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Figurativeness in English grammar: the role of metonymic tropes and schemes of repetition

Graeme Trousdale

§1 Introduction

Certain figures of speech – particularly metaphor and metonymy – have played a central role in some theories of language structure and language use; this is most evident in work in conceptual metaphor theory from Lakoff and Johnson (1980) onwards, and in related work on metonymy in cognitive linguistics (see for example the contributions to Panther and Radden 1999). The figures have also featured in other areas of linguistic enquiry, particularly in functional explanations of language change - both metaphor and metonymy have been considered in approaches to grammaticalization, as researchers have considered links between these figures on the one hand, and analogy and reanalysis as mechanisms of language change on the other (Hopper and Traugott 2003).

But what of other figures of speech like antimetabole and paranomasia? Such terms are more likely to be found in literary analyses and handbooks of rhetorical techniques than in expositions of particular linguistic theories. Perhaps one reason for this concerns a proposed link between metaphor and cognition. Work in conceptual metaphor theory focuses on the idea that metaphor in language is a reflection of certain basic aspects of cognition; in Lakoff and Johnson's terms, "our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 1). Such claims are not made for

paradiastole, for example, possibly because this figure of flattery is seen to be rather too specific to be a reflection of a general cognitive mechanism. Part of the *Oxford English Dictionary* definition of metaphor states that it is a “figure of speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object of action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable” (*OED* s.v. *metaphor*), and analogical thinking is common human practice. Certain figures may therefore have received particular attention because they are most clearly observable (potentially as a consequence of their frequency) in instances of language use, and their manifestation may be very diverse, both within a particular language and cross-linguistically.

So while metaphor and metonymy have received a great deal of attention, the very many other figures of speech have tended to be overlooked, at least as far as ‘ordinary’ language is concerned. This neglect has been called into question in some of the work of John Anderson (see especially Colman and Anderson 2000; Anderson 2014; Andor this volume). Anderson has foregrounded the ‘ordinariness’ and pervasiveness of figurative language, not just in terms of metaphor and metonymy, but of many other tropes, and the schemes in which particular lexical items can be embedded. While figurative language has an expressive and potentially ornamental function, it is also a reflection in part of how grammar is structured.

This would suggest a more pervasive role for figurative language in the architecture of language itself, and it is this issue that will be explored in more depth in the present chapter. The remainder of the chapter is in three parts. Section 2 is largely theoretical, and deals with the importance of figurativeness in the understanding of grammar, drawing extensively on John Anderson’s work, including his collaboration with Fran Colman (e.g. Colman and Anderson 2004). Section 3

reviews Colman and Anderson's claims regarding metonymy and word-formation, and extends the discussion to derivational change in English (focussing particularly on the reanalysis of the second element of some compounds into derivational suffixes). Section 4 considers some patterns of reduplication in English, and relates these to figures of speech associated with repetition. My aim is to explore and (to some degree) extend the discussion of figurativeness and grammar expounded in some of Anderson's work.

§2 **Figurativeness and grammar**

In the abstract to a recent article, Anderson writes that “many aspects of linguistic structure are figuratively based, some of them necessarily; figurativeness is basic to language structure and use, and to the development of languages” (Anderson 2014: 971). In this regard, Anderson's position is not unlike that of those linguists working on conceptual metaphors, who see figurativeness not as something marked or deviant, but rather pervasive and commonplace. Or rather, figurativeness *may* be rather ordinary and unremarkable. Consider (1) below:

(1) The British government's approach to Brexit is a complete dog's breakfast

The idiomatic expression *a dog's breakfast* (meaning ‘a mess’) is likely to be of variable familiarity to users of English, and for those for whom the expression is unfamiliar, the novelty of the metaphor is likely to be rather more striking than in the

case of the noun *approach* (which I take in this context to have a figurative sense of ‘means of addressing an issue’, a meaning which has been attested for over a century). These two figures of speech are significantly different in their degree of novelty and their ornamental status. The conventionalization and ‘bedding-in’ of the figurative meaning of *approach* has a greater time depth than is the case of *a dog’s breakfast*. This is in part related to what Anderson refers to in the quotation given above as “the development of languages”: as is well-known, figuration, as part of the semantics of a sign, may bleach over time, or become otherwise opaque (e.g. Modern English *daisy* < Old English *dæges eage* ‘day’s eye’).

Anderson’s approach to figurativeness is linked to much of the conceptualization of syntax in his notionalist framework, and this too shares much with more general cognitive approaches to language, including conceptual metaphor, even if there are also significant differences. Consider for instance the following examples in (2) (from Taylor 2002: 506), which illustrate degrees of figuration involving the verb *go*:

- (2) a. I went from the hotel to the airport
- b. The inheritance went from George to Philip
- c. The light went from green to red

In these instances, the verb denotes motion in space (2a), transfer of ownership (2b) and change of state (2c). Drawing on the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS, the expression in (2c) is motivated by seeing a change of state as a change of location. A similar case may be made for the grammaticalization of *go* in the string BE *going to* as a future marker (Hopper and Traugott 2003).

Also critical for Anderson's conceptualization of figurativeness is how particular figures are involved in "the structuring of whole domains, the expression of relationships within the domain" (Anderson 2014: 985); this is associated with localism, in the connection between spatial and semantic relations more generally. In this way of thinking about figurativeness, the notion of a container metaphor may be extended to the relation between grammatical and semantic/thematic roles. For instance, Anderson (2014: 985-6) discusses the relationship between the following sentences (the examples in (3) are his examples (37a, b) and (38a, b) respectively):

- (3) a. He has sent that to London
- b. He has told that to John
- c. That is in London
- d. John knows that

Building on the transmission metaphor that links (3a) and (3b), Anderson (2014) observes that the relation between (3a) and (3c) is paralleled in the relation that holds between (3b) and (3d), such that both (3c) and (3d) involve nouns with a locative semantic role. In the case of (3d), the noun with the semantic role of locative also has the grammatical role of subject, though as Anderson points out, this is not without precedent (cf. a verb like *hold*, at least in one of its senses). Identifying the relationship between tropes such as metaphor, and atypical semantic roles associated with subjects in English, is a clear example of how "figures are a normal part of languages" (Anderson 2014: 971).

§2.1 *Figurativeness and grammar in language change*

As noted above, while much of the work that has been carried out on the linguistics of figurativeness has been oriented towards an understanding of synchronic patterns in language, the role of figures in speech in language change has also been addressed, perhaps most importantly in the domain of grammaticalization, understood as the development of grammatical items from lexical material. It is not restricted to the creation of new grammatical items, however. An important aspect of Anderson's thinking in this regard is summed up well in one part of the interview with József Andor that forms the introductory part of this volume. Anderson states:

Lexical innovations often show a search for making more precise and communicable particular domains of cognition, a search aided by creativity and imagination, particularly in the use of figurativeness (Andor, this volume)

In part of what follows (particularly in section 3, on the development of derivational suffixes, but also in the discussion of reduplication in section 4), there is a reflection on the importance of figurative language in Anderson's substance-based view of language, and how this interacts with my own view on the nature of language change. This latter view is strongly informed by principles of construction grammar and is articulated in detail in Traugott and Trousdale (2013). However, the notion of construction as adopted in various cognitively-oriented construction grammars (such as Croft 2001 and Goldberg 2006) is not part of the architecture of language in Anderson's theory. Given that, rather than focus on the differences, I have chosen to concentrate on what is shared between the construction and substance-based views,

and have therefore made only brief references to particular concepts associated with construction grammar.

The data in section 3 below come from the development of derivational suffixes in English, and are therefore concerned with the nature of lexical items and their contentful semantics (rather than procedural meaning associated with grammatical constructions, as articulated by Traugott and Trousdale 2013). Anderson's work on figurativeness and the creation of new lexical structures has involved reflection on both 'overt' derivation (via affixation), and conversion. He suggests that "**TROPES add structure to lexical representations**, complicate them; they are typically a kind of lexical derivation" (Anderson 2014: 972, emphasis original) and illustrates this with reference to metonymic conversions, drawing parallels between *cook_V-cook_N* and *bake_V-baker_N*. An important question is whether we can treat both a subtype of conversion and a set of derived forms as instantiations of some metonymic process. Anderson's motivation for the parallel is that in each case the verb "signifies a set of actions" while the noun "denotes a set of human entities associated with the performance of those actions" (Anderson 2014: 972); the distinction resides in what Anderson terms "figurative force" – stronger in the *cook* case, where the lack of an overt marking of the derivation signifies a clearer metonymic relation, perhaps in terms of the strength of the contiguity. The role of metonymy in the change from compound to suffix is the central topic of section 3 below, but here I want to consider briefly more general issues in change, and how Anderson's views appear to me to be consistent with some other approaches to change in cognitive linguistics.

One important distinction underlined by Colman and Anderson (2004) concerns the creation of an innovation in a particular context, and the adoption of that

innovation into the linguistic system of a speaker, and its replication in the systems of other speakers in cases of language change. In relation to lexical change, Colman and Anderson suggest (2004: 547) that word formation is “a pragmatic act”, and make a distinction between that act, and a subsequent lexicalisation, i.e. entry into a speaker’s lexicon. While I do not suggest that Anderson’s substance-based approach is isomorphic with more wide-spread usage-based approaches, there are some parallels. For instance, in Word Grammar (e.g. Hudson 2007), the standard distinction between type and token is modified to allow for tokens to form part of a speaker’s knowledge of language, however transient this may be. In this framework, in the production and perception of a novel token, the token – with all its rich pragmatic, contextual properties – is stored in short-term memory and weakly linked to an existing type. Learning involves abstraction away from such tokens either to

- existing types as a (near)perfect match (which reinforces the cognitive representations of those types); this is akin to Langacker’s full sanction (see Langacker 1987: 66-68)
- existing types as a partial match (which extends and generalises properties of the type); this is akin to Langacker’s partial sanction (see Langacker 1987: 68-71)

or involves the creation of a

- new type. This is a linguistic innovation on the part of the speaker. It is akin to Colman and Anderson’s ‘entry into the lexicon’; replication of such innovations in the lexicons of other individuals constitutes a linguistic change.

This distinction, in the framework of diachronic construction grammar outlined in Traugott and Trousdale (2013), is between the production of a construct (an instance of use in a specific context, sanctioned by an existing type), and a lexical constructionalization, i.e. the creation of new conventionalised form-meaning pairing with lexical semantics. What is common to the approaches taken by Colman and Anderson (2004), Hudson (2007) and Traugott and Trousdale (2013) is the recognition that the conventionalization of pragmatic acts is an important factor in cases of language change, and that figurativeness, as part of an encyclopaedic view of lexical meaning, is often an important factor in the characterization of pragmatic acts.

§2.2 *Beyond lexical figures*

Section 4 of this chapter concerns various patterns of reduplication in English. These are highly diverse in form, function and creativity (compare a partial reduplication *huggermugger* ‘secret’ with contrastive focus reduplication as in *It’s not really out of the way-out of the way*). Reduplications are primarily associated with syntax, though some of the patterns may be lexicalized (e.g. *hush-hush* ‘secretive’). I will argue that the various kinds of reduplication that are found in (varieties of) English are consistent with Anderson’s (2014) conceptualization of the grammar of figurativeness. As was suggested in §2.1 above, in the brief discussion of metonymy and word-formation¹, there is a clear link between a particular type of figure (a trope, specifically metonymy) and a particular linguistic process (conversion at the very least, but in Anderson’s terms extensible to more general lexical derivations). But

¹ This is discussed further in section 3.

tropes are not the only figures that have strong connections with particular linguistic processes in Anderson's conceptualisation of how language works:

I have suggested that tropes involve complication of lexical structure: they often express the additional structure of derivational relationships in the lexicon that introduce a denotational shift. Schemes involve an increase in the structuring of utterances. These additions may involve syntax and/or phonology (Anderson 2014: 976).

The position that Anderson takes regarding tropes and schemes is a rethinking of the traditional distinction that tropes involve some aspect of variation in meaning, while schemes involve some aspect of variation in form: the fact that a trope such as metonymy might involve morphological restructuring impacts both form and meaning. The situation with schemes is yet more complex. Anderson (2014) recognises that both phonological and syntactic restructuring may take place in figures of speech that are schemes. The former must be included to account for familiar schemes like alliteration and assonance, but these are not discussed below. By contrast, since the issue of syntactic schemes will be explored in some depth, I provide a summary of Anderson's position on this. Anderson (2014) addresses a number of different kinds of syntactic schemes, but I will restrict the discussion here mainly to schemes of repetition, because it is these schemes which are most clearly connected with the linguistic phenomenon of reduplication.

Schemes of repetition are typically associated with formal or literary language. Consider for instance the examples in (4) and (5)

(4) The American people don't expect government to solve every problem. They don't expect those of us in this chamber to agree on every issue. But they do expect us to put the nation's interests before party. They do expect us to forge reasonable compromise where we can. (Barack Obama, from the 2013 State of the Union address to the US congress)

(5) It is impossible to say how first the idea entered my brain; but once conceived, it haunted me day and night. Object there was none. Passion there was none. (Edgar Allen Poe, from *The Tell-Tale Heart*)

These two examples highlight certain features regarding the nature of syntactic schemes generally, and of patterns of syntactic repetition specifically. In the Obama quotation (allowing for an equivalence between the subject of the first clause, i.e. *the American people* and the subject pronouns of the following clauses), there is a quadruple repetition of a raising structure with *expect*; in particular this involves the scheme of anaphora, repetition of the same words at the beginning of the clause (i.e. [*The American people/they*] *don't expect* X), combined with antithesis (*they don't expect* vs. *they do expect*). Such combinations of repetition and antithesis may create a rhetorical effect of balance which is regularly exploited in political discourse. The fictional example (5) is also one which involves repetition, here of words at the end of the clause (the figure of epistrophe). Yet again this is complicated by the presence of a further syntactic scheme, hyperbaton, creating an unusual word order. While this order may be unusual in the sense of less frequent, it is nevertheless an important information structuring device, associated with topicalization.

Examples such as (4) and (5) typify particular rhetorical uses of schemes of repetition in planned, formal discourse. Anderson (2014: 976-7) takes the position that many cases of repetition have an intensifying function, suggesting that in some occasions of use they may be “blatantly rhetorical” or “typical of attempts of persuasion”. Political discourse is of course well-known for its attempts to persuade, and Obama’s State of the Union address is clearly aimed at a layered audience (from those politicians directly addressed in the US congress to the wider audience in America and beyond who are not directly addressed). But the Poe example is telling too: an irony of the story is that the narrator is not expressly concerned with establishing his guilt or innocence (he freely admits he killed the old man); rather, the rhetorical issue is whether or not he is mad, and the narration is essentially his attempts to argue for his sanity, the irony lying predominantly in the fact that his attempts at a rational explanation for his actions are undercut by the very words that are foregrounded by the combination of schemes of epistrophe and hyperbaton in (5).

These two examples clearly indicate the relevance of a figurative approach to grammatical structure for our understanding of particular discourse types. But what of more general linguistic issues, and of less ‘stylised’ forms of language? Clearly repetition is frequently attested in casual speech (Anderson (2014: 980) notes the frequency of polysyndeton – the frequent repetition of conjunctions – in oral narratives, for example); but the extent to which we can talk of patterns of repetition as part of grammatical structure is a more open question, and it is this topic that will be addressed in section 4. The concluding remarks of Anderson (2014) are as follows. I quote them at length because of their relevance for the next two sections of the chapter.

The traditional figures are a part of the potential for linguistic restructuring that has been considered most important to creative literature and public rhetoric. But this has led to a failure to give full attention to their prevalence in language and its development. This has, in my experience, resulted in neglect of the study of the roles of figures in language [...] and particularly their effect on linguistic structure. Both these effects and their centrality to the evolution of linguistic structure and other aspects of culture deserve more explicit and intensive exploration. (Anderson 2014: 988)

The following sections explore this claim in more detail. Section 3 is concerned with extending the discussion of metonymy presented by Anderson (2014) and Colman and Anderson (2004) to a particular case of derivational change. Section 4 looks at figures of repetition, and how these may be associated with patterns of reduplication in contemporary English. This is intended to go some way to addressing the suggestions expressed by Anderson (2014) with regard to further research in the area of figurativeness, language structure and language change.

§3 Metonymy

A central issue with regard to the Colman and Anderson (2004) position on metonymy is its association with conversion. They write “metonymy is not entirely idiosyncratic, and results in derived lexemes which bear a relationship to their bases parallel to (derivational morphological) conversions; both traditional conversions and (other) metonymically-based relationships may be class-preserving and class-

changing. We thus argue that lexicalised metonymies are conversions” (Colman and Anderson 2004: 547). This section provides some general remarks on metonymy and its role in conversion (§3.1), then considers the place of metonymy in relation to change (§3.2). §3.3. extends the discussion to metonymy and over derivation in change.

§3.1 Some introductory remarks on metonymy

Along with conceptual metaphor theory, the figure of metonymy has had a significant amount of attention within the cognitive linguistics literature. In this introductory section, I address only those issues which will be of direct relevance to issues of conversion, derivation and language change.

Evans and Green (2006: 311) observe that “linguistic metonymy is referential in nature: it relates to the use of expressions to ‘pinpoint’ entities in order to talk about them.” This is most clearly the case in synecdoche, a common subtype of metonymy, illustrated by the examples in (6)

- (6) a. I need some fresh eyes to proof-read this manuscript
- b. Nice wheels!
- c. Nice threads!
- d. He likes to tickle the ivories

The process of metonymy is often connected in the cognitive linguistics literature with activation: “within a specific discourse context, a salient vehicle activates and thus highlights a particular target” (Evans and Green 2006: 311). The importance of

‘a specific discourse context’ is clear, and is connected with Colman and Anderson’s assertion, discussed above, that word-formation is a pragmatic act, distinct from lexicalization. It concerns an ‘encyclopedic’ view of lexical semantics, and relates particularly to the cognitive linguistic concept of a domain: while metaphor involves a cross-domain mapping, metonymy involves mapping within a domain (Lakoff and Turner 1989), in particular activating a region within a domain (Croft 1993). Standard examples of such within-domain mapping involve conceptual metonymies such as PLACE FOR EVENT, as in (7a-c), where *Rio*, *Brazil* and *Wembley* all stand for one or more football matches or competitions:

- (7) a. We’re looking forward to Rio 2016
- b. Are you going to Brazil?
- c. We’re going to Wembley!

and PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, as in (8a-c), where *Domino’s*, *Beethoven* and *Croft and Cruse* stand for an item of food, a piece of music and a book respectively:

- (8) a. Fancy a Domino’s?
- b. I can’t play this Beethoven
- c. You could have a look at Croft and Cruse.

In terms of language change, metonymy has had a role in the creation of particular lexical items, often in the lexicalization of what historically were phrases. For instance, in contemporary English, the term *foolscap* is used metonymically to refer to a particular size of paper; the source of the expression is the watermark of a fool’s cap

which typically appeared on paper of that size. That the expression is lexicalized is manifest in alternative spellings (*fullscap*), and subsequent folk etymologies (paper half the size of foolscap has been referred to as *halfscap*; see Trousdale 2008). In the next section, the issue of language change is discussed in more detail.

§3.2 *Metonymy, word-formation and entry into the lexicon*

As Colman and Anderson (2004) observe, conversion has been typically associated with the derivational (or ‘systematic’) processes of creating new lexical items.

Examples like (9)

- (9) remark > remarkable > unremarkable

contrast with instances like (compound) clippings such as those in (10):

- (10) a. suburbs > burbs
 b. situation comedy > sitcom

Examples such as (10) are typically unsystematic and somewhat unpredictable (consider for instance, the two possible clippings of *pornography* to *porn* and *porno*). The lack of systematicity in such ‘extragrammatical’ word formation processes can be somewhat overstated (see for example Gries 2004 on the nature of blend formations such as *brunch* and *spork* for a cogent discussion of the regularity of such processes), but it is clear that the number and nature of the idiosyncracies is far greater here than in cases such as (9).

Where does conversion fit? Colman and Anderson (2004) recognise examples such as (11):

(11) $\text{sweet}_A > \text{sweet}_N$

as derivations, without adopting the concept of zero-morphemes. They also draw attention to the issue of class-preserving derivation in contrast to class-changing derivation. English prefixes tend to be class preserving (with exceptions of limited productivity such as *endanger* and *adrift*), while a form derived via suffixation may involve preservation or alternation with respect to the class of the base (compare *boyhood* with *boyish*). In this chapter, I follow Colman and Anderson (2004) in treating conversions as falling into two categories (and refer the reader to their article for the debate around this position). A class-changing conversion is illustrated in (11) above, and these are taken to be the canonical types. More controversial are the class-preserving types like *anorak* ‘nerd’ and *suit* ‘corporate official’ that Colman and Anderson cite. Such cases have been taken to involve a figurative polysemy, but not necessarily a novel word-formation. But as Colman and Anderson (2004: 550-1) observe, some non-figurative conversions do not involve class-change (e.g. intransitive *run* > causative *run*, as in *run the hot water*), and this pattern extends across lexical categories (e.g. mass to count noun developments such as *bread* > *bread*s).

§3.3 *Beyond conversion*

Colman and Anderson (2004) also touch on the more general issue of the role of metonymy in derivational morphology. They write that “much of traditional derivational morphology, whether overtly marked or not, results from acts of metonymic word formation” (Colman and Anderson 2004: 553), but acknowledge that they do not explore this in detail. In this section, I consider the wider derivational issues in more detail, and subscribe to the claim, in the cognitive linguistics literature, that there is no sharp distinction between ‘grammar’ and the ‘lexicon’ (e.g. Langacker 1987), without suggesting that this view is held by Colman and Anderson (2004); in what follows, I draw on the discussion of changes affecting English derivational morphology outlined by Traugott and Trousdale (2013).

Nominalizing constructions in early English show continuity in relation to the Germanic period; for instance, compounding and derivation via ablaut are attested in Old English (OE) from the earliest times. The compounding pattern, in the majority of cases, involves a determinant-determinatum order; this order is found in other productive domains of English derivational morphology (as instantiated by the nominalized expressions *drink-er* and *violin-ist*). This relation thus holds across the compound-complex divide. Indeed, the notion of a sharp divide between compound element and affix is brought into question by Booij (2010, *inter alia*). He addresses the notion of the affixoid, a piece of productive morphology, which derives from an independent lexical item yet has a specific and different meaning when it appears as a constituent in a compound. Examples given by Booij (2010) include the Dutch forms *reus* ‘giant’ and *hoofd* ‘head’, which develop special meanings as the first elements of Dutch compounds, as in *reuze-kerel* ‘good guy’ and *hoofdverdachte* ‘prime suspect’. Specified meanings may also be attested in the development of affixes (understood as a subsequent stage of the derivational change). It is here where metonymy may have a

particular role to play. This can be attested in the development of the OE nouns *dom* and *ræden*. Both nouns are polysemous (OE *dom* may mean ‘doom’, ‘choice’ or ‘dignity’ for example), but in the course of derivational change a particular general meaning is foregrounded; I suggest this is a metonymic activation of a region within a domain (consistent both with the cognitive linguistic position, and with Anderson’s view of metonymy as involving “a shift of denotation ... to a set closely connected with the base set” (Anderson 2014: 972). This is clearer in the case of conversions, and possibly harder to invoke in some cases of overt derivation, but a case may still be made.

Consider for example the kinds of formal and functional changes involved in the shift from the OE noun *dom* to the present day English suffix *-dom* (see also Trips 2009). This suffix is of limited productivity but not entirely unproductive (witness the pejorative word-formations *Blairdom*, *Obamadam* and *Trumpdom*). OE *dom* is attested as both a noun (12) and as part of a morphological word-formation pattern (13) and (14). These examples are taken from the *Dictionary of Old English Corpus*, and are discussed in more detail in Haselow (2011), whence these examples, and Traugott and Trousdale (2013).

- (12) for ðam ðe hit is Godes dom
 for that that it is God.GEN law.NOM
 ‘because it is God’s law’ (Deut (c1000 OE Heptateuch) B 8. 1.4.5
 [DOEC])

- (13) for ðan þe he æfter cristes þrowunge
 for that that he after Christ.GEN suffering

ærest martyrdom geðrowade

first martyrdom suffered

‘because he was the first to suffer martyrdom after Christ’s suffering’

(c1000 ÆCHom I.3 [DOEC])

(14) Ðæt is se freodom ðætte mon mot
that is the freedom.NOM that man.NOM may.3S

don ðæt he wile

do.INF that he want.3S

‘ That is freedom, that a man may do as he will’. (c890 Boethius B.9.3.2
[DOEC])

Haselow (2011: 153) observes that the various meanings of affixal *-dom* in OE are:

- a state characterized by the behaviour of a group of individuals (as in *cristendom* ‘christianity’, also *martyrdom* in (13) above)
- the rank of a group of individuals (e.g. *biscopdom* ‘rank of bishop’)
- the abstract result of an action (e.g. *swicdom* ‘deceit’)
- a state defined by a particular quality (e.g. *freedom* ‘freedom’)

But by Middle English (ME) there has been some relaxing of the constraints; for example, *biscopdom* came to mean the location over which a bishop had authority, rather than the status of being a bishop. And by present-day English, according to Trips (2009) ‘having authority’ is the chief semantic property of the affix. Crucially,

of those compounds of which the second constituent was *-dom*, the only subset which underwent change was that in which the base allowed a general interpretation of *dom* rather than one of the more specific meanings like ‘doom’, ‘dignity’, ‘power’, or ‘choice’. The same holds true for OE *ræden* and *lac*: the derivational shift takes place only when the semantics of the first element allowed interpretation of *ræden* as ‘condition’ rather than its more specific meanings ‘estimation’, ‘rule’, and when the semantics of the first element allowed a general interpretation of *lac* as ‘action or proceeding’ rather than the more specific meanings like ‘game’, or ‘fight’. In all three cases, the semantic constraints on the base were relaxed over time as the word-formation became more productive, and the meaning of the second constituent was the most general one available for the nominal from which it was derived (see further Traugott and Trousdale 2013: §§4.5 and 5.3.1). The key association with metonymy is in the association between a derivational shift (from head of a compound to head of a complex form) and a denotational shift (from ‘state’, ‘rank’ or ‘result’ to ‘authority associated with SEM’ where SEM is the meaning of the base to which the suffix is attached). Anderson (2014: 976) observes that tropes “often express the additional structure of derivational relationships in the lexicon that introduce a denotational shift” (Anderson 2014: 976). These overt derivations may be only covertly metonymic, but the parallels are clear and made even clearer in cases of language change.

§4 Repetition and reduplication

In contrasting the distinction between tropes and schemes, Anderson (2014: 976) suggests that the former involve “complication of lexical structure”, while the latter “involve an increase in the structuring of utterances” (ibid), which may arise through structural modification of the phonology or of the syntax. The focus in this section is on a subtype of figures of repetition, ones that are manifest in the various linguistic phenomena that are grouped together as reduplication. The relation between repetition and reduplication has been addressed by a number of researchers (see e.g. Stolz *et al* 2011). Lensch (forthcoming) argues that “while repetition triggers a change in expressive or interpersonal meaning, reduplication is accompanied by changes in descriptive meaning”. Certain patterns such as total reduplication (see §4.2 below) are found to be common typologically (Stolz 2008). The following deal only with some kinds of reduplication that have been attested in English. However, even restricting the discussion of reduplication just to English, we can observe a number of different types. It should be recognised, however, that reduplication has been an atypical method of deriving new lexical items in the history of English (Curzan and Adams 2012). Minkova (2002: 133) notes that reduplication is rarely attested in OE, with the main types (ablaut, rhyme and copy reduplication according to Jespersen 1965) established by the ME period. To aid exposition, a distinction is made briefly between partial and total reduplications, but the focus is on the latter, and therefore properties of the former are dealt with only briefly.

§4.1 Partial reduplications

Adapting the normal denotation of particular figurative terms, we might say that many partial reduplication patterns are the phonological equivalent of epistrophe (the

repetition of words at the end of successive phrases or clauses) and symploce (the repetition of one word at the beginning, and a different word at the end, of successive phrases or clauses) respectively. In this section, I review some of their salient properties, and record what has been said of their historical development.

In the case of English epistrophic partial reduplications with a monosyllabic base, the rhyme may be reduplicated, while the onset varies, as in the case of *nitwit* and *chit-chat*. For polysyllabic bases in English, the rhyme of the first syllable, plus the whole of the other syllable(s) may be reduplicated. Examples of the latter set include *mumbo-jumbo* and *hocus-pocus*. A subtype of these ‘onset-variable’ partial reduplications is the *shm*-reduplication type, exemplified by expressions such as *football-shmootball*. This pattern has been discussed both in terms of its phonological and particularly prosodic properties (Nevins and Vaux 2003), as well as its syntactic, semantic and discourse functions (Grohmann and Nevins 2004). Just as Anderson (2014) underscores the importance of figurativeness more generally to the understanding of the structure of language, so Grohmann and Nevins (2004) observe some subtle structural properties of this particular figure. For instance, they note that an important property of *shm*-reduplication is that the reduplicated form cannot appear in an argument position (including ‘displaced’ arguments):

- (15) a. *I don’t want to play football-shmootball
 b. *Football-shmootball is all she talks about

Rather, the function of *shm*-reduplication appears to be more related to discourse structuring; it serves to focus the discourse topic, typically in a dismissive way (what

Grohmann and Nevins refer to as ‘pejorative mood’). Examples of this function include:

- (16) a. Trump shmump, nuke deal not going anywhere, Iranian leaders declare (*Times of Israel*, 16 November 2016)
- b. Brexit, Schmexit: Central Banks Increased British Pound Holdings During Q2 (*Wall Street Journal*, 3 October 2016)

Southern (2005) suggests that the pattern may have arisen in Yiddish and been transferred into English, with the *OED* recording the first use of the pattern as an early twentieth-century phenomenon (Nevins and Vaux 2003).

Another complex and variable type of epistrophic partial reduplication concerns the derivation of nouns from prepositional and phrasal verbs such as *wash up*; the non-reduplicated variant involves suffixation of *wash* (i.e. *washer-up*), while the reduplicated version is *washer-upper*. These ‘doubler-upper’ (Cappelle 2010) expressions are heterogeneous: the creation of the agentive noun derived from the phrasal verb *whip in*, i.e. *whipper-in*, is lexicalized and invariable, in contrast to the *washer-up* ~ *washer-upper* doublet. With *whipper-in*, the expression denotes a person who has a particular role associated with the practice of fox-hunting. This heterogeneity affects the lexicalization of the outputs of this word formation process. Chapman (2008) and Cappelle (2010) recognise that the motivation for the reduplication is the product of two competing factors: one to place the suffix on the verb, the other to place the suffix at the right edge. Other complicating factors include the use of *-er* suffixation to derive a noun associated with the typical theme (rather than agent) of the phrasal verb; thus a *fixer-upper* is a noun referring to something

(typically a house) that requires to be fixed up, rather than a noun referring to the person who carries out the repairs; this lexicalized expression is fixed (cf. **fixer-up*, **fix-upper*). Lensch (forthcoming) argues that a central semantic feature of nouns marked by reduplication is that they “appear to be more agentive than their singly-marked counterparts”, contrasting *walker-outer* with *passer-by*. This would be consistent with an association between reduplication as a linguistic construction and the rhetorical potential of repetition to serve as means of auxesis (a figure of increase, often used to build to a rhetorical climax). Lensch (2016) provides evidence to suggest that the ‘doubler-upper’ reduplication pattern is, like *shm*-reduplication, first attested in English in the early twentieth-century, and subject to prescriptivist criticism by the 1930s (Wentworth 1936).

The second subtype of partial reduplication (the symploce type identified above) involve a change in the vocalic peak of the base. Examples include *nick-nack*_N ‘ornament’, *ding-dong*_N ‘argument’, and *flip-flop*_V ‘change position’. These typically have a high front vowel alternating with a vowel that is back, low or both; Minkova (2002) argues that such ablaut reduplication involves identity in vowel quantity in both base and reduplicant, combined with a (maximally) distinct quality, and suggests that there are “no recorded examples of Ablaut reduplication in English before the fifteenth century” (Minkova 2002: 139).

These partial reduplications are, compared to other derivational mechanisms in English, fairly recent in origin and of limited productivity. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that, even in a small way, speakers of English have come to systematise a figurative pattern of repetition in a set of reduplicative processes as a means of deriving new lexical items. As we will see in the following section, similar claims may be made regarding the development of syntactic patterns.

§4.2 Total reduplications

The focus of the rest of this chapter is on patterns involving total reduplication. By total reduplication, I mean a direct repetition of the segmental phonology of the base; however, the reduplicated element may have a different prosodic pattern, and it may not involve apposition to the base from which it was copied. As a result, copy reduplications in English vary considerably in terms of their form and function. In the first part of this section, I look at the range of reduplications in English and associate them with particular traditional figures; in the second part, I look in more detail at the more general implications for these patterns, in light of Anderson's work.

§4.2.1 Epizeuxis reduplications

Epizeuxis in rhetorical terms is a figure in which words or phrases are repeated in immediate succession. Epizeuxis reduplications are heterogeneous. They may be phatic or exclamative (17a) or lexicalizations of phatic or exclamative expressions (17b):

- (17) a. farewells, such as *bye bye*, *pip pip*, and *ta ta*²; greetings such as *knock knock* (on entering a room or home); other exclamatives such as *hubba hubba*
- b. *pooh pooh*_V 'dismiss as ridiculous', *hush hush*_A 'secretive'

² I am grateful to a reviewer of this chapter for pointing out that in other languages, some phatic terms in isolation may mean either 'hello' or 'goodbye', but in reduplication can only mean the latter, e.g. Danish *hej* (*hej*), Italian *ciao* (*ciao*).

These are related to but distinct from other patterns such as the doubling (or tripling, etc.) of intensifying adverbs as premodifiers of adjectives, as in (18):

- (18) a. The play was very, very good
b. I'm quite, quite sure you're wrong

and from the kind of contrastive focus reduplication (to be discussed in more detail below) as in (19):

- (19) I'm going out but I'm not going out-out.

Intensification may involve:

- a. a degree adverb modifier (*a very long story*)
- b. reduplication of the head (*a long, long story*)
- c. reduplication of the modifier (*a very, very long story*)

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 561) note that the repetition patterns here have a number of linguistic constraints (e.g. the adjective must be gradable); they also comment on the discourse function of the expressions. They suggest a frequency effect associated with the construction, and also that it “is used more frequently in children’s stories and other language addressed to children ... and thus may have a patronising or jocular tone if over-used, but it is unquestionably established and quite common in serious prose usage addressed to adults, both spoken and written.”

A well-known example of epizeuxis reduplication is a pattern referred to in the literature under a number of names, such as lexical clones (Horn 1993) and contrastive focus reduplication (Ghameshi *et al* 2004). Examples include those in (20), showing how various word classes may be reduplicated:

- (20) a. Do you want tea or a drink-drink?
 b. The viola isn't mine-mine; it's on loan
 c. I play for friends, but I don't perform-perform

This is a construction in the construction grammar sense of the term: a conventionalised and phonological underspecified entrenched form-meaning pairing (Langacker 1987; Goldberg 1995, 2006; Croft 2001, 2005). It is formally idiosyncratic vis-à-vis other English reduplication patterns since it involves a reduplication that cannot be defined in prosodic terms, i.e. is not a well-defined prosodic constituent. As examples (21a-d) demonstrate, the reduplicant can be longer than a word, as long as what is reduplicated is an object pronoun (but not a full noun phrase) or an idiom.

- (21) a. The newspapers didn't really out him-out him
 b. *The newspapers didn't really out the celebrity-out the
 celebrity
 c. He was only a little bit drunk; he wasn't out of it-out of it
 d. The restaurant isn't close, but it's not really out of the way-out
 of the way

In terms of function, it is typically prototype-delimiting. In examples such as (22)

(22) He's a university lecturer, he's not a teacher-teacher

the speaker invokes a contrast between a marginal and a central member of the set of teachers; prototypicality is invoked by the reduplication. This is the reason (as Ghomeshi *et al* 2004 observe) that grammatical items cannot be reduplicated:

(23) *Did you eat, or did-did you eat? (intended meaning: 'Did you eat recently, or did you eat a long time ago?')

Horn (1993, 2017) suggests various subtypes in terms of function. These are exemplified in (24a-c):

- (24)
- a. If you invite me in for coffee, all I want is coffee-coffee
 - b. Did you know they were living together-living together?
 - c. I'm excited about Christmas, but not excited-excited

Respectively, these have the function of:

- establishing a literal meaning rather than a figurative meaning (since in (24a) *coffee* can be used euphemistically to mean 'sex');
 - establishing a figurative meaning rather than a literal one (since in (24b) *living together* can be used euphemistically to mean 'being in a sexual relationship');
- Horn refers to these as 'value-added';

- intensifying.

Horn's distinctions – and the central, prototypical function of contrastive focus reduplication - appear to be a reflection of a more general property of the construction, which is again based on figurative thinking. It can be argued that each case relies again on metonymy, understood as the pinpointing of a region in a particular domain (Croft 2003, Evans and Green 2006). In each case, the construction has a restricting function; the prototype-subtype restricts to a canonical meaning or central member of set; the intensifying-subtype restricts, conversely to a non-central point on a scale, i.e. at the scalar end-point; the value added-subtype restricts to a euphemistic interpretation; and the literal subtype, conversely, restricts to a non-euphemistic interpretation.

The nature of the difference in figurativeness between these various epizeuxis reduplications is a moot point. In their discussion of intensificatory attribution repetition (as exemplified by (18a) and (18b) above), Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 561) suggest that expressions like *It's a long, long way* involve a kind of repetition that is “distinct from the ironic use of repetition, as in *Is this the final final draft?*, which asks whether this is really the last in a series of drafts each of which is supposed to be the last”. Clearly again figuration is involved in this use of repetition, and indeed involves a combination of scheme and trope: Huddleston and Pullum (2002) suggest irony. And it seems to me that the irony arises as a result of a kind of coercion (Michaelis 2003), since in examples such as *final final draft*, the semantics associated with the intensificatory construction is transferred to what is typically a non-gradable adjective. Clearly coercion is only variably applicable: Huddleston and

Pullum (2002: 561) observe that an expression such as **I hurt my left, left hand* is not possible.

§4.2.2 *Ploce reduplications*

Total reduplications can be further contrasted with other non-epizeuxis repetition, i.e. ploce repetition, where some material intervenes between the base and the replicated form. Examples of this include what Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1304) refer to as “coordinator-marked reduplication”, illustrated in (25)

- (25) a. Despite my diet, I appear to be getting fatter and fatter.
b. I was getting more and more angry by the minute.
c. He tried and tried and tried but still didn’t succeed.

These examples demonstrate the range of forms that can appear in the construction (i.e. analytic and synthetic comparative adjectives in (25a) and (25b) respectively, and sequences of verbs in (25c)), and the meaning is similar but not the same across these different construction subtypes. There is some sort of scalar change in the case of the adjective coordination (the meaning is ‘incrementally more or less x’), while the conjunction of verbs involves either iterativity or continuity beyond an expected duration. Again, we see a combination of scheme (in the structural patterning of repetition with co-ordination) and trope, since the overall function of the construction is to mark some sort of auxesis or climax.

There are some interesting overlaps in form and function between this type of reduplication and the contrastive focus reduplication discussed in the previous section. For example, Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1305) observe that in the case of

coordinator-marked reduplication, the base that is replicated is typically lexical not phrasal, pointing out a contrast between examples such as (26) and (27):

(26) He practised and practised and practised

(27) *He walked to Leith and walked to Leith and walked to Leith

while recognising that examples like (28) are nevertheless acceptable:

(28) He practised it and practised it and practised it

suggesting that *it* is “little more than a clitic here”. As observed in the previous section, sequences of verb and object pronoun are also felicitously reduplicated in contrastive focus reduplication, while sequences consisting of verb and full noun phrase are not. On the functional side, both this type of ploc reduplication and a subtype of contrastive focus reduplication have an intensifying function.

Also relevant to the discussion of figurativeness and ploc reduplication are the exceptions noted in a footnote by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1305, fn. 24). They observe a number of different types.

First are the cases where the reduplicated item is an existential construction, as in (29):

(29) There are problems and there are problems

Again this involves particular figurative reasoning: it is a case where a coordinator-marked reduplication sets up an antithesis of some sort (e.g. that there are serious

problems and trivial problems). A related but distinct pattern is where the coordinator is *or*, rather than *and*, as in (30):

(30) Am I right or am I right?

This appears to be a case of anti-antithesis – what is formally offered as a binary set of alternatives is in fact a pragmatic act which suggests that both alternatives are the same. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1305) point out that in examples such as this “the question is rhetorical”. This suggests another formal property of this subtype. Where the reduplicated base is an interrogative, the coordinator must be *or* and the figure involved is erotema. This is suggested by the ungrammaticality of expressions such as (31):

(31) *Am I right and am I right?

Huddleston and Pullum’s final exception involves examples such as (32):

(32) You can have tomato soup or tomato soup for your dinner

This declarative structure also involves a type of structural paranomasia. Paranomasia is typically associated (as a trope) with variation in lexical meaning, as in the last part of the Groucho Marx line in the 1933 film *Duck Soup*, example (33):

(33) You can leave in a taxi. If you can’t leave in a taxi you can leave in a huff. If that’s too soon, you can leave in a minute and a huff.

As Anderson (2014: 975) has observed, “some puns are figuratively schematic, as well as tropic”. Indeed the first part of (33) involves a schematic pun, where the complement of the first *in* marks the means of departure, and the second, the manner. In the case of this exceptional type of coordinated marked reduplication, the paronomasia relies not simply on “implicatures deriving from the ordinary meaning of ... *or*” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1305), but also the structural copying of the base as a co-ordinate. Similar patterns are found with *and*, as in Huddleston and Pullum’s example (34):

(34) The three most important things in real estate are location, location and location.

Asyndetic examples are also attested, as in Tony Blair’s soundbite, given in (35)

(35) Ask me my three main priorities for government and I tell you:
education, education, education.

This is clearly not intensifying in the sense of the examples in (18), and shows that the paronomasia is not dependent on the presence of the coordinator: it can equally be achieved via asyndetic tricolon (three units of equal length).

Finally with regard to co-ordinator marked place reduplication, a related pattern is also noted by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1312), which they call emphatic reaffirmation, illustrated by (36), part of an advertising campaign for the charitable organisation Age UK:

(36) No-one, but no-one, should have no-one.

Again, this is a particular kind of figurative use, diacope, where the base and the reduplicant are separated by at least one word. In literary analysis, the term is used to describe patterns involving ‘deep feeling’. This is demonstrable in the third line of a soliloquy in Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*, part of which is provided as example (37):

(37) She should have died hereafter;
There would have been a time for such a word.
— To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
(William Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, V.v.17-21)

The final type of ploc reduplication I will mention involves patterns such as those in (38):

(38) day by day, time after time, plate upon plate, hand in hand

In these cases, the noun base and the reduplicant are separated by a preposition. This NPN construction has been discussed in detail by Jackendoff (2008); here I focus on some properties especially related to figurativeness. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 409) treat such constructions as a restricted, non-referential use of noun phrases in what they call “fixed expressions or frames”. They further observe (2002: 632) that

such forms, while they involve the reduplication of a noun, do not always have the distribution of noun phrases; this appears to vary by preposition (see Jackendoff 2008: 9). Consider examples (39) and (40)

(39) *I used spoonful by spoonful (= Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 632, ex. 19.i.a)

(40) We filled crack after/*by crack (= Jackendoff 2008: 9)

The syntactic structure ascribed to the pattern by Huddleston and Pullum (2002) is that it consists of a prepositional head, with a posthead NP (internal) complement, forming a PP constituent that exceptionally takes an NP (external) complement, i.e. which precedes it. This suggests that this is a construction in the Goldberg (1995) sense of the word, i.e. a form-meaning pairing where some aspect of the form is not predictable from other constructions in the language. A further property of the construction is that the NP complements may or may not contain pre-modifiers of the head noun. In cases where there is modification, the modifier may or may not be reduplicated; see examples (41a) and (41b):

- (41) a. The detectives moved from dirty room to dirty room
b. The detectives moved from room to dirty room

To what extent can we find a figurative explanation for these constructions? It seems that, like many other cases of epizeuxis and plocce reduplication, they may involve a degree of auxesis, and that the nature of the auxesis is somewhat specific to each constructional subtype. In other words, what is common to the NPN plocce

reduplication is general auxesis, but that we can be more specific when the individual micro-constructions are specified. Zwarts (2013: 86), for example, makes the following observations regarding the meanings of the various subconstructions:

N *after* N = succession of many Ns, e.g. *attack after attack*

N *upon* N = (vertical) succession of many Ns, e.g. *plate upon plate*

N *by/for* N = one N at a time, e.g. *bit by bit, bottle for bottle*

Some of these expressions may undergo semantic shift once lexicalized (e.g. in an expression such as *He repeated what he'd been told word for word, word for word* means 'without changing a word'. Whatever the precise meaning of the individual subconstructions, however, the clear sense of auxesis through reduplication remains.

§5 Conclusions

The aim of this chapter has been to explore some ways in which claims made by Colman and Anderson (2004) and Anderson (2014) may be extended to other domains of English morphology and syntax, including the historical domain. In particular, I have wanted to highlight the ways in which figurativeness shapes both patterns of use (in terms of rhetoric) and patterns of structure (in terms of grammar). In the case of metonymy, the concept of 'denotational shift' was considered in relation to the development of derivational affixes from compounds, to examine how Colman and Anderson's view of the association between metonymy and conversion could be extended to the domain of overt derivation, and the evolution of new

derivational suffixes. The discussion of reduplication and its relation to schemes of repetition likewise sought to show how a focus on figuration may help to elucidate “the roles of figures in language [...] and particularly their effect on linguistic structure” (Anderson 2014: 988). The diversity of patterns of repetition – and their manifestation as reduplication constructions in the linguistic system of English – is evidence that Anderson (2014) is correct in suggesting that figurative language is deserving of more attention in grammatical descriptions. While reduplication may not be a particularly productive mechanism in the grammar of English, there is evidence that speakers of the language make use of the various schemes of repetition to fulfil particular communicative needs, and that such patterns, even when weakly entrenched, form part of an English speaker’s knowledge of his or her language.

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