably until 2014). Yet, it also supports his view that India never has been a consociational democracy (contrary to Lijphart 1996). Minority communities are not necessarily represented, let alone given veto-rights in executive institutions, nor has India introduced a proportional electoral system which could have strengthened their presence in the legislature beyond what is currently on offer through reserved seats or quotas (Wilkinson 2000).

Similarly, India’s territorial arrangements are far removed from ‘territorial pluralism’ (Basta et al. 2015). For one, the constitution as well as the country’s election law prohibits political parties from openly expressing views in support of secessionism, even if propagated by non-violent means (Swenden 2016). Secondly, territorial pluralism not only requires that the boundaries of the federal units are drawn along ‘ethno-linguistic’ lines, but also that the state adopts a combination of strong self and shared rule and recognizes the polity as ‘robustly multinational’. Territorial shared rule is modest, given the subordinate power of the Rajya Sabha (second chamber) relative to the lower house and the representation of the states therein on the basis of proportionality (Swenden and Saxena 2017). Self-rule is constrained due to the
fiscal dominance of the centre and the retention of emergency provisions facilitating its suspension. Admittedly, the constitution institutionalized elements of territorial asymmetry, especially in relation to Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and some states which seceded from Assam, in particular Nagaland and Mizoram (Saxena 2012, 73-74; Arora 2010, 204) or Sikkim upon its accession to India in 1975 (Tillin 2016, 541). Furthermore, the Sixth Schedule of the constitution facilitated the creation of ‘autonomous district councils’ which can make laws on a.o land use, forest management and social customs by the ‘hill’ (and later also ‘plain’) tribal communities in Assam (again, due to the later reorganization of Assam extending to Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram), whereas the Fifth Schedule enabled the setting up of Tribal Advisory Councils in states outside the North-East with significant tribal populations (Tillin 2016, 549-51). Importantly though, the relevance of these provisions should not be overstated. Demographically, these asymmetric provisions apply to a small percentage of the Indian population and the powers conferred onto some of these institutions (as under Schedule 5) are sometimes merely advisory. Most importantly, especially in relation to the North-East and Jammu and Kashmir, the practical relevance of these asymmetric provisions can be questioned due to the high militarization of these border territories and the recurrent interference of the central government in the working of their subnational democracy (Lacina 2009; 2017; Adeney 2017; Varshney 2013; Hausing 2014, Swenden 2016). This interference also facilitated the gradual hollowing out of the asymmetric powers which the constitution initially conferred upon Jammu and Kashmir (Tillin 2016, 54).

THE MANAGEMENT OF DIVERSITY IN PAKISTAN

*Critical Juncture I: Partition, Constitutional intransigence and the emergence of a Dominant Group Strategy in the 1956 Constitution*
Although the shock of Partition was comparatively more severe for Pakistan and despite the dominance of the Muslim League in its Constituent Assembly, Pakistan made little progress in drafting its own constitution. In fact, a first indigenous constitution did not come about until 1956. Table 4 (first three columns) sets out the main features of the Pakistani constitution (1956) and compares it with the diversity arrangements of British India which preceded it.

[Insert Table 4 About Here]

As Table 4 demonstrates, in comparison with India, Pakistan’s diversity arrangements edge much closer towards the group-dominant end of the continuum, although some accommodationist practices are retained. This shift cannot be linked to Pakistan becoming a much less diverse society: Hindus still made up close to 13 percent of the population (a comparatively higher share than Muslims in India after Partition) with Christian minorities around 1 percent. Furthermore, the majority Muslim community has been divided along linguistic, territorial and sectarian lines (mainly between Shia and Sunni Muslims).\(^3\)

Demographically, Bengali (54.4 percent) was the majority language, followed by Punjabi (27.6 percent), Pashtu (6.6 percent), Sindhi (5.3 percent), Urdu (3.2 percent) and Baluchi (1.2 percent) (Adeney 2007, 66-67; Pakistan Census 1951). In turn, these language groups are associated with six ethnic groups which are largely – but not exclusively - concentrated within the following provincial areas: Bengalis (East Bengal or East Pakistan), Pashtuns (North-West Frontier Province or later Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Sindhi’s (mainly in rural Sindh), Muhajirs (mainly in urban Sindh) and Baluchis (Baluchistan).

Why did Pakistan, despite its internal diversity adopt a group-dominant strategy in relation to language and territory even though its leaders had been the strongest proponents of
power-sharing (with the Hindus) and provincial self-rule (for the Muslim-majority provinces) during the late colonial period?

First, the Muslim League, like Congress in India dominated the composition of the Pakistani Constituent Assembly and thus had the ability to shape the country’s diversity arrangements. However, the League’s origins and mobilizational strength were confined to present-day northern India where its constituency comprised so-called ‘salariats’ in the Muslim-minority provinces (Adeney 2007, 38). Until the 1945-1946 provincial elections, the Muslim League had a limited electoral following on future Pakistani territory. Less threatened by their demographic status, many (possibly most) Muslims in these Muslim-majority provinces identified with linguistic and socio-economic interests and voted for provincial parties (Jaffrelot 2015, 70-75; Tudor 2013, 86-7). Muslims in these provinces felt little reason to support a powerful centre and strongly propagated provincial self-rule. In Bengal, most voters even rallied behind the League because it had been identified with the formation of an independent Bengali state, made up of Assam and Bengal; more so than the Eastern wing of a future Pakistani state (Jayal 1995, 151; Jaffrelot 2002, 14).

Although the Muslim League managed to turn its electoral fortunes around across most of the Muslim majority states in the 1945-6 provincial elections, this was not reflective of a clear effort to deepen its organizational base. Organizationally and ideologically the League was not prepared for democratization and the resulting need for linguistic and territorial accommodation (Shah 2014, 37). In 1947 only ten of the League’s twenty-three Working Committee members (central party executive) belonged to provinces of later Pakistan (Shah 2014, 37) with the rest originating from North India as so-called Muhajirs (Talbot 2012, 57; Jaffrelot 2015, 77; Jayal 2014, 24). The latter were Urdu-speaking, and sought to impose it as the national language of Pakistan even though only 3.3 percent of the Pakistani population reported Urdu as their mother tongue in the 1951 census (Ayres 2009, 32). This was especially
detrimental to the position of Bengali and Sindhi, which, of all the Pakistani languages, had the strongest literary tradition. The League also insisted on a strongly centralized state with limited provincial autonomy.

The lack of accommodative tradition quickly eroded the support base for the League and postponed an agreement on the constitution and the organization of subsequent general elections. Within this context, long-standing feelings of intra-regional mistrust, not just between the Western provinces and East Bengal but also between Punjab and the other Western provinces came to the fore. Political leaders of the West felt little affinity with the demographically dominant Bengalis which they considered as citizens of ‘second rank’ and from which they were separated by more than 1000 miles. The refusal to recognize Bengali as a national language and the under-representation of Bengalis in key institutions of the state and the economy contributed to the overwhelming victory of the Awami League in the 1954 East Bengal provincial elections. Although this result prompted accommodation in the late recognition of Bengali as a state language on a par with Urdu (Jaffrelot 2015, 113), it also triggered the amalgamation of the West Pakistani provinces into One Unit to help secure the de facto political dominance of the West in a unicameral parliament.

Yet, next to divisions between East Bengal and the provinces of West Pakistan, leaders from the smaller West Pakistani provinces (especially rural Sindh, Baluchistan and the N-WFP) feared the domination of the country by a Punjabi and Muhajir elite (Jaffrelot 2015, 91). In the 1936 provincial elections, their voters had neither supported the League nor the Unionist Party which dominated Punjabi politics. Like Punjab in the colonial period, leaders of these provinces had sought to maximize provincial autonomy. That Punjabi leaders no longer insisted on provincial autonomy but took satisfaction with a much more centralized state structure after independence reflected their ability to dominate key spheres of the Pakistani state, in particular the agricultural economy, the military and the civil service.
The rapid rise of the Punjabis in the governance of Pakistan following the collapse of the Muslim League is not surprising. Colonial practices ‘predisposed’ Punjabis to such a role in the new state. Punjabis dominated Pakistan’s agricultural economy since support for large scale irrigation during colonial times helped the province develop into the ‘wheat basket’ of British North India (Jaffrelot 2015, 109). Punjabis also dominated the Pakistani military, since 54.9 percent of the British Indian army was made up of Punjabis of which 70 percent were Muslims (Wilkinson 2015, 51). Consequently, the part of the British Indian army which was ceded to Pakistan following independence was more imbalanced than the part which India inherited (Fair 2014, 62-3; Wilkinson 2015, 199). Finally, Punjabis were over-represented in the civil service because the colonial Punjabi provincial government had sought to narrow the attainment gap between Punjabi Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs by offering the former free scholarships and representational quota at key institutions of higher learning (Talbot 2009, 71-3). Consequently, Punjabi Muslims came out second best (after Muhajirs from North India) in entry examinations for the All-India Services and both groups came to dominate the Pakistani civil service (Wilkinson 2015, 213; Samad 1995, 195).

The dominant position of the Punjabis in the army and civil service matters as both institutions gained in significance following the disintegration of the Muslim League and the absence of a constitutional compromise. Furthermore, the military claimed a strong stake in the running of the state from the very outset since Pakistan was strategically insecure (having fought and largely lost a war with India on Kashmir in 1947-8) yet significant due to its proximity to the Soviet Union and China (Paul 2014, 46). To protect the state, provincial resources were diverted to national security, weakening the already limited self-rule properties of the provinces. The military had played a strong role in enforcing the One Unit Plan upon the Western provinces and in shaping the 1956 constitution more generally (Jayal 2014, 96-7). When resistance against the One Unit Plan increased, the military staged a coup in 1958. This
coup locked Pakistan into an autocratic, or at best hybrid military-civilian path, from which it has been difficult to escape (Lieven 2009, 166; Wilkinson 2015, 196-204). Furthermore, the militarization of Pakistan increased the relative influence of Punjabis at the expense of the Muhajirs who traditionally had been better represented in the civil service (Kennedy 1991, 942-3). This played a role in the gradual Islamization of the state, especially since the 1970s. For although Punjabi and Muhajir elites were united in their disdain for the Bengalis and their support for a group dominant strategy (Wilkinson 2015, 213), they did not share the same religious ‘Weltanschauung’. For the Muhajirs, Islam was a convenient tool to rally the Muslim population of South Asia behind a common cause. For (rural) Punjabis, the state had to live by the principles of Islam (Jaffrelot 2015, 108-9).

Critical Juncture II: The secession of East Pakistan and its contradictory outcome for diversity

The dramatic circumstances which led to the secession of East Pakistan involving a short but full-scale war with India, constituted a second critical juncture. This secession followed shortly after the first polity-wide general elections in which the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP) emerged victorious in the West (but the Awami League in the East). Therefore, the debates on a 1973 constitution were dominated by a civilian government and a political party which had not been represented in the Pakistani parliament before. As Table 4 illustrates (columns 4-5), the 1973 constitution moves Pakistan closer towards the accommodationist end of the continuum in terms of the management of territorial and linguistic divisions, yet also strengthened a group-dominant strategy in relation to religious diversity. What explains these shifts in different directions?

First, the ‘second Partition’ reduced the religious diversity of Pakistan. The share of Hindus in the Pakistani state dropped from 10.7 percent in 1962 to just 1.5 percent (Zaidi 1988, 449), almost on a par with the share of its Christian minority (Raina 2014, 691). This social
change facilitated the strengthening of Islam in the constitution. The Indian military involvement in the Bangladeshi liberation struggle also cemented ideological support for Islamization as was the outcome of the 1970 elections in which radical Islamist parties, especially in the West performed relatively well (Nohlen et al. 2001). The PPP sought to preempt their agenda by adopting a pro-Islamist discourse and by inserting pro-Islamist measures in the constitution.

Second, with the secession of Bangladesh the demographic imbalance between the provinces became more unequal. According to the 1972 population census, the Punjab amassed 57.5 percent of the population, against 21.7 percent for Sindh, 12.8 percent for the N-WFP, 3.7 percent for Baluchistan and 3.8 percent for the tribal areas. Yet, this did not prevent a move towards linguistic and territorial accommodation. The first polity-wide general elections brought provincial loyalties into the open. After all, the military, not civilian leaders had enforced the amalgamation of the Western provinces in 1956 and the leader of the PPP, Zulifkar Ali Bhutto, originated from (rural) Sindh. The rural Sindhi’s (as opposed to the urban Sindhi’s who are predominantly Urdu-speaking Muhajirs) were hitherto underrepresented in the institutions of the state. Bhutto’s Sindhi power-base made him ideologically more supportive of the concerns of the peripheral provinces, such as Baluchistan and Sindh. These concerns were reflected by restoring the erstwhile provinces of the West (except Bahawalpur and Kaipur which were integrated in Punjab) and by enabling their administrations to use regional languages. Both of these changes have survived until this day.

At the same time, the significance of these measures in redressing group-dominance in Pakistan should not be overstated. The state continued to be run on quite centralized terms (Jaffrelot 2015, 127) and provincial governments were still regularly dismissed (e.g the PPP worked to dismiss the National Awami League led provincial governments in N-WFP and Baluchistan which in turn contributed to insurgencies there between 1973 and 1977; Khan
1999). The military and secret intelligence services, which kept a lead role in the formulation of foreign and defence policy remained highly group-imbalanced. Furthermore, several ‘accommodative’ measures were seen primarily to advance the presence of Bhutto’s own Sindhi group at the expense of the Muhajirs. Muhajirs felt targeted by the Sindh provincial government’s initial decision to introduce Sindhi as the province’s sole official language (Kennedy 1991, 944). They also took offense with Bhutto’s decision to break up the Sindhi provincial quota in the civil service between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ and by enforcing such quotas across a much wider range of institutions, including public sector corporations and educational institutions (Kennedy 1991, 945). This strategy survived so long as it was directed against Muhajirs, whose status had been in relative decline since the military coup in 1958. However, by recruiting almost exclusively from Sindhi’s in his ‘Federal Security Force’ (Wilkinson 2015, 215) Bhutto also appeared to undermine the centrality of the Punjabi dominated ISI (military intelligence services). This (and unrest after the 1977 elections) triggered another military coup in 1977, headed by the Punjabi (and Islamist) General Zia.

Gradual Change since 1973: cautious territorial accommodation in the face of Islamization?

Compared with India, there was little incremental change in Pakistan’s diversity regime between 1977 and 2008. Zia’s reign (1977-88) did little to strengthen federalism or push Pakistan away from its largely group-dominant path. Islamization continued apace. The source of this Islamization lies in part with the gradual replacement of secular leaders (military and non-military alike) who often had been formed in the West (from Jinnah to Ayub Khan or Bhutto) with more hard-line Islamist indigenous leaders (e.g. General Zia). Another important source derives from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the influx of many (radicalized) Afghan refugees into Pakistani territory. With the help of the US and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, especially the army’s ISI became the training ground for thousands of mujahid warriors who
later formed the bed-rock of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, Lakshar e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Paul 2014, 141-45). The state and military became complicit in the spread of Islamist ideas. Under Zia, Islamic fundamentalists (JI) were appointed to the cabinet and the military command structures, and the Islamic Council became more directly involved in advising on government policy. Through a set of judicial reforms ‘*hudud*’ (physical) punishments were introduced for crimes such as theft or adultery. Large sums were invested in Deobandi madrassa schools, turning education into a key mechanism through which the state could entrench the ideological support for Islamist policies among the masses (Jaffrelot 2015, 460-80).

As in 1970, the return to civilian rule between 1988 and 1999 kept Pakistan largely on a group-dominant path. Leaders of both major parties, the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) focused much of their energy on toppling each other, where necessary with the cooperation of the army. In contrast, elections preceding the restoration of civilian rule in 2008 compelled these parties to join forces to keep the military at bay (Adeney 2012, 547). Severe floods which battered Pakistan during the monsoon of 2010 and left large areas of Baluchistan and the N-WFP blank, temporarily strengthened ideological support among the Punjabi elite for taking the concerns of the peripheral provinces more seriously (Jaffrelot 2015). In turn, coalition government created a large enough parliamentary majority to produce constitutional change. Indeed, with the 18th constitutional amendment, the country somewhat moved closer towards territorial accommodation (Adeney 2012). The amendment strengthened territorial self-rule by abolishing the concurrent list (which pre-empted provincial powers) and by moving its items predominantly to the state-list. Grievances of peripheral provinces such as Baluchistan and the N-WFP were partially addressed as they were allowed a larger share of their natural resources (oil and gas benefiting Baluchistan, hydro-electric power supporting the N-WFP). Symbolically the N-WFP was renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, acknowledging its
predominantly Pushto-speaking nature (Adeney 2012, 546-551). In parallel, the 7th Finance Commission devolved a larger share of federal resources to the states.

However, the accommodative effects of the 18th amendment should not be overestimated. Adeney (2012) argued that the consent of Punjabi representatives in the Special Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reform hinged on the expectation that the amendment would not make the Punjabis relatively worse-off. Furthermore, both the army and the Punjabi elites would have considered the full implementation of the amendment unlikely, due to a lack of provincial administrative and financial capacity and/or political will (ibid). Indeed, more than 5 years after the amendment was approved, many of its provisions are left unimplemented, questioning the extent to which they challenge Pakistan’s group-dominant pathway (Waseem 2015a; 2015b, 144-7).

**CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF DIVERSITY**

This article applied a comparative historical analysis to explain why India and Pakistan developed different pathways in the governance of their divided societies at independence despite common colonial roots and identical constitutional starting points. Partition was identified as a critical juncture which opened up the possibility of distinctively new strategies in the management of diversity by actors which for the first time dominated –nearly monopolized- the process of constitution-making: the Congress Party in India and the Muslim League in Pakistan.

I demonstrated how Partition pushed both polities away from the more accommodationist schemes which marked the late colonial regime. Changes in the social sources underpinning diversity and ideological support for constitutional ‘centring’ (Adeney 2002) in the aftermath of Partition explain this push away from accommodation. However, in
India an integrationist path was chosen with some elements of group-specific accommodation while in Pakistan the 1956 constitution showed decisively more group-dominant features. I pointed at the accommodationist tradition within the Congress Party in India and the lack thereof among the Muslim League in Pakistan as an important factor which contributed to these divergent outcomes. As such one of the key elements explaining the more successful democratization of India also accounts for the comparatively more accommodationist approach to diversity in that country.

However, the prevalence of a group-dominant approach in Pakistan did not merely result from the absence of an accommodationist champion. It was also reflective of the asymmetric power-tussle between the East and West and between Punjab and the other Western provinces. Bengal had not been a part of Pakistan’s ‘imaginary’ during colonial times by the Western provinces and the Punjab possessed significant resource advantages in terms of military might and economic wealth which enabled it to overpower its smaller provincial neighbours. In this sense, Punjabi group dominance is partially rooted in ‘structural antecedent’ conditions, which in turn are nested within practices on future Pakistani territory in colonial times.

Critical junctures do not always generate a different pathway, and in fact, as Cappuccia and Kelemen (2007, 352) assert, they can even reproduce the recalibration of an existing set-up. Regime change in Pakistan in the aftermath of Bangladesh’s exit was not a strong enough shock to produce substantive change in the country’s dominant strategy for managing diversity, but it did generate limited territorial and linguistic accommodation.

Drawing from a multiple-orders framework, I demonstrated how India veered closer to territorial, linguistic and caste accommodation in recent decades and how this process had been facilitated by democratic contestation. Elections and the resulting changes in the Indian party system brought rising frictions between social and ideological support for change and the
institutional status quo into the open. A sometimes flexible decision-making rule (as in the case of state reorganization) facilitated the realignment of existing institutions with ideological and societal preferences on matters of language, caste and territory. However, this shift towards accommodationism puts India well-short of a deeply accommodationist strategy marked by the advocacy of territorial pluralism and/or consociationalism.

In Pakistan too, ideological support for territorial accommodation appeared to have mounted after the 2008 elections and found a voice in the combined support of Pakistan’s two largest parties; securing the necessary parliamentary majority to see it through. Yet, these modest steps towards territorial accommodation appear to have left the country’s group-dominant pathway intact.

Finally, the comparative analysis demonstrated that both polities have witnessed a gradual rise in religious majoritarianism. This rise demonstrates that elections are not a sufficient mechanism to foster accommodation unless contestants and the public at large remain ideologically wedded to liberal constitutional principles and safeguards. These, perhaps unlike the ‘flexible’ rules governing state reorganization, require proper entrenchment and policing. Without such liberal safeguards, religious nationalists in both countries not only risk undermining the protection of religious minorities but ultimately may also jeopardize any arrangement for the protection of territorial, caste, cultural and linguistic minorities which could challenge their majoritarian worldview.
NOTE

I wish to thank Katharine Adeney, Abhishek Chatterjee, Bettina Petersohn, Simon Toubeau, three anonymous referees and John Dinan, the editor of Publius, for their helpful comments and suggestions. My thoughts have also benefited from collaborative work in the context of a Leverhulme International Network Grant on ‘Continuity and Change in Indian Federalism’, IN-2013-043 (2014-17) for which I was the Principal Applicant. The usual disclaimers apply.

References


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Jayal (1995) offers a deviant analysis as in her view politics in India as well as in Pakistan takes on largely authoritarian forms.

Admittedly, some states have sought to incorporate Muslims within their OBC quota, but to do so for Dalits and Scheduled Tribes would be unconstitutional (Wilkinson, 2000).

In the absence of census data, it is estimated that at present Shia’s represent between 12 and 18 percent and Sunni’s between 79 and 85 percent of Pakistan’s Muslim population (Oberst et al. 2013, 212). The vast majority of Sunni’s today are Deobandi’s, professing a strict imposition of the Quran and Sunnah on state and society, whereas a minority are Barelvis or Sufis who adhere to a more moderate interpretation of Islam (Paul 2014, 130-1; Talbot 2009, 28).

‘educated lower middle classes whose main avenue for livelihood and upward mobility was to secure salaried jobs in the colonial… state apparatus’ (Adeney 2007, 38).

The vote gains are usually tied to four factors: (1) the ‘majoritarian’ policies (perceived or real) by some of the Congress ruled states after the 1937 provincial elections worked as a ‘negative force’ uniting the Muslims behind a common cause (shared rule in a united and independent but also confederal India) and organization (Adeney 2009, 40); (2) Jinnah and the Muslim League succeeded in gaining recognition by the British as the legitimate voice of all the Indian Muslims; negating the input of other Muslim parties (such as the Unionist Party in Punjab or the Awami League in Bengal) in future independence negotiations; (3) across Muslim majority provinces, the League translated its privileged position as the voice of Muslim concerns into votes by mobilizing student unions to its cause and by co-opting local landlords, tribal or religious leaders (Talbot 2009, 67-71) and (4) ‘false promises’ in a sense that Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal were –mistakenly- made to believe that a vote for the League would safeguard their control of these provinces in after Partition (Jayal 2014).

Furthermore, in India, these migrant leaders had also fought against democratization insofar as it could have threatened the position of the Muslims there vis-à-vis the more populous upwardly mobile Hindus (Jaffrelot 2002, 261).
Symbolically this was reflected by appropriating the name of Pakistan for the would-be Muslim majority state (an acronym for five Northern Muslim regions of British India (‘Punjab, North-West Frontier Province or [Afghan Province], Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan), without reference to East Bengal, its demographically dominant unit.

Although Pakistan acquired a third of the defence forces of undivided India, following the Kashmir dispute it did not receive its matching share of military equipment (Jayal 2014, 64-67). In response, the Pakistani government diverted two thirds of its expenditure to defence outflanking what it set aside for industrial development and welfare (Talbot and Singh 2009, 127-153).

For the circumstances which led to the fall of the military regime in the 1960s see Jayal 2014, 98-141.