Explaining Divergent Trends in Coups and Mutinies:
The End of the Cold War and the Role of Military Agency

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Military loyalty is central to both military professionalism and stable civil-military relations. Within the military itself, loyalty is required for the smooth functioning of the chain of command and the ability of senior officers to execute orders. Professional militaries are characterised by their clear hierarchical structures and the routinized obedience of lower ranks to their superiors. Military loyalty is also a precondition of civilian authority over the military, and political stability is contingent on the willingness of military officers to abide by the policies advanced by ruling politicians, even when they find them objectionable.¹

In practice, of course, military disloyalty is common.² Individual rank and file soldiers often breach military rules and disobey orders, and procedures for punishing military disobedience are a central mechanism through which armed forces seek to maintain the chain of command. At times, however, disloyalty can manifest itself in collective action and mutinous behaviour can threaten the cohesion of the military and lead to generalised insecurity. This is especially the case when loyal units are used to violently counter mutinous units, as occurred in Burkina Faso in 2012.³

Similarly, senior military officers can also depart from the normal standards of military behaviour by challenging the authority of civilian leaders. Military coups represent a fundamental threat to political order, producing destabilising and often violent political upheaval.⁴ The 2019 coup in Sudan that ousted Omar al-Bashar, for example, was followed by internal divisions within the security services and the brutal crackdown of peaceful protests.

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As they both involve forms of military disloyalty, coups and mutinies have often been treated as broadly equivalent types of behaviour. However, they are distinct forms of indiscipline that are carried out by different sets of actors and have fundamentally distinct goals. Mutinies tend to be carried out by rank and file soldiers while coups are more commonly initiated from within the officers corps. And while mutinies are directed against the military leadership, coups target the political leadership of the country. Although they are not completely unrelated (mutinies can sometimes give rise to coups, and visa-versa), they require separate treatment.

In this article, we seek to make two contributions to the scholarship on both coups and mutinies. The first contribution is empirical, and involves identifying the variation in trends of both coups and mutinies in recent decades. While prior research has sought to trace the frequency of coups and mutinies in separate studies, we offer the first systematic attempt to compare their rates and illustrate the difference in their frequency over time. This allows us to understand and compare the shifting patterns of two important forms of military disloyalty over time. In particular, we identify a striking divergence in the frequency of coups and mutinies over time as well as a set of fluctuations that coincide with the end of the Cold War. Using data on mutinies and coups from West and Central Africa, we show that while the post-Cold War rate of mutinies is significantly higher than during the Cold War period, the opposite is true for coups, which have declined in number compared to their pre-1990 rates. Far from being equivalent or parallel activities, coups and mutinies appear to operate according to distinct and divergent logics.

The second contribution is theoretical, and we offer several explanations for these divergent trends. Our aim is to use the data from our West and Central African cases to build new theory.

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that can be subsequently tested in a wider set of cases, from both Africa and other regions. We contend that it is no coincidence that trend lines for coups and mutinies appeared to change most starkly around the end of the Cold War. In particular, we argue that a set of macro-political processes associated with the end of the Cold War were experienced in different ways by diverse actors within armed forces in the countries we examine. Global structural shocks like the end of the Cold War can have profound effects at the domestic level, but their effects are not uniform across all domestic audiences. Political and societal actors often experience structural transformations in diverse ways as a result of their distinct identities, beliefs, preferences and resources. We build on approaches that emphasise the role of agency within military institutions and that highlight important differences in the motivations and resources of actors in different ranks of the military when it comes to disloyal behaviour.\footnote{Jimmy D. Kandeh, \textit{Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa} (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Naunihal Singh, \textit{Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups} (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Holger Albrecht, ‘The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d’état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950–2013,’ \textit{Armed Forces & Society} 41:4 (2015), pp. 659–87; Holger Albrecht and Ferdinand Eibl, ‘How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups,’ \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 62:2 (2018), pp. 315–28; Bruin, ‘Will There Be Blood?’} Within the complex structure of military institutions, individual actors among the junior and senior ranks have systematically different incentives and opportunity structures when it comes to engaging in disloyal behaviour, and we argue that the end of the Cold War affected those incentives and opportunities in systematically diverse ways.

We do not argue that the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War politics explains all the variation we see in the data, and there are periods of shorter-term volatility that suggest a one-shot explanation based on the Cold War is not sufficient. Nonetheless, the big-picture trends across a 60-year timespan of the data from 1960-2019 suggests a crucial mediating role for the nature of the international system and structural shifts that took place at the very beginning of the 1990s. We identify three key changes associated with the end of the Cold War that had
distinct effects on junior and senior military ranks and that help explain the divergent trend lines in the rates of coups and mutinies.

The first concerns the increasing experiences of democratisation in Africa beginning in the 1990s. We posit that the rise in the number of democracies had distinct effects on coups and mutinies. After initially contributing to a spike in coup numbers, democratisation processes gave rise to more consolidated democratic regimes that contributed to a decline in the number of coups by reducing political grievances within the senior ranks of the military. By contrast, the new norms and practices surrounding democracy largely encouraged rather than suppressed mutinous behaviour by incentivising rank and file soldiers to mobilise and demand improved conditions. The second concerns the ways in which the shift in the global balance of power led to the emergence of new norms and the rise of democratic political conditionality. While the increasing enforcement of democratic conditionality provisions created new disincentives for those senior officers considering a military coup, they placed few constraints on the lower ranks in African militaries who were not targeted by new international standards. Finally, the rise of international peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War created another diverse set of incentives for different military personnel in ways that reduced the incentive for coups and raised them for mutinies. Peacekeeping created important new revenue streams, gave militaries a new focus, and increased training related to adherence to democratic norms. Research on peacekeeping and military interventions finds these benefits have served as a deterrent of coups. However, peacekeeping also comes with risks for those involved and complex compensation arrangements in which remuneration varies extensively from country to country. When governments handle these risks poorly, peacekeeping has contributed to new grievances among the rank and file and resulted in a series of mutinies following deployments.

We set out these arguments in five sections. First, we identify the key differences between coups and mutinies, and highlight their divergent trends in recent decades. Second, we present
our principal argument that these trends can be understood as a result of the divergent effects of the end of the Cold War on diverse audiences within African military institutions. The subsequent three thematic sections then address the divergent influence of a set of global transformations associated with the end of the Cold War: processes of democratisation, the emergence of the international anti-coup norm, and the rise of international peacekeeping.

**DIVERGENT TRENDS IN COUPS AND MUTINIES**

Coups and mutinies both share a common defining feature: they involve disloyal behaviour by military actors. They are united in the central role that soldiers play in challenging the authority of actors who, in theory at least, should be deferred to. The prevailing norms of civil-military relations suggest that military actors should remain subordinate to civilian authorities, and should act only on the orders of the incumbent political elites. Similarly, within the armed forces, the norms and practices associated with the chain of command require soldiers of any rank to obey the orders of their military superiors. Both coups and mutinies involve a stark rejection of these prevailing norms and practices, and involve military actors stepping outside their defined roles within the wider military and political system. As a result of this central similarity, coups and mutinies have often been treated as interchangeable activities. However, while they share a central similarity, they are distinct forms of political behaviour whose causes, occurrences and consequences are often independent of one another.

Conceptually, coups and mutinies are distinct both in the identity of the central actors and the goals that are pursued. Dwyer defines mutinies as acts of ‘collective insubordination in which military personnel revolt against lawfully constituted authority in order to express

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8 Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State*.
grievances and make explicit demands’.\textsuperscript{10} We follow Powell and Thyne’s definition of a coup as entailing ‘illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive’,\textsuperscript{11} which clearly distinguishes the aim of coups from that of mutinies. As coups include the explicit aim of ousting the incumbent political leadership of the country, they represent a challenge to civilian control over the military rather than to the chain of command. As a result, successful coups have direct implications for society as a whole and can influence the international relations of a country. The direct effects of mutinies are generally more contained to a military environment and to the civilian communities in close proximity of the revolt. As mutinies are rebellions within the military hierarchy, they usually entail action by mostly rank and file soldiers against more senior military leadership. By contrast, coups are usually carried by mid-level or senior military officers, and almost never by the rank and file.\textsuperscript{12}

We seek to move beyond the conceptual distinctions between coups and mutinies by comparing the rates of coups and mutinies across time in a comparable set of cases. To date, the literature in this area has neglected any sustained empirical or theoretical comparison of the rates and determinants of coups and mutinies, and we offer new insights on the shifting patterns of military disloyalty. To do so, we compare the rates of coups and mutinies in West and Central Africa, before turning to questions of theory in the next section. We focus on West and Central Africa for two main reasons. The first is that this region has the most detailed data available on mutinies, drawn from Dwyer’s comprehensive dataset set of mutinies in West and

\textsuperscript{10} Dwyer, \textit{Soldiers in Revolt}, p. 16.


Central Africa spanning six decades. Secondly, West and Central Africa has the highest rate of coups on the world’s most coup-prone continent. For example, Patrick McGowan found that the region accounted for 59 percent of all successful and failed coup attempts in Africa between 1956 and 2001. Data from 2011 to the present only further confirms the pattern. Therefore, it can be argued that there is nowhere in which the issue of military indiscipline is more prominent than West and Central Africa.

Figure 1 compares trends in coups and mutinies in West and Central Africa from 1960-2019, using a rolling 5-year average. We compare rates of mutinies from Dwyer’s dataset of 22 West and Central African countries with rates of coups attempts (both successful and failed) from the same set of countries using Powell and Thyne’s widely used coup data. We include failed as well as successful coups because we are interested in the factors that determine the onset of military rebellions, rather than accounting for success rates.

13 Full dataset from 1960-2014 available in Dwyer, *Soldiers in Revolt*, pp. 26-27. We have updated the dataset to 2019 for this paper. For recent scholarship that has introduced new data on mutinies spanning all countries within Africa, see Rebecca Schiel, Jonathan Powell, and Ursula Daxecker, “Peacekeeping Deployments and Mutinies in African Sending States,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Online First 2020. However, this data does not enable comparisons before and after the Cold War as it includes cases only from 1990-2011.


15 Powell and Thyne dataset.

16 Dwyer, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 189 footnote 23; In Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset” coups are coded as successful if the perpetrators successfully seize and hold power for at least seven days. Details for the data collection of the mutiny data can be found in Dwyer, *Soldiers in Revolt*, pp. 24-27 and for the coup data in Powell & Thyne, ‘Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010,’ pp 252-253. Coups, especially successful ones, generally receive more media reporting and are easier to identify than mutinies. Scholars of mutinies have acknowledged that there are likely to be incidents that are unreported or intentionally covered-up by military hierarchies. This could contribute to the low number of cases in years when West and Central African countries were under authoritarian rule with limited press freedoms. Still, we do not consider this to fully account for the striking rise in mutinies in the 1990s or to negate the overall trends seen in Figure 1 and 2.
The comparison illustrates a number of important patterns of military indiscipline. First, the trendlines in Figure 1 clearly show that mutinies and coups are distinct forms of political behaviour that have usually departed from one another. In the initial decades after decolonisation, mutinies were sporadic and took place at a much lower rate than coups, which were a much more constant feature of civil-military relations. Even in more recent decades where the trendlines have shown some convergence, there remain clear differences in the frequency of coups and mutinies over time. These findings challenge some existing assumptions of the civil-military relations literature by demonstrating that coups are largely independent of mutinies.\(^\text{17}\)

A second important feature of the comparison concerns the story it tells about the role of the Cold War in shaping patterns of military indiscipline. The low rates of mutinies in the decades after decolonisation came to an abrupt end just as the Cold War itself ended, and mutiny rates rose sharply from 1990 onwards. In contrast, coup attempts were much more frequent during the Cold War, and were a constant feature of civil-military relations in the decades after decolonisation. Looking at the 60-year time span of the data and comparing trends before and after the Cold War illustrates the stark changes involved. As Figure 2 shows, there were just 14 mutinies in the 30-year period from 1960-1989, compared with 65 in the 30-year period from 1990-2019, more than a four-fold increase. In contrast, there were 69 coup attempts in the 30-year period from 1960-1989, compared with 46 in the 30-year period from 1990-2019, a fall of exactly one third. The pre- and post-Cold War trends are starkly different.

However, a third feature of the data is that they also show that the end of the Cold War does not offer a simple one-shot explanation of the overall pattern, and the long-term trends are accompanied by periods of volatility. Figure 1 shows a clear rise in mutinies in the early 1990s with rates that have remained higher than pre-Cold War years, despite some fluctuation. The pattern of coup attempts is more complex. The long-term pattern of change visible in the decades before and after the end of the Cold War is complicated by some moments of real
volatility, especially relating to a slump in coup numbers in the late 1980s and a spike in the early 1990s. Understanding the full implications of these trends, and ensuring that the signal is separated from the noise, requires both a close examination of the finer detail of the data and a nuanced explanation of the overall patterns that avoids simple mono-causal explanations.

In the next section, we present our overall argument that accounts for some of the stark variation between coups and mutinies. In the sections that follow, we present three distinct explanatory factors that help explain for the long-term trends while also accounting for moments of short-term volatility.

GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS AND MILITARY AGENCY

Our central argument hinges on the contention that large-scale, macro-political changes at the international level can have highly diverse affects within militaries at the domestic level. International ‘shocks’ like the end of Cold War have been shown to have major implications for national political outcomes across a wide range of areas. In Africa, the end of the Cold War has been associated with a range of profound political and economic transformations, including changing patterns of democracy, conflict and development. Major shifts in the polarity of the international system can lead to the rise of new norms and changes in patterns of material resource allocation in ways that create new incentive structures and resource streams for national actors. However, these effects are not uniform, and different actors are

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20 Gunitsky, “From Shocks to Waves.”
affected in different ways depending on their place in the political system and their pre-existing identities, interests, incentives. While some international-level shifts might transform the beliefs, incentives or resources of one set of actors, they may have little impact on others. 21

We argue that several of the changes associated with the global shock of the late 1980s and early 1990s had important implications for patterns of military obedience and loyalty in West and Central Africa as expressed through both coups and mutinies. Crucially, these transformations affected different sectors of African military institutions in different ways, thus giving rise to the divergent trends of military rebellion outlined in the previous section. Focusing on military agency and the organisational position of individual military actors provides a more nuanced understanding of how international developments shape patterns of military disloyalty.

Military institutions are not homogenous actors, and the highly regulated and hierarchical structure of military organisations entails a stark division between military ranks. We build on recent scholarship that has placed military rank at the centre of explanations that account for different forms of military rebellion.22 As Singh notes, ‘rank defines all aspects of life within the military’.23 Depending on the rank, individual members of the military will experience profound differences in status, command authority, access to arms, salary, perks and social/political networks.


23 Singh, Seizing Power, p. 36.
Many of these differences are experienced most starkly between enlisted soldiers and officers. Huntington captured a central difference among these two groups by suggesting that enlisted soldiers are specialists in the application of violence while members of the officer corps are specialists in the management of violence.24 However, the differences between officers and enlisted soldiers extend beyond their role in the military’s warfighting functions. Officers are not just managers of violence and commanders of armed units, but also enjoy a wider range of benefits associated with their position in the military institution. The most senior officers are members of the political elite and in nondemocratic settings often key members of the broader ruling coalition. Officers often have access to a range of benefits as members of a privileged group, including housing, cars, an elevated social status and profit-making opportunities in state-owned companies and the black market.25 For example, senior members of the Egyptian military have benefited from landowning opportunities, senior roles in business and government, and share-holding schemes in public-private ventures.26

In contrast to officers, enlisted soldiers not only lack the ability to command other soldiers, but they are also excluded from access to the social and material privileges afforded to the senior echelons. Their location at the bottom of the military hierarchy places them in a comparatively high-risk and low-status military role that offers limited financial rewards.

These differences among the ranks have implications for the propensity to military disloyalty among different sectors of the armed forces. Different ranks within the military have divergent incentives to challenge the chain of command or threaten civilian control, and they face different opportunities and constraints to successfully engage in rebellious behaviour that

are related to the disparity in resources that they enjoy. Enlisted soldiers tend to engage in collective indiscipline primarily to address material grievances and concerns about unjust treatment. As a result, they seek primarily to communicate with the senior military leadership or political authorities and do not seek to target the government of the day.

By contrast, the officer corps has a separate set of motivations for disloyal behaviour that relate to a broader set of interests. While officers do sometimes engage in mutinous behaviour that targets their superior officers, it is more common for officers to engage in disloyal behaviour by challenging political leadership rather than by challenging the chain of command within the military itself.27 Scholars have identified a wide range of motivations for military interference in domestic politics, in which protection of the interest of the military is often central. Officers have a set of corporate interests related to the prestige and standing of the military that create preferences for certain government policies and practices. These include high levels of military spending, freedom from civilian interference in military affairs, maintenance of the status and prestige of the armed forces, and political order and stability. When governments fail to properly fund or respect the military, when they seek to politicise or take control over internal military matters (including promotions, training, and doctrine), and when they engage in widespread corruption or fail to maintain basic political order, then military officers will often have an incentive to encroach on civilian authority in order to remove what they see as a threat to the military’s core interests.28 In addition to protecting the interests of the military as an institution, coups can also protect or promote the interests of

27 There are hierarchical differences within the officers ranks and junior officers are not privy to the same level of perks as senior commanders. Still, detailed case studies of military disloyalty from the region find that while there are examples of both coup attempts and successful coups instigated by junior officers, there are very few cases of mutinies orchestrated by junior officers. See Dwyer, Soldiers in Revolt
individual officers. Coup leaders may be motivated to topple the existing regime for the personal power, prestige, and wealth that comes with taking over the role of head of state.\textsuperscript{29}

Different military actors thus exhibit divergent patterns of rebellious behaviour related to their distinct position within the military hierarchy. Soldiers and officers have distinct identities, interests and resources, and these differences give rise to different forms of disloyal behaviour. We argue that individual military actors in Africa experienced the end of the Cold War according their rank and position within the military, and the international transformations associated with the end of Cold War contributed to the divergent trends in the incidence of coups and mutinies. In the following sections, we examine three key international transformations in turn: those related to regional democratization within Africa, changes in patterns of Western democratic conditionality, and shifts in practice of international peacekeeping. These major international developments gave rise to changes in government policies within the region, the rise of new normative standards, and alterations to pre-existing revenue streams. However, they had uneven effects on the different ranks within African military institutions in ways that contributed to a stark divergence in post-Cold War trends in military disloyalty. While each factor is individually insufficient to explain the full range of variation, taken together they present a potent explanation of divergent trends in military disloyalty.

**DEMOCRATISATION AND MILITARY DISOBEDIENCE**

One of the most profound political transformations that took place in the final decades of the twentieth century involved a long wave of political transitions that took place across many regions of the world. The so-called ‘third wave’ of democratisation brought an end to many

\textsuperscript{29} First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d’etat*. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints*. 
long-lasting authoritarian regimes and introduced democracy to many countries that had no previous experience of genuine self-government. This long wave of democratisation was not exclusively a result of the end of the Cold War and its earliest cases can be found in Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1970s. In Latin America, the spread of democracy from the late 1970s onwards has been linked to the region’s steep decline in the frequency of coups. According to Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich, the spread of democracy in the region after 1978 ‘reduced the viability of military adventures and forced radical opponents to find constitutional mechanisms to oust presidents from office.’

In Africa, the spread of democracy is more tightly connected to the end of the Cold War. Prior to the 1990s, the number of democracies in the region was negligible, but the continent experienced a sudden shift in the early post-Cold War years. From 1990-1995, the number of countries holding competitive elections quadrupled to 38 out of 47 countries. The trajectory of these transitions was uneven, and many of the initial political transitions in Africa resulted in the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes rather than the consolidation of enduring liberal democracies. Nonetheless, the wave of transitions radically altered the political map of the continent in ways that had important implications for the decline of military interventions in politics.

The scholarship on the determinants of coups has produced mixed findings on the relationship between democracy and coups. In a systematic review of the literature, Gassebner et al observe that recent quantitative analyses have failed to produce clarity regarding the

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32 Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa.*

33 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Møller and Skaaning, “The Third Wave.”
democracy–coup relationship and that it remains difficult to adjudicate between competing theoretical accounts of the relationship. Some have found that democracy reduces coup rates, others that there appears to be no relationship, and some have found that coup rates may be lower in autocratic regimes than democratic ones. It is beyond the scope of this theory-building paper to resolve this dispute, but we propose that the evidence from West and Central Africa suggests an important role for democratic transitions in accounting for the post-Cold War variation visible in coup attempts. The wider scholarship on democratisation offers compelling theoretical arguments that can help account not just for the overall slump in coup numbers during the overall post-Cold War period, but also the manner in which coup rates fluctuated sharply immediately after the end of the Cold War.

As Figure 1 illustrates, coup rates in the region rose sharply from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, before entering a period of overall decline. We offer an explanation for these trends that draws on a distinction between the process of regime transition on one hand, and the quality of any resulting democratic regime on the other.

Processes of liberalisation and democratisation often entail a significant rupture from long periods of authoritarian stability, and involve high levels of political uncertainty for key elite actors. Old structures and institutions are under threat, and the future direction of politics is often unclear. Such contexts can create incentives for political elites to move to protect their

core interests in ways that foster inter-elite conflict and instability. The military is often a key actor during these transition moments, and can intervene intrusively to shape the political trajectory of democratisation processes. The rise of coups in the early 1990s can thus in part be accounted for by the political instability brought on by initial periods of liberalisation and regime change. In some cases, the military acted as a promoter of change, and sided with emergent democracy movements to oust incumbent autocrats (for example, in Mali in 1991). In other cases, the military acted as a reactionary force, and sought to intervene in order to protect and maintain the pre-existing regime in the face of liberalising pressures from new pro-democratic elites (as in Togo in 1991). The central catalyst for these coups was the political instability brought on by the initiation of regime change moments, which in turn were heavily influenced by events in Eastern Europe that coincided with the end of the Cold War.

However, although the process of democratisation itself can lead to political tension and conflict, in the longer-term the benefits of democratic rule create disincentives for military intervention. After the initial instability of the immediate post-Cold War period in Africa, over time there was a steady consolidation of democracy within the region that coincided with the regional decline in coups. We posit that the increasing concentration of democratic regimes helped alter the incentives among military leaders about the desirability and necessity of removing sitting incumbents. The central mechanism at work here concerns the higher levels of political legitimacy enjoyed by democratic regimes, which derives from the rule-based and consent-seeking attributes of democratic political rule. Multiple scholars have highlighted the

important role that regime legitimacy plays in shaping the military’s incentives to intervene in politics.42 Legitimacy captures the idea that there is some consensus among elites and the public that the state has the right to make rules. In turn, if an incumbent government enjoys such legitimacy, the incentives for military intervention in politics decrease, not least because it creates governance costs for prospective coup plotters who are considering removing a popular leader.43

A further democracy-related explanation for reduced coup rates lies in the fact that military leaders also learned that democracy could be an opportunity rather than a threat. In the early phases of the shift to democracy, there were signs that many in the military feared that the transition would come with new policies that would be unfavourable to the armed forces.44 However, it turned out that the introduction of democratic practices did not mean an end to military influence in politics.45 Instead there has been a persistent pattern of military officers swapping their fatigues for civilian attire and holding political office. For example, Nic Cheeseman found that from 1989 to 2014, 45 percent of elected civilian regimes had leaders with significant military or rebel experience.46 These leaders are often seen to be more sympathetic to the interests of the military. Additionally, many newly democratic states and their international donors threaded lightly when it came to military reform for fear of

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destabilizing the democratic process.\textsuperscript{47} As a result, many of the military elite have maintained privileged positions through the transition to democracy, potentially reducing some of the grievances that could spur coups.

By contrast, the move towards democracy did not deter rank and file soldiers from orchestrating revolts, instead it seemed to inspire them. Whereas military officers seemed to view democratically elected leaders with more caution, mutineers often saw opportunity in political leadership with popular legitimacy. The economic crisis that had hit most of Africa by the 1990s meant that military budgets suffered and salaries for soldiers were often delayed for months on end. Mutineers regularly demanded direct contact with Heads of States in the 1990s to discuss these material grievances as well as other broader concerns about their conditions. These were bold moves, especially in the early 1990s as in previous decades under authoritarian leadership it would be almost unheard of that Heads of State would meet directly with rank and file soldiers. Yet, increased rhetoric about accountability and participatory politics throughout the region seemed to convince soldiers that top civilian leadership in both democratic and non-democratic regimes would be responsive. These mutineers were not mistaken and in many cases Heads of State did directly listen to the grievances of the lowest members of the hierarchy and in some cases sided with them over more senior military leaders. For example, one hundred conscripted soldiers took to the streets in protest of their pay and conditions in Côte d’Ivoire in 1990 following months of unprecedented anti-government protests. President Houpuët-Boigny, in office since 1960, surprisingly agreed to meet directly with a delegation of the junior soldiers and promised to increase their pay and improve their living conditions.\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, in 1991 Gambian rank and file mutineers demanded to meet with the president over claims of missing pay. President Jawara had been in office since 1962 and,


\textsuperscript{48} West Africa, 28 May-3 June 1990, p.877.
although democratically elected, had been under increasing public scrutiny over allegations of corruption and lack of transparency in government procedures. He met directly with the mutineers and agreed to remove the highest-ranking military officer at their request.49 Both of these long serving leaders were likely to be more inclined to personally resolve the mutinies due to growing pressures and public criticism of their leadership that extended beyond the military.

Statements and demands made by mutineers in the 1990s also demonstrate that they were motivated by wider themes of political liberalisation that were gaining prominence through the democratisation movement. Mutineers in some West and Central African countries began to frame their demands as an issue of human rights and attempted to attract the support of international organisations. In other cases in the region, mutineers argued that military policies countered their individual liberties and demanded a greater role in military decision making. In these incidents it appears that soldiers were re-evaluating their conditions within the wider rhetoric surrounding human rights and civil liberties.50 These types of demands would have been considered highly unusual in the previous decades, especially in countries under authoritarian leadership. Yet by the 1990s the language and requests are aligned with the general political landscape of the democratization movement.

As military rule became delegitimised following the rise of democracy across Africa, the incentives for coups decreased.51 The transition to democracy also did not cause the shock waves within the military that many within the services had feared. Instead many military officers have maintained elite positions, further reducing their motivation for inciting a military intervention. While the legitimacy of democratically elected leaders deterred potential coup-

50 Further details on examples of these trends can be found in Maggie Dwyer, ‘Borrowed Scripts: Democratization and Military Mutinies in West and Central Africa,’ Conflict, Security, and Development 15:2 (2015), pp. 97-118.
plotters, it inspired mutineers. Rank and file soldiers saw these leaders as more responsive and accountable and soldiers across the region began to take their grievances directly to political leadership in the form of mutiny. Many of their demands reflected wider ideas related to the democratization movement including accountability and individual rights, signalling that the soldiers were inspired by the political climate of the time.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND COUP-CONDITIONALITY

Part of the reason that the end of the Cold War coincided with rising rates of democratisation in Africa was due to the shifting normative environment and incentive structures created by the sudden move in global power relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the shift in global power to the US and other Western democracies, new democracy norms emerged and began to be enforced through democratic political conditionality. The new normative agenda was promoted by a range of states and international organisations, and included a broad range of ideal democratic standards relating to elections, the rule of law, civil society and human rights. It also included a robust prohibition against changes of government through coups d’état, marking a significant change in international policies regarding coups. During the Cold War, coups were often used as tools of proxy warfare between the major superpowers, and were either welcomed or condemned by international actors depending on the ideological affiliation of the coup plotters rather than any normative anti-coup principles. By contrast, after the end of the Cold War a range of international actors began to push for more principled and consistent international responses to coups, and new standards emerged that required

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international actors to help ensure that that ousted leaders (especially democratically elected ones) should be returned to power and that coup leaders should be excluded from future politics.\(^\text{54}\)

In the early 1990s, the Organization of American States (OAS) led the way in institutionalising the anti-coup norm through a series of legal instruments, including the 1992 Washington Protocol (ratified in 1997) which authorized the OAS to suspend its own member states if their governments had been overthrown by force.\(^\text{55}\) The UN Security Council appeared to embrace anti-coup conditionality in 1994, when it authorised the use of force to ensure the return to power of President Bertrand Aristide of Haiti, who had been ousted in a 1991 coup.

In Africa, regional organisations also began to adopt robust anti-coup provisions. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played a key role in restoring democratic rule after the 1997 coup in Sierra Leone. Partly in response to this episode, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) took the first steps in institutionalizing regional anti-coup norms in the late 1990s.\(^\text{56}\) In 2000, it adopted the Lomé Declaration, which identified a number of actions that would be classed as ‘unconstitutional changes of government’ and set out procedures for suspending norm-violating member states.\(^\text{57}\)

These policies were further entrenched and enhanced in the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2000, and the AU’s ambitious African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.\(^\text{58}\) While the OAU was lax when it came to enforcing its democracy-related


\(^{57}\) OAU, Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government (AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), 2000. The four actions included: “military coup d'état against a democratically elected Government; intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government; replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections”.

instruments, the AU has tended to act quickly and firmly to punish coup-created governments. Since adopting its more robust and punitive policies, the AU has suspended several member states in the wake of coups, including Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Egypt (2013) and Burkina Faso (2015).

Consequently, coup plotters have had to consider the real prospect of international sanctions if they succeed in seizing power, and the rise of the anti-coup enforcement regime thus creates a disincentive for coup activity. The more constrained international environment gives rise to a deterrent effect among senior military figures who would otherwise consider moving against incumbent political elites. Recent studies that have examined region-wide trends suggest a close relationship between coup rates in Africa and the activism of regional international organisations. Powell et al find that the post-Cold War decline in coups in Africa is specifically related to the emergence of the AU and its enforcement regime, and that the AU has had a significant impact in contributing to the decline of African coups.\textsuperscript{59} The post-Cold War rise of democracy enforcement in the region thus helps account for the post-Cold War decline of coups in Africa.

In contrast to the rise of anti-coup norms, a similar international disincentive does not exist for mutinies, at least not in recent decades. In early independence years in Africa, former colonial powers were willing to intervene during revolts by rank and file soldiers. This was particularly the case in newly independent countries with significant settler populations. For example, when simultaneous mutinies broke out in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in 1964 the United Kingdom sent in thousands of British troops to help quell the revolt. At the time former colonial powers viewed the political situation in newly independent countries as fragile and saw the mutinies as a threat to wider stability.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{60} Timothy Parsons, \textit{The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa} (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).
Yet, in more recent decades foreign partners, both within and outside the continent, have come to view mutinies as an internal matter. Mutineers are generally bringing forward grievances related to their conditions or direct accusations against senior officers (for issues such as corruption or favoritism). Issues of soldiers’ pay, living conditions, and internal military procedures are considered domestic responsibilities. Suggestions that countries should adhere to uniform military pay structures (for example, with regards to international peacekeeping pay) have been met with objections from political leaders in Africa with claims that this would infringe on sovereignty. Even when African leaders have requested foreign assistance to help put down a mutiny it has generally been denied. For instance, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire asked France to send military reinforcements in 1990 to help respond to mutinies but France refused to get involved.  

While international responses may deter coup plotters, there is not an equivalent disincentive for mutineers. States must react to mutineers using their own resources and tactics, which generally involve some form of negotiation. In more extreme cases, African states have counterattacked with other elements of the state forces, but this usually only follows extended mutinies. Based on interviews with dozens of former mutineers in West Africa, it is clear that these types of revolts are often planned in advance with risks taken into account. Soldiers expressed concern that they could be punished (usually through court martials) and possibly lose their job, while at times they also mentioned the chance of a counterattack. Yet, these interviewees almost never mentioned negative international reactions as a potential deterrent, suggesting that possibility was not part of their risk calculation.

Although foreign governments have typically remained mute on mutinies, international nongovernmental organisations and media have at times been vocal about the revolts and the 

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61 West Africa, 28 May-3 June 1990, p.877
62 Dwyer interviews in West Africa between 2011 and 2014
When mutinies turn violent, there is widespread condemnation by national and international nongovernmental organisations. Yet mutiny research in Africa and beyond has found most mutinies do not result in direct acts of physical violence. In these nonviolent cases, local organisations and media have often been sympathetic towards the claims of mutineers. It is common to see local media relate the grievances of soldiers to wider allegations of corruption or government mismanagement seen in sectors outside the armed forces. Nongovernmental international organisations tend to remain neutral on the claims of mutineers but have championed the rights of soldiers who have been arrested on mutiny charges. For example, in 2004 Amnesty International wrote about their concern for 230 soldiers who had been arrested for mutiny and held for over a year without charge. The organization also strongly condemned the death penalties that were given to Nigerian mutineers in 2012. Likely due to the strong local and international response to the sentences, Nigerian authorities later overturned the death penalties. Similarly, local civil society organisations and local media in Sierra Leone were vital to bringing both local and international attention to a year-long delay in the trials of soldiers arrested for mutiny in 2013. In recent years African mutineers have increasingly approached media or gone directly to social media to air their complaints. This suggests that soldiers believe that they will find sympathy, if not support, from broader audiences outside the military and often outside their national borders. This is in stark contrast to coup plotters, who have seen mostly condemnation from international audiences, particularly in recent years.

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

A final development related to the end of the Cold War that has had divergent implications for both coups and mutinies concerns the increasing participation of African states in international peacekeeping missions. After the end of the Cold War the UN Security Council embraced a more expansive definition of international security and began authorising a significantly increased number of more ambitious international missions. The early 1990s saw a spike of new peacekeeping missions (20 missions were authorised between 1989 and 1994), and after a lull in the mid-1990s, the turn of the century saw another resurgence of Security Council activism with large-scale missions authorised in, among others, Kosovo, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. By 2018 the UN’s peacekeeping deployment had increased to over 110,000 personnel, with the vast majority of these comprising of military troops. In addition to UN peacekeeping missions there has also been a rise in peace operations involving collaboration between multilateral and bilateral actors and institutions. This partnership peacekeeping in an African context has become the norm, with the most sustained partnership being between the UN and AU. Regional economic organisations have also been important institutions in peace operations, especially post-Cold War. ECOWAS has been the most aggressive of the regional organisations in Africa. Although ECOWAS had been in existence since 1975 the organisation only began peace support operations in 1990 and has since authorized interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, and The Gambia.

69 United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Our History.’
As well as an increase in the number of peacekeepers, the profile of international peacekeepers also changed. Traditionally, UN peacekeepers were drawn from the armed forces of the UN’s more developed states, and in the early 1990s European states provided the largest share of peacekeepers. By contrast, over subsequent years a much greater share of peacekeeping troops was drawn from poorer and less developed countries, especially within Africa. After the year 2000, Asian and African countries greatly increased their participation rates and came to be the dominant contributors to the new array of large-scale UN missions, with Europe and South America lagging far behind. The increase in regionally led interventions, such as those by ECOWAS, has further pushed African countries into the position of top contributors to peace support missions.

The consequences of international peacekeeping for the resolution of conflict in host countries have been the subject of sustained analysis. In recent years, attention has shifted to include analysis of the consequences of international peacekeeping for the countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions. When states decide to contribute to international peacekeeping missions, the troops they deploy gain new experiences and new skills in ways that can have important implications after their return. Participation in peacekeeping also creates an income stream for the military as an institution as well as individual troops, who are often paid more while on deployment. The large increase in the numbers of deployed

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peacekeepers and the shifting profile for troop contributing countries means that these peacekeeping effects have been amplified in Africa after the end of the Cold War, and after 2000 in particular.

Some observers have suggested that participation in peacekeeping might increase the chances of coups in contributing countries. Cunliffe, for example, notes that peacekeeping can strengthen the military and provide it with capacities and interests that are independent of (and may conflict with) the government. The resources and revenues that accrue from peacekeeping duties contributes to the independence of the armed forces and creates a set of benefits that the military feels it must protect against any threat, including from incumbent rulers. However, if peacekeeping systematically increased the likelihood of coups, we would expect to see an increase in the frequency of coups in Africa as the rates of peacekeeping participation have increased. However, as shown in Figure 1, during the periods in which peacekeeping activity surged (both in the early 1990s and especially after 2000), we see a decline of coups in Africa rather than an increase. While isolated individual examples might suggest a link between peacekeeping and coup behaviour, the aggregate data suggests a different story.

In a recent study that examines data from 157 countries from 1991-2013, Lundgren finds that countries that are more dependent on peacekeeping contributions for income are less likely to experience coups. Far from encouraging coup activity, participation in peacekeeping appears to help suppress it. He argues that the revenue that accrues from peacekeeping creates a valuable income stream that military figures will not wish to put at risk. The importance of

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75 Cunliffe, 'From Peacekeepers to Praetorians – How Participating in Peacekeeping Operations May Subvert Democracy.'

76 Levin, MacKay, and Nasirzadeh, 'Selectorate Theory and the Democratic Peacekeeping Hypothesis.'

77 Lundgren, 'Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?'
peacekeeping revenue in deterring coups is also highlighted in work by Jonathan Caverley and Jesse Savage. Their research demonstrates that peacekeeping income provides a mechanism for the regime to bypass traditional (civilian) elites and gain support directly from the military. They argue this ‘could strengthen the army’s….loyalty to the regime in a way that other forms of patronage may not.’

Revenue from peacekeeping is a significant source of funding, particularly for countries with weak economies. Research by Katharina Coleman and Benjamin Nyblade found the states most able to ‘profit’ from UN peacekeeping are those with small militaries who limit the pay they provide their peacekeepers. Their research indicates that African countries are among those that most fit those criteria. For example, from their global sample Ghana ranks amongst the highest UN reimbursement rate as a percentage of the 2014 military expenditure (at 25.49 percent), which demonstrates the financial importance of peacekeeping for the country.

Additionally, peacekeeping participation often comes with additional opportunities for training and wider professionalization programmes such as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme funded by the U.S. These programmes are significant in developing and upgrading militaries in countries with struggling economies. For instance, between 2007 and 2011 the ACOTA programme invested $20.3 million in Burundi’s security sector. Peacekeeping income and wider security assistance programmes associated with peacekeeping are important revenue streams that the military would like to protect. As the UN often has the discretion to choose between potential TCCs, military officers will wish to avoid actions that are likely to earn the displeasure of the UN. Although the UN rarely blacklists

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entire countries from participating in peacekeeping, political concerns do inform decisions about peacekeeping contributions. For example, in 2016 the EU cut back funding to Burundi peacekeepers contributing to the AMISOM mission in Somalia after political unrest and repression tarnished the government’s reputation.  

Others have argued that peacekeeping can play a role in decreasing the occurrence of coups in ways that are less related to income. The experience of peacekeeping itself, and the training that comes with it, can promote norms that encourage the acceptance of military subordination to civilian rule. Additionally, the mission may reorientate the military to a task that is not related to internal domestic politics or security.  

By contrast, the introduction of more widespread peacekeeping contributions from West and Central Africa from the 1990s onwards is a contributing factor to the spike in mutinies in this time period as it introduced new grievances for soldiers at the lower levels of the hierarchy. In West and Central Africa there have been at least fourteen mutinies following peacekeeping participation, with thirteen of the cases occurring after the end of the Cold War. Troops from the region began to deploy to external conflict zones at a rate that had been unprecedented in previous decades. Furthermore, many of the troop contributions from West and Central Africa in the 1990s were part of ECOWAS missions, which were particularly challenging and contentious given the organisation’s limited peacekeeping experience at the time. The high rate of deployment on ECOWAS missions is significant in understanding mutinies in this region given forthcoming research by Rebecca Schiel, Jonathan Powell, and Ursula Daxecker which...

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82 Lundgren, ‘Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?’ p. 509.


examines rates of mutinies for African countries that send peacekeepers on UN peacekeeping compared to non-UN peacekeeping. They demonstrate that participation in regional peacekeeping (including ECOWAS and AU missions) significantly increased the likelihood of mutiny. Our argument about peacekeeping mutinies expands beyond the rate of peacekeeping deployments to demonstrate how junior soldiers experience the missions and ways their perceptions can create disloyalty within the ranks. As will be elaborated below, peacekeeping mutineers often objected to the ways their government handled the risks of the mission and raised concerns about deployment compensation.

The experience of peacekeeping varies depending on an individual’s place within the military hierarchy. Peacekeeping deployments, like most other types of military deployments, involve mostly rank and file soldiers with a smaller number of junior- to mid-career officers in leadership roles. Deployments of senior level officers are generally very small in numbers and reserved to command posts, often at regional headquarters. In contrast, the rank and file soldiers are much more likely to be based in remote locations, which regularly come with challenges related to resupply and communication. The day to day activities such as conducting patrols, providing security to allow for humanitarian activities or elections, participating in DDR activities and the many other tasks assigned to peacekeepers fall to the rank and file, as do the hardships and threats associated with conducting missions in volatile areas.

There are a wide range of peace support operations that African troops take part in. Some occur after a ceasefire has been reached but others take place in the midst of an ongoing violent conflict. ECOWAS missions in the 1990s were an example of the latter and were followed by a general shift towards more ‘robust peacekeeping’ in the mid 2000s onward that has allowed

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for more aggressive means to pursue the protection of civilians. In practice this has meant that many of the missions that African countries contribute troops to more closely resemble war-fighting than peacekeeping. Tragically, this has resulted in high casualties on many of the missions that West and Central African countries contribute to. While no official casualty rates were made available for the ECOMOG mission to Liberia in the 1990s, experts have estimated that around 500 soldiers were killed while on deployment. High rates of casualties in peacekeeping in recent years demonstrate the continued risk of these types of deployment. The United Nations reported its highest ever annual number of personnel killed during peacekeeping operations in 2017. Of the 53 peacekeepers killed in the line of duty that year, 49 were from African countries.

Peacekeeping is thus a source of potent grievances for rank and file soldiers. However, we argue that these grievances are not a direct result of participation in peacekeeping, but rather from dissatisfaction with how some governments and military institutions manage the risks of the deployments. Peacekeeper mutineers in the region have argued that they were not adequately trained and equipped to handle the combat scenarios they found themselves in once deployed. For example, the first contingent from The Gambia Armed Forces to deploy on the ECOMIG mission to Liberia in 1991 lost two members of their unit and mutinied on their return home. Among their grievances were claims that leadership had not properly prepared them for the type of conflict they endured. At the time of deployment the military had only been in existence for five years and had no combat experience. Gambia media at the time also

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90 Dwyer, *Soldiers in Revolt*, pp 125-145.
suggested policy makers were irresponsible for deploying the newly created army to such a volatile situation. Objections to the Nigerian government’s handling of the danger associated with deployments were raised in 2000 when twenty-five Nigerian soldiers who were part of the ECOMOG mission mutinied over claims that they were neglected after being injured on the mission. As the above examples illustrate, peacekeeping mutineers are not necessarily objecting to going on dangerous missions. In interviews, soldiers were adamant that they accepted that deployments came with risks and they saw that as part of their duty. Instead the mutinies centred on the perception that the government was not taking these risks seriously, either by failing to prepare them for deployments or neglecting their care when injured.

To compensate for the hardship of the mission, soldiers generally receive higher pay while on deployment than they would when stationed at their home base. Yet, peacekeeping mutineers have also alleged that this potential advantage is inadequate and/or mismanaged by their command. At times pay grievances overlap with issues of risk, with soldiers arguing that the level of compensation is not adequate for the danger involved. For example, ECOWAS agreed on a five USD per day rate for soldiers on the ECOMOG mission to Liberia, which was considered one of Africa’s most violent civil wars. Gambian soldiers who mutinied following their deployment alleged that the rate was too low given that they were risking their lives and were further insulted that they waited months upon return home to receive their pay. This logic is not unique to West and Central Africa; in many parts of the world military personnel and civilians alike expect to receive higher pay or increased benefits when deployed abroad, especially to combat zones. However, in West and Central Africa financial constraints and at times corruption have meant that soldiers’ expectations are not met.

92 AFP, 30 December 2000.
UN missions provide higher compensation for troop contributions than AU or ECOWAS missions. Yet, this troop cost reimbursement is provided to states (not individual soldiers), who then decide what amount to compensate their troops. While the payment rates for peacekeepers by country are often not transparent, it is well known that less developed countries often do not transfer the full UN troop cost reimbursement to deployed individuals.\textsuperscript{95} Therefore, troops from poorer countries in Africa often receive less compensation (and lower general salaries) than their counterparts from other countries on the same mission. This practice is not against UN regulations and can be explained in part through the wide range of economic conditions within troop contributing countries. Still, peacekeeping mutineers from West and Central Africa have drawn attention to their objections to inconsistencies of compensation across contingents and have questioned if government fraud is involved in the disparity. A lack of transparency about how the surplus peacekeeping compensation is used by the military in troop contributing countries alongside frequent delays in receiving deployment pay has led to allegations by peacekeepers that their due pay was misappropriated or stolen. For example, Nigerian soldiers who had recently returned from UN peacekeeping in Liberia in 2008 mutinied when they did not receive the pay they expected and accused senior Nigerian officers of negligence and ‘conspiracy to steal.’\textsuperscript{96}

Despite the hardships of deployments, there is no shortage of soldiers in West and Central Africa vying for spots on peacekeeping missions, especially those hosted by the UN. In addition to the potential for higher pay while deployed for peacekeeping, there are other perceived advantages for troops, including advanced training, experience needed for professional promotion, and experience abroad. Yet peacekeeping contributions have not necessarily altered the structures of African militaries and for many the deployments do not


lead to professional advancements.\textsuperscript{97} This is particularly the case for the lower ranks who have often been unable to use their peacekeeping experience for career advancement in the way that many senior ranks have.\textsuperscript{98} While the expectations of what soldiers deserve often rise with international deployments, their home conditions are typically the same when they return, generating collective grievances that can underwrite mutinies.

Increased awareness about the disparities within the lifestyles and roles in a deployment context between enlisted soldiers and their officers have also been a motivating factor for indiscipline in the form of mutiny. In interviews with former mutineers in the region they regularly accused their officers of living lavish lifestyles while they suffered on the frontlines. A general lack of transparency about how surplus funds from peacekeeping is used has also led to suspicion and accusations against officers by soldiers deployed on peacekeeping missions.

The structure of deployments, which puts the heaviest burden on rank and file soldiers, helps explain why rank and file soldiers have generally had a stronger reaction to peacekeeping deployments than officers. The grievances raised by rank and file soldiers such as inadequate supplies and training can be a matter of life or death for foot soldiers in a hostile environment. At times this has led peacekeepers to take more extreme action and mutiny. Officers, especially those of mid-career to senior ranks are less likely to experience combat given that their role typically would not put them on the front lines. Additionally, officers are more likely to be in the position to present complications or grievances to decision makers, whereas rank and file soldiers regularly perceive that their place at the bottom of the hierarchy provides them with few avenues to express their concerns.

\textsuperscript{97} Maggie Dwyer, “Peacekeeping Abroad, Trouble Making at Home: Peacekeeping-Related Mutinies in West Africa,” \textit{African Affairs} 144, 455 (2015), pp. 205-225.

CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH

This article offers the first systematic comparison of coups and mutinies in West and Central Africa, and identifies important patterns of military loyalty across a sixty-year period. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the trends of coups and mutinies have starkly different trajectories, and both exhibit important shifts associated with the end of the Cold War. We explain this pattern by looking at how the macro-level political changes associated with the end of the Cold War had varying effects on ranks within the armed forces. The findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of armed forces by demonstrating how distinct identities, interests and resources of soldiers compared to officers give rise to different forms of disloyal behaviour.

Further research could build upon and test these arguments by examining the patterns and determinants of military disloyalty across all Africa countries, as well as between regions. There are strong reasons to believe that the arguments we propose for West and Central Africa apply elsewhere, although with some variation on how far each of the three separate explanatory factors are likely to travel. The Cold War has been shown to have had important consequences for civil-military relations and internal military discipline in other regions. Scholars of Latin America account for the steep decline of coups within the region with reference to the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy and the rise of democratic conditionality. Similarly, post-Cold War dynamics have also been linked to reduced military interference in politics within Asia. However, not all of our three factors are likely to have the same impact outside of West and Central Africa. The region has a particularly high rate of peacekeeping deployments with involvement in UN, hybrid and regional missions.


Furthermore, accusations by soldiers that their governments have mismanaged deployments has been a pattern in the region, especially for regional missions such as ECOMOG. We would not expect to see peacekeeping-induced mutinies to the same extent in other regions where peacekeeping contributions are limited or where the deployment process has more transparency and funding. Further study of the international influences on military disloyalty will thus have to take regional variations into account when seeking to identify global trends.

Further research will also have to tackle two important challenges that are likely to arise when testing and generalising from the theoretical arguments presented here. First, while there is readily available data on incidences of coups worldwide and over time, we lack similarly comprehensive cross-regional data on mutinies, which are more difficult to identify and do not receive the same level of media and scholarly attention. A crucial next step in the study of military disloyalty thus relates to the essentials of cross-national data collection before more significant theoretical strides can be made.

Second, in order to empirically examine some of the theoretical propositions we advance, we suggest that it is necessary to engage in challenging process tracing research. While the recent surge of quantitative research on coups (and to a much more limited extent, mutinies) has led to crucial new insights and findings, some of the causal processes at work are difficult to capture and analyse through quantitative methods. Understanding the often complex set of perceptions and interactions between military members and the political elite requires in-depth analysis of timing and sequence, and close attention to the narratives of the actors involved. Such close analysis can complement the set of findings that have been derived from quantitative research, identifying and testing causal mechanisms that underpin theoretical arguments already made in the literature. However, it also poses challenges in terms of data access, as it involves gaining the trust and confidence of military members and senior political elites who are often reluctant to talk openly about sensitive political events. Similarly, in the
case of the decline of military coups, there is the extra challenge of engaging in process tracing to explain a non-event, namely the absence of a coup that might otherwise have happened. Process tracing for such ‘negative cases’ is challenging, and requires a clear set of theoretical priors and rigorous criteria for identifying relevant forms of evidence.\textsuperscript{101}

Yet with the right research design, it is possible to examine the causal mechanisms that link large scale international change to domestic-level civil-military interactions. Further research on this topic should focus on seeking to unpack the causal processes behind the shifting trends in military disloyalty that are revealed in the long-term trends.

\textsuperscript{101} For an excellent example of process tracing with negative cases, see Nina Tannenwald, \textit{The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945}, vol. 87 (Cambridge University Press, 2007); On negative cases, see James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research,” \textit{American Political Science Review} 98, no. 4 (2004): 653–669.