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Quiet War in Germany: Friedrich Schelling and Friedrich Schleiermacher

Zachary Purvis

History is really the science of that which is, for everything before now is revealed as the basis for the present.
—Friedrich Schleiermacher (1793)

I have learned to see that religion, public faith, and life in the state form the point around which everything else revolves.
—F. W. J. Schelling (1806)

As the nineteenth century dawned, the philosopher F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854) announced that the present epoch was “surely bound to give birth to a new world,” with universities strategically occupying the vanguard. Schelling’s Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums (1803), addresses he delivered in Jena in 1802, profoundly shaped the

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3 F. W. J. Schelling, “Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums,” in
future of German higher education in general, and the founding of the new Prussian University of Berlin in 1810—a replacement for Prussia’s humiliating loss of the University of Halle in 1806—in particular. After the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, Friedrich Wilhelm III pronounced, “the state must replace intellectually what it has lost physically,” and Schelling’s Vorlesungen constructed much of the intellectual framework for that task. Furthermore, the Vorlesungen wielded a “determining influence,” Arnaldo Momigliano suggested, upon the “first phase of the so-called ‘Historismus,’” promoting “empirical history against the theory of a history a priori.”

In an intriguing outcome, however, Schelling’s lectures also elicited a lengthy critical review by the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), who was himself an honorary member of the Jena circle and a major intellectual architect of the University of Berlin. In the embellished words


7 On Schleiermacher and Jena Romanticism, see Theodore Ziolkowski, German Roman-
of Karl Barth, Schleiermacher was “the great Niagara Falls” to which the theology of two centuries was inexorably drawn. As the “Church Father” of the nineteenth century, Schleiermacher’s relation to Schelling had considerable ramifications for the orientation of academic, scientific (wissenschaftliche) theology in modern Europe. Formidable Protestants from Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860) to Albrecht Ritschl (1822–89) found in both a deep well from which to draw for their own accounts of the Christian religion. Members of the “Catholic Tübingen School” evidenced perhaps to an even greater extent the influence of Schelling’s and Schleiermacher’s ideas arising from their interaction—a line of influence that reached even to the Second Vatican Council. Despite this, historians have generally neglected Schleiermacher’s review. The contours of Schleiermacher’s engagement with Schelling thus warrant investigation.

In this article, I contend that the acrimonious exchange between Schleiermacher and Schelling left a lasting impression on the development of the modern German university and the nature of Schleiermacher’s pivotal


and formative ideas on academic theology; specifically, that is, their disagreements masked deeper commonalities, which together contributed to the historicization of theology in the nineteenth century. The affair turned on the organization and methodological coherence of academic disciplines, the status of philosophical speculation and historical criticism in theology, and how both fit together in contested models of German higher education. Without reducing disagreements solely to matters of biography, the particular personality of each figure factored into the altercation. In his contentious review, Schleiermacher critiqued Schelling at numerous points, but proceeded in his own work to repeat many of the same concerns he found so distasteful. With suggestive imagery given the tumult of the French Revolution and commencing Napoleonic Wars, Schleiermacher observed that he was engaged in a “quiet war” with Schelling.

Part I of this article explores Schelling’s Vorlesungen in the context of the European reform movements targeting universities from the late eighteenth century to the founding of the University of Berlin. Part II considers Schleiermacher’s review and the import for his own statements on the structure of the German university and the academic study of theology. Part III interprets the significance of biographical matters: in the midst of their “quiet war,” the two figures nearly became colleagues at the Bavarian University of Würzburg, adding another layer of complexity. Their exchange inspired later paradigms of Protestant and Catholic academic theology that would dominate German intellectual life, enabling original and creative research into the twentieth century.

**SCHELLING, THE FACULTIES, AND UNIVERSITY THEOLOGY**

Like numerous other towering German intellectuals of the same era, Schelling was a pastor’s son, descending from Lutheran clergy on both sides of his family. He was born in the small town of Leonberg, west of Stuttgart, where his father Joseph Friedrich was an assistant pastor. The family moved in the year of Schelling’s birth to Bebenhausen, when his father received a call to teach theology there at the Protestant school and former Cistercian monastery. Swabian Pietism informed his upbringing: his father and his grandfather were followers of the speculative Pietists Johann Albrecht

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14 Robert Minder, “Das Bild des Pfarrhauses in der deutschen Literatur,” in *Kunst und Literatur in Deutschland und Frankreich* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1963), 44–72.
Bengel (1687–1752) and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–82), initiating Schelling into their company well before he read Jacob Böhme and made the acquaintance in Munich of Franz von Baader, who himself had deep ties to Meister Eckhart, Böhme, and Saint-Martin. At age 15, Schelling entered the venerable Tübingen Stift, famously sharing rooms with G. W. F. Hegel and Friedrich Hölderlin. In 1798, at only twenty-three years of age, he received a call from Goethe to lecture at Jena. He would later hold various positions in Würzburg, Munich, Stuttgart, Erlangen, and Berlin. At Berlin, the last and frequently studied of his active academic periods, he was called to fill Hegel's vacant chair by Friedrich Wilhelm IV, with the express purpose to crush “the dragon-seed of Hegelian pantheism.” Yet as Warren Breckman and John E. Toews remind us, the oft-discussed “Schelling in Berlin” cannot be identified neatly with the “Schelling of the early Romantic movement,” nor with Schelling as he prepared to leave Jena and began to settle in Würzburg and Munich.

Schelling’s lectures on academic study belonged to a lengthy series on the topic of universities at Jena. By the late eighteenth century, German universities were marked generally by “ongoing lethargy, decline, and frequent crises,” with the progressive institutions in Halle (founded in 1694) and Göttingen (1737) proving moderate exceptions. The University of Jena, founded in 1576, had increasingly earned an ignoble reputation, built upon regular accounts of dueling and student unrest.

During Napoleon’s imperial reign, his reforms throughout the satellite

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20 McClelland, State, Society, and University in Germany, 33.
21 Ziolkowski, German Romanticism, 228–34.
states resulted in the closing of many of Europe’s prestigious universities. French state centralization of higher education and abolishment of universities in favor of scientific academies occupied a wave of progressive thinkers across Europe. Berlin’s *Mittwochsgesellschaft*, the distinguished secret society of statesmen and noble intellectuals, debated earnestly the place of Prussian universities in the new climate in 1795. In 1798, Immanuel Kant published his *Streit der Fakultäten*, by turns catalyzing the dispute over the hierarchy of the four traditional faculties of theology, law, medicine, and philosophy while overturning their longstanding “medieval” order. Jena likewise emerged as the seat of an important dialogue on education that ran from 1789 to 1802. In the 1780s, Jena had begun to change course, as Goethe encouraged educational reforms to boost the intellectual health of Saxe-Weimar. That so many of Jena’s young and promising thinkers, like Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), took the opportunity in their inaugural lectures to address the nature of the university as an institution is certainly symptomatic of the “exuberance of spirit” at the turn of the century.

In the same year that Kant’s book appeared, Schiller began his short-lived academic career in Jena with a resounding success. He discussed differences between the narrow-minded student bent on obtaining the bare minimum necessary to make a decent living—the “bread-scholar” (*Brotgelehrte*)—and the imaginative student who pursues knowledge “because he has always loved the truth”—the “philosophical mind” (*philosophische Kopf*). Those most likely to fall into Schiller’s first category tended to come from poor backgrounds, had difficulty obtaining entry into a patronage system to finance even a meager subsistence in a costly university town, and, frequently, studied theology because a focus on the *Brotstudium* of basic theology courses allowed one to move through the university as quickly as possible. The case of the Göttingen classicist C. G. Heyne (1729–1812), who struggled to survive as a poor theology student at Leipzig, serves as one famous case in point.

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24 Ziolkowski, *German Romanticism*, 237.
Social profiles notwithstanding, Schiller disapproved of bread-scholars for hindering educational reform more than he criticized their singular focus on careers. “Who holds up the progress of useful revolutions in the realm of knowledge [more] than the mob of bread-scholars?” he asked. By contrast, the philosophical mind is directed “toward the completion of his knowledge; his noble impatience cannot rest until all his concepts have organized themselves into a harmonious whole, until he is standing in the middle of his art, his science, and from this point surveys his realm with a satisfied gaze.”

Five years later, Fichte continued the theme in his own public lectures “on the duties of scholars.” The true scholar (der Gelehrte), he argued, “dedicates his life” to the acquisition of knowledge, which he differentiated into the three categories of philosophical, philosophical-historical, and purely historical. In addition to the traditional academic activities of teaching and research, Fichte’s Gelehrte carried the special social responsibility for humanity’s progress and ethical refinement, a task for which the scholar—indeed, philosopher, like Fichte himself—was uniquely suited. This social responsibility elevated the scholar’s role in the world compared to more specialized professions. “The true vocation of the scholarly class [Gelehrtenstand] is the supreme supervision of the actual progress of the human race in general and the unceasing promotion of this progress”—a “lofty ideal,” he acknowledged.

He returned to the topic repeatedly, especially in his Über das Wesen des Gelehrten (1806), a proposal for reorganizing the internal structure of the University of Erlangen, and his 1811 lectures from Berlin, Über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. Fichte’s Gelehrte stood in essential accord with Schiller’s “philosophical mind” such that Schiller recommended Fichte’s lectures in the next year in his acclaimed Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1795).

But the series reached its apotheosis with Schelling’s lectures “on the method of academic study,” at the end of 1802. Like Fichte, Schelling returned to the motif more than once, as in his 1811 essay, Über das Wesen deutscher Wissenschaft. But he did not simply repeat antecedent arguments. Each of the fourteen lectures radiated his emphasis on “absolute

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29 Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, 54.
science” (Wissenschaft), commanding even more applause than the prior addresses; even Wilhelm von Humboldt devoured them “with admiring approval.”

Taken together, they amounted to Schelling’s scholarly “Wissenssystem.”

Remedying the confusion of young students roused Schelling such that he used the problem to frame his opening arguments. The “world of science” often confronts impressionable young minds “as a chaos,” in which one can “distinguish nothing, or an ocean upon which one is launched without compass or guiding star.” Lesser minds succumb to vulgar appetites, short-circuiting their education as they memorize by “mechanical industry” the skills they suppose will benefit them in a future trade or profession. Instead, he countered, students must discern the unity of knowledge. “Recognition of the organic whole of the sciences [Wissenschaften] must precede the definite pursuit of a specialty.” Specialists must learn to see their endeavors “in relation to the harmonious structure of the whole,” while grasping their specialization “not as a slave, but as free men,” in “the spirit of the whole.”

Later in the lectures Schelling evoked Kant’s definition of Enlightenment: when entering academic life, students have their “first experience of emancipation from blind faith,” their “first practice in exercising their own judgment.” “Individuality” (Eigentümlichkeit or Individualität) and genius—concepts embedded in the milieu of German Romantik and Idealismus—held out some direction for talented students, Schelling granted, but these did not always come to full fruition, and students sometimes still looked upon their studies disparagingly as Brotwissenschaften. Universities, therefore, should provide a course of general education that orients, without “enslaving,” beginning students to the nature of academic study.

Anticipating Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808), Schelling proclaimed that his ideal scientific university would form part of the “new

33 Schelling, “Über die Methode des akademischen Studiums,” 233–43.
34 Ibid., 325.
world” in Germany, and “those who do not actively contribute to its emergence will inevitably be forgotten.”37 Like Fichte, Schelling considered the philosopher to be the only figure suited to bring about this revival, and accordingly, placed the faculty of philosophy at the center of the university. Only the philosopher “can give rise to the vision of knowledge as an organic whole.” Philosophy is “the science of all science” (Wissenschaft aller Wissenschaft) and the philosopher, who studies “the living unity of all sciences,” is able exclusively to communicate this vision.38

In the second lecture, Schelling insisted that “organizational matters” and “temporal forms” of the university as institution are not arbitrary, but mirror “the spirit of the new world.” When ordered rightly, the outward forms bring together the specialized elements of education (Bildung). The actual structure of the university thus needs to be reformulated according to the logic of the organic unity of knowledge to make the relation explicit.39 He returned to this point in the third lecture, arguing that because all of the sciences are interconnected—in absolute Wissenschaft—their “internal organic unity” should be “expressed objectively in the external organization of the universities.” This was the main thrust of Schelling’s university model, that the external organization of the institution must reflect the inner unity of the sciences; he called the result “a general encyclopedia of the sciences.”40

In the remaining sections, Schelling surveyed his general encyclopedia, which included three disciplines, and discussed how they related to the four traditional faculties. He did not believe that philosophy should constitute a separate faculty, even if, like Kant, he retained its importance when compared to other branches of human learning. For Schelling, philosophy formed the basis for the other faculties: “that which is all things,” he concluded, “cannot for that very reason be anything in particular.” University faculties amounted to historical realities (the “Real”) of absolute knowledge (the “Ideal”). Theology, therefore, was the external or real science that studied the “absolute and divine being,” medicine was the science of nature, and jurisprudence was the science of law and “world order.” He called these three disciplines “positive sciences,” that is, practical for the natural needs of humanity.41

38 Ibid., 236.
39 Ibid., 245, 247.
40 Ibid., 269.
The positive sciences mapped on more or less to the traditional higher faculties. In Kant’s *Streit der Fakultätten*, theology, law, and medicine were not devoted to the search for truth per se, like philosophy, but to the search for the “natural ends” of people: “being happy after death, having their possessions guaranteed by public laws during their life in society, and finally, looking forward to the physical enjoyment of life itself.”

The positive sciences, administered in part by the state, had practical ends. The state had a legitimate interest in the positive sciences, because the common good depended on clergy, lawyers, and doctors—“instruments of the state.” In order to promote the common good to the highest degree, though, the state had to support disinterested knowledge, giving students the opportunity to acquire genuine *Wissenschaft* freed from all coercive measures. “The usual view of the universities,” Schelling agreed, “is that they should produce servants of the state, perfect instruments for its purposes. But surely such instruments should be formed by science. Thus, to achieve such an aim through education, science is required. But science ceases to be science the moment it is degraded to a mere means, rather than furthered for its own sake.”

Where philosophy as absolute *Wissenschaft* pursued knowledge as a means in itself, the positive and professional fields, though related to absolute *Wissenschaft* and sharing concerns for rigorous scientific methods, attempted to fulfill humanity’s basic needs. Schelling’s final lectures surveyed the role of art and poetry in public life.

In lectures eight and nine, “On the Historical Construction of Christianity,” and “On the Study of Theology,” respectively, Schelling suggested how theology fit with his Idealist, speculative philosophy. He criticized the “scholastic jumble of the old dogmatics” for endless “hairsplitting” and “fiddling with etymologies.” Older orthodox formulations needed to give way to new, speculative forms and come under the influence of what he called “the spirit of the modern age.” Summing up, “philosophy,” he said, “is the true organ of theology as science.”

Yet Schelling also dissociated himself from Kant’s “pure religion of


44 Ibid., 308–17, 318–27.

reason,” by making room for Christianity’s historical development. The philosophical religion he envisioned admitted the historicization of theology. “Theology,” he declared, “stands in a special relation to history. It is primarily in theology, which deals with speculative ideas, that philosophy becomes objective. For this reason, theology is the highest synthesis of philosophical and historical knowledge.” As he said in the eighth lecture, there is a “great historical character of Christianity. This is the reason why the science of this religion cannot be separated from history, why it must indeed be completely one with it. Each historical synthesis, however, without which theology itself cannot be conceived, demands in its turn the higher, Christian view of history.” Historical categories are essential to the Christian religion, he argued, and so Christian theology must in turn adopt historicist methods. Christian theology does not merely have a historical component, but “is, strictly speaking, its own history.” At the same time, modern historical thought, expressed for Schelling in speculative philosophical terms, required a “higher, Christian view of history.” This formulation suggested provocatively that the speculative philosophy of history and Christian theology would overlap considerably, even radically, while referencing the same historical background. In the ninth lecture he put the matter pointedly: “the essential thing in the study of theology is to combine the speculative with the historical construction of Christianity and its principal doctrines.”

Schelling’s contention surprised his contemporaries. Raised in a clerical family and encouraged in Old Württemberg piety, he moved toward and then away from the likes of Fichte, Hegel, and Spinoza (and back again, to Spinoza), while uncoupling himself from Lutheran orthodoxy. In Bavaria, he turned toward mythology, a pursuit already implicit in the Vorlesungen. He had planned to write a parody of his education at the Tübingen Stift. He dabbled in mockery with the blistering poem, Epikurisch

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47 Schelling, “Über die Methode des akademischen Studiums,” 308.
48 Ibid., 313.
49 Zachhuber, Theology as Science, 11.
53 O’Meara, Romantic Idealism, 34.

**TWO HEARTS IN ONE BREAST: SCHLEIERMACHER’S DUAL INTERESTS**

The talented Breslau-born, Moravian-reared Schleiermacher had studied at Halle, passed his final set of theology exams in 1794, served as a house tutor to the family of the Prussian statesman Count Dohna, and received a prominent position as chaplain to the Charité hospital in Berlin. For a time he lived with Friedrich Schlegel, becoming a regular member at the literary salon of Henriette Herz.\footnote{On this period in Schleiermacher’s biography, see Kurt Nowak, *Schleiermacher: Leben, Werk und Wirkung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 74–186; and Andreas Arndt, ed., *Wissenschaft und Geselligkeit: Friedrich Schleiermacher in Berlin 1796–1802* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009). See also Deborah Hertz, *Jewish High Society in Old Regime Berlin* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988).} His celebrity status around 1802 fell short of Schelling’s, though his speeches on religion brought him some notoriety.

When Schelling discoursed on theology’s speculative-historical interests, Schleiermacher professed that he was counting down the days “to the
unhappiest year of my life,” stuck in “exile” in the Pomeranian village of Stolp, near the Danish border. In May 1802, he had taken a preaching post at the small confessionally-mixed town. F. S. G. Sack, his superior in the Prussian Upper Consistory, had harbored suspicions that Schleiermacher’s circle of friends was detrimental to the life of a young minister, which the alleged “Spinozism” of the Reden seemed to confirm. Schleiermacher’s defense of Friedrich Schlegel’s “obscene” novel Lucinde (1799) created further problems in an environment of state-supported religious conservatism, so Sack sent him away in isolation.

So bleak was Stolp, Schleiermacher maintained, that his health began to waver on account of the harsh climate and lack of personal contact with friends. His thoughts turned darkly toward suicide. Near the end of 1803, he wrote: “I have played the great game to win much or to lose all, and have lost. What remains for me?” Still, he took solace in his commissioned review of Schelling’s lectures for one of the premier literary publications in Europe, the Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung.

Jena’s periodical was founded by Goethe and H. K. A. Eichstädt (1772–1848), Jena’s professor of eloquence, in 1803 and 1804 after the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, from which it descended, moved its center of operations to Halle. Goethe and Eichstädt, the editor, pressed Schleiermacher to become a reviewer for their fledgling outfit, hoping to secure the services of insightful, up-and-coming scholars of religion, literature, natural science, and art. Schiller would participate, they noted, and they leaned on another promised contributor, A. W. Schlegel, to aid their efforts of persuasion. Schlegel wrote to Schleiermacher about the project, insisting that it would serve a rewarding “twofold purpose: to establish criticism and to bring the old Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, now possessed of the devil, to ruin.” Schleiermacher agreed to contribute, and of the first assignments over which he and Eichstädt came to terms—in addition to a volume on poetry, a drama about Prometheus, five works on pedagogy, and a volume

57 Schleiermacher to Henriette Herz, November 21, 1803, in KGA V/7, 114.
59 Schleiermacher to Reimer, October 26, 1803, in KGA V/7, 70.
60 Schleiermacher to Herz, December 17, 1803, in KGA V/7, 165.
63 A. W. Schlegel to Schleiermacher, September 26, 1803, in KGA V/7, 33.
on gravitational theories, a highly interesting list in its own right—the first was Schelling’s lectures.64

The Swedish diplomat Karl Gustav von Brinckmann, Schleiermacher’s friend from their student days at Halle, first drew his attention to the Vorlesungen. Brinckmann commended the speculative–historical approach to theology, and looked forward to Schleiermacher’s verdict.65 The review appeared under the initials “P.p.s.” for Pepopoios, a Greek approximation for dressmaker (Kleidermacher) and clear allusion to the German “veil-maker” or “Schleiermacher.” (Nietzsche would offer a similar quip about Schleiermacher’s name in Ecce Homo; one wonders whether Nietzsche knew of Schleiermacher’s original wordplay some eighty years before.66)

Schleiermacher’s review noted, rather half-heartedly, that some might recognize in Schelling’s lectures “the touchstone of true philosophizing,” the ability to perceive art and poetry in the midst of speculation, without which “one drifts about in the emptiness and void of dialectics.”67 In fact, one of the review’s striking features is how Schleiermacher raised objections to Schelling at nearly every turn, casting a strongly negative, and misleading, overall impression. Principally he agreed with Schelling that the inner logic of “absolute Wissenschaft” should be manifested in the model of the university.68 Those with a “scientific” mind, he acknowledged, should agree that the “external organization” of academic study, “for the sake of the real sciences should be a faithful copy [Abdruck] of their inner and natural organic relationship, even if until now the cloudy mixture of heterogeneous elements has prevented the free development of the true external design” (Gestaltung).69 But Schelling’s system remained far too complex—“too much tied to the esoteric,” meaning Schelling’s internal philosophical structure of the “absolute”—to be of any actual relevance in the daily life of students (im Studienalltag). He reminded the Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung’s readers that students represented the major market for the lectures.70 Severe difficulties arise in the proper integration of “exoteric

64 Eichstädt to Schleiermacher, November 7, 1803, in Patsch, “Schleiermachers Briefwechsel,” 268–70.
65 Brinckmann to Schleiermacher, November 29, 1803, in KGA V/7, 137.
68 Ibid., 465.
69 Ibid., 464–65.
70 Ibid., 481.
matters,” or external concerns of academic daily life and the ambiguous philosophical agenda of the Vorlesungen, he held.71

Schelling allowed “that the external organizations of knowledge are comprehended in the state.” This, Schleiermacher wrote, presented “an almost incomprehensible confusion.” If the positive sciences, as “external organisms,” come to exist through the state, then they digress from “knowledge as such.”72 Where Schelling promised to establish the faculties in the university as replicas or copies of the interconnected branches of knowledge, he “failed” by relying on the state to justify and explicate their function. Despite employing rigorous scientific methods, the positive sciences retained external reference points outside of the organism of purely scientific knowledge.

Schelling’s treatment of Christianity’s historical nature further absorbed Schleiermacher. “It can be difficult,” Schleiermacher insisted, “to see how the science of the absolute divine being can receive through the state objective existence and external appearance.” The issue “of a truly historical science of theology, that Christianity might be understood as a historical necessity, is truly more of a reminder of what the author should have provided here,” but did not adequately explain.73 For “just as well and with the same words, this would also produce a truly historical science of philosophy.” Rounding out his puzzling critique, Schleiermacher decided that Schelling’s comments on Christianity remained “very cloudy” and yet perhaps contained something “excellent.”74 In the end, he judged the review his final “deviation” (Abweichung) from Schelling, anticipating no future rapprochement.75

Schleiermacher’s subsequent forays into the debate nevertheless reflected Schelling’s aims, an outcome following the pattern Wilhelm Dilthey discerned in Schleiermacher’s disinclination to acknowledge Kant’s influence.76 Schleiermacher’s Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn (1808), the “intellectual charter” of Humboldt’s University in Berlin, constructed a similar model of the “organism” of knowledge and the positive sciences.77 Regarded as a landmark in the history of the Western

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72 Schleiermacher, “Rezension,” 467–68.
73 Ibid., 469.
74 Ibid., 470, 473–74.
75 Schleiermacher to J. C. Gaß, September 6, 1805, in KGA V/7, 307.
76 Wilhelm Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1870), 87.
77 Schleiermacher, “Gelegentlich Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn, nebst
university, the political initiative to which the memorandum belonged attracted other proposals from the likes of Fichte, Humboldt, and Steffens, which addressed the structure and ethos of the university and the proper balance between the free pursuit of knowledge and the interests of the state. These proposals shared the assumption that Wissenschaft embodied the true sense of philosophy, the discipline responsible for the organization of knowledge. Philosophy as “the science of science,” they agreed, occupies the core of the ideal university and justifies the organic unity of knowledge amidst the diversity of scientific fields. Though Schleiermacher and Fichte drafted their texts at roughly the same time, they did not read each other’s until a number of years after the university had been established, which suggests a larger role for Schelling’s ideas in Schleiermacher’s work than scholars have tended to ascribe.

For Schleiermacher, Wissenschaft was properly the social pursuit of a group united by a common language, supported by the state but remaining under some condition of intellectual freedom from outside control. The state “all too easily fails to recognize the worth” of striving for “scientific unity,” he reasoned. “As for speculation—a term that we would always use for scientific activities that relate preponderantly to the unity and common form of knowing—the more clearly it is brought to notice the more the state tends to restrict its use.” The state settles for “mere information” (Kenntnisse), rather than true science (Wissenschaft). Consequently, there was reason for the state to support the pursuit of Wissenschaft, without completely controlling it.

Philosophy likewise stood at the center of Schleiermacher’s university model: “everything begins with philosophy, with pure speculation.” The philosophy faculty should assume first place (die erste Stelle), with the other faculties of practical science (theology, law, and medicine) subject to it.

79 Howard, Protestant Theology, 155–77.
82 Ibid., 28–29.
83 Ibid., 55–56.
Traditionally, the church formed the theology faculty “in order to preserve the wisdom of the Fathers; not to lose for the future what in the past had been achieved in discerning truth from error; to give a historical basis, a sure and certain direction and a common spirit to the further development of doctrine and church.” Moreover, “as the state came to be bound more and more closely with the church, it also had to sanction these institutions and place them under its care.”\(^{84}\) In the modern world, Schleiermacher believed, theology had to shift some of its focus from ecclesial traditions to “the spirit of Wissenschaft.” Yet this shift in orientation was not a turn entirely away from the church, but rather a combining of theology’s ecclesial concerns with scientific ones.\(^ {85}\)

Schelling’s rule on the study of academic theology came to partial fruition in Schleiermacher’s programmatic Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, which contained, Schleiermacher insisted, “my entire present outlook on theological study.”\(^ {86}\) The Kurze Darstellung organized the study of theology according to a threefold scheme: philosophical, historical, and practical. The first branch promoted the philosophy of religion, where the empirical and historical nature of a given expression of Christianity might be compared through speculative and historical reasoning with an “ideal” Christianity. Accomplishing this task required a “critical” stance toward, on one hand, philosophical speculation or rational deduction regarding “the general concept of a religious community,” and, on the other hand, historical investigation into the “plurality of ecclesial communities claiming to be ‘Christian.’”\(^ {87}\) As Schleiermacher put it elsewhere, in order to reach a proper conception of the Christian church, one needed to “sufficiently maintain the balance between the historical and the speculative.”\(^ {88}\) The second branch of study, historical theology, included exegesis, the history of the church, and, radically, dogmatics. The final branch secured theology to the needs of the religious community. Philosophy represented theology’s “root,” history the “body,” and practice the “crown.”\(^ {89}\) Schleiermacher left little doubt that a combined speculative-historical understanding must permeate all branches of theological study. Where philosophical theology relied on a “critical” perspective, practical theology

\(^{84}\) Ibid., 54.

\(^{85}\) Ibid., 52–68.

\(^{86}\) Schleiermacher, “Vorerinnerung zur ersten Ausgabe” (1811), Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums (1830), in KGA I/6, 321. Citations are from the 1830 edition, unless otherwise noted.

\(^{87}\) Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung, 338–40.

\(^{88}\) Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube, 2nd ed. (1830/31), in KGA I/13.1, 17–18.

\(^{89}\) Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung (1811), 253.
relied on the “results of the past.” Similarly, he stated, “historical criticism is the all-pervasive and indispensable organ for the work of historical theology, as it is for the entire field of historical studies.”

Collectively, these branches of academic theology approached—and clarified—the “cloudy” image from Schelling’s eighth and ninth lectures.

Notably, Schleiermacher also defined theology as a “positive science.” Following Schelling’s construction, he granted that theology does not form a “constituent part of the organization” of Wissenschaft, but “is necessary for carrying out a practical task.” Without a vital connection to the church—a body outside of absolute Wissenschaft—theology “ceases to be theological and devolves to those sciences to which it belongs according to its varied content.” Biblical studies, for instance, might be undertaken entirely within philological or archaeological fields, but would no longer be theology qua theology if divorced from “church leadership.”

The Gelegentliche Gedanken also stated that the three “positive faculties each arose from the need to establish an indispensable praxis securely in theory and the tradition of knowledge.”

The development of a theory of the state, moreover, ran along parallel lines in both figures in the first years after 1800.

In a post-Enlightenment, revolutionary world, Schleiermacher declared, the theologian or “prince of the church” (Kirchenfürst) should conjoin “both a religious interest and a scientific spirit in the highest degree.” The theologian must be a Wissenschaftler, he contended, even while admitting that without the practical purpose of church government, the coherency of academic theology would disintegrate. Schleiermacher attempted to strike a balance between the “ecclesial” and the “scientific,” or, to relate this to Schelling’s terms, between the positive sciences focused externally on the common good (specifically the religious community) and absolute Wissenschaft. In this way, he adopted Schelling’s conception of positive Wissenschaft and elaborated on the speculative–historical construction of Christian theology. For him the meaning was clear: as Goethe’s Faust had uttered in another context, it was possible “for two hearts to beat in one breast.” In Schleiermacher’s class lectures on the encyclopedia and methodology of theological science, the

90 Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung, 340, 357, 364.
91 Ibid., 325–26, 328.
95 Ibid., 328.
course for which he penned the *Kurze Darstellung* and taught over eleven times, instructing some six hundred students, he made the same points with explicit reference to Schelling, advocating Schelling’s position on the positive sciences and highlighting their shared concern for the speculative and the historical in theological inquiry.96

## CRITICISM, CONNECTIONS, AND DIVERGENT PATHS

Under an intriguing set of circumstances, Schelling and Schleiermacher nearly became colleagues in the thick of this exchange. After Schelling left Jena in 1803, he received a position at the recently reconstituted Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg in the north of Catholic Bavaria, where he attempted, unsuccessfully, to launch some of his ideas on curriculum reform.97 Many acquaintances also came to Würzburg, including his former mentor and friend H. E. G. Paulus (1761–1851). Paulus had taught oriental languages at Jena, but also left for Würzburg, due in part to grumbling over his erudite two-volume critical Latin edition of Spinoza’s works. Initially, the two shared lodgings in their new city, but became increasingly ill-tempered in nearly all of their dealings with one another.98 By the 1840s, their contretemps grew into a large-scale feud: Schelling sued Paulus for plagiarism when he produced an unauthorized transcript of Schelling’s 1841 lectures on the philosophy of revelation; Karl Marx and Ludwig Feuerbach openly pilloried Schelling’s suit and mocked him as the “holy” thirty-eighth member of the German Confederation.99

In Würzburg, Schelling found himself at odds with his Catholic peers. Bombarded by an incessant pamphlet campaign by Franz Berg (1753–1821), Würzburg’s professor of church history known as the “Franconian

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96 See the student notes (*Nachschriften*) from Ludwig Jonas, “Theologische Encyclopædie nach den Vorlesungen des Herrn Dr. Schleiermacher, Wintersemester 1816/17,” in Archiv der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (BBAW), Nachlass Schleiermacher 547/1, 2fr, 133fv, passim.


Voltaire” (der fränkische Voltaire) for championing the Catholic Enlightenment, Schelling received orders to suspend his lectures on religion for their alleged pantheism, mysticism, and atheism. Like Schleiermacher, who had once called Spinoza a man “full of religion and full of [the] holy spirit,” Schelling complained that he had to defend himself—even to his mother—against charges that he had both abandoned Christianity and become a Catholic.

On January 9, 1804, Schleiermacher received word from Paulus offering a professorship in practical theology. Given his condition in Stolp, Würzburg plainly appealed, but was not without its drawbacks. Schleiermacher was reluctant to settle in a largely Catholic Bavarian state. While wavering over expatriation from Prussia, he commenced negotiations for a dual appointment as Preacher to the University, thinking that if he could teach and preach, to which he had grown accustomed, the confessional demographics and his Prussian-nationalist sympathies might be overcome. His ecclesiastical seniors advised him not to accept the offer. His principal obstacle nonetheless remained: he did not want to be associated with Schelling. “This professorship,” declared Schleiermacher, “is precisely the only one I could gladly accept, since I do not want to fill up my time with the learned specialties [gelehrten Fächern] of theology, and [yet] I do not want to hold a philosophical [post] where Schelling is.” “Far more vexing,” he wrote, “is what I face from Schelling himself, to whom I am in fact so very much opposed, despite a great apparent agreement, and who is much too keen-sighted not to notice it and much too arrogant and tyrannical to tolerate it. Unfortunately, he will find it difficult to bring himself to despise me . . . which for me would be the most desirable thing, and so I have soon to expect perpetual public attacks or secret bantering, such as only one professor can direct toward another.”

Before his review went to print, Schleiermacher admitted, “I am anxious about what will become of the quiet war [dem stillen Kriege] in which Schelling and I are engaged.” After hinting at Schelling in his first work at Stolp, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), he now

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102 Schleiermacher to Dohna, January 9, 1804; February, 1804, in KGA V/7, 187, 229.
103 Dorothea Veit to Schleiermacher, November 20, 1802, in KGA V/6, 209.
thought that Schelling alluded to him in the Vorlesungen. Schleiermacher appropriated from Friedrich Schlegel the complaint that Schelling’s Darstellung meines System der Philosophie (1801) amounted to “love-empty wisdom,” a “dismal system,” and “an unpleasant neighbor”—or “Spinozism” but “without love.” Both figures, with forceful conceptions of “individuality,” were well disposed for a “quiet war” of implicit attack and subtle critique.

CONCLUSION

Unexpectedly, Schleiermacher accepted the Würzburg professorship. “Schelling’s contrary character” awaits, he announced, “and I hope that his restless spirit” will not get the best of him. “What a pity it is that the excellent Schelling does not know how to extract from his genius a certain bourgeois moderation; and I almost fear that in this way Würzburg too will soon become odious to him.” Apparently, Schleiermacher did not perceive the irony. On March 15, 1804, he asked to be relieved of his duties in Stolp. On April 4, he received his official appointment from the Bavarian court. Immediately, however, Friedrich Wilhelm III interceded, not wishing to lose Schleiermacher from Prussia. In a flurry of activity, a royal decree on April 24 refused Schleiermacher’s release from Stolp, and a second decree on May 10 promoted him to ausserordentlicher Professor of Theology and Preacher to the University of Halle, where he made his professorial debut as a rising star—only the beginning of his celebrated academic career. Though outside of the scope here to pursue subsequent phases of their “quiet war”—or potential agreements between Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie and Schleiermacher’s later Dialektik—I note one further chronological oddity: the final installment of Schleiermacher’s review

104 Schleiermacher to Reimer, November 11, 1803, in KGA V/7, 93–94.
105 Schleiermacher to Reimer, February 1, 1804, in KGA V/7, 213; Schlegel to Schleiermacher, April 12, 1802, in KGA V/5, 376. Cf. Suskind, Der Einfluss Schellings, 58–63.
106 Schleiermacher to Ehrenfried von Willich, February 25, 1804, in KGA V/7, 243–44.
107 Schleiermacher to Paulus, February 29, 1804, in KGA V/7, 252–53.
appeared in print on the morning of April 23, merely one day before Friedrich Wilhelm III signed the edict preventing Schleiermacher and Schelling from becoming colleagues.

The dual construction of academic theology from Schelling and Schleiermacher had a substantial impact on Germany’s classic intellectual period. In the semi-autobiographical novel *Theodor* (1822) by the prominent Old Testament scholar W. M. L. de Wette, the arrangement made a great impression upon the protagonist Theodor (ostensibly de Wette), which surfaced in de Wette’s biblical criticism. Later theologians, among them Carl Daub (1765–1836), Ignaz Thanner (1770–1856), and the Catholic Tübingens J. S. Drey (1777–1853) and J. A. Möhler (1796–1838), applied Schelling’s and Schleiermacher’s concepts to a host of projects. Both speculative and historical concerns received sustained attention, if conceived somewhat differently, in Hegel, Baur, and Ritschl, among others, who found in Schelling’s and Schleiermacher’s summation the fuel for an ambitious program of historical theology that persisted deep into the nineteenth century.

Where Schelling allowed for concerns outside of pure *Wissenschaft* to function as organizing principles for the positive sciences, Schleiermacher maintained the same role for church life as the goal of theology. Schleiermacher allowed that theology must redefine its methods along *wissenschaftliche* and historical lines to find a place in the modern university, but nevertheless preserved a modified form of the “traditional” focus on the church. Schelling’s conception of the “Christian view of history” and his plea to unite the speculative and historical branches of Christianity in the study of theology undergirded Schleiermacher’s program. These concerns

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would lead to the legitimation—and historicization—of theology as a rigorous, critical discipline on par with the other sciences of the modern university.\footnote{Howard, Protestant Theology, 133. On contemporaneous trends toward historicization, see, e.g., Ziolkowski, Clio the Romantic Muse; and Jörn Rüsen, Konfigurationen des Historismus: Studien zur deutschen Wissenschaftskultur (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), 29–94.} As the century lurched forward, theology’s academic standing faced an increasing number of challengers, from avant-garde proponents of the comparative “science of religion” (Religionswissenschaft) to a general “crisis of historicism.”\footnote{Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, “Protestantische Theologie in der Gesellschaft des Kaiserreichs,” in Profile des neuzitlichen Protestantismus, ed. Graf (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1993), 2:12–117.} If, at last, the center did not hold, the “quiet war” nevertheless resulted in a potent intellectual synthesis that informed the reigning historicist paradigms in nineteenth-century German theology.

University of Oxford.