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The Dynamics of Emotion in Euripides' *Medea* *

Douglas Cairns

Medea's emotions loom large in a wide range of dramatic, literary, and philosophical sources from Euripides onwards. In focusing on aspects of the emotional texture of the original Euripidean play, all one can do is scratch the surface of an enormous subject, both in that play and in ancient literature and thought. Fortunately, we have the other papers in this issue of *Greece & Rome* to supplement this inevitably limited perspective. My procedure in this short paper is simply to highlight certain aspects of the dramatization of emotion in Euripides' *Medea* that strike me as especially worthy of analysis in terms of ancient or modern emotion theory.

One of the most striking features of Euripides' play, in terms of the emotions it portrays and elicits, is the extent to which the emotions in question are emotions *about* emotions. Medea's emotions loom large in the concerns of other characters even before she appears on stage. First the Nurse, then the Paedagogus react, in their own emotional ways, to *her* emotional situation and her emotional responses to it,¹ and so begins the process of steering audience emotion – our emotions, that is, about the characters' emotions – that will continue throughout. One does not need to be an emotion researcher to see how deeply the play is marked by mixed emotions: especially at the height of the drama, before the killing of the children, Medea herself is emotionally torn (922–31, 1007–80, 1236–50); but Medea's mixed emotions are also the focus of those of the Chorus, still sympathetic but now also appalled (976–1001, 1251–70, 1279–81); and both the shifts in Medea's own emotions, and the shifts in the Chorus's emotional reactions to Medea's emotions, influence the shifts in our emotions as spectators.

Thus there is a dynamic and interactive quality to the emotional texture of the play, as indeed there is to emotional life (or just 'life') in general. Emotions, in the audience and as

* I am grateful to Damien Nelis not only for organizing the colloquium that gave rise to this set of papers, but also for his support and friendship throughout the years of our collaboration. I thank Ed Sanders, too, for seeing the papers through to publication, Pia Campeggiani for very helpful comments, and an anonymous reader for *Greece & Rome* for encouragement. I draw on research carried out in the context of three projects (A History of Distributed Cognition, 2014–18; Emotions through Time, 2016–18, and Honour in Classical Greece, 2018–22), and am very grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Leverhulme Trust, and the European Research Council (Advanced Grant 74108) for the funding which made these projects possible.

¹ See Eur. *Med.* 16–45, 53–8, 90–5, 98–110, 115–18 (Nurse), 61–2, 67–73 (Paedagogus).

represented in the characters, are embedded in ongoing processes of social interaction, processes which are, to a large extent, a matter of emotional responses to the perceived emotions of others. Audience responses to the emotions of characters in visual or verbal narratives reflect the centrality of narrative in the ways that we understand our own and others' emotions in everyday social interactions, as events with a script- or narrative-like structure of their own, embedded in contexts with their own narrative structure (including the narratives that derive from our cumulative experiences of ourselves and others).² This in turn reflects the centrality of emotion in discussions of motivation: emotions prepare us for and guide our actions – there may, indeed, be no motive for doing anything without at least some form of affectivity.³ The characters' emotions thus form part of the basis on which we as audience-members evaluate their motives.

In providing reasons for action, emotions are context-sensitive; we assume that people's emotions constitute an appraisal of a given scenario or state of affairs and we expect these appraisals to be contextually appropriate. To that extent, they will often be predictable; the Paedagogus thinks he is bringing good news of the children's reprieve, and so finds Medea's reaction – she stands confounded and cries *aiai* – to be 'out of tune' with his report (1005–10). He had assumed that a certain scenario would elicit a particular appraisal and a commensurate emotional response, but was mistaken. He recognizes his mistake (δόξης ἐσφάλην, 1010) from Medea's body language and paralinguistic behaviour. The Paedagogus' expectation was a belief, a *doxa*, but that was based simply on the assumption of a normal relation between a given scenario and the emotional reaction to which it will typically give

² For the large claims made in this paragraph so far see S. Gallagher, *Action and Interaction* (Oxford, 2020), the culmination of a very substantial programme of earlier research and publication. For some pointers on relations between emotion scripts and verbal narratives, see D. Cairns, 'Exemplarity and Narrative in the Greek Tradition', in D. Cairns and R. Scodel (eds), *Defining Greek Narrative* (Edinburgh, 2014), 103–36. On the narrative structure of emotions, cf. C. Voss, *Narrative Emotionen: Eine Untersuchung über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen philosophischer Emotionstheorien* (Berlin, 2004), 181–224.

³ The most influential exponent of the view that emotions are states of action readiness is Nico Frijda: see e.g. *The Emotions* (Cambridge, 1986); but he has significant predecessors (e.g. John Dewey, in 'The Theory of Emotion: (i) Emotional Attitudes', *Psychological Review* 1 (1894), 553–69, and 'The Theory of Emotion: (ii) The Significance of Emotions', *Psychological Review* 2 (1895), 13–32). The notion that affectivity is essential to motivation is at least as old as Hume, but in modern affect theory is especially associated with (in the first wave) Silvan Tomkins (e.g. 'Affect Theory' in K. R. Scherer and P. Ekman (eds), *Approaches to Emotion* (Hillsdale NJ, 1984) 163–95) and (more recently) Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York, 1994). See also Lisa Feldman Barrett, *How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain* (New York, 2017), 80–2. Giovanna Colombetti (in 'The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does not Show', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 59 (2008), 51–71) makes important criticisms of Damasio's specific formulations, but her own enactivist approach (in *The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind* (Cambridge MA, 2014)) offers powerful support for the intrinsically affective nature of cognition more generally. This general position is now widely accepted: see e.g. R. Boddice, *The History of Emotions* (Manchester, 2018), 95–7.

rise in a particular individual who stands in a certain relation to that scenario. This is a matter of events with a narrative structure and agents with a certain narrative role. Equally, when the Paedagogus realizes his mistake, this is an immediate consequence of the discrepancy between the narrative as he understands it and Medea's response, as directly perceived in her demeanour. The discrepancy, in turn, calls for an alternative account of Medea's motivation. The capacity in play here has, in recent years, been typically referred to as 'mindreading' or Theory of Mind,⁴ and much ink has been spilt in disputes over the extent to which theory, as such, is actually involved. Though the main rival of 'Theory Theory' has for long been Simulation Theory (according to which we understand others' mental states by – somehow – simulating them ourselves),⁵ alternative (simpler and, to my mind, more plausible) accounts based on direct perception, primary interaction, and narrative are now gaining ground.⁶ For our purposes, however, and whatever account of 'mindreading' we favour, one point that emerges from the Paedagogus' perplexity at Medea's response is that some minds may be more difficult to read than others: Medea in this play regularly confounds the expectations of other characters and creates scenarios which lead them to believe that her motives are other than they really are. To some extent, we, the external audience, are also implicated in these

⁴ An enormous field, but one can make a start on the more traditional approaches to the issue with S. Nichols and S. P. Stich, *Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds* (Oxford, 2003). The most accessible introduction in Classics remains a *G&R* article, F. Budelmann and P. E. Easterling, 'Reading Minds in Greek Tragedy', *G&R* 57 (2010), 289–303. For more recent perspectives, with specific reference to Euripides' *Medea*, see I. Sluiter, B. Corthals, M. van Duijn, and M. Verheij, 'In het hoofd van Medea: Gedachtenlezen bij een moordende moeder', *Lampas* 46.1 (2013) 3–20; E. van Emde Boas, 'Mindreading, Character, and Realism: The Case of Medea', in F. Budelmann and I. Sluiter (eds), *Minds on Stage* (Oxford, forthcoming).

⁵ For simulation as an explicit process, see (e.g.) R. M. Gordon, 'Folk Psychology as Simulation' *Mind and Language* 1 (1986), 158–71; A. I. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', *Mind and Language* 4 (1989), 161–85. For the view that it is implicit and sub-personal, see (e.g.) V. Gallese, 'The Manifold Nature of Interpersonal Relations: The Quest for a Common Mechanism. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences* 358 (2003), 517–28. More recent formulations incorporate elements of both views: see (e.g.) V. Gallese and A. Goldman, 'Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 2 (1998), 493–501; A. I. Goldman, *Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading* (Oxford, 2006); K. Stueber, *Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences* (Cambridge MA, 2006).

⁶ Again, for a recent and comprehensive statement, drawing on a great deal of earlier bibliography, see Gallagher (n. 2), esp. Part II. See also S. Gallagher and D. D. Hutto, 'Understanding Others through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice', in J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha, and E. Itkonen (eds), *The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity* (Amsterdam, 2008), 17–38. Cf. D. D. Hutto, *Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons* (Cambridge MA, 2008); 'Understanding Fictional Minds without Theory of Mind!', *Style* 45.2 (2011), 276–282, 415. For a simulationist response to narrative theory, see K. Stueber, 'Varieties of Empathy, Neuroscience, and the Narrativist Challenge to the Contemporary Theory of Mind Debate', *Emotion Review* 4 (2012), 55–63; 'Empathy versus Narrative: What Exactly is the Debate about? Response to my Critics', *ibid.*, 68–9.

strategies, though we are at the same time, and by the very ways in which these strategies are constructed, challenged to discern and evaluate the motives that lie behind them.⁷

Emotions are, or should be, at the centre of debate over the forms and possibilities of other-understanding especially because they are associated with externally visible signs, symptoms, and behaviour patterns, and because these external factors are typically taken as signs of appraisals, motivations, and values. If characters within a drama can attempt to understand each other's motives in this way, then so can we as readers and spectators. We have no direct access to the inner life of dramatic characters – because they have no such inner life. But still an inner life is constructed for them, as it is constructed in real life, on the basis of what they do, what they say, and what others say about them. We impute agency and motivation on the basis of agent-like behaviour, whether we are talking about dramatic fictions such as Medea or the geometrical shapes used in the well-known experiments of Heider and Simmel.⁸ The fact that we can attribute agency, intention, and emotion not just to (masked) actors on stage or to the characters created in a purely verbal narrative, but also to simple shapes moving on a screen shows that such attributions need not be limited to cases that are 'just like real people'. Yet this in no way detracts from the truth that in attributing agency to those geometrical shapes we are deploying skills that we use in everyday social interaction.⁹

Just as we can perceive emotions as motives *in the absence of words*, so people often assume and attribute emotional motives *behind what is said in words*. In the *agôn*, for example, both Medea and Jason claim to know the other's *true* emotions, which betray their true motivations, as each charges the other with a reprehensible obsession with sex (491, 555–6, 568–73, 623–6). In the same way, Creon recognizes that Medea's pleas have and are designed to have a certain (soothing and reassuring) emotional effect; but he ('within his *phrenes*', i.e. 'deep down') retains a sense of dread (*orrôdia*) that her true intentions are

⁷ See Sluiter, Corthals, van Duijn, and Verheij (n. 4), §§3 and 6. Cf. E. van Emde Boas, 'Euripides', in K. de Temmerman and E. van Emde Boas (eds), *Characterization in Ancient Greek Literature* (Leiden, 2018), 360–1, as well as his forthcoming paper cited in n. 4.

⁸ F. Heider and M. Simmel, 'An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior', *American Journal of Psychology* 57.2 (April 1944), 243–59. See B. Boyd, *On the Origin of Stories. Evolution, Cognition and Fiction* (Cambridge MA, 2009), 137–8; S. Gallagher, *Phenomenology* (London, 2012), 79–80; Sluiter, Corthals, van Duijn, and Verheij (n. 4), §5.

⁹ Thus the Heider and Simmel experiments offer no succour to New Materialist views regarding the agency of objects (on which see the helpful survey by L. G. Canevaro, 'Materiality and Classics: (Re)turning to the Material', *JHS* 139 (2019), 222–32). True, the shapes in question are just objects; but when they are made to move like objects, they are interpreted as such. When they are made (by human agents) to move like agents, they are interpreted (in narrative terms) as if they were agents. But it takes a real agent, with the agency detection capacities that real agents have, to attribute that agency and construct that narrative: the experiments testify to human agents' powers of agency attribution and narrative construction, not to the agency of objects.

malign (λέγεις ἀκοῦσαι μαλθάκ', ἀλλ' ἔσω φρενῶν | ὀρρωδία μοι μή τι βουλευῆς κακόν, 316–17). In both his case and, he assumes, in Medea's, the emotions that appear on the surface vie with deeper and darker feelings. Other-understanding can be a matter of direct perception, especially in interactive contexts (as when the Paedagogus, above, sees that Medea is troubled); but when others attempt to conceal their true feelings and motivations in order to deceive us or to present their conduct in a more positive light we need to resort to less immediate forms of inference and deduction. This is not to say that we need a developed and explicit theory of others' motives; but our interpretations may require more complex and better-informed kinds of narrative.¹⁰ Even then, however, it is not only the motivations of skilled manipulators that may remain opaque; and, miraculous though our ability to understand others' minds may be, we also need to accept that it has its limits.¹¹ In this respect, the mimetic representations of drama may provide more cues and material for interpretation than would everyday life, but perhaps not as many as diegetic narrative sometimes can, especially in narratives with a strong and reliable narratorial voice; something of the uncertainty and speculation that can bedevil real social interaction can remain.

The very existence of debate between Medea and Jason presupposes that the emotions that motivate them and that they see as motivating others are in principle – though not, as it turns out, in practice – modifiable by reasoned persuasion. But the rhetoric of the debate – in which each impugns the other's emotional motives – reminds us that emotions are themselves subject to evaluation in the light of shared ethical and social norms. That evaluation, in turn, is itself often, if not always, emotional.¹² One essential driver behind the various ways in which emotions reflect and enact shared ethical and social norms rests – in the play and in reality – on the interplay of esteem and self-esteem in social interaction. As Erving Goffman has taught us, all partners to social interaction bring some degree of 'face' to the encounter;¹³ social interaction is a matter of strategies of self-presentation and recognition (what Goffman calls, respectively, *demeanour* and *deference*). In co-operative encounters these are strategies of self-protection, respect, and mutual recognition, but it goes without saying that people can also seek to protect their own face while threatening the face of the other.¹⁴ These features apply in asymmetrical and unequal as well as in equal and mutual relationships. The core

¹⁰ See Gallagher (n. 2), *passim*, esp. 81–2, 98–9, 118–19, 132, 151–4, 165–74, 229–33.

¹¹ For the limitations of mind-reading, as traditionally understood, see N. Epley, *Mindwise: How We Understand What Others Think, Believe, Feel, and Want* (New York, 2014).

¹² See especially J. Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind* (Cambridge, 1999).

¹³ E. Goffman, *Interaction Ritual* (New York, 1967).

¹⁴ A topic on which the perspectives offered by P. Bourdieu (e.g. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, 1977)) are fundamental.

Greek term here is *timê*, around which a very wide range of emotions and reactive attitudes circle.¹⁵ Medea's concern for *timê* (in her desire for revenge, in her determination to avoid mockery, in her sense of who she is and what she deserves) is thus a fundamental feature of the negotiations of recognition and respect on which social interaction is based. This is not something that is essentially or exclusively heroic or masculine in nature, though there are indubitably cases in which Medea's formulations are inflected by attitudes that are at least more frequently associated with the male heroes of epic and tragedy.¹⁶

One very important way in which the human capacity for other-understanding is exploited in the play is in what one might refer to as Medea's emotional intelligence.¹⁷ For her own (emotional) reasons, and in ways that inevitably engage the emotional evaluations of internal and external audiences, she repeatedly exhibits a subtle understanding of *other* characters' emotions, motivations, and dispositions. One particular emotional disposition that she is adept at fostering and exploiting is trust,¹⁸ an attitude that rests fundamentally upon our readiness to believe that we can, in fact, discern others' motives and judge their character from their words and actions. Trust is a basic prerequisite for co-operation and will rest on affective capacities and tendencies that are deeply rooted in human intersubjectivity. Early in

¹⁵ See D. L. Cairns, 'Honour and Shame: Modern Controversies and Ancient Values', *Critical Quarterly* 53 (2011), 1–19.

¹⁶ See (e.g.) 383, 403–6 (esp. *vñv áγών εὐψυχίας*, 403), 765–6 (esp. the athletic metaphor, *καλλίνικοι*), 797, 807–10, 1049–51, 1060–1, 1354–5, 1362. Cf. the descriptions of her by the Nurse at 108–10. The classic account of Medea as hero is B. M. W. Knox, 'The Medea of Euripides', *YCS* 25 (1977), 193–225. For comments and further references, see D. J. Mastronarde (ed.), *Euripides: Medea* (Cambridge, 2002), 8–9, 14, 18–20. J. Mossman (ed.), *Euripides: Medea* (Warminster, 2011), 31–6, 40, 46 seems to me to go a little too far in downplaying this element of her characterization. For sensible remarks, see also W. Allan, *Euripides: Medea* (London, 2002), 81–99.

¹⁷ I use the term loosely to refer to that form of other-understanding that focuses on others' affective states, and not in the sense of a positively evaluated trait, ability, or set of traits and abilities as popularized by D. Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ* (New York, 1995). Cf. P. Salovey and J. D. Meyer, 'Emotional Intelligence', *Imagination, Cognition and Personality* 9.3 (1989/1990), 185–211. While in my sense of the term 'emotional intelligence' is thus, in one way, just a textbook case of other-understanding, it also shares with Goleman's sense the notion that such understanding is a skill that can contribute to an agent's realization of her goals.

¹⁸ Steven Johnstone's splendid book, *A History of Trust in Ancient Greece* (Chicago, 2011), focuses on impersonal forms of trust in the economic and political spheres. There is thus a pressing need for a study of ancient Greek notions of trust (whether expressed as *pistis* or otherwise) in interpersonal relations. For some pointers, see T. Morgan, 'Is *Pistis/Fides* Experienced as an Emotion in the Late Roman Republic, Early Principate, and Early Church?', in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (eds.), *Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture* (Stuttgart, 2013), 191–214. An edited volume is to be expected from the conference 'Vertrauensverlust und Vertrauenskrisen in antiken Gesellschaften', Schloss Rauischholzhausen, 14–16 March 2019, but that too appears to concentrate on the political (see the report in *H-Soz-Kult* 26.06.2019). For political trust in Republican Rome, cf. J. Timmer, *Vertrauen: Eine Ressource im politischen System der römischen Republik* (Frankfurt/Main, 2017).

the play, Medea gets the Chorus on her side by exploiting their shared experience as women, especially in the famous lines 248–51:¹⁹

λέγουσι δ' ἡμᾶς ὥς ἀκίνδυνον βίον
ζῶμεν κατ' οἴκους, οἱ δὲ μάρνανται δορί,
κακῶς φρονοῦντες· ὥς τρις ἂν παρ' ἀσπίδα
στῆναι θέλοιμ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τεκεῖν ἅπαξ.

They say that we live a risk-free life at home, while they fight with the spear: but they're wrong – I'd rather stand three times in the phalanx than give birth once.

Medea's references to shared experience imply shared emotional attitudes and create a basis for sympathy (even as Euripides makes her acknowledge that she is not a typical woman – ἄλλ' οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς πρὸς σὲ κάμ' ἥκει λόγος, 252). And the Chorus do sympathize: Medea has gained their trust. But to ensure that she can trust them she makes them promise (259–63, 267–8) not to divulge her plans. The Chorus' sympathy and trust are then sorely tried when they realize, to their regret, that the silence to which they have agreed involves complicity in filicide (811–13, 853–65, 906–7, 976–1001, 1251–70, 1279–92).

The common ground that Medea finds or feigns between herself and the Chorus constitutes a fundamental condition for sympathy (*eleos*), all the way from the exemplary demonstration of the principle in practice in *Iliad* 24 to its theoretical statement in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and beyond.²⁰ Medea creates a similar bond between herself and Creon (as parents, 344–5). Here she also uses the ritual of supplication, in which physical and emotional constraints combine (324–56). There is an emotional reluctance to break the physical bond, but also a prototypical emotional response (*aidôs*) that is traditionally regarded as characteristic of the encounter itself.²¹ The fact that *aidôs* (shame, respect) is the characteristic response here reminds us that the importance of *timê* in everyday social

¹⁹ Cf. her later words to the Nurse at 821–2: 'Tell him [Jason] nothing of my plans, if you wish your mistress well and are a woman.' Medea returns repeatedly and with various purposes to the theme of 'women's nature': see 230–51, 263–6, 407–9, 822, 889–90, 928, 945, 1368. This is one way in which she inspires the Chorus (see esp. the first stasimon at 410–20); but her words, in some cases, also resonate with the misogynist stereotypes voiced by Jason (569–73; cf. the irony of his patronizing remarks at 909–13).

²⁰ See Cairns, 'Exemplarity' (n. 2). For the stipulation that *eleos* rests on shared vulnerability see Arist. *Rhet.* 1385b14–1386a3, 1386a26–9. For more on this, and on the relation between Aristotle's views and *Iliad* 24, see D. Cairns, 'Homer, Aristotle, and the Nature of Compassion', in R. Barth, U.-E. Eisen, and M. Fritz (eds), *Barmherzigkeit: Das Mitgefühl im Brennpunkt von Ethik und Religion* (Tübingen, forthcoming 2021).

²¹ See J. Gould, 'Hiketia', *JHS* 93 (1973), 85–90; D. L. Cairns, *Aidôs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1993), 113–19, 183–5, 189–93, 209–10, 221–7, 253–4, 276–87, 330–1. F. S. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication* (Oxford, 2006), esp. 8–12, overlooks Gould's and my emphasis on the ethical significance of *aidôs* as the emotion that is characteristic of supplication.

interaction can also be formalized and institutionalized in specific practices of ritual and religion. Having won the trust of Aegeus simply through the cogency of her case (690–708), Medea exploits not only the ritual of supplication (709–18), but also that of the oath (735–55) in ensuring that she can trust him to support her in future (731–40):

Μη. ἀλλὰ πίστις εἰ γένοιτό μοι
τούτων, ἔχοιμι' ἂν πάντα πρὸς σέθεν καλῶς.
Αἰ. μῶν οὐ πέποιθας; ἢ τί σοι τὸ δυσχερές;
Μη. πέποιθα· Πελίου δ' ἐχθρός ἐστί μοι δόμος
Κρέων τε. τούτοις δ' ὀρκίοισι μὲν ζυγεῖς
ἄγουσιν οὐ μεθεῖ' ἂν ἐκ γαίας ἐμέ·
λόγοις δὲ συμβᾶς καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἂν κάπικηρυκεύμασιν
τάχ' ἂν πίθοιο· τὰμὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῇ,
τοῖς δ' ὄλβος ἐστί καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

Med. But if I had a pledge [*pistis*] of your support, I'd have all I could possibly want from you.

Aeg. Don't you trust me? Or what is your difficulty?

Med. I do trust you. But the family of Pelias is hostile to me, as is Creon. If you were bound by oaths you could not give me up to them if they tried to take me from your country. But if we had only a verbal agreement and you swore no oath by the gods you might make an alliance and give in to their heralds' requests. For I am weak, but they enjoy prosperity and dynastic power.

The way that these rituals exploit religious sanctions, religiously calibrated emotions, and the emotions of everyday social interaction to underpin trust is a significant theme in the play.

Medea and her supporters in the Chorus indignantly deplore the breakdown of these institutions through the faithlessness of Jason (439–40, 492–8);²² but she of course uses them, and the emotional susceptibility of men such as Creon and Aegeus towards them, to her own

²² 439–40 (Chorus): βέβακε δ' ὀρκῶν χάρις, οὐδ' ἔτ' αἰδῶς | Ἑλλάδι τᾷ μεγάλῃ μένει, αἰθερία δ' ἀνέπτα (The obligatory force of oaths is no more, nor does *Aidōs* remain in the great land of Greece – she has taken wing and flown off). 492–8 (Medea): ὀρκῶν δὲ φροῦδη πίστις, οὐδ' ἔχω μαθεῖν | εἰ θεοὺς νομίζεις τοὺς τότε σὺκ ἄρχειν ἔτι | ἢ καινὰ κεῖσθαι θέσμι' ἀνθρώποις τὰ νῦν, | ἐπεὶ σύνοισθ' ἄ γ' εἰς ἔμ' οὐκ εὐόρκος ὢν. | φεῦ δεξιὰ χεῖρ, ἥς σὺ πόλλ' ἐλαμβάνου, | καὶ τῶνδε γονάτων, ὥς μάτην κεχρῶσμεθα | κακοῦ πρὸς ἄνδρός, ἐλπίδων δ' ἡμάρτομεν (Trust in oaths has gone, and I can't tell whether you think that the gods of those days no longer rule or that new rules have now been established for human beings, since surely you are aware that you have not kept your oath to me. Ah, right hand, which you often grasped, and these knees of mine, how futile was the supplication of a wicked man, how badly I failed in my hopes).

advantage and the others' detriment.²³ A scenario of this sort can get off the ground only if Medea is able to use her own skills in reading and understanding the minds and motives of others to encourage them falsely to believe that they can read and understand *her* mind and motives.²⁴

Medea is both conscious of and explicit about her ability to manipulate others' emotions and exploit their susceptibilities.²⁵ When Creon departs, and the Chorus sympathize with Medea on account of her impending banishment, she confirms that her emotional performance in the previous scene was merely a ploy to exploit the king's emotional weakness (368–75):

δοκεῖς γὰρ ἂν με τόνδε θωπεῦσαί ποτε
εἰ μή τι κερδαίνουσιν ἢ τεχνωμένην;
οὐδ' ἂν προσεῖπον οὐδ' ἂν ἡγάμην χεροῖν.
ὁ δ' ἐς τοσοῦτον μωρίας ἀφίκετο
ὥστ', ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τᾶμ' ἐλεῖν βουλευμάτα
γῆς ἐκβαλόντι, τήνδ' ἐφῆκεν ἡμέραν
μεῖναί μ', ἐν ἣ τρεῖς τῶν ἐμῶν ἐχθρῶν νεκροὺς
θήσω, πατέρα τε καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ' ἐμόν.

Do you think I would ever have fawned on him unless it were to make some gain, in pursuit of some scheme? I would not even have spoken to or laid a hand on him. But he has reached such a level of stupidity that, although he had the chance to check my plans and expel me from the land, he has allowed me to remain for this one day, on which I'll turn three of my enemies into corpses – father, daughter, and *my husband*! Clearly, the emotion that Medea really feels in Creon's case is contempt.

Similarly, Medea tells the chorus in advance that her plans (*bouleumata*) will involve summoning Jason and speaking 'soft words' that will transform her situation from that of humiliated victim to that of triumphant avenger (764–89). In the ensuing scene, her confidence in her ability to feign emotion in order to manipulate Jason's emotions is proved to be fully justified. But in manipulating Jason Medea is also manipulating his new wife – just as she foresees her soft words winning Jason over, so she foresees her gifts appealing to

²³ See J. Dalfen, 'Ist Kreon ein Mann ohne Arme? Das Problematische an der Aidos in Tragödien des Euripides', in D. Ahrens (ed.) *Θίασος τῶν Μουσῶν: Festschrift J. Fink zum 70. Geburtstag* (Cologne, 1984), 67–75; Cairns, *Aidōs* (n. 21) 277–8, with 279–80 n. 52.

²⁴ Again, see Sluiter, Corthals, van Duijn, and Verheij (n. 4), §6.

²⁵ On her 'skill at persuasion', cf. Mossman (n. 16) 44.

the bride (784–9, 947–75). Jason says he is confident of persuading his wife, ‘if she is a woman like any other’ (945), but Medea – having just presented herself as ‘a woman like any other’ in manipulating Jason – now exploits the princess’s feminine sensibilities as a bride, the appropriateness of her means of revenge to the circumstances of the wedding that is still in progress, and the emotions that are associated with yet another ritualized institution, presenting her gifts as if they were the culmination of the happiness and good fortune that marriage is meant to ensure (952–8). It works: the royal bride accepts the gifts with pleasure (δῶρα νύμφη βασιλῆς ἀσμένῃ χειροῖν ἐδέξατ’, 1004–5). Medea’s planning is driven by astute assessments of other people’s emotional character and a vivid imaginative sense of the kind of future that she wishes to bring about. Medea is a good example of how emotional intelligence (what some people sometimes call ‘cognitive empathy’) need not give rise to pro-social behaviour.²⁶

This is where Medea’s plans and her anger coalesce: her planning is geared towards fulfilling the desire for retaliation, revenge, or redress (*antilypêsis*, *DA* 403a29–30; *timôria*, *Rhet.* 1378a30) that Aristotle sees as an essential aspect of anger. Both as plans and as anger there is a very pronounced element of imaginative projection (*phantasia*) in this: Medea repeatedly dwells on, fantasizes about, and vividly imagines the form that her vengeance will take: there are so many possible ways, she says; but she might, for example, enter their bedroom in secret and kill them in their marriage bed (374–80). In the same way, when Medea outlines her plan to kill Creon’s daughter she envisages the sending of the gifts with the children, describes them in the kind of detail that emphasizes their attractiveness to their victim, and imagines the painful demise of the girl and anyone who touches her after she has put them on (784–9). This is a scene that Medea pictures again at 1065–6, with a telling use of the particles καὶ δὴ – ‘Look: the crown is on her head; the royal bride is dying in her robes’ (καὶ δὴ ’πὶ κρατὶ στέφανος, ἐν πέπλοισι δὲ | νύμφη τύραννος ὄλλυται). When the Messenger then comes with the news that the princess and her father are dead, Medea rejoices (1125–35): having imagined the event so many times, Medea now wants to hear exactly how it happened – it will give her twice as much pleasure if the Messenger can

²⁶ For problems with the whole notion of empathy, see various authors in A. Coplan and P. Goldie (eds.), *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives* (Oxford, 2011), 180–4, 193, 197, 201, 302–3, 319, 325; cf. pp. xxxi, 4, 31–2, 103, 162–3, 211, 319 on the imprecision of the term itself. Cf. Boddice (n. 3), 55–6 on the concept’s ‘remarkably unstable history’ (p. 56). For ‘cognitive empathy’, i.e. the ability to understand how other people might feel – a capacity shared by saints and psychopaths – see S. Spaulding, ‘Cognitive Empathy’, in H. Maibom (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy* (London, 2017), 13–21. For criticism, see P. Bloom, *Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion* (New York, 2016), 3, 17, 36–9, 62, 70–3, 199–200, 214.

confirm that they died a horrible death (1134–5). A similar gruesome pleasure is evident in her sarcastic dismissal of Jason at 1396: ‘Don’t lament too soon; old age is coming!’ (οὐπω θρηνεῖς· μένε καὶ γῆρας.) The representation of anger here bears out a great deal of what Aristotle says about the emotion in the *Rhetoric*. Both in the discussion of pleasure at *Rhetoric* 1.11 and in the account of anger in 2.2, Aristotle emphasizes that there is an element of *elpis* in anger that focuses on the possibility of the desired *timôria* (1370b12, 1378b3–4). More specifically, in the second of these passages, he suggests that the element of pleasure lies in ‘thinking that one will obtain what one aims at’ (1378b2–3) – the pleasure of anger is not just about the future pleasure of *timôria*; it also involves dwelling on that outcome in the present, imagining oneself exacting revenge and so, Aristotle says, taking the kind of pleasure that people take in dreams (1378b7–9). The *elpis* that is operative here is not merely (or not exactly) what we call ‘hope’; it coheres closely with the *elpis* that is important in Plato’s account of anticipatory pleasure in the *Philebus*, where it derives from *mnêmê* of previous pleasure and involves constructing images and narratives of future states of affairs that not only promise future pleasure, but also afford pleasure in the here and now (38e–40b).²⁷ The missing term that Plato does not use is one whose significance is elaborated in detail by Aristotle in works such as *De anima* and *De motu animalium*, namely *phantasia*. For Aristotle, both *phantasia* and pleasure depend on sensory experience (*Rhet.* 1.11, 1370a26–35); this means that, in the accounts of the emotions in the *Rhetoric*’s second book, the recurrent reference to pleasure and pain is not just a matter of valence (whether this or that scenario is good or bad for me), but also of arousal (hence ‘disturbance’, *ταραχή*, as an alternative for ‘pain’, *λύπη*, at 1382a21, 1383b13, 1386b23); for Aristotle, as for Euripides in his portrayal of Medea, the pleasure of anger also has a pronounced phenomenal aspect – it is not just about how we construe things, but also about how aroused we feel in the light of that construal.

Before leaving this topic, we might just dwell in passing on the vividness of Medea’s imagined futures: the scenes of revenge that she conjures up are neither static nor strictly pictorial – they involve agency, movement, and the manipulation of objects. They are not just ‘mental pictures’, but narrative scenarios that are full of action and affordances for action (as well as for emotion).²⁸ And so we can compare Euripides’ use of the same set of techniques

²⁷ See esp. *Phlb.* 40a: ‘And there are also images painted [in the soul]; and often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his possession, and with it many pleasures; and he even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself immensely.’

²⁸ See J. Grethlein and L. Huitink, ‘Homer’s Vividness: An Enactive Approach’, *JHS* 137 (2017), 67–91; L. Huitink, ‘*Enargeia*, Enactivism and the Ancient Readerly Imagination’, in M. Anderson, D. Cairns, and M.

in the Messenger Speech – in the opening lines alone there is body language, facial expression, interpersonal interaction, direct speech, and the detailed description of the princess putting on the robe and the crown, with emphasis on her dainty step as she moves through the house (1136–66). The *phantasia* that such passages demand involves more senses than just the visual; the audience’s involvement rests on an invitation to put themselves physically in the scene by virtue of the way that the text provides affordances for the kinds of actions that they, as embodied human beings, might in principle perform. It is about feeling as though we are there, in all the sensory modalities that being there implies, rather than creating detached mental pictures. And this is what facilitates emotional engagement.

The notion of anger as something that has these vividly imagined goals in the future that Euripides’ play shares with Aristotle’s theory also illuminates Medea’s monologue at 1019ff., with its much-discussed representation of mental conflict.²⁹ As is regular in these contexts, the representation of competing motives has ready recourse to psychological metaphor.³⁰ Medea begins with lamentation over the loss and suffering that she feels compelled to inflict on herself; but the physical presence and facial expressions of the children, ignorant of what is to come, make her hesitate: her heart, she says, is gone (καρδία γὰρ οἴχεται, 1042). The departure of her heart requires the departure of her *bouleumata* – she bids them farewell (χαίρετω βουλευμάτα, 1044, 1048). The coalescence here of what the *kardia* wants, as a personified metonym (or synecdoche) for anger (as in the well-known image of Odysseus’ barking heart, *Od.* 20.13–21), and what the *bouleumata* are about is enough to demonstrate, even before we take the controversy over the authenticity of lines 1056–80 into account,³¹ that we are not dealing with any simplistic opposition between reason and passion. Further, and again without going into the dispute over 1056–80, we can see that Medea’s competing motives come in sequence – she is sadly and reluctantly resolved

Sprenak (eds.), *Distributed Cognition in Classical Antiquity* (Edinburgh, 2018), 169–89. On the notion of affordances, see J. J. Gibson, ‘The Theory of Affordances’, in R. Shaw and J. Bransford (eds), *Perceiving, Acting, and Knowing* (Hillsdale NJ, 1977), 67–82.

²⁹ See (among many studies) C. Gill, ‘Did Chrysippus Understand Medea’, *Phronesis* 28 (1983), 136–49; G. Rickert, ‘Akrasia and Euripides’ *Medea*’, *HSCP* 91 (1987), 91–117; H. P. Foley, ‘Medea’s Divided Self’, *ClAnt*, 8 (1989), 61–85. C. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue* (Oxford, 1996), 216–26.

³⁰ See D. Cairns, ‘Psyche, Thymos, and Metaphor in Homer and Plato’, *Les Études Platoniciennes* 11 (2014), 1–37 (online at <http://etudesplatoniciennes.revues.org/566>); cf. ‘Thymos’, *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (digital edition, Oxford, 2019; DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.013.8180).

³¹ On which see especially M. D. Reeve, ‘Euripides, *Medea* 1021–80’, *CQ* 22 (1972), 51–61; H. Lloyd-Jones, ‘Euripides, *Medea* 1056–80’, *WJbb* 6 (1980), 51–9; D. Kovacs, ‘On Medea’s Great Monologue (E. *Med.* 1021–80)’, *CQ* 36 (1986), 343–52. For a strong defence of 1056–80 (minus only 1062–3), see Mastronarde (n. 16), 388–93. Mossman (also n. 16), by contrast, would delete 1056–63 (with Kovacs): see pp. 314–19 (on 1021–80), 324–5 (on 1056–63), and 329–32 (on 1078–80, which she also wishes to delete).

to kill the children (1021–39), but then bids farewell to those plans at 1040–8, before recovering her resolve at 1049–55. If these lines are authentic, then there is purchase here for the Stoic (Chrysippan) view that motivational conflict is not between opposing centres of agency or ‘parts of the soul’, but between a series of judgements involving assent first to one impression and then to another.³² Whoever wrote 1056–80, it is likely that they are intended to be consistent with this picture: though the address to the *thymos* in 1056–7 (‘don’t do it, *thymos* ...’) abandons the ambiguity over killing as opposed to leaving the children that has been maintained up to now, the *thymos* here plays the same role – the personified aspect of the person that gives rise to emotions such as anger – as is played by the *kardia* in 1042.³³ The *thymos* here is still the force behind the *bouleumata*. This makes it plausible that whoever wrote θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων in 1079 wanted it to express the same idea: ‘my anger is master of my plans’.³⁴ But even if the words should not actually mean that,³⁵ the idea itself – that in Medea’s case there is no wedge to be driven between anger and the development of practical plans to realize anger’s aims – is more than evident from the rest of the play. The motivational conflict that is dramatized in lines 1021–80 is that between the emotion of anger (including the steps to be taken to realize its aims) and the equally affective motivation of maternal affection which threatens to derail Medea’s plans.³⁶ Medea personifies her *thymos*, *kardia*, and *bouleumata* as a means of talking about her own motives as agent.

³² See M. Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion* (Chicago 2007), 71. On the possibility of motivational conflict in orthodox Stoicism, see also C. Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions?’, in J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.) *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy* (Frankfurt, 1998), 138–48; ‘Stoicism and Epicureanism’, in P. Goldie (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion* (Oxford, 2010), 152; Graver (this n.) 69, 75–81. For lines 1078–9 in particular as the focus of Stoic versus Platonizing debate on motivational conflict, see J. Dillon, ‘Medea among the Philosophers’, in J. J. Clauss and S. I. Johnston (eds.), *Medea: Essays on Medea in Myth, Literature, Philosophy and Art* (Princeton, 1997), 211–18.

³³ Just so, in *Od.* 20, the ‘psychic organ’ involved in deliberation and motivational conflict is now *thymos* (5, 9–10), then *kradiē* (13–21), then *ētor* (22), *kradiē* again (23), *thymos* once more in 38 (together with the *phrenes*), and *phrenes* in 41. At the same time, the operative agent remains Odysseus himself (5, 10, 16, 21, 24, 28, 41). Note especially how Odysseus (in character speech at 38–40) can describe as the deliberation of the *thymos* precisely the same process as the narrator presents as the deliberation of Odysseus himself at 28–30. The ‘psychic organs’ are not independent centres of agency, but a flexible system of overlapping and often interchangeable entities whose purpose is largely to mark the interiority of the psychological activity of real human agents. See T. Jahn, *Zum Wortfeld ‘Seele-Geist’ in der Sprache Homers* (Munich 1987). In this connexion, we might note how, in taking the ‘barking heart’ passage as evidence for the existence of the *thymos* or *thymoeides* in the *Republic*, Plato’s Socrates in fact quotes only a line that refers to the activity of the *kradiē* (*Resp.* 4, 441b–c, quoting *Od.* 20.17).

³⁴ As argued by (e.g.) H. Diller, ‘θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων’, *Hermes* 94 (1966), 267–75; Gill, ‘Chrysippus’ (n.29), 138, *Personality* (n. 29), 223–5; G. R. Stanton, ‘The End of Medea’s Monologue: Euripides, *Medea* 1078–1080’, *RhM* 130 (1987), 97–106; H. P. Foley, ‘Medea’s Divided Self’, *CLAnt* 8 (1989), 68, 71; Allan (n. 16), 92; and S. Lawrence, *Moral Awareness in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 2013), 202.

³⁵ So Mossman (n. 16), 330; on the difficulties, see Mastronarde (n. 16), 393–4.

³⁶ As argued by Foley in the article cited above (n. 34).

I have been talking about anger. And there are plenty of uses of anger-terms with reference to Medea's attitude towards her abandonment by Jason.³⁷ This is something that has been stressed by David Konstan, as part of his argument that what motivates Medea, both in Euripides' play and elsewhere, is not jealousy.³⁸ Though Medea later becomes a type of *zêlotypia*, that term does not refer to what we call jealousy, and in Euripides' play (which antedates the first occurrence of *zêlotypia*) what she feels is not jealousy but anger. Konstan recognizes that 'Jason complains that Medea and women generally are fixated on the bed (555–6, 568–75), and Medea herself acknowledges its importance in marriage (1367–8).' He also notes that Aegeus appreciates her distress that Jason has fallen victim to passionate love (*erôs*) for another (697–703). But 'the real issue' is Jason's abandonment of Medea; her own concern, like that of Aegeus, is for her welfare; the focus is 'not on her amorous sensibilities'.³⁹

But Medea *does* accept that she took homicidal revenge for the sake of sex (1367–8):⁴⁰

Ια. λέχους σφε κήξίωσας οὔνεκα κτανεῖν;
Μη. μικρὸν γυναικὶ πῆμα τοῦτ' εἶναι δοκεῖς;

Jason: You actually thought it right to kill them for the sake of sex?

Medea: Do you think that this is a minor trouble for a woman?

And she has already foreshadowed the same response in her remarks to the Chorus at 263–6:

γυνὴ γὰρ τᾶλλα μὲν φόβου πλέα
κακὴ τ' ἐς ἀλκὴν καὶ σίδηρον εἰσορᾷ·
ὅταν δ' ἐς εὐνήν ἡδικομένη κυρῇ,

³⁷ For Medea's anger as *orgê*, see 176–7, 446–7, 520, 615, 870–1, 909; as *cholos*, 93–4, 98–9, 171–2, 588–90, 898, 1265–6; as *thymos*, 106–8, 271, 878–9, 883. On stereotypical views of women's anger, see W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge MA, 2001), 264–82.

³⁸ See D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks* (Toronto, 2006), 230–4; cf. 57–9. Against his interpretation, see D. Cairns, 'Look Both Ways: Studying Emotion in Ancient Greek', *Critical Quarterly* 50.4 (2008), 53–6; E. Sanders, *Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach* (New York, 2014), 130–42. See also G. Sissa, *Jealousy: A Forbidden Passion* (Cambridge, 2018), 9–33 on erotic anger (*orgê*) as jealousy in *Medea* and elsewhere. For jealousy in American English as an 'amalgam of more basic emotions', including anger, cf. P. Stearns, *Jealousy: The Evolution of an Emotion in American History* (New York, 1989), xi. Cf. (on Ger. *Eifersucht*) R. Schnell, *Haben Gefühle eine Geschichte? Aporien einer History of Emotions* (Göttingen, 2015), 224–6. The view that (some, many, most) emotions are 'compounds' of other emotions is common (see the references in Schnell p. 224 nn. 108–9). Though it can be as problematically reificatory as the view that associates each emotion term with one subjective internal state, it does at least serve to remind us that similar scenarios might be labelled now by one emotion term and now by another.

³⁹ Konstan (n. 38), 233.

⁴⁰ Jason makes the same charge at 1338: 'You killed them [sc. your children] for the sake of sex and marriage' (εὐνῆς ἕκατι καὶ λέχους σφ' ἀπώλεσας).

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη φρὴν μαιφονωτέρα.

A woman is fearful in other respects and no good in battle or at facing cold steel; but if ever she's wronged in bed, there's no mind more murderous.

Equally, Jason *does* allege that her irritation derived from her belief that he had spurned her bed out of desire for a new sexual partner (555–6):

οὐχ, ἦ σὺ κνίζῃ, σὸν μὲν ἐχθαίρων λέχος
καινῆς δὲ νύμφης ἰμέρῳ πεπληγμένος

not – the thing that irritates you – because I detested your bed, smitten with desire for a new bride.

And he *does* attribute this ‘irritation’ to an obsession with sex that is supposedly typical of women (568–73):

οὐδ’ ἂν σὺ φαίης, εἴ σε μὴ κνίζοι λέχος.
ἀλλ’ ἐς τοσοῦτον ἦκεθ’ ὥστ’ ὀρθομένης
εὐνῆς γυναῖκες πάντ’ ἔχειν νομίζετε,
ἦν δ’ αὖ γένηται ξυμφορά τις ἐς λέχος,
τὰ λῶστα καὶ κάλλιστα πολεμιώτατα
τίθεσθε.

Not even you would say [that my plan was bad], if it wasn't for the fact that sex is eating away at you. But you women have reached the point that if everything is fine in bed you think you have it all, but if something goes wrong in that area, you regard the best and most satisfactory of situations as hostile.

Jason's charges trivialize and stigmatize (though in fact Medea accepts their essential truth), but the fact that he can make them at all shows that (what we call) sexual jealousy is an issue in the play. Not only Jason (and Aegeus) raise this issue; so do the Chorus (155–9, 207, 627–44, 996–1001, 1290–2). To be sure, Jason's betrayal is much more than a transferal of affection – Medea is to be homeless and exiled, and Jason's action constitutes an abject failure to recognize how much he owes her. But this does not mean that Medea is ‘just’ angry and not jealous, because the dishonour, disloyalty, and abandonment that her anger focuses on involve her husband's rejection of her in favour of another woman. We know that possessiveness with regard to Jason is part of her motivation, because she tells us so, not least through her emphatic use of the possessive adjective ‘my’ in referring to the proposed

victims of her revenge at 375 – πατέρα τε καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ’ ἐμόν ‘father, daughter, and *my husband*’ (cf. 229). Though Medea has lost more than just Jason’s affection, and though his offence is more than infidelity, her extreme anger at the insult and injustice that she feels she has suffered can be represented as, and seems genuinely to contain an element of, anger at her husband’s rejection, at the loss of his sexual affections, and at the rival who has alienated those affections. The fact that this is part of a wider set of responses does not mean that it is not there, and the fact that anger at insult and injustice does not *invariably* encompass jealousy does not mean that it may not, where the insult in question involves being rejected by one’s sexual partner in favour of another. If we accept that ‘anger’ in English can be used as a description of a jealous reaction, in a scenario that satisfies the conditions for jealousy, then we should also accept it in Greek.

What makes Medea’s anger, in this case, a form of jealousy (and what distinguishes anger from jealousy in other, different cases) is not primarily a matter of how the experiences are labelled. And it is not a matter of whatever bodily changes or symptoms may be involved either. It may, partly, be a matter of the way the agent appraises the situation; but a difference in appraisal between (a) anger that counts as jealousy and (b) anger that does not is above all a consequence of the difference in the eliciting conditions, in the scenario that the appraisal construes, i.e. in the context. If you are angry because your husband has left you and taken up with another woman, we can call it jealousy; if you are angry because a neighbouring country to the south is dragging your country out of the European Union against its will, we cannot.

This is an important reminder that emotions are not just subjective, internal feelings or states of mind. They are also implicated in the relations between people, in the external conditions in which they arise and which give rise to them, and in the actions that we take in a given emotional scenario. They have many dimensions, all of which are important in their definition.⁴¹ Their specificity can depend not just on what is going on in the brain or in the body, but also on what is going on out there in the world. When we ascribe an emotion to a person, we are not just hazarding our best guess about what specific subjective process may be going on within them and then applying a label that will designate that and only that process; we are relating their conduct to a set of narrative cues – about them, their behaviour, and their habits, as well as about the context in which they find themselves, and we are

⁴¹ (Dimensional) appraisal theories of emotion, as associated especially with Magda Arnold, Richard Lazarus, Nico Frijda, and Klaus Scherer, are discussed by various authors in *Emotion Review* 5 (2013), 119–91. Cf. Gallagher (n. 2), 129–30 on emotion as a ‘cluster concept, characterized by a sufficient number of characteristic features, although no one of them may be necessary to every instance’, in which contextual situatedness is a fundamental consideration.

drawing on the shared, intersubjective resource of language to make connections between the scenarios in which emotion terms typically apply, the typical behaviour of individuals in such scenarios, and the subjective states of feeling to which such behaviour typically relates. As we have seen, this is what the characters portrayed in dramatic fictions such as Euripides' *Medea* do when they interpret the motives of their fellow characters. These interpretations themselves provide further narrative cues which we, as external audience members, can incorporate into our own interpretations. The strategies of both internal and external audiences are based on strategies that human beings deploy in real, everyday social interaction. Though real human agents enjoy a rich, complex, and (at least to some extent) private inner life and the agents portrayed in dramatic fictions do not, still the ascription of affective states and emotional motives and the application of linguistic labels to such states and motives do not primarily depend on access to or speculation about undetectable inner processes, and so it can proceed in the case of fictional characters much as it does with reference to the agents we encounter in real social interaction. This is one of the reasons why those of us who are interested in language, literature, culture, and history also have plenty to contribute to emotion research.