THE UNIVERSITY *of* EDINBURGH

Edinburgh Research Explorer

Leitkultur debates as civic integration in North-Western Europe

Citation for published version:

Mouritsen, P, Faas, D, Meer, N & Witte, ND 2019, 'Leitkultur debates as civic integration in North-Western Europe: The nationalism of 'values' and 'good citizenship' ', *Ethnicities*, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 632-653.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796819843538>

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

[10.1177/1468796819843538](https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796819843538)

Link:

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

Document Version:

Peer reviewed version

Published In:

Ethnicities

General rights

Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

***Leitkultur* Debates in North-Western Europe: The nationalism of ‘values’ and ‘good citizenship’**

Per Mouritsen, Daniel Faas and Nynke de Witte

Abstract

Political responses to ethno-religious diversity often include the idea of a common culture or (core) values, e.g., the German *Leitkultur* and isomorphic concepts in Denmark and the Netherlands. Each debate concerns (1) forms of *societal integration*, oriented towards (2) forms of *civiness*, which are nonetheless (3) also *cultural*, and (4) *national*. Within this common structure, variation exists, as to what should be ‘common’, what it takes to share it, and the very point of doing so. Advocacy of *Leitkultur* as so many attempts to civilise newcomers – and to exclude those who are unamenable to such efforts – reflects the continuing core of nationalistic ambition, despite novel semantic content. This ambition, which equivocates between ‘manifest’ functions - educating minorities, reminding majorities of their forgotten heritage - may also fail to serve more ‘latent’ functions of trust and solidarity-building among majorities.

Introduction

Over the last 15-20 years, Western European countries have debated the need for a public culture of key values, shared by all citizens and newcomers, lest ‘too diverse’ societies (Goodhart 2004) jeopardize social cohesion. Ideas of liberal societies as fragile cultural constructs legitimize integration tests, hardened naturalisation regiments, and hostility to multiculturalism. What do they signify? Directed at hostile electorates and immigrants alike, are they rear-guard attempts to talk up a ‘romanticized vision of national citizenship’ (Joppke 2010a, 162), irrelevant in light of citizenship’s diluted material and symbolic value, and the futility of promoting a persuasive content of nationhood over and above liberal values? (Joppke 2010b, 29) Is hectoring on such values a sign of the *waning* of nationalism, in societies, which just do not want ‘illiberal people’ (Joppke 2010a, 139)?

We argue that the focus on common values as means and content of integration illustrate the essence of European nationalism, which above all concerns boundary demarcation (Wimmer 2008). Such demarcation, at least in relation to immigration, is based less on particularity of heritage or custom, and more on civilizational superiority and enforced *civic* acculturation. However, although its seemingly paradoxical universalist ‘thinness’ may function politically, it is less useful for purposes of national integration, either for newcomers or established majority populations.

This article looks at the German *Leitkulturdebatte* and two similar national debates, with the point of departure that each debate assumes integration to be an *ideological* matter. *Leitkultur*-debates are part of a cumulative civic integrationist ambition, in terms of not only what immigrants should do (work, learn language, participate), but also what they should believe in and identify with. Incorporation of immigrants, here, involves acculturation in the sense of knowing, affirming, or adhering to values and ideals.

Whereas the debates have been studied separately for Germany (Klusmeyer 2001, Pautz 2005, Ohlert 2015), the Netherlands (Tonkens, Hurenkamp, and Duyvendak 2010; Slootman and Duyvendak 2015), and Denmark (Mouritsen 2006) no comparative work has linked them to theoretical discussions of nationalism. Based on three case studies, we analyse the framing of universalistic elements and perceived functions of common values (sections 2-4). Before this, we develop the idea of nationalism as civic boundary maintenance. Section 5 discusses similarities and varieties of semantic and functional content within four structuring aspects of what we term *civic cultural national integration*. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of whether nationalism as public discourse on common values may integrate European societies.

1. Nationalism as civic acculturation and boundary maintenance

Nationhood in Western Europe, in elite and popular discourse, increasingly has a civic content. Even far right parties adopt the ‘civic Zeitgeist’ (Halikiopoulou et al 2013), defending national heritages of e.g., gender equality and gay rights, as secularism, modernization, and globalisation eat away at the particularities of ethnic traditions. Transforming or fending off ostensibly illiberal groups through civic integration programs (Borevi, Jensen and Mouritsen 2017) has been seen as post-national struggles waged by ‘liberal people’ (Joppke 2010a, 140). Ethno-national decline, however, does not equate civic nationalism’s ascent, if understood as a ‘cool’ solidarity of liberal principles and institutions only (Ignatief 1994). The ethnic-civic distinction disregards the role of culture in both models (Brubaker 1999; Yack 2008), so that, empirically speaking, thickening constitutional patriotism with mnemonic imagery (Viroli 1995), national political conversations (Laborde 2002), or public cultures (Miller 1995) have pushed on an already open door.

At the level of individual and social identity, nationhood as everyday emotional experience and group attitudes was never a ‘culturally unmarked’ (Brubaker 2004, 137) state allegiance. Civic nations such as USA have their imagined peoplehood of moers, religious and racial markers (Smith 2003). Identification is continually produced by the ‘banal’ structuring of national space (Billig 1995), and in shared ‘societal cultures’ of majority language schools and media (Kymlicka 1995, 76). The distinction also breaks down within discourse and institutional transmission of nationhood. Traditional customs, folklore, and mythologies of origin, well-known in the history of nationalism, were peripheral (see Podoksik

2017) to nation building and, also in ostensibly ethnic nations, superimposed by state-sponsored cultivation. Against a dominant emphasis on ‘holistic culture’ – an anthropological view of culture as folk-traditions and ways of life, which, while meaningful and valuable, are experienced as ‘natural’ – Podoksik argues that modern nationalism relied on ‘high culture’ (Podoksik 2017: 306). Nations, here, are created and maintained as collective entities, when members *acquire* their nationhood in the sense of *civilisation*, in a ‘self-conscious activity of cultururation’ (Podoksik 2017: 306-307), which is voluntarist and individual. It presupposes a shared ‘common culture ... broad enough to enable self-sufficient communal existence’ (308), but also insertion of individual members into it through education and personal effort, in the process developing a national pride, motivating regional groups, lower classes and young people to contribute to its maintenance.

In the face of cultural globalisation and immigration, this homogenizing *Bildung* is back. High culture as a constitutive element of nationhood may emphasise political, aesthetic, or religious refinement in many combinations. It may invoke ascriptive ideas of primordially privileged carriers, but always assumes certain manifestations of competence, conduct, and orientation by prospective nation members, or a generic idea of citizenship as virtuous contribution. In present day nationalism, such citizenship orientation overwhelmingly relate to the labour market, liberal democracy, family/gender-relations, and – associated with each – acceptable religious orientation.

In Western states expressions of nationhood involve ambitions to maintain cultural *distinctness*. Rarely (outside tourist industries) as celebration of myth and folklore, but often as preservation of artistic heritage and history in curricular reform or museums. This cultural identity is perceived to be precarious when faced with the levelling influence of globalization on cultural-aesthetic literacy (e.g. Danish and Dutch canons of culture and history), and a concern with civic cultural *decline*. It concerns erosion of inherited civic practices and orientations, and sometimes the stable textures of emotional attachment, which nations *need* (whether such practices, orientations and meanings overlap with those of other nations) to bolster themselves, or – in more benign manifestation – to navigate cultural globalization constructively.

Although still temporal, with the past as reference for actions towards a desired future, nationalism today is above all spatial, although associated with protection more than betterment. In line with Hegel and Clausewitz-inspired political sociology (Højrup 2003), national identity, as in its nineteenth century infancy, is importantly constituted by state-and-territory-centered mobilization of what Elias called survival units (Kaspersen and Gabriel 2008). What constitutes survival capacity in civic cultural terms (rather than Elias’ welfare and defense provision) is an open question. The key point is that nationalism involves a dialectical struggle, not about distinctiveness (Western nations do not threaten each other), but about demarcation in terms of relatively general capacities, also at the individual level of citizens.

While the latter's particular cultivation may be imagined within national histories, invoking them as collective identities relies on moral boundary drawing the outside, above all towards unwanted immigrants, and defining those boundaries in terms of cultural practices, which should be nourished to aid the nation's prospering and betterment (Zolberg and Woon 1999, 8). This ambition is alive and kicking in Western European *Leitkultur* debates, but its current articulation will weaken rather than strengthen internal nation state cohesion.

The German word *Leitkultur* – 'leading culture' – was specific to this country, although very similar nouns were also used in the Netherlands. Other varieties, such as 'our values', 'common values', and 'shared culture' come up in all the three countries, as do 'culture', 'values', and 'principles' within semantic structures that tie them to national traditions – exclusively, or as part of larger collectives (Western, European). 'Dutch culture' or the very popular 'Danishness' had no German equivalents for historical reasons. In Denmark and the Netherlands, common values and culture often attach to concepts of citizenship. Rather than strict *Begriffsgeschichte* we trace structurally similar *ideas* – concepts with attached normative and causal arguments whose content and functions vary within relatively narrow boundaries. We focus on similarities, overlaps, and varieties across three cases, whose public rejection of multiculturalism occurred on different backgrounds: Germany's 'republican' normalisation of its past, the Netherlands's evolving criticism of *laissez faire* multiculturalism and the pillarization system, and Denmark's continuing pursuit of a communitarian brand of comprehensive welfare state liberalism (Meer, Mouritsen, Faas and de Witte, 2015). To this end we use three case studiesⁱ to make a series of qualitative observations about discursive distinctions in the representations of common culture as a means to national integration of immigrants.

2. Germany - The Original *Leitkultur* Debate

Since World War II, Germans have emphasized what Germany is *not*, contrasting itself with the Nazi past or autocratic East Germany, as reflected in the *Verfassungspatriotismus* of Sternberger (1979) and Habermas (1992). However, in light of conservative criticism of the unengaging formalism of mere constitutional loyalty (e.g. Lammert 2006), it is a paradox that *Leitkultur*, introduced in 1998 by Syrian-born Bassam Tibi, denoted, not a specifically German, but European common culture, which he, like Habermas (1993) associated with universal values. The context was nevertheless different. *Leitkultur* involved the requirement, and to Tibi the desire, of migrants to participate in European societies on the basis of 'democracy, secularism, the Enlightenment, human rights and civil society' (Tibi 1998: 154). Although constitutional patriotism was also evoked in the context of immigration (Müller 2007), its prominence was earlier, after the eighties' *Historikerstreit*, the 1990 reunification, and European concerns about a large new Germany, as a way to anchor a self-critical *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* of the Nazi past. Tibi's *Leitkultur* had a different, double edge, both against cultural assimilation and against

the alleged relativism and ‘parallel lives’ of multiculturalism. This culture of liberal belief and practice was a requirement for immigrants but also a measuring rod for receiving societies’ provision of equal rights, e.g. in citizenship reforms, pushed by the center-left through the nineties (Tibi 2001; Howard 2008).

In 2000, the concept had a different connotation when Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz argued that ‘foreigners ... must adapt to the free and democratic German *Leitkultur*’ (Merz 2000a; Esser 2004). It coincided with the CDU blocking of the SPD-Green government proposal for liberalised naturalisation (Mouritsen 2012). *Leitkultur* was now German and something Muslim newcomers could not necessarily master – because of a backward ethno-religious *culture*. Thicker and more particular than mere principles and defined, in a debate with Green party chair Renate Künast, as ‘mores, manners and customs’ for immigrants to ‘accept’, it contrasted to faith schools, head scarfs, and reeducating teenagers in home countries (Merz 2000b). Conservatives, skeptical of Germany’s refugee regime, supported Merz. Bavarian CSU chair Herbert Stoiber while denying any cultural supremacy, argued that common culture, in European countries in each place came with “independent facets”, rendering “French mentality ... different to the German one.” (ref).

It also provoked criticism. Theo Sommer, editor of *Die Zeit* and early endorser of Tipi (Sommer 1998) explained that Merz misunderstood him. While immigrants must ‘assimilate to a fair degree’, *Leitkultur* was a unifying legal-constitutional creed, which left individuals free to practice private cultures. Germany would remain a ‘multi-ethnic’ society and integration was a two-way street. *Leitkultur* concerned *political* culture (not ‘flag, national hymns, or *Heimat*’), was processual, a largely *European* heritage, and included newcomers’ contributions (Sommer 2000). Others reacted more strongly. Tibi claimed that his concept had been hi-jacked (Tibi 2001). The Jewish Council’s head Paul Spiegel (2000) questioned its association with a particularly *German* heritage, as did others who asked if ‘the Third Reich was also part of *deutsche Leitkultur*’ (Cornelius 2000). To SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, if mere constitutional loyalty, law abidance, and functional German were at stake this required no new concept, lest the purpose was to incriminate (Schröder 2000). He was echoed by *Züddeutsche Zeitung* journalist Herbert Prantl to whom ‘whoever speaks of *Leitkultur* does not want to integrate but provoke’ (Prantl 2000, 4). These commentators saw the concept as a stand-in for older racial boundary drawing, with Sommer (2000) distancing himself from ‘the open-dikes metaphors of those conservative who worry about “the German character of Germany.”’ Such essentialism underwrote the bestselling *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Sarrazin 2010), whose author claimed that ‘the cultural particularity of peoples’ reflected natural differences whereby, e.g. Jews and Basques ‘have particular genes’ (Sarazin ref).

When, a decade before Sarrazin, the concept emerged within the CDU’s *Zuwanderungs Kommission* recommendations, aided by Angela Merkel [ref], not ethnicity or genes but religion undergirded culture.

After the usual liberal-constitutional and language components, this text asked that immigrants ‘adapt to our social and cultural way of life, meaning that the value foundation of our Christian-Western culture, which is influenced by Christianity, Judaism, antique philosophy, humanism, Roman law and Enlightenment, must be accepted.’ (Zuwanderungs-kommision 2000). These words provoked by their implication that Muslims did not naturally belong, and as a means to overcome multicultural isolation: ‘Integration in this sense is neither one-sided assimilation nor a permanent condition of living side-by-side without contact. Multiculturalism and parallel societies is no model for the future. Our goal must be a culture of tolerance and togetherness – based on constitutional values and in awareness of one’s own identity. It is in this sense that observation of these values is called *Leitkultur*’ (Zuwanderungs-Kommission 2000). The CDU’s inclusion of religion reflects a conservative view of Christian dominance-in-Germany, bluntly expressed as a demand that ‘cathedrals must be bigger than mosques’ (Stoiber 2010), and reflected e.g., in the inclusion of questions on Christian figures and holidays in citizenship test material [ref].

When the new *Bundestagspräsident* Norbert Lammert re-ignited the *Leitkultur* debate in 2005-6, the concept again also denoted supporting ‘cultural preconditions’ (‘historical experiences and beliefs’ and ‘shared convictions and orientations’) without which society’s ‘rules and legal framework’ could not ‘retain its inner legitimation’. *Leitkultur* had to be ties other than these legal rules (Lammert 2006a). To this ‘glue’, he responded in an earlier interview, ‘religious convictions and traditions’ made up a significant contribution” (Lammert 2005a). Yet Lammert, despite concern for a *German* ‘identity’, like most conservatives also emphasised a European heritage of universal values – within which Germany belonged. Its ‘high degree of obligatoriness and broad acceptance’ (Lammert 2005b) suggests that not Christianity as much as certain types of non-Christianity were clearly at issue. Hence, the constitution-supporting *Leitkultur* – the national high or *Bildungskultur* – is less a comprehensive *Sittlichkeit* as the absence or censoring of unliberal Islam, epitomized, at the time, by reactions to the Muhammed Cartoons (Lammert 2006a).

In light of the ensuing international controversy, the German debate was quite restrained. The center-left received the *Leitkultur* concept skeptically despite its liberal core, acknowledged by Mertz himself in a remarkably defensive restatement [ref]. Its ‘thickness’, historical or Christian, was European as much as German, although a few, including Stoiber insisted on the national varieties of what he now called ‘everyday culture’ (*Alltagskultur*) (Stoiber 2006). Far from any calls for cultural assimilation, its particularity remaining unnamed except as a desired absence of non-Western (multi)culture. Although the hierarchy between Islam-as-unliberal and Western liberalism-based-on-Christianity is controversial, no ghost from Germany’s past were visible. *Leitkultur* – and the *Leitkultur* debate - reflected how German intellectuals view their post-war political culture as a precarious accomplishment. Germany, in-

creasingly ‘republican’ on citizenship and integration, is a *Kulturnation*, less in its reverence for language, *Dichter und Denker*, than in the sense by which belonging connotes political maturity. Culture, here, is civic culture, a modern *Bildungsbürgertum*, which must be protected against all manners of unmodern unreason. Into this unnegotiable civic trust – *gegenseitiges Vertrauen* (Zuwanderungs-Kommission 2000) – which is German only in the sense that Germans more than others appreciate its fragility newcomers must fit, and in its tenets they must affirm their loyal faith (Mouritsen 2012).

3. Denmark – ‘Our Danish values’

As in Germany, the Danish debate was part of a sustained critique of a multicultural past, which the country never had. In the nineties, a liberal ideology of equal treatment gave way to a *quid pro quo* discourse of duty-to-integrate through work, language training and overcoming cultural obstacles to employability (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013). A 1999 Law on Integration, passed by social democrats to curb the new-right Danish People’s Party (DPP), introduced mandatory integration courses (Ejrnæs 2001) and added an ambition to ‘convey to each foreigner an understanding of the fundamental values and norms of the Danish society’ (cited from Ejrnæs 2001: 4). Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen, after 9/11, called on all who ‘wish to live their lives in Denmark’ that they

commit themselves clearly to the idea that democracy and the constitution stand over all else, including religion. For human rights and democratic values to be respected in Danish society. For clear distance to be taken from fundamentalism. For women to have the same rights as men. For everyone to have the right to choose his or her partner. For all to have equal access to education. For all to take responsibility to contribute to positive integration in Denmark (Rasmussen 2001)

This appeal, a marked contrast to Schröder’s dismissal of *Leitkultur* a year earlier in Germany, did not keep him in office. After Fogh Rasmussen’s liberal-conservative coalition came in power from late 2000 (supported by the DPP) his redirection of Danish integration and citizenship policy towards a position as European hardliner coincided with a government led ‘struggle over values’ (*værdikamp*) against religious traditionalism *and* multicultural, relativist leniency towards Islam.

An early – pre-cartoon crisis – analysis (Mouritsen 2006) demonstrated that these values were mainly liberal and universal, but unlike in Germany, they were often presented as national. Straightforwardly, communitarian right-to-own-culture ideas were mainly found in the DPP, for whom ‘our duty as a nation first and foremost regards Danish culture and its Christian foundation of ideas’ or our ‘culturally determined faith, norms, traditions and attitudes’ (Mouritsen 2006: 77). However, more universalistic values were also seen as a national heritage. They were not abstract principles but a particularly egalitarian, autonomous and participatory *way of life*, associated with Denmark’s Low Church, this-worldly Lutheranism, and folk high schools. Against this communally lived-through history – this ‘particular

universalism' (Mouritsen 2006) – prominent on the right, but also among social democrats, liberal pretensions originating in less blessed quarters could be doubted. In his 2003 New Year's speech the prime minister noted that 'immigrants must make an effort to get to understand the values on which Danish society is based. Many of these we consider as a matter of course, *because we have developed them over many generations*' (Rasmussen 2003, emphasis added). Some immigrants were less likely to master this acculturation process than others (Jensen 2014,).

Universal values were also simply presented *as* Danish *and* constitutive of Danish culture, not to be given up for misguided relativism. A Social Democrat defending a 'Danish identity, which builds on respect for certain basic values and rights', insisted that 'to live here is also about saying yes to for instance equal treatment and free-mindedness'. One must 'dare to 'affirm Danish values ... such as democracy, freedom of expression and much else, on which we should not compromise' (Redder 2004). This discourse also came in an intercultural, but still existentially embedded version, where, in the Social Democratic party program of the time, 'a country with a strong common culture dares to meet the world. Culture shapes our values and gives us a point of reference in the world. The better we know ourselves and our own culture, the easier it will be to meet and understand the culture of others' (Social Democrats 2004: 7-8). This meeting of culture was asymmetrical: 'a modern welfare state should be based on liberalism, diversity and inclusiveness ... We should be true to our own values while remaining open to impulses from outside'. Not that such impulses would change much, as 'the ancient Nordic saying "freedom for Loke as well as Thor" ... conveys the message that we are not the same and should not be forced to be alike.' The upright Thor, obviously, represent Danes and Danish values, not the immigrants with theirs, hence 'freedom to differ does not mean that anything goes and everything is equally good' (Danish Government 2003).

Some values were more important than others. *Jyllands-Posten's* 2005 cartoons had a caption telling Muslims 'to put up with scorn, mockery and ridicule' (Jyllands-Posten 2005). In the ensuing debate (Meer & Mouritsen 2009), freedom of speech as a value and practiced virtue (without 'ancient Nordic' live-and-let-live connotations) represented a liberal way of life, which citizens must fight for. Debates often evolved more generally (unlike Germany) on civic practices and 'active' citizenship (*medborgerskab*).ⁱⁱ This old and abandoned term re-entered policy discourse and white papers from 2002. Post-assimilationist in principle it had a flexible meaning, which broadened into practices, identity and competences required for a welfare state way of life.

In the *Citizen in Denmark* booklet newcomers learned that 'Denmark being a welfare state means that every person must, to the best of his ability, make a contribution to the community – by, among other things, educating himself, working, paying taxes and supporting himself and his family' (Ministry of Integration 2002). A social democratic version celebrated a romantic image of an egalitarian society, built by workers who 'wore themselves down in the factories' and 'women who also went out and

worked hard on the labour market for the general welfare'. 'It is their inheritance we are managing' (Rasmussen 2000). Or, in an earlier speech, again linking values, history, and civic obligation: 'We have created a society with better prosperity, more welfare, better safety and a cleaner environment than most countries'. These 'ideals of equality and community must include all and be respected by all' (Rasmussen 1997).

Being a citizen involved recognition: 'having a job gives both self-respect and respect from others because it makes one capable of supporting oneself and one's family, and ... contributing to society' (Ministry of Integration, 2002: 85). Bettering oneself could enhance this: 'education and good Danish capabilities ... increase opportunities to participate as an active citizen in social and democratic situations and to understand and commit oneself to the solidaristic community of which the individual is a part' (The Government, 2003b). Citizenship eventually denoted, beyond work, education and tax-payment, a whole series of egalitarian-individualist values, tied to a welfare state way of life in work places, schools and kindergartens. The *Declaration of Integration and Active Citizenship in Danish Society* from 2006 (still required for permanent residence), asks the signer to 'acknowledge that men and women have equal rights and duties in Denmark, and that both men and women should contribute to society. Men and women thus have the same right – and in some cases duty – to educate themselves and to work ... to participate in democratic processes [and] ... to pay taxes and to take parental responsibility for their children.' [ref] The declaration notes duties to respect people of different religious persuasions and sexual outlooks, acquire knowledge of the country, refrain from marital violence, female circumcision, and forced marriages, to report terrorists and much else. In a similar vein, here, as when Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen asked 'that all Muslims practice Islam in a way that is consistent with the Danish traditions for being down-to-earth, for pragmatism, peaceful discussion and respect for others' (Rasmussen 2005), civicness thickens, casting suspicion on a great deal of 'diversity'. Reading the declaration, 'it is difficult not to see it as drawing the profile of a problematic foreigner: an intolerant male of Middle Eastern and Muslim background who has come to Denmark to live off the welfare state; a male who prefers to stay in his council flat' (Østergaard & Sinclair, 2007: _).

If this chauvinistic welfare state modernism remains on the civic side of the civic-ethnocultural distinction, other elements cross the line. A new citizenship test (2007) easily beats the German on Christian figures and includes additional items on writers, artists, and ancient history – as well as sports and trivia. After 2005, debates increasingly reflected this, particularly with the influential trope *sammenhængskraft* – the social cohesion and trust undergirding Danish democracy and welfare society (Peters 2014). In an influential speech in 2005 Fogh Rasmussen linked trust to 'a certain community of values; a core that keeps us together', consisting not only of Danish civicness ('jovial Danish conversational democracy'), but also 'Danish culture in the broadest sense', including language, history, and the people's 'cultural heritage' – including Christianity (Fogh Rasmussen 2005).

This concern with cultural heritage also informed related debates on *canons*, some of which directly entered national school curricula. In 2006, the commissioning minister (Mikkelsen 2006) linked the publication of seven ‘cultural canons’ (literature, painting and other art forms) to the broader cultural struggle (Fogh Rasmussen introduced the word *kulturkamp* in 2003). Liberal minister of education Bertel Haarder saw a subsequent ‘democracy canon’ as a means to combat ‘democracy blindness’ among second generation immigrants – but also to signal a more voluntarist and civic conception of integration (Ministry of Education 2006). Working to strengthen the national ‘culture carrying’ functions of the school subjects Christianity, History and Danish, his ambition was not only to expose newcomers to a Danish heritage for their own good, but also to preserve an aesthetic-emotional space for expression of majority national identity (Fernandez and Jensen 2016). Haarder also initiated, as a so far final canon initiative, a national dialogue and electronic vote on the most defining national values. This exercise was more open, also to immigrant voices, than its predecessors were, even as it continued a Danish obsession with values and identity.

The Danish equivalent of the *Leitkultur* debate was less structured, less sophisticated, but also, compared to Germany, tougher and more politically influential, mirroring the saliency of citizenship policy, the DPP’s support of liberal-conservative government – but also the participation of Social Democrats. Public criticism came from academics and the far left parties. It was characterised by the self-congratulatory innocence of a small nation state without its southern neighbour’s critical introspection, not least as it moved from the culturally thin to comprehensive articulations of welfare state and democratic citizenship as-national-particularity, and in its obsession with cultural homogeneity, history and celebration of aesthetic heritage.

4. The Netherlands – shared citizenship and remembering our liberal values

The Dutch debate began already in 1991 when the Liberal-Conservative Frits Bolkestein criticized the failures of Netherland’s *avant la lettre* multiculturalism (Bruqueras-Callejo et al. 2006),ⁱⁱⁱ and ‘emancipation by pillarization’ (Bolkenstein 1991b) by claiming the superiority of the ‘cultural values’ of ‘the non-Muslim majority’ over ‘Islamic culture’ and ‘way of life’. The former, while also ‘liberal’ values – secularism, tolerance, freedom of speech – were part of Dutch ‘roots’ (Bolkenstein 1991a). Controversial at the time, Bolkenstein’s intervention triggered parliamentary debate on more sustained integration policies. A following government policy paper, which associated integration with *burgerschap* as a voluntary choice to ‘participate’ as individuals in a society of duties as well as rights, still saw ‘mutual respect for identity [as its] necessary precondition’ (TK 1993-94, 24). A more demanding ‘active citizenship of persons from ethnic minorities’ – dropping identity respect but still mainly emphasising socio-economic aspects – emerged in the 1998 Newcomer Integration Law (*Wet Inburgering*),

which introduced mandatory civic integration courses and requirements to actively to seek education and employment.

However, a broader debate on common culture only emerged a decade after Bolkestein's intervention. In 2000, the social democrat Paul Scheffer in an influential op-ed criticised the left for 'a borderless attitude', which 'often hides a detached and careless society' that failed, at the immigrants' peril, to acknowledge the inevitable harshness of integration. Poor socio-economic emancipation and concomitant alienation and segregation of *allochtonen* was caused by lack of exposure to a 'shared citizenship' of common language, history, and culture. A heritage, which progressives should stop pretend did not exist, let alone forget themselves, and should demand from immigrants in their own interest, even as they did not have to appropriate it uncritically. Scheffer's instrumental culture-as-communality pledge supported social democratic agendas of equal participation (which he called 'full-fledged citizenship') and welfare state cohesion. Moreover, the onus of responsibility lay on the Dutch with their careless cosmopolitanism, more than on the immigrants (Scheffer 2000). Although he too associated Dutch culture with unnegotiable liberal values – pitted against backward Islamic traditionalism – he was not

In a parliamentary debate that year, most parties downplayed Scheffer's 'cultural drama', except his name brother de Hoop Scheffer, leader of the Christian Democrat opposition. Replacing *pillarisation*-integration with a more national communitarian notion, he spoke of *inburgering* into 'pattern of values' or 'public consciousness', developed from a Jewish-Christian heritage complemented by humanism," which newcomers should "make their own", lest they "isolate themselves" (TK 1999-2000, 4700-4728). His calls, on this background, for civic integration tests, integration from abroad and other measures became reality five years later, after 9/11, the rise of Pim Fortuyn, and the van Gogh murder had caused other main parties to move. A Christian Democrat led government in 2005 adopted Scheffer's 'shared citizenship' (instead of 'active citizenship') as its goal of comprehensive civic integration and citizenship acquisition programs [ref]. Neither these measures, nor attempts to strengthen national identity in general - a controversial history canon, and the decision to establish a new Museum of National History – prevented Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom and Rita Verdonk's Proud of the Netherlands from entering the political scene in 2006-7.

Both Schnabel and the two Scheffers had been criticised from the intellectual left for essentializing culture as both problem and solution (Aboutaleb 2000; Halsema 2000). Professors Gowricharn and Duyvendak dismissed the causal link between cultural assimilation and socio-economic integration, as well as the idea that a more assertive majority *autochton* culture could could 'rescue *allochtons* from cultural isolation.' The Dutch, they claimed, were already 'pregnant with self-importance' (*eigendunk*) (Gowricharn and Duyvendak 2003). Arguably, politicians hid such self-importance well. In an interview a Christian Democrat MP lamented how

‘we have become cultural orphans. Therefor I will use the word *Leitkultur*. We always thought, let it go, we will not bother anybody...But now we do not feel connected to anything (...). We have been too careless with our own culture. We are adrift. We need to search for an identity to realise this connectedness, otherwise you do not get a society, but conflicting communities’ (Verhagen 2005)

By now, the integration-through-national-values discourse dominated, although disagreement remained (as in Germany) about the roots and particularity of liberal-democratic mores. The cabinet promoted citizenship education and a Charter for Responsible Citizenship with duties such as law-abidance and loyalty to nation over cultural conformity. In a similar vein, the Nationality Law (2009) included a declaration of *verbondenheid* and oath of constitutional allegiance.

However, the Scientific Council’s report and princess Maxima’s remark at its launch, that after seven years’ search she had not found ‘*the Dutch identity*’, were heavily criticised. Professor Koopmans noted that some identities were indeed incompatible and undesirable and that the least diversity accepting groups were found among immigrants as well as Dutch (Koopmans 2007). The publicist Spruyt (2007) saw it as ‘spreading a hymn of multiculturalism’, and ‘tabooing real, everyday experiences of common people’ (Spruyt 2007). Paul Scheffer, launching his book *Het land van aankomst*, also dismissed the report’s and the princess’ elite cosmopolitanism, insisted on the existence of a shared Dutch history, which ‘autochtons and immigrants’ (Scheffer 2007) must navigate as ‘without a “we”, without an imagined community, there is no shared responsibility for society’ (Scheffer 2009). Yet, he dismissed dystopias of ‘islamization’ (Scheffer 2007). Revisiting the pluralism/tolerance nexus within Dutch culture, he insisted on an inclusive nationhood, based on history and willingness of immigrants to familiarise with it – but also on their participation, along with natives, in its critical reconstruction in ‘an open society that has the ability to measure itself against its own norms’ (Scheffer 2009, 415). Remarks in the *Integration Memorandum 2007-2011* indicated that the government was after all receptive to such participatory engagement with Dutch nationhood (e.g., in citizenship education). Presented more pluralistically than in parallel Danish efforts, it still required ‘curiosity with respect to the ways of Dutch society and the life-world of co-citizens, especially where the Dutch culture and history are concerned. By participating in society it becomes possible to increasingly identify with these’ (Integration Memorandum 2007).

Reflecting similar influences from very strong anti-migration parties and public sentiment (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) but on a more difficult background of historical segregation and political murders than Denmark’s, Dutch intellectual life has remained preoccupied with questions of culture and conceptions of citizenship, which continue to influence politics. More sophisticated and academic than the Danish one, this preoccupation, however, has become reflective, increasingly revolving around ‘what the Dutch deemed to be Dutch,’ with participants performing their Dutchness in imagining character traits and historical exemplars, which *should* be Dutch ‘to reinvigorate, strengthen and sustain the imaginative prowess of the nation’ (van Reekum 2016, 565).

Left-of-center intellectuals share in this activity, which, while contesting what Dutch individualism and liberal tolerance means, *accept* the very idea of a particular Dutch civic culture, even Dutch character traits and mentalities, with historical roots.

The Dutch debate, then, is paradoxical. It is less blatantly self-congratulatory and communitarian than the Danish, less concerned with Christian roots, and intensely occupied with secular- liberal values and tolerance of pluralism. However, it is also without German inhibitions about invoking historical particularity and civic cultural character traits in relation to this Dutch management of pluralism, as something that should be, either treated as given, critically re-appropriated, or deconstructed. Also Dutch left-liberal discourse (which is much stronger than in Denmark), less concerned with loyalty, belonging, or culture as integration resource, reflects this *national* culturalisation of good citizenship. So do other, more blunt interventions, who present ‘normal’ Dutch virtues in a more mundane, non-relativist way, to target the everyday unciviness of Muslim immigrants. Hence, the present Prime Minister, the liberal Mark Rutte in a recent open letter (Rutte 2017) was head-on about the meaning of ‘culture’ as he criticized ‘people who abuse our freedom ... although they have come to our country for that freedom ... who do not want to adapt’. The conduct he chastised as ‘not normal’ included ‘harassing homosexuals, scaring women in short skirts and calling ordinary Dutch people racists’, and failure to ‘respect teachers’ and ‘work for your money’. The solution, he argued, was not to ‘banish whole groups from the country’ but ‘make clear what is normal and not normal in our country.’

5. *Leitkultur* as amateur political theories of civic cultural national integration

We introduce the long term *civic cultural national integration* to capture four analytical aspects delineating *Leitkultur*-debates in their three national cases discussed, within which varieties, overlaps and developments may be looked at more closely.

First, all debates reflect ‘amateur political theories’ (Favell 1998, 14) of *integration*. They define problems in view of desirable end states, and mechanisms and means towards them. By contrast to the ‘organic’ solidarity (where man ‘depends upon society, because he depends upon the parts that go to constitute it’ [Durkheim 1984, 83]), which dominates migration studies (Enzinger & Biezeveld 2003, 19ff), they assume a ‘mechanic’ solidarity of sameness. The onus is on normative conformity and *being alike*, rather than *doing things together* – working, participating in politics and civil society, let alone having adequate resources and rights to do so. Durkheim’s organic solidarity also entailed a ‘whole system of rights and duties joining them in a lasting way to one another’ (Durkheim 1984: 337), but these arose from the universalistic thrust of social interaction itself. *Leitkultur* requires values before interaction may start and cultural isolation may be broken, invariably linking the process to *integration policy*, individual *responsibility to integrate*, and – most strongly in Denmark and the Netherlands – to *integration potential*.

Beyond this, the integration mechanism and function of common values may vary. They may facilitate loyalty and identification with society in general, or with state institutions and the liberal universal *Rechtsstaat*, as emphasised in Germany. They may alleviate *difference as a form of inequality* (between unmodern immigrant and carriers of modern universal culture), which makes societal participation and functioning harder, as in Paul Scheffer's Dutch intervention, mirrored in the Danish centre-left. This potentially progressive assimilation discourse competes with the idea of inherent cultural backwardness, which – mainly in the Netherlands and Denmark – legitimizes selection of 'integrationable' immigrants, even for their own good. They may facilitate *trust* – because similar people presumably trust each other more or because liberal people are more trustworthy (a common argument in Denmark). Although immigrants must integrate, a common trope is the responsibility of the majority – often a false 'us', representing leftist multiculturalists – to *remember our values*. Either to be able to transmit it to newcomers – rather than pretend that this is not important (the Netherlands), or because having a strong awareness of own culture creates the resilience and cautious openness, which enables 'meeting of cultures' (Denmark). Alternatively, in a more culture-securitizing manner (arising from Germany's post-totalitarian heritage, and connected to the welfare state and freedom of speech in Denmark) because the national culture, or its inviolable core, is eroding or even submerged.

Secondly, integration is *civic* (Mouritsen 2008). The community is conceptualised in universalistic terms of liberal-democratic rights and virtues, and onus is on voluntariness (the possibility and responsibility to integrate) over ethnic origin. Respect for political-constitutional principles (secularism, freedom rights, and religious toleration) are supplemented, particularly in the Netherlands and Denmark, with comprehensive personal-ethical values (gender relations, egalitarianism, autonomy). In these two spearheads of liberalism-as-form-of-life perfectionism in Europe they connect to thick conceptions of citizenship, with associated virtues such as self-reliance, language learning, civil society participation and much else.

The slide into culture as particularity, finally, is paradoxically enhanced, by the way, that integration equals culture as *Bildung* - a universalistic, modern, Western type of character formation whereby newcomers must enter an already achieved, unnegotiable civic-liberal civilisation. This high culture, however, is also informal, and engrained in everyday mores. It is less than ethno-religious heritage, but also more than general tenets and principles, because associated with competences and behaviour. In Denmark and the Netherlands, values connect to expansive conceptions of citizenship, guiding conduct in multiple spheres of life, including intimate and personal ones, which must eventually become habits

eliciting identification. Demonstrating such orientations constitute a wilfully acquired capacity to belong, which crowds out most of the remaining space for ethno-religious minority culture, filling both with symbolic meanings in a series of contrasts between negative and positive, backwards and civilised.

Debates, thereby, are finally *national* – and nationalistic. They may be so, as in Denmark, in their particularistic sense, i.e. by instrumental connecting common values to trust-through-similarity, or by emphasising their distinct flavour, comprehensiveness, or priority (Jensen & Mouritsen 2017). Boundary demarcation here assumes culturalised ‘particular universalism’ (Mouritsen 2006) flavoring, as when integration courses and citizenship tests require familiarity with traditions, symbols and heroes of liberal democratic heritages, idealized representations of religious establishments, or even literary canons. By contrast to ‘Dutch values’ or ‘Danishness’, most German politicians, including conservatives who nevertheless stress a Judean-Christian heritage, tend to see *Leitkultur* as part of a broader occidental enlightenment heritage. The important point, however, is the securitization of aspects of the (Muslim) other’s *unciviness*, which cannot become included in the nation unless amended, and the concomitant emphasis on the receiving nation as a community of citizens, each contributing to its stability and improvement as hard working, tax-paying, democratically competent, trustworthy, and loyal. Debates are nationally oriented, thereby, in a spatial sense, presupposing territorial societies, with institutions and economies that must be upheld, and psychologically, whereby such support requires (and can be measured by) over-riding solidarity, commitment, and allegiance. In Germany, this happens on the backdrop of post war history, but also the uncertain unity of a previously divided, federal state, and in the Netherlands within criticism of multiculturalism and pillarization. Denmark, whose national unity faces no such difficulty, is no exception.

There is no real ‘paradox of universalism’ (Joppke 2008) in civic semantics of nationhood in Western Europe, including countries traditionally on the ethnic side, such as Germany and Denmark. First, because liberalism and citizenship connotes diverse normative content and different assumptions of integration (Jensen & Mouritsen 2017), each within richly textured narratives of political heritage. Secondly, because nationalism currently manifests itself more partialist than particularistic, more concerned with *superiority* and *endurance* than *distinctness*. It denotes the will to place the interest of the nation first by only adding newcomers who aid this project and strengthen the nation’s cohesion and standing. The nation, here, is an essentially fragile achievement of Civilisation, which is largely sustained by the qualities of citizens, and the institutions and cultural mores, which support their virtue. This situation is not a weakening of nationalism, but a modern expression of its historical core.

7. Assessing the functions of nationalism as *Leitkultur*

Debates on *Leitkultur* win their variety within and across these countries reflect a dual aim, with classical pedigrees. First, they communicate (to immigrants and to others, who communicate to these groups) that sharing and respecting certain values and principles, learning and engaging in certain practices, and maybe also appreciating the historical context of these, is important and mandatory. For the newcomers to function and succeed in their new country, but particularly for national societies themselves, who need well-integrated citizens to maintain their ways of life, welfare states, and democratic institutions. Call these the *manifest functions* of the immigration-nationalism of *Leitkultur*. Secondly, proponents imply, not only that it improves new citizens, but also that it furthers social cohesion, by enhancing loyalty and solidarity, national identity, and trust, also by addressing the legitimate concerns and fears of majorities. Call these the *latent functions* of immigration-nationalism.^{iv}

Manifest functions

To assess these debates requires acknowledging their actual, manifest integrationist intent. They constitute sincere mainstream ambitions to bolster their nations' high cultures by cultivating new citizens, rather than islamophobia or racism, even as they feed on racialized stereotypes. To state obvious points, values and practices propagated, *do* constitute 'core culture' in the sense of broad ideals and aspirations affirmed by majorities. These majorities *do* see think these values and practices are threatened by immigrants, which do not share them. At the level of generality that most debates occur, they are also, at face value, normatively uncontroversial. This is true, if we think of political liberalism (human rights, tolerance, freedom of speech) (Rawls 1993), more perfectionist, social democratic, and feminist liberalism (strong autonomy, gender/intergenerational equality) (e.g. Raz, Arneson, Okin), and liberal republicanism (work obligations, social and political participation) (e.g. Dagger; White). They tap values and virtues that liberal societies may legitimately further. Advanced welfare states, requiring high employment, social participation and solidarity, may even *depend on* them. Issues of course remain, concerning limits, beyond non-neutrality in education and policy, to societies' enforcement of liberal values at the level of *Gesinnung* (Bauböck). Leaving normative discussion aside, liberal-civic integration – 'liberal states for liberal people' (Joppke), is the only game in town in post-multiculturalist Europe.

However, does *Leitkultur* further these manifest goals? Over and above furthering such values in education and social policies, e.g. to strengthen gender equality or employment, which is not the issue here, are there positive effects on immigrants of the debates themselves? This is doubtful. Discourse on common values is probably ineffectual as a means of integration, often unfocussed, and thereby harmful.

The value integration, which does take place among Western Muslims (), arises from other processes, such as upward social mobility, generational change, and above all education (). Having modern values to begin with of course eases functional integration, but changing adults' values is difficult through public policy, let alone patronizing discourse. Even ignoring this difficulty, *Leitkultur* obscures the

challenge. To begin with, despite significant pockets of radicalisation, demanding affirmation of standard liberal-democratic values arguably barks up a wrong tree. In Pew and many national surveys, immigrant populations are as or almost as likely as majority populations to favour e.g. democracy, and human rights (). A recent Danish even showed higher affirmation among immigrants and descendants of religious freedom and freedom of speech (). Immigrant populations appreciate Western liberties.

Intolerance of towards Jews, apostates and family members, who claim sexual and marital independence, indicates that some groups do not practice these values. This is also true of receiving societies, whose principles of secularism, religious freedom, and anti-discrimination do not prevent Christianity dominance in schools, religious dress restrictions, obstacles to Muslim schools and mosques, and citizenship laws that severely limit the democratic participation, Muslims must demonstrate. Such institutional unfairness affects those who experience its effects directly (e.g., school parents) (). Double standards in public discourse, which represents Muslims as inherently illiberal, alienates more generally and may even cause democratic withdrawal (Simonsen a,b), particularly among the young.

Most immigrants can easily affirm liberal values in the abstract. When host societies present them as ‘ours’, and even tie them to specific institutions and practices, they claim a false consensus on matters like welfare state redistribution, participatory democracy, religious freedom, or approaches to cultural pluralism (Laborde 2002,) so that immigrants face standards some majority individuals neither meet nor value. Real problems lie elsewhere. First, with private-ethical values pertaining to gender roles, sexuality, apostasy, and in tolerance of certain other minorities (Joppke). Secondly, with traditionalist segments’ displaced amoral familism (Banfield), counter culture masculinity in young left-behind subgroups, residential segregation, and crime (). The latter reflects social causes, educational failure, and dysfunctional, often broken, traditional (not necessarily religious) family patterns. The former, sometimes further strengthened by strong ‘modern’ religiosity, does not necessarily go away with social integration. Societies must meet these challenges separately, and for none of them *Leitkultur* debates help, even where it names concrete unwanted practices. The latter challenge requires social, employment, educational and housing policy, from which ‘common values’ deflect attention. The former challenge calls for civic education in schools, targeting children and young people, protecting their autonomy, teaching religious and sexual tolerance, and empowering real freedom of choice. It may also require a dose of traditional liberal tolerance, where regulation is ineffective or counterproductive (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013). In both cases, when liberal societies mould citizens – also adults – into the comprehensive welfare state modernism, which best serves the nation, ideals must connect to specific, realistic, behavioural requirements. Such requirements – to refrain from some religious practices in schools, to put children in kinder gardens, to seek or accept employment etc. – state agencies should communicate directly to affected individuals and families, and above all enforce indiscriminately.

When *Leitkultur* – as in the Netherlands and Denmark – also concerns cultural and historical knowledge, another case of problem displacement occurs. Although it is disingenuous to expect first generation immigrants to *identify* with a heritage, which is not their own (and to expect the second generation to cherish it *exclusively*) it may be helpful to *know* it. Host societies may transmit knowledge, which is instrumental to integration. However, which knowledge? Familiarity with societal institutions, situated within modern history is certainly important. There is also no inherent injustice in including older history, literary traditions, and familiarity with Christian heritage in, say, integration programs (unless tied to naturalisation).

Presenting it as a context for value commitment is more dubious. First, because the causal link is unpersuasive. Cultural references, e.g. to intellectual traditions, may enhance dialogue about national meanings of universal values (Laborde 2002), except that context knowledge is not presented to enable critical dialogues, as much as questioning immigrants' capacity for it, or for understanding national liberal values in the *right* way. Demanding this invites resentment. Why cannot liberal values appreciated within other contexts – other national or global ones, reflecting the immigration experience? At any rate, it is unrealistic and elitist to expect immigrants to master knowledge that Western youth hardly learn in school. It is also less functionally useful for newcomers (not just Middle-eastern Muslims) than more mundane, anthropological culture of unstated norms and habits, below the highbrow *Bildungs*-horizon of *Leitkultur* – think of how Danes pretend consensus in decision-making, use irony in every second sentence, or have highly invisible work place hierarchies. Failure to decipher such particularistic culture is more of a handicap, and renders a person more alien, than ignorance of poets and thinkers.

Latent functions

Civic acculturation is indeed important for social cohesion. Having liberal-democratic values correlates with trust (Rothstein) and community participation facilitates trust-enhancing inter-group contact (Uslaner). Liberal lifestyles and working for welfare-state-functioning are significant elements of moral boundary-drawing in North-Western Europe. Solidarity – willingness to redistribute to immigrants, and willingness to distribute at all – correlates negatively with perceptions of unwillingness or inability to work (Albrekt Larsen), particularly among blue collar workers (Petersen et al). We also know that a large 'immoral' underclass (real or perceived) creates lower social trust (Albrekt Larsen).

While all this underscores the importance of civic integration for welfare state functioning and legitimacy it does not vindicate *Leitkultur*-debates, however uncontroversial their manifest functions. Hectoring about liberal values, in general, essentialising ways, mystified within thick historical contexts, and experienced as double standards likely hurts its latent functions, including systemic pursuit of social cohesion. From the sociology of moral boundary maintenance (Lamont), we know that (unfair) signalling of failure to meet civic norms in a host society will produce less political identification, engagement

and political trust from immigrants, not more. We also know that impenetrable national identity markers ('cultural context' knowledge) diminishes belonging (Simonsen a,b).

Calls for more comprehensive acculturation/assimilation for the sake of national homogeneity (i.e., not just as context-for-civiness) is most often instrumentalist, seen as conducive to trust, rather than straightforwardly communitarian). Yet, the implied argument is notoriously slippery (Abizadeh), because the salient culture-stuff is vaguely defined, and because 'too diverse'-tropes function by vaguely suggesting a deficit of specific *kinds* of values. We know that civic and liberal values are almost indistinguishable from *being* trustful (Rothstein), so that general trust will rise numerically with civic acculturation. We also have theoretical reason to believe that perceived or experienced liberal and civic conduct enhances general trust (Mouritsen 2015,). We rationally trust others more, when we think that they obey the law, abide by contracts, and respect norms of reciprocity. All are trustworthy elements of a 'civic culture', of which there is really just one type (Verba). It is less obvious that we should distrust anybody simply for leading traditional and religious lifestyles, unless they connect to uncivic behavior, discursively or experienced. Nevertheless, some research finds correlations between religious cleavages (if they overlap other cleavages) and lower trust (Finseras et al), and between religious traditionalism and higher levels of within-group trust (and lower general trust) (Fafo), potentially strengthening outside impression of ethno-religious parallel societies.

Even acknowledging such research, its significance for the latent trust-building functions of *Leitkultur* is unclear. If the latter merely denotes civic-liberal values and conduct, the debates at best blur the issues, and at worst stigmatize Muslims who affirm these ideals. If strong religiosity were inherently associated with their absence, *Leitkultur* could hardly facilitate trust through integration – but only by legitimising categorical exclusion. Such equivocation may be picked up by immigrants as a signal that 'they will never trust us (unless we stop being religious)'. This is also true of the more general diversity-distrust argument (Putnam's 2006). First, because of the slipperiness of trust-conducive diversity. If we impute a problem with religiosity as such, let alone colour of skin, the cure is immigrant-selection and exclusion, not integration, at which point the conversation stops – at which immigrants ambitious to integrate.

In fairness, this is not the message of most *Leitkultur* proponents who invoke a more mainstream argument, from the earliest days of European nationalism. According to it, fellow feeling within nations must be artificially created not only by making subjects into contributing citizens but also by homogenizing ethnic, regional and class sub-groups in conduct, tastes, and cultural orientations. In Europe, this process, which previously often involved exclusion and insisting on natural boundaries, is after all more 'French' than 'German.' However, research also indicates that the understanding is flawed. Whereas mainly American studies before and after Putnam's found connections between diversity and lower

general trust, European studies mainly find it in immigrant-dense residential areas, and mainly for strategic, inter-group and local trust (). Many studies point to intervening variables such as low positive inter-group contact, poverty, unemployment, and unfairness (a recent comprehensive review is). A sophisticated Danish study (), did find effects of ethnic diversity on general trust but also, in line with many other studies, that inequality was a far more important factor ().

Literature

- Borevi, K, K. Jensen & M. Mouritsen (2017).
- Bauböck, R. (2002) 'Farewell to Multiculturalism: Sharing Values and Identities in Societies of Immigration', *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, Vol. 3, No. 1.
- Billig, M., 1995. *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage.
- Bolkenstein 1991a
- Bolkenstein 1991 b
- Brubaker, R. (2001) 'The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol 24, no. 4, pp. 531-48.
- Brubaker, R., 2004. *Ethnicity without groups*
- Bruquetas-Callejo, M., Garcés-Mascareñas, B. Penninx, R. Scholten, P. (2006) *Policymaking related to immigration and integration. The Dutch Case*, Amsterdam: IMISCOE.
- Buruma, I. (2006) *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*. New York: Penguin.
- Michael Cornelius, Todtmoos, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4.11.2000, S.13
- Danish Government 2003 *Action Plan to promote equal Treatment and Combat Racism*
- Ejrnæs, M. (2001). Integrationsloven: En case, der illustrerer etniske minoriteters usikre medborgerstatus. Aalborg: Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier og Samfundsforhold, Aalborg Universitet.
- Esser, H. (2004) 'Was ist denn dran am Begriff der 'Leitkultur'?', in R. Kecskes, M. Wagner and C. Wolf (eds.) *Angewandte Soziologie*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.
- Faas, D. (2010) *Negotiating Political Identities: Multiethnic Schools and Youth in Europe*, Farnham: Ashgate.
- Fernandez and Jensen 2017 The civic integrationist turn in Danish and Swedish school politics
- Fogh Rasmussen 2005 <https://dansketal.dk/tale/soendagstale-paa-venstres-landsmoede-2005/>
- Fossum, J.E. (2008) 'Constitutional patriotism: Canada and the European Union' in Mouritsen, P. and K. E. Jørgensen (eds) *Constituting Communities – Political Solutions to Cultural Difference*, London: Palgrave.
- Goodhart, David (2004)
- Goodman, S. W. (2010) 'Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake: Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies'
- Gowricharn & Duyvendak 2003
- Habermas, J. (1992) 'Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität', in J. Habermas *Faktizität und Geltung*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Habermas, J. (2003) 'Towards a cosmopolitan Europe', *Journal of Democracy*, 14(4): 86-100.
- Habermas, J. and Ratzinger, J. (2006) *Dialektik der Säkularisierung*. Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. [??]
- Habermas 2010
- Halsema 2000

- Minister van Justitie & WWI, 2008, Kabinetsstandpunt WRR-rapport Identificatie met Nederland.
- Hedetoft, U. (1999) 'The Nation-state Meets the World: National Identities in the Context of Transnationality and Cultural Globalization', *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 2 no. 1, pp. 71-94.
- Howard, M. M. (2008). "The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law", *German Politics*, Vol.17, No.1, pp.41-62.
- Højrup, T., 2003. *State, Culture and Life-Modes. The foundations of Life-mode analysis*, London: Ashgate
- Ignatieff, Michael. 1994. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*. Toronto: Penguin.
- Integration Memorandum 2007
- Jensen, 2015 What can and cannot be willed
- Jensen, K. & P. Mouritsen (2017). 'Nationalism in a Liberal Register: Beyond the Paradox of Universalism', *British Journal of Political Science*, Published online ahead of print 6 July 2017.
- Joppke, C. (2007) 'Beyond national models: Civic Integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe', *Western European Politics*, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 1-22.
- Joppke, C. (2008) 'Immigration and the identity of citizenship: the paradox of universalism', *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 12, no. 3; 533-546.
- Joppke, C. (2010a). *Citizenship and Immigration*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Joppke, C. (2010b). "The inevitable lightening of citizenship", *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 51, no.3: 9-32.
- Jyllandsposten
- Kaspersen, L.B. and N. Gabriel, 2008. 'The importance of survival units for Norbert Elias's figurational perspective', *The sociological Review*, 56 (3): 370-387.
- Klusmeyer, D. (2001) 'A 'guiding culture' for immigrants? Integration and diversity in Germany,' in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 27, No. 3, 519-532.
- Koopmans 2007
- Kymlicka, W., 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laborde, C. (2002) 'From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, No. 2; 591-612
- Lammert 2005a"(http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/lammert-plaedierte-fuer-neue-leitkultur-debatte.691.de.html?dram:article_id=49131)
- [Lammert 2005b](http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article183928/Auch_die_EUbraucht_ein_Ideelles_Fundament.html) Auch die EU braucht ein ideelles Fundament », in : *Welt Online*, 13. Dezember 2005. [http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article183928/Auch die EUbraucht ein Ideelles Fundament.html](http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article183928/Auch_die_EUbraucht_ein_Ideelles_Fundament.html).
- Lammert, N. (2006a) <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/karikaturenstreit-lammerts-wiedervorlage-1305810.html>
- (2006b) 'Gewissheiten und Zweifel,' in N. Lammert (ed.) *Verfassung, Patriotismus, Leitkultur: Was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenhält*, Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
- Merz, F. (2000a) 'Einwanderung und Identität,' in *Die Welt*, October 25.
- Merz, F 200b Bild am Sonntag, Hamburg, 3.12.2000 Seite 18; "Sie spielen mit dem Feuer, Herr
- Miller, D. (1995). *On Nationality*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mouritsen, P. (2006) 'The Particular Universalism of a Nordic Civic Nation: Common values, state religion, and Islam in Danish political culture', pp. 70-93 in T. Modood, R. Zapata-Barrero & A.Triandafyllidou (eds.) *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship*, London: Routledge.
- Mouritsen, P. (2008) 'Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn', pp. 1-30 in P. Mouritsen and K. E. Jørgensen (eds), *Constituting Communities. Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict*, London: Palgrave.
- Mouritsen, P. (2009) 'The Culture of Citizenship: A Reflection on Civic Integration in Europe', in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), *Citizenship Policies in an age of diversity: Europe at the crossroads*, Barcelona: CIDOB.
- Mouritsen, P. (2012) 'The resilience of citizenship traditions: Civic integration in Germany, Great Britain and Denmark', *Ethnicities* .
- Mouritsen, P. & T. V. Olsen (2013). 'Denmark Between Liberalism and Nationalism', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36 (4)

Mouritsen & Olsen – liberal intolerance there could also be discussion about what the Dutch deemed to be Dutch

- Müller, J.-W. (2007) *Constitutional Patriotism*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Ohlert, Martin (2015) *Zwischen "Multikulturalismus" und "Leitkultur": Integrationsleitbild und – politik der im 17. Deutschen Bundestag vertretenen Parteien*, Wiesbaden: Springer Verlag.
- Pautz, Hartwig (2005) 'The Politics of Identity in Germany: The Leitkultur debate', *Race and Class* 46 (4): 39-52.
- Peters, R. A. 2014, '[Kampen om sammenhængskraften: En analyse af begrebet sammenhængskraft i den offentlige debat fra 1994 til 2010](#)' *Slagmark tidsskrift for idéhistorie*, nr. 70, s. 129-156.
- Petersen, T. (2008) 'Das zarte Pflänzchen Integration,' *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 19 2008.
- Gerhard Schröder, Bundeskanzler, Interview mit Peter Hahne auf dem Flughafen Hannover, Fernsehsendung, Berlin direkt, ZDF, 19.11.00; Textfassung nach Video-Aufzeichnung;
- Slootman and Duyvendak 2015
- Smith, R., 2003. *Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of political membership*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Spiegel, P 2000, Was soll das Gerede um die Leitkultur? - Die Welt, 11.11.2000, p. 3
- Sternberger
- Stoiber, 2006 <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/stoiber-fuer-alltagskultur-cdu-haelt-an-leitkultur-fest/2680650.html>
- Stoiber, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/leitkultur-debatte-stoiber-kathedralen-muessen-groesser-sein-als-moscheen-1.343015>). 17. Mai 2010
- Tibi, B. (1998) *Europa Ohne Identität: Die Krise der Multikulturellen Gesellschaft*, München: Bertelsmann Verlag.
- Tibi, B. (2001) 'Leitkultur als Wertekonsens: Bilanz einer missglückten deutschen Debatte', in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (Das Parlament)* 1-2: 23-26.
- Tonkens, E, M. Hurenkamp, and J. W. Duyvendak, 2010. 'Culturalisation of Citizenship
- Wimmer, Andreas (2008). *American Journal of Sociology*, 113, 4: 970-1022.
- Waever, O., 1993. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*,
- Viroli, M. 1995. *For Love of Country*
- Østergaard, K & K. Sinclair (2007). Danish Muslims, the Cartoon Controversy, and the Concept of Integration, *Global Dialogue*, 9 (3-4).
- Yack, B., 2008. 'The myth of the civic nation
- Zolberg, A. and ---Woon, 1999.
- Arbeitsgrundlage für die Zuwanderungs-Kommission der CDU Deutschlands, Berlin, 6.11.2000, Kapitel IV; <http://www.cdu.de:80/ueber-uns/buvo/pmueller/arbeitsgrundlage.htm>, download 12.12.2000

ⁱ Each derives in part from longer qualitative reports on key public interventions, all at elite level and in the political main stream, and some main permutations and controversies, arising in specific national policy contexts. With some data originating in the *CiviTurn*-project (Aarhus University), research was funded within the Norwegian Research Council project Active Citizenship in Diverse Societies (ACT).

ⁱⁱ The following draws on an unpublished research note by Jensen (2009)

ⁱⁱⁱ The Netherlands' cultural minorities policy had been officially criticized already in the late eighties (Scientific Council for Government Policy 1989).

^{iv} To Malinowski and Merton latent functions were unintended, even unacknowledged, whereas proponents of *Leitkultur* do anticipate their beneficial effects on social cohesion. As public intellectuals they rely upon popularized social science notions and theories of trust, political legitimacy and social cohesion.