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Round-Optimal and Communication-Efficient Multiparty Computation

Michele Ciampi¹ , Rafail Ostrovsky² ,
Hendrik Waldner¹ , and Vassilis Zikas³ 

¹ The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
 {michele.ciampi,hendrik.waldner}@ed.ac.uk

² University of California, Los Angeles, CA, US
 rafail@cs.ucla.edu

³ Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, US
 vzikas@cs.purdue.edu

Abstract. Typical approaches for minimizing the round complexity of multiparty computation (MPC) come at the cost of increased communication complexity (CC) or the reliance on setup assumptions. A notable exception is the recent work of Ananth *et al.* [TCC 2019], which used Functional Encryption (FE) combiners to obtain a round optimal (two-round) semi-honest MPC in the plain model with a CC proportional to the depth and input-output length of the circuit being computed—we refer to such protocols as *circuit-scalable*. This leaves open the question of obtaining communication efficient protocols that are secure against *malicious* adversaries in the plain model, which we present in this work. Concretely, our two main contributions are:

1) We provide a round-preserving black-box compiler that compiles a wide class of MPC protocols into *circuit-scalable* maliciously secure MPC protocols in the plain model, assuming (succinct) FE combiners.

2) We provide a round-preserving black-box compiler that compiles a wide class of MPC protocols into *circuit-independent*—i.e., with a CC that depends only on the input-output length of the circuit—maliciously secure MPC protocols in the plain model, assuming Multi-Key Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (MFHE). Our constructions are based on a new compiler that turns a wide class of MPC protocols into *k-delayed-input function* MPC protocols (a notion we introduce), where the function that is being computed is specified only in the *k*-th round of the protocol.

As immediate corollaries of our two compilers, we derive (1) the first round-optimal and circuit-scalable maliciously secure MPC protocol, and (2) the first round-optimal and circuit-independent maliciously secure MPC protocol in the plain model. The latter achieves the best to-date CC for a round-optimal maliciously secure MPC protocol. In fact, it is even communication-optimal when the output size of the function being evaluated is smaller than its input size (e.g., for boolean functions). All of our results are based on standard polynomial time assumptions.

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1 Introduction

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) [Yao86,GMW87] allows different parties to jointly evaluate any circuit over private inputs in such a way that each party learns the output of the computation and nothing else. Many improvements in this area have led to better protocols in terms of complexity assumptions and round complexity in the case of malicious adversaries⁴ [GMW87, Kil88, IPS08, BMR90, KOS03, KO04, Pas04, PW10, Wee10, Goy11, COSV17, CCG⁺21].

Recently, the design of round-optimal MPC has attracted a lot of attention. Concretely, for semi-honest adversaries, two rounds are necessary for secure MPC in the plain model (as any one-round protocol is trivially broken). A lower bound was matched by [BL18, GS18], where the authors present a two-round MPC protocol in the semi-honest model from standard assumptions. Note that the above lower bound holds even when a correlated-randomness setup is assumed. The works [BGI17, DHRW16, MW16, BL18, GS18] show that the same bound also holds for maliciously secure MPC, assuming a trusted correlated-randomness setup. However, Garg et al. [GMPP16] proved that in the plain model four rounds are necessary for maliciously secure MPC with a black-box simulator. This four-round lower-bound was then matched by several constructions for a range of common (polynomial) complexity assumptions [CCG⁺20, BGJ⁺18, HHPV18]. Notwithstanding, a common drawback in all the above constructions is that their communication complexity is proportional to the size (of the description) of the circuit being evaluated. For malicious adversaries, under the assumption that parties have access to correlated randomness, Quach et al. [QWW18] proved that it is possible to design a two-round circuit-scalable MPC protocol that is secure against malicious adversaries under the learning with errors assumption (LWE). Also in the correlated randomness model, Morgan et al. [MPP20] showed that it is possible to construct a two-round circuit-independent⁵ two-party computation protocol in which only one party gets the output, by relying only on LWE.⁶

In the case of semi-honest adversaries (without a setup) the works of Ananth et al. [ABJ⁺19] and Quach et al. [QWW18] proposed a round-optimal (two-round) circuit-scalable MPC protocol under standard assumptions. Interesting, and most related to our results, Ananth et al. [ABJ⁺19] obtained their result by leveraging a connection between round-optimal semi-honest MPC and *functional encryption combiners*. However, their construction does not achieve security against malicious adversaries. The mentioned results raise the following important open question:

Is there a round-optimal maliciously MPC protocol secure against dishonest majority⁷ in the plain model based on standard complexity assumptions that achieves circuit-scalability, i.e. has a communication complexity that depends only on the depth of the circuit being evaluated and its input and output length?

As the first of our two main contributions, we answer the above question in the affirmative by extending the investigation of the relation between FE combiners and MPC to the malicious setting. This completes the landscape of circuit-scalable and round-optimal maliciously secure MPC in the plain model. More concretely, we provide a round-preserving black-box compiler

⁴ A malicious adversary attacks the protocol following an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time strategy. Unless stated differently, when we talk about the security of an MPC protocol against semi-honest or malicious adversaries we assume that up to $n - 1$ parties can be corrupted, where n is the number of parties.

⁵ We stress that in our work the size of the circuit is always related to the security parameter via a polynomial p . We use the term circuit-independent for MPC protocols whose communication complexity depend on the security parameter, the size of the input and output, and does not depend on p . The same argument holds for circuit-scalable MPC protocols.

⁶ In the communication model used in [MPP20] in each round only one party can speak. Hence they obtain the best possible security guarantees in such a communication model.

⁷ Unless otherwise specified, all our results are proved secure in the dishonest majority setting.

that compiles a wide class of MPC protocols into circuit-scalable protocols assuming any *succinct* FE combiner (see below). Such FE combiners are known to exist based on the learning with errors assumption. We next investigate whether our result can be strengthened to achieve *circuit-independent* MPC:

Is there a round-optimal and circuit-independent maliciously secure MPC protocol in the plain model from standard (polynomial) complexity assumptions?

Although the connection between MPC and FE does not seem to help here, we still answer the above question in the affirmative. Concretely, we propose a round-preserving *black-box compiler* that compiles a wide class of MPC protocols⁸ into circuit-independent protocols assuming the existence of any *compact* Multi-Key Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (MFHE) scheme that enjoys perfect correctness. Informally, the compactness property, here, requires that the size of the ciphertexts and the size of the description of the encryption and decryption algorithms depend only on the input-output size of the function being computed.

For the special case of constant parties, the MFHE scheme required for our compiler exists based on perfectly correct FHE [LTV12], which, in turn, can be instantiated from the LWE assumption [BGV12]. Hence our result yields the first circuit-independent round-optimal maliciously secure MPC protocol in the plain model for a constant number of parties—and therefore specifically to the first two-party-computation protocol—based on standard polynomial-time assumptions. For the case of arbitrary many parties, to our knowledge, compact MFHE is only known to exist based on the Ring-LWE and the Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) assumption [LTV12]. Hence, under these assumptions, we obtain a circuit-independent round-optimal MPC protocol for arbitrary many parties. Deriving compact MFHE for arbitrary many parties—and hence also a circuit-independent round-optimal MPC—from standard polynomial-time assumptions (e.g., LWE) is an interesting open problem.

We highlight that all our constructions require the input protocol to achieve a special notion called *k*-delayed-input function, which we introduce in this work. Informally, in a *k*-delayed-input function protocol each party has two inputs: 1) a private input (known at the beginning of the protocol) and 2) the function to be computed whose description is needed only to compute the rounds $k, k + 1, \dots$. A *k*-delayed-input function protocol guarantees that the adversary does not learn more than what it can infer from the evaluation of the function f on the honest parties' input, where f can be adversarially (and adaptively) chosen.

We further show how to turn any MPC protocol that does not require the input to compute the first $k - 1$ rounds into a *k*-delayed-input function protocol.

1.1 Related Work

Functional encryption (FE) [SW05,BSW11,O'N10] is a primitive that enables fine-grained access control over encrypted data. In more detail, a FE scheme is equipped with a key generation algorithm that allows the owner of a master secret key to generate a *secret key* sk_f associated with a circuit f . Using such a secret key sk_f for the decryption of a ciphertext $ct \leftarrow \text{Enc}(msk, x)$ yields *only* $f(x)$. In other terms, the security of a functional encryption scheme guarantees that no other information except for $f(x)$ is leaked.

A functional encryption combiner allows for the combination of many FE candidates in such a way that the resulting FE protocol is secure as long as any of the initial FE candidates is secure. Ananth et al. [ABJ⁺19] show how to construct an FE combiner, based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, that enjoys the property of *succinctness* and *decomposability*

⁸ We require the first 2 rounds of the MPC protocol to be independent of the inputs.

(we elaborate more on the latter property in the next section). The property of succinctness states that 1) the length of each secret key is related to the depth and the length of the output of the circuit being evaluated and 2) the encryption complexity is proportional to the depth of the circuit being evaluated and to the length of the message being encrypted.

Given such a succinct FE combiner and an ℓ -round semi-honest MPC (not necessarily communication efficient), Ananth et al. showed how to obtain an ℓ -round *circuit-scalable* MPC protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries. Given that such a combiner—as well as a round optimal semi-honest MPC—can be constructed from LWE, this result can be instantiated from the LWE assumption. In [AJJM20] the authors also explore the relation between MFHE and MPC and, among other results, the authors also show how to obtain a circuit-independent MPC protocol that is secure against semi-malicious adversary assuming Ring LWE, DSPR and 2-round OT.⁹ Cohen et al. [CsW19] proposed a round-optimal *circuit-scalable* MPC protocol which tolerates adaptive corruption (i.e., the identities of the corrupted parties can be decided during the protocol execution). The security of this protocol is proven in the correlated-randomness model under the adaptive LWE assumption and secure erasures (alternatively, sub-exponential indistinguishability obfuscation).

We recall that it is not possible to achieve security with adaptive corruption (with black-box simulation) in the plain model within a constant number of rounds [GS12]. For this reason, our work focuses on static corruption only.

1.2 Overview of our Results

In this work, we provide two main results which close the gap between communication-efficient and round-optimal maliciously secure MPC. We present two compilers that amplify existing protocols in terms of their communication complexity while preserving their round complexity, which results in the first class of maliciously secure MPC protocols that are communication-efficient and round-optimal.

From FE combiners to circuit-scalable MPC. The first contribution is a round optimal MPC protocol that 1) is secure against malicious adversaries, 2) tolerates arbitrary many parties, 3) is secure under standard polynomial time assumptions and 4) is circuit-scalable, i.e., has a communication complexity proportional to the depth of the circuit and the length of the input and output of the circuit being evaluated.¹⁰ In summary, we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 1 (informal). *If there exists a 3-delayed-input function ℓ -round MPC protocol Π that is secure against malicious adversaries and a succinct FE combiner, then there exists an ℓ -round MPC protocol Π' that is secure against malicious adversaries whose communication complexity depends only on the security parameter, the depth, the input length and the output length of the circuit being evaluated, and that makes black-box use of Π .*

We argue that the four-round protocols proposed in [BGJ⁺18, CCG⁺20] can be turned into 3-delayed-input function protocols, which in turn implies that we can obtain a circuit-scalable round optimal MPC protocol from the LWE assumption, since the maliciously-secure four-round OT that the protocol of [CCG⁺20] relies on can also be instantiated using LWE [FMV19]. This allows us to prove the following corollary.

Corollary 1 (informal). *If the LWE assumption holds, then there exists a round optimal MPC protocol that is secure against malicious adversaries which communication complexity*

⁹ We recall that a semi-malicious adversary behaves like a semi-honest adversary with the exception that it decides the randomness and the input used to run the protocol.

¹⁰ All our result are with respect to black-box simulation.

depends only on the security parameter, the depth, the input length and the output length of the circuit being evaluated.

From MFHE to circuit-independent MPC. For the second contribution we show how to combine an MPC protocol with a perfectly correct, compact MFHE scheme to obtain a *circuit-independent* MPC protocol. The notion of MFHE extends the notion of Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) to the multi-party setting by allowing each party to generate a public-secret key pair. All the ciphertexts generated using the public keys of the MFHE scheme can be homomorphically combined to obtain a single ciphertext, which can be decrypted only using all the secret keys. The output of our compiler is a circuit-independent round-optimal MPC protocol that supports $\min\{n_0, n_1\}$ parties where n_0 and n_1 is the number of parties supported by the input MPC protocol and the MFHE scheme respectively. Our second contribution can be summarized as follows.

Theorem 2 (informal). *If there exists a 2-delayed-input function ℓ -round MPC protocol Π that is secure against malicious adversaries which supports n_0 number of parties and a perfectly correct, compact MFHE scheme that supports n_1 number of parties, then there exists an ℓ -round MPC protocol Π' that is secure against malicious adversaries whose communication complexity depends (polynomially) only on the security parameter, the input length and the output length of the circuit being evaluated, and that makes black-box use of Π and supports $\min\{n_0, n_1\}$ number of parties.*

Additionally, it is possible to improve the above result and to obtain a protocol whose communication complexity is only linear in the length of the inputs (and polynomially in the length of the output and the security parameter), by relying on pseudorandom generators (PRGs). Hence, we obtain an MPC protocol that is optimal in terms of round and communication complexity for all the functions whose input-size is bigger than the output-size (e.g, boolean functions).

Given that a MFHE scheme for a constant number of parties can be instantiated from LWE and that a scheme for arbitrary many parties can be instantiated from Ring-LWE and DSPR [LTV12] we obtain the following additional corollary.

Corollary 2 (informal). *If the LWE assumption holds (resp. Ring LWE and DSPR hold and any of the assumptions DDH, QR, N^{th} Residuosity, LWE hold, or malicious-secure OT exists), then there exists a round optimal circuit-independent MPC protocol for a constant (resp. arbitrarily) number of parties that is secure against malicious adversaries.*

For completeness we have included a comprehensive comparison of our results with existing round-optimal MPC protocols proven secure in the plain model, under standard polynomial-time complexity assumptions in Table 1.

2 Technical overview

Our treatment advances the state of the art in communication-efficient and round-optimal MPC. Toward this goal, we combine and substantially extend several recent techniques in the literature of FE and MFHE as well as delayed-input MPC. In this section, to assist the reader better navigate through the many technical challenges and details of our result and evaluate its novelty, we review the main technical challenges and our approach in tackling them.

From FE combiners to circuit-scalable MPC. Towards our construction of circuit-scalable MPC, we rely on the recent work of Ananth et al. [ABJ⁺19]. In order to build a better intuition for our final solution, we briefly recap their compiler here.

	Communication Complexity	Assumptions	Adversarial Model	Rounds
[ABJ ⁺ 19, QWW18]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$	LWE	Semi-honest	2
[BL18, GS18]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, f)$	Semi-honest OT	Semi-honest	2
[DHRW16]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$	piO and lossy encryption	Semi-honest	2
[GS17]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, f)$	Bilinear Maps	Semi-honest	2
[HHPV18]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, f)$	QR	Malicious	4
[BGJ ⁺ 18]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, f)$	DDH/QR/ N th Residuosity	Malicious	4
[CCG ⁺ 20]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, f)$	Malicious 4-round OT	Malicious	4
[AJJM20]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$	Ring LWE and DSPR and 2-round OT	Semi-malicious	2
This work	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$	LWE	Malicious	4
This work [*]	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$	LWE	Malicious	4
This work	$\text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$	Ring LWE and DSPR and malicious 4-round OT	Malicious	4

Table 1: Communication complexity of two-round semi-honest secure and four-round maliciously secure n -party protocols in the plain- and all-but-one corruption model, with black-box simulation, based on polynomial-time assumptions. We denote by $|f|$ and d the size and depth of the circuit representing the MPC functionality f . L_{in} and L_{out} denote the input and output lengths of the circuit and piO stands for probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation. We recall that we can replace 4-round maliciously secure OT with either DDH, QR, Nth Residuosity, or LWE.

*Constant number of parties only.

The main building blocks of that compiler are an ℓ -round semi-honest secure MPC protocol and a succinct decomposable FE combiner. The property of decomposability requires the functional key for f to be of the form $(\text{sk}_1^f, \dots, \text{sk}_n^f)$, and the master secret key needs to be $(\text{msk}_1, \dots, \text{msk}_n)$, where sk_i and msk_i are the secret key and master secret key produced by the i -th FE candidate.

Compiler of Ananth et al. [ABJ⁺19]. The construction of Ananth et al. [ABJ⁺19] is very intuitive, and roughly works as follows. The MPC protocol computes the function g which takes n inputs, one for each party P_i with $i \in [n]$. The input of each party consists of a master secret key msk_i , a value x_i and a randomness r_i . The function g uses the n master secret keys to compute an encryption of x_1, \dots, x_n using the randomness r_1, \dots, r_n .

Let x_i be the input of the party P_i with $i \in [n]$. Each party P_i samples a master secret key msk_i for the FE combiner, a random string r_i and runs the MPC protocol Π using (msk_i, x_i, r_i) as an input. In parallel, P_i computes the secret key sk_i^f and sends it to all the parties (we recall that sk_i^f can be computed by party P_i due to the decomposability property of the FE combiner). Let ct be the output of Π received by P_i , and let $(\text{sk}_1^f, \dots, \text{sk}_{i-1}^f, \text{sk}_{i+1}^f, \dots, \text{sk}_n^f)$ be the keys received from all the other parties, then P_i runs the decryption algorithm of the FE combiner on input $(\text{sk}_1^f, \dots, \text{sk}_n^f)$ and ct thus obtaining $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$.

Given that the MPC protocol computes a function g whose complexity is $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, L_{\text{in}})$ and the size of each one of the secret keys sent on the channel is $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, L_{\text{out}})$ the final protocol

has a communication complexity of $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$, where λ is the security parameter, d is the depth of f , L_{in} is the length of the input of f and L_{out} is the output length of f (we recall that this is due to the succinctness of the FE combiner).

Achieving malicious Security. Starting from the above approach, we now show how to obtain a circuit-scalable MPC protocol in the case of malicious (instead of semi-honest) adversaries in the plain model.

As a first approach, one can try to simply replace the semi-honest MPC protocol with a maliciously secure one. Unfortunately, this does not work as a corrupted party P_j^* might create an ill formed master secret key msk_j (i.e., msk_j is not generated accordingly to the setup procedure of the j -th FE candidate) and sample r_j according to an arbitrary strategy. However, we note that the second problem is straightforward to solve as we can modify the function g , evaluated by the MPC protocol Π , in such a way that it uses the randomness $r_1 \oplus \dots \oplus r_n$ to compute the encryption ct (we note that in this case each party needs to sample a longer r_i compared to the semi-honest protocol described earlier).

To solve the first problem, we follow a similar approach. Each party P_i inputs an additional random value r_i^{Setup} to the MPC protocol and the function g is modified such that it generates the master secret keys using the randomness $R = r_1^{\text{Setup}} \oplus \dots \oplus r_n^{\text{Setup}}$ and outputs to the party P_i the ciphertext ct .¹¹ Unfortunately, this approach is not round preserving, as the knowledge of the master secret key msk_i , which becomes available only in the end of the execution of Π , is required to generate the secret key sk_i^f . Hence, if Π requires ℓ -rounds, our final protocol would consist of $\ell + 1$ rounds as each party P_i needs to send its secret key sk_i^f in the $(\ell + 1)$ -th round.

Besides this, the described protocol is still not secure, since a corrupted party P_j^* might generate an ill formed secret key sk_j^f , that could decrypt ct incorrectly, yielding an incorrect output for the honest parties. However, we can prove that this protocol protects the inputs of the honest parties. That is, it achieves *privacy with knowledge of outputs (PKO)* [IKP10, PC12]. This notion guarantees that the input of the honest parties are protected as in the standard definition of secure MPC, but the output of the honest parties might not be the correct one (e.g., the adversary can force the honest party to output a string of its choice).

Round preserving construction: privacy with knowledge of outputs. The first step towards our final construction is to adapt the above idea in such a way that the round complexity of the resulting protocol is kept down to ℓ , while achieving a somewhat reduced security, namely *privacy with knowledge of outputs* [IKP10]. Looking ahead, in the following paragraph, we discuss how to elevate this to full security. For simplicity, we describe our protocol considering only two parties P_0 and P_1 and consider as a building block an MPC protocol Π that consists of $(\ell = 4)$ -rounds (which is optimal). The protocol then can be trivially extended to the case of n -parties and an arbitrary $\ell \geq 4$ as we show in the technical part of the paper.

For our construction we need the first two rounds of Π to be independent of the inputs (i.e., the input is required only to compute the last two rounds in our simplified example). Assuming that the parties have access to a simultaneous broadcast channel where every party can simultaneously broadcast a message to all other parties, our compiler works, at a high level, as follows (we refer to Fig. 1 for a pictorial representation).

In the first step, the parties run two instances of Blum’s coin tossing protocol [Blu81]. In the first instance the party P_0 acts as the sender and in the other instance the party P_1 acts as the sender. In more detail, each party P_i commits to two random strings in the first round $c_i^0 := \text{com}(r_i^0; \rho_i^0)$ and $c_i^1 := \text{com}(r_i^1; \rho_i^1)$ and sends, in the second round, r_{1-i}^i to P_{1-i} .¹² Then P_i

¹¹ R is parsed as n strings and each of the strings is used to generate a different master secret key.

¹² Note that only the committed message is sent, not the randomness ρ_i^{1-i} .




Fig. 1: FE_i , with $i \in \{0, 1\}$, denotes a functional encryption candidate. The master secret key for the combiner corresponds to the master secret keys of FE_0 and FE_1 . A secret key for the combiner required to evaluate the function f is generated by combining a secret key for FE_0 (sk_0^f) and a secret key for FE_1 (sk_1^f). Dec denotes the decryption algorithm of the combiner which takes as input a combined secret key for the function f and a ciphertext ct generated accordingly to a combined master secret key represented by $(\text{msk}_0, \text{msk}_1)$. mpc_i^k , with $i \in \{0, 1\}$ and $k \in [4]$, represents the k -th message of the MPC protocol Π computed by P_i . The protocol Π evaluates a function $g'(x'_0, x'_1)$ where $x'_i = \{x_i, (r_i^0, \rho_i^0, r_i^1, \rho_i^1, r_{1-i}^i, r_i), (c_0^0, c_0^1, c_1^0, c_1^1)\}$ with $i \in \{0, 1\}$. The function g checks if the commitments that are part of the two inputs x'_0, x'_1 are the same and if c_i^b has been computed accordingly to the message r_i^b and the randomness ρ_i^b for each $i, b \in \{0, 1\}$. If the check is successful, then g computes two master secret keys msk_0 and msk_1 using respectively the randomnesses $r_0^1 \oplus r_1^1$ and $r_0^0 \oplus r_1^0$, and computes an encryption ct of $x_0 || x_1$ for the FE combiner using those master secret keys and the randomness $r_0 \oplus r_1$. The output of Π for P_i consists of $\text{mpc}_{\text{out}_i} = \text{ct}$.

uses the randomness $R_i := r_0^i \oplus r_1^i$ to generate a master secret key msk_i , and uses it to compute the secret key sk_i^f which it sends in the fourth round.

In parallel, P_0 and P_1 execute the MPC protocol Π that evaluates the function g' . The function g' takes the inputs of each party, where the input corresponding to party P_i (for each $i \in \{0, 1\}$) is of the form $(x_i, (r_i^0; \rho_i^0, r_i^1; \rho_i^1, r_{1-i}^i, r_i), (c_1^0, c_1^1, c_2^0, c_2^1))$. In more detail, the input of each party P_i corresponds to its actual input x_i , all the commitments generated (by P_0 and P_1) in the first round, the message r_{1-i}^i received in the second round from P_{1-i} and the randomness used to generate the commitments c_i^0, c_i^1 . The function g' checks that 1) the commitments $(c_1^0, c_1^1, c_2^0, c_2^1)$ (that are part of the inputs of the two parties) are the same, 2) the value r_i^{1-i} sent in the second round by the party P_i is committed in c_i^{1-i} for each $i \in \{0, 1\}$ and 3) the randomness used to generate the commitments is correct. If all these checks are successful then g' outputs a ciphertext $\text{ct} = \text{Enc}((\text{msk}_i)_{i \in \{0, 1\}}, (x_0, x_1); r_0 \oplus r_1)$ for the FE combiner computed using the randomness $r_0 \oplus r_1$. We highlight that the check that the commitments generated outside of the MPC protocol are generated correctly is not possible in the standard security definition of MPC. To perform these checks we require the underlying MPC to achieve our new notion of k -delayed-input function, which we explain in the end of this section.

Upon receiving the output of g' (evaluated by Π), P_i computes the output running the decryption algorithm of the FE combiner. Using this approach we guarantee that: 1) the ciphertext ct is honestly computed using honestly generated master secret keys and randomnesses, 2) each party can compute its own master secret key already in the third round so that a functional key can be generated and output in the last round and 3) the value r_{1-i}^i that P_i receives in the second round corresponds to the value used in the commitment c_{1-i}^i (hence, the master secret

key that P_i obtains as part of the output of Π is consistent with the master secret key it has created *outside* of Π).

Unfortunately, we can only prove that the above protocol preserves the privacy of the inputs of the honest parties, but the output computed by the honest parties might still be incorrect. This is due to the fact that a corrupted party can generate an ill formed secret key sk_i^f and send it to the honest parties. We finally note that it might look like our approach allows for malleability attacks (i.e., the adversary might bias its commitments using honest-parties commitments). Intuitively, such attacks are prevented since we require the adversary to provide the correct opening as part of the input to the MPC protocol. Hence, we delegate the prevention of such malleability attacks to the MPC protocol.

From PKO to Full security. The next step is to elevate PKO security to full security. To achieve this, we utilize the PKO-secure to fully-secure compiler of Ishai et al. [IKP10] to turn the above described protocol into a protocol that achieves standard security in a black-box way.

Besides achieving privacy with knowledge of outputs, our protocol also only realizes single-output functionalities instead of multi-output functionalities. In this case, we can also rely on existing compilers to make our protocol supporting multi-output functionalities [LP09, AJW11].

We note that we can apply those compilers only if they are 1) round-preserving and 2) do not increase the communication complexity by more than a factor of $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. For the sake of completeness we formally argue that this is indeed the case and refer the interested reader to Sections 7 and 8.

From MFHE to circuit-independent MPC. To obtain a circuit-independent MPC protocol, we combine a multi-key fully-homomorphic encryption scheme (MFHE) with a (non-necessarily communication-efficient) MPC protocol Π .

Let us first briefly recall MFHE: A MFHE scheme consists of four algorithms: (1) a setup algorithm `Setup` that allows for the generation of public-secret key pairs; (2) an encryption algorithm `Enc` that takes as input a public key and a message and outputs a ciphertext; (3) an evaluation algorithm `Eval` that takes as input a list of public keys PK , a set of ciphertexts CT (generated using the list of public keys PK) and a function f , and outputs a ciphertexts ct that contains the evaluation of f on input the messages encrypted in the list CT ; (4) a decryption algorithm `Dec` that on input all the secret keys, associated with the public keys of PK , and the ciphertext ct outputs the decryption of ct . Additionally, we require the MFHE scheme to be *compact*, i.e. we require the size of the keys, the ciphertexts and the description of the algorithms `Enc` and `Dec` to depend only on the input-output size of f .

Once again, to keep the description simple and to focus on the core ideas, we stick to the two-party case and refer to Section 6 for the description of the protocol that supports arbitrary many parties. We provide a pictorial description of our protocol in Fig. 2.

At a high level, our compiler works as follows. Let x_i be the secret input of the party P_i with $i \in \{0, 1\}$. Each party P_i runs the setup algorithm using the randomness r_i thus obtaining a private-secret key pair $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ and encrypts its input using `Enc` with some randomness r'_i , obtaining ct_i . Then P_i sends the public key together with its encrypted input and the first message of the MPC protocol Π to party P_{1-i} . Upon receiving pk_{1-i} and ct_{1-i} from P_{i-1} , P_i runs the evaluation algorithm on input $\text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, f, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1$, obtaining ct'_i . At this point, P_i keeps executing the protocol Π on input x_i which consists of the randomness used to generate the MFHE keys, the randomness used to generate ct_i , the list of all the ciphertexts (received and generated) $\text{CT} = (\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1)$ and the evaluated ciphertext ct'_i . The function g computed by the MPC protocol Π does the following: 1) checks that both P_0 and P_1 have input the same list of ciphertexts CT , 2) for each $i \in \{0, 1\}$ it uses the randomness r_i and r'_i to check that pk_i and ct_i




Fig. 2: (Setup, Enc, Dec, Eval) represents a MFHE scheme. The MPC protocol checks that the ciphertexts ct_0 and ct_1 are in the domain of Enc and that both parties have input the same list of ciphertexts ct_0, ct_1 . Then the MPC protocol decrypts ct'_0 and ct'_1 and if the decrypted values corresponds to the same value y then the protocol outputs y .

are in the domain of the setup and of the encryption algorithm. If these checks are successful, then the function g decrypts ct'_0 and ct'_1 using the secret keys $(\mathbf{sk}_0, \mathbf{sk}_1)$ (which can be generated using the randomnesses r_0, r_1) thus obtaining y_0 and y_1 . If $y_0 = y_1$ then g outputs y , otherwise it outputs \perp .

In a nutshell, we use Π to check that all ciphertexts and public keys have been generated correctly and that all the parties have obtained an encryption of the same value when running the MFHE evaluation algorithm. As in the circuit-scalable compiler described before, the check that the public keys and ciphertexts outside of the MPC protocol are generated correctly is not possible in the standard security definition of MPC. To perform these checks we require the underlying MPC protocol to achieve our new notion of k -delayed-input function. The protocol that we have just described is circuit-independent since the size of the public keys and the ciphertexts depends only on the input-output size of f and the protocol Π evaluates a function g whose description size depends only on the input-output size of f and the description of the circuits for Enc and Dec.

The communication complexity of this protocol is $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$, where L_{in} is the input-size and L_{out} is the output size of the function being evaluated.

We can slightly modify the protocol above to achieve a communication complexity of $O(L_{\text{in}}) + \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{out}})$. To do that, we rely on a folklore technique to reduce the size of the ciphertexts of the MFHE scheme using pseudorandom generators (PRGs). In more detail, instead of providing an encryption of the input x_i under the MFHE scheme, each party P_i encrypts a short seed s_i of a PRG using the FHE scheme, i.e. $\text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_i, s_i; r_i^s)$, and sends this encryption along with the value $w_i = \text{PRG}(s_i) \oplus x_i$ to the other party. The size of the resulting message is then $O(L_{\text{in}}) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$. The party P_i , upon receiving $(\text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_{1-i}, s_{1-i}; r_{1-i}^s), w_{1-i})$ computes $\text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_{1-i}, \text{PRG}(s_{1-i}))$, using homomorphic operations, $\text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_{1-i}, w_{1-i})$ by encrypting w_{1-i} using \mathbf{pk}_{1-i} , and then homomorphically XORs the resulting ciphertexts to receive $\text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_{1-i}, x_{1-i})$. This ciphertext can now be used to run the evaluation algorithm and compute $\text{Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, f(x_0, x_1))$. The parties now check that the ciphertexts (w_0, w_1) are well formed by running the MPC protocol, exactly as in the previous protocol.

k -Delayed-Input Function MPC. As already mentioned in the description of the compilers, we need to rely on an MPC protocol Π that needs the input of the parties only to compute the last two rounds (three in the case of the construction of Fig. 2). Indeed, for the protocol of Fig. 1 for example, the input of each party consists of its actual input, the randomness used to

generate its commitments, and *all* the commitments that it has seen (even those generated by the adversary). We note that many existing MPC protocols (e.g., [BGJ⁺18, BL18, CCG⁺20]) indeed do not require the input to compute the first two rounds. However, the fact that the input of the honest parties might be adversarially influenced (e.g., in our protocol some commitments are generated from the adversary) makes it impossible to rely on the standard security notion achieved by such MPC protocols. This is because the standard security notion of MPC requires the inputs of the honest parties to be specified before the real (ideal) world experiment starts. Therefore, the honest parties cannot choose an input that depends on (for example) the first two messages of the protocol, and is, therefore, adversarially influenced.

However, we observe that even if P_i needs to provide all the commitments it has received as part of its input to Π , we do not care about protecting the privacy of this part of P_i 's input, we just want to achieve a correct evaluation of Π . That is, these commitments could be thought of as being hardwired in the function evaluated by the MPC protocol Π .

To capture this aspect, we consider a more general notion called k -delayed-input function, where the input of each party consists of two parts, a private input x and a function f . The private part x is known at the beginning of the protocol, whereas the function f does not need to be known before the protocol starts and it is needed only to compute the rounds $k, k + 1, \dots$ of the protocol. We want to guarantee that in the real-world experiment the adversary does not learn more than what it could infer from the output of f , even in the case where it chooses the function f . Equipped with an MPC protocol that satisfies such a definition, we can modify our constructions by letting the parties specify the function that needs to be computed. For example, in the case of the protocol of Fig. 1, the function will contain, in its description, the set of commitments sent in the first round and the messages r_0^1, r_1^2 and uses these values to check that the opening of the commitments are valid with respect to (r_0^1, r_1^2) and only in this case returns a ciphertext for the FE protocol.

To construct a k -delayed-input function protocol, we use a standard $2n$ -party ℓ -round MPC protocol Π , where the first $k - 1$ rounds can be computed without requiring any input, and a one-time MAC. We refer to the technical part of the paper for more details on how this construction works.

3 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter with $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. A randomized algorithm \mathcal{A} is running in *probabilistic polynomial time* (PPT) if there exists a polynomial $p(\cdot)$ such that for every input x the running time of $\mathcal{A}(x)$ is bounded by $p(|x|)$. We use “=” to check equality of two different elements (i.e. $a = b$ then...) and “:=” as the assigning operator (e.g. to assign to a the value of b we write $a := b$). A randomized assignment is denoted with $a \leftarrow A$, where A is a randomized algorithm and the randomness used by A is not explicit. If the randomness is explicit we write $a := A(x; r)$ where x is the input and r is the randomness. When it is clear from the context, to not overburden the notation, we do not specify the randomness used in the algorithms unless needed for other purposes.

3.1 Functional Encryption

Definition 3.1 (Functional Encryption [SW05, BSW11, O’N10]). *Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a collection of circuit families (indexed by λ), where every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ is a polynomial time circuit $C: \mathcal{X}_\lambda \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$. A (secret-key) functional encryption scheme (FE) for the circuit family \mathcal{C}_λ is a tuple of four algorithms $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:*

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter λ and generates a master secret key msk . It also outputs the randomness r that has been used to generate the master secret key.

$\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$: Takes as input the master secret key msk and a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, and outputs a functional key sk_C .

$\text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$: Takes as input the master secret key msk , a message $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ to encrypt, and outputs a ciphertext ct .

$\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct})$: Is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a functional key sk_C and a ciphertext ct and outputs a value $y \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$.

A scheme FE is (approximate) correct, if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, when $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$, we have $\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)) = C(x)] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

In this work, we define the setup algorithm in such a way that it also outputs the randomness r that has been used to generate the master secret key. This has no effects on the security definition of the scheme since the master secret key msk and the randomness r both remain in the control of the challenger.

Definition 3.2 (Single Key Simulation Security of FE [ABJ⁺19]). Let FE be a functional encryption scheme, $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ a collection of circuit families indexed by λ . We define the experiments $\text{Real}^{\text{DFEC}}$ and $\text{Ideal}^{\text{DFEC}}$ in Fig. 3. A functional encryption scheme FE is single key simulation secure, if for any polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2, \mathcal{A}_3)$, there exists a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} and a negligible function negl such that: $|\Pr[\text{Real}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

$\text{Real}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$	$\text{Ideal}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S})$
$\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$	$\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
$(C, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda)$	$(C, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda)$
$\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$	$\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$
$(x, \text{st}_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(\text{sk}_C, \text{st}_1)$	$(x, \text{st}_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(\text{sk}_C, \text{st}_1)$
$\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)$	$\text{ct} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(\text{msk}, C, C(x))$
$\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_3(\text{ct}, \text{sk}_C, \text{st}_2)$	$\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_3(\text{ct}, \text{sk}_C, \text{st}_2)$
Output: α	Output: α

Fig. 3: Single Key Simulation Security of FE

The succinctness definition provided in [ABJ⁺19] requires some restrictions on the circuit size of the encryption algorithm, as well as on the size of the functional key. In our work, we also require a bounded circuit size for the setup algorithm and we refer to this notion as strong succinctness.

Definition 3.3 (Strong Succinctness). A functional encryption scheme $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ for a circuit class \mathcal{C} containing circuits C that take inputs of length ℓ_{in} bits, outputs strings of length ℓ_{out} bits and are of depth at most d is succinct if the following holds:

- The size of the circuit for $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ is upper bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}})$ for some polynomial poly.
- Let $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, then the size of the circuit for $\text{Enc}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$ is upper bounded by $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}})$ for some polynomial poly.

- The functional key $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$ is of the form (C, aux) where $|\text{aux}| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{out}}, n)$ for some polynomial poly .

3.2 Decomposable Functional Encryption Combiner

After recapping the notion of functional encryption, we are ready to define a decomposable functional encryption combiner (DFEC) as introduced by Ananth et al. [ABJ⁺19].

Definition 3.4 (Decomposable Functional Encryption Combiner). Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a collection of circuit families (indexed by λ), where every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ is a polynomial time circuit $C: \mathcal{X}_\lambda \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ and let $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ be the description of n FE candidates. A decomposable functional encryption combiner (DFEC) for the circuit family \mathcal{C}_λ is a tuple of five algorithms $\text{DFEC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Partition}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

Setup $(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$: Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter λ and the description of n FE candidates $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ and generates a master key msk_i for each FE candidate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}_i(1^\lambda)$ and outputs $\text{msk} := \{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$.

Partition (n, C) : Takes as input the number of parties n and a circuit C and outputs (C_1, \dots, C_n) , where each C_i is a circuit of depth polynomial in the depth of C .

KeyGen $(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, (C_1, \dots, C_n))$: Takes as input the master secret key msk , the description of n FE candidates $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ and a partitioned circuit (C_1, \dots, C_n) , and generates a functional key sk_{C_i} for each FE candidate $\text{sk}_{C_i} \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}_i(\text{msk}_i, C_i)$ and outputs $\text{sk}_C := \{\text{sk}_{C_i}\}_{i \in [n]}$.

Enc $(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, x)$: Takes as input the master secret key msk , the description of n FE candidates $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$, a message $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ to encrypt, and outputs a ciphertext ct .

Dec $(\text{sk}_C, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{ct})$: Is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a functional key sk_C , the description of n FE candidates $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ and a ciphertext ct and outputs a value $y \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$.

A scheme DFEC is (approximate) correct, if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$, $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, when $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, x)) = C(x)] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

To ensure that all the algorithms of the functional encryption combiner are still polynomial in the security parameter λ and the number of parties n , we introduce the notion of polynomial slowdown.

Definition 3.5 (Polynomial Slowdown [ABJ⁺19]). A decomposable functional encryption combiner $\text{DFEC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Partition}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ satisfies polynomial slowdown, if the running time of all its algorithms are at most $\text{poly}(\lambda, n)$, where n is the number of FE candidates that are being combined.

The definition of single key simulation security of a functional encryption combiner should capture the case that if at least one of the FE candidates is secure, then the combiner is also secure. In the case of decomposability we give the adversary even more power by letting it choose a set I of all the corrupted candidates, which contains all but one party.

Definition 3.6 (Single Key Simulation Security of DFEC [ABJ⁺19]). Let DFEC be a decomposable functional encryption combiner, $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ a collection of circuit families indexed by λ and $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ n FE candidates of which at least one is guaranteed to be secure. We define the experiments $\text{Real}^{\text{DFEC}}$ and $\text{Ideal}^{\text{DFEC}}$ in Fig. 4. A decomposable functional encryption combiner DFEC is single key simulation secure, if for any polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2, \mathcal{A}_3)$ there exists a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} and a negligible function negl such that:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}^{\text{DFEC}}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}^{\text{DFEC}}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

Real ^{DFEC} ($1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C, \mathcal{A}$)	Ideal ^{DFEC} ($1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}$)
$\text{msk} := \{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$	$\text{msk} := \{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$
$(C_1, \dots, C_n) = \text{Partition}(n, C)$	$(C_1, \dots, C_n) = \text{Partition}(n, C)$
$\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, (C_1, \dots, C_n))$	$\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, (C_1, \dots, C_n))$
$(I, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C)$, where $I \subset [n]$ with $ I = n - 1$.	$(I, \text{st}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C)$, where $I \subset [n]$ with $ I = n - 1$.
$(x, \text{st}_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(\{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{sk}_C, \text{st}_1)$	$(x, \text{st}_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(\{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in I}, \text{sk}_C, \text{st}_1)$
$\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, x)$	$\text{ct} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(\text{msk}, C, C(x))$
$\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_3(\text{ct}, \text{sk}_C, \text{st}_2)$	$\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_3(\text{ct}, \text{sk}_C, \text{st}_2)$
Output: α	Output: α

Fig. 4: Single Key Simulation Security of DFEC

Definition 3.7 (Strong Succinctness). A decomposable FE combiner $\text{DFEC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Partition}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ for a circuit class \mathcal{C} containing circuits C that take inputs of length ℓ_{in} bits, outputs strings of length ℓ_{out} bits and are of depth at most d is succinct if for every set of succinct FE candidates $\{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$, the following holds:

- For the circuit of $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ it holds that $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}) \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, \ell_{\text{in}})$.
- Let $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$. For the circuit of $\text{Enc}(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \cdot)$ it holds that $\text{Enc}(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \cdot) \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{in}}, \ell_{\text{out}}, n)$ for some polynomial poly .
- The functional key $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \{\text{FE}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, (C_1, \dots, C_n))$, with $(C_1, \dots, C_n) = \text{Partition}(n, C)$, is of the form (C, aux) where $|\text{aux}| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d, \ell_{\text{out}}, n)$ for some polynomial poly .

3.3 Multi Key Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Definition 3.8 (Multi-Key Fully Homomorphic Encryption [LTV12]). Let $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a collection of circuit families (indexed by λ), where every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ is a polynomial time circuit $C: \mathcal{X}_\lambda \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$ and n the number of participating parties. A multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) for the circuit family \mathcal{C}_λ is a tuple of four algorithms $\text{MFHE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$:

Setup(1^λ): Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter λ and generates a public key pk and a secret key sk .

Enc(pk, x): Takes as input a public key pk and a message $x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$ to encrypt, and outputs a ciphertext ct .

Eval($C, (\text{pk}_i, \text{ct}_i)_{i \in [\ell]}$): Takes as input a circuit C , ℓ different public keys pk_i and ciphertexts ct_i and outputs a ciphertext ct .

Dec($\{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{ct}$): Is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input n secret keys $\{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ and a ciphertext ct and outputs a value y .

A scheme MFHE is perfectly correct, if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $i \in [n]$, $\ell \leq n$, $r_i^{\text{Setup}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $r_i^{\text{Enc}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$, $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, $x_i \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, we have

$$\Pr \left[\text{Dec}(\{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{Eval}(C, (\text{pk}_i, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, x_i; r_i^{\text{Enc}}))_{i \in [\ell]})) = C(x_1, \dots, x_\ell) \right] = 1.$$

For $n = 1$ multi-key FHE is equivalent to FHE. In the introductory paper of López-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan [LTV12], the setup algorithm also outputs an evaluation key together with the public and secret key. In our work we assume that the information of the evaluation key is contained in the public key.




Fig. 5: The IND-CPA Game.

Definition 3.9 (IND-CPA security of MFHE). Let $\text{MFHE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ be a MFHE scheme. For $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, we define the experiment $\text{IND-CPA}_\beta^{\text{MFHE}}$ in Fig. 5, where the advantage of an adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ is defined by

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{MFHE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{IND-CPA}_0^{\text{MFHE}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{IND-CPA}_1^{\text{MFHE}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1]|.$$

A multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme MFHE is called secure, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, there exists a negligible function negl such that: $\text{Adv}_{\text{MFHE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Besides the security of a multi-key FHE scheme, we also need to define what it means for a multi-key FHE scheme to be compact.

Definition 3.10 (Compactness). A multi-key FHE scheme $\text{MFHE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ for a circuit class \mathcal{C} and n participating parties is called compact, if $|\text{ct}| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, n)$, where $\text{ct} := \text{Eval}(C, (pk_i, ct_i)_{i \in [n]})$ with $\ell \leq n$ and with the description of the circuits Setup, Enc and Dec being polynomial in the security parameter λ .

We note that this definition implies that public- and secret-key pairs are also independent from the size of the circuit.

3.4 Symmetric Encryption, Authentication and Commitments

In this section, we recall the definitions of symmetric encryption, message authentication codes, digital signatures, and commitments.

Definition 3.11 (Symmetric Encryption [GB96]). A symmetric encryption scheme (SE) for the message space \mathcal{M} is a tuple of three algorithms $\text{SE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

Setup(1^λ): Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter λ , and outputs a key k .

Enc(k, m): Takes as input the symmetric key k , a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ to encrypt, and outputs a ciphertext ct .

Dec(k, ct): Takes as input the symmetric key k and a ciphertext ct and outputs a message or \perp if decryption fails.

A scheme SE is correct, if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $k \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}(k, \text{Enc}(k, m)) = m] = 1 .$$

Security for a symmetric encryption scheme is defined in an indistinguishable manner.

Definition 3.12 (IND-CPA Security of SE). Let $SE = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an SE scheme, for the message space \mathcal{M} . For $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, we define the experiment $\text{IND-CPA}_\beta^{\text{SE}}$ in Fig. 6, where the encryption oracle QEnc outputs $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k, x_\beta)$ on a query (x_0, x_1) . We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in the following way

$$\text{Adv}_{SE, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{IND-CPA}_0^{\text{SE}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{IND-CPA}_1^{\text{SE}}(\lambda) = 1]| .$$

A symmetric encryption scheme SE is called IND-CPA secure, if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} it holds that $\text{Adv}_{SE, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.




Fig. 6: IND-CPA Security Game for a symmetric encryption scheme SE.

In our protocol, it is sufficient to use a symmetric encryption scheme that fulfills *one-time security*. In this special case of IND-CPA security the encryption oracle can only be queried once. The one-time pad is a candidate scheme that fulfills this notion.

Definition 3.13 (Message Authentication Code [Gol04]). A message authentication code (MAC) for the message space \mathcal{M} is a tuple of three algorithms (Setup, Auth, Verify):

Setup(1^λ): Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter 1^λ , and outputs a key k .

Auth(k, m): Takes as input the key k , a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs a tag τ .

Verify(k, m): takes as input a key k , a message m and a tag τ and outputs either 0 or 1.

A scheme MAC is correct, if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $k \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Verify}(k, m, \text{Auth}(k, m)) = 1] = 1 .$$

Definition 3.14 (Unforgeability of MAC). Let $\text{MAC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Auth}, \text{Verify})$ be a MAC, for the message space \mathcal{M} . We define the experiment $\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{MAC}}$ in Fig. 7 with Q being the set containing the queries of \mathcal{A} to the authentication oracle $\text{Auth}(k, \cdot)$.

A message authentication code MAC is called existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA secure), if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} it holds that $\Pr[\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{MAC}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Furthermore, we call a message authentication code MAC one-time secure if for any adversary \mathcal{A} it holds that $\Pr[\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{MAC}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] = 0$, where the adversary can query the authentication oracle only once.

A one-time secure MAC is for example the MAC presented in [Riv97].

Definition 3.15 (Digital Signature Scheme [Can03]). A digital signature scheme (DS) for the message space \mathcal{M} is a tuple of three algorithms $\text{DS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$:

Setup(1^λ): Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter λ , and outputs a verification key vk and a signing key sk .

EUFCMA^{MAC}(1^λ, \mathcal{A})
$k \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
$(m^*, \tau^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Auth}(k, \cdot)}(1^\lambda)$
Output: $\text{Verify}(k, m^*, \tau^*) = 1 \wedge m \notin Q$

Fig. 7: The Existentially Unforgeability Game for a message authentication code MAC.

$\text{Sign}(sk, m)$: Takes as input the signing key sk , a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs a signature σ .

$\text{Verify}(vk, m, \sigma)$: Takes as input the verification key vk , a message $m \in \mathcal{X}$ and a signature σ and outputs either 0 or 1.

A scheme DS is correct, if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $(vk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Verify}(vk, m, \text{Sign}(sk, m)) = 1] = 1 .$$

A scheme DS is consistent, if for any $m \in \mathcal{X}$, the probability that $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ generates (vk, sk) and $\text{Verify}(vk, m, \sigma)$ generates two different outputs in two independent invocations is 0.

Definition 3.16 (Unforgeability of DS). Let $\text{DS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$ be a DS scheme, for the message space \mathcal{M} . We define the experiment $\text{EUFCMA}^{\text{DS}}$ in Fig. 8 with Q being the set containing the queries of \mathcal{A} to the signing oracle $\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)$.

A digital signature scheme DS is called existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUFCMA secure), if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} it holds that $\Pr[\text{EUFCMA}^{\text{DS}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

EUFCMA^{DS}(1^λ, \mathcal{A})
$(vk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
$(m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Sign}(sk, \cdot)}(vk)$
Output: $\text{Verify}(vk, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1 \wedge m \notin Q$

Fig. 8: The Existentially Unforgeability Game for a signature scheme DS.

We recap the definition of a commitment scheme as stated in [Lin10] as well as the definition of (computational) hiding and binding.

Definition 3.17 (Commitment Scheme). A commitment scheme (CS) is a PPT algorithm Com that takes as an input a unary representation of the security parameter 1^λ , a message m a random value r and outputs a commitment.

The pair (m, r) is called the decommitment of c .

We recall that commitments are secure under parallel composition. We will use this fact in the security proof of our compiler using the functional encryption combiner.

Definition 3.18 (Hiding of CS). Let Com be a CS scheme, then we define the experiment $\text{HIDE}_\beta^{\text{Com}}$ in Fig. 9 The advantage of an adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ is defined in the following way:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Com}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{HIDE}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{HIDE}_0^{\text{Com}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{HIDE}_1^{\text{Com}}(\lambda) = 1]| .$$

A commitment scheme Com is called computational hiding, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ it holds that $\text{Adv}_{\text{Com}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{HIDE}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ and perfectly hiding if $\text{Adv}_{\text{Com}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{HIDE}}(\lambda) = 0$.

$\text{HIDE}_{\beta}^{\text{Com}}(1^{\lambda}, \mathcal{A})$ $(m_0, m_1, \text{st}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^{\lambda})$ $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$ $c = \text{Com}(m_{\beta}; r)$ $\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(\text{st}, c)$ Output: α
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Fig. 9: Hiding Game for a commitment scheme CS.

Definition 3.19 (Binding of CS). Let Com be a CS scheme, then we define the experiment BIND^{Com} in Fig. 10.

A commitment scheme Com is called *computational binding*, if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} it holds that $\Pr[\text{BIND}^{\text{Com}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ and *perfectly binding* if $\Pr[\text{BIND}^{\text{Com}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] = 0$.

$\text{BIND}^{\text{Com}}(1^{\lambda}, \mathcal{A})$ $(c, m, r, m', r') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^{\lambda})$ Output: 1 if $\text{Com}(m; r) = \text{Com}(m'; r')$ and 0 otherwise

Fig. 10: Binding Game for a commitment scheme CS.

3.5 Secure Multiparty Computation

The security of a protocol (with respect to a functionality f) is defined by comparing the real-world execution of the protocol with an ideal-world evaluation of f by a trusted party. More concretely, it is required that for every adversary \mathcal{A} , which attacks the real execution of the protocol, there exist an adversary \mathcal{S} , also referred to as a simulator, which can *achieve the same effect* in the ideal-world. In this work, we denote an ℓ -round MPC protocol as $\pi = (\pi.\text{Next}_1, \dots, \pi.\text{Next}_{\ell}, \pi.\text{Out})$, where $\pi.\text{Next}_j$, with $j \in [\ell]$ denotes the *next-message function* that takes as input all the messages generated by π in the rounds $1, \dots, j-1$ (that we denote with τ_{j-1}) the randomness and the input of the party P_i and outputs the message $\text{msg}_{j,i}$. Additionally, we assume that all the parties run the same next message function algorithms (the only difference is the randomness and the input provided by each party). $\pi.\text{Out}$ denotes the algorithm used to compute the final output of the protocol. Now, we give an overview of the security definition for multiparty computation. For a more detailed treatment, we refer the reader to [Gol04].

The security of a protocol (with respect to a functionality f) is defined by comparing the real-world execution of the protocol with an ideal-world evaluation of f by a trusted party. More concretely, it is required that for every adversary \mathcal{A} , which attacks the real execution of the protocol, there exist an adversary \mathcal{S} , also referred to as a simulator, which can *achieve the same effect* in the ideal-world. Let us denote $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$.

The real execution In the real execution of the n -party protocol π for computing f is executed in the presence of an adversary \mathcal{A} . The honest parties follow the instructions of π . The adversary \mathcal{A} takes as input the security parameter λ , the set $I \subset [n]$ of corrupted parties, the inputs of the corrupted parties, and an auxiliary input z . \mathcal{A} sends all messages in place of corrupted parties and may follow an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. The interaction of \mathcal{A} with a protocol π defines a random variable $\text{Real}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x})$ whose value is determined by the coin tosses of the

adversary and the honest players. This random variable contains the output of the adversary (which may be an arbitrary function of its view) as well as the outputs of the uncorrupted parties. We let $\text{Real}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}$ denote the distribution ensemble $\{\text{Real}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^*}$.

The ideal execution – security with abort. In this variant of the ideal model, fairness and output delivery are no longer guaranteed. This is the standard relaxation used when a strict majority of honest parties is not assumed. In this case, an ideal execution for a function f proceeds as follows:

- **Send inputs to the trusted party:** As before, the parties send their inputs to the trusted party, and we let x'_i denote the value sent by P_i .
- **Trusted party sends output to the adversary:** The trusted party computes $f(x'_1, \dots, x'_n) := (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ and sends $\{y_i\}_{i \in I}$ to the adversary \mathcal{S} .
- **Adversary instructs trusted party to abort or continue:** This is formalized by having the adversary send either a continue or abort message to the trusted party. In the latter case, the trusted party sends to each uncorrupted party P_i its output value y_i . In the former case, the trusted party sends the special symbol \perp to each uncorrupted party.
- **Outputs:** \mathcal{S} outputs an arbitrary function of its view, and the honest parties output the values obtained from the trusted party.

The interaction of \mathcal{S} with the trusted party defines a random variable $\text{Ideal}_{f, \mathcal{S}(z)}(k, \mathbf{x})$ as above. Having defined the real and the ideal world, we now proceed to define our notion of security.

Definition 3.20. *Let λ be the security parameter. Let f be an n -party randomized functionality, and π be an n -party protocol for $n \in \mathbb{N}$.*

We say that π securely realizes f in the presence of malicious adversaries if for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S} such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following ensembles are computational indistinguishable:

$$\{\text{Real}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^*}, \{\text{Ideal}_{f, \mathcal{S}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^*}.$$

In this work we also consider a relaxed notion of security known as *privacy with knowledge of outputs* [IKP10, PC12]. In this notion, the input of the honest parties is protected in the standard simulation based sense, but the output of these parties might be incorrect. To formalize this notion we need to slightly modify the ideal execution as follows.

1. **Send inputs to the trusted party:** The parties send their inputs to the trusted party, and we let x'_i denote the value sent by P_i .
2. **Ideal functionality sends output to the adversary:** The ideal functionality computes $(y_1, \dots, y_n) := f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and sends $\{y_i\}_{i \in I}$ to the adversary \mathcal{A} .
3. **Output of the honest parties:** The adversary \mathcal{S} sends either a continue or abort message or arbitrary values $\{y'_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus I}$ to the ideal functionality. In the case of a continue message the ideal functionality sends y_i to the party P_i , in the case of an abort message every uncorrupted party receives \perp and in the case that the ideal functionality receives arbitrary values $\{y'_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus I}$ it forwards them to the honest parties.
4. **Outputs:** \mathcal{S} outputs an arbitrary function of its view, and the honest parties output the values obtained from the trusted party.

The interaction of \mathcal{S} with the trusted party defines a random variable $\text{Ideal}_{f, \mathcal{S}(z)}^{\text{PKO}}(k, \mathbf{x})$ as above.

Having defined the real and the ideal world, we now proceed to define our notion of security.

Definition 3.21. Let λ be the security parameter. Let f be an n -party randomized functionality, and π be an n -party protocol for $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

We say that π securely realizes f with knowledge of outputs in the presence of malicious adversaries if for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S} such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following ensembles are computational indistinguishable:

$$\{\text{Real}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0,1\}^*}, \{\text{Ideal}_{f, \mathcal{S}(z), I}^{\text{PKO}}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0,1\}^*}.$$

4 k -Delayed-Input Function MPC

In this section, we introduce the new notion of *k -Delayed-Input Function MPC*. The classical simulation-based definition of secure MPC requires that the function to be computed is known at the beginning of the real (and ideal) world experiment, before the protocol starts. In our construction we are not in this setting, as we need an MPC protocol in which the parties can influence the function to be computed by giving an extra input mid-protocol. Concretely, in our protocols, the function computed by the MPC protocol becomes fully defined in the third round (i.e., for the circuit-scalable construction the function incorporates the commitments and the random values sent in the second round).

To capture this, we devise a variant of secure MPC where each party P_i has two inputs x_i and f , where 1) the input x_i is known at the beginning of the real (ideal) world experiment (as in the standard definition of MPC) but 2) the input f can be any function and it becomes known only in the k -th round. In this setting we want to guarantee that if all the honest parties input the same function f , then the adversary either learns the output of f or nothing at all. More formally, we require the input of the honest parties to be protected in the standard simulation based manner for the case where the ideal world evaluates the function f .

A strawman's approach for such a protocol would be to rely on an ℓ -round MPC protocol that does not require the input of the parties to compute the first $k - 1$ rounds with $k \leq \ell - 1$. We call such protocols *delayed-input* protocols. More precisely, one could consider a delayed-input MPC protocol Π for the universal function g where g takes a pair of inputs from each party P_i denoted with (x, f) and returns $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$.

Unfortunately, it is not guaranteed that this approach works since the standard security definition of MPC does not capture the scenario in which an input f for an honest party is chosen adaptively based on the first $k - 1$ rounds of the protocol. Therefore, even if all the honest parties follow the naive approach we have just described and use the function f as their input, the adversary might be able to compute the output of a function $\tilde{f} \neq f$. It should be noted that the description of the computed function can be part of the output as well, hence, the honest parties will notice that the wrong function has been computed and will reject the output. However, the adversary might have gained much more information from the evaluation of \tilde{f} than it would have gotten by evaluating f .

Syntax & Correctness. Before defining the real and ideal execution, we need to define the syntax of an ℓ -Round k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol and its correctness. An ℓ -Round k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol is defined as $\Pi = (\text{Next}_1, \dots, \text{Next}_\ell, \text{Out})$. The next message function Next_1 takes as an input the security parameter in unary form, the input of the party, its randomness and a parameter m that represents the size of the function that will be computed, and returns the first message of the protocol. The next-message function Next_j , with $j \in [k - 1]$ takes as input all the messages generated by Π in the rounds $1, \dots, j - 1$ (that we denote with τ_{j-1}) the input and the randomness of P_i and outputs the message $\text{msg}_{j,i}$. The next message function Next_j with $j \in \{k, \dots, \ell\}$ takes the input of the party P_i , a function f (together with τ_{k-1}) and the randomness of P_i , and returns the message $\text{msg}_{j,i}$. To compute the

final output, each party P_i runs Out on input τ_ℓ , its input and randomness. We now define the correctness and the security property that a k -delayed-input function protocol must satisfy.

Definition 4.1 (Perfect Correctness for ℓ -Round k -Delayed-Input Function MPC Protocols). For any $\lambda, m \in \mathbb{N}$, for any inputs $(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in (\{0, 1\}^\lambda)^n$ and for any set of functions $\{f_\gamma\}_{\gamma \in [n]}$ with $|f_\gamma| = m$ for all $\gamma \in [n]$, it must hold for all $i \in [n]$ that

- if $f_1 = \dots = f_n$ then $\Pr[(\text{Out}(\tau_\ell, x_i, r_i) \neq f(x_1, \dots, x_n))] = 0$,
- if there exists $\alpha, \beta \in [n]$ s.t. $f_\alpha \neq f_\beta$ then $\Pr[(\text{Out}(\tau_\ell, x_i, r_i) \neq \perp)] = 0$,

where $\text{msg}_{1,i} \leftarrow \text{Next}_1(1^\lambda, x_i, m; r_i)$, $\text{msg}_{c,i} \leftarrow \text{Next}_c(\tau_{c-1}, x_i; r_i)$ and $\text{msg}_{j,i} \leftarrow \text{Next}_j(\tau_{j-1}, x_i, f_i; r_i)$ where $r_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $c \in \{1, \dots, k-1\}$ and $j \in [k, \dots, \ell]$.

We now proceed to defining the security of k -delayed-input function protocols, by describing how the real and the ideal world look like.

The real execution. Let us denote $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ where x_i denotes the input of the party P_i . In the real execution the n -party protocol Π is executed in the presence of an adversary \mathcal{A} . The honest parties follow the instructions of Π . The adversary \mathcal{A} takes as input the security parameter λ , the size of the function m , the set $I \subset [n]$ of corrupted parties, the inputs of the corrupted parties, and an auxiliary input z . \mathcal{A} sends all messages in place of corrupted parties and may follow an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. At round $k-1$, \mathcal{A} picks a function f and sends it to the honest parties. Then each honest party P_i uses f to compute the rounds $k, k+1, \dots, \ell$ of Π . The adversary \mathcal{A} continues its interaction with the honest parties following an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. The interaction of \mathcal{A} with a protocol Π defines a random variable $\text{Real}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}^{\text{DIF-MPC}}(k, \mathbf{x})$ whose value is determined by the coin tosses of the adversary and the honest players. This random variable contains the output of the adversary (which may be an arbitrary function of its view), the outputs of the uncorrupted parties as well as the function f chosen by the adversary. We let $\text{Real}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}^{\text{DIF-MPC}}$ denote the distribution ensemble $\{\text{Real}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}^{\text{DIF-MPC}}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^*}$.

The ideal execution

- **Send inputs to the trusted party:** Each honest party P_i sends x_i to the ideal functionality. The simulator sends $\{x_j\}_{j \in I}$ and f to the ideal functionality.
- **Ideal functionality sends output to the adversary:** The ideal functionality computes $(y_1, \dots, y_n) := f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and sends $\{y_i\}_{i \in I}$ to the simulator \mathcal{S} and f to P_i for each $i \in [n] \setminus I$.
- **Output of the honest parties:** The simulator \mathcal{S} sends either a continue or abort message to the ideal functionality. In the case of a continue message the ideal functionality sends y_i to the party P_i , in the case of an abort message every uncorrupted party receives \perp .
- **Outputs:** \mathcal{S} outputs an arbitrary function of its view, and the honest parties output the values obtained from the trusted party.

The interaction of \mathcal{S} with the trusted party defines a random variable $\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{S}(z), I}^{\text{DIF-MPC}}(k, \mathbf{x})$ as above. Having defined the real and the ideal world, we now proceed to define our notion of security.

Definition 4.2 (k -Delayed-Input Function MPC). Let λ be the security parameter. We say that a protocol Π satisfying Definition 4.1 is k -delayed-input function in the presence of malicious adversaries if for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} attacking in the real world (as defined above) there exists an expected PPT ideal-world adversary \mathcal{S} restricted to query the ideal functionality with the same function f that will appear in the real world experiment output such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following ensembles are computational indistinguishable

$$\{\text{Real}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}^{\text{DIF-MPC}}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^*}, \{\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{S}(z), I}^{\text{DIF-MPC}}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^*}.$$

Remark 4.3. We note that Definition 4.2 is very similar to the standard notion of MPC. Indeed, our ideal world can be thought of as the ideal world of the standard definition of MPC for the case where the parties want to evaluate the universal function. We also note that in the ideal world there is no notion of rounds, hence it is not immediately clear how to translate what happens in the real world (where the function f is adaptively chosen in the k -th round by the adversary) into the ideal world (where the ideal world adversary has all the information it needs from the beginning of the experiment). The way we break this asymmetry between the ideal and the real world is exactly by restricting the power of the simulator (i.e., the power of the ideal-world adversary) depending on an event that happens in the real world. In our specific case, we require the admissible simulators (i.e., the admissible ideal world adversaries) to be those that query the ideal world functionality using the same function that will appear in the output of the real world experiment. We note that without this requirement this definition becomes useless since the simulator might query the ideal functionality using a function \tilde{f} that is different from the function f used in the real world, which would allow the simulator to learn more about the honest parties' inputs than it would have by querying the ideal functionality with the function f .

From MPC protocols to k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocols. To construct an n party ℓ -round k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol Π^{DIF} , we rely on a $2n$ party ℓ -round MPC protocol Π that does not require the input to compute the first $k - 1$ rounds¹³ and a one-time MAC scheme $\text{MAC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Auth}, \text{Verify})$. In our protocol Π^{DIF} , each party P_i controls two parties of Π . One party uses the private input and a MAC key (which is known from the beginning) as its input and the other party uses the function f (received at the end of round $k - 1$) authenticated with the MAC key as its input. The MPC protocol Π then checks that the functions are authenticated accordingly to the MAC key and that they are all equal. If this check is successful, Π evaluates the function f over the secret inputs of the parties. Finally, the individual outputs of the function evaluation are returned to one of the two parties of Π controlled by the party P_i . To show that the described protocol Π^{DIF} is indeed k -delayed-input function, we rely on the security of the MPC protocol Π and the unforgeability of the MAC. The security of the MPC protocol Π ensures that the private inputs of the parties are protected and the unforgeability of the MAC is used to enforce that the correct function is used in the protocol execution. Intuitively, if, by contradiction, there exists an adversary that manages to evaluate the function \tilde{f} instead of f then we would be able to construct a reduction to the security of the MAC since the only condition in which Π does not output \perp is the one in which all the parties input the same authenticated function f . If there exists an adversarial strategy that makes Π parse f as \tilde{f} , then it must be that \tilde{f} has been authenticated using the MAC key of an honest party. We can extract such a forgery using the simulator of Π (that extracts the input from the parties declared as corrupted).

Now, we describe the construction and its proof more formally. Let Π be a $2n$ -party MPC protocol that realizes the $2n$ -input function g described in Fig. 11 with the property that it needs the input of the parties only to compute the rounds $k, k + 1, \dots, \ell$ with $0 \leq k \leq \ell - 1$ where $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ represents the round complexity of Π . In our k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol Π^{DIF} , each party P_i emulates two parties P_i^0 and P_i^1 of Π . Let x_i be the private input of P_i , then P_i performs the following steps.

1. Run **Setup** to sample a MAC key k_i .

¹³ Additionally, we require the MPC protocol to also commit to the input of the parties in the $(\ell - 2)$ 'th round in a statistically binding way. We require this property to allow for extraction when we rely on the security of the one-time MAC. Both of the protocols [BGJ⁺18, CCG⁺20] that can be used as an instantiation for our results achieve this property.

2. Run the party P_i^0 using the input (x_i, k_i) and P_i^1 until the round $k - 1$.¹⁴
3. Upon receiving the function f_i compute $\tau_i \leftarrow \text{Auth}(k_i, f_i)$ and run P_i^1 using the input (f_i, τ_i) .
4. When the protocol Π is finished, P_i outputs the output obtained by P_i^0 .

Input: $((x_i, k_i), (f_i, \tau_i))_{i \in [n]}$.
 If $\text{Verify}(k_i, f_i, \tau_i) = 0$ or $f_i \neq f_j$ for any $i, j \in [n]$, then output \perp .
 Compute $y_1, \dots, y_n := f'(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ with $f' = f_i$ for any $i \in [n]$ and
 set $y_i := y_i^0 := y_i^1$ for all $i \in [n]$.
Output: (y_i^0, y_i^1) to the party P_i for each $i \in [n]$.

Fig. 11: Description of the function g .

Theorem 4.4. *Let Π be a $2n$ -party ℓ -round MPC protocol that securely realizes the function f of Fig. 11 and that requires the input only to compute the rounds $k, k+1, \dots, \ell$ with $0 \leq k \leq \ell - 1$ and let $\text{MAC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Auth}, \text{Verify})$ be a one-time secure MAC scheme, then the protocol Π^{DIF} described above is an n -party ℓ -round k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{A}^{DIF} be the adversary attacking our protocol Π^{DIF} . To simplify the description of the proof we assume that only one party P_i is honest. The proof can be easily extended to the case where more than one party is honest. To prove the security of our protocol we need to describe a simulator \mathcal{S}^{DIF} . Before doing that, we define an augmented machine \mathcal{M} that works as described in Fig. 12. \mathcal{M} internally runs the adversary \mathcal{A}^{DIF} and computes the messages for the party P_i^1 . In addition, all the messages received by the adversary \mathcal{A}^{DIF} and the messages computed by P_i^0 are forwarded to the external interface of \mathcal{M} which we refer as the *left-session*, and all the messages that come from the left session are forwarded to the adversary \mathcal{A}^{DIF} . In a nutshell, \mathcal{M} acts as an adversary for the protocol Π where only the party P_i^0 is honest.

By assumption, we know that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a simulator \mathcal{S} such that for any $I \subset [2n]$ the following ensembles are computational indistinguishable:

$$\{\text{Real}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0,1\}^*}, \{\text{Ideal}_{g, \mathcal{S}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x})\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}, \langle \mathbf{x}, z \rangle \in \{0,1\}^*} \cdot$$

Hence, there exists a simulator \mathcal{S} for the adversary $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}^{\text{DIF}}, \cdot, \cdot)$. At a high level, our simulator \mathcal{S}^{DIF} internally runs \mathcal{S} , and its formal description is provided in Fig. 13.

Now, we describe the hybrid experiments that we use to prove the theorem.

Hybrid H_0 : Hybrid H_0 is identical to the real world experiment.

Hybrid H_1 : In hybrid H_1 the messages of Π are simulated using \mathcal{S} . This hybrid differs from hybrid H_0 in the following aspects

1. All the messages of Π are replaced with the messages of \mathcal{S} .
2. Upon receiving the query $((x_j, k_j), (f_j, \tau_j))_{j \in I} \cup (f_i, \tau_i)$ from \mathcal{S} , check that $\text{Verify}(k_j, f_j, \tau_j) = 1$ and that $f_j = f_{j'}$ for all $j, j' \in [n]$, if this is not the case return \perp , otherwise, continue as follows.
3. Compute $((y_1^0, y_1^1), \dots, (y_n^0, y_n^1)) := f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$, with $f = f_i$ for any $i \in [n]$, set $y_i := y_i^0 := y_i^1$ and output (y_1, \dots, y_n) .

The theorem follows from the following Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6. □

¹⁴ We recall that P_0^i and P_1^i do not need to use the input to compute the first $k - 1$ rounds, nonetheless we can specify the input of P_i^1 at the very beginning of the protocol.

$\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}^{\text{DIF}}, r_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{DIF}}, k_i) :$

Run \mathcal{A}^{DIF} **using the randomness** $r_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{DIF}}$

For each Round $r = 1, \dots, k - 1$

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{r,i,0}$ from the left session, run P_i^1 thus obtaining the message $\text{msg}_{r,i,1}$ and send $(\text{msg}_{r,i,0}, \text{msg}_{r,i,1})$ to \mathcal{A}^{DIF} .
2. Upon receiving the messages $\{\text{msg}_{r,j,b}\}_{j \in I, b \in \{0,1\}}$ from \mathcal{A}^{DIF} send $\{\text{msg}_{r,j,b}\}_{j \in I, b \in \{0,1\}} \cup \{\text{msg}_{r,i,1}\}$ in the left session.

Round k

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{k,i,0}$ from the left session and upon receiving f_i from \mathcal{A}^{DIF} , compute $\tau_i \leftarrow \text{Auth}(k_i, f_i)$ and run P_i^1 on input (f_i, τ_i) thus obtaining the message $\text{msg}_{k,i,1}$ and send $(\text{msg}_{k,i,0}, \text{msg}_{k,i,1})$ to \mathcal{A}^{DIF} .
2. Upon receiving the messages $\{\text{msg}_{k,j,b}\}_{j \in I, b \in \{0,1\}}$ from \mathcal{A}^{DIF} send $\{\text{msg}_{k,j,b}\}_{j \in I, b \in \{0,1\}} \cup \{\text{msg}_{k,i,1}\}$ in the left session.

For each Round $r = k + 1, \dots, \ell$

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{r,i,0}$ from the left session, run P_i^1 thus obtaining the message $\text{msg}_{r,i,1}$ and send $(\text{msg}_{r,i,0}, \text{msg}_{r,i,1})$ to \mathcal{A}^{DIF} .
2. Upon receiving the messages $\{\text{msg}_{r,j,b}\}_{j \in I, b \in \{0,1\}}$ from \mathcal{A}^{DIF} send $\{\text{msg}_{r,j,b}\}_{j \in I, b \in \{0,1\}} \cup \{\text{msg}_{r,i,1}\}$ in the left session.

Fig. 12: The augmented machine \mathcal{M} which emulates the adversary for Π .

\mathcal{S}^{DIF}

- Sample a MAC key k_i .
- Sample a sufficiently long random R and run \mathcal{S} for the adversary $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}, R, k_i)$.
- For every query $((x_1, k_1), (f_1, \tau_1), \dots, (f_i, \tau_i), \dots, (x_n, k_n), (f_n, \tau_n))$ issued by \mathcal{S} do the following:
 1. For each $j, j' \in [n]$ check if $\text{Verify}(k_j, f_j, \tau_j) = 0$ or if $f_j \neq f_{j'}$ then return \perp to \mathcal{S} , else continue as follows.
 2. Query the ideal functionality using (x_1, \dots, x_n) , and receive $((y_1^0, y_1^1), \dots, (y_n^0, y_n^1)) := f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ as an output where $f = f_1 = \dots = f_n$.
 3. For each i set $y_i := y_i^0 := y_i^1$.
 4. Send (y_1, \dots, y_n) to \mathcal{S} .
- When \mathcal{S} stops, output what \mathcal{S} outputs.

Fig. 13: The simulator \mathcal{S}^{DIF} for our k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol Π^{DIF} .

Lemma 4.5 (Transition from H_0 to H_1). *Let Π be a maliciously secure MPC protocol, then the output distributions of the hybrid experiments H_0 and H_1 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. From the security of the protocol Π , it follows that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A}^{DIF} there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S}^{DIF} such that for any $I \subset [n]$ it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{f, \mathcal{S}^{\text{DIF}}(z), I}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

with $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

Suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability then we can use the adversary $\mathcal{A}^{\text{DIF}} := \mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$, as defined in Fig. 12, to break the security of the protocol Π .

Note that $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ is a valid adversary for Π as it waits to receive the messages of Π generated by the honest party P_i and replies with the messages computed by the malicious

parties indexed by $[n] \setminus \{i\}$ in each round $k \in [\ell]$. In the reduction we have a challenger \mathcal{C} that, having black box access to $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$, either interacts with the augmented machine using the honestly generated messages of Π or the messages output by the simulator \mathcal{S} , which exists by the security definition. If the messages are generated accordingly to the honest procedure of Π the output of $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ corresponds to H_0 and, if the messages are simulated using \mathcal{S} the output of $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ corresponds to H_1 . \square

We note that experiment H_1 and \mathcal{S}^{DIF} are equal. Besides showing that the hybrids H_0 and H_1 are indistinguishable, we also need to argue that the adversary cannot compute the output of $\tilde{f} \neq f$ where \tilde{f} is the function that appears in the real world experiment and f is the function that our simulator uses as a query in the ideal world experiment. More formally, we need to prove the following.

Lemma 4.6. *The probability that \mathcal{S}^{DIF} queries the ideal functionality with a function f and that the real world output contains the description of a function $\tilde{f} \neq f$ is negligible in the security parameter.*

Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the above does not hold. That is, the simulator \mathcal{S}^{DIF} does query the ideal functionality using f , but in the real world experiment the output contains \tilde{f} . We first observe that the only case where \mathcal{S}^{DIF} queries the ideal functionality is when the function f_i , extracted from P_i^1 , is equipped with a valid MAC. Hence, we can argue that if \mathcal{S} (that by assumption can extract the inputs of P_i^1) returns a function \tilde{f} equipped with a valid MAC then we can make a reduction to the security of the one-time MAC.

Without loss of generality we assume that the messages of the protocol Π can be simulated straight-line using an exponential time strategy. That is, if we allow \mathcal{S} to run in exponential time then no rewinds are needed to simulate the messages of Π .

The reduction for the MAC we are considering interacts with the adversary exactly as in H_1 , with the difference that no rewinds are made by \mathcal{S} (since the simulation is straight-line). Upon receiving the function f from the adversary, the reduction queries the MAC challenger to obtain a tag for f and it uses it to compute the third round of the protocol on the behalf of the party P_i^1 . If the adversary computes a third round that would yield to the extraction from P_i^1 of a function $\tilde{f} \neq f$ with a valid MAC then our reduction is successful. Since we have assumed that this happens with more than non-negligible probability, we have reached a contradiction. \square

5 Our Compiler: Circuit-Scalable MPC

In this section we prove one of our main theorems on how to construct a circuit-scalable MPC protocol that realizes any functionality f with privacy with knowledge of outputs. We refer to Section 2 for a simplified description of the protocol for the two-party case and to Fig. 14 for the formal description. Our construction makes use of the following cryptographic tools:

- An ℓ -round k -delayed-input function MPC protocol $\Pi^{\text{M}} = (\Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Next}_1, \dots, \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Next}_\ell, \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Out})$ (not necessarily communication efficient) with $k \geq 3$. In the description of our compiler we assume, without loss of generality, that Π^{M} is 3-delayed-input function.¹⁵
- A strong succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner $\text{DFEC} = (\text{DFEC}.\text{Setup}, \text{DFEC}.\text{Enc}, \text{DFEC}.\text{KeyGen}, \text{DFEC}.\text{Dec}, \text{DFEC}.\text{Partition})$ for n FE candidates.
- A non-interactive computationally hiding commitment scheme Com .

¹⁵ Any k' -delayed-input function MPC with $k' > 3$ can be turned into a 3-delayed-input function MPC protocol since the function received in round 2 can be ignored up to round $k' - 1$.

Π^{FE}

Each $i \in [n]$ party P_i has input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$ as its secret input.

Round 1.

1. Sample $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}, r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow k}, r_i^{\text{Enc}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ for all $k \in [n]$ and set $R_{\text{com}}^i := (r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow k})_{k \in [n]}$.
2. Set $x'_i := (x_i, r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}, R_{\text{com}}^i, r_i^{\text{Enc}})$ and compute $\text{msg}_{1,i} \leftarrow \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Next}_1(1^\lambda, x'_i)$.
3. Sample $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ for all $k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k} := \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}; r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow k})$ and set $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i := \{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}\}_{k \in [n]}$.
4. Send $(\text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i)$.

Round 2.

1. Let τ_1 denote the transcript of the protocol Π^{M} up to round 1.
2. Compute $\text{msg}_{2,i} \leftarrow \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Next}_2(\tau_1)$.
3. Send $(\text{msg}_{2,i}, (r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j})_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}})$.

Round 3.

1. Let τ_2 denote the transcript of the protocol Π^{M} up to round 2.
2. Compute $\text{msg}_{3,i} \leftarrow \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Next}_3(C_{\text{comSetup},i}^{\text{ct}}, \tau_2)$, with $\text{com}_{\text{Setup},i} := \{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^k\}_{k \in [n]}$ and $R_{\text{Setup}}^i := (r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{j \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$.
3. Send $\text{msg}_{3,i}$.

For each round $k \in \{4, \dots, \ell - 1\}$.

1. Let τ_{k-1} denote the transcript of the protocol Π^{M} up to round $k - 1$.
2. Compute the second round message $\text{msg}_{k,i} \leftarrow \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Next}_k(\tau_{k-1})$.
3. Send $\text{msg}_{k,i}$.

Round ℓ .

1. Let $\tau_{\ell-1}$ denote the transcript of the protocol Π^{M} up to round $\ell - 1$.
2. Compute $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i}$.
3. Generate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$, compute the partition of C , i.e. $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFEC.Partition}(1^\lambda, C)$ and generate $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}_i, C_i; r_i^{\text{KeyGen}})$ with $r_i^{\text{KeyGen}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$.
4. Compute the fourth round message $\text{msg}_{\ell,i} \leftarrow \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Next}_\ell(\tau_{\ell-1})$.
5. Send $(\text{msg}_{\ell,i}, \text{sk}_i)$.

Output Computation.

1. Let τ_ℓ denote the transcript of the protocol Π^{M} up to round ℓ .
2. Compute the output of Π^{M} as $(\text{ct}, (\tilde{r}_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i})_{i \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}) \leftarrow \Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{Out}(\tau_\ell)$.
3. Output $\text{DFEC.Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct})$ with $\text{sk}_C = (\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n)$.

Fig. 14: Description of the protocol Π^{FE} that securely realizes any functionality with knowledge of outputs.

Input: $(x_i, r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}, R_{\text{com}}^i, r_i^{\text{Enc}})_{i \in [n]}$

- Parse $\text{com}_{\text{Setup},i}$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^k\}_{k \in [n]}$ and $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}\}_{k \in [n]}$.
- Parse R_{Setup}^i as $(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{j \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$.
- Parse R_{com}^i as $(r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow k})_{k \in [n]}$ for all $i \in [n]$.
- For all $i, j \in [n]$ check that $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j} = \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}; r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow j})$.

If one of the above checks fails then output \perp , continue as follows otherwise.

For each $i \in [n]$, compute $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i}$ and generate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$

Let $\text{msk} := (\text{msk}_1, \dots, \text{msk}_n)$, $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, $r^{\text{Enc}} := \bigoplus_{i \in [n]} r_i^{\text{Enc}}$.

Output: $\text{ct} := \text{DFEC.Enc}(\text{msk}, x; r^{\text{Enc}})$ and $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$ to P_i .

Fig. 15: Circuit $C_{\text{comSetup},i,R_{\text{Setup}}^i}^{\text{ct}}$.

Theorem 5.1. *Let DFEC be a single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner with circuit size cs_{Setup} for the setup algorithm DFEC.Setup, circuit size cs_{ct} for the encryption algorithm DFEC.Enc and functional key size s_{sk} , let Com be a commitment scheme and let Π^{M} be the ℓ -round MPC protocol k -delayed-input function protocol described in Section 4, then Π^{FE} is an ℓ -round MPC protocol that realizes the single-output functionality C with knowledge of outputs which has communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, s_{\text{sk}})$.*

We split this theorem into two Lemmas and prove them separately:

Lemma 5.2. *Let DFEC be a single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner with circuit size cs_{Setup} for the setup algorithm DFEC.Setup, circuit size cs_{Enc} for the encryption algorithm DFEC.Enc and functional key size s_{sk} , then Π^{FE} has communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, s_{\text{sk}})$.*

Proof. We divide the analysis of the communication complexity into two steps. In the first step, we analyze the communication complexity of the inner MPC protocol Π^{M} and in the second step the communication complexity of the additional values sent in the outer MPC protocol.

We remark that the operations executed inside the MPC protocol Π^{M} , besides the generation of the master secret keys and the encryption, have communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n)$. Since the circuit size of the setup algorithm is cs_{Setup} and the circuit size of the encryption algorithm is cs_{Enc} the resulting message length is $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}})$, i.e. $|\text{msg}_{k,i}| = \text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}})$ for all $k \in \{1, \dots, \ell\}$ and all $i \in [n]$.

After analyzing the communication complexity of the inner MPC protocol Π^{M} , we continue with the analysis of the messages that are sent in addition to the messages of Π^{M} .

The additional messages, strings of length λ and commitments, that are output by every party P_i for all $i \in [n]$ in round k , with $k \in \{1, \dots, \ell - 1\}$ are of length $\text{poly}(\lambda, n)$. Since the additional output in round ℓ contains the secret key sk_i for all $i \in [n]$ it increases in size by s_{sk} . This results in a communication complexity of $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, s_{\text{sk}})$ for the additional messages.

Combining the two analysis yields an overall communication complexity of $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, s_{\text{sk}})$. \square

To specify the values $cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}$ and s_{sk} we apply the definition of combiner succinctness (Definition 3.7), which results in the fact that $cs_{\text{Enc}} = \text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$ and $s_{\text{sk}} = \text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{\text{out}})$. For the circuit size cs_{Setup} of the setup algorithm Setup it holds that $cs_{\text{Setup}} = \text{poly}(\lambda, n)$. This results in an overall communication complexity of $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, d, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$.

Lemma 5.3. *Let DFEC be a single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner, and let Π^{M} be a k -delayed-input function ℓ -round MPC protocol (with $k \geq 3$), then Π^{FE} is an ℓ -round MPC protocol that realizes the single-output functionality C with privacy with knowledge of outputs.*

Proof. To prove our lemma we need to show that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S} such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^{\text{FE}}, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{C, \mathcal{S}(z), I}^{\text{PKO}}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1]| ,$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

$\mathcal{M}(r_{\mathcal{A}})$:

Round 1.

1. Receive the message $\text{msg}_{1,i}$ in the left session.
2. Sample $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}$ for all $k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, compute $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k} = \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}; r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow k})$ and set $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i := \{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}\}_{k \in [n]}$.
3. Send $(\text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i)$ in the right session.
4. Receive $(\text{msg}_{1,j}, \text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^j)_{j \in I}$ as a reply in the right session and output $\{\text{msg}_{1,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

Round 2.

1. Receive the message $\text{msg}_{2,i}$ in the left session.
2. Sample random values $r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}$.
3. Output $\text{msg}_{2,i}, \{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the right session.
4. Receive $(\text{msg}_{2,j}, r_{\text{Setup}'}^{j \rightarrow i})_{j \in I}$ as a reply in the right session and output $\{\text{msg}_{2,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

Round 3.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{3,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the circuit $C_{\text{comSetup}, i, R_{\text{Setup}}^i}^{\text{ct}}$ and the messages $\{\text{msg}_{3,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

For each round $k \in \{4, \dots, \ell - 1\}$.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{k,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the messages $\{\text{msg}_{k,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

Round ℓ .

1. Receive the message $\text{msg}_{\ell,i}$ in the left session.
2. Compute $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i} \oplus r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow i}$, with a random value $r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow i}$, and generate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$, compute the partition of C , i.e. $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFEC.Partition}(1^\lambda, C)$ and generate $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}_i, C_i; r_i^{\text{KeyGen}})$ for a random r_i^{KeyGen} .
3. Send $(\text{msg}_{\ell,i}, \text{sk}_i)$ in the right session.
4. Receive $(\text{msg}_{\ell,j})_{j \in I}$ as a reply in the right session and output $\{\text{msg}_{\ell,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

Fig. 16: The augmented machine \mathcal{M} which emulates the adversary for Π^M .

- $\underline{\mathcal{S}}$
- Sample a sufficiently long random R and run the simulator $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ for the adversary \mathcal{M} .
 - For every query $(x_j, r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow j}, R_{\text{com}}^j, r_j^{\text{Enc}})_{j \in I}$ and $C_{\text{comSetup}, i, R_{\text{Setup}}^i}^{\text{ct}}$ issued by $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ do the following:
 1. Parse $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}, i}$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^k\}_{k \in [n]}$ and $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}\}_{k \in [n]}$ for all $i \in [n]$.
 2. Parse R_{Setup}^i as $(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{j \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$ and R_{com}^j as $(r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{k \in [n]}$ for all $j \in I$. Afterwards, check that $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k} = \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k}; r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})$ for all $j \in I$ and $k \in [n]$. If this check fails, **Abort**.
 3. Compute $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i} \oplus r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow i}$ with a random value $r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow i}$ and generate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$.
 4. Query the ideal functionality C using $\{x_j\}_{j \in I}$ and receive $C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ as an output.
 5. Compute $r_j^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow j} \oplus r_{\text{Setup}'}^{j \rightarrow j}$ for all $j \in I$ and generate $\text{msk}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_j^{\text{Setup}})$. Simulate a ciphertext $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{DFEC}.\mathcal{S}(\{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, C, C(x_1, \dots, x_n), I)$ and send $\text{ct}^* := (\text{ct}, \{r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow l}\}_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}, l \in [n] \setminus \{k\}}, \{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow l}\}_{l \in [n] \setminus \{i\}})$ to $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$.
 - When $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ stops, output what $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ outputs.

Fig. 17: The simulator \mathcal{S} for our protocol Π .

Also in this case, for simplicity, we assume that all but one of the parties are corrupted, where we denote the set that contains the indices of all the corrupted parties as I , i.e. $|I| = n - 1$.

Before describing how \mathcal{S} works, we define an algorithm \mathcal{M} that we refer to as the *augmented machine*. The augmented machine internally runs the adversary \mathcal{A} (we refer to this as the right session), and acts as a proxy between \mathcal{A} and its external interface with respect to the messages of Π^M (we refer to this as the left session). To describe our simulator we then need to describe the augmented machine \mathcal{M} and how \mathcal{S} interacts with it (i.e., how the messages of Π^M are computed).

The reason why we describe our simulator via the augmented machine \mathcal{M} is to deal with the rewinds that the simulator of Π^M might do. We note that \mathcal{M} acts as an adversary for the protocol Π^M . Hence, we can consider the simulator $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ for Π^M (which exists by assumption) for the adversary \mathcal{M} . Our simulator \mathcal{S} will then simply run $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$. For the formal description of \mathcal{M} we refer to Fig. 16 and for the formal description of \mathcal{S} we refer to Fig. 17.

We describe the hybrid experiments that we use to prove the lemma. We first give an informal description:

Hybrid H_0 : Hybrid H_0 is identical to the real world.

Hybrid H_1 : In hybrid H_1 , the messages of the inner MPC protocol Π^M are simulated using the simulator $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ (which exists by assumption). The transition between hybrid H_0 and H_1 is justified by the malicious security of the MPC protocol Π^M and formally proven in Theorem 5.4.

Hybrid H_2 : In hybrid H_2 , the commitments $(\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j})_{j \in I}$ commit to the values $(r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j})_{j \in I}$, but the values output in the second round and used to complete the remaining rounds are freshly generated random values $\{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$. The transition between hybrid H_1 and H_2 is justified by the hiding property of the commitment Com and formally proven in Theorem 5.5.¹⁶

Hybrid H_3 : In hybrid H_3 , the randomness used to generate the master secret key msk_i is computed using the randomness $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i} \oplus r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow i}$ where $r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow i}$ is a randomly sampled value which is different from $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}$ committed to in the first round. The transition between hybrid H_2 and H_3 is justified by the hiding property of the commitment Com and formally proven in Theorem 5.6.

Hybrid H_4 : Hybrid H_4 is identical to the ideal world. In this hybrid, the honestly generated ciphertext ct is replaced by a simulated ciphertext that is generated using the simulator $\text{DFEC}.\mathcal{S}$ of the functional encryption combiner DFEC . The transition between H_3 and H_4 is justified by the succinct single-key simulation security of the functional encryption combiner DFEC and requires the introduction of two intermediate hybrids H_3^* and H_4^* , which are described below. This hybrid is described in more detail on Page 36.

We also need to introduce the intermediate hybrids H_3^* and H_4^* :

Hybrid H_3^* : The hybrid H_3^* , is an intermediate hybrid that works exactly as hybrid H_3 with the only difference that look ahead threads for the second and third round are created and freshly sampled random values $\{r_{\text{Setup}''}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$ instead of $\{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$ are output in the second round of the main thread. Since the values $\{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$ and $\{r_{\text{Setup}''}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$ are randomly sampled, the output distribution of the messages in the second round is the same and therefore the hybrids H_3 and H_3^* are perfectly indistinguishable. This hybrid is described in more detail on Page 34.

Hybrid H_4^* : In this hybrid, the same look ahead threads as in H_3^* are created, but the honestly generated ciphertext ct is replaced by a simulated ciphertext that is generated using the simulator of the functional encryption combiner $\text{DFEC}.\mathcal{S}$. The transition between the hybrids is proven by relying on the succinct single-key simulation security of the functional encryption

¹⁶ We make use of the fact here that commitments are secure under parallel composition, as mentioned after Definition 3.17, and output a new random value to all the parties P_j with $j \in I$.

combiner DFEC. To enforce that the master secret keys that the corrupted parties generate match the master secret keys that are generated by the challenger, we need to sample the values $\{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$ such that their XOR with the values output by the other parties in the second round $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k}\}_{j \in I, k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$ match the randomness used by the challenger for the master secret key generation. This transition is formally proven in Theorem 5.7.

For the formal description of the hybrids, we also use an augmented machine. More precisely, we define a different augmented machine for each hybrid experiment. In addition, for each hybrid experiment H_k with $k \in \{0, \dots, 4\}$ we need to specify how to construct the answers to the query made by the simulator $\Pi^M.S$. For the formal description of the augmented machines we refer to Fig. 19, whereas the formal description of the hybrid experiments is provided in Fig. 18. \square




Fig. 18: Description of the hybrids H_0, \dots, H_4 , where the machines $\mathcal{M}_0, \dots, \mathcal{M}_3$ are defined in Fig. 19.




Fig. 19: The description of the augmented machines $\mathcal{M}_0, \dots, \mathcal{M}_3$ for the hybrids $\text{H}_0, \dots, \text{H}_4$.

Claim 5.4 (Transition from H_0 to H_1) *Let Π^{M} be a maliciously secure MPC protocol, then the output distributions of the hybrid experiments H_0 and H_1 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. By assumption we know that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S}' such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^{\text{M}}, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{S}'(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1]|$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

Suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability then we can use the adversary $\mathcal{A}' := \mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ to break the security of Π^{M} . The description of the augmented machine \mathcal{M}_0 can be found in Fig. 19.

Note that $\mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ is a valid adversary for Π^{M} as, in each round $k \in [\ell]$ it waits to receive the messages of Π^{M} generated by the honest party P_i and replies with the messages computed by the malicious parties indexed by $[n] \setminus \{i\}$. In the reduction we have a challenger that, having black box access to $\mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$, either interacts with it using the messages of Π^{M} generated accordingly to the honest procedure or using the simulator \mathcal{S}' , which exists by the security definition. We note that in the case where the messages are generated accordingly to the honest procedure that

the output of $\mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ corresponds to the output of \mathbf{H}_0 , otherwise it corresponds to the output of \mathbf{H}_1 . \square

Before we continue with the description of the transition between the remaining hybrids, we need to distinguish between two different cases. The case where the adversary aborts in round three with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, and the case where the adversary completes the third round with some non-negligible probability. In the case that the adversary aborts in the third round, the following hybrids are not necessary, since the security in this case can be directly reduced to the security of the inner MPC protocol Π^M . Indeed, note that the input of the honest parties appears only in the messages of Π^M and nowhere else.

In the case that the adversary completes the third round with some non-negligible probability, the proof continues as follows.

Claim 5.5 (Transition from \mathbf{H}_1 to \mathbf{H}_2) *If Com is a computationally hiding commitment scheme, then the output distribution of the hybrids \mathbf{H}_1 and \mathbf{H}_2 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The difference between \mathbf{H}_1 and \mathbf{H}_2 is that the values sent in the third round are replaced by random values (i.e., they are different from the committed values in the first round). Assuming that the output distribution of \mathbf{H}_1 and \mathbf{H}_2 are distinguishable, we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that breaks the hiding of Com. The adversary \mathcal{A}' works as follows.

1. Sample two sets of random values $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$ and send them to the challenger \mathcal{C} .
2. Upon receiving $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$ from \mathcal{C} sample the values $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}, r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow i} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and compute $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i} := \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}; r_{\text{com}}^{i \rightarrow i})$.
3. Set $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i := \{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n]}$.
4. Act exactly as in \mathbf{H}_1 (and \mathbf{H}_2) with the following differences:
 - (a) In round one use $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i := \{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n]}$ instead of freshly generated commitments.
 - (b) In round two output the values $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$.
 - (c) For every query $(x_j, r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow j}, R_{\text{com}}^j, r_j^{\text{Enc}})_{j \in I}$ and $C_{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}, i}, R_{\text{Setup}}^i}^{\text{ct}}$ asked by the simulator $\Pi^M.S$, parse $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}, i}$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^k\}_{k \in [n]}$ and $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}\}_{k \in [n]}$ for all $i \in [n]$. Also, parse R_{Setup}^i as $(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{j \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$ and R_{com}^j as $(r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{k \in [n]}$ for all $j \in I$. Afterwards, check that $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k} = \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k}; r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})$ for all $j \in I$ and $k \in [n]$. If this check fails, reply to the simulator with **Abort**. In the case that these tests pass, compute $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i}$ and generate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$. Compute $r_j^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow j}$, generate $\text{msk}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_j^{\text{Setup}})$ for all $j \in I$, compute $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{DFEC}.\text{Enc}(\{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ and send $\text{ct}^* := (\text{ct}, \{r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow l}\}_{k \in [n], l \in [n] \setminus \{k\}})$ to $\Pi^M.S$.
 - (d) Output what \mathcal{A} outputs.

The proof ends with the observation that the output of \mathcal{A}' in the case where \mathcal{C} has computed the commitments using the values $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$ corresponds to the output of \mathbf{H}_1 , and to the output of \mathbf{H}_2 otherwise. \square

Claim 5.6 (Transition from \mathbf{H}_2 to \mathbf{H}_3) *If Com is a computationally hiding commitment scheme, then the output distribution of the hybrids \mathbf{H}_2 and \mathbf{H}_3 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. In the transition from hybrid \mathbf{H}_2 to hybrid \mathbf{H}_3 the randomness of the party P_i that is used to generate the master secret key msk_i changes from being determined by the committed

values of all the parties, i.e. $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i}$ to a random value that is independent of the commitments $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i}\}_{k \in [n]}$ by computing $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i} \oplus r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}$, with a random value $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}$.

Assuming that the output distribution of H_1 and H_2 are distinguishable, we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that breaks the hiding of Com . The adversary \mathcal{A}' works as follows.

1. Sample two random values $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}, r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i'}$ and send them to the challenger \mathcal{C} .
2. Upon receiving $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}$ from \mathcal{C} act exactly as in H_2 (and H_3) with the following differences:
 - (a) In round 1 use $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}$ instead of freshly generated commitments.
 - (b) In round ℓ compute $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i}$ and generate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$, compute the partition of C , i.e. $(C_1 \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFEC.Partition}(1^\lambda, C)$ and generate $\text{sk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}_i, C_i; r_i^{\text{KeyGen}})$ for a random r_i^{KeyGen} .
 - (c) For every query $(x_j, r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow j}, R_{\text{com}}^j, r_j^{\text{Enc}})_{j \in I}$ and $C_{\text{comSetup}, i}^{\text{ct}, R_{\text{Setup}}^i}$ asked by the simulator $\Pi^{\text{M}}.\mathcal{S}$, parse $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}, i}$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^k\}_{k \in [n]}$ and $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}\}_{k \in [n]}$ for all $i \in [n]$. Also, parse R_{Setup}^i as $(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{j \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$ and R_{com}^j as $(r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{k \in [n]}$ for all $j \in I$. Afterwards, check that $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k} = \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k}; r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})$ for all $j \in I$ and $k \in [n]$. If this check fails, reply to the simulator with **Abort**. In the case that these tests pass, compute $r_i^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow i}$ and generate $\text{msk}_i \leftarrow \text{FE}_i.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$. Compute $r_j^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n]} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow j}$, generate $\text{msk}_j \leftarrow \text{FE}_j.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_j^{\text{Setup}})$ for all $j \in I$, compute $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{DFEC.Enc}(\{\text{msk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ and send $\text{ct}^* := (\text{ct}, \{r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow l}\}_{k \in [n], l \in [n] \setminus \{k\}})$ to $\Pi^{\text{M}}.\mathcal{S}$.
3. Output what \mathcal{A} outputs.

The proof ends with the observation that the output of \mathcal{A}' in the case where \mathcal{C} computes the commitments using the value $r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow i}$ corresponds to the output of H_2 , and to the output of H_3 otherwise. \square

To make the next transition possible, we need to introduce an intermediate hybrid H_3^* . This hybrid works as H_3 with the difference that once the adversary \mathcal{A} has received the third round, it is rewound up to the end of the first round after \mathcal{A} has provided its output. In the next step, a set of new random values $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$ is sampled and used to complete the interaction with the adversary \mathcal{A} instead of $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$ accordingly to H_3 . We introduce this hybrid to simplify our last reduction to the security of the FE combiner. We provide a more detailed description of the hybrid H_3^* below.

Hybrid H_3^* : This hybrid works as hybrid H_3 with the difference that look ahead threads are created. In more detail, in this hybrid, the first three rounds of the protocol are executed as in hybrid H_3 . When the simulator $\Pi^{\text{M}}.\mathcal{S}$ of the inner MPC sends the query $(x_j, r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow j}, R_{\text{com}}^j, r_j^{\text{Enc}})_{j \in I}$ and $C_{\text{comSetup}, i}^{\text{ct}, R_{\text{Setup}}^i}$, the simulator parses $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}, i}$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^k\}_{k \in [n]}$ and $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^i$ as $\{\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow k}\}_{k \in [n]}$ for all $i \in [n]$. It also parses R_{Setup}^i as $(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{j \in [n], k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$ and R_{com}^j as $(r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})_{k \in [n]}$ for all $j \in I$. Afterwards, it checks that $\text{com}_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k} = \text{Com}(r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k}; r_{\text{com}}^{j \rightarrow k})$ for all $j \in I$ and $k \in [n]$.

We now distinguish between two cases 1) the above check fails and 2) the above check is successful. We denote the event in which 1) occurs with E_1 and the event in which 2) occurs with E_2 . In the case that E_1 occurs, the hybrid behaves exactly as H_3 (i.e., no rewinds are needed) and the simulator \mathcal{S} replies to the query $(x_j, r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow j}, R_{\text{com}}^j, r_j^{\text{Enc}})_{j \in I}$ and $C_{\text{comSetup}, i}^{\text{ct}, R_{\text{Setup}}^i}$ with **Abort**. In the case of E_2 , the current thread becomes a look ahead thread and the execution is rewound until the beginning of the second round. Then the second and third

round are executed again with the difference that the random values $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$ sent in the second round of the look ahead thread are replaced with freshly generated random values $\{r_{\text{Setup}}''^{i \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I}$.

We distinguish again between the two cases where 1) the query made by $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ to its ideal functionality is valid and does not return **Abort** or 2) the query made by $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ is invalid and the ideal functionality returns **Abort**.¹⁷ We denote with F_1 the event that the first case occurs and with F_2 the event that the second case occurs. In the case of F_2 , we rewind the adversary again, create another look ahead thread and behave as described before. We repeat this procedure until the ideal functionality query asked by the simulator $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$ fulfills the condition, which puts us into event F_1 . Since we need to ensure that our hybrid experiment runs in polynomial time, we need to argue that the adversary \mathcal{A} gets rewound at most a polynomial number of times. We recall that in this proof we are assuming that the event E_1 happens with some non-negligible probability p . Given that the view of the adversary during the look-ahead threads is the same as in the main thread, we can claim that $\Pr[E_1] = \Pr[F_1]$. Hence, the number of rewinds is polynomial in the security parameter. Given that $\Pr[E_1] = \Pr[F_1]$ and that the view of the adversary in the look-ahead threads and in the main thread is identical, we can claim that the output distribution of H_3 and H_3^* are identical.

Claim 5.7 (Transition from H_3^* to H_4^*) *If DFEC is a single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner, then the hybrids H_3^* and H_4^* are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The hybrids H_3^* and H_4^* differ in the generation of the ciphertext ct that is output by the inner MPC protocol Π^M . In hybrid H_3^* the ciphertext is generated by encrypting the messages (x_1, \dots, x_n) using the encryption procedure DFEC.Enc , whereas in hybrid H_4^* the ciphertext is simulated using the inputs $(\{x_j\}_{j \in I}, C, C(x_1, \dots, x_n), I)$ and the simulator of the functional encryption combiner DFEC.S .

Assuming that the output distribution of H_3^* and H_4^* are distinguishable, we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that breaks the single-key simulation security of the decomposable FE combiner DFEC . The adversary \mathcal{A}' works as follows.

1. Interact with \mathcal{A} accordingly to H_3^* until the look ahead threads are created.
2. In the case that event E_1 occurs, the reduction stops here and outputs **Abort**. In the case that E_2 occurs save the values $r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow k}$ for all $j \in I, k \in [n]$ and submit the set of corrupted parties I and the circuit C to its underlying challenger \mathcal{C} .
3. Upon receiving the master secret keys $\{\text{msk}_j\}_{j \in I}$, as well as the functional key $\text{sk}_C = (\text{sk}_{C_1}, \dots, \text{sk}_{C_n})$ with $(C_1, \dots, C_n) \leftarrow \text{DFEC.Partition}(1^\lambda, C)$ for the circuit C compute $r_{\text{Setup}}''^{i \rightarrow j} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow j} \oplus r_j^{\text{Setup}}$ for all $j \in I$ with $\{r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow j}\}_{j \in I, k \in [n]}$ learned from the creation of the look-ahead threads.
4. Return to the main thread and output $(r_{\text{Setup}}''^{i \rightarrow j})_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$ in the second round. Continue with the execution until event F_1 occurs.
5. Act exactly as in H_3^* (and H_4^*) until the query $(x_j, r_{\text{Setup}}^{j \rightarrow j}, R_{\text{com}}^j, r_j^{\text{Enc}})_{j \in I}$ and $C_{\text{comSetup}, i}^{\text{ct}}, R_{\text{Setup}}^i$, asked by the simulator of Π^M , is checked for correctness.
6. Query the ideal functionality using $\{x_j\}_{j \in I}$ and receive $C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ as an answer.
7. Submit $(\{x_k\}_{k \in [n]}, C(x_1, \dots, x_n))$ to the challenger \mathcal{C} .
8. Upon receiving ct , send $\text{ct}^* := (\text{ct}, \{r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow l}\}_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}, l \in [n] \setminus \{k\}}, \{r_{\text{Setup}}''^{i \rightarrow l}\}_{l \in [n] \setminus \{i\}})$ to $\Pi^M.\mathcal{S}$.
9. Output what \mathcal{A} outputs.

¹⁷ We recall that the ideal functionality for $C_{\text{comSetup}, i}^{\text{ct}}, R_{\text{Setup}}^i$ is emulated by the simulator.

The proof ends with the observation that the output of \mathcal{A}'' in the case where \mathcal{C} computes the ciphertext using the values $\{x_k\}_{k \in [n]}$ corresponds to the output of H_3^* , and to the output of H_4^* otherwise.

For the final transition from H_4^* to H_4 , we need to simulate the ciphertext ct without the creation of look ahead threads. Since we do not need to rely on the challenger of the functional encryption combiner DFEC to simulate the ciphertext ct in H_4 , it is also not necessary to program the master secret keys of the corrupted parties $\{msk_j\}_{j \in I}$ to match the master secret keys generated by the challenger. This allows the simulator \mathcal{S} of the MPC protocol Π^{FE} to simulate the ciphertext using the master secret keys $\{msk_j\}_{j \in I}$ defined by the randomness $\{r_j^{\text{Setup}}\}$, i.e. $msk_j \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_j^{\text{Setup}})$ for all $j \in I$ with $r_j^{\text{Setup}} = \bigoplus_{k \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} r_{\text{Setup}}^{k \rightarrow j} \oplus r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow j}$. Therefore there is no need to sample the additional random values $\{r_{\text{Setup}'}^{i \rightarrow l}\}_{l \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$.

These changes do not affect the output distribution of H_4^* and H_4 , which makes the two hybrids perfectly indistinguishable. \square

The following theorem follows immediately from Theorem 5.1 and the definition of strong succinct FE combiners.

Theorem 5.8. *Let DFEC be a succinct single-key simulation secure decomposable FE combiner, then Π^{FE} is a circuit-scalable secure MPC protocol that realizes any single-output functionality with knowledge of outputs.*

Instantiations. To instantiate our compiler we need an ℓ -round k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol and a succinct decomposable FE combiner. From Theorem 4.4 and from the fact that the 4-round protocols proposed in [BGJ⁺18, CCG⁺20] do not require the input to compute the first two rounds, we can construct a k -Delayed-Input Function MPC protocol assuming that any of these assumptions holds: DDH, QR, N^{th} Residuosity, or the existence of malicious-secure OT, which, as already previously mentioned, also follows from the LWE assumption [FMV19]. Regarding the FE combiner, in [ABJ⁺19, Section 4], the authors mention that a functional encryption scheme that fulfills succinctness and can be used as an instantiation for the FE candidates of the FE combiner is the scheme of Goldwasser et al. [GKP⁺13]. However, our definition of *strong* succinctness for FE combiner requires the complexity of the setup algorithm to be dependent only on the circuit depth and the input and output size of the function being computed. For their instantiation, the authors of [ABJ⁺19] consider the FE protocol proposed in [GKP⁺13]. This can be instantiated from an attribute based encryption (ABE) scheme and a leveled fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, and becomes succinct (in the key-size and the description of the encryption circuit) when instantiated with one of the ABE schemes proposed in [BGG⁺14, GVW15] and one of the leveled FHE schemes of [BGV12, GSW13]. Fortunately, the scheme of Goldwasser et al. [GKP⁺13] provides succinctness also in the description of the setup algorithm when instantiated with the above ABE and FHE schemes. In more detail, the FE protocol proposed in [GKP⁺13] runs the setup algorithm of an ABE scheme N times, where $N := \text{poly}(\lambda, d, L_{\text{in}})$. Hence, we just need to make sure that also the description of the circuit of the setup procedure of the ABE schemes proposed in [BGG⁺14, GVW15] depends only on the circuit depth and the input and output size. In the work of Boneh et al. [BGG⁺14, Section 4] the authors present an attribute based encryption scheme based on the LWE assumption, where the setup algorithm takes as an input a unary representation of the security parameter λ and the input length L_{in} of the circuit that needs to be computed. Therefore the running time of this algorithm only depends on the security parameter and the circuit input-length, which results in $\text{poly}(\lambda, L_{\text{in}})$. The predicate encryption scheme presented in [GVW15, Section 4] is also based on the LWE assumption and the setup algorithm of this construction takes as an input a

unary representation of the security parameter λ , the input length L_{in} as well as the depth of the circuit d . This allows us to bound the circuit size of the setup algorithm as $\text{poly}(\lambda, d, L_{\text{in}})$. Hence, we get that the description of the setup circuit of the FE protocol of [GKP⁺13] is at most $cs_{\text{Setup}} = \text{poly}(\lambda, d, L_{\text{in}}, n)$. Given the above, we can now claim the following.

Theorem 5.9. *If the LWE assumption holds, then there exists a round optimal (4-round) circuit-scalable MPC protocol that realizes any single-output functionality with knowledge of outputs.*

By relying on the compilers proposed in [IKP10, LP09, AJW11] we can turn our protocol into a protocol that computes any function under the standard simulation based definition of MPC.

6 Our Compiler: Circuit-Independent MPC

We now show how to construct a communication efficient MPC protocol that realizes any single-output functionality f . We refer to Section 2 for a simplified description of the protocol for the two-party case and to Fig. 20 for the formal description of our compiler. We make use of the following tools:

- An ℓ -round k -delayed-input function MPC protocol $\Pi^M = (\Pi^M.\text{Next}_1, \dots, \Pi^M.\text{Next}_\ell, \Pi^M.\text{Out})$ (not necessarily communication efficient) with $k \geq 2$.
- A multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme MFHE = (Setup, Enc, Eval, Dec) for n keys.

$\underline{\Pi^{\text{FHE}}}$

Initialization: Each $i \in [n]$ party P_i has input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$ as its secret input.

Round 1.

1. Sample r_i^{Setup} and $r_i^{\text{Enc}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$.
2. Set $x'_i := (x_i, r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}})$ and compute $\text{msg}_{1,i} \leftarrow \Pi^M.\text{Next}_1(1^\lambda, x'_i)$.
3. Compute $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) := \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, r_i^{\text{Setup}})$.
4. Compute $\text{ct}_i := \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, x_i; r_i^{\text{Enc}})$.
5. Send $(\text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{pk}_i, \text{ct}_i)$.

Round 2.

1. Let τ_1 denote the transcript of the protocol Π^M up to round 1.
2. Compute $\text{ct}^i := \text{Eval}(C, (\text{pk}_1, \text{ct}_1), \dots, (\text{pk}_n, \text{ct}_n))$.
3. Compute $\text{msg}_{2,i} \leftarrow \Pi^M.\text{Next}_2(C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}, \tau_1)$, where $K^i := (\text{pk}_j, \text{ct}_j)_{j \in [n]}$.
4. Send $\text{msg}_{2,i}$.

For each round $k \in \{3, \dots, \ell\}$.

1. Let τ_{k-1} denote the transcript of the protocol Π^M up to round $k-1$.
2. Compute the k -th round message $\text{msg}_{k,i} \leftarrow \Pi^M.\text{Next}_k(\tau_{k-1})$.
3. Send $\text{msg}_{k,i}$.

Output Computation.

1. Let τ_ℓ denote the transcript of the protocol Π^M up to round ℓ .
2. Compute the output of Π^M as $y \leftarrow \Pi^M.\text{Out}(\tau_\ell)$.
3. Output y .

Fig. 20: The protocol Π^{FHE} that securely realizes f .

Input: $(x_i, r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}})_{i \in [n]}$.

- Parse K^i as $(\text{pk}_i, \text{ct}_i)_{i \in [n]}$.
- For all $i \in [n]$, check that $(\text{pk}_i, \cdot) = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$, $\text{ct}_i = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, x_i; r_i^{\text{Enc}})$ and compute $(\cdot, \text{sk}_i) = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$.
- Compute $y := \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n, \text{ct}^i)$.

If one of the above checks fails output \perp else return y to P_i .

Fig. 21: Circuit $C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}$

Theorem 6.1. *Let MFHE be a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme with circuit size cs_{Setup} for the setup algorithm MFHE.Setup, circuit size cs_{Enc} for the encryption algorithm MFHE.Enc, circuit size cs_{Dec} for the decryption algorithm MFHE.Dec and ciphertext size s_{ct} , let Π^{M} be the ℓ -round MPC protocol k -delayed-input function protocol, then Π^{FHE} is an ℓ -round MPC protocol that securely realizes the single-output functionality C with communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, cs_{\text{Dec}}, s_{\text{ct}})$.*

We split this theorem into two Lemmas and prove them separately:

Lemma 6.2. *Let MFHE be a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme with circuit size cs_{Setup} for the setup algorithm MFHE.Setup, circuit size cs_{Enc} for the encryption algorithm MFHE.Enc, circuit size cs_{Dec} for the decryption algorithm MFHE.Dec and ciphertext size s_{ct} , then Π^{FHE} has communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, cs_{\text{Dec}}, s_{\text{ct}})$.*

Proof. We divide the analysis of the communication complexity into two steps. In the first step, we analyze the communication complexity of the inner MPC protocol Π^{M} and in the second step the communication complexity of the additional values sent in the outer MPC protocol.

We remark that the operations executed inside the MPC protocol Π^{M} , besides the generation of the public and secret keys, the encryptions and the decryption, have communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n)$. Since the circuit size of the setup algorithm is cs_{Setup} , the circuit size of the encryption algorithm is cs_{Enc} and the circuit size of the decryption algorithm is cs_{Dec} the resulting message length is $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, cs_{\text{Dec}})$, i.e. $|\text{msg}_{k,i}| = \text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, cs_{\text{Dec}})$ for all $k \in \{1, \dots, \ell\}$ and all $i \in [n]$.

After analyzing the communication complexity of the inner MPC protocol Π^{M} , we continue with the analysis of the messages that are sent in addition to the messages of Π^{M} .

The additional messages, public keys and ciphertexts, that are output by every party P_i for all $i \in [n]$ in round 1 are of length $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, s_{\text{ct}}, s_{\text{pk}})$. This results in a communication complexity of $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, s_{\text{ct}}, s_{\text{pk}})$ for the additional messages.

Combining the two analysis yields an overall communication complexity of $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, cs_{\text{Setup}}, cs_{\text{Enc}}, cs_{\text{Dec}}, s_{\text{ct}}, s_{\text{pk}})$. \square

To specify the values cs_{Setup} , cs_{Enc} and cs_{Dec} we apply the definition of compactness for MFHE (Definition 3.10), which results in $s_{\text{ct}} = \text{poly}(\lambda, n)$. For the circuit sizes cs_{Setup} , cs_{Enc} and cs_{Dec} of the setup algorithm Setup, the encryption algorithm Enc and the decryption algorithm Dec, it holds that $cs_{\text{Setup}} = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $cs_{\text{Enc}} = \text{poly}(\lambda, L_{\text{in}})$ and $cs_{\text{Dec}} = \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{out}})$. This results in an overall communication complexity of $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$.

Lemma 6.3. *Let MFHE be a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and let Π^{M} be a k -delayed-input function ℓ -round MPC protocol (with $k \geq 2$), then Π^{FHE} is an ℓ -round MPC protocol that realizes the single-output functionality C .*

Proof. To prove our lemma we need to show that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S} such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^{\text{FHE}}, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{C, \mathcal{S}(z), I}^{\text{PKO}}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1]| ,$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

As before, for simplicity, we assume that all but one of the parties are corrupted. We denote the set that contains the indices of all the corrupted parties as I , i.e. $|I| = n - 1$. Before describing how \mathcal{S} works, we define an algorithm \mathcal{M} that we refer to as the *augmented machine*. The augmented machine internally runs the adversary \mathcal{A} (we refer to this as the right session), and acts as a proxy between \mathcal{A} and its external interface with respect to the messages of Π^{M} (we refer to this as the left session). To describe our simulator we then need to describe the augmented machine \mathcal{M} and how \mathcal{S} interacts with it (i.e., how the messages of Π^{M} are computed).

The reason why we describe our simulator via the augmented machine \mathcal{M} is to deal with the rewinds that the simulator of Π^{M} might do. We note that \mathcal{M} acts as an adversary for the protocol Π^{M} . Hence, we can consider the simulator $\Pi^{\text{M}}.\mathcal{S}$ for Π^{M} (which exists by assumption) for the adversary \mathcal{M} . Our simulator \mathcal{S} will then simply run $\Pi^{\text{M}}.\mathcal{S}$. For the formal description of \mathcal{M} we refer to Fig. 22 and for the formal description of \mathcal{S} we refer to Fig. 23.

We describe the hybrid experiments that we use to prove the lemma. We first give an informal description:

$\mathcal{M}(r_{\mathcal{A}})$:

Round 1.

1. Receive the message $\text{msg}_{1,i}$ in the left session.
2. Sample $r_i^{\text{Setup}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and compute $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) := \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$.
3. Sample $r_i^{\text{Enc}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and compute $\text{ct}_i := \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, 0; r_i^{\text{Enc}})$.
4. Output $(\text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{pk}_i, \text{ct}_i)$ in the right session.
5. Receive $(\text{msg}_{1,j}, \text{pk}_j^i, \text{ct}_j^i)_{j \in I}$ as a reply in the right session.
6. Output $\{\text{msg}_{1,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

Round 2.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{2,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the circuit $C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}$ and the messages $\{\text{msg}_{2,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

For each round $k \in \{3, \dots, \ell - 1\}$.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{k,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the messages $\{\text{msg}_{k,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

Round ℓ .

1. Receive the message $\text{msg}_{\ell,i}$ in the left session.
2. Send $\text{msg}_{\ell,i}$ in the right session.
3. Receive $\{\text{msg}_{\ell,j}\}_{j \in I}$ as a reply in the right session and output $\{\text{msg}_{\ell,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

Fig. 22: The augmented machine \mathcal{M} which emulates the adversary for Π^{M} .




Fig. 23: The simulator \mathcal{S} for our protocol Π^{FHE} .

Hybrid H_0 : Hybrid H_0 is identical to the real world.

Hybrid H_1 : In hybrid H_1 , the messages of the inner MPC protocol Π^M are simulated using the simulator $\Pi^M.S$ (which exists by assumption). The transition between hybrid H_0 and H_1 is justified by the malicious security of the MPC protocol Π^M and formally proven in Theorem 6.4.

Hybrid H_2 : Hybrid H_2 is identical to the ideal world. In this hybrid, the honestly generated ciphertext ct_i is replaced by an encryption of 0 under the same public key instead of an encryption of x_i . The transition between H_1 and H_2 is justified by the IND-CPA security of the multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme MFHE and formally proven in Theorem 6.5.

For the formal description of the hybrids, we also use an augmented machine. More precisely, we define a different augmented machine for each hybrid experiment. In addition, for each hybrid experiment H_k with $k \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ we need to specify how to construct the answers to the query made by the simulator $\Pi^M.S$. For the formal description of the augmented machines we refer to Fig. 25, whereas the formal description of the hybrid experiments is provided in Fig. 24.




Fig. 24: Description of the hybrids H_0, H_1, H_2 , where the machines \mathcal{M}_0 and \mathcal{M}_1 are defined in Fig. 25.

$\mathcal{M}_0(r_{\mathcal{A}}), \boxed{\mathcal{M}_1(\mathcal{A}, r_{\mathcal{A}})}$:

Round 1.

1. Receive the message $\text{msg}_{1,i}$ in the left session.
2. Compute $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) := \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$.
3. Compute $\text{ct}_i := \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, x_i; r_i^{\text{Enc}})$.

2. Sample $r_i^{\text{Setup}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and compute $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) := \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$.
3. Sample $r_i^{\text{Enc}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and compute $\text{ct}_i := \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, 0; r_i^{\text{Enc}})$.

4. Output $(\text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{pk}_i, \text{ct}_i)$ in the right session.
5. Receive $(\text{msg}_{1,j}, \text{pk}_j^i, \text{ct}_j^i)_{j \in I}$ as a reply in the right session.
6. Output $\{\text{msg}_{1,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

Round 2.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{2,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the circuit $C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}$ and the messages $\{\text{msg}_{2,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

For each round $k \in \{3, \dots, \ell - 1\}$.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{k,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the messages $\{\text{msg}_{k,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

Round ℓ .

1. Receive the message $\text{msg}_{\ell,i}$ in the left session.
2. Send $\text{msg}_{\ell,i}$ in the right session.
3. Receive $\{\text{msg}_{\ell,j}\}_{j \in I}$ as a reply in the right session and output $\{\text{msg}_{\ell,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

Fig. 25: The augmented machine \mathcal{M} which emulates the adversary for Π^M .

□

Claim 6.4 (Transition from H_0 to H_1) *Let Π^M be a maliciously secure MPC protocol, then the output distributions of the hybrid experiments H_0 and H_1 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. By assumption we know that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S}' such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^M, \mathcal{A}'(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{C_{\text{Dec}, \mathcal{S}'(z), I}^{\text{Dec}}}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1]|$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

Suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability then we can use the adversary $\mathcal{A}' := \mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ to break the security of Π^M . The description of the augmented machine \mathcal{M}_0 can be found in Fig. 25.

Note that $\mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ is a valid adversary for Π^M as, in each round $k \in [\ell]$ it waits to receive the messages of Π^M generated by the honest party P_i and replies with the messages computed by the malicious parties indexed by $[n] \setminus \{i\}$. In the reduction we have a challenger that, having black box access to $\mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$, either interacts with it using the messages of Π^M generated accordingly to the honest procedure or using the simulator \mathcal{S}' , which exists by the security definition. We note that in the case where the messages are generated accordingly to the honest procedure that the output of $\mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{A}, \cdot)$ corresponds to the output of H_0 , otherwise it corresponds to the output of H_1 .

Besides showing that the hybrids H_0 and H_1 are indistinguishable, we also need to show that the outputs of the protocol in both of the hybrids is correct with respect to its inputs. This means that we need to show that $C(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n, \text{ct}^i)$ for all possible inputs $(x_i, r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}})_{i \in [n]}$ and $C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}$ that pass all the tests described in Fig. 21. We prove this by contradiction. We assume that $C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ is unequal to the output of the MPC

protocol $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n, \text{ct}^i)$. In more detail, $C(x_1, \dots, x_n) \neq \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n, \text{ct}^i)$, where $\text{ct}_i^i := \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i^i, x_i; r_i^{\text{Enc}})$ with $(\text{pk}_i^i, \text{sk}_i) := \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$ and $\text{ct}^i = \text{Eval}(C, \text{ct}_1^1, \dots, \text{ct}_n^n)$. This directly yields a contradiction to the perfect correctness of the multi-key FHE scheme (Definition 3.8) or the k -delayed-input function security of the protocol. In more detail, perfect correctness states that $C(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n, \text{Eval}(C, \text{ct}_1^1, \dots, \text{ct}_n^n))$, where $\text{ct}_i^i := \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i^i, x_i; r_i^{\text{Enc}})$ for any x_i and any $r_i^{\text{Enc}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ with $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) := \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_i^{\text{Setup}})$ for any $r_i^{\text{Setup}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and the k -delayed-input function security of the protocol ensures that $\text{ct}^i = \text{Eval}(C, \text{ct}_1^1, \dots, \text{ct}_n^n)$. \square

Claim 6.5 (Transition from H_1 to H_2) *If MFHE is a semantic secure perfectly correct multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme, then the output distribution of the hybrids H_1 and H_2 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. The difference between H_1 and H_2 is that the encryption of x_i sent in the second round is replaced by an encryption of 0. Assuming that the output distribution of H_1 and H_2 are distinguishable, we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that breaks the semantic security of MFHE. The adversary \mathcal{A}' works as follows.

1. Receive pk_i from the challenger \mathcal{C} .
2. Send $(x_i, 0)$ to the challenger \mathcal{C} and receive ct_i as a reply.
3. Act exactly as in H_1 (and H_2) with the following differences:
 - (a) In round one output the keys pk_i and the ciphertext ct_i received from the challenger \mathcal{C} .
 - (b) For every query $(x_j, r_j^{\text{Setup}}, r_j^{\text{Enc}})_{j \in I}$ and $C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}$ asked by the simulator $\Pi^M \cdot \mathcal{S}$, parse $K^i := (\text{pk}_j, \text{ct}_j)_{j \in [n]}$ and check that $(\text{pk}_j, \cdot) = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; r_j^{\text{Setup}})$ and $\text{ct}_j = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_j, x_j; r_j^{\text{Enc}})$ for all $j \in I$. If this checks fails, **Abort**. In the case that the check passes, query the ideal functionality C using $\{x_j\}_{j \in I}$, receive $y := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ as an output and send y to $\Pi^M \cdot \mathcal{S}$.
 - (c) Output what \mathcal{A} outputs.

To ensure that the adversary \mathcal{A} does not have a distinguishing advantage between the hybrids H_1 and H_2 , we need to show that the output of the protocol in H_1 and H_2 is the same. This means we need to show that $C(x_1, \dots, x_n) \neq \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n, \text{ct}^i)$ for all possible inputs $(x_i, r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}})_{i \in [n]}$ and $C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}$ to the protocol Π^M that pass all the checks. Now, we assume that this is not the case and that there exists an input $(x_i, r_i^{\text{Setup}}, r_i^{\text{Enc}})_{i \in [n]}$ and $C_{\text{ct}^i, K^i}^{\text{Dec}}$ to the protocol Π^M that pass all the checks, such that $C(x_1, \dots, x_n) \neq \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_n, \text{ct}^i)$, but this would yield a contradiction to the perfect correctness of the multi-key FHE scheme (Definition 3.8) or the k -delayed-input function security of the protocol Π^M as described in the proof of Theorem 6.4. This results in the fact that the output of the protocol in H_1 and H_2 is the same for every possible correct input. This also results in the correctness of the outputs in both hybrids as in Theorem 6.5.

The proof ends with the observation that the output of \mathcal{A}'' in the case where \mathcal{C} has encrypted x_i corresponds to the output of H_1 , and to the output of H_2 otherwise. \square

Due to Theorem 6.1 and the definition of a compact multi-key FHE scheme we have the following theorem.

Theorem 6.6. *Let MFHE be a compact multi-key FHE scheme, then Π^{FHE} is a circuit-independent secure MPC protocol that realizes any single-output functionality.*

We can easily modify Π^{FHE} to obtain a protocol $\Pi^{\text{FHE}'}$ which has a communication complexity of $O(L_{\text{in}}) + \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{out}})$. The protocol $\Pi^{\text{FHE}'}$ works exactly as Π^{FHE} with the following differences. Every party P_i encrypts a short seed s_i of a PRG using the FHE scheme, i.e.

$\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, s_i; r_i^s)$, and sends it together with the value $w_i = \text{PRG}(s_i) \oplus x_i$ to all the other parties P_j with $j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$. The party P_i , upon receiving $(\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_j, s; r_j^s), w_j)$ from all the other parties P_j with $j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$, computes $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_j, \text{PRG}(s_j))$, using homomorphic operations, $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_j, w_j)$ by encrypting w_j using pk_j , and then homomorphically XORs the resulting ciphertexts to receive $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_j, x_j)$. This ciphertext can now be used to run the evaluation algorithm and compute $\text{Enc}(\{\text{pk}_j\}, f(x_1, \dots, x_n))$. The parties now check that the ciphertexts $\{w_j\}_{j \in [n]}$ are well formed by running the MPC protocol as described in Fig. 21.

Theorem 6.7. *Let MFHE be a compact multi-key FHE scheme, then $\Pi^{\text{FHE}'}$ is a secure MPC protocol with communication complexity $O(L_{\text{in}}) + \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{out}})$ that realizes any single-output functionality.*

Instantiations. To instantiate the underlying multi-key FHE scheme, we can rely on the work of López-Alt et al. [LTV12]. In their work, they present several schemes. The first scheme is a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme for a constant number of parties that allows for the evaluation of any circuit based on a perfectly correct FHE scheme. As an instantiation for the perfectly correct FHE scheme we could for example use [BGV12] which can be either based on LWE or ring-LWE. Additionally, López-Alt et al. present a multi-key FHE scheme for any number of parties based on the Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) and the ring-LWE assumption.

Due to [LTV12, LP09, AJW11] and the fact that maliciously secure OT can be instantiated based on LWE [FMV19], we can claim the following.

Corollary 6.8. *If the ring-LWE and DSPR assumptions hold and any of the DDH, QR, N^{th} Residuosity or LWE assumption hold, or there exists a malicious-secure OT, then there exists a round optimal (4-round) circuit-independent MPC protocol that realizes any functionality.*

7 From Privacy with Knowledge of Outputs to Standard Security

We recall that a protocol that realizes a functionality f without knowledge of outputs allows the adversary to see the output of the computation y , and then lets the adversary decide what the output of the honest parties should be. We can rely on the results of [IKP10] and [PC12] where the authors present a compiler that turns a protocol Π^{PKO} that realizes any *single-output* function under security with knowledge of outputs, into a protocol Π^{Corr} that securely realizes any single-output function in the standard simulation based sense. In this section, we recap the compiler of [IKP10] and [PC12] as well as their security proof. Since Ishai et al. already showed that their compiler preserves the round complexity, we only need to argue that it also preserves the communication complexity of the underlying protocol.

Before we formally define the compiler, we present an informal description and a proof intuition of the protocol.

7.1 Informal Description

To turn a protocol with knowledge of outputs Π^{PKO} that realizes the circuit C into a protocol Π^{Corr} that achieves standard simulation based security for the same circuit, we make use of a signature scheme DS. In more detail, every party P_i will sample a verification and signing key $(\text{vk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and use the key sk_i together with a random value r_i and the inputs x_i as the input to the MPC protocol Π^{PKO} . In addition, each party sends its verification key vk_i to the other parties. The circuit that the MPC protocol Π^{PKO} evaluates consists of two steps. In the first step, it computes the circuit C on the inputs (x_1, \dots, x_n) and generates $y := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$.

In the last step, the output y is signed under the different signing keys, i.e. the signatures $\sigma_i \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_i, y; r_i)$ are generated for all $i \in [n]$. The output of the MPC protocol Π^{PKO} then corresponds to the output y and all the signatures $\{\sigma_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ generated under the signing keys $\{\text{sk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ of all the parties P_i . Finally, every party P_i uses the received verification keys $\{\text{vk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ to verify all the signatures, i.e. it computes $b_i \leftarrow \text{Verify}(\text{vk}_i, y, \sigma_i)$ for all $i \in [n]$. If one of the values b_i is equal to 0, then the honest parties abort. The unforgeability of the digital signature scheme DS ensures that no party is able to create signatures for the verification keys of an honest party. Intuitively, this means that an adversary that receives the output cannot tamper with it unless it can break the security of the signature scheme.

7.2 Formal Description

Now, we describe the protocol Π^{Corr} formally. We start by describing the building blocks used for the construction of Π^{Corr} .

Building Blocks. Let C be the single-input function that we want to securely evaluate. The tools that we use to construct our protocol, which we denote with Π^{Corr} , are the following.

- A signature scheme $\text{DS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$.
- A protocol Π^{PKO} that realizes the function C_σ with knowledge of outputs described in Fig. 27.

We refer to Fig. 26 for the formal description of Π^{Corr} .




Fig. 26: Our compiler: from MPC with knowledge of outputs to MPC with correctness.




Fig. 27: Circuit C_σ

Theorem 7.1. *Let C be an n -party single-output randomized functionality, if DS is a signature scheme and Π^{PKO} realizes the function C_σ with knowledge of outputs then Π^{Corr} securely realizes C .*

Proof. To prove our lemma we need to show that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S} such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^{\text{Corr}}, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{C, \mathcal{S}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1]| ,$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and I denotes the set that contains the indices of all the corrupted parties, i.e. $|I| = n - 1$. Also in this case, for simplicity, we assume that all but one of the parties is corrupted. Before describing how \mathcal{S} works, we define an algorithm \mathcal{M} . The augmented machine internally runs the adversary \mathcal{A} (we refer to this interaction as the right session), and acts as a proxy between \mathcal{A} and its external interface with respect to the messages of Π^{PKO} (that we call left session). To describe our simulator we need to describe the augmented machine \mathcal{M} and its interaction with \mathcal{S} (i.e., how the messages of Π^{PKO} are computed).

The reason why we describe our simulator using the augmented machine \mathcal{M} is to deal with the unknown actions that the simulator of Π^{PKO} might execute (e.g., rewinds). More precisely, the augmented machine \mathcal{M} acts as an adversary for the protocol Π^{PKO} .

By assumption, we know that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S}' such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^{\text{PKO}}, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{C, \mathcal{S}'(z), I}^{\text{PKO}}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1]|$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

Therefore, we can run the simulator \mathcal{S}' for the adversary \mathcal{M} . For the formal description of \mathcal{M} we refer to Fig. 28 and for the formal description of \mathcal{S} we refer to Fig. 29.

$\mathcal{M}(r_{\mathcal{A}})$:

For round 1.

1. Compute $(\text{vk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{1,i}$ from the left session send $(\text{msg}_{1,i}, \text{vk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} .
3. Receive the messages $(\text{msg}_{1,j}, \text{vk}_j)_{j \in I}$ and forward $\{\text{msg}_{1,j}\}_{j \in I}$ in the left session.

For each Round $k \in \{2, \dots, \ell\}$.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{k,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the messages $\{\text{msg}_{k,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

Fig. 28: The augmented machine \mathcal{M} which emulates the adversary for Π^{PKO} .

\mathcal{S}

- Sample a sufficiently long random R and run the simulator $\Pi^{\text{PKO}}.\mathcal{S}$ for the adversary \mathcal{M} .
- For every query $(x_j, \text{sk}_j, r_j)_{j \in I}$ issued by $\Pi^{\text{M}}.\text{PKO}$ do the following:
 1. Query the ideal functionality using $\{x_j\}_{j \in I}$ and receive $y = C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ as an output.
 2. Sample a random value $r_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$.
 3. Compute $\sigma_k \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_k, y; r_k)$ for all $k \in [n]$ and output $(y, \{\sigma_k\}_{k \in [n]})$.
- When $\Pi^{\text{one}}.\mathcal{S}$ stops, output what $\Pi^{\text{one}}.\mathcal{S}$ outputs.

Fig. 29: The simulator \mathcal{S} for our protocol Π^{Corr} .

Hybrid H_0 : Hybrid H_0 is identical to the real world experiment

Hybrid H_1 : . By assumption, we know that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S}' such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^{\text{PKO}}, \mathcal{A}'(z), I}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{C, \mathcal{S}'(z), I}^{\text{PKO}}(\lambda, \mathbf{x}) = 1]|$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$. In hybrid H_1 the messages of Π^{PKO} are simulated using \mathcal{S}' . In more details, H_1 runs \mathcal{S}' and the adversary \mathcal{A} , and acts exactly as in H_0 with the following differences.

1. All the messages of Π^{PKO} are replaced with the messages of \mathcal{S}' .
2. Upon receiving the query $(x_j, \text{sk}_j, r_j)_{j \in I}$ from \mathcal{S}' (who wants to query the ideal world functionality to evaluate C_σ), compute $y := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$.
3. For each $k \in [n]$ compute $\sigma_k \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_k, y; r_k)$ and send $(y, (\sigma_k)_{k \in [n]})$ to \mathcal{S}' .
4. Let $\{\text{vk}_k\}_{k \in [n]}$ be the verification keys sent in the first round respectively by P_1, \dots, P_n and $(y', (\sigma'_k)_{k \in [n]})$ be the output computed by \mathcal{S}' for the honest parties. If for all $k \in [n]$ $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}_k, y', \sigma'_k) = 1$ then output y' , otherwise output \perp .

We show that the output distributions of the two hybrids is indistinguishable, and then prove that the output received by the honest parties in both hybrids is correct.

Lemma 7.2 (Transition from H_0 to H_1). *Let Π^{PKO} be a maliciously secure MPC protocol, then the output distributions of the hybrids H_0 and H_1 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. By contradiction, we assume that the output distributions of H_0 and H_1 are distinguishable by a non-negligible quantity p . If this is the case, then we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that breaks the security of Π^{PKO} . The adversary \mathcal{A}' works exactly as in H_0 (and H_1) with the difference that it acts as a proxy with respect to all the messages of Π^{PKO} between \mathcal{A} and an external challenger. The external challenger tosses a coin b' , and if $b' = 0$ then the messages of Π^{PKO} are computed accordingly to the honest procedure, otherwise those messages are computed accordingly to \mathcal{S}' . The output of \mathcal{A}' corresponds to the output of \mathcal{A} . We note that in the case where $b' = 0$ the output of \mathcal{A}' corresponds to the output of \mathcal{A} in H_0 , and to the output of \mathcal{A} in H_1 otherwise. \square

We define the event WrongOutput_{H_b} as the event in which the output computed by the honest party is incorrect (i.e., P_i accepts $y \neq y' := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ as a valid output) in the hybrid $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

We now prove the following lemma.

Lemma 7.3. $|\Pr[\text{WrongOutput}_{H_0}] - \Pr[\text{WrongOutput}_{H_1}]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

The proof of this lemma follows immediately from Lemma 7.2

What remains to be proven is the following lemma.

Lemma 7.4. $\Pr[\text{WrongOutput}_{H_1}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Assume by contradiction that $\Pr[\text{WrongOutput}_{H_1}]$ is equal to a non-negligible quantity p , then we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}^{DS} that breaks the security of the digital signature scheme DS. The adversary \mathcal{A}^{DS} receives a verification key vk from the challenger of the unforgeability security game, and on input x_i acts as follows.

1. Run accordingly to H_1 and upon receiving the query $(x_j, \text{sk}_j, r_j)_{j \in I}$ from \mathcal{S}' (who wants to query the ideal functionality to evaluate C_σ), compute $y := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$.
2. For each $j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$ compute $\sigma_j \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_j, y)$, query the signing oracle $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}_i, \cdot)$ on input y thus obtaining the signature σ_i .
3. Send $(y, (\sigma_j)_{j \in [n]})$ to \mathcal{S}' .
4. Let $\text{vk}_1, \dots, \text{vk}_n$ be the verification keys sent in the first round respectively by P_1, \dots, P_n and y', σ'_i be the output computed by \mathcal{S}' for the honest party P_i . If $\text{Verify}(\text{vk}_i, y', \sigma'_i) = 1$ with $y \neq y'$ then output (σ'_i, y') as the forgery and stop, otherwise output \perp and stop.

Having assumed by contradiction that $\Pr[\text{WrongOutput}_{H_1}]$ is equal to a non-negligible quantity p , then \mathcal{A}^{DS} is able to forge the signature scheme DS with non-negligible probability p . \square

The proof ends with the observation that the output distribution of H_1 is identical to the one of \mathcal{S} (which is described in Fig. 29) and that \mathcal{S} never uses the input of the honest party P_i . \square

To analyze the communication complexity of the resulting protocol Π^{PKO} , we define the input and output size of C with L_{in} and L_{out} and the communication complexity of Π^{PKO} with CP when the circuit being evaluated is C_σ . We can immediately conclude that the input size of C_σ is $L'_{\text{in}} := \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{in}})$ and the outputs size is $L'_{\text{out}} := \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{out}})$. Now we can state our theorem.

Theorem 7.5. *If Π^{PKO} has communication complexity CP when evaluating the circuit C_σ , then Π^{Corr} has communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, \text{CP}, L'_{\text{in}}, L'_{\text{out}}) = \text{poly}(\lambda, n, \text{CP}, L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$ when evaluating C .*

8 Individual Outputs for each party

Besides achieving security with correctness from a protocol with knowledge of output security, we need to show how to turn a protocol for single output functionalities Π^{one} (i.e., a protocol that provides the same output to all the parties), into a protocol that realizes any functionality Π^{many} . Here, we can rely on the compiler presented in [LP09, Section 2]. As in the previous section, we recap here the compiler of [LP09] and their security proof. Additionally, we show that also this compiler preserves the round and the communication complexity of the input protocol.

Before we formally define the compiler, we present an informal description and a proof intuition of the protocol.

8.1 Informal Description

Let P_1, \dots, P_n be the set of parties and x_1, \dots, x_n their respective inputs. Let $(y_1, \dots, y_n) := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ be the function that these parties want to compute in such a way that each party P_i learns only y_i and nothing beyond that. Our compiler makes use of Π^{one} and of a symmetric encryption scheme SE.

P_i samples a random value r_i , generates a symmetric encryption key $k_i \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and uses (k_i, r_i, x_i) as the input to the MPC protocol Π^{one} . Π^{one} evaluates the circuit C_{many} that 1) computes the circuit C on the inputs (x_1, \dots, x_n) and generates $(y_1, \dots, y_n) := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$. In the last step, the outputs (y_1, \dots, y_n) are encrypted using the different keys, i.e., the ciphertexts $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_i, y_i; r_i)$ are generated for all $i \in [n]$. The output of the MPC protocol Π^{one} then consists of all the ciphertexts $\{c_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ (we recall that the same set of ciphertexts is sent to all parties). Finally, every party P_i uses its secret key k_i to decrypt the ciphertext c_i thus obtaining y_i . The security of the symmetric encryption scheme ensures that no party learns anything about the outputs of the other parties. We also note that if the communication complexity of Π^{one} is CT then the communication complexity of Π^{many} is $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, \text{CT})$.

This concludes the description of the protocol Π^{many} .

8.2 Formal Description

Now, we describe the protocol Π^{many} formally. We start by describing the building blocks used for the construction of Π^{many} .

Building Blocks. Our Construction makes use of the following cryptographic tools:

- A secret key encryption scheme $SE := (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$.
 - A protocol Π^{one} that realizes the circuit C_{many} described in Fig. 31.
- A formal description of the protocol Π^{many} is presented below.

Π^{many}

Each party P_i , on input x_i executes the following steps:

1. Compute $k_i \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. Run the protocol Π^{one} using input (x_i, k_i, r_i) for a random value r_i .
3. Upon receiving the output $\{c_j\}_{j \in [n]}$ of Π^{one} , compute $y_i = \text{Dec}(k_i, c_i)$ and output y_i .

Fig. 30: Description of the protocol Π^{many} .

Input: $(x_i, k_i, r_i)_{i \in [n]}$
 Compute $(y_1, \dots, y_n) := C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and
 $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_i, y_i; r_i)$ for all $i \in [n]$

Output: $\{c_i\}_{i \in [n]}$.

Fig. 31: Circuit C_{many}

Theorem 8.1. *Let C be an n party many-output randomized functionality, if $SE = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is an IND-CPA secure secret key encryption scheme and Π^{one} realizes the function C_{many} , which is a single-output functionality, then Π^{many} securely realizes C .*

Proof. To prove our lemma we need to show that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{S} such that for any $I \subset [n]$ the following quantity is negligible:

$$|\Pr[\text{Real}_{\Pi^{\text{many}}, \mathcal{A}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Ideal}_{C, \mathcal{S}(z), I}(k, \mathbf{x}) = 1]| ,$$

where $\mathbf{x} = \{x_i\}_{i \in [n]} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

Before describing how \mathcal{S} works, we define an algorithm \mathcal{M} . The augmented machine internally runs the adversary \mathcal{A} (we refer to this interaction as the right session), and acts as a proxy between \mathcal{A} and its external interface with respect to the messages of Π^{one} (to which we refer to as the left session). To describe our simulator we need to describe the augmented machine \mathcal{M} and its interaction with \mathcal{S} (i.e., how the messages of Π^{one} are computed). More precisely, the augmented machine \mathcal{M} acts as an adversary for the protocol Π^{one} . Hence, we can consider the simulator $\Pi^{\text{one}}.\mathcal{S}$ for Π^{one} for the adversary \mathcal{M} . Our simulator \mathcal{S} will then simply run $\Pi^{\text{one}}.\mathcal{S}$. For the formal description of \mathcal{M} we refer to Fig. 32 and for the formal description of \mathcal{S} we refer to Fig. 33.

$\mathcal{M}(r_{\mathcal{A}})$:

For each Round $k \in \{1, \dots, \ell\}$.

1. Upon receiving the message $\text{msg}_{k,i}$ from the left session forward it to \mathcal{A} .
2. Receive the messages $\{\text{msg}_{k,j}\}_{j \in I}$ and forward them in the left session.

Fig. 32: The augmented machine \mathcal{M} which emulates the adversary for Π^{one} .




Fig. 33: The simulator \mathcal{S} for our protocol Π^{many} .

We propose the description of a simulator \mathcal{S} (Fig. 33), and consider the following sequence of hybrids to show that the real world is indistinguishable from the ideal world.

Hybrid H_0 : Hybrid H_0 is identical to the real world experiment.

Hybrid H_1 : In hybrid H_1 , the inner MPC protocol Π^{M} is simulated instead of honestly generated.

The transition between hybrid H_0 and H_1 is justified by the malicious security of the MPC protocol Π^{M} and formally proven in Lemma 8.2.

Hybrid H_2 This hybrid is identical to the ideal world. In this hybrid, the ciphertext that is an encryption of the output y_i for party P_i is exchanged with an encryption of a random value. The transition between hybrid H_1 and H_2 is justified by the IND-CPA security of the single key encryption scheme SE and formally proven in Lemma 8.3.

Putting everything together, we obtain the theorem. □

Lemma 8.2 (Transition from H_0 to H_1). *Let Π^{one} be a maliciously secure MPC protocol, then the hybrids H_0 and H_1 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability. We use \mathcal{A} to construct an augmented machine \mathcal{M} that breaks the security of the underlying MPC protocol Π^{M} .

We describe the interactive machine \mathcal{M} that interacts with the MPC protocol Π^{M} as all the corrupted parties in the left session and with an adversary \mathcal{A} using randomness $r_{\mathcal{A}}$ in the right session. Afterwards we describe how to reply to ideal functionality queries asked by the simulator $\Pi^{\text{M}}.\mathcal{S}$. We stress that whenever the augmented machine is rewound by the inner MPC protocol it rewinds the adversary \mathcal{A} it is interacting with accordingly and continues the execution with \mathcal{A} using the randomness $r_{\mathcal{A}}$ afterwards.

The augmented machine \mathcal{M} acts as an intermediary between the left and the right session. It forwards the messages it receives in the left session, which represent the messages of the party P_i , to the adversary \mathcal{A} in the right session and it also forwards the messages that it receives in the right session, representing the messages of the corrupted parties P_j , to the left session.

To finish the description of the reduction, and to achieve consistency between the output of the inner MPC protocol Π^{one} and the interactions of the parties, we need to adjust the answers given to the ideal functionality queries by the simulator $\Pi^{\text{one}}.\mathcal{S}$.

For every query $(x_j, k_j, r_j)_{j \in I}$ generate a secret key $k_i \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, sample a random value $r_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and compute $(y_1, \dots, y_n) = C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$. In the next step, encrypt the outputs under the different secret keys, i.e. compute $c_k \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_k, y_k; r_k)$ for all $k \in [n]$. Finally, send $\{c_k\}_{k \in [n]}$ as a reply to the simulator $\Pi^{\text{one}}.\mathcal{S}$. This concludes the description of the simulator.

Since we assume that the adversary \mathcal{A} is able to distinguish between the two hybrids H_0 and H_1 with non-negligible probability, it would be able to detect if the messages $\text{msg}_{1,i}, \dots, \text{msg}_{4,i}$ of the underlying MPC are simulated or honestly generated. This would also allow the machine \mathcal{M}

to distinguish if the inner MPC Π^M has been simulated or honestly generated which contradicts the malicious security of the inner MPC Π^M . Therefore, the claim follows. \square

Lemma 8.3 (Transition from H_1 to H_2). *Let $SE = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an IND-CPA secure secret key encryption scheme, then the hybrids H_1 and H_2 are computationally indistinguishable.*

Proof. In the transition from hybrid H_1 to hybrid H_2 the ciphertext c_i that is an encryption of the output y_i for the party P_i is changed to an encryption of a random value r .

To describe the transition from H_1 to H_2 , we need to define the answers to the simulator Π^M when it queries its ideal functionality. We do not need to change anything in the description of the augmented machine \mathcal{M} since it behaves in both hybrids in the same way, with the only difference that the augmented machine does not need to send any input (x_i, k_i) since the protocol execution is simulated. We prove the indistinguishability of H_1 and H_2 with a reduction to the IND-CPA security of the symmetric encryption scheme SE . In more detail, we suppose that there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability and we use this adversary \mathcal{A} together with the augmented machine \mathcal{M} to break the IND-CPA security of the underlying secret key encryption scheme SE in a game with the challenger \mathcal{C} .

To finish the description of the reduction, and to achieve consistency between the output of the inner MPC protocol and the interactions of the parties, we need to adjust the answers given to the ideal functionality queries by the simulator $\Pi^M.S$.

For any ideal functionality query $(x_j, k_j)_{j \in I}$ asked by the simulator Π^{one} , query the ideal functionality to receive $(y_1, \dots, y_n) = C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and encrypt the outputs for the corrupted parties P_j under the different secret keys, i.e. compute $c_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_j, y_j)$ for all $j \in I$. For the output y_i belonging to the honest party P_i send the tuple (y_i, r) with a random value r to the underlying challenger \mathcal{C} . The challenger replies with the ciphertext c_i . Finally, send $\{c_k\}_{k \in [n]}$ as a reply to the simulator $\Pi^{\text{one}}.S$. This concludes the description of the reduction.

In the case that the challenger replies with an encryption of y_i , the experiment between \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{A} corresponds to H_1 and when the challenger replies to \mathcal{M} with an encryption of the random value r , the experiment corresponds to H_2 . Since we assume that the adversary \mathcal{A} is able to distinguish between the two hybrids H_1 and H_2 with non-negligible probability, it would be able to detect if the encryption c_i output in the second round corresponds to the value y_i or r . This would also allow the machine \mathcal{M} to distinguish between the values its underlying challenger has encrypted which contradicts the IND-CPA security of the secret encryption scheme SE . This leads to a contradiction and therefore the claim follows. \square

To analyze the communication complexity of the resulting protocol Π^{PKO} , we define the input and output size of C with L_{in} and L_{out} and the communication complexity of Π^{one} with CP' when the circuit being evaluated is C_{many} . We can immediately conclude that the input size of C_{many} is $L'_{\text{in}} := \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{in}})$ and the outputs size is $L'_{\text{out}} := \text{poly}(\lambda, n, L_{\text{out}})$.

We state the theorem regarding the communication complexity of Π^{many} formally.

Theorem 8.4. *If Π^{one} has communication complexity CP' when evaluating the circuit C_{many} , then Π^{many} has communication complexity $\text{poly}(\lambda, n, \text{CP}', L'_{\text{in}}, L'_{\text{out}}) = \text{poly}(\lambda, n, \text{CP}', L_{\text{in}}, L_{\text{out}})$ when evaluating C .*

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