If the issue fits, stay put: cleavage stability, issue compatibility and drastic changes on the immigration ‘issue’

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Keywords: immigration; populist radical right; mainstream parties; manifestos; Sweden; the Netherlands
Abstract

The political mainstream in the Netherlands and Sweden has been challenged by a growing support for the populist radical right (PRR) and a public opinion that is increasingly dissatisfied with the pursued immigration/integration policies. Conventional narratives suggest that parties respond to these cues by making drastic shifts to their manifesto positions, either in a restrictive/assimilationist (RA) or liberal/multicultural (LM) direction, as a way of pre-empting any electoral losses or dismissing the niche position. While the Dutch parties have been more likely than their Swedish counterparts to make such changes, they have not always been connected to the above stimuli. The article argues instead that such positional volatility is amplified by the (in)stability of the societal fault lines, and the relative fit between these cleavages and parties’ choice of issue framing (economic or socio-cultural). While providing some support for supply-and-demand explanations, the article’s focus on dimensional stability and issue fit calls attention to the variability in conflict mobilisation and the role of mainstream parties as active agents in shaping debates on immigration and integration.
Introduction

The Netherlands and Sweden are often grouped together in the political science and migration literature. On the one hand, due to institutional similarities (Richardson, 1982) and on the other, due to similar approaches to immigration and integration (Geddes, 2003). Their corporatist arrangements successfully de-politicised the immigration ‘issue’ for a remarkably long period of time whereas their ‘multicultural’ orientations constructed national narratives that accepted as well as promoted ethnic difference (Soininen, 1999; Bruquetas-Callejo et al, 2007).

However, by the early 1990s several societal changes were underway which subsequently moved the issue away from the consultation committees and into the party-political arena. The institutional structures were reformed (Lindvall and Sebring, 2005; Jones, 1999), and both cases witnessed a dramatic rise in ‘numbers’ (Bevelander, 2004; Vink and Meijerink, 2003) and an increasingly split public opinion (Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2011; Breugelmans and van de Viejer, 2004). This, in turn, provided fertile ground for the emergence and formation of populist radical right parties (PRR) (Mudde, 2007).

Although saliency levels have fluctuated, the overall pattern suggests that immigration/integration have become increasingly more important for parties and electorates alike (Rydgren, 2002; Vliegenhart and Roggeband, 2007). But merely emphasising an issue may not always be enough, especially if the adopted stance is associated with electoral shortcomings (Adams et al 2004). The literature thus suggests two potential party responses. They can drastically change their manifesto positions to signal a clear commitment to restrictive immigration/assimilationist integration policies. This, the argument runs, will be an attempt to co-opt/outperform the PRR and/or to clearly respond to these public mood changes. Conversely, parties
can make equally drastic changes but in the *opposite* direction, thereby emphasising a liberal immigration/multicultural integration stance (hereafter labelled RA and LM). This more proactive behaviour aims to dismiss the niche position and clearly place the party on the side of, e.g., human rights and ethnic diversity (Meguid 2005).

While accepting these premises, we also suggest that the opportunities for making such changes are likely to depend on the external environment that parties function in. The prevailing institutions can be more or less stable and provide different incentives for the degree of change undertaken. In particular, we focus on the (in)stability of social cleavages in multi-dimensional vs. uni-dimensional party systems. The former should allow for more flexibility regarding issue framing (e.g. is the impact predominantly economic or socio-cultural?). In the latter, however, parties are more likely to experience a cleavage ‘lock-in’ that further narrows down the space for (re)interpreting immigration’s effects. The electoral gains from making drastic changes – and thereby deviating from the overall position - should thus be reduced. But such shifts must also make electoral sense. This relates to the twin concerns of whether they are likely to correspond better to voters’ spatial placement, and whether the immigration ‘issue’ is considered salient enough to warrant any additional attention (which a drastic change undoubtedly signals). Yet making such changes may not necessarily lead to an increased vote share or help to stem off the outflow of votes. Parties may very well miscalculate and move too much, thereby subjecting themselves to sustained criticism for being either too ‘liberal’ or too ‘restrictive’.

As both cases experienced similar supply-and-demand-type pressures (PRR success and public mood volatility), we expect these to also have filtered through to the party manifestos by positions having changed drastically. But as we demonstrate, the Dutch manifestos show a higher frequency of such changes than the Swedish ones do (see also van Spanje, 2010; Brandorf *et al*, 1995). This variance is thus surprising
and presents a comparative puzzle. As per a ‘most similar systems design’ (Meckstroth, 1975), we seek to explain two interlinked phenomena: (1) what is the rationale for making drastic changes in the first place, and (2) what explains the greater likelihood of such changes in the Dutch - but not the Swedish - case?

**Research Questions and Hypotheses**

Manifesto positions often remain relatively fixed but may change due to particular external circumstances, e.g. significant electoral losses or shifts in public opinion (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009). Contrary to studies that address incremental directional shifts or party responses to a more volatile electorate, the reasons for any drastic changes tend to receive scant scholarly attention (although cf. Adams and Merrill, 1999). This lack of attention is surprising given how such behaviour may affect the strength of the ‘party image’ (Rohrschneider, 1993) or imply limping from one strategy to the next (Scheffer, 2011). Since drastic changes could also prompt an association with some form of leadership shortcoming (van Wessel, 2010), establishing when and why parties would make these moves is important for understanding the implications they have on the party-electorate linkages and for voters’ perceptions of an increasing democratic deficit (Norris, 2011). Focusing on manifesto changes, and competition over the immigration ‘issue’, provides general conclusions about the evolving nature of party competition but also some more specific insights into how parties engage with an issue that rarely has an obvious dimensional fit.

Previous studies tend to start with either a supply or a demand perspective. In the former, the presence/success of the PRR is said to generate a co-opting response
(Minkenberg, 2001) and mainstream parties will strive to crowd out these challengers by taking over their positions. Accordingly, any changes will be *restrictive* (regarding immigration control) and *assimilationist* (regarding integration policies) in response to this electoral ‘threat’ (van Spanje, 2010).

On the demand side, conversely, the public mood can become more RA and prompt similar changes (Sadiraj *et al.*, 2010). But merely moving in tandem with public opinion may not always be enough. Parties will also need to show a clear commitment to the issue – by perhaps being more ‘intense’ (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989) - in order to (re)capture any lost votes. This is said to explain the emergence of discourses that promise to be ‘tough on immigration’, thus resulting in manifesto positions that drastically shift in order to clearly signal this stance. However, responses can also be more proactive and the manifesto statements will thus counter with a dismissive position that aims to discredit the niche party stance (Meguid 2005). Changes will still be drastic but in the opposite direction when attempting to set the agenda and/or to change the public mindset. Such behaviour further emphasises the agency that party elites can exercise when trying to position their party at the leading cusp or ahead of public opinion (Cox and McCubbins, 2005).

A limitation facing these narratives is that they do not account for any drastic shifts that occur even when the PRR is *not* a significant electoral threat (Bruff, 2003). By the same token, they also face difficulties explaining moderate, or non-existent, changes even though a PRR threat is imminent (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008) and/or public opinion becomes more RA (Dahlström and Esaiasson, 2011).

Furthermore, neither narrative addresses the effects that social cleavages can have on any (re)positioning. If one accepts the multi-dimensionality of the political space (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995), then questions of immigration/integration will be difficult to pin down to any particular dimension since they often have both
economic and socio-cultural effects (Lahav and Courtenmanche, 2011). Parties will therefore have to negotiate, and decide on, what type of issue the immigration ‘issue’ constitutes. As such, the main question is not whether it gives rise to a ‘new’ cleavage (or not), or whether it can be fully absorbed into existing ones (or not). Instead, the more pertinent query relates to how flexible the institutional space is for parties to frame – as well as reframe – the societal effects of immigration, and whether these interpretations fit with the dominant cleavage. This relative degree of issue compatibility can thus facilitate, or constrain, parties’ scope for making any drastic changes.

For parties that function in systems characterised by multiple and unstable cleavages, more opportunities for (re)framing should be available compared to what uni-dimensional and stable ones can offer. Multi-dimensionality is thus likely to generate a greater degree of electoral choice but also a greater degree of uncertainty. Intra-party negotiations may therefore undergo a series of positional shifts as they work out how to win the new electoral calculus and/or how to resolve any internal divisions deriving from the new issue. In systems characterised by one but stable cleavage, parties are more likely to experience a cleavage ‘lock-in’. This limits the incentives as well as the opportunities, for making any drastic changes. While our discussion focuses on immigration/integration, the underlying mechanisms contributing to positional changes have implications for how parties contest ‘new’ issues – more broadly - in party systems characterised by single or multiple cleavages.

Given this overview, we address how mainstream parties have engaged with the immigration ‘issue’ by setting out the following hypotheses:

H1: When the PRR experiences greater electoral success, drastic manifesto changes are more likely;
H2: When public opinion favours more RA policies, drastic manifesto changes are more likely;

H3: In party systems characterised by multiple and unstable cleavages, and where the perceived impact of immigration does not ‘fit’ with the dominant fault line, drastic manifesto changes are more likely.

The article proceeds as follows. We first operationalise ‘positions’; ‘drastic changes’ and ‘discussed impact’ and then conduct a three-fold manifesto analysis for each country (1991-2010). The timeframe includes several points where parties should have been subject to increased (re)framing pressures and we would therefore expect these strains to also be reflected in their respective manifestos. It is further bookended by two ‘critical junctures’: sudden issue politicisation and presence of anti-immigration parties in both parliaments. The manifesto analysis as such is based on the positional scaling system developed by Pellikaan et al (2003; see also Odmalm, 2012; De Lange, 2007). While the Comparative Manifesto Project and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey both include ‘positions on immigration’, they treat the term almost exclusively as a question of integration\(^1\). The study conducted here, however, captures stances on immigration \textit{and} integration (‘positions’), and breaks down the substantive focus into two sub-categories (economic and socio-cultural) when these positions are articulated (‘discussed impact’). We then return to the article’s original hypothesis (H.3), compare it to the competing explanations found in the literature (Hs 1 and 2) and discuss our findings with respect to the broader implications they have for the study of party politics.
Data and Methods

To establish positions, discussed impact and degree of change over the time, we consider the manifestos\(^2\) for all mainstream parties\(^3\) with a national level representation. Manifestos are a central data source since they ‘inform the electorate about the course of action the party will pursue when elected’ (Klingemann, 1987:300) and are as such well suited for investigating political agendas and party conflict in comparative perspective (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Walgrave and Nuytemanns, 2009 but see also Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006).

We further consider the immigration ‘issue’ to involve expressed positions on immigration as well as integration\(^4\). To capture these we have carried out a hand-coded content analysis (Patton, 2002) using key words to identify the quasi-sentences associated with each individual category\(^5\). All indicators, except for ‘Immigration (in general)’; ‘Student migration’\(^6\) and ‘Integration’, were scored depending on whether statements suggested a more liberal (-1) or more restrictive (+1) approach to the prevailing policies. E.g. FP’s statement in 2010 (‘Sweden should be open to labour migrants’) was given a score of -1, whereas SP’s in 2002 was scored +1 (‘No shortsighted imports of foreign labour’). For ‘Integration’ the following scores were used: (-1) if the statement was primarily in favour of a more inclusive and universalistic approach (e.g. ‘Immigrants experience particular difficulties with employment, these walls need to be removed’ (V, 2002)), and (+1) if that statement indicated a more exclusive and particularistic stance (‘VVD is for an end to the subsidised integration industry’ (2010)). When statements were unclear or ambiguous, a score of (0) was allocated, exemplified by CDA’s 2010 statement on ‘Labour migration’: ‘Admission of migrant workers should be based upon the needs of the Dutch labour market’, and by M’s 1998 statement on ‘Integration’: ‘Our integration policies aim to reduce
welfare dependency’. To ensure coding consistency, continuous inter-reliability checks were carried out. Statements were initially scored by one author and then passed on to the other to score ‘blind’. Some coding discrepancies were identified through this process, e.g. one author would allocate a score of (+1) whereas the other would give it a (0). These instances tended to arise when the concerned quasi-sentences were particularly lengthy, thus prompting a discussion and occasional recoding of the score. All indicators were then added together to provide a positional range from -7 to +7 where the closer to -7 a party is, the more LM its stance is. Conversely, the closer to +7 a party is the more RA will its position be.

We then calculated how much these positions had changed and in which direction. This was done by simply looking at the differences between Y1 and Y2’s scores. These were then coded according to the following criteria: ‘No Change’ (0); ‘Change’ (+1/-1) and ‘Drastic Change’ (> +2/-2). For a change to be classified as ‘Drastic’, it had to constitute a move of two or more spatial points since this more obviously indicated that the party was breaking away from its ‘original’ position.

Finally, we examined the perceived effects (‘discussed impact’) that the immigration ‘issue’ was considered to have. For some categories – namely ‘Labour’, ‘Student Migration’, ‘Family Reunification’ and ‘Unaccompanied Minors’ – these fitted easily into either dimension (‘economic’ for the first two; ‘socio-cultural’ for the latter). However, statements relating to ‘Immigration (in general); ‘Asylum/Refugees’ and ‘Integration’ often connected to both economic and socio-cultural concerns and were subsequently broken down further and coded as ‘Immigration (in general) (economic)’; ‘Immigration (in general) (socio-cultural)’; ‘Asylum/Refugee (economic)’; ‘Asylum/Refugee (socio-cultural)’, ‘Integration (economic)’, and ‘Integration (socio-cultural)’. These additional categorisations
provide an ‘Impact Index’ made up of five ‘Economic’ and five ‘Socio-cultural’ indicators that range from 0 (low) to 5 (high impact).

Manifesto Positions and Changes over Time

Tables 1. and 2. show the aggregate manifesto positions over time.

(Tables 1 and 2 about here)

Tables 3. and 4. show type and direction of changes per party.

(Tables 3 and 4. about here).

Drastic changes occur more frequently in the Dutch than the Swedish manifestos (67% of the time compared to 20%). Between 1994-1998, the overall pattern suggests a drastic shift in the LM direction which is followed by an equally drastic swing but in the RA direction. From 2002-2006, there is evidence of polarisation and positions change drastically in both directions. This trend continues in 2006-2010 but the moves are either drastic, or incremental, in an RA direction versus moving incrementally in, or maintaining, the LM position.

There are several inter-party differences however. Between 1994-1998, D’66 and VVD do not make any drastic changes, whereas the others do, and between 1998-2002, only SP and GL do not make such changes. From 2002-2006, PvdA does not follow the overall drastic trend, and in 2006-2010 the party system is split with three manifestos (SP’s; PvdA’s and D’66’s) not exhibiting any drastic changes. Post-2002,
polarisation not only increases but the manifestos also alternate between drastic LM and RA moves compared to the preceding election. During the 1991-2010 period, CDA; VVD, and GL have most frequently made drastic changes.

The Swedish manifestos paint a different picture. Between 1991-1994 about half of the positions change in the RA direction, but none of these are drastic. In 1994-1998 it only applies to V while there is no clear overall direction. Between 1998-2002, positions predominantly move in the LM direction but SAP’s and FP’s are the only ones to make any drastic shifts. The 2002-2006 period stands out. Here, a directional polarisation develops but with the (perhaps) surprising grouping of MP; V; SAP and FP making RA changes while CP and M head in the opposite direction. However, only V and FP make any drastic changes. In 2006-2010, two manifestos (MP’s and KD’s) make drastic changes (LM), and the remaining ones move either incrementally or hold their position. In the Swedish case, V and FP exhibit the highest number of drastic changes.

**Explaining the Degree and Direction of Change**

Why have the Dutch manifestos been more likely to make such drastic changes? We will first address the previous explanations set out in the literature: as being a response to successful PRR challengers (H.1) and/or to the restrictive swings in public opinion (H.2). We then discuss our original contribution – that such changes reflect the magnitude and stability of the societal cleavages, and the relative degree of issue ‘fit’ with these divides (H.3).

The PRR’s electoral success is often put forward to explain the positional changes made by mainstream parties. A reasonable explanation would thus be that the
Dutch parties have reacted to this cue by drastically changing their positions in order to win back any lost votes and/or to clearly signal their societal visions. In Sweden where this threat has been comparatively weaker, the need to make any similar changes is largely absent thereby explaining the relatively minor adjustments made (see further Hinnfors et al, 2011; Bale, 2003; 2008).

While our data would indeed suggest that the Dutch parties either ‘co-opt’ or ‘dismiss’ the niche position, the timing points to how the influence of the PRR may, at the very least, be exaggerated, and, at most, be detached from the drastic changes undertaken. For example, the shifts that take place in 1994-1998 and 1998-2002 predate the success of either List Pim Fortuyn or the PVV. Equally, the expected responses in 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 are not evidenced uniformly since only the former cycle predominantly indicates drastic changes taking place (H.1).

Furthermore, considering the changes that took place before and after the PRR experienced electoral success, H1 is not fully supported. From 1994-2002, the average change is 2.42 positions, and between 2002-2010 it decreases slightly to 2.3. In other words, drastic changes were made before and after the PRR was a significant electoral presence. The Swedish figures are still below the drastic threshold but positions were more likely to change after the PRR ceased to be an electoral threat at the parliamentary level (0.57 between 1991-1994 compared to 1.17 between 1994-2010)\textsuperscript{12}.

...(Tables 5 and 6 about here)

Nor can such shifts be solely explained by the RA turns in public opinion since the manifestos that drastically change do not necessarily belong to those parties whose size in parliament declined in the subsequent elections (see further Adams et al,
2004). The public mood has grown increasingly restrictive, especially regarding asylum seekers (Todosijević et al., 2009), and if one looks at the overall changes between 1994-2010, the Dutch parties appear to be more responsive to these cues yet their drastic changes are not consistent. In comparison, the Swedish manifestos are remarkably static even in the presence of such stimuli that would otherwise predict drastic changes taking place (H.2).

While it may be too early to reach any conclusive statements about the PRR’s influence in Sweden, especially following the 2010 breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats, it is clear that even the most recent (re)politicisation does not come close to the pre-PRR politicisation of the ‘issue’ in the Netherlands. As such, the PRR’s impact continues to explain the gradual shift of some parties to the right but cannot explain the overall positional volatility from one election cycle to the next (H.1). Similarly, shifts in public opinion only explain some drastic movements in some party manifestos in some years (H.2).

The Interplay between Cleavage Stability, Issue Fit and the Rationale for Making Drastic Changes

So far we have only found partial support for Hs 1 and 2. The article will now address H.3 - in party systems characterised by multiple and unstable cleavages, and where the perceived impact of immigration does not ‘fit’ with the dominant fault line, drastic manifesto changes are more likely..

While immigration’s economic impact is identified to a similar degree in both countries, its socio-cultural implications stand markedly higher in the Netherlands (see Figure 1.)
In capturing these references, however, Figure 1 does not reflect the amount of space devoted to either dimension but rather the type of impact that is emphasised. The Swedish manifestos tend to consider economic and socio-cultural implications as roughly equal but the former begins to surpass the latter by 2002. This development is not only indicative of the cross-party consensus on immigration control and multiculturalism that prevailed (Dahlström, 2004) but also of the rift that emerged in the late-1990s. The main sources of contention concerned the appropriate loci for deciding on labour migration demand (individual firms vs. employment agencies), and how to best achieve economic integration (pursuing equality measures vs. freeing up the labour market regulations) (Spång, 2008). By framing the immigration ‘issue’ accordingly it did not disrupt the party-political equilibrium since these areas tapped into pre-existing conflicts regarding state-market relations. As such, the Swedish mainstream has continuously managed to circumvent the more perilous ‘welfare state chauvinism/value-conservative’-side of the immigration coin which is frequently championed by the PRR. This is not the case in the Netherlands, however. While some agreement exists on some aspects of the economic dimension (e.g. easing entry requirements for highly skilled migrants), the socio-cultural implications of immigration are increasingly emphasised and have also become increasingly polarised (van Spanje, 2010). This conflict has thus exacerbated party differences on questions of social cohesion and what the Netherlands is, and should be, as a nation.

The relative ease with which the Swedish parties have managed to position themselves on either side of the debate was facilitated by their position on the dominant economic cleavage (Sundberg, 1999) being transferred, and applied, to their
positions on (labour) migration and modes of integration. Consequently, there have not been any obvious incentives to deviate too far from the position parties already hold, which would explain the relative lack of drastic changes that we identified.

These differences in framing are important because of how they affect party competition and, subsequently, the rationale for making drastic changes. In the Netherlands, voters’ preferences - and party positions - are increasingly structured around a two-dimensional space but competition largely takes place along a single, left-right dimension (van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009). Given the correlation between economic-left and LM-leftist positions, and the economic-right and RA-rightist positions, this can potentially leave voters whose preferences are in the economic-left and RA-right quadrant with no obvious mainstream option. A greater degree of volatility is likely to ensue depending on saliency levels of different issues in different years, and as voters choose between parties that represent some, but not all, of their preferences and between parties deemed competent on some, but not all, of those issues (Green and Hobolt, 2008; van der Brug, 2004).

When ‘new’ issues become a source of conflict and when that conflict is not on the dominant (usually, economic) cleavage, parties face a new set of strategic choices regarding which voters to pursue. Without needing to change their economic position, they can compete by making a drastic issue positional move. This is particularly relevant when the preferred party does not provide the desired position on the new issue. At the same time, parties also have to contend with preference variation among their core voters, some of whom will want more a hard line approach, whereas others will not.

Thus, new questions of strategy and positioning will arise. Should parties focus on keeping their ‘own’ voters, and can they do that without changing their position on the new issue (Sani and Sartori, 1983)? Or is a shift required to shore up
that vote? Much like party responses to the environmental ‘issue’ some thirty years prior (Rohrschneider, 1993), such positional volatility is the result of those strategic choices that must be addressed when an issue is understood as cross-cutting from parties’ stances on the dominant cleavage.

**Conclusion**

This contribution has examined how the Dutch and Swedish mainstream engaged with the immigration ‘issue’ during a period of increased politicisation. Of particular concern was to explain why drastic manifesto changes have been more likely in one case (the Netherlands) than the other (Sweden) even though one would expect such changes to be present in both. The comparison highlights the need to address particular institutional effects on the dynamics of party competition. Cleavage stability; the relative fit between these fault lines, and the degree to which parties are able to contest selected aspects of the immigration ‘issue’ are found to be likely explanatory factors for the observed behaviour. The findings are important since previous research often overlooks such relationships in favour of how parties respond to the PRR’s success and/or shifts in public opinion. These factors offer only a partial explanation for the outcomes in both cases.

Yet drastic changes do not happen automatically but are rather likely to take place under two preconditions. First, the existing cleavages must be porous enough so as to allow the immigration ‘issue’ to be framed as either an ‘economic’ or ‘socio-cultural’ matter. Second, these shifts must also be accompanied by a perceived and, in the long run, actual electoral advantage (either additional votes and/or a monopolisation of the question). From this perspective, the more ‘entrepreneurial’ a party is (Ström. 1990), the more likely it will also be to undertake these changes.
The Netherlands and Sweden are also unique in many ways. In the latter, due to the limited space that is available to address immigration/integration as a ‘socio-cultural’ matter, and in the former, due to the exceptionally high degree of positional volatility (Mair, 2008). However, when placing the analytical attention on the relative fit between issue framing and the pre-existing cleavages, we highlight a process likely to have broader applicability and one which merits further exploration. Indeed, our conclusions are in line with the developments found in the policy agendas and party competition literature (Green-Pedersen, 2007; Walgrave et al, 2006).

While our findings support the idea of the two-dimensional space, they also question the ease with which some of these ‘new’ issues can be successfully ‘integrated into this structure’ (Kriesi et al, 2006: 949; Hooghe et al, 2002). The Swedish parties appear to have been ‘better’ at incorporating immigration/integration into the existing cleavages, which, in contrast, their Dutch equivalents seem to experience greater difficulties with. As such, the conflicting nature of the immigration ‘issue’, and parties’ uncertainty as to how to address it, may also have contributed to the higher likelihood of volatility in the Dutch case.

This suggests that party system analyses should not limit themselves to explaining whether immigration/integration give rise to a ‘new’ cleavage (or not), it also needs to account for the stability and cohesiveness of these divides and for parties’ ability to set the agenda by framing ‘new’ questions in a way that is to their advantage. Multi-dimensionality, and the strains that exist within, point to how the immigration ‘issue’ is likely to undergo a continuous number of (re)framings, such that electoral strategies are often constrained by, but also adapted to, the prevailing consensus of what the issue at stake is.

Finally, by using a new method for measuring manifesto stances, we have been able to capture nuances in the expressed statements. This enabled us to a carry
out a closer examination of how the political mainstream has contested an increasingly contentious issue and to explain when, and why, they decide to make any drastic positional changes. Such an approach opens up further comparative opportunities to investigate the relationship between cleavage stability, issue competition, and positional changes.

Word count: 7191 (18/02/2014)
‘Immigration (in general) and ‘Student Migration’ were scored: (-1) if the statement considered the
category to have a predominantly positive effect on society and (+1) if negative.

This particular scoring system may appear counter-intuitive but is adopted so as to be consistent with
De Lange’s measurement scheme.

E.g. references made to the effects on labour market and employment agreements, the ‘knowledge
economy’ and/or [country’s] position in the global economy.

E.g. references made to ‘rights’ (to family life and of children), and/or to state-individual relations
(e.g. access to education; issues of detention or deportation).

Included references to e.g. allow applicants to work and/or eligibility to welfare benefits; (global)
human rights/nationalist concerns; ‘real’/’bogus’ claims; role of national-supra-national levels in the
decision-making process; labour market access; discrimination legislation; support for ethnic
entrepreneurs, conflicting values; multiculturalism/assimilation and language acquisition.

If the manifesto discussed the category in relation to its economic/socio-cultural implications a score
of (1) was given, regardless of the number of times mentioned. If not mentioned, a score of (0) was
given. The total category score was then divided by number of parties, and each individual category
were added together to provide the total score for that year.

The following formula was used: average change (No PRR in parliament): [total number of
changes/parties x nr. of election cycles]; average change (PRR in parliament): [total number of
changes/parties x nr. of election cycles].
Bibliography


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### TABLE 1. Manifesto positions on the immigration ‘issue’ - The Netherlands

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### TABLE 3. Type and Direction of Changes – The Netherlands

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TABLE 4. Type and Direction of Changes – Sweden

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**Type**

No Ch = No Change  
Ch = Change (1 spatial location movement)  
Dr Ch = Drastic Change (2 or more spatial location movements)

**Direction**

RA=Restrictive/Assimilationist  
LM= Liberal/Multicultural
### TABLE 5. Change with/without PRR in national parliament – the Netherlands

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### TABLE 6. Change with/without PRR in national parliament – Sweden

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