Title
Decentring norms in EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood.

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Abstract
The EU’s external norm promotion and the idea of Normative Power Europe itself are increasingly contested, which is especially true in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. However, whereas EU foreign policy scholars acknowledge the existence of external norms contestation, they find it difficult to understand why other normative frameworks could be equally or more appealing to Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, as they entail norms which are less prominent in the Western liberal values catalogue. In order to facilitate the detection and analysis of a wider set of norms, we situate them on several continua of norm orientations and apply this framework to the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. EU foreign policy scholars can then examine whether different norms are overlapping, complementary, competing or indeed incompatible, and the extent to which values promoted by European actors are congruent with normative frameworks in the MENA region.

Key words
Decentring, European foreign policy, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Normative Power Europe
Introduction

In the last decade, the normative foundations of the liberal international order have become increasingly contested (i.a. Alcaro, 2018; Ikenberry, 2018; Wiener, 2018), and with it, so are the traditional assumptions on which our understanding of international affairs and foreign policy are based. Likewise, the EU as a ‘bulwark of the wider liberal international order’ (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 7) has been facing challenges to its normative identity and actions on the international as well as at the domestic scene. The external contestation of EU norms promotion, due to differences in normative worldviews, has been particularly apparent with regard to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (i.a. Bilgin, 2012; Cavatorta and Pace, 2010; Johansson-Nogués, 2018; Schumacher and Bouris, 2017).

Such external contestation has led the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) to make a ‘case for engagement with the outside world’, guided by a pragmatic and deeper assessment of the external environment, and including an awareness of different (normative) world views (European Union, 2016; Tocci, 2017: 498). As prevailing standards are ‘constituted discursively by both policy actors and academics’ (Manners and Rosamond, 2018, p. 28), the Global Strategy’s call for changing course is also echoed in the academic field. However, whereas EU foreign policy scholars increasingly acknowledge the existence of external contestation to EU norms promotion, they often find it difficult to detect which other normative frameworks could be equally or more appealing in other parts of the world.

These difficulties may be a reflection of a scholarship on European foreign policy that traditionally excludes from mainstream debates ‘dissident voices which attempt to theorise Europe differently’ (Manners and Whitman, 2016, p. 3), resulting in academic research on EU foreign policy that generally adopts a Eurocentric or ‘inward-looking’ perspective (Keuleers et al., 2016). We claim that, in order to achieve a genuine understanding of external contestation of
European foreign policy, it is essential to complement current Europe- and western-centred approaches with a *decentred* perspective (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013; Keukeleire and Lecocq, 2018; 2021).

**Operationalising the Decentring Agenda: norm decentring**

Building on the ‘Decentring Agenda’ proposed by Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013), Keukeleire and Lecocq (2018, p. 277) move towards operationalizing this agenda through the development of ‘an analytical framework to systematically open up for difference, and to see and understand dynamics and realities that go beyond dominant Eurocentric accounts’. It consists of five (partially overlapping) categories, referring to major facets of what ‘difference’ may entail: time, space, polity, norms, and language. These five categories are explored through the three analytical steps for decentring proposed by Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis (2013): ‘provincializing’ (questioning Eurocentric accounts), ‘engagement’ (learning about and from non-Eurocentric perspectives) and ‘reconstruction’ (the subsequent renewal of the analysis and praxis of European foreign policy).

We further adapt these stages to ‘provincializing’, ‘learning’ and ‘recalibration’ in order to link them more closely to the analysis and practice of foreign policy. ‘Provincializing’ means taking into account how European assumptions emerged from and are embedded in particular European contexts, but also how these alleged European worldviews, perspectives and practices hide considerable diversity and diverge from ideal-type representations. ‘Learning’ presents a more neutral term than engagement, which raises concerns over endorsing actors, norms or practices that may be considered immoral. Finally, ‘recalibration’ acknowledges that practitioners and analysts are rarely open for a genuine ‘reconstruction’, but rather change and adapt existing frameworks.
In this article, we also aim to move the debate on operationalizing the ‘Decentring Agenda’ forward by focusing in more detail on one of the five categories, ‘norm decentring’, and deepening the analytical framework by doing so; by arguing that a decentred approach can contribute to explorative and comparative research; and by applying the decentring framework on one specific region, thereby examining its applicability.

Adopting a decentred approach means examining European foreign policy from the perspective and context of the regions, countries and societies that are the object of this policy. In the analysis of the EU as a normative foreign policy actor, this would involve the inclusion of a wider set of normative worldviews, in order to understand the contestation of those emphasized by the EU (e.g. in the Treaty on European Union) and in Eurocentric academic debates (e.g. on ‘Normative Power Europe’). The aim is thus to strengthen the analytical capacities of EU foreign policy analysts and ‘assist scholars in detecting, labelling and understanding concepts, ideas and practices […] without making a priori normative judgements’ (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018). This does not mean resorting to moral relativism; rather we suggest perspectivism, which means analysing issues from different normative standpoints (Rorty, 1989).

This article develops the ‘norm decentring’ category of the framework, while taking into account the potential challenges related to decentring (Keukeleire and Lecocq, 2018, p. 280). First, decentring should not lead to simplifications, to homogenizing an essentialized “Other”, or to overemphasising or artificially creating difference between the “Self” (the “West” or “Europe”) and the “Other”. All areas and societies – including in Europe – are characterized by differences, complexity and hybridity (Morozov, 2013, p. xiii). For the MENA context, this is particularly relevant in relation to common Orientalist constructions of an Arab or Islamic ‘Other’ as fundamentally opposed to ‘Western’ views and actors (Abou El-Fadl, 2016; Borg, 2016; Lockman, 2009). In reality, both the EU and MENA do not stand for one cohesive set of norms or

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1 See also Huber and Kamel (2016) for a different take on ‘decentring’ research on the MENA region.
one foreign policy stance (Hadfield et al., 2017). Just as specific normative preferences may be contested within EU Member States and differ substantially among them, the EU does not encounter a homogenous normative counterpart abroad.

Conversely, referring only to specificities and differences in order to avoid simplification and homogenization, risks fragmenting knowledge into merely case-specific information, without relevance for other cases, potential for comparative analysis, or possibility of generalization (Chabal and Daloz, 2006, p. 171-176). A third challenge is that scholars trained within Western political sciences and EU Studies easily fall back on known frames of reference and filter out norms which do not resonate with their own ontological, epistemological or linguistic framework (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013, pp. 285, 290). The continua of norm orientations, explained in the next section, aim at dealing with these latter two challenges.

**Continua of norm orientations**

Before explaining our argument through the three levels of decentring (provincializing, learning and recalibration), we summarily define what is meant here by norms and norm orientations, followed by a brief presentation of three continua. Throughout the vast body of literature touching upon the meaning of ‘norms’, comprising various disciplines, different definitions emerge. In this article, we use the definition of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 891), who define a norm as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’. What is deemed acceptable behaviour can not only change over time, but also differs according to place (Postel-Vinay, 2008, pp. 39-40). Norms are dynamic and typically evolve through interaction, which is why they are ‘contested by default’, especially ‘when contexts of norm-setting and norm-following are decoupled’ (Wiener, 2009, p. 180). This conceptualization calls into question the
proclaimed “universality” of certain normative outlooks, as the meaning, application and prioritization of norms are associated with a specific temporal and spatial context.

The difficulty of capturing the meaning of “a norm” within a definition generally has to do with the fact that there are different types of norms. As a result, almost as many typologies as definitions have been proposed, emphasizing various characteristics of norms by which they may be distinguished, such as their distribution or reach, how they are enforced or sanctioned, expectations and evaluations connected to them, motivation, etc. The drawback of categorizing norms is, however, that ‘normativity is not a black-and-white concept but comes in shades of grey, explaining the different normative interpretations by different actors standing at different points in time and space’ (Tocci, 2008, p. 302). We therefore propose to think about norms or normative worldviews along continua of norm orientations instead of within types and categories (cf. Schwartz, 2006; 2012). In our analysis, we discern the following partially overlapping and co-constitutive continua of norm orientations: individuality – relationality, rights – responsibilities, and secularism – religiosity.

The three continua presented here were developed from an abductive logic of reasoning (Reichertz, 2014), building on findings from field research, interviews as well as secondary literature on various normative frameworks in Europe, the MENA region, Africa and Asia.2 These three continua were found to be relevant for the analysis of norms in different regions of the world and of the EU’s normative interactions with these regions – and thus not only in relation to the MENA region. The continua do not present an all-encompassing holistic model, but serve as a parsimonious heuristic tool with particular strengths.

2 The three continua originate from common findings throughout different research projects, fieldwork and interviews in and on the Western Balkans, the MENA region, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia between 2008 and 2018, including fieldwork and interviews in Tunisia in October-November 2014 and October-November 2015. Secondary literature on the various normative frameworks confirmed these findings and was integrated in the analytical framework. The framework was further refined through the interaction between the co-authors and their respective fields of research (European foreign policy and MENA scholarship), taking into account comments received during several IR, EU and MENA related conferences.
A first main strength in terms of decentring is that the continua provide lenses at a middle level of categorization. While leaving room for grasping both nuance and complexities, they are applicable to and within a wide variety of areas and cases, guarding against essentializing any normative disposition. Second, inquiring systematically into these three continua facilitates bringing to the fore norms that may not appear in the analyst’s usual frame of reference or that are in the first place framed as undermining ‘European’ or ‘universal’ norms. As will also appear in the following sections, the position of the EU vis-à-vis other regions is often primarily defined and analysed in terms of one end of the continuum (i.e. individualism, rights, and secularism), implying a (conscious or unconscious) neglect of the other end, intermediate or more complex positions. Third, the continua help scholars detect and understand variation in the interpretation, prioritization and application of norms. Applying the continua can shed light on whether different normative frameworks are overlapping, complementary, competing or indeed incompatible. They point at gradations and nuances of and among normative dispositions, which can help to shed light on divergence and contestation, but also on potential convergence and connectivities between different worldviews. By exploring the continua within the context of the MENA, the article aims to demonstrate how the continua might be used to gain a deeper insight into the extent to which norms promoted by European actors are congruent with normative frameworks in their Southern Neighbourhood.

The continua are designed to support scholars in discovering, interpreting and contextualizing the normative inclinations in a society, country, or region, keeping in mind that major differences may also exist within polities (Aydin-Düzgit, 2018) and can vary per issue and over time. Indeed, identifying norm orientations is particularly complex in countries and regions where purely national identities are relatively recent or where policy stances are influenced by authoritarian forms of governance or other strong sub- and supra-national normative frameworks. In sum, it is important to note an awareness of evolving differences, hybridity and complexity within MENA
societies in terms of national, ethnic and religious affiliations and their impact on norm orientations.

**Provincializing: unpacking EU normative actorness**

Norm provincializing means that analysts become aware of norm prioritization and the often quite specific interpretation of a norm and its field of application (Keukeleire and Lecocq, 2018, pp. 283-284). When examining the norms explicitly promoted by the EU, and the discussion on norms within the academic debate on EU foreign policy, the prioritization, meaning and application of norms appear more Europe-specific or Eurocentric than is often assumed. This section does not merely aim to reveal inconsistencies or double standards in the EU’s foreign policy. It rather aims to illuminate how the emphasis in both the conduct and analysis of EU norms promotion tilts, at least in terms of its discourse, towards interpretations based on individuality, rights and secularism, while illustrating a growing external contestation to the promotion of Eurocentric normative worldviews.

**Contestation of EU norms promotion**

The Treaty on European Union (TEU, Art. 21(1)) places upholding and promoting norms externally at the heart of the EU’s purpose and functioning:

> The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law (European Union, 2010).

These norms are emphasized in numerous other major EU policy documents and declarations on external relations, including the EU’s relations with its Southern Neighbourhood. Several policy instruments are in place for furthering EU norms promotion. These include political dialogues and consultations, conditionality and the inclusion of human rights clauses in agreements with third countries, financial instruments (such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Civil Society Facility and the European Endowment for Democracy), and a whole range of action plans and strategies (Smith, 2014, pp. 95-146).

The TEU illustrates how these norms are presented not only as inherently European in their origin, but as having adopted a universal character along the way: ‘Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’ (TEU, Preamble). Unpacking European assumptions about norms exposes that these are not necessarily universal in terms of interpretation, application and priority, although often presented as such (Tocci, 2008, p. 4).

By way of example, provincializing the EU’s dominant discourse on human rights sheds light on a rather selective interpretation, mainly focusing on ‘first generation’ civil and political rights as opposed to ‘second generation’ economic, social and cultural or ‘third generation’ solidarity rights’ (Tomuschat, 2014). Emphasis on human rights is generally disconnected from wider interpretations of dignity, equality and solidarity. Although the latter are also mentioned in the TEU, they receive less attention and are not operationalized as foreign policy criteria. A potential explanation for this imbalance may be that human rights are more easily evaluated and addressed within a legal framework, whereas this is more difficult for questions regarding dignity or solidarity. However, the ‘malleability’ of human rights interpretations and applications remains
evident, also in EU discourse. A recent example pertains to the EU’s narrative on its measures towards the Mediterranean ‘refugee crisis’, where according to Moreno-Lax (2018, p. 119) ‘the invocation of human rights serves paradoxically to curtail (migrants’) human rights, justifying interdiction (‘to save lives’).

The EU sees the presumed universality of its norms confirmed in those adopted by global international organizations such as UN bodies. Nevertheless, this ‘EUUniversalism’ can predominantly be traced back to the fact that ‘the EU has been able to claim first mover advantage and shape the debate in global norm setting’ while ‘resistance of most other countries to such a normative approach (which happens to correlate better with EU interests than with their own) … has been palpable’ (Nicolaïdis, 2015, p. 296). In addition, critics have pointed to the underlying neoliberal ideological basis of EU foreign policy, reflected in ‘the EU’s utilization of moral norms in the public legitimation and self-rationalisation of geopolitical interests and commercial gain in its relations with external “partners”’ (Langan, 2012, p. 243).

An increasing contestation of EU norms promotion by third countries is also apparent from the ‘[r]esistance from a growing number of partner governments to engage with the EU on the values agenda’ (ECDPM, 2017, p. 13). In the MENA region, the EU’s normative claims are often contested because they are perceived to be related to imperial legacies and related interests (Del Sarto, 2016). The idea of a ‘virgin birth’ of the EU, detached from past colonial governance and policies of its Member States (Bhambra, 2016; Nicolaïdis, 2015; Pasture, 2018), is not convincing from the perspective of Southern actors who struggle with the deleterious consequences thereof (Staeger, 2016; Manners, 2010). In addition, the ambiguous engagement of EU member states with MENA regimes during more recent episodes of political transformation justify continuing scepticism of populations towards a ‘benevolent’ EU (Pace, 2014; Volpi, 2017).
Contestation of academic debate on Normative Power Europe

The EU’s normative approach as described in the former section is also mirrored in the academic debate about the EU as a normative international actor. The norms it prioritises permeate the widespread academic debate on ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) coined by Manners (2002). First, NPE assumes that the EU ‘seeks to redefine international norms in its own image’ and has the ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’ (Manners, 2002, p. 252, 239). Second, in terms of the norm selection of prioritization, “core norms” (peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights) are distinguished from “minor norms” (social solidarity, equality and anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance). NPE remains one of the main conceptualizations of the EU’s identity as an international actor, although authors generally overlook the wider theoretical framework in which Manners situated his original piece. His work on NPE and on the ‘Normative Power Approach’ (NPA) indeed also cautions against Eurocentrism (Manners, 2010; 2011; 2018), while a generation of EU scholars mainly focused on often simplified and Eurocentric interpretations of the 2002 article, reflecting both the EU’s civilizational tone and the focus on a specific selection of prioritized norms.

Whereas critical reflection within the NPE debate initially called for scrutinizing the uniqueness and capacity of the EU to act as a normative actor, other evaluations question the universality of the ‘western/European’ normative framework. Recent studies on external receptions and perceptions of EU foreign policy in general, and of NPE in particular (Larsen, 2014), illuminate differences in normative priorities between the EU and partner countries. Initially, most external perceptions research continued to revert to the equally Eurocentric approach of asking “What do you think of the EU and of EU norms?” as opposed to the more engaging “What do you think of norms?” or “Which norms do you consider to be important?” (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013, p. 289), and therefore rarely went beyond observations of (mis)perceptions and contestation.

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3 We are grateful to Ian Manners to point to the simplification of the NPE debate which also appeared in the first draft of this article (presented at the ISA conference 2018 in San Francisco).
Gradually, more analyses emerged that do engage with third country’s perspectives on norms, including perspectives in Turkey (Aydin-Düzgit, 2018), China (Kavalski, 2017), Russia (Romanova, 2016) and Africa (Staeger, 2016). These point to different dispositions with regards to norm orientations that can explain (mis)perceptions and contestation.

Learning

Although norm contestation is increasingly acknowledged as one of the most important challenges in international relations, scholars rarely move beyond questioning the EU’s normative action and NPE discourse (provincializing), towards investigating what meaningful engagement may entail. Engagement requires that analysts learn about prioritised norms in other societies or regions and their specific interpretation and application. In the following section, we explore different norm orientations in the MENA region, based on the above-developed continua. The various examples illustrate how the continua can be interrelated and at times overlapping. As indicated above, the aim here is to bring different normative perspectives to the fore and not to make a case for endorsing them. At the start of every section, we include as an illustration excerpts from interviews conducted in 2014-2015 in Tunisia during fieldwork on Islamist movements at the time of the democratic transition.

Individuality – relationality

‘[W]e must rebuild a genuine Islamic community even if this means ignoring the rights of some people to do things or have businesses that the state says are legal but that are bad for the community’

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4 Former Ansar al-Sharia sympathizer (Tunis, November 2015).
A first continuum is situated between interpreting norms in function of the individual on the one hand, or in function of the community, group members or relational dimension on the other. By ‘relationality’ we mean the importance of maintaining and prioritizing relationships with members that are considered part of one’s in-group. Groups can refer to various kinds of authority structures or ‘polities’, ranging from the (extended) family, ethnic group, religious community, country, larger supra- or transnational entities, or the global community as a whole (Lecocq and Keukeleire, 2018). The interrelationship between the individual and group can be very diverse and complex. However, as norms are interpreted, applied and prioritized within a particular context, they usually either privilege or focus mainly on the individual or on the relational.

When engaging with third countries or regions and learning about prioritized norms, attention is drawn to the interests and well-being of the group, and related norms such as equality, social inclusion, justice, stability or harmony. This is mirrored in an interpretation of human rights which focuses on collective rights to self-determination, development or other so-called second and third generation human rights. Learning can also lead to uncovering other concepts related to the importance of community or relationality, which are less known or unknown by scholars of EU foreign policy and EU norms promotion.

Messari (2016) identifies some key norms prevalent in the MENA which illustrate an emphasis on the community and on relationality, including asabiyya and umma. Asabiyya refers to social cohesion and relationships derived from tribal solidarity and entails a reliance on one’s kin to assure security and project power outwardly. Whilst traditional asabiyya may no longer be at the forefront of political thinking today, new articulations of this model of kin-based solidarity (neo-asabiyya) remain potent political factors in the Middle East (Alatas, 2014; Orhan, 2016). A second example, grounded in Islamic religious tradition, stresses the role and responsibilities of the faithful as an individual vis-à-vis the overall well-being of the umma or imaginative supra- and transnational community of believers (Mandaville, 2013; Petersen, 2015; Sheikh, 2014).
third example is wasta, or the use of a network of personal relations to advance one’s own position, with implications for wider issues such as equality, education and employment (Cavatorta, 2018; Gatti et al., 2013; Gray, 2018; Lust, 2009). This normative framework can also inform a specific kind of patronage connected to sectarian-based forms of redistribution. In the Lebanese context, for example, communal and religious solidarities are interlocked to provide a basis for redistributive justice (Cammett, 2014).

**Rights – responsibilities**

‘We recognise the human rights and the political freedoms of western democracies but because we value the Islamic heritage of Tunisian society, we know that these rights have to be used carefully in order to preserve our identity’.

The examples developed to illustrate the individuality-relationality continuum already hinted at the importance of the second continuum, with variations of the focus on rights and freedoms on the one hand and responsibilities and duties on the other (Del Valle and Sikkink, 2017). Contexts in which relationality plays a larger role can emphasize one’s responsibility to the community over individual rights (Hodgson, 2017). Differences in interpretation, application and prioritization of norms can then be based on different dispositions along the right-responsibilities continuum. Questions not only arise about whether the emphasis is on rights or responsibilities, but also whose rights and responsibilities are emphasized and towards whom people or entities are then responsible.

The complex interrelationship between rights and duties, which is visible in the workings of values and practices such as assabiya and wasta, can also be informed by Islamic normativity, which has further implications for the legitimacy of policies (Tripp, 2006). The importance of the

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5 Member of Ennahda (Medenine, October 2014).
zakat (pious donation) as one of the pillars of Islam illustrates the (in this case economic) responsibility of the individual towards the community; a duty that naturally extends beyond national boundaries (Petersen, 2015). This duty of care by and for members of the umma is also partly transferred to the state and can constitute a way to evaluate the legitimacy of policies (Tripp, 2006), particularly when the latter claims to be part of the Islamic tradition. Whilst this normative framing can help Islamic actors’ delegitimization of secular state policies, apparent failure in upholding these ideals in a position of power can also damage Islamists.

As general norms have to be translated into concrete policies, tensions can emerge between the wider principles of justice and the policy choices of Islamist movements when they are in power. This tension was very visible in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings when mainstream Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia faced criticism from other Islamic actors for being economically too liberal and failing to devise policies embodying a just social order. For example, the debate in Egypt on austerity measures to negotiate an IMF loan for the country seriously damaged the credentials of President Morsi, after he had stressed the social justice dimension of his programme to attract votes by poorer segments of the population (Vannetzel, 2017; Joya, 2016; Merone, 2015).

**Secularism – religiosity**

‘Tunisia cannot accept an economic alliance with Europe simply for the money; it has to develop a genuine system of Islamic economic relations because this is the only way to have a just economy and society’*

Both the continua between individuality and relationality, and rights and responsibilities, illustrate how religious considerations can be at the heart of norm orientations. A final continuum

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* Leading cadre of Hizb ut-Tahir (Tunis, October 2015).
proposed here relates to secular and religious interpretations of norms. Within the context of western secularism, religion became a largely ignored category in EU international relations (Sheikh, 2014; Sheikh and Wæver, 2012). However, there are normative mind-sets in which religiosity and spirituality transcend the private sphere and partly guide political actions and relations.

In the transnational umma, the relationship with Allah provides its members with an array of normative frameworks explicitly or implicitly associated with Islamic faith (Petersen, 2015). Victories of Islamist parties in the MENA may indicate that there is a clear appeal to institutionalizing religious interpretations of norms within the state system. One should not of course assume that growing electoral support for Islamists in the region automatically indicates a growing importance of religious normativity in state politics (Volpi, 2010). Voters endorse different kinds of Islamist parties for a multiplicity of reasons (protest vote, economic programme, etc.) (Teti et al., 2018), while most mainstream Islamist parties have toned down their ideological agenda to appeal to a generally conservative constituency (Schwedler, 2014).

Nevertheless, norms can become differently interpreted, applied and prioritized depending on where a country or region’s disposition would be situated along the secular-religious continuum. For example, when ‘justice’ is referred to by the EU, it is generally done so within the context of ‘rule of law’. In the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood, however, justice often caries a quite different set of assumptions pertaining to social justice. Whilst the redistributive implications of social justice are stressed by various political actors in the EU (particularly those parties influenced by socialism or Christianity), it is not a dominant feature of secular-liberal normativity. In the MENA region, it is more centrally positioned by Islamist parties and underpins a positive notion of the good, predicated upon following the commandments of Islam. Symbolically, the importance of the concept in MENA politics is apparent from the fact that ‘justice’ appears in the names of several prominent political parties in the region, such as the ‘Justice and Development
Party’ (PJD) in Morocco, the ‘Justice and Development Party’ (AKP) in Turkey, the ‘Justice and Construction Party’ in Libya and the ‘Freedom and Justice Party’ in Egypt (the latter two being offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood).

Often, legal systems in Muslim-majority countries also consist of an intricate negotiation between secular and religious provisions. In Egypt for example, the ‘legal system is largely derived from European, mostly French-based law’ while ‘its personal status law – which deals with the private affairs of family – is based on codes derived from religious law’ (Agrama, 2010, p. 497). This means citizens revert to a court based on the religion they identify with. Rulings can therefore provide different interpretations of justice, which has implications for what is regarded as ‘equality’ and ‘rule of law’ as compared to European views.

It would indeed be misguided to adopt a simple binary perspective – secular or religious norms – and to take the European experience of state-church relations as a model. There is no clear-cut, universally valid classification of what constitutes a religious matter and what does not, but at best an evolving agreement that is interpreted differently in various parts of the Muslim world (Krämer, 2015). Hence, whilst some Islamic scholars may view the secular state and its policies as antithetical to a religious community, others view it as a meaningful normative and institutional system (An-Naim, 2008). The same policy may thus appear acceptable in one Muslim country or community, whilst being deemed unacceptable in another. Meaningfully addressing religious issues when engaging with Islamic parties is identified as one of the major challenges EU actors have been facing in the region (Wolff, 2018), pointing to the importance of understanding different national or local normative consensuses.

Recalibration

7 We are grateful to Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués for bringing this to our attention.
Recalibration means renewing the analysis and practice of EU foreign policy making in a non-European world based on provincializing and learning in the spirit of humility, mutuality, empowerment and co-constitution (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013, pp. 286, 294-295). Instead of automatically adopting Eurocentric conceptualizations of norms as frames of reference, a wider set of norm orientations can be considered, leading to new research questions and an ambitious new research agenda. We illustrate this through the example of the EU’s human rights promotion policy.

Recalibration implies that the widened analytical perspectives obtained through provincializing and learning are integrated in a new decentred conceptualisation of ‘human rights’. First, provincializing has exposed how the rather selective interpretation of human rights adopted in EU is reflected in analysis of EU foreign policy, with a particular focus on first generation rights. Recalibration can lead to a wider conceptualisation, including second and third generation human rights. Second, other related norms that are important in the considered human rights dialogue, discovered through engagement, can be included in this conceptualisation. These could include the duty to take responsibility for the own group and to socio-economic or redistributive justice norms, as emphasized in various normative frameworks within the MENA region (such as asabiyya, wasa or umma). Third, scholars can examine whether these different norms can be related to a widened conceptualisation of human rights and to what extent these are comparable, compatible, complementary, competing or incompatible. Finally, these analyses can lead to a new recalibrated analytical framework which integrates various conceptualisations, acknowledging similarities, complementarities, and incompatibilities.

This framework can subsequently be used for the empirical analysis of the EU’s policies towards MENA region or specific countries in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. The EU’s norms promotion policy as such, but also at the impact of the EU’s wider external policy (including its trade policy and the various dimensions of the ENP) can be considered. Human rights and norms
can thus be analysed from a wider perspective, taking into account the socio-economic situation of the populations and pressing issues such as inequality or youth unemployment.

Bringing together insights from the provincializing and learning stages indeed also leads to wider observations about the EU’s policy. For example, EU democracy promotion discourse in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings was mainly articulated around notions of formal political rights. Meanwhile, socio-economic issues that were crucial in mobilizing people across the Arab world at the time were either downplayed or presented as technical issues for trade agreements between the EU and individual states (Teti, 2015). Yet within multiple policy sectors there were practical opportunities for the EU to further its agenda on bottom-up demands from local populations, civil society organizations or political parties.

Fontana (2017) points out that ultimately, European policy-makers effectively funded and engaged with those actors whose agenda matched with and validated that of the ENP and of the state authorities. The combination of realpolitik and normative dominance of the ‘centre’ (including both the EU and secularized state elites in the MENA), implied that engagement remains limited and possible solutions to the problems that were raised during and after the uprisings were not considered. Kourtelis (2018) illustrates this point in socio-economic terms in relation to EU strategies for rural development in the Arab Mediterranean. In the political field, Voltolini and Colombo (2018) point to some pernicious implications of the EU’s engagement with Islamist parties that rebranded themselves as ‘Muslim democrats’ to be more acceptable to European partners, but which in doing so distanced themselves from some of their main domestic constituencies.

Recalibration is also relevant for the practice of EU foreign policy. For European politicians, diplomats and civil servants, recalibration could entail that – instead of unilaterally determining the normative agenda or dominant normative discourse – they demonstrate an ability to recognize and involve their interlocutors’ perspectives on norms. Both moral and instrumental purposes
could be envisioned. EU foreign policy-making and norms promotion in particular may be perceived as more legitimate, as it demonstrates a willingness to listen and an attempt to understand underlying meanings and reasons for different perspectives and for the specificities of the various partners (Zoubir, 2018, p. 102). A decentred approach can also prove effective in finding connectivities beyond contestation and open the way to more sophisticated and productive norm-aware policy-making by enabling policy actors to identify which specific policies could act in synergy with local norms. For example, recent initiatives by the EU to finance the Moroccan state provision of welfare to migrants in the country had the advantage of simultaneously satisfying the human rights agenda of the state and the charity demands placed by Islam on both Moroccan regime and society (European Commission, 2016).

**Critical reflections on norm decentring**

Some important additional remarks have to be made with regards to norm decentring. A first set of observations relates to the fact that learning and recalibration should not be equated with endorsement. Recognizing that there are other normative frameworks does not mean scholars or the EU should agree with them. A related issue is that whereas learning and recalibration can already be contested in an academic context (as reflected in the heated debate on cultural relativism) (Kane, 2015; Manners, 2010; Mayer, 2018; Sikkink, 2017), policy makers may face even greater challenges in view of the public and political nature of their choices to engage, which can then (mistakenly) be perceived as legitimizing interlocutors with different normative perspectives.

This is particularly relevant as MENA state institutions may be differently connected to prevailing social norms than is the case in the EU, as social preferences are not always quantified through a democratic process. By this we do not imply that the EU represents a cohesive
normative stance based on perfect democracy, only that it is important to underscore the role of
democratic practices in enabling the emergence of (imperfect) consensuses on common norms
and in euphemizing social and political consequences of disagreements. In the MENA region,
forms of authoritarian governance make the process of consensus building far more haphazard
and mean that some views and voices are forcefully removed from state normativity.

Secondly, the focus on norms in this article does not imply a neglect of realpolitik or of the
interest-driven foreign policy of the EU and its member states. Pursuing commercial, political,
diplomatic and security interests or defending the Western neoliberal economic and political
ideological stance can indeed be at the heart of European foreign policy towards the Southern
Neighbourhood. This also implies that European policy-makers and diplomats may not be
interested in ‘recalibration’. Even when there is an interest to learn about different norm
orientations of societies and countries in the MENA region, this may still be aimed at fostering
self-interest. Decentring is however not a matter of altruism or naivety. Understanding and taking
into account the perspectives and interests of the societies and third countries in the MENA
region can strengthen the effectiveness and external legitimacy of the EU’s external action. This
is particularly the case in a changing international context in which other global and regional
powers being increasingly active in the MENA region (Lecocq and Keukeleire, 2018).

Thirdly, within the context of recalibration it is important to recognize complexity and repeat the
warning against simplifications and homogenizing analyses. For example, even when
interlocutors from the MENA region may genuinely believe in the importance of Islamic
normativity, this shared belief may reflect very different and specific interpretations of Islamic
norms. For example, in the Moroccan case, both the monarchy and the Islamist opposition invoke
Islamic norms, but in different ways and in order to support different models of legitimation and
different types of policies (Zeghal, 2008). Islamic norms are thus relevant in themselves but
contestation over interpretation makes it difficult for both analysts and foreign policy makers to
establish which interpretations they should take into account or who they should listen to on the issue. Here, the importance of knowing the different positions and understanding how these relate to the EU’s stance comes to the fore.

Finally, even if analysts and practitioners are willing to decentre and are allowed to enter into dialogue with interlocutors with different normative mind-sets, the question arises whether they are equipped to do so. For scholars, normative decentring may lead to demands for ‘disciplinary decentring’, for overcoming the hurdles of interdisciplinary research and for rethinking ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’ (Keukeleire and Lecocq, 2018; 2021). For policy-makers within the EU, the question arises whether the structures and working procedures of the EU’s foreign policy architecture allow the EU and its member states to adapt to challenges and opportunities related to decentring (Keukeleire, 2014, pp. 234-238).

Conclusion

The increasing contestation of the liberal order predicts a future in which international relations will be ‘less normatively convergent … but more inclusive of multiple voices’ (Tocci, 2018, p. 3). In this article, we propose a framework for studying normativity in EU foreign policy from a decentred perspective, aimed at supporting scholars and practitioners to take into account a wider spectrum of normative worldviews than only those emphasized by the EU and in Eurocentric academic debates. The article explores the external contestation of EU normative actorness throughout three stages: provincializing, learning and recalibration.

First, normative provincializing implies a consciousness that the focus in the conduct and analysis of EU foreign policy mainly lies on the EU’s own value system, permeated by rights, individuality, and secularism, and on norms such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Provincializing implies questioning the assumed universality of this normative worldview and
seeing contestation to it both in international relations and in academia. Second, *normative learning* means dialogue with and aiming to understand different normative dispositions that exist on wider spectrums of normativity, ranging from individuality to relationality, from rights to responsibilities, and from secularism to religiosity. Exploring these continua of norm orientations in the MENA region has illustrated difference and variation in the interpretation and application of certain norms, and uncovered norms which gain less attention in EU norms promotion. Finally, provincializing and learning give impetus to a *recalibration* of our approach towards conducting and analysing EU foreign policy and norms promotion in order to better detect and cope with challenges and contestation but also opportunities and connectivities in the relationship between the EU and its Southern Neighbourhood and wider MENA region.

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