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Reflections on the ‘Devolution Paradox’: a comparative examination of multi-level citizenship

Ailsa Henderson, Charlie Jeffery, Daniel Wincott, Richard Wyn Jones

Abstract

This paper addresses a paradox in the literature on federal and decentralised states: citizens want their regional governments to do more and yet seem reluctant to embrace the logical consequences of regional control, namely inter-regional policy variation and limited state-wide intervention in policy provision. Based on a survey conducted in fourteen regions across Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom we clarify the extent of this devolution paradox and identify variables that seem to mitigate or exacerbate its presence, including strength of regional identity, regional institutional authority and regional economic wealth. The analysis helps us to understand where and how multi-level citizenship operates.

Keywords: citizenship, public policy, devolution, regions, federalism

In recent years a number of authors have pointed to a paradox: citizens in federal and regionalised states typically want their regional institutions of government to do more than they do now, and central government institutions less;¹ yet at the same time they appear reluctant to embrace what would appear to be logical consequences, namely more inter-regional variation, and less intervention to secure state-wide equity, in public policy provision. Though aspects of this paradox have been identified in Germany (e.g. GRUBE 2001) and Canada (c.f. JEFFERY 2006), it has received particular attention in the post-devolution United Kingdom, where powerful popular support for further-reaching devolution in Scotland and Wales appears to co-exist with continuing preferences for state-wide uniformity of policy (CURTICE, 2006: 102-9; JEFFERY, 2005; WYN JONES and SCULLY, 2009). What we call the ‘devolution paradox’ is intriguing, not only because of its potential political implications in an era characterised by ‘the rise of regional authority’ (HOOGHE, et al. 2010), but also – and centrally for our current purposes – for the profound analytical questions it raises about public attitudes towards, and expectations of, governmental institutions in systems of multi-layered authority. In this paper we will seek to specify some of those questions more fully as well as provide some necessarily tentative answers.

Several potential explanations for the devolution paradox may be identified in the literature. Reflecting on the UK, James Mitchell (2006: 165-6) has argued that the pressures which led to devolution in Scotland and Wales had little to do with the advocacy of distinctive policy agendas *per se*, but are rather better understood in terms of reclaiming *ownership* of the political process after a period under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major when the UK government appeared indifferent or even hostile to Scottish and Welsh concerns. On this view, devolution was above all a process of democratic renewal of which a distinctive

policy agenda was a by-product. A related view that has been rehearsed both in work on the UK (JEFFERY 2009) and in wider comparative analysis (e.g. BANTING 2006), is that federal and devolved states embody distinctive logics: a logic of proximity and responsiveness of decision-making at a regional scale within the state; and a logic of equity and solidarity that is effected on a state-wide scale through uniform policies and services. While these logics may appear to stand in tension with one another, citizens may well endorse both as desirable, producing the seemingly paradoxical responses that public attitudes surveys reveal.

Whether or not citizens do endorse both logics, and how they reconcile any cross-pressures they feel in simultaneously pursuing collective goals at regional and state-wide scales, is, however, an open question. It remains open because, with too few exceptions, public attitudes have mostly been explored by political scientists at state-wide scales (and, increasingly, through aggregation of state-wide samples at trans-state scales). Only in some places, but then often rather patchily, have public attitudes on political participation and public policy been explored at regional scales. The data that inform this paper are an initial attempt to build a more systematic evidence base on how citizens negotiate – paradoxically or not – multi-level government within the state. These data were generated by the ‘Citizenship after the Nation-State’ (CANS) project which fielded a common survey questionnaire to randomly selected samples of at least 900 respondents in 14 regions in five European states in early 2009. The survey was designed to elicit views on how public authority should best be organised at regional and state-wide scales, and of how that authority should be used to make or influence public policies.ⁱⁱ

The CANS project has two inter-linked theoretical points of departure (as developed more fully in JEFFERY and WINCOTT 2010 and JEFFERY 2012). The first is in T.H. Marshall's ([1950] 1992) understanding of 'citizenship' as the product of the interaction over centuries of different clusters of civil, political and social rights and their eventual bundling at the scale of the 'nation-state' after the Second World War.ⁱⁱⁱ The second is the identification of 'methodological nationalism', the unreflective use of the state as a unit of analysis (see e.g. MARTINS 1974; CHERNILO 2007), as a problem not just for the understanding of social and political phenomena at trans-state scales (a problem now widely recognised e.g. by BECK 2007; SCHOLTE 2005), but also at regional scales within the state. Focusing attention on the state-wide scale – as some of the key branches of political science have long done – runs the danger of leaving politics at other scales 'hidden from view' (WIMMER and GLICK-SCHILLER 2002: 302). One of those key branches – welfare state analysis – has, of course, been enduringly shaped by Marshall's work, in particular the notion that citizenship was somehow 'completed' by the addition of social rights to earlier civil and political rights with the establishment of the national welfare state. That association of social rights with the 'nation-state' has had a powerful normative legacy, shaping many of the key contributions to the analysis of the welfare state over the last decades, and underpinning widespread assumptions that the state-wide scale is a 'natural' one for the pursuit of social welfare (JEFFERY and WINCOTT 2010: 182-6; cf. BANTING 2006; JEFFERY 2002).

Yet in Marshall's work there is an inherent challenge to any notion of 'completion' of citizenship or of any 'natural' scale for realising it (WINCOTT 2009). For Marshall citizenship was dynamic, with change in any one of its component clusters spilling over to produce change in others. One of the most significant changes to the nationalised pattern of citizenship Marshall wrote about after the Second World War has been the decentralisation of

political rights to regional scales. Since around 1970 there has been a trend towards the establishment of new elected institutions of regional government (HOOGHE, MARKS and SCHAKEL 2010) and the growth or emergence of new forms of regional political mobilisation focused on those institutions (JEFFERY 2010b). There has also been a significant widening of the policy responsibilities carried out by those institutions (HOOGHE, MARKS and SCHAKEL 2010). The growing importance of regions prompts the question at the heart of the apparent devolution paradox. The rescaling of political rights to regional democratic institutions and the political mobilisation that has accompanied that rescaling may – in Marshall’s terms – spill over into a rescaling of social rights to the regional scale, as different regional jurisdictions develop differing packages of public policies (e.g. MORENO and McEWEN 2005; HARRISON 2006; LODGE and SCHMUECKER 2010). So, if citizens approve of the decentralisation of government, do they also approve of the inter-regional diversification of public policy that can and often does result? And if not, why not?

Before exploring our findings, a number of caveats should be entered. First the survey is a snapshot of 14 regions in five states; although these were selected to provide variation on a number of variables, this is evidently a small set of regions from a small set of states. What it can tell us about the ‘multi-level citizen’ is necessarily limited. Second it is a snapshot taken in 2009. It can say little about change over time, except where the questions it asked connect with earlier surveys to establish two or more time points for comparison. Third, although our project title may perhaps appear a little polemical – Citizenship *after* the Nation-State – we do not in fact seek to claim that the ‘nation-state’ has become redundant or rendered insignificant as regional-scale politics become more important. We are clear that the state-wide scale remains the primary focus of most citizens, political parties and interest groups in most areas of political contestation in most advanced democracies. Our focus, by contrast, is on the

transformative effect on the (nation-)state of the growth of public authority, political mobilisation and policy variation at the regional scale. The growing importance of regional scale politics suggests that the state has to some extent become ‘de-nationalised’, and recast as a more complex multi-levelled form of political organisation that needs to respond to the demands of distinctive regional political communities as well as the political community as organised at the state-wide scale.

Mapping the Devolution Paradox

Table 1 about here

In essence, the CANS project is an exploration of how citizens negotiate multi-levelled statehood. As Table 1 demonstrates, its 14 regional cases were selected to provide variation on three independent variables that we felt could influence the extent to which citizens might pursue collective goals at regional as well as (or instead of) at statewide scales: strength of regional identity; scope of regional institutional authority; and strength of the regional economy.^{iv} The cases range from:

- 1) Historic regions (or, perhaps better, stateless nations) like Wales and Catalonia to regions initially created as administrative conveniences like Lower Saxony and Ile de France;
- 2) High autonomy (‘self rule’) regions like those in Spain and Scotland, through ‘shared rule’ regions interlocked with central government like those in Germany and Austria, to weaker administrative regions in France; and
- 3) Economically powerful regions like Bavaria or Ile de France to economically weak regions like Thuringia and Galicia.

If we were to identify a devolution paradox among citizens in these regions, we would expect to find evidence of strong preference for (more) regional government alongside a preference for uniform, statewide policy outcomes. We would also expect this paradox to be less evident in historic, institutionally powerful and economically strong regions, which are likely to benefit from and be more relaxed about intra-state variation. We might expect the strongest evidence of the paradox to be found in ‘intermediate’ regions. Consistently ‘statist’ attitudes might be expected in the most feeble of regions – those that are institutionally or economically weak and lack historic foundations – although if the preference for (more) regional government turns out to be widely spread even in ‘weak’ regions, then these could turn out to be among the most paradoxical. We explore these expectations below first through a discussion of aggregate level region-by-region findings and second at the individual level across the dataset as a whole. We then drill down into the data by means of further inter-regional comparison.

Support for More Regional Government ...

Table 2 about here

Before we analyse how much power citizens believe government *should* have it is useful to establish what individuals think of the various institutional levels affecting their lives. Table 2 reports the relative importance respondents give to the decisions of regional and state-level institutions. Citizens attribute importance to *both* regional *and* state-level decisions, with more respondents treating the state level as very important in all but two cases, Scotland and Catalonia. There is relatively little cross-regional variation around the importance attributed to state-level decisions, with responses tending to cluster in the 40-50 per cent range. The state-level is clearly important to citizens. The importance attached to decisions of regional institutions is significantly more variable and accounts for most of the variation in the relative

importance scores in column c. Table 2 establishes from the outset the enduring importance for citizens of statewide political institutions and that the importance of regional institutions varies from place to place. It also suggests that making a clear distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘intermediate’ regions in terms of patterns of support for regional government is difficult.

Table 3 about here

The question whether the state level *should* be as important, or whether the regional level should be *more* important is addressed in Table 3, which reports responses to questions about which level of government should and does ‘have most influence over the way’ each region ‘is run’. It has been ordered according to responses on whether the state level ‘does have most influence’. Oddly, given the relative importance attributed to state and regional level decisions in Table 2, there is nowhere a majority of respondents that thinks the state level ‘does have most influence’ and everywhere except Scotland and Wales a majority that thinks the regional level does have most influence. Evaluations of the institutions that ‘have most influence’ do not vary much within states, suggesting a fairly uniform perception within states of the distribution of ‘influence’ across levels of government. What is also striking is how across all regions – with the single exception of Castilla-La Mancha – more respondents indicate that regions should have more power than say this level already has the most power, which might suggest support for an increase in regional level powers. That distinction is at its widest in Scotland and Wales, perhaps reflecting the continuing and very active debate in both places about the extension of devolved powers, or even the particular dynamics of what Rawlings has termed ‘national devolution’ within the context of the UK state (2003). But the view that regional institutions should have most influence is *everywhere* a majority view, and one held by supermajorities of three-quarters or more respondents in all but three regions (Castilla-La Mancha, Ile de France and Galicia). Again, the overall pattern here suggests a difficulty in distinguishing between intermediate and weak regions.

Tale 4 about here

The sense that regional government should do more rather than less than it does now is confirmed in Table 4 which reports responses on a set of constitutional options ranged either side of the status quo situation in the various regions. Obviously the status quo position differs from place to place, which means that respondents almost certainly have different things in mind when envisaging ‘more’ or ‘fewer’ powers than now. What is significant, though, is that everywhere the more powers option easily outweighs the fewer powers option and is in eight out of 14 cases the most popular option. In some cases – Catalonia, Scotland, Bavaria and Wales – a significant group also favours a more radical version of ‘more powers’: independence (the table is ordered by adding responses in the columns ‘more powers’ and ‘independence’). The combined message from Tables 2-4 is that whatever kind of region they live in – whether or not historic, institutionally entrenched or wealthy – citizens across all our regions appear to want their regional institutions to do more rather than less.

... But Not Inter-Regional Policy Variation?

The preference at an abstract level for more regional control is not, however, generally reproduced when our respondents were asked more concrete questions about policy. These include: which level of government was ‘most suitable’ for ‘dealing with’ particular policy fields or challenges (Table 5); whether particular issues should be dealt with uniformly across the state or a matter for each region to decide for itself (Table 6); and whether ‘money should be transferred from the richer parts’ of the state ‘to the poorer parts so that everyone can have similar levels of public services’ (Table 7).

Table 5 about here

Table 5, which also allows the EU as an option as the ‘most suitable’ level, reveals a clear overall pattern, if with some important exceptions. It reports on 70 cases: 14 regions and

five policy fields in each. In only 14/70 cases (cells highlighted in grey) does a plurality of respondents identify the region as the most suitable level for the making of policy. In 6 of these cases – related to education and health in Scotland, Wales and Catalonia - a majority judged the regional level most suitable. In 9/70 cases (all in environmental policy) the EU was identified as most suitable, and in the other 47 cases the plurality (and in 42 cases a majority) deemed state-level government was most suitable. In no region was the regional level identified as the most suitable for dealing with unemployment and in only two – Scotland and Catalonia – for dealing with crime. In four regions there is a plurality preference for regional control of the environment, although the balance between region and state control of this policy field is affected by the relatively strong preferences for the EU as most suitable in environmental policy. Perhaps the most striking results are those for the two classic social policy fields of health and education. There, the same four regions – Catalonia, Scotland, Wales and Galicia – stand out as preferring regional-level action. In these regions, which possess well established nationalist movements and a self perception as a historic nation, citizens appear to be more consistent in their preferences, at least in respect of education and health policies, favouring both regional control in the abstract and regional control in specific policy areas. In all other regions the state is identified as most suitable for dealing with problems in health and education, generally by around two-thirds or more respondents.

Table 6 about here

This apparent preference for state-level and, by implication, uniform state-wide action is even more strongly underlined in Table 6. This makes more explicit a choice between statewide uniformity and regional-scale decision-making. The Table offers 56 cases (that is, 14 regions across four policy issues) and for only three is there a preference for the region to decide, all in Catalonia. Scotland, Wales and Galicia generally have the next highest preferences for regional decision, although they are some way behind Catalonia. Outside of

these four cases the *lowest* preference for uniformity on any of the policy issues is 70 per cent (Ile de France, old age care). The Austrian regions are most pro-uniformity, with close to 90 per cent of respondents in each of them preferring uniform action rather than regional decision, with the French and German regions only a little behind.

Table 7 about here

Table 7 offers a different perspective on statewide uniformity. It reports responses to a question focused on what we term inter-regional solidarity: whether or not resources should be transferred from richer to poorer regions to ensure all citizens have similar public services. The table has been ordered by ranking the regions where respondents most disagreed with rich-poor transfers. Two aspects of the responses are particularly striking. The first is that a majority of respondents everywhere felt there should be state-level government action to even out economic disparities, and that richer regions should transfer resources to poorer regions (except in Salzburg, where this was narrowly the plurality view). As suggested also in Table 6, a sense of statewide equity clearly remains powerful.

But second, those respondents that disagree most with the propositions in Table 7 are a different group than those – in the four stateless nations – more likely to favour regional-scale action in education, health and to an extent in other policy fields. Rather, the regions where there are higher levels of disagreement with inter-regional transfers are also among the economically stronger regions in our analysis. The middle and right-hand columns of the table report and rank regions that subjectively were felt (in the views of respondents), and objectively were (in terms of regional GDP), economically stronger than other regions in that state. The top six for each economic ranking are highlighted to ease comparison, with four appearing in the top six for opposition to transfers, subjective and objective wealth: Bavaria, Salzburg, Upper Austria and Vienna. Equally regions at the bottom of the objective and

subjective rankings are generally those that most strongly endorse interventions, possibly to compensate for their own regional economic weakness: Wales, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha and Brittany. There is a dividing line here which suggests that a general commitment to statewide equity may be under challenge by a lesser willingness of people in more affluent regions to cross-subsidise less well off regions.^v

This initial analysis has opened up a number of perspectives on the devolution paradox. Four, in particular, deserve to be highlighted:

1. Some regions are less paradoxical than others. Specifically Catalonia, Scotland, Wales and Galicia are the four most consistent regions in matching preferences for more regional government with preferences for regional policy responsibility among those we analyse here.
2. Regions in Austria, Germany and France appear paradoxical in wanting both more influence and powers for regional institutions, while also preferring state-level policy responsibilities and statewide uniformity of policy.
3. Richer regions appear in the main least likely to support inter-regional transfers to support statewide equity in the delivery of public services; there is a suggestion here that the devolution paradox is qualified by relative regional economic strength.
4. Yet on questions of statewide uniformity and inter-regional transfers majorities *everywhere* (with marginal exceptions in Catalonia) appear to have preferences for action by state-level governments and/or with state-wide reach. Even in the four less paradoxical regions and the richest regions there remains a powerful commitment to equity and solidarity at a statewide scale.

Nonetheless, looking beyond these important variations and qualifications, at the aggregate level at least, our analysis suggests that claims that a devolution paradox exists are well

founded. Strong support for increased regional authority tends to coexist with strong support for uniform policy outcomes across the territory of the state. Moreover, and further highlighting the apparent contradictions, support for increased regional authority in the abstract tends not to be accompanied by support for regional authority in at least those policy areas featured in our survey.

The existence at the aggregate level of a devolution paradox itself represents a suggestive research finding. We know that aggregate voting results, for example, show differential voting patterns in regional as opposed to state-wide elections, and in particular the tendency of regionalist parties to prosper in the former to a far greater extent than the latter (DE WINTER 1998, DE WINTER et al 2006, HOPKIN 2009, HOPKIN and BRADBURY 2006, HOUGH and JEFFERY 2006, MÜLLER-ROMMEL 1998, SWENDEN and MADDENS 2008). These findings may well become more intelligible when viewed through the prism of the devolution paradox. But as the example of election results – a nonpareil example of aggregated behaviour – reminds us, to focus on aggregate results alone is insufficient if we are to understand the individual-level attitudes and behaviours that give rise to overall outcomes. Similarly, to posit and even demonstrate the existence of a devolution paradox at the aggregate level tells us very little about attitudes at the individual level: it is to this task that we now turn.

From aggregate to individual level

Table 8 about here

Here we compare individuals across the 14 regions through multivariate analysis. The models set out in Table 8 take as their dependent variables three individual components of the devolution paradox: attitudes to the suitability of regional institutions for dealing with policy

issue and problems (described in Table 5); preferences for policy uniformity (Table 6); and preferences for inter-regional transfers (Table 7). By understanding the types of individuals most likely to support regional control or policy uniformity we can perhaps help to account for the presence of the paradox. Our analysis employs the level of attachment to the region, the importance attributed to the decisions of regional institutions and subjective perceptions of relative regional economic performance as independent variables.

A mix of demographic and political control variables are deployed. The demographic control variables include age, gender, marital status, religiosity, and ethnic minority status. The political control variables include political interest, two measures of political efficacy and three assessments of current or desired regional influence. In the case of the latter these are: the belief that the region should have the most influence over regional affairs, support for independence and the belief that the region is most ‘concerned with the needs and wishes of’ people in the region.

In addition, we have included a binary control variable that indicates whether the respondent is an inhabitant of one of the ‘historic regions’, namely Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Galicia, which our previous analysis has suggested are characterised by different patterns of attitudes.

The results in Table 8 contain the unstandardised regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for ordinal logistic regressions. Each of the three columns represents a different dependent variable. The results show that our independent and control variables account for around one fifth of the variation in our dependent variables on policy control and policy uniformity, but much less for the variable on inter-regional solidarity.

Reading across the analysis, four key findings emerge. First, the demographic variables, in general, do not account for significant variation in our dependent variables; no single demographic variable matters consistently across the dependent variables. Second, when we turn to the independent variables we see that regional attachment and the importance attributed to regional decisions are consistently significant for the policy variables and in the expected direction. A greater sense of regional attachment and greater perception of regional institutional importance is positively associated with regional policy suitability, and negatively associated with state-wide policy uniformity, even when we control for all other variables in the model. Perceived regional wealth is a significant and negative predictor of inter-regional solidarity and policy uniformity – those who feel that they live in a wealthier region are less likely to support state intervention and more likely to support regional policy variation – and a positive predictor of regional policy suitability.

Third, our three attitudinal control variables, two for efficacy and one for political interest, matter in most cases but sometimes in surprising ways. Those with higher levels of political interest are more likely to support regional policy control and are less supportive of policy uniformity. Our two measures of political efficacy probe both so-called internal efficacy ('people like me have no say') and external efficacy ('political actors don't care'). The more dissatisfied one is with regional politics (the less efficacy one feels at the regional level) the less likely one is to feel that regional institutions are suitable to deal with policy problems. Only for policy uniformity – for which, it will be recalled, support tends to be particularly strong - is efficacy irrelevant.

The three measures of current or desired regional influence perform fairly consistently across the dependent variables. A belief that the region should have the most influence and

support for independence are both positively associated with regional policy control and negatively associated with policy uniformity. Support for independence is the stronger predictor in each case. A sense that the region is more concerned with people's needs and wishes is also a positive predictor of support for regional policy control and a negative predictor of support for policy uniformity.

Fourth, and finally, the binary variable that identifies whether or not an individual lives in one of the four historic regions - Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Galicia - is also a significant predictor across the three dependent variables, and in the expected direction.

As will now be obvious, in clear contrast to our findings at the aggregate level, the results of this multivariate analysis do not support the existence of a devolution paradox at the level of the individual. Rather, viewed through this optic, attitudes are far more consistent: preferences for regional decision-making and more regional government appear to be accompanied by a belief that regional institutions are suitable for dealing with policy issues problems, a greater openness for non-uniform policies as well as (but less consistently) lower support for inter-regional transfers.

Types of Region

This dissonance between the individual and aggregate levels – between the regression analysis and the descriptive statistics – appears puzzling and prompts further reflection. One way of investigating it further is to continue with an individual level analysis, seeking to identify those respondents holding paradoxical views. Given our concern about the relationship between individuals, regions and states, here we limit ourselves to locating the proportion of respondents holding 'paradoxical' views in our various regions.

We operationalize the concept of paradoxical individuals in three different ways. First, what we call the **Policy Paradox** applies to individuals who believe the region should have most powers but do not support regional policy control in any of our policy fields. Second, the **Uniformity Paradox** focuses on abstract regional control and support for policy uniformity. Here individuals believe the region should have most influence but have above average support for policy uniformity. On average, individuals support uniformity across four of our five fields so we have coded support for uniformity as uniformity across all 5 fields. Finally our **Total Paradox** brings together abstract regional control, total uniformity and no regional policy control (ie. Region most influence = 1, uniformity for all fields = 1, regional policy = 0).

Table 9 about here

These paradox measures underscore our earlier findings about the distinctiveness of 'historic' regions in devolving states. There are many fewer 'paradoxical' individuals in four regions – Catalonia and Scotland, Wales and Galicia (arguably in two distinct sub-clusters). Preferences for policy uniformity appear somewhat more paradoxical in Wales and Galicia than Scotland and Catalonia, perhaps reflecting a fear that these relatively poor regions might lose out were policy allowed to diverge. Austria stands out as particularly 'paradoxical'. Despite having radically different state structures (unitary versus federal) attitudes across French and German regions are strikingly similar. In fact, for the policy and uniformity variables, Bavaria contains fewer paradoxical individuals than any of the French regions, and only marginally more such people than Ile de France with respect to the total paradox variable. Interestingly, while there are more paradoxical respondents in Castilla la Mancha than in any other of our UK or Spanish regions, there are fewer than in other states. That having been

said, the profile of ‘statist’ Castilla la Mancha within a devolving Spain looks fairly similar to that of ‘regionalist’ Bavaria in Germany.

This analysis helps us to specify the nature of the devolution paradox more precisely, with respect to its substance and the states and regions within which paradoxical individuals can be found. So, the paradox appears to be strongest where we consider preferences for more regionalism and pan-state policy uniformity. It is also strongest in federal states – and particularly in Austria – and then in unitary France. An absolute majority of respondents in all Austria regions, as well as Lower Saxony and Thuringia and Alsace display paradoxical preferences on regionalism and policy uniformity. All the paradoxes are weakest in historic regions in devolving states.

Table 10 about here

Returning to regional level analysis, an obvious starting point, then, is the historic regions. The four ‘least paradoxical’ regions are all stateless nations with strong territorial identities, as confirmed in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 presents findings on a bipolar identity scale (commonly known as the Moreno question), which allows respondents both to claim exclusive regional or state-level identities, but also to claim dual identities which are either balanced or lean towards one or other of the identity poles. Table 10 is ordered by those regions with the ‘most regional’ identities (that is adding together the respondents who claim an exclusive or a predominantly regional identity). Scotland stands out as the ‘most regional’ of our regions, with Catalonia, Wales and Galicia also having significantly higher levels of regional than state identity.

Table 11 about here

Table 11 offers a measure of attachment to region relative to attachment to state, built on those respondents who claimed to be ‘very attached’ to either (or both) level(s). The four

historic regions appear among the group in which strong attachment to region outweighs strong attachment to the state, a group also extending to an interesting intermediate group of regions with distinctive cultures and/or histories: Brittany, Bavaria and Thuringia.^{vi} We use an index of relative attachment (to state and region) in Figure 1 to explore the relationship at a regional level of analysis between attachment to the region and a similar index for the belief that regional institutions are suitable for dealing with policy problems. Figure 1 shows that stronger attachment to region is positively associated with belief in regional policy suitability, with a strong correlation coefficient of $R=.71$. But that statistical relationship masks two divergent stories. The four historic regions present a very clear relationship between the two variables. The other 10 regions flatline on the suitability index, while varying significantly on the attachment index.

Figures 1 and 2 about here

Figure 2 reports a similar relationship across regions between relative attachment and a policy uniformity scale. Again there is a strong correlation coefficient ($R=0.75$), showing that as relative attachment to region increases support for uniformity decreases, but again the historic regions, especially Catalonia and Scotland, stretch out from a narrow cluster of the other regions at 0.8-0.9 on the uniformity index. For the other 10 regions relative attachment varies, but preferences for policy do not vary much with them.

Figure 3 about here

Figure 3 explores this distinction between what we have termed the historic regions and the rest in a different way, this time by correlating the strength of the view that the regional government ‘should have most influence’ with the regional policy suitability index. As reported earlier in Table 3 a majority in all 14 regions felt that the region should have most influence in the abstract. It would be logical to expect that the strength of support for regional influence would correlate positively with support for regional institutions as suitable for

dealing with policy problems. Yet Figure 3 shows that the general trend across the regions is for a *negative* relationship. Believing that the region should have the most influence is negatively associated with support for regional control over various policy areas. But again there are two stories. The four historic regions display the ‘right’ or consistent relationship between the two variables with support for more influence positively associated with stronger support for regional suitability. Nine of the other 10 do not: the Austrian, French and German regions. These cluster around a belief that the region should have most influence which is as strong as in Catalonia and stronger than the other three historic regions. Yet that belief is not matched by support for regional policy suitability. It is in these regions that a devolution paradox stands revealed.

In the final region, Castilla-La Mancha, the lowest preference for regional influence is matched by a low preference for regional policy suitability. Here again, then, is a more consistent set of preferences. Seen in this light, Castilla-La Mancha seems to occupy a position that is more consistent with our historic regions than the nine paradoxical regions, although in its particular case the relationship between the two variables demonstrates support for strong statism (or weak regionalism) rather than its opposite. If we interpret the data from Castilla-La Mancha in this manner, there is an emergent distinction not just between types of region but between types of state, with respondents in the UK and Spain seemingly sharing a similar logic of responses, and respondents in Austria, France and Germany a different, shared logic.

Types of State: ‘either-or’ vs ‘both-and’

Table 12 about here

A tentative explanation of the distinction between what appear to be two types of state is suggested by Table 12. This presents a cross-tabulation of two sets of questions: which level of government should have most influence over how the region is run; and whether particular policy issues should be dealt with uniformly across the state, or should be a matter for the region to decide. The table reports on how strongly those who feel that the state government should have most influence over how the region is run prefer policy uniformity and how strongly those who feel that the regional government should have most influence over how the region is run think that policy issues should be a matter for the region to decide. We report the relationship to mean responses on the policy uniformity questions rather than presenting the actual cross-tabulations.

The table suggests three things. First, that there is at best a modest, generally a negative, and rarely a significant relationship between the ‘should’ and the policy variables in all of the Austrian, French and German regions (with the single exception of Bavaria). If anything the belief that the state should have most influence produces *less* support for uniformity than the mean, and if anything the belief that the region should have most influence produces *less* support for regional decision-making. This is counterintuitive, but also chimes with the finding in Figure 3.

Second, in the UK and Spanish regions (but also in Bavaria), there is in each case a positive (and in most cases a significant) relationship between preference for state influence and policy uniformity, and between preference for regional influence and regional decision. There is a polarisation of attitudes between a (smaller n) group of ‘pro-statists’ and a (larger n) group of ‘pro-regionalists’. Strikingly in all cases in these six regions, the pro-statists are more consistent in their pro-statism than the pro-regionalists are in their pro-regionalism.

This polarisation of attitudes appears consistent with the continued conflict that exists around the appropriate form of territorial constitution for the UK and Spain (and the enduring concern by successive Bavarian governments to decentralise the German federal system). It suggests there are contested understandings of multi-level statehood that produce two groups of people – pro-devolution regionalists, and pro-centralisation statist – there is disagreement, but no contradiction evident in these attitudes towards devolution (or indeed a centralisation). Multi-level statehood in the UK and Spain (and Bavaria) appears in the eyes of citizens – at least in the cases we are able to report on – to present either-or choices: authority and competences should reside at either one level of government or the other, rather than be shared between them.

This polarisation generally does not exist, or is very much more muted in Austria, France and Germany. There are – as Table 11 suggests – no entrenched camps of vociferous pro-statists and vociferous pro-regionalists. In all nine regions (including, but at a lower level, Bavaria) in these states there appears to be much less of a sense of having to choose between regional and state-level government. The absence of a perception of contest between the two levels of government is clearest in Austria. The Austrian regions provide the top three in the ranking on whether the region should have most influence (Table 3) *and* the top three in the ranking on preferences for policy uniformity (if we average out the responses in Table 6). Though on the surface these responses appear paradoxical, there is little sense of cross-pressure or self-contradiction in them. The great majority of Austrian respondents are ‘both-and’ respondents. Their statism appears more to be part of, rather than contradictory to, their regionalism.

This apparent absence of contradiction may seem counterintuitive for respondents from a federal state, who might be expected to be comfortable with regional-scale decision-making and with its non-uniform policy outcomes. The Austrian version of federalism, however, is very different from the separated power models of federalism in the Anglophone tradition. The former is characterised by an interlocking structure of political authority in which the key locale of regional influence is in institutions of intergovernmental cooperation with central government rather than in the regional institutions themselves. In this ‘shared rule’ setting it may not be contradictory for Austrians to prefer strong regional influence *and* statewide policy uniformity; regional influence may be expressed in co-determining statewide policy outcomes. In this sense Austria is a ‘both-and’ multi-level state in which pro-regionalist and pro-statist attitudes among citizens can co-exist without contradiction because regions and state co-exist without (very much) conflict in a cooperative and integrated multi-level state structure. A similar case might be made for the German regions, which are also embedded in a system of (even more fully) interlocked, multi-level decision-making, with even the more autonomist Bavarians presenting responses closer to the other German regions than to historic regions in the UK and Spain. It is possible also that the French system of *cumul des mandats*, with key figures often holding office at local, regional and national level simultaneously, offers an informal, functional equivalent to the more formal interlocking of levels in Austria and Germany.

Though some of the questions in the CANS survey allow us to probe ‘both-and’ responses for region and state, we did not set out to generate evidence of ‘shared rule’ attitudes which might *without contradiction* combine support for strong regional institutions and statewide policies. So the suggestion that the co-existence of pro-regionalism and pro-statism particularly in the Austrian, but also the German and perhaps French regions reflects

the logic of shared-rule systems is therefore, at this stage, speculative. It does though allow us to move to some concluding reflections on the devolution paradox.

Conclusion: Reflections on the Devolution Paradox

Three key arguments emerge from the preceding discussion. The first is a challenge to the view that the logics of proximity/responsiveness and equity/solidarity in federal and devolved states necessarily stand in tension with one another, competing in a zero-sum game that ends up with one ‘dominating’ or ‘trumping’ the other (Banting 2006: 47, 64). Initially we identified a ‘devolution paradox’ with respondents apparently wishing more power to be vested at the regional level without embracing greater policy control or diversity across regions. But the idea of a paradox can refer to an *apparent* contradiction that dissolves on closer or deeper analysis. Our analysis – at both individual and regional levels – explained away a good deal of the apparent contradiction to which the devolution paradox seemed to point. Citizens may, quite logically, pursue collective goals through institutions at multiple levels and indeed see strong regional institutions as the guarantors of the common, statewide citizenship they prefer. In this sense – if this interpretation is correct – the CANS respondents in Austria, Germany and France are not contradictory beings, but sophisticated multi-level citizens.

The second is that our respondents in the UK and Spain are not that paradoxical either. But here there is a competition or polarisation between those who prefer a state-wide scale for pursuing collective goals and those who prefer a regional scale. Even here, though, and even in the most regionalist regions of Catalonia and Scotland, most people have some attachment to, and see significant policy roles for, the state as a whole. Citizens here may be more divided, but they remain multi-levelled in their attitudes to politics and policy. Or at least they

do with the exception of statist Castilla-La Mancha. And it is here that we must enter an important caveat about our findings reflecting the limitations of our dataset.

As was made clear in our introduction, the regions surveyed in CANS were selected in order to provide a good spread across our three independent variables of regional identity, regional institutional authority, and strength of regional economy. They were not intended to be representative of their state territories as a whole. So the question remains, to what extent are the statist attitudes apparent in Castilla-La Mancha representative of attitudes across the rest of what we might term Castilian Spain? While citizens in Galicia and Catalonia may be multi-levelled, to what extent is this true across the rest of the state? The same questions arise in even more pointed fashion in the context of the UK. No matter how limited the public appetite for regional authority there, Castilla-La Mancha is nonetheless a constituent part of Spain's 'state of autonomies'. By contrast, in the UK, England – representing some 85% of the population – remains highly centralised and governed by the apparatus of the UK central state which, for the purposes of many domestic policy areas, is now in effect the government of England (MITCHELL 2009). This curious hybrid system of territorial governance whereby a central state holds sway over a core area while at the same time relatively powerful regional bodies control most important areas of domestic policy in the periphery – a system recently dubbed 'bi-constitutionalism' (FLINDERS 2009) – reflects the very different attitudes towards territorial governance across the UK. Setting aside Northern Ireland as *sui generis*, overwhelming public support for significant self-government in Scotland and Wales coincides with a distinct lack of enthusiasm for even the most minimal form of regional government in England. This in turn suggests that while a sense of multi-levelled citizenship may well exist in the periphery, it is far from self-evident that this is also the case across the rest of the state. In short, the example of Castilla-La Mancha reminds us that not only are there divisions

between regionalists and statistes within the four historic regions, but that there are almost certainly important divisions between the different parts of the two historic states of which they form a part; divisions that are not only impossible to capture through our dataset but also of great potential political salience.

The clear differences between Austrian, French and German regions, on the one hand, and – caveats included – those in Spain and the UK, on the other, lead to a third and final point. Despite a research design that takes the regional scale as a unit of analysis, the fourteen regional cases cluster logically into groups defined by the states in which they are located. Taking serious, comparative account of multi-layered government within the state emphatically does not imply bypassing or otherwise somehow ignoring the state level. Quite the opposite: states and state form matter. They will also continue to matter. While data presented in this paper serve to confirm that regional secession is not beyond the bounds of possibility in at least some cases, the general picture presented is of diverse forms of *multi-levelled statehood*; the compound adjective modifying, of course, but not effacing the noun. Which, in conclusion, is precisely why the type of research facilitated by the CANS project is so important. Inevitably, as a first attempt of its kind, it has its limitations. Fourteen regions at one point in time are not enough regions in enough states to draw definitive conclusions about the pattern and content, the puzzles or the paradoxes, of contemporary multi-level citizenship. Neither does it allow us to say anything about the direction and extent of change over time. Nonetheless, by demonstrating that it is possible to organise and co-ordinate such an ambitious programme of survey work, including within its reach so many regions in which similar scholarly activity has never taken place before, it has represented a vital first step.

Table One: Case Selection

State/Region	Regional Identity			Regional Government			Relative Wealth		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	Strong	Medium	Weak
Austria									
Salzburg	X				X			X	
Upper Austria		X			X				X
Vienna			X		X		X		
France									
Alsace		X				X		X	
Brittany		X				X			X
Ile de France			X			X	X		
Germany									
Bavaria	X			X			X		
Lower Saxony			X	X				X	
Thuringia		X		X					X
Spain									
Catalonia	X			X			X		
Galicia		X		X					X
Castilla-La Mancha			X	X				X	
UK									
Scotland	X			X				X	
Wales		X			X				X

Note: For identity and wealth, the decision to place a region in the high, medium or low category was made on the basis of inter-regional comparisons within a state rather than across states. For regional government, the decision to place a region in the strong, medium or weak category is made on the basis of inter-regional comparisons across states, in large part to reflect the fact that regional institutional authority within a state *tends* to be constant. The original research design included three Swedish regions Jämtland, Malmö and Stockholm and South East England in the UK. Their absence, prompted by reductions in funding budgets, does not impact significantly on the identity and wealth variables, though would have added four more cases of 'low' regional government powers, leaving the three French regions as our only cases of regional decentralisation within unitary state structures.

Table Two: Relative Importance of Regional Decisions (Q7b, 7c)

	a) regional decisions 'very important' %	b) state decisions 'very important' %	c) relative importance of regional decisions a) – b)
Scotland	60	52	5
Catalonia	43	42	1
Galicia	41	42	-1
Wales	47	50	-3
Alsace	39	44	-5
Brittany	37	42	-5
Salzburg	35	41	-6
Upper Austria	32	40	-8
Thuringia	20	28	-8
Castilla-La Mancha	33	43	-10
Bavaria	27	38	-11
Ile de France	40	52	-13
Vienna	28	45	-17
Lower Saxony	22	40	-18

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by column c.

Table Three: Which Should, Which Does Have Most Influence (Q13, 14)

	State		Region	
	Does have most influence	Should have most influence	Does have most influence	Should have most influence
Scotland	49	23	38	73
Wales	49	26	40	70
Catalonia	31	13	58	79
Castilla-La Mancha	27	35	58	55
Galicia	25	21	54	65
Ile de France	25	14	53	66
Brittany	21	14	58	76
Lower Saxony	17	16	60	73
Alsace	16	11	61	75
Thuringia	16	15	63	76
Upper Austria	14	12	67	82
Vienna	14	13	65	79
Salzburg	13	8	73	89
Bavaria	12	15	67	75

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by 'State has most influence'.

Table Four: Constitutional Options (Q25)

	No regional government	Fewer powers	Status quo	More powers	Independence
Catalonia	2	7	15	51	21
Scotland	7	4	28	39	20
Brittany	1	2	31	52	5
Wales	9	6	28	42	14
Galicia	5	8	26	51	3
Alsace	1	2	42	41	6
Salzburg	3	7	45	42	2
Thuringia	9	13	28	39	5
Bavaria	3	8	41	29	15
Upper Austria	3	5	47	41	2
Castilla-La Mancha	7	10	37	40	1
Ile de France	3	3	35	38	0
Lower Saxony	6	13	40	30	4
Vienna	5	12	51	27	2

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by more powers + independence.

Table Five: Which is Most Suitable for Dealing with ... (Q21a-e)

	Environment			Fighting crime			Fighting unemployment			Education			Health		
	Region	State	EU	Region	State	EU	Region	State	EU	Region	State	EU	Region	State	EU
Scotland	39.2	33.8	26.9	48.3	47.8	3.9	38.6	57.2	4.2	66.6	30.6	2.8	57.4	39.6	2.9
Wales	37.3	41.7	21.0	32.3	65.1	2.6	29.7	66.8	3.5	54.9	43.7	1.5	54.2	43.9	1.9
Salzburg	30.0	30.0	40.0	21.3	57.1	21.6	21.5	58.6	19.9	18.2	73.9	7.9	24.5	68.1	7.3
Upper Austria	31.4	33.6	35.1	20.3	55.2	24.5	24.5	59.6	15.9	22.7	67.6	9.7	26.4	65.3	8.3
Vienna	23.1	37.6	39.3	34.4	46.0	19.6	20.7	62.8	16.5	19.6	69.3	11.1	23.8	68.4	7.8
Lower Saxony	22.1	38.8	39.1	36.5	46.8	16.7	17.2	74.4	8.5	38.8	54.0	7.2	16.9	74.3	8.8
Thuringia	27.1	34.2	38.7	30.9	50.5	18.6	17.8	74.3	8.0	28.6	64.8	6.6	15.4	77.5	7.2
Bavaria	22.5	33.7	43.8	34.2	45.7	20.0	21.2	69.3	9.5	40.7	50.9	8.4	19.1	73.3	7.6
Alsace	36.6	17.5	45.8	27.1	60.8	12.1	20.1	60.0	19.9	25.8	64.1	10.1	18.7	68.0	13.3
Brittany	44.6	18.6	36.8	27.0	67.7	5.4	18.1	69.2	12.7	23.7	69.5	6.9	14.5	77.3	8.2
Ile de France	34.9	24.0	41.1	26.9	65.7	7.3	14.7	67.7	17.7	17.8	74.8	7.4	11.8	79.1	9.1
Catalonia	37.1	16.0	46.9	48.5	36.2	15.3	37.5	45.7	16.7	67.2	22.0	10.8	64.2	25.4	10.4
Castilla-La Mancha	34.5	31.2	34.4	18.4	68.8	12.8	16.8	67.4	15.8	23.2	63.3	13.5	26.7	64.7	8.6
Galicia	45.7	15.1	39.2	26.0	55.8	18.2	26.0	55.0	19.0	44.9	43.2	11.9	46.6	42.9	10.5
Total	33.2	29.2	37.7	30.9	54.8	14.3	23.2	63.5	13.3	35.2	56.6	8.2	29.9	62.1	8.0

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707.

Table Six: Uniform Policies, or Matters for the Region to Decide? (Q26a-d)

	Tuition fees		Young offenders		Old Age Care		Unemployment Benefits	
	Uniform %	Region to decide %	Uniform %	Region to decide %	Uniform %	Region to decide %	Uniform %	Region to decide %
Salzburg	92	8	87	13	82	7	93	17
Upper Austria	91	8	86	13	81	8	91	17
Vienna	93	6	88	11	85	7	93	15
Alsace	83	9	82	12	76	9	85	14
Brittany	83	10	83	13	81	14	80	13
Ile de France	81	11	78	16	70	13	79	20
Bavaria	75	22	84	14	74	15	83	23
Lower Saxony	83	14	90	9	79	11	88	18
Thuringia	84	12	92	6	89	7	91	8
Castilla-La Mancha	77	18	79	18	81	9	88	16
Catalonia	43	52	46	50	46	41	56	50
Galicia	66	25	65	29	70	14	78	23
Scotland	51	47	60	40	67	36	63	31
Wales	63	36	80	20	74	28	71	24

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by uniform tuition fees.

Table Seven: Limits to Inter-Regional Solidarity (Q28)

	Transfers from richer to poorer regions		Regional economic situation compared to rest of state		Regional GDP relative to state GDP	
	Agree %	Disagree %	Better %	Rank	Proportion	Rank
Salzburg	49	47	49	5	1.12	5
Upper Austria	52	46	62	2	0.97	6
Bavaria	53	43	78	1	1.18	3=
Vienna	65	32	58	3	1.33	2
Catalonia	67	29	30	9	1.18	3=
Lower Saxony	72	24	20	11	0.88	9=
Alsace	69	23	55	4	0.93	8
Thuringia	72	23	41*	8	0.71	14
Scotland	79	20	29	7	0.96	7
Wales	80	18	9	14	0.75	13
Ile de France	78	13	43	6	1.55	1
Brittany	83	11	26	10	0.88	9=
Galicia	86	9	12	12	0.83	11
Castilla-La Mancha	91	5	10	13	0.78	12

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % disagree with transfers to poorer regions.

* By convention in German public attitudes work, Thuringian respondents were asked to compare their situation with the other east German regions, not with the rest of Germany as a whole. The Thuringian figure of 41% is therefore an outlier. If comparing with the rest of Germany as a whole we might expect a figure closer to the bottom group of Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha and Wales.

Table Eight: Multivariate Analysis of Dependent Variables

	Regional policy control	Policy uniformity	Inter-regional solidarity
Age	.484 (.093) ***	.048 (.101)	.438 (.094) ***
Gender	-.002 (.055)	-.034 (.060)	.030 (.055)
Ethnic min	.164 (.148)	-.313 (.159) **	.143 (.152)
Religiosity	-.062 (.102)	.166 (.111)	.201 (.104) *
Married	-.055 (.057)	.035 (.063)	-.030 (.055)
Born in region	.015 (.062)	-.007 (.069)	-.031 (.063)
Attachment to region	.527 (.095) ***	-.650 (.104) ***	-.532 (.096) ***
Importance of reg decisions	.562 (.110) ***	-.347 (.119) ***	.107 (.110)
Perceived regional wealth	.237 (.077) ***	-.183 (.085) **	-.267 (.078) ***
Political interest	.269 (.095) ***	-.242 (.103) **	.166 (.096) *
Don't care	-.152 (.095)	-.121 (.106)	-.050 (.097)
No say	-.182 (.094) *	-.007 (.105)	.235 (.095) **
Region should influence	.544 (.071) ***	-.281 (.080) ***	-.058 (.071)
Region more concerned	.585 (.102) ***	-.457 (.115) ***	-.042 (.099)
Independence	1.042 (.094) ***	-1.193 (.101) ***	.156 (.095)
Historic nation	1.022 (.061) ***	-1.162 (.068) ***	-.429 (.061) ***
Thresholds			
Policy control = 0	1.242 (.170) ***		
Policy control = .2	2.198 (.172) ***		
Policy control = .4	3.051 (.175) ***		
Policy control = .6	3.913 (.178) ***		
Policy control = .8	4.737 (.183) ***		
Uniformity scale = 0		-4.303 (.199) ***	
Uniformity scale = .25		-3.574 (.196) ***	
Uniformity scale = .50		-2.907 (.194) ***	
Uniformity scale = .75		-2.170 (.191) ***	
Inter-regional solidarity = 0			-3.014 (.178) ***
Inter-regional solidarity = .33			-1.594 (.170) ***
Inter-regional solidarity = .67			.229 (.168)
Nagelkerke R ²	.222	.202	.038

Results are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for ordinal logistic regression. ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.1 Categorical variables (gender, ethnicity, marital status, place of birth, region should influence, region more concerned, historic nation) have been entered as factors rather than covariates so that coefficients give scores for trait present (1) rather than trait absent (0). The signs of coefficients are merely reversed if they are entered as covariates. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707

Table Nine: Regional scores by paradox
 % in each category

	Policy Paradox	Uniformity Paradox	Total Paradox
Salzburg	36	64	29
Vienna	32	62	26
Upper Austria	32	58	25
Thuringia	27	54	21
Alsace	28	51	19
Lower Saxony	22	51	16
Brittany	23	49	15
Ile de France	27	40	14
Bavaria	20	40	14
Castilla La Mancha	18	34	13
Galicia	11	31	8
Wales	11	29	6
Scotland	8	22	5
Catalonia	8	18	5
Average	22	43	16

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % Total Paradox.

Table Ten: Bipolar Identity Scale (Q5)

	Just Regional Identity	Regional more than State Identity	Equally Regional and State Identity	State more than Regional Identity	Just State Identity
Scotland	19	41	26	4	7
Catalonia	16	29	37	6	6
Wales	11	29	33	10	15
Galicia	6	25	57	6	4
Bavaria	9	19	36	11	19
Thuringia	9	18	44	9	17
Upper Austria	10	16	38	11	22
Salzburg	9	17	50	9	10
Brittany	2	23	50	15	9
Vienna	7	14	38	15	19
Alsace	1	17	42	20	15
Lower Saxony	6	11	34	15	27
Ile de France	1	7	30	42	12
Castilla-La Mancha	2	4	52	18	20


Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % regional identity + regional more than state identity.

Table Eleven: Relative Attachment to Region (Q1c, d)

	a) 'very attached' to region %	b) 'very attached' to state %	c) relative attachment to region a) – b)
Scotland	80	43	37
Catalonia	55	25	30
Wales	69	49	20
Brittany	65	49	16
Thuringia	57	42	15
Galicia	58	44	14
Bavaria	53	42	9
Alsace	60	60	0
Vienna	52	61	-9
Upper Austria	51	62	-11
Salzburg	52	64	-12
Lower Saxony	36	51	-15
Castilla-La Mancha	33	52	-19
Ile de France	26	53	-27


Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by column c.

Figure One: Regional Attachment and Regional Policy Suitability




Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707

Figure Two: Regional Attachment and Policy Uniformity



Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707

Figure Three: Regional Influence and Regional Policy Suitability



Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707

Table Twelve: Which Level Should Have Most Influence, and How Uniform Should Policy Be?

	Scotland		Wales		Salzburg		Upper Austria		Vienna		Lower Saxony		Thuringia	
	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides
Unemployment benefit	+20.6*	+6.7*	+17.1*	+6.8*	-1.3	-0.5	-5.3	-0.7	+0.3	-0.1	-2.5	-1.3	-1.3	-0.3
Tuition fees	+18.1*	+6.6*	+20.2*	+8.2*	-3.9	-0.5	-2.3	-0.6	-0.2	+0.2	-1.3	-0.6	+1.0	-0.2
Old age care	+15.6*	+6.4*	+16.2*	+6.5*	-4.3	-0.4	+1.4	+0.3	+0.6	+0.1	-3.4	-1.2	-0.6	-0.6
Juvenile crime n (state/region should)	+19.0*	+6.7*	+12.2*	+5.1*	-2.2*	-0.4*	-2.4	-0.3	-3.4*	-1.0*	-5.0*	-1.5*	+3.8	+0.6
	205	664	230	621	76	799	107	745	119	630	140	683	135	704
	Bavaria		Alsace		Brittany		Ile de France		Catalonia		Castilla-La Mancha		Galicia	
	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides	State should: policy uniform	Region should: region decides
Unemployment benefit	+10.1*	+1.8*	-0.5	+0.5	-1.6	-0.5	-5.8	-0.5	+25.3*	+5.1*	+1.9	+1.1	+7.1*	+2.3*
Tuition fees	+10.5*	+2.5*	+0.9*	-0.1*	+0.7	+0.3	-1.8	+0.4	+25.7*	+6.1*	+3.5	+2.6	+7.8*	+4.3*
Old age care	+9.0*	+1.4*	-1.2	-0.5	-3.5	-0.4	-3.2	+0.5	+22.4*	+7.3*	+3.7*	+2.9*	+3.6*	+3.5*
Juvenile crime n (state/region should)	+4.2*	+1.9	-5.1	-0.3	-1.3	-0.2	-5.0	-0.5	+26.8*	+6.6*	+2.4	+1.5	+7.2	+2.9*
	133	681	86	619	118	641	110	586	117	687	305	486	177	564

Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707, * Pearson Chi-Square <0.05

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ENDNOTES

ⁱ While we recognise the sensitivities attached to the word ‘region’ in places like Scotland that are widely considered to be ‘nations’, we have nonetheless retained the usual academic convention of using ‘regional’ to describe tiers of government smaller in scale than the state and bigger than local government. All alternatives appear to raise equally intractable – if different – problems.

ⁱⁱ It might be noted that while the relationship between the regional and state-wide scales was the primary focus of the project, the questionnaire also probed attitudes to the broader European and narrower local scales where appropriate.

ⁱⁱⁱ ‘Nation-state’ is another problematic term, not least given the limited extent to which national communities and state boundaries coincide in Europe and elsewhere. We prefer to use ‘state’ and ‘state-wide’ as a more neutral terminology determined by the administrative boundaries that demarcate states.

^{iv} The absence of systematically comparative regional level public attitudes research is one aspect of the ‘methodological nationalism’ we critique here. The difficulty of finding research funding to carry out a study of the kind reported here meant that we were unable to include an English region or any regions from Sweden or Italy. We have subsequently fielded a CANS-type survey in England, finding considerable support for a sub-state level of government there. We hope to carry out further rounds of research and to include more regions and states within the CANS framework.

^v There is also a striking outlier: Ile de France. Ile de France is the richest region relative to others in its state (though less so in the perception of its inhabitants), but is among the most supportive of inter-regional transfers. This may reflect its status as a capital city region dominated by the Paris conurbation; (greater) Parisians may have strongly ‘statist’ attitudes that reflect their location at the centre of the French state and outweigh the more instrumental

calculations of material interest that appear to be present in other rich regions. Other work deriving from the CANS project is focusing on what appear to be the shared and distinctive characteristics of the two capital city regions in the data set, namely the Ile de France and Vienna.

^{vi} Brittany is a particularly interesting case, not least because of the presence of Wales among the historic regions group (the Welsh and Breton languages are closely related.) We hope to return to this intermediate group in future analysis.