Left and right populism compared

Citation for published version:

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1177/1369148117701753

Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer

Document Version:
Peer reviewed version

Published in:
British Journal of Politics and International Relations

General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
‘We are seemingly living in populist times’ (Moffitt, 2016, 1). The influential theory of the populist Zeitgeist long argued not just that populist parties are ascendant, but that the European mainstream is regularly prone to ‘mainstream’ or ‘soft’ populism (Mudde, 2013, 2004). Manifestly successful ‘populists’ of the right (Le Pen, Trump) and left (Sanders, Tsipras) appear to indicate that this Zeitgeist has gone global (Judis, 2016; Moffitt, 2016, 159).

This ubiquity poses problems. Is ‘Everyone a Populist’ now? Or do we need to apply more discerning theoretical and methodological lenses? (Muller, 2016, 7). The emergent ‘measuring populism’ literature has sought to do exactly that, but still argues that the mainstream is ‘rather populist’ (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011, 1277). Such approaches have been criticised for ‘degreeism’, i.e. apparent inability to distinguish between populist and non-populist parties (Pappas, 2016).

This article addresses this conundrum by developing a discriminatory measurement for populism to distinguish between populist and non-populist parties and types of populist parties. In particular, the focus is on the distinctiveness of left-wing populism relative to right-wing populism within the UK. Comparing European right- and left-wing populism, which is much less studied (March, 2011) usefully tests populism’s omnipresence. Some argue that, left and right are essentially similar qua populist parties (e.g. Clark et al., 2008; Judis, 2016). For others, underlying ideological distinctions make them substantively distinct. Most notably, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013, 2011) argue that left populism is more inclusionary, more socio-economically inclined and overall more populist than the right. However, their left-wing cases are all Latin American: no-one has performed similar analysis on European left populism.

This article’s central claim is that populism’s ubiquity is much overstated: left and right populisms are not basically the same, nor are populism’s core attributes equally shared by the mainstream and genuinely populist parties. Populism is an unusual ideology in that its
core principles (people-centrism, anti-elitism and popular sovereignty) are not unique to it (Freeden, 2016). However, in order to class as populism, all three elements need to be present in combination. Many observed instances of populism, such as the aforementioned ‘mainstream’/’soft’ populism and especially ‘thin populism’ (closeness’ to the people’, Jagers and Walgrave, 2007) do not fulfill this full ideological definition.

In focus here are two populist radical left parties (the Scottish Socialist Party [SSP] and Respect), two populist radical right parties (the British National Party [BNP] and UK Independence Party [UKIP]) and two mainstream parties of the left and right (the Labour Party and Conservative Party). There are several good reasons for the British focus. First, although the Zeitgeist theory is contested on a pan-European level (Rooduijn et al., 2014), the UK is arguably archetypal, with a high propensity to ‘mainstream populism’ being noted for Labour (Mair, 2002; Mudde, 2004), as well as Conservative and Liberal Democrat politicians (Bale, 2013; Rooduijn et al., 2014). Second and relatedly, although British populist parties are electorally weak per se, populism is supposedly omnipresent in British political discourse (Bale et al., 2011). Third, British left populism is allegedly resurgent, as exemplified by the former and current Labour Party leaders, Ed Miliband and Jeremy Corbyn (Freedland, 2013; Varoufakis et al., 2016). The ensuing analysis can show whether this alleged Zeitgeist (left-populist or otherwise) finds any corroboration in British party ideologies.

Accordingly, the main questions of this article are the following:

- What are the key similarities and differences between left and right populism?
- Do mainstream left and right parties also exhibit features of populism? Does this confirm a populist Zeitgeist in the UK?
- To what degree do the measurement techniques utilised here adequately explain the principal differences among UK populist parties?
This article makes four main substantive contributions. First, it provides empirical richness to the study of British parties. It demonstrates that a) genuine populism is confined to parties of the radical left and radical right, especially the latter; b) mainstream parties’ ‘populism’ is rarely genuine populism and therefore the much-touted populist Zeitgeist in the UK barely exists. Second, methodologically, it proposes a novel two-stage measurement technique with advantages over existing methods because it can effectively distinguish populist from non-populist parties and analyse degrees of populism in depth. The first stage is a classical content analysis providing a *disaggregated* populism scale that allows the distinct elements of populism to be foregrounded. The second stage is a qualitative analysis of party manifestos, providing a more holistic overview and thereby allowing clearer focus on how respective parties’ populisms differ. Third, it provides theoretical elucidation to the concept of left populism. It shows that underlying (‘host’) ideology is more important than populism *per se* in explaining left and right-wing populisms’ essence. Specifically, it supports all of Mudde and Kaltwasser’s propositions except the third: in the UK case at least, left-wing populists are less populist than the right. Fourth and finally, is a broader theoretical point: what passes for ‘mainstream’ or ‘thin’ populism is not really populism at all but *demoticism* (closeness to ordinary people), which is necessary but by no means sufficient for populism. Therefore analysts should not call parties ‘rather populist’ just because their rhetoric is demotic.

The article proceeds as follows: the first section briefly sets out the definition of populism then reviews literature on left populism; the second introduces the methodology and cases; the third section presents the content analysis of party populism; the fourth section provides the qualitative analysis; the fifth section discusses the findings; the final section concludes.
Left vs. right populism: definition and expectations

This article utilises the ideational definition of populism (populism as a set of ideas), which is the dominant approach among party scholars (e.g. Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). In particular, I adopt Cas Mudde’s influential view of populism as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology ‘that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2004, 543). The main elements of Mudde’s definition will underpin the methodological variables (below).

As a thin-centred ideology, populism cannot advance ‘a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to crucial political questions’ and must be combined with other ‘full’ host ideologies (Stanley, 2008, 95–6). This makes it ‘empty-hearted’ and ‘chameleonic’ (Taggart, 2004), which explains both how it can appear in left or right-wing forms and how it can ‘contaminate’ the political mainstream as claimed by the populist Zeitgeist theory.

Indeed, left populists have been an increasing, albeit still minor, subtype of the European radical left (March, 2011; March and Mudde, 2005). Newer ‘social-populist’ parties retain a democratic socialist ideological core, but alongside decreasing Marxist class Weltanschauung, profess to be the vox populi and not the proletarian ‘vanguard’, and place particularism (national, regional or ethnic concerns) before internationalism.

The 2014-5 success of the Greek Syriza and Spanish Podemos has led to several single-party case studies (Kioupkiolis, 2016; Ramiro and Gomez, 2016; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). Nevertheless, there is need for more systematic comparative analyses (Mudde, 2016; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). In particular, there are emergent
disagreements as to the nature and degree of left populism’s distinctiveness. Whereas most analysts concede some distinctions (e.g. that left populism is more egalitarian), the first general approach is that populism trumps (underlying) ideology, i.e. right and left are essentially similar qua populist parties. For example, Judis (2016, 82–3) (over)-simplifies the right-left distinction to anti-elitism. Left-wing populism is dyadic (attacking ruling elites), right-wing populism is triadic (attacking elites and out-groups). However, left-wing populism is ‘not a politics of class conflict’ and is ‘historically different from socialist or social democratic movements’. Others posit greater similarities still. Although Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015, 4, 8–9) argue that underlying ideologies ‘color in’ the substance of populism, radical left and right ‘do not differ significantly from each other when it comes to their populism’, and ‘the general message is the same: corrupt elites neglect the interests of ordinary people’. For Halikiopoulou et al. (2012, 524, 531), ‘issues of cultural identity and European integration’, including the ‘national-populism of the left’ mean that ‘Radical right- and left-wing parties side together’. In the British context, comparison of the UK’s BNP and Respect parties indicates that common populism makes right and left ‘More Similar Than They’d Like to Admit’, especially in terms of shared authoritarianism, anti-elitism and community-focused politics (Clark et al., 2008, 525–7).

The rise of Syriza, and in particular its post-2015 coalition with the (right-populist) ANEL, has reinforced the so-called ‘theory of two extremes’ whereby left and right populists have essential (proto-extremist) commonalities (Anastasakis, 2013). In Greece, populism has allegedly become the ‘master narrative’ engendering right-left rapprochement (cf. Pappas, 2014, 105; Vasilopoulou et al., 2014, 401). Indeed, the Syriza-ANEL coalition’s durability might presage ‘a disturbing ideological choice … that the “patriotic left” is more patriotic than left’ (Mudde, 2016, 28).
It is questionable whether such rapprochement has developed outside Greece. The second principal position fundamentally rejects this, by arguing that *ideology trumps populism* (i.e. right-left differences remain hegemonic). First, a normative (Laclauian) position contests that that left-wing populism’s arguments for a ‘politically integrated and solidary Europe’ (Kioupkiolis, 2016, 100) make it not merely fundamentally different from ‘reactionary’ right-wing populism but *per se* an emancipatory weapon against such (Mouffe, 2016; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). Second, the implication of ideational approaches is that host ideology should matter more: ‘given that populism is a thin rather than a full ideology, it is important not to exaggerate [populism’s] substantive meaning’ (Pauwels, 2014, 21). Indeed, ‘it is exactly the specific ideology behind targeting an “elite” and calling upon a “people” that defines a [populist’s] essence and orientation’ (Katsambekis, 2016, 4). A recent (Dutch) case-study of populist legislative behaviour indicates that party family better explains differences than populism (Otjes and Louwerse, 2015). Similarly, Mudde and Pauwels have used host ideologies to define populists as ‘national populists’, ‘neoliberal populists’ and ‘social populists’ (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2014). The former study focuses on the right, whereas the latter’s main purpose is explaining electoral success rather than detailing differences between left and right, or between populists and the mainstream. However, such definitions add useful insights that inform the typologisation set out below.

One of the sole attempts at theorising such differences is provided by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2011) comparison of (Latin American) left and (European) right populism. They certainly concede similarities between left and right populisms that justify their categorisation as similar phenomena, particularly anti-elitism, distrust of liberal democracy, and emphasis on plebiscitarianism. Nevertheless, they emphasise the differences, for which they provide three useful theses. Most important is that *right populism is primarily exclusionary* (demarcating key groups as outsiders), whereas *left populism is primarily*
inclusionary (focussed on policies of economic, cultural and political incorporation). Second, *left populism is predominately focussed on socio-economic issues (egalitarianism above all)*, whereas *right populism focuses more on ethnic identity*. Third, the relationship of host ideology to populism varies: *populism is less ideologically important to the right than the left, who are populists first and socialists second*. That said, the common thread distinguishing left and right is underlying ideology: the right’s nativism (protectionist ethnic nationalism) underpins its exclusionism and identitarian approach, whereas the left’s *Americanismo* (anti-colonial regionalism) substantiates its accent on socio-economic inclusivity and populist plebiscitarianism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).

These theses are not unproblematic, especially the last, which conflates ideological and regional explanations (i.e. the left’s greater populism is partly because of populism’s higher salience in Latin America). In contrast, Pauwels argues that populism is theoretically *equally* compatible with core concepts of left (class) and right (nation) (Pauwels, 2014, 25). Nevertheless, there is no *a priori* reason why these theses cannot help illustrate European left populism. For example, evidence of the exclusionary-inclusionary division might be European right-wing populists’ ‘welfare chauvinism’, i.e. welfare for the ‘native’ people (Mudde, 2007); conversely European social populists like Syriza have explicitly appealed to ‘excluded’ constituencies, such as immigrants and LGBT groups (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). Consequently, the ensuing analysis will use the three Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser theses to test the validity of the populism-trumps-ideology and ideology-trumps-populism theses. But first it turns to methodological issues.
Operationalising populism

One of the major emergent directions in populism studies is literature on measuring populism systematically. Such techniques have emerged out of disappointment with previous (Sartorian) comparative approaches, several of which declare certain actors populist ‘by fiat’ without consistent criteria (e.g. Hawkins, 2009).

There are four main methods of measuring populism (Pauwels, 2014, 33–36). First is quantitative computer analysis, which is best suited to large-n studies, but which allows no scope for interpretation. Then there are three variants of classical content analysis. First is the ‘holistic grading’ of chief executive speeches (Hawkins, 2009), i.e. ranking whole speeches on a three-point scale (nonpopulist, mixed, populist). Second is the coding of manifesto paragraphs by two-point scale (people-centrism vs. anti-elitism) (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). Third are approaches that code key-words for populist style or frames (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Reungoat, 2010; Vasilopoulou et al., 2014).

Each approach has strengths and weaknesses. Above all, the first two provide an aggregate scale (overall populism score), which is difficult to interpret qualitatively. Conversely, the last is perhaps too fine-grained and difficult to apply comparatively, especially because it relies on idiosyncratic definitions, in particular ‘thin populism’ (people-centrism) versus ‘thick populism’ (people-centrism, anti-elitism, exclusionism) (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007).

My preferred method is an adaptation of the Rooduijn and Pauwels’ technique (2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014). This approach provides consistent, valid and reliable temporal and spatial comparative measurement of party populism. In particular, it focuses on ideational factors in party manifestos, the most suitable approach for analysing populism in programmatic party systems such as the UK’s. My adaptations (outlined below), improve the
technique’s ‘fit’ with ideational definitions, while finessing its ability to underpin in-depth analyses of populism where the emphasis is not just quantitative (counting instances and proportions of populism) but qualitative (understanding how populism is constructed, what is meant by it and how it differs between parties).

‘Degreeism’ is the main charge levelled against measuring populism (Pappas, 2016). Many measurements assume that populism is a continuous/ordinal (more-or-less) rather than a dichotomous/nominal (either-or) concept (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015, 3). It then becomes potentially difficult to separate populism from non-populism or to interpret the meaning of populism scores. For instance, techniques relying on an aggregated score sometimes find that there is little distinguishing some ‘populist’ and ‘mainstream’ actors, and indeed that the latter are occasionally more populist (Hawkins 2009; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al. 2014). At the extreme, this leads to vague statements, such as ‘allegedly populist parties turn out to be rather populist indeed’ and ‘there are also some mainstream parties that turn out to be rather populist’ (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011, 1277).

In truth, allegations of degreeism are much overstated. Sartori allows for degreeism, provided that concept formation occurs before quantification (Sartori, 1970, 1038). Stijn van Kessel has developed a potentially useful approach to answering such allegations. At a higher level of abstraction, populism is a ‘discourse’; it is a continuous concept used potentially and variably by any political actor. At a lower level of abstraction, populism is an ideology, and is a ‘classifier’ and dichotomous variable. This line is in practice difficult to delineate but primarily involves temporal consistency: populist discourse is fleeting but populist ideology is routinised. Van Kessel’s use of the term ‘discourse’ is problematic, since the term underpins the Laclauian tradition, with very different implications. As outlined below, the terms ‘demotic/demoticism’ often better denote quasi-populist ‘discourse’ falling short of ideological populism.
The redesign of the Rooduijn/Pauwels technique used here aims a) to allow more fine-grained qualitative analysis; b) precisely to distinguish more clearly between populism and non-populism; and c) to disaggregate parties’ specific ideological components. As with their approach, extensively trained coders used a codebook to analyse party manifestos using indices of populism. The three indices were people-centrism, anti-elitism and popular sovereignty. People-centrism was operationalised by asking coders to identify positive references to a homogeneous people. Apart from ‘the/our people’, such references could include notions such as ‘the/our country’, ‘we/us’, ‘everyone’ and partes-pro-toto references (subgroups meaning the whole, e.g. ‘working people’, ‘every family’). Anti-elitism was measured by negative references to homogeneous elites. The critique had to be expressed towards the elite in general rather than sub-categories of that elite (e.g. ‘the Establishment’ rather than ‘the Tories’) although partes-pro-toto categories were again coded (e.g. ‘establishment parties’). Finally, popular sovereignty was operationalised by coding invocations to ‘power to the people’. These could be general (‘popular control’) or specific (e.g. ‘referenda’). To distinguish clearly from people-centrism, sentences were coded only once and as popular sovereignty when they had specific action-oriented or normative emphases (e.g. ‘people need …’). For each index, coders were provided with an exhaustive list of populist and non-populist words and phrases, but also required to interpret the context during coding. Following analysis, I calculated the percentage of quasi-sentences referring to the three indices.

The first major change from the Roouduin/Pauwels design was to match the indices more closely to Mudde’s ideological definition. They used a two-fold populism index (people-centrism vs. anti-elitism), whereas I added the third (popular sovereignty), which satisfies the last clause of Mudde’s definition (politics as expression of the volonté générale). Populism has both descriptive and proscriptive elements, i.e. it, ‘arises from a dissatisfaction
with existing politics but also is an attempt to fix its representational failures’ (Beasley-Murray, 2010, 27). Therefore this last element is essentially about the operationalisation of the first two: the specific mechanisms and policies whereby people can be empowered and the elite dispossessed.

The second difference was to use ‘quasi-sentences’ rather than paragraphs as the main unit of analysis. As in the Comparative Manifestos Project, a quasi-sentence is a sentence or clause that encapsulates a discrete relevant and meaningful statement (Werner et al. 2011). I considered paragraph coding too broad-brush to allow meaningful qualitative analysis, whereas conversely, simply using key-words could miss crucial nuances. The third difference was to have a two-stage analysis, following the content analysis with a more detailed qualitative analysis of the party manifestos (below). The qualitative analysis aimed to provide a more fine-grained comparative approach, and more specifically to typologise the forms of populism, while avoiding over-relying on percentages for questions of interpretation.

The sample is all Westminster and Scottish elections from 1999-2015. The combined UK/Scottish emphasis both maximises the available database and reflects that the SSP has not competed outside Scotland, but has regularly produced lengthy manifestos that have never been examined in detail.²

It might be objected that the populist parties examined are electorally insignificant (see Table 1). However, the focus here is on the parties’ content not context. Besides, in the UK context they are not irrelevant: within the period of analysis both the BNP and UKIP have had MEPs, UKIP and Respect MPs, and the SSP MSPs. Additionally, the latter two’s performance should be judged against the previously negligible UK radical left parliamentary representation. Moreover, the UK shows graphically that the ‘success’ of populism should not be assessed solely by electoral results, rather than the degree to which populist forces affect the political mainstream. Indeed, the structural crisis of the UK party system is intertwined
with the rise of populist Euroscepticism (Gifford, 2006). One of the best examples is the 2016 Brexit referendum, when, absent traditional party-system obstacles, UKIP’s influence vastly exceeded its electoral strength. This reinforces the need to compare populist and mainstream parties in any analysis.

Table 1 here

Content analysis results

Figure 1 presents the results of the disaggregated three-fold index. The utility of separating the components is shown when we consider the aggregated score, which is not very revealing and even misleading. For example, the average for mainstream parties (13.43) is hardly behind the average for all the populists (19.62). Moreover, there are some manifesto scores (e.g. 22.12 for the Conservatives [2010], 19.35 for Labour [2015]), which surpass some populist manifesto scores. Prima facie, this looks like a veritable populist Zeitgeist! However, it says nothing about how such scores are comprised.

Figure 1 here

Focussing on the components of populism in more detail as per Figure 1 highlights immediate differences between mainstream and populist parties. In particular, the mainstream parties have scores that are very heavily loaded on the people-centrism index (average 10.96) with much lower popular sovereignty scores (2.14) and, crucially, very low anti-elitism scores (0.33, with some manifestos scoring 0.0). In contrast, the populist parties score more evenly
across all three indices. The average people-centrism score for all the populist parties is actually lower than the mainstream parties (9.41), but the popular sovereignty score is over twice as high (4.92) and the anti-elitism score is over sixteen times higher (5.29) than the mainstream parties’ score. The figure also highlights immediate differences between left and right-wing populists. Left-wing populists are much less people-centric than right-wing populists (6.14 vs. 12.79), but their anti-elitism (5.49 vs. 5.57) and popular sovereignty (4.92 vs. 5.39) are little different.

Thus my revised indices are sensitive enough to distinguish both between populism and non-populism and types of populism. The populist parties display each of the core elements of populist ideology, even when their overall score is not substantially different from mainstream parties. In contrast, the near-negligible anti-elitism of the mainstream parties means that while they look populist, they do not contain all the necessary constitutive criteria to satisfy a ‘classical’ ideological definition of populism. It is the combination of the core criteria that makes them populist, and classifying them as such without even one such criterion is concept-stretching (van Kessel 2014, 104). Indeed, the Manichean people-elite dichotomy is absolutely fundamental to populism; ‘closeness to the people’ by itself, without any attempt at articulating a popular, antagonistic identity, is not populism (Laclau, 2007).

So what explains the mainstream parties’ high people-centrism? On one hand it might simply be a consequence of catch-all parties maximising their appeals in a majoritarian and adversarial political system (van Kessel, 2015). On the other hand, it is simply demoticism (i.e. closeness to ‘ordinary’ people without this antagonistic identity). Demoticism is a product of increasing societal mediatisation; it may facilitate populism but is not synonymous with it (Turner, 2010). Academic use of terms such as ‘thin populism’ and ‘soft/mainstream’ populism has tended to obscure this. As mentioned, the former simply means ‘closeness to the people,’ whereas the latter terms indicate the use of populist discourse fleetingly, as outlined
by van Kessel. But since there are few parties that don’t sometimes appeal to the people or attack elites (Sikk, 2009), these terms are insufficiently discriminatory. It is possible that they are identifying demoticism, not populism at all, and arguably, much of the populist Zeitgeist is actually a demotic Zeitgeist!

Analysing the results diachronically seems to confirm this. The mainstream parties’ people-centrism is the only element to increase (Figure 2), whereas their anti-elitism and popular sovereignty (Figures 3 and 4) remain static at low levels. The populist parties’ anti-elitism generally increases (particularly the left), and popular sovereignty does partially. Their people-centrism is more ambiguous, with the left increasing and the right decreasing after 2010. It is difficult to extrapolate general patterns, but it seems likely that the 2008-10 economic crisis and Westminster expenses scandal caused a spike in (some) populist elements. The other explanation is partisanship; it is arguably not coincidental that the left populists’ scores increase and the right populists’ decline after 2010 with the instauration of a Conservative government. Similarly, the Conservatives’ overall score peaks in 2010 (22.12) before dropping, while Labour’s peak is 2015 (19.35).

Figures 2-4 here

Overall, such oscillating results endorse the Zeitgeist thesis only as regards high propensity to demoticism; outside the genuinely populist parties, populism appears no core ideological feature, but rather a fleeting and marginal component. Analysis now moves to the second stage (the qualitative analysis), focussing briefly on the people-centrism, anti-elitism and popular sovereignty elements of each party type in turn. This section reinforces the distinction between the demoticism of the mainstream parties and the distinct and varied
The mainstream parties

Substantiating the previous points, the mainstream parties are highly demotic, but have only occasional and ambiguous traces of genuine populism. Certainly, a handful of their statements appear little different to populist invocations of the (pure) people, e.g. ‘we can change direction, begin to return power to people’ (Labour, 2015). However, generally the ‘people’ plays second fiddle to other preferred terms (e.g. ‘citizens’, ‘our country’, ‘our community’, ‘the public’). People-centrism is generally used implicitly, with frequent use of ‘we’ or ‘our’ as mainstream parties highlight their identification with popular aspirations (the Conservatives’ 2010 claim that ‘we are all in this together’ is typical).

In particular, both the Conservatives and Labour are prone to using ‘our’ to denote shared ownership of the country and its resources (‘our borders’, ‘our NHS’, ‘our society’ etc.). This could in principle reflect a populist homogeneous people and its ‘imagined community’, but more likely indicates these parties’ catch-all functions (and by implication, their claim to be governments-in-waiting, responsible enough to protect national attainments).

Reflecting the previous discussion, where anti-elitism exists at all, it is rarely either counterposed to a ‘good people’ or focussed on specific nefarious elites. Rather, it is nebulously expressed (‘remote politicians’ for the Conservatives, ‘the privileged few’ versus the ‘many’ for Labour). Only the Conservatives (in 2001) outlined their critique out more fully: in this manifesto, anti-elitism is largely ‘anti-intermediaries’ populism (de Raadt et al., 2004), i.e. not focussed on specific elites but rather the elitist intermediary mechanisms that limit the accountability of the elite before the people, in this case ‘remote bureaucracy’ and
‘political correctness’. Labour admitted once (2010) that the ‘closed political system had lost touch with people’ but did not convert this into an anti-elite critique.

It is also symptomatic that the mainstream parties’ invocations to popular sovereignty are generally banal (‘the ability to govern ourselves’, ‘opportunity for all’). More specific policies are present, and these are on occasion similar to those of the populist parties, most notably the Conservatives’ 2010 emphasis on referenda on the transfer of powers to Europe and its 2015 promise of an ‘in/out’ referendum on EU membership, presumably adopted to outflank UKIP. Generally though, for the mainstream parties, enhanced popular sovereignty involves greater public access to services and nebulous, non-specific statements about enhancing popular control.

**The right-wing populists**

Only the populist parties actually present a critique sustained enough to be regarded as a populist thin-centred ideology. In each case, the ideology cleaves closely to the ‘host ideology’, which provides most of its content, and explains each party’s divergent policy preferences.

Ideologically, the BNP was once an ‘extreme right’ party notorious for xenophobic authoritarianism. It has gradually moderated, moving from biological to cultural racism and becoming populist, although its substantive commitment to democracy is debatable (Goodwin, 2011). In contrast, UKIP has developed from a single-issue Euro-rejectionist pressure group into a more genuine populist radical right party, while maintaining a neoliberal and anti-EU ideological core (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

Each party’s populism clearly reflects these ideological cores. For the BNP, its people-centrism demonstrates its nativist subtext. It usually qualifies ‘people’ with ethnic nationalist
terms (‘native/indigenous British people’), while speaking in overtly nationalist as often as populist terms (e.g. ‘once proud nation’). In contrast, UKIP deliberately distinguishes itself from the “blood and soil” ethnic nationalism of extremist parties by espousing open, inclusive civic nationalism (UKIP, 2010). However, UKIP’s people is still culturally defined, as it opposes ‘multiculturalism and … promotes uniculturalism - aiming to create a single British culture embracing all races and religions’ (UKIP, 2010).

Alone of the parties here, the BNP fully expounds an archetypal populist ‘heartland’ (Taggart, 2000): a clean, beautiful country, respectful of historical traditions and symbols, such as Christianity, old crafts, the traditional pub and the red telephone box (BNP, 2010, 2003). The ethnic nature of the BNP’s world-view is reinforced by the manifestos’ concern with existential challenges to this idyllic heartland: mass immigration, multiculturalism, the black population’s alleged propensity to crime, and the Islamic ‘threat’. In contrast, UKIP’s ‘heartland’ is only implicit: a ‘free, democratic’ and crime-free Britain run by Westminster not Brussels, respecting family and other British values. In other respects, UKIP’s people are rational market agents, usually ‘taxpayers’, otherwise ‘citizens’, ‘the electorate’ and ‘the public’.

Contrary to Mudde’s definition, even the populist parties’ ‘people’ is not entirely homogeneous: even the right-wing populists refer repeatedly to several sub-groups (e.g. students, farmers, NHS patients). Nevertheless, the BNP comes closest to being ideal-typical. Although UKIP’s people resembles the BNP’s in key respects, e.g. emphasis on law and order and (albeit less draconian) anti-immigrant sentiment, its high people-centrism score (15.75, higher only than the Conservatives) reflects that much of what it espouses is similar to that party. This was particularly evident in 2015, when rising support allowed UKIP to become more office-oriented, arguing for ‘opportunity for real change in our politics’ (UKIP, 2015). The manifesto was replete with invocations to protect ‘our borders, ‘our NHS’ etc., blending
the catch-all demoticism of the mainstream parties and the party’s more authentically populist aims to put ‘power … back into the hands of the people.’

Compared with the mainstream parties, the right-wing populists’ anti-elitism is far more substantive. Both the BNP and UKIP attack three sets of targets: corrupt national politicians and political parties; foreign (principally EU) elites; and intermediaries (such as bureaucratism and political correctness) whereby these elites allegedly control their populations. The BNP’s anti-elitism is far more vehement, sustained and detailed: the ‘regime’ is quasi-totalitarian, employing ‘Orwellian methods of intellectual terrorism’ (BNP, 2010), the EU aims at ‘the eventual liquidation of Britain as a nation and a people’ (BNP, 2005), while among the vexatious intermediaries are left-liberal ideologies like the ‘cult of global warming’ and egalitarianism.

In contrast, UKIP’s anti-elitism score is the lowest of the populists (3.57). This reflects a neoliberal conservatism that, unlike the BNP, essentially accepts UK political institutions (e.g. the monarchy and parliamentary sovereignty). Therefore, UKIP barely concerns itself with national political elites, except when they are the ‘regional agents’ of its main enemy, Brussels. True, UKIP inveighs against the ‘old political parties’ and ‘the LibLabCon-sensus’ and like the BNP, excoriates political correctness and multiculturalism, but its raison d’être remains ending participation in the ‘undemocratic and autocratic European Union’ with ‘its unelected bureaucrats, commissioners, multiple presidents and judges’ (UKIP, 2010).

Each party’s emphasis on popular sovereignty partially replicates the mainstream parties’ vague invocations to popular involvement. But each buttresses this with emphases on national sovereignty, border control and freeing the populace from the EU’s tutelage. Each has relatively developed direct democratic proposals, especially the BNP, with its emphasis on non-bureaucratic government that is ‘closer to the people’, ‘Citizens’ Initiative Referenda’,
recall mechanisms for MPs and local devolution (BNP, 2005, 2003). UKIP is generally vaguer and less anti-establishment, but has a similar policy agenda to ‘give meaningful power back to the British people and not just talk of localism’ (UKIP, 2005). Each shows ‘welfare chauvinism’ (i.e. enhanced welfare rights that exclude foreigners) and demonstrably talks of the National Health Service, not ‘the International Health Service’ (BNP, 2010; UKIP, 2015). Consistent with their relative authoritarianism, UKIP proposes restricting migration via border controls, the BNP via deportation of illegal immigrants and repatriation of legal immigrants and their descendants (BNP, 2010). From 2010, UKIP’s major weapon to control immigration became leaving the EU via national referendum, the precursor to Brexit.

The left-wing populists

Both the SSP and Respect are much more similar to each other than are the BNP and UKIP, reflecting broadly similar radical left ideological cores (democratic socialism), but also have different emphases traceable to their origins. The SSP developed primarily from ex-Trotskyist and left-nationalist groups, and its signature policy has been its militant separatism, evident in aspirations for an ‘Independent Scottish Socialist Republic’ (March, 2011). It is also more nationalistic than Respect, for instance openly defending Scottish culture, and invoking a ‘heartland’ of progressive and iconoclastic traditions (SSP, 2001). However, this is an explicitly civic nationalism, evident in the preference of the term ‘people of Scotland’ to ‘the Scottish people’. Conversely, Respect emerged from the anti-Iraq war movement in 2004. As such it has a strong communalist element, with its best electoral performances in Muslim constituencies (Peace, 2013).

Each party’s people-centrism score is noticeably lower than the right-wing populists (6.71 for the SSP and 5.57 for Respect). The first reason is that ‘people’ has not fully replaced
‘class’ and the concepts exist in uneasy symbiosis. Although the SSP’s aim is to ‘improve the lives of ordinary people’ abandoned by mainstream politicians (SSP, 1999), it often invokes ‘ordinary working people’ (a populist partes-pro-toto term), but also claims to be a ‘working class party’. In 2015 it awkwardly bridged these inconsistencies with reference to Scotland’s alleged ‘working class majority’ (SSP, 2015).

Similarly, although Respect’s core ideology is downplayed (unlike the SSP, it does not mention socialism or anti-capitalism), the party remains still more class-based: a ‘clear, radical, working-class voice’ (Respect, 2005). Nevertheless, Respect does make numerous references to ‘ordinary people’ and ‘working people’, especially ‘the millions who, through the betrayals of New Labour, have lost their political voice’ (Respect 2005). However, its more developed internationalist and anti-conflict emphasis means that it actually spends relatively little time addressing the British people, rather than those of Venezuela, Palestine or Kashmir.

Secondly, although the right-wing populists also refer to sub-groups, the left-wing populists are even more inclined to devote attention to particularist constituencies whose interests diverge from those of the people as a whole, such as the unemployed (both parties); women, the disabled and LGBT groups (especially the SSP); immigrants and religious (especially Muslim) minorities (Respect). Both parties advocate open borders for asylum seekers and immigrants. Whereas Respect’s focus is more particularist (devoting most attention to sub-groups), the SSP is more vocally inclusive, claiming that ‘diversity is a strength’ and espousing ‘a tolerant socialist society in which racism, sectarianism, homophobia, ageism and discrimination against women, disabled people have no place’ (SSP, 2001).

Relative to the right-wing populists, these parties’ anti-elitism is much more focused on economic issues. True, they both attack political elites. For the SSP, there are classically
populist attacks on the ‘grey’ establishment (Westminster and Holyrood) parties for being ‘timid sycophants’, ‘mindless conformists’, ‘out of touch’ or ‘corrupt’. Naturally focusing on Westminster alone, Respect refers to the establishment’s ‘tyranny, prejudice … abuse of power’ and ‘shallowness and cynicism’, particularly towards immigrants (Respect, 2005). But the majority of both parties’ critique is directed against the economic elites and structures underpinning the political elite. Both attack the ‘big business parties’ and mainstream politicians for being controlled by a ‘clique of multi-millionaire bankers’, ‘private fatcats’ (SSP, 2001, 1999), ‘cutthroat privateers’ and the ‘rich elite’ (Respect, 2005). Unlike the right-wing populists, the foreign elites that are lambasted are explicitly economic ones in the multinationals, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Significantly, unlike the BNP and UKIP, neither party is Euro-rejectionist. Each supports Europe while opposing the current EU, which is pro-capitalist and does not serve ‘the ordinary people of Europe’ (SSP, 2001) and which is ‘dominated by big business interests’ (Respect, 2005). Neither, however, proposes leaving. Another stark contrast with the right-wing populists is that, apart from criticising the bureaucratism of the EU and big business interests, neither party says anything about bureaucratic or other intermediaries.

As regards popular sovereignty, the SSP is distinct from Respect in sharing the right-wing populists’ focus on national sovereignty, believing that ‘Scotland is a nation and has the right to control its own economy, its own welfare system and its own defence policy’ (SSP, 2001). Otherwise, the parties’ emphases are near-identical, with a greater focus on economic than political sovereignty. This latter accent is relatively vague, e.g. ‘encouraging the full participation of all communities in the political process’ (Respect, 2010). However, there are commitments to local democratic control, direct democracy via referenda and electoral reform. The overriding aim is economic democracy, the ideal that ‘public services should be
publicly owned and democratically controlled by those who use them and those who work in them’ (Respect, 2005). This means greater public ownership of ‘key sectors of the economy’ including transport, water, gas and electricity services and a commitment to a ‘fully-funded, publicly-owned NHS, delivering care free at the point of use’ (Respect, 2006; cf. SSP, 2001, 1999). These are classical socialist themes, albeit in a more populist idiom.

**Discussion**

These parties can now be typologised on the basis of their populism and host ideologies (Table 2). It is clear that all parties have essential similarities as populist parties, i.e. the core attributes of Mudde’s definition (people-centrism, anti-elitism and popular sovereignty) are sustained throughout in a consistent and detailed way (unlike the mainstream parties). Moreover, both left and right populisms share key specific orientations (e.g. targeting mainstream politicians/parties and advocating popular sovereignty involving increased direct/local democracy). They are thus not polar opposites. On first view, this corroborates the *populism-trumps-ideology* view that the differences are less of kind than degree. However, Table 2 shows the vital ideological subtext to each party’s vision: the BNP’s is ethno-cultural (indigenous people vs. left-liberal elite); UKIP’s is economic and cultural (taxpayers/citizens vs. bureaucrats/cultural elites) and both the SSP and Respect’s are economic (working people vs. capitalists), although there are nuances (the SSP’s national-separatism relative to Respect’s more evident class-based internationalism). Thus each party’s populism has little substantive content without reference to its host ideology/ies.

**Table 2 here**
The veracity of the *ideology-trumps-populism* thesis is further reinforced by returning to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s aforementioned three theses for distinguishing left and right populism.

First, is right populism primarily exclusionary and left populism primarily inclusionary? This division is largely borne out, even though no form of populism should be regarded as completely exclusionary or inclusionary, since populism involves a two-dimensional exclusion: a *horizontal* one between people and ‘dangerous others’ and a *vertical* one between people and the elite (Mény and Surel, 2002). All the populists examined here are obviously exclusionary to the ‘corrupt elite’, but only the right-wing populists have ‘dangerous others’ (immigrants in both cases, the non-indigenous in the case of the BNP). Whereas both the BNP and UKIP call for a radical devolution of power to the people that looks inclusionary, this is in practice heavily restricted, particularly by the former.

In contrast, both the SSP and Respect are demonstrably inclusionary, with repeated invocations to diversity, minority rights and unlimited immigration. Nevertheless, assertions that left-wing populism is *per se* emancipatory and pluralist (e.g. Mouffè, 2016) need to be interrogated, not assumed *a priori*. In particular, Respect demonstrates few specific proposals for improving democratic rights, undermining its left-libertarianism; moreover its proposals for greater economic democracy are poorly defined, largely involving greater ‘public’ economic control that recalls the dirigisme of a planned economy (Clark et al., 2008, 523). In addition, Respect has been criticised for alleged inattention to gender and sexual minority concerns (e.g. Cohen, 2006). The SSP might also be criticised for economic dirigisme, although it is more openly libertarian (e.g. in support for the environment and LGBT rights). Overall, however, relative to the right, the left populists do promote the principle of inclusion of divergent interests and do not advocate restrictive measures towards outgroups.
Second, is left populism more focussed on socio-economic issues, and right populism more focused on ethnic identity? Again, this is broadly true, although variable by party. Both UKIP and the BNP (especially) make far more reference to nation/culture than do Respect or the SSP. However, the latter do not ignore ethnic issues (e.g. the SSP’s reference to Scottish national culture, Respect’s support for multiculturalism) nor do the former (especially the BNP) ignore economic elites and economic sovereignty. Ideology underpins these differences. The BNP’s economic protectionism and anti-globalisation sentiment is allegedly an example of fundamental similarities between left and right populism (Clark et al., 2008, 526). However, this ignores the BNP’s welfare chauvinism as well as its explicit anti-egalitarianism (purportedly a ‘politically-correct’ Marxist dogma). Similarly, UKIP’s economic attitudes reflect its neoliberalism (e.g. with its preference for flat taxes, UKIP is clearly anti-egalitarian). In contrast, both the SSP and Respect have an egalitarian and internationalist vision reflecting their socialist host ideologies. Their vision of popular sovereignty involves overcoming economic deprivation and invigorating public ownership and they see ‘the people’ as part of a global community.

Third, is populism less ideologically important to the right than the left, who are populists first and socialists second? This point is not borne out here. First, the right populists are more populist than the left, not the reverse, above all because of greater people-centrism. Second, even though the right is more populist in this way, one could hardly argue that populism is more important than core ideologies to any of these parties, since the former makes little sense without the latter.

Nevertheless, the greater propensity to people-centrism among the right populists needs explanation. It is possible, despite the aforementioned theoretical possibility that left and right-wing host ideologies are equally compatible with populism, that there is a greater elective affinity between populism and the right, i.e. the right’s core ideological concepts (e.g.
homogeneous nation) accommodate better to the ‘pure people’ than do the left’s (class/diversity). Certainly, these examples show that the left is more ‘ideological’ than the right, more often preferring sectoral over popular constituencies, paying more attention to economic democracy than political sovereignty, and continuing to employ classist arguments (e.g. overcoming the exploitative nature of private ownership). The British populist left are socialists first and populists second.

Obviously, a single-country case study cannot prove how much such observations might travel to different political contexts, nor how region and ideology interact. The greater populism of the Latin American left observed by Mudde and Kaltwasser appears a product of both: first more adversarial and personalist presidential contexts, and second the quasi-populist elements of Americanismo.

In the European context, the ‘newness’ of southern European left populism allegedly rests on its more developed political critique, an emphasis (particularly in Podemos’ case) on creating the ‘popular collective will’ surpassing particularism (Mouffe, 2016), combining opposition to the ‘oligarchy’ and ‘caste’ with a newer popular-patriotic emphasis influenced by Latin American populism. Yet it is less remarked how Syriza’s discourse remains strongly influenced by Marxism (Ovenden, 2015, 38), or how Podemos has increasingly had to define itself as traditionally left-wing. This implies that the ‘new’ left populism is different from the SSP and Respect by degree not kind and that its socialist ideological core and not just its populism should be the focus of attention. This study cannot answer such issues, but its methodological and theoretical approach would prove very useful in examining how precisely populism interacts with host ideology elsewhere.

Conclusion
The main empirical contribution of this article was a holistic comparison between British populist and mainstream parties. It showed that the only genuinely populist parties occupy the radical left and right of the political spectrum. Only the populist parties demonstrated populism as a consistent, core (thin-centred) ideology, not just demonstrating closeness to the people, but creating popular identities in juxtaposition to nefarious elites. However, there is little evidence of populism among the mainstream parties. At the party-political level there is no obvious British populist Zeitgeist, although of course this says little about populism’s probable influence in other realms (e.g. tabloid media).

The second main contribution is this article’s methodology. The two-stage analysis combines quantitative (content) and qualitative approaches to provide a holistic view of party populism. This has advantages over existing methods because it can effectively distinguish populist from non-populist parties and analyse degrees of populism in depth. In particular, its disaggregated scale provides a closer fit to the Mudde definition than most existing methods, and avoids the ‘false positives’ that existing aggregated scales can produce. The qualitative analysis enabled nuanced judgements as to how populism’s elements interrelate. This methodology could usefully be employed to examine other types of populist parties outside the UK, and other types of textual source (e.g. speeches or broadcasts).

Third, this article provides theoretical elucidation of the concept of left populism. It tested Mudde and Kaltwasser’s three theses and broadly confirmed the first two, showing that British left populists are more inclusionary and more socio-economically focussed than right populists, and that these differences are explained by underlying ideology. It failed to confirm the last thesis; in the UK case at least, left populists are less populist than the right. It suggested that this was because of more ‘elective affinity’ between populism and the right’s core ideological concepts. Overall, the study provided strong support for the ideology-trumps-populism thesis: host ideology is more important than populism per se in explaining the
essence of left and right-wing populisms. The implication of this is that, although it is clearly meaningful to examine populisms comparatively at a higher level of abstraction, underlying ideological differences should never be forgotten nor populism reified – after all it makes little sense to categorise parties by what is a secondary characteristic (cf. Pauwels, 2014, 185).

The fourth and final contribution is a more general theoretical one; the methodology helped distinguish clearly between genuine populism and demoticism. This latter is ubiquitous in the UK, as demonstrated by parties’ high people-centrism and popular sovereignty scores, even when their anti-elitism is virtually absent. Therefore analysts should not call parties ‘rather populist’ just because their rhetoric is demotic. Often-utilised terms such as ‘thin’, ‘mainstream’ or ‘soft’ populism, which imply a populist Zeitgeist, appear far closer to this demoticism than genuine populism.

There are two main areas for future research. The first is the further comparative study of left-wing populism. Most specifically, this article’s methodology could help examine whether Jeremy Corbyn has furthered Labour’s populist transformation, which this study suggests was hitherto absent. There are reasons to be sceptical: despite his ‘outsider’ status and borrowings from parties like Podemos (e.g. ‘People Powered Politics’), his ideology appears too rooted in Bennite traditionalism to be genuinely populist. More generally, the methodology would help compare left populisms elsewhere. Additionally, the core thesis of critical distinctions between populist party types could be substantiated by examining the extent to which there are important sociological similarities between left and right populist party supporters (cf. Ramiro, 2016).

The second main area for future research is further exploring the relationship between demoticism and populism. Demoticism appears a necessary but not sufficient component of populism, but how and why the former can become the latter is less clear. At the very least, the ubiquity of demoticism indicates that populism potentially has a fertile ‘breeding ground’.
Given that the central slogan of the successful Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum ('Take Back Control') is strongly demotic, this demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, demoticism becomes the most visible, and perhaps potent, accompaniment to populism.

---

1 Training and reliability checks were based on Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011, 1279). The author originally coded all manifests. Two additional coders (Carl Truedsson and Sofia Widen, to whom many thanks) undertook several training sessions when the codebook was explained and queries addressed. Each coder then performed a take-home sample coding and, following author feedback, coded additional sample manifests. Inter-coder reliability was assessed using Krippendorff’s alpha (Krippendorff, 2004). Initially, reliability was low (α=0.345), highlighting ambiguities in the codebook and indices. Both were redesigned with extra guidance, and the team coded additional samples from each party, resulting in reliability (α=0.70) satisfactory by usual standards (Krippendorff 2004, 241). All manifests were then recoded by the author using the revised codebook. The codebook is available from the author.

2 Manifestos were sourced from party and other public websites. 37 manifests were examined in total, 8 Conservative, 6 Labour, 6 BNP, 6 UKIP, 7 SSP and 4 Respect. I included the 2006 Respect regional manifesto because of Respect’s relatively few available manifests. Coded manifests are available from the author.
Bibliography


Cohen, B. (2006) “‘What was the right answer for the question?’ George Galloway and gay rights’, PinkNews. Available at: http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2006/02/21/what-was-the-right-answer-for-the-question-george-galloway-and-gay-rights/.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/](http://www.bbc.co.uk/)
Figure 1. Party populism 1999-2015 (% of populist sentences per manifesto)

Source: author’s calculations
Figure 2. People-centrism over time (% of people-centric statements)

Figure 3. Anti-elitism over time (% of anti-elite statements)
Figure 4. Popular sovereignty over time (% of popular sovereignty statements)
Table 2. Populist party typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BNP</th>
<th>UKIP</th>
<th>SSP</th>
<th>Respect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National populism</td>
<td>Euro-rejectionist neoliberal populism</td>
<td>Separatist social populism</td>
<td>Internationalist social populism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of host ideology</td>
<td>Ethnic nationalism</td>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Socialism/Anti-capitalism</td>
<td>Socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
<td>Euro-rejectionism</td>
<td>Separatism</td>
<td>Internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Civic/cultural nationalism</td>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare chauvinism</td>
<td>Welfare chauvinism</td>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euro-rejectionism</td>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>Civic nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People-centrism</td>
<td>Pure people</td>
<td>People as taxpayers</td>
<td>People as working people</td>
<td>People as working class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People as ethnic nation</td>
<td>People as civic/cultural nation (Scottish/British nation)</td>
<td>People as everyone (ordinary people, people of Scotland, society)</td>
<td>People as everyone (working people, ordinary people, the ‘Millions’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People as everyone (citizens; ordinary people; workers)</td>
<td>People as everyone (voters, workers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elitism</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>The establishment (‘old ruling class’)</td>
<td>The Scottish/British establishment (‘ruling class’)</td>
<td>The establishment (‘privileged few’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The surveillance State (‘Big Brother’)</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politics (‘corrupt political life’)</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parties (‘old gang parties’)</td>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Cultural elite (‘chattering classes’)</td>
<td>Cultural elite (‘chattering classes’)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Corporations</td>
<td>Wealthy landowners &amp; investors</td>
<td>Corporations/big business</td>
<td>Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rich capitalists (‘private fatcats’)</td>
<td>Rich capitalists (‘privateers’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private companies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40
| Foreign | The international community  
The EU (‘Orwellian EU super-state’)  
EU commissioners  
Multinational (media) corporations  
The EU (tyrannical, corrupt ‘European project’)  
Multinationals  
The EU (promoter of big business)  
Multinationals  
Global capitalists  
International ‘quangos’ (e.g. WTO) | Bankers  
Rich party funders  
Absentee landlords | The EU (‘unelected bureaucracy’)  
Multinationals  
International ‘quangos’ |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Intermediaries | Ideologies (e.g. political correctness, egalitarianism, multiculturalism) | Political correctness  
Bureaucracy |  |
| Popular sovereignty |  |  |  |
| Political | National self-government  
Control over borders  
Stopping multiculturalism  
Direct democracy (referenda; recall of MPs)  
Political reform (English parliament)  
Local democracy | Brexit referendum  
National self-government  
Control over borders  
Direct democracy (referenda; recall of MPs)  
Political reform (PR voting system)  
Local democracy | Independence referendum  
Increase parliamentary powers  
Direct democracy (referenda)  
Political reform (electoral reform; abolishing Monarchy)  
Local democracy | Political reform (elected House of Lords, PR)  
Anti-corruption drive |  |
| Economic | Repatriation of economic control from EU  
Funding subsidiarity  
Local democratic control of state sector  
Foreigners denied access to welfare | Repatriation of economic control from EU  
NHS democratically accountable | Repatriation of economic control from UK/EU  
Local democratic control of public sector (e.g. NHS)  
Democratic public ownership of key economic sectors  
Workplace democracy ‘People’s budget’ | Local democratic control of public sector  
Democratic public ownership of key economic sectors  ‘People’s bank’ |  |