Introduction

It has repeatedly been suggested that the ransom agreement between Rome and the Gauls reported by Livy in his account of the Gallic attack on Rome in (traditionally) 390 BC proves that Rome was not taken in its entirety (5.48.7-8).1 Instead, the ransom – widely assumed to be the authentic stuff of history – is understood to have been agreed between the men that held out on the Capitol Hill and the besieging Gauls, in order to lift the Gallic siege.2 Livy states that the army, worn out by hunger, ‘declared that they must either surrender or ransom themselves, on whatever conditions they could make’, since the Gauls clearly indicated that ‘no great price would be required to induce them to raise the siege’ (vel dedi vel redimi se quacunque pactione possent insit, iactantibus non obscurae Gallis baud magna mercede se addeci posse ut obсидionem relinquant, 5.48.7). Quintus Sulpicius for the Romans, and Brennus for the Gauls, agreed a thousand pounds of gold as the price (et mille pondo auri pretium populi, 5.48.8). But in 1957, McGann asked rhetorically ‘if the Gauls were in control of every part of the city, who paid them the ransom?’3 He concluded that ‘if any Romans continued to live in the occupied city, they would have been in no position to offer gold in return for evacuation since all their wealth would already have been taken from them.’4 Following this line of reasoning, the mention of the ransom is seen as evidence that the Gauls could not have taken the Capitol Hill. The idea is so entrenched that Varro’s testimony of the Gallic take-over of Rome in de vita populi Romani iit5 has been challenged (and emended) because of his mention, in de vita i, of a juicy ransom payment to the Gauls,6 resulting, in Skutsch’s words, in an ‘apparent contradiction’.7 As Horsfall comments: ‘clearly, if the Capitol was seized (fr. 61 [...]), then the circumstances in which a ransom was paid, let alone recovered (fr. 62) are not easy to envisage’.8 The ransom, then, also mentioned in other authors,9 is taken to fit (only) into a story-line in which Rome was not completely captured.

* For comments and discussion I owe thanks to James Clackson, Michael Crawford, Ben Gray, and Jim Roy. Texts of classical authors have been taken from the Loeb Classical Library; the translations have been adapted from those given there.

1 The ‘traditional’ date may be three to four years adrift from what is more likely to have been the year in which Rome was attacked by Gallic invaders, i.e. either in 387 or 386 BC: for brief discussion, see Cornell 1995, 313–4.
2 e.g., Cornell 1995, 318; Ogilvie 1965, 536; cf. Polyb. 1.6.3. I have adopted the generic term ‘Capitoline Hill’ for Capitolium atque arx in this article, including with regard to 5.47.1 where Livy identifies the target of the Gallic attack as arx Romae Capitoliumque (in contrast to his use of ‘arc’ elsewhere, e.g. at 5.43.1). For discussion of term(s) and locations, see Oakley 1997, 490 (ch. 6.11.4, with further references); Richardson 1992, 40 (“Arc’) and 68-70 (“Capitolius Mons’); Plutarch and Ashby 1965, 54-5 (“Arc”) and 95-8 (“Capitolius Mons’); for a full list of mentions in the Latin literary sources see Kardos 2000, 300-388; and for succinct topographical discussion, see Steinby ed. 1993, vol. 1, 127-9 and 226-54.
3 McGann 1957, 142 (note 4).
4 Non. p. 800L = fr. 61 Rip.: ut noster exercitus ita sit fugatus ut Galli Romae Capitoli sint potitii neque inde ante sex menses cesserint; Romae nisi Capitoli (Popma) / Romae praeter Capitolium (Riposati).
5 Non. p. 338L = fr. 62 Rip.: auri pondo duo milia accepserunt, exaedibus sacris et matronarum ornamentos; a quibus postea id aurum et torques aureae multae relatae Romam et consecratae.
6 Skutsch 1978, 93.
7 Horsfall 1981-2, 300 (who ‘solves’ the problem by (rightly) denying the need for Varronian consistency and putting emphasis on Varro’s ‘practice of setting down numerous versions of a story’).
8 cf. Poly. 1.6.2-3 and 2.18.2-3, twice noting that the Capitoline Hill was not taken, without mention of a ransom payment; but note, e.g., Ogilvie 1965, 736: ‘if the ransom is assumed but not stated’; similarly already Walbank 1957-1979, I, ad loc. (p. 185), who speaks of ‘the ransom, which was probably paid’ (see also p. 48 (1.6.3)). Diod. Sic. 14.116.7 mentions the same amount as Livy for the ransom (but embedded in a different narratological rationale); and Varro double the amount (see note 5 above). For an example of a later mention of the ransom, see Suet. Tib. 3.2 (providing yet another version as to how the ransom was recovered).
The question of the scale of the Gallic attack on Rome has attracted much discussion. Scholars also remain divided on whether there once existed a version of the attack that narrated the Gauls’ complete take-over of the city, including the Capitoline Hill and its temples. Whatever the scale of the attack, it is the aim of this contribution to show that the ransom agreement cannot be used against the idea that Rome was taken in its entirety: ransom agreements are well documented in our evidence as an option available to a city, people or individuals taken by military force; the Romano-Gallic ransom agreement might, therefore, potentially stem from a version of the story that actually saw Rome captured in its entirety – whatever the historical reality. To argue this point, I begin by contextualising ransom on other known occasions, from the mid-republican to the late republican period, before looking more closely at Livy’s narrative of the Gallic attack of Rome and the ransom payment: that narrative, I contend, fits perfectly with the idea that Rome was taken (in its entirety), and that the ransom was solicited not in Rome but outside of the city. I show subsequently how Livy’s later narrative in Book 6 of the AV/C provides implicit confirmation of this view, corroborating the notion that Livy chose to foreground a version of the story that was more acceptable for his Roman audience than the (story of a complete) Gallic take-over would have been; at the same time, Livy’s narrative leaves enough of a trace of that other, embarrassing and humiliating story, in which the city desired to rule the world was sacked ... by the Gauls. As Williams has stated rightly, ‘(i)t is apparent from the extant versions [of the Gallic Sack of Rome] that the tradition of the sack was constantly remade, and at any one time circulated in a number of different versions’: which of the ‘sack narratives’ drawn on by Livy in quite different ways is closer to the historical truth is not answerable from the texts focussed on here. But, as this article shows, that Livy knew that other, less charming version for Rome should no longer be questioned because of the mention of a ransom.

Ransom contexts

First, it is of course standardly reported that captives taken in battle might subsequently be sold into slavery. Varro lists this form of enslavement as one of six ways to acquire legal ownership over another human being through purchase – ‘if he has bought him at an auction of war booty sub corona’. Later Romans conceptualised enslavement after battle as saving the individuals concerned from death: the jurist Florentinus writes that ‘slaves are so called because commanders generally sell the people they capture and thereby save them instead of killing them’. To avoid such a situation, a ransom agreement might be struck. This could include the exchange of captives between the involved parties, as Livy mentions for the year 217 BC, when Roman and Carthaginian forces agreed to exchange prisoners one-for-one, and that a money ransom of two and a half pounds of silver was to be paid for each captive over and above the one-for-one exchange (in this event paid for by a private individual, the then dictator Q. Fabius Maximus, and

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10 Skutsch (1953, 1968, 138-42, and 1978) has produced strong arguments in favour of the existence of such an alternative version (listing all the relevant texts), to be read with Skutsch 1985, 408; see also Horsfall 1981-2; against, Cornell 1986, 247-8 and 1995, 317. The existence of such an alternative version need not imply the burning of the Capitoline Hill (with its temples), as suggested by Lucan in his Pharsalia (5.27-8), or indeed the destruction of Rome’s infrastructure, elements that are often adduced against the existence of an alternative version and history because of their absence from the archaeological record: typical is Cornell 1995, 317-8; also Ogilvie 1965, 720. Note in contrast that after the Roman sack of Veii, the city remained in such good shape that it could feature as a possible ‘new’ Rome not much long after.

11 Williams 2001, 142.

12 Varro, Rust. 2.10.4: ... aut si e praeda sub corona emit. Discussion of this and other evidence for this form of enslavement is in Welwei 2000.

13 Dig. 1.5.4.2: Serui ex eo appellati sunt, quod imperatores captiuos uendere ac per hoc seruare nec occidere solent.
financed through sale of one of his rural estates).14 In a situation similar in some respects to the one typically assumed for Rome during the Gallic attack, the Romans accepted ransom from the inhabitants of Palermo, in 259 BC, after they had taken the outer city and massacred a large number of people. Diodorus Siculus writes that ‘the rest fled to the old city from where they sent ambassadors to the [Roman] consuls to ask them to spare their lives’: it was agreed that those who could give two minae would be liberated, and the Romans then took control of the (entire) city; Diodorus concludes the episode with information on the number of people thus freed (14,000 individuals), and the number of those for whom there was no ransom paid and who were sold instead with the rest of the booty (13,000 individuals).15 The ransom, then, whilst not technically a purchase, is portrayed as an alternative form of payment to that taken in a sale at market for each ‘body’.16 But ransom agreements also occur in situations in which a whole people had been taken.

A good example of a situation involving a ransom after (complete) capture is provided in Polybius’ account of the Roman capture of Aegina in 210 BC under Sulpicius Galba. Polybius states the following:17

When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the inhabitants as did not escape having been assembled on the ships begged the proconsul to allow them to send envoys to cities of kindred race to obtain ransom (ἀφ' τις συγγενῶν πόλεως προὶ ἱπτόμενοι). Publius at first refused very sharply, saying that they ought to have sent envoys to their betters to come and save them while they were still their own masters and not now they were slaves (μὴ τῶν δούλων γεγομένων). That they who a short time ago had not even deigned to reply to his envoys, now when they had fallen into his power should request leave to send envoys to their kinsmen was most foolish. So at the time he dismissed those who had approached him with these words, but next day summoning all the prisoners of war, he said he was under no obligation to be lenient to the Aeginetans, but for the sake of the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send envoys to get ransom, as such was their custom (πρὸ τοῦ δοῖλου μὲν, ἐκαίνες πρὸ ἀδύνατος βιοῦ ἑαυτῶν).

It is irrelevant for present purposes that Polybius later gives away that the people of Aegina were after all sold into slavery, and Aegina given over to the Acetians.18 The passage exemplifies clearly a situation in which capture (here of an island city-state) had been complete without this preventing the possibility of securing a ransom agreement: Aegina hoped (and expected) to solicit assistance from other powers (τῶν συγγενῶν πόλεως). Ransom and complete capture can, then, go hand in hand. Welwei calls Sulpicius’ explanation for allowing the Aeginetans to collect ransom – i.e. Greek custom – ‘ein perfider Trick’: Sulpicius is seen to be keen to boost his war coffers, implying that the permission to collect ransom was motivated by economic considerations, not adherence to Greek cultural norms.19 Whatever Sulpicius’ motives, Horsmann (in his revised edition of Volkmann’s study of mass enslavements after military encounters) comes to the general conclusion that redemption was possible for a (completely) captured town if economic motives were the driving force behind its capture: ‘Da es dem Eroberer meist allein um den Beutewert der Gefangenen ging, ist die redemptio ab hostibus für die Bevölkerung einer eroberten Stadt [...] keineswegs ganz unmöglich gewesen’.20 Horsmann points also to the wider contexts, such as (in the Greek world) proxeny, and asylum, in which city-states and peoples related to one another, encouraging

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14 Livy 22.23.6-8.
15 Diod. Sic. 23.18.
16 Ransom was, however, not always required for the liberation of captives, nor did ransom agreements automatically follow surrender, nor did these automatically protect captives from enslavement: in 15.4.1, Polybius reports that in the Second Punic War, Publius Scipio did not agree to terms for those who freely surrendered to him, but enslaved them instead; and in 10.17.6-15, Polybius narrates how after the capture of Carthago Nova, in 210 BC, the Romans let the citizens go free without ransom, but enslaved the craftsmen to employ them in their own service, with a promise of subsequent freedom. Discussion (and other examples) is in Volkmann 1990, 105-10.
17 Polyb. 9.42.5-8.
18 Polyb. 11.5.6-8 and 22.8.9-12.
19 Welwei 2000, 120.
20 Volkmann 1990, 123 and 158 (regarding p. 81).
mutual redemption in times of crisis. Ransom agreements can of course also be influenced by other motives, including strategic or political ones – as in the case of the Illyrian capture of Phoenice, in 230 BC. Notwithstanding the complex developments as recounted by Polybius, the Illyrians, having taken the city and defeated a relief army of (other) Epirotes, were incidentally recalled to Illyria by Queen Teuta because of trouble at home; they consequently agreed to a truce just before giving battle to a combined force of Epirotes, Aetolians and members of the Achaean league, the latter two having been called to help by the Epirotes. By the mutually agreed terms, the Illyrians were to release the city and its free population on payment of a ransom, taking also their booty consisting of slaves and goods of all kinds with them: ‘after plundering Epirus, [the Illyrians] made a truce with the Epirotes, by the terms of which they gave up to them the city and its free population on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats’. The ransom followed the plundering, as Polybius states; and the captured city benefitted from the support of its kinsmen and allies, as Aegina had also hoped. The case of Thalamai, in the territory of Elis, demonstrates the same underlying approach to ransom just a decade later: having been captured by Philip V, King of Macedon, in 219 BC, the captives were taken to Olympia. For reasons that are of no interest to the present inquiry, Philip agreed at Olympia to let the captives go free without a (monetary) ransom if Elis went over to his side; if they joined him he would return all captured men and animals without ransom (χωρίς λόπτην). Once more, complete capture did not stand in the way of a ransom agreement in principle.

Livy, too, was fully aware of the practice of ransom after a city had been captured: in his account of what we call the Second Macedonian War, for instance, Livy discusses a number of attacks on cities, including the capture and ransoming of their inhabitants. Thus, Livy recounts that the people of Eretria fled to the arx of their city when Lucius Quinctius took the town, before they eventually surrendered: Livy comments immediately thereafter on the monetary value of the town’s holdings, including works of art, statues, inscriptions, and so forth (32.16.10-11). Livy continues his account with the capture of Carystus: having fled to the arx upon the arrival of the enemy army, the people of Carystus sent ambassadors to seek protection from the Romans; they were granted life and liberty (vita ac libertas) upon the agreement of a ransom payment of 300 nummi for each individual. Having paid the ransom, they were transported to Boeotia unarmed (32.17.1-3). And the Dymaei, who had been captured by a Roman army, are recounted by Livy as having been freed on the orders of Philip of Macedon through ransom payments wherever they were enslaved (cum redimi eos, ubicumque servirent, 32.22.10).

The Polybian account of the sack of Aegina in 210 BC, discussed above, implies of course that the practice of asking for ransom after capture was specifically Greek (παρ᾽ αυτοῖς θῶς ἵπτιν). Polybius, like anyone else, would have known that Rome acted quite differently when capturing neighbouring Etruscan, Latin and later, Italic cities. Symptomatic is Livy’s bland description of Camillus’ action after his heroic

21 Polyb. 2.5-6. Polybius implies, at 2.6.4, that the Illyrians also feared a disadvantageous battlefield.
22 Polyb. 2.6.5-6: … οὕτω λεπτισσόμενες τὴν Ἡπείρου ἀναχαι ἐπικαταλέσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἡπείρους, ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν ἑλεύθερα σύμματο καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπολοτότσσαντες αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ δούλακα καὶ τὴν λαχανὶ σχολὴν ἀναλαβόντες εἰς τούς λέμβους … (Volkmann 1990, 129), wrongly understood the ransom to consist of the mentioned booty (i.e. the slaves and various goods), rather than of a separate payment. The actions of C. Flavius Fimbria, in the mid 80s BC, in Thrace, Nicomedia, and Phrygia, allowing his soldiers to plunder and enslave at will and with the utmost brutality, and compelling the citizens of Cyzicus to ransom themselves by surrendering their property to him (λόπτα τῆς πολιορκίας), are not, as far as it is possible to tell, identical with the type of situation here discussed, despite Diodorus’ use of the term λόπτα; the case of Cyzicus is, for all its misery, not that of a sack, capture or siege, whilst that of Ilium, clearly labelled as taken by siege by Strabo (ἐν πολιορκίας), does not offer information on the events after Fimbria’s capture of the city: Diod. Sic. 38.8; Strabo 13.1.27 (C 594); brief discussion in Volkmann 1990, 65-6.
23 Polyb. 4.75.
24 Polyb. 4.84.3-4.
25 But note that Leviathan 2013, 12-21 elaborates the wider cultural context of siege warfare, and suggests, at 19-20, that there existed a shared understanding amongst different ancient peoples (including Greeks and Hebrews) of the

Please cite this article from the published version in:
Mnemosyne 71.3 (2018), 460-484
Roman approach to the capture of a city, 'made in Italy'.26 The matter found unusual comment: Dionysius of Halicarnassus states that Pyrrhus, who arrived on the Italian scene upon the invitation of Taranto in 281 BC to assist against the Roman forces under L. Aemilius Barbula, wrote to the Roman consul P. Valerius Laevinus to say that he would prevent the Romans from plundering Greek cities, demolishing allied towns, and selling free people into slavery.27 The historical context of expanding Roman control on the Italian peninsula from the fourth century onwards, including the foundation of colonies and land settlements, involves Roman behaviour different from the custom of the Greeks. But this is not to say that the Romans took the same approach when it came to Rome. Naturally, we do not know what the corresponding Roman practice could look like, given that, according to the dominant historical record, Rome the city was never taken (in the republican period). Our ignorance is shared, however, by Livy: he too would have had no better knowledge of Roman practice around 400 BC than what he ultimately passed on in the AV/C.28 Livy's narrative was of course also shaped by contemporary models. To gain a firmer foothold, then, on the meaning of ransom in Livy's story of the Gallic attack on Rome, it is important to take account also of later examples that would have been known to Livy and his audience, and that would have influenced their views on the Roman capacity to try and raise a ransom in case of capture.

First, then, there is P. Clodius Pulcher, who was taken captive after the defeat of a Roman naval force in Cilicia by a fleet of pirates in 67 BC. Clodius immediately appealed to King Ptolemy of nearby Cyprus to pay the ransom money (who offered an insufficient sum of 2 talents, i.e. 48,000 sesterces). Verboven writes that 'the very fact that Ptolemy offered such a ridiculously low sum as contribution suggests that no personal connection existed between them'29 Clodius' request must have been framed by broader practices. Appian's brief mention of the episode in the second book of his Civil Wars also implies widespread familiarity with the practice he seems 'the avaricious Ptolemy' for his pathetic contribution to the ransom, suggesting an expectation of support across Graeco-Roman networks.30 Dio's Roman History, too, recounts Clodius' anger over the lack of due support on the part of Ptolemy for the ransom payment;31 in the end, Clodius gets freed without a ransom payment. Personal offence and the particular outcome of the matter aside, the Roman general P. Clodius Pulcher acts as an individual and representative of the Roman state in the same structural manner as (for instance) Aegina the Greek city-state in the example cited above: he seeks help from a nearby power to solicit the ransom.

This pattern is also evident in the ransom solicited by Caesar for his release from being held captive by pirates near the island of Pharmacusa, possibly in 77 BC, possibly on his way to Rhodes. Having himself arrogantly suggested 50 in place of the requested 20 talents for his liberation from the Cilicians, Caesar 'sent various followers to various cities to procure the money'; he himself was kept in captivity with just three others, including according to Suetonius one physician and two personal

26 See Volkmann 1990, 36-45 (for Italy); and Harris 1979, 58-60 for brief discussion of Livy’s evidence for the number of war captives in the so-called Third Samnite War.
27 Dion. Hal. 19.9.4.
28 Livy of course did not simply reproduce his sources; see Luce 1971 for an analysis of Livy’s structuring of the passages of interest here.
29 Verboven 2002, 84. The practice of providing ransom for others on the basis of one own’s wealth is also mentioned in Cic. Off. 2.16.56.
30 App. B Civ. 2.23.
31 Cass. Dio 38.30.5.
attendants – stating also explicitly that his other travelling companions and slaves were released for the purpose of soliciting the ransom.\textsuperscript{32} Plutarch reports that the ransom was provided by the city-state of Miletus; Velleius Paterculus suggests that more than one city assisted with the ransom, sourced from their public coffers:\textsuperscript{33} either way, as in the case of P. Clodius Pulcher, Caesar evidently sought support from nearby powers, and clearly not in vain. It is notable in this context that both Velleius Paterculus and Valerius Maximus stress that Caesar was then merely a private citizen, with particular regard, in the case of Velleius Paterculus, to the actions taken by Caesar. Both episodes taken together demonstrate, then, that the Romans knew and took advantage of the practice of soliciting ransom from nearby (and assumedly friendly) powers in case of capture, whether acting as private individuals (as Caesar did) or on behalf of the (Roman) state (as in the case of P. Clodius Pulcher): however thin the evidence, going by what we have available, Roman practice away from Rome was not noticeably different from the custom of the Greeks in the period in which Rome’s history was (re)written. But what about (early) Rome?

**Contextualising the Gallic ransom**

In his *Roman Antiquities*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus attributed to Romulus the institution of rules for patronage. Following a brief description of the duties of patrons, Dionysius lists the duties of clients: besides assisting their patrons in providing dowries for their daughters, discharging their patrons’ losses in private suits and pecuniary fines by the state, and sharing with their patrons the costs incurred in their political offices and through public expenditures, Dionysius also states that they ‘pay their ransom to the enemy if any of them or of their children were taken prisoners’ (καὶ εἰς τῶν ἢ παιδῶν ἢ παιδῶν ἀγγαλότων γένοτο).\textsuperscript{34} Dionysius of Halicarnassus, then, was able to project into the mythological past of Rome a rule guiding the soliciting of a ransom payment amongst private citizens. Moreover, he continued the ‘Roman myth of patronage’\textsuperscript{35} by plainly stating that this relationship between clients and patrons continued for many generations; more still, he added that it was effective ‘not only in the city itself’, but that it extended to ‘every colony of Rome and every city that had joined in alliance and friendship with her and also every city conquered in war’.\textsuperscript{36} As Drummond has argued, we need not assume a legal basis for Dionysius’ comments:\textsuperscript{37} for the most part, Dionysius himself refers to the ‘rules of patronage’ as custom (τῆν), not law.\textsuperscript{38} Varro and Valerius Antias are the more likely candidates for having provided Dionysius with the source material for his embellished recreation of patronage in Romulean Rome\textsuperscript{39} – sources also available to Livy. Drummond contended that ‘Livy is bewilderingly haphazard in his references to an institution in which he is clearly little interested’;\textsuperscript{40} yet Livy makes both direct and indirect reference to the institution precisely in his narrative of the Gallic attack on Rome: at 5.32.8, Camillus rejects his clients’ offer to pay the fine that would prevent his exile; and at 5.47.8, the soldiers’ food offerings to Marcus Manlius Capitolinus craftily assimilate the men to clients, and Manlius to a patron.\textsuperscript{41} Livy thus played with the same kind of information for the ‘rules of patronage’ in early Rome as Dionysius – however historically incorrect from a modern perspective. Importantly, the roles of


\textsuperscript{33} Plut. *Vit. Cae*. 2.3; Vell. *Pat.* 2.42.2. If the account of Valerius Maximus were the only one to have survived, all that would be known is that Caesar managed to ransom himself: Val. Max. 6.9.15.

\textsuperscript{34} Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.10.2.

\textsuperscript{35} Verboven 2002, 84.

\textsuperscript{36} Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.11.1.

\textsuperscript{37} Drummond 1990, 90-1.

\textsuperscript{38} Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.10.1.

\textsuperscript{39} Balsdon 1971, 27.

\textsuperscript{40} Drummond 1990, 94.

\textsuperscript{41} Discussed in Ogilvie 1965, 735, and Jaeger 1997, 72-3.
clients and patrons in this ‘myth making’ were filled by the plebeians (= clients) and the patricians (= patrons) respectively. Livy moreover explicitly states that Camillus’ clients formed a large part of the plebeians: ... quae magna pars plebis erat ... (5.32.8). It is time to return with all this in mind to the story of the Gallic attack on Rome.

It is of course the case that the ransom money in the story of the Gallic attack on Rome belongs (as it has survived in large part) to the narrative strand concerned with the successful defence of the Capitoline Hill. But even if it were transposed from there to a narrative concerned with the fall of Rome – hill and all included, it would not be out of place. Whilst unlike in Greece there is no evidence that (e.g.) the Latin city-states supported each other with ransom in case of capture, the narrative strand of the Gallic attack of Rome ends, in its current form, with – as Livy visualises it – a small number of (Roman) men, women and children on the Capitoline Hill (5.39.4; 5.39.9), many others slaughtered in battle (at the Allia and from there at the Tiber: 5.38.8), the elder senators killed (5.41.9-10), and a majority at various stages of the happenings having dispersed into the neighbouring cities and countryside (e.g. to Veii: 5.38.5; 5.39.4; 5.39.6). As Livy put it wryly: ‘the chief part got safely to Veii ...’ (maxima tamen pars incolenis Veiōs perfugit, 5.38.9), ‘some scattered through the countryside, and others made for the towns nearby’ (pars per agros dilapidi, pars urbes petunt finitimis, 5.40.6). We are moreover explicitly told that most able-bodied men were gathering in Veii (and some also at Ardea) at the time – where they would in due course be trained and prepared for battle with the Gallic invaders under Camillus’ leadership (5.46.4; 5.46.10-11; 5.48.5). In short, a large number of Romans were outside Rome when the Gauls arrived; and their temporary migration did not cut them off the resources required for instance to train the legions.

Looking in greater detail at the resources available to those outside Rome, Livy tells us that the flamen Quirinalis and the Vestal Virgins took care of the objects of public cult (5.39.11): they brought what they could to Etruscan Caere, having buried the rest in dolia in the shrine adjacent to the flamen’s house (5.40.7-10). Livy emphasises that in transporting what they could to Caere, flamen and Vestals ignored care for their own possessions – contrasting sharply with the actions of others: Lucius Albinius, who helped to carry the sacred objects in his wagon to Caere, was, evidently, busy removing his own private belongings from Rome, together with his family (5.40.7-10); one wonders what else was taken away by the wagon-load by those who left en masse at the same time as Lucius Albinius.42 Indeed, even the grain harvest from the fields had been hurriedly, yet with oversight and intent, brought to Veii (5.43.4). It is therefore not surprising that, as Cornell has put it,43

(i) it has been reasonably suggested that the flight of the soldiers to Veii was not a spontaneous act arising in the panic of the moment, but part of a pre-arranged plan; in other words the Romans, realising that their cause was hopeless and that they would be unable to save the city, evacuated it in advance. This would be consistent with the story of Albinius and the Vestals.

This view is corroborated by Livy’s mention, at 5.45.4-8, that the (Roman) soldiers who had migrated to Veii attacked under the command of Q. Caecilius groups of Etruscans in two night-time raids, following the rout of a group of Gauls by an army led by Camillus from Ardea (5.45.1-3). The soldiers who attacked the Etruscans had been angered by the latter’s hunt for booty in Rome’s hinterland, and the fact that they brought that booty to their camp in plain sight, situated outside Veii (Viderant eos milites Romani vagantes per agros et congregatos agmine prædám praē se agentis, et castra cernabant baud præclarum Veiōs posita, 5.45.5). Livy states in fact openly that irrespective of not (yet) having Camillus as their general (again), the soldiers were in all respects organised and operating as a Roman army should (5.45.7-8). It is not surprising, then, that we are

42 This is not to underestimate the practical limitations and logistical difficulties in removing one’s assets in times of persecution or attack, but merely to emphasise the Livian acknowledgement of the (plebeians’) removal of resources from Rome.

43 Cornell 1995, 317, referring to Alföldi 1965, 356 (who emphasises the concerted action and oversight that the withdrawal of the soldiers to Veii must have resulted from).
also informed that these same Roman soldiers took captives after their raids on the Etruscans (5.45.8), i.e. that they operated according to the standard terms of warfare.\footnote{General discussion of terms and practices is in Welwei 2000, passim.} The story-line clearly implies that their booty augmented the resources available to them in Veii.

Concerning the resources available to those who remained in Rome, the depiction of their oppression by hunger brings home with force the lack of food in town: Livy describes graphically how the ongoing undernourishment turned the soldiers’ guard duties into an increasingly impossible task as ‘their bodies grew almost too weak to sustain their armour when they went out on picket duty’ (... cum stationes procederent prope obruentibus infirmum corpus armis, 5.48.7).\footnote{The scarcity of food is also brought out in the story of the soldiers’ food offerings to Marcus Manlius Capitolinus after the defence of the Capitoline Hill (5.47.8), and in the story of the soldiers throwing bread over the walls into the outposts of the Gauls (5.48.4).} As regards the non-consumable resources, Livy implies that the houses of the elder senators who remained in the city still had possessions in them that the Gauls would later take as booty, as did the houses of those in arms up on the Capitoline Hill (5.41.10; 5.42.4; but cf. 5.41.5-6). And if Diodorus Siculus is to be believed, those of the magistrates who remained managed to persuade some of the others to remain too, not flee, and to bring to the Capitoline Hill grain, food, and whatever costly goods, including silver and gold, they could.\footnote{Diod. Sic. 14.115.4.} But these were, as Livy has made sufficiently clear, and as Diodorus also implies, a minority of Rome’s population. All told, and fixed assets (and elder senators and national heroes) aside, the population of Rome and its material resources were not in Rome at the time of the attack: the eternal city was, for all practical purposes, a ghost town at that point in time. Livy consequently comments that the Gauls did not need to take the city by assault (... nec tum impetu aut vi capiebant urbem, 5.41.4): once in control, and ‘having vainly for some days waged war against only the buildings of Rome’, the Gauls realised that ‘there was nothing left amidst the smouldering ruins of the captured city but armed enemies’ (Galli quoque per aliquot dies in tecta modo urbis nequiquam bello gesto cum inter incendia ac ruinas captae urbis nullius superesse praeter armatos hostes viderent ..., 5.43.1).

When looking back at the attack, in a list of actions taken and proposals made by Camillus after the departure of the Gauls, Livy later mentions ‘the gold that had been rescued from the Gauls and that had been gathered from other temples into the cella of the temple of Jupiter in the midst of the alarm (Aurum quod Gallis erumpit et quod ex aliis templis intrationem in Iovis cellam conlatum, 5.50.6). Almost predictably, these hidden temple treasures are not touched for the ransom at all in Livy’s narrative; instead, the (previously unmentioned) gold held by the state, together with additions from the 

matronae – copying their behaviour in collecting the tithe to help fulfill Camillus’ vow to Apollo after the capture of Veii (5.25.8) – is identified as making up the ransom (5.50.7):

Iam ante in eo religio civitatis apparet, quod cum in publico deesset aurum, ex quo summa pactae mercedis Gallis confiscerat, a matronis conlatum acceperant ut sacro auro abstineretur.

(Even before this the scrupulousness of the citizens had been apparent in this connexion, for when the gold in the public coffers was insufficient to make up to the Gauls the stipulated sum, they had accepted what the matrons got together, that they might not touch the sacred gold.)

In Varro’s version of the same narrative element, the ransom payment is made up instead by exactly the temple treasures, to which is added, once more, the jewellery of the 

matronae ex aedibus sacris et matronarum ornamentis.\footnote{Non. p. 338L = fr. 62 Rip. (see note 5 above for the full quotation.)} In the light of Livy’s concern with the proper place of religion at Rome, so forcefully brought to the fore not least in Camillus’ speeches, and focussed on Rome’s location, its topography and materiality, it is easy to see that the temple treasures needed narratological ‘protection’ in the Livian
narrative in order to prevent Rome’s ‘religious buy-out’. The emphasis on the city’s sacrosanctity is likely to have motivated the explicit reference to the collection of the temple treasures into the cella of the temple of Jupiter – implying that Rome’s religious core remained in Rome. (But note the glitch with the mention of the flight of Vestals and flamen to Caere, as Sordi has succinctly pointed out: ‘L’invio a Cere dei sacerdoti e delle Vestali [...] sembra contraddire, però, l’idea che il Campidoglio sia stato difeso in quanto sedes deorum.’) By contrast, Livy does not say where the state treasure was kept. The importance for Rome’s existence of keeping the temple treasures in Rome and unspoilt by the Gauls is re-emphasised when at 5.50.6 the gold that was part of the ransom is returned, and the concealment of the temple treasures in the cella of the temple of Jupiter repeated (where from now on all the gold was to be kept after having been deemed sacred: *Aurum quod Gallis ereptum erat quodque ex aliis templis inter trepidationem in Iovis cellam conlatum, cum quo referri oportere confusa memoria esset, sacrum omne iudicatum et sub Iovis cella poni iussum*). In his analysis of contradictions and doublets in Books 4 and 5 of the *AVC*, Ogilvie showed that the two stories of the donations by the *matronae* (5.25.8 and 5.50.7) stem from two different sources (and, hence, stories) used by Livy. The fact that Livy makes use of the same narrative element (i.e. the *matronae’s* donations) on two (separate) occasions in his own narrative does not enhance the narrated events’ historicity: the *matronae*-doublet is a painful reminder that there is little reason to junk that Livy, or his source(s), knew how the Gallic attack on Rome ended, and how the ransom, if authentic, was secured. But this does not mean that we cannot get any further with the Livian narrative: there is, in fact, a quite different, productive way of looking at the ransom arrangements; one that accommodates much of the narrated happenings and what else we know about situations in which a ransom is agreed, as surveyed above. It is time to return once more to Veii.

If we then assume that Rome was taken, hill and all, i.e. that the Gauls had taken possession of precious objects and valuables, as well as the remaining men, should we then believe that the soliciting from the other Romans of ransom for their fellow citizens and the city’s liberation, and potentially also from neighbouring Latin (e.g. Ardea) and Etruscan (e.g. Caere) cities, was not a very real possibility – a possibility denied implicitly and explicitly by McGann and others? Note that the Etruscan city of Clusium sent for help to Rome when under attack by the Senones (5.33.1-6) a year or so before Rome itself was attacked by the same Gallic tribe – even if we are not told what their request consisted of, apart from the fact that it was made despite the lack of formal alliance or friendship between Clusium and Rome (5.35.4-6). As seen above, it was perfectly possible in the late Republic and the early Empire for a Roman to solicit ransom from nearby powers after (complete) capture, as Clodius and Caesar did; but also to entertain the notion of clients in early Rome ransoming their patrons in case of capture. To assume, on the contrary, that the invading Gauls and any beleaguered and captured Romans in Rome would not consider at least those Romans located outside Rome a potential source of ransom makes nonsense of a narrative element that fits perfectly well with the idea of a ransom payment after the Gauls had indeed taken the (whole) city. There is widespread agreement amongst scholars that ‘(t)he best explanation of all the evidence is that the Gauls were interested in movable booty [...] They ransacked the place, and made off with whatever they could carry. The story that they had to be bought off with gold is consistent with

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48 The place of religion in Livy is discussed and demonstrated in great detail in Levene 1993 and Davies 2004, 21-142, with different approaches to (and outlooks on) Livy’s religious position. See also Liebeschütz 1967.

49 Sordi 1984, 85. The lasting fascination of the Capitoline Hill – il Campidoglio – is beautifully brought to the fore in Parisi Presicce and Danti 2016; and the hill’s religious (and civic) function forcefully restated, e.g. at 9: ‘Il Campidoglio, cuore religioso e civile di Roma antica, è sempre stato considerato carico di significati simbolici, talmente emblematici da essere adoperato come denominazione del luogo in cui in qualsiasi parte del mondo si insediava un nuovo governo democratico’.

50 Ogilvie 1958, 43-4, with earlier bibliography on the *Doublottenjagd*. 
this interpretation’. But this is exactly the kind of situation described by Polybius in the case of Phoenice, discussed above. And with (let us assume then again) the Capitoline Hill taken and all treasures already in the hands of the Gauls (as far as they knew!), what best next before the homeward journey than an agreed ransom that drew also on the Romans’ kin and friends located outside Rome – clients (i.e. plebeians) explicitly included (however much in their infancy the so-called ‘rules of patronage’ at the time). And the resources – including no doubt the most valuable belongings of that part of Rome’s citizen body that had left the town, i.e. the majority – were, as seen, available outside Rome.

The Gallic ransom again ... in Book 6

The idea that the citizenry of Rome, albeit outside Rome, could have been responsible for collecting money for the ransom is not entirely new. And this article, therefore, cannot claim originality for the argument here pursued. That claim must fall to Livy or his source(s). For in Book 6 of the AV 6, Livy returns one more time to the question of the ransom, this time in a reported speech by Camillus’ counter-foil Marcus Manlius Capitolinus. In that speech, Manlius addresses his favourite topic, i.e. the plight of the plebeians. And in this context, the patricians are accused of concealing the ‘Gallic gold’, and of abusing public funds. One particular bone of contention there discussed is the plebeians’ unhappiness over the handling of their contribution to the ransom during the Gallic attack (6.14.12).

But this same gold, after being captured from the enemy, had become the spoil of a few. When gold had had to be collected to ransom the state from the Gauls, there had been a levy of tributum; but this same gold, after being captured from the enemy, had become the spoil of a few.

The passage has found surprisingly little comment in the modern scholarly debate on the Romans’ capacity to collect ransom for the Gauls. In part, this may be motivated by the fact that the various passages in Livy’s narrative that deal with the ransom payment do not coincide at first sight. Thus, as seen above, the list of actions taken during the crisis included in passing mention of the Romans’ preference to save the temple treasures, and to employ instead state funds. But since the state funds were not enough, the matronae are adduced to fill the gap, at 5.50.7: no mention there of the levy of a special tax on the citizen body to make up the deficit. Ogilvie plainly notes that ‘50, 7 is certainly at variance with 6, 14, 2, where the money is said to have been collected tributo’ [in fact: 6.14.12]. There is no need, in my view, for the two versions to be harmonised. But, actually, since Livy clearly states that the public funds were not enough, the tributum asked of Rome’s citizens need not be read in contradiction to that earlier comment: it could easily be seen as the missing link, i.e. as a means to make up the difference. In similar vein, the story of the tributum can also accommodate the donation of the matronae’s jewellery: both sources of funding could be understood as adding to the state funds for the ransom. Either way, Livy does not

51 Cornell 1995, 318.
52 I elaborate the structural similarities between the Polybian story of the Illyrian attack on Phoenice and the Gallic sack of Rome in a forthcoming article: ‘Livy (and Polybius) on the Gallic Sack of Rome’.
53 The counter-positioning of Marcus Furius Camillus and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus in Livy’s narrative has been well brought out in Jaeger 1997, 57-93.
54 Characteristic is Oakley 1997, ad loc. (p. 526), who points back to 5.48.7-9, 5.49.1-2 and 5.50.6-7, but does not comment on the seeming contradiction in Livy’s descriptions of the various sources for the ransom; see also Ogilvie 1965, ‘laudatio’ (50.7; p. 741; and pp. 736-7), who does, in turn, not point forward to the passage in Book 6.
55 Ogilvie 1958, 43.
56 If the three elements are harmonised into a single narrative thread for the ransom payment that liberated Rome, the ransom would consequently be made up by a three-fold contribution, from all of Rome’s constituent (human) parts: the contributions of the state – through the public funds; the contribution of the patricians – through the wealth stored away in their wives’ jewellery; and finally that of the plebeians – through the means of tributum.
actually say, as already noted, where the state funds are located, or where the matronae are. Some women (including clearly married women) remained in the city (5.40.3-4; 5.42.4). But there is no reason to think that all patricians remained, and that only the plebeians (whose jewellery one would assume to have been less in quantity and quality) left for Veii or another city. Indeed, in his description of those leaving the city at 5.40.5, Livy says that the majority was made up of plebeians, admitting by implication that the group included also patricians (‘Alicia maxima plebis turbam...’). (Note though, as mentioned twice before, that Livy in any case has his matronae dispose of their jewellery already on the occasion of the collection of the gold required in fulfillment of Camillus’ vow to Apollo – ... omnia ornamenta sua in aerarium detulerant, leaving them, theoretically, with their natural beauty only: 5.25.8-10). But however one wants to understand the relationship between the matronae and the tributum, in the light of this massive exodus of human and material resources from Rome, should we really assume that the resources that made up the ransom were, in contrast, to be found in Rome? Or that, moreover, the public funds would have been left behind in what Cornells has termed ‘a pre-arranged plan’ (see above) for the evacuation of the city?

It is not possible given the confused, potentially multiple narrative(s) of the ransom in Livy, and in the lack of sound information in our other sources on this matter, to press the argument for the location of the public funds outside Rome beyond what common sense dictates. The matronae are also a slippery case: they could be viewed as a reference to the wives who remained in the city. But in Livy’s text, the story of the plebeians in general is clear: they left the city with all that they could carry, not unlike the flamen Quirinalis and the Vestal Virgins. When they are asked for tributum to make up the ransom, they are, in consequence, not in Rome. Even accepting, as stated, that the plebeians’ possessions cannot match those of the patricians, the Veian war booty delivered unusual riches in particular to the large(r) number of plebeians (irrespective of Camillus’ supposed mishandling of the booty: 5.23.8-11; 5.25.7-13; 5.7-9), augmented, as stated, by the spoils from their raids on groups of Etruscans in Rome’s hinterland. Besides, the story of the tributum implies also a fairly organised set-up, contrary to the impression given by Livy elsewhere of the group of plebeians that headed out of Rome ‘without leader or concerted plan’ (5.40.6): the citizenry of Rome was, to all appearances, getting itself fairly well organised in the new home, the other Rome – Veii. It is not my intention to argue, here, that the possibility of another city taking the ancestral place of Rome was more of a reality than the Livian narrative permits, which has in contrast immortalised the relocation of Rome to Veii in the speeches of Camillus as a future threat, in place of a past happening. Rather, I have tried to show that the various stories and pieces of information regarding the Romans’ actions before and during the Gallic attack fit without distortion the notion that the ransom could have been solicited outside Rome (and irrespective of whether the Etruscans or Latins played ball) – a practice that is well documented for other cities, as we have seen. What is perhaps not so easy to contextualise is the (planned) mass-migration of Rome’s population to Veii or another city. But the seemingly concerted plan for the Romans’ exodus reinforces the argument here presented, providing a logical explanation for their capacity to collect the agreed ransom price outside Rome. That Livy’s text

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57 To acknowledge the plebeians’ location outside Rome has repercussions for the view that ‘the physical limitations of the citadel produce the preconditions for Manlius’ sedition’, where ‘there is no wealth to speak of’ but ‘only the necessities and not enough of them’: Jaeger 1997, 68. In Livy’s narrative, at 6.14.12, and by contrast, it is the abuse of capital (not poverty) that motivates the plebeians’ argument.

58 The same contradictions plague the narrative of Diodorus Siculus, which has the city’s wealth located on the Capitoline Hill (14.115.3–4), but the numerous troops in Veii (14.116.2-4). The army’s location outside Rome – i.e. in Veii – is reiterated by Livy in his narrative of another great (military) threat to the Romans, the Battle of the Caudine Forks against the Samnites: 9.4.7-16. Interestingly, regarding the later event, Livy stresses the location of the Romans’ resources in Rome (9.4.14): His omnes spes opesque sunt [...]. For brief comparison of Livy’s accounts of the Gallic attack and the Roman disaster at the Caudine Forks, see Oakley 2005, 24. See also the discussion by Levithan 2013, 86-89 on Livy’s parallel staging of (the successful Roman siege of) Veii and (the Gallic sack of) Rome.
openly comments on the ransom payment from those outside Rome later on in the narrative, at 6.14.12, may not render this particular ransom narrative more likely in historical terms. But it demonstrates that later Romans knew perfectly well that the collection of ransom from outside a captured city was possible, and perhaps even typical; and that the (private) resources of the Romans were also believed by them to have been properly removed from the eternal city. And as already implied, we can but speculate as to whether they thought that there was space in their ancestors’ careful and deliberate evacuation of the city for the forgetting or foregoing of the state funds in town. But we can at least fairly certain that the story of the plebeian anger over the misuse of their contribution to the ransom payment does not make sense if these same plebeians are assumed to have remained in Rome, where the Gauls had in any case already taken what they could find: Lucius Albinius and his family, albeit diverted to Caere, exemplify the widespread plebeian reaction to the Gallic threat.

Interestingly, the plebeian contribution to the ransom, and the quarrel over its later ‘redistribution’ by (and amongst) the patricians, might expose another, otherwise subdued narrative strand, namely that the plebeians had a clear stake in the rescue of a city that was destined to rule the world (1.16.7) – whatever the contribution of the patrician national heroes, Camillus and Manlius, to Roman success: perhaps, the narrative’s substratum leaves more room than hitherto acknowledged for a more complex depiction of the relationship between the roles of big men and small men in the government of Rome. At base, however, the appearance of the tributum in a narrative thread concerned with the social division between plebeians and patricians, and its neglect in the narrative thread actually concerned with the ransom, might be mistaken as evidence for the faulty or flimsy handling of his source(s) by Livy; but it is more likely that Livy selected the soldiers’ tributum for the latter story because it strengthened the image of the seditious movement there narrated, just as it would have distorted the clear view of Rome in the earlier narrative – providing in turn a methodological role model for Tacitus in his very similar differentiated handling of the story of the city’s sack in the Histories and the Annals respectively. The ransom thus informs Livy’s portrayal of the (so-called) plebeian sedition, and the social tensions between plebeians and patricians more generally, embedded in a complex depiction of contrasts, including locational contrasts (Rome vs. Veii), and numerical contrasts (the few who remain in Rome vs. the many who leave for Veii).

Conclusion

To assume that the source of the ransom payment was located outside Rome makes better sense of the happening that we have come to call the Gallic Sack of Rome – avoiding the difficult proposition that a few hungry Romans fought off an army of beastly Gauls, thus protecting (one then needs to assume) the remaining state, temple and personal treasures from which the ransom required to lift the siege could be paid. It may also explain why, at the point at which the ransom money was to be exchanged, the other Romans (under Camillus’ leadership) were present in Rome, after a fashionable delay perfectly on time for

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59 e.g., Oakley 2015, 239: ‘little or nothing that Livy writes in [Book 5] prevents his readers from deciding that, in a time of crisis, it was preferable to be governed by one man than a college of magistrates’.
60 In Hist. 3.72.1, Tacitus prefers the version in which only the (lower) city is taken, whilst in Ann. 11.23.7, he has the Gauls take the Capitoline Hill: Skutsch 1978; see also Horsfall 1981-2, 301-2.
61 Note also Livy’s framing of events ‘in Rome’ – Romae interim (e.g. 5.46.1), as opposed to ‘in Veii’ – Veii interim (e.g. 5.47.4). See also Luce 1971, 280-2, on Livy’s ‘division by place’ as a structuring device. Starkly put, if the Gallic sack and the ransom are viewed in a patrician-versus-plebeian framework, the patricians who remained in the city emerge as responsible for its loss, and the plebeians who left the city as responsible for its liberation, following on the demonstration of the plebeians’ essential military role in the capture of Veii, thereby increasingly challenging the patricians’ political dominance. Note also that the report of the prodigy that warned Rome of the approaching Gauls was delivered by a plebeian (at 5.32.6-7): see Davies 2004, 40 for discussion of Livy’s comment that the man’s status was a reason why the prodigy was ignored.
(breaking) the deal, expected – in the line of happenings suggested here – to deliver the agreed ransom price, collected from Rome’s holdings outside Rome. For all we know, it was the Romans, not the ‘barbarian’ Gauls who played foul over the ransom arrangement and declined to pay up as previously agreed: (the danger of) Romans behaving like the ‘barbarian’ Gauls is a well-developed theme in the narrative as it stands. To be sure, commenting on Camillus’ feat of crossing the enemy lines and arriving safely in the captured city, Wiseman has rightly stressed that the practicalities of fourth century BC warfare are not what is at stake here; rather, the researcher’s focus must be on the ‘type of narrative [that] could present such stories with any appearance of credibility’. So Wiseman asks and answers:

How did Camillus arrive at the Capitol […]? Livy refers to the gods’ involvement, and then blandly goes on: ‘For by some chance the Dictator arrived’. But the truce had only been to allow negotiations; it would hardly extend to allowing Camillus and his relief force to pass through the besiegers’ lines. One can only assume that the Gauls were atttoniti, as they had been when Fabius Dorsuo, trusting in his gods, walked through their lines to make his sacrifice on the Quirinal, and walked back again.

Or that the Gauls were awaiting a Roman delegation to deliver the ransom, at least in a version of the story that knew of the fall of the Capitoline Hill and the subsequent ransom payment, collected, as argued here, outside Rome: specially agreed embassies with safe passes are mentioned in situations of a city’s capture elsewhere in our sources. That Livy’s own text features more than once an episode in which a Roman crosses unharmed the enemy lines, typically with divine help, does not exclude the possibility that the context of Camillus’ arrival in Rome is comfortably embedded in the practicalities of ransom arrangements, as known or imagined in later centuries (thereby in fact enhancing the narrative’s credibility). Wiseman concluded that ‘(the sudden appearance of Camillus […] is easier to imagine on the stage than in real siege conditions’; it is equally easy to imagine in the context of a ransom arrangement, of the type exemplified above on Aegina and Phleumce, Clodius and Caesar. That Livy used his (different) sources with some considerable creative knack has already been stressed above: he was what Wiseman himself has called ‘a good story-teller’ who ‘knew hardly anything about the real

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62 Livy’s use of delays to create suspense is discussed for 5.32-55 in Luce 1971, 279-83.

63 pass Ogilvie 1965, ad loc. (p. 738), who in arguing that the Roman complaint over dishonest weights was ignored by the Gauls maintained that ‘the simplest explanation is undoubtedly the right one’.

64 The technique of casting a particular people or individual in the role of the ‘barbarian’ or ‘other’ is widely employed in ancient historiography. Livy would have found much inspiration in Polybius, whose most popular ‘barbarians’ include, next to the Illyrians, the Gauls. But the historian can also employ his ‘barbarology’ to indicate degeneration in a people, group or sub-group otherwise shown to conform to the ideals of the community: Champion 2004, 137-143 and 193-203. On the Roman (republican) conception of the Gauls (and on Polybius), see Williams 2001, 68-99; and on Roman ‘barbarology’ generally, see D’Auge 1981. The transposition of conqueror and conquered that the episode of the alleged defence of the Capitoline Hill thrives on is a guiding theme throughout Book 5 of the 21C, played out for instance in (the danger of) Rome’s relocation to Veii (5.24.5), the Roman ambassadors’ ‘Gallic’ behaviour (5.36.1), or (the danger of) the Romans’ personal transformation into Veientes (5.52.14; 5.53.7).


66 Wiseman 2008, 32.

67 So for instance in Polybius’ account of the capture of (the ‘lower’ city of) Psophis by Philip of Macedon in 219 BC, for the purpose of negotiating the ransom: Polyb. 4.72.3. The account of Sulpicius Galba’s capture of Aegina, discussed above, although not specifically mentioning safe passes, only makes sense if this practice is assumed to have been employed, and to have been widely known. Livy’s account of the ransom discussion in the context of the Battle at the Caudine Forks reiterates moreover the possibility of passing through the Gallic enemy lines at the time: 9.4.8. Note also that Thucydidse reports Helots crossing the Athenian siege lines in 425 BC, when the Spartan army was under siege on Sphacteria, to deliver additional food supplies: 4.26.

68 The other examples are 5.15.6-7; 5.27.2; 5.46.2-3. Davies 2004, 115-6, shows that Livy’s description of Camillus’ appearance at 5.49.1 (... forte quaedam ...) embeds this into the larger theme of the workings of the divine in Livy’s historical conception.

69 Wiseman 2008, 35.
conditions of archaic Rome, and what little he did know he ignored’ – a statement also applicable to Livy’s knowledge of (early) fourth century Rome.\(^\text{70}\) Having chosen not to foreground the Gallic take-over of Rome in his own version of events does not mean that Livy could not use elements of that narrative for his story, suitably adapted, exchanging the delivery of the ransom payment with the arrival of a relief force, and so forth, thus suppressing Rome’s most significant embarrassment – and humiliation – to date\(^\text{71}\) instead of the money, Camillus brought the sword.\(^\text{72}\) As Forsythe wrote: ‘(i)t is virtually certain that the Romans paid a sizeable ransom to persuade the Gauls to leave the city, but Livy instead has Camillus return from exile and appear in the Forum just in time to prevent the ultimate embarrassment’.\(^\text{73}\) Perhaps not ‘every Roman in the street knew about (Camillus’) feats’ in full understanding of this Roman hero’s (other) role\(^\text{74}\).

The hypothetical perspective of a ransom collection outside Rome here suggested may also provide another, additional explanation for Livy’s eagerness to focus his audiences’ minds on the fixed assets in Rome, through the speeches of Camillus, foregrounding the religious topography of Rome, the city’s temples, as much as Rome’s mythological relationship with its location (5.304–7.5.50–54) – to avert the gaze from the evil not of his own days (pref. 4) but of the episode that was the Gallic take-over of Rome, when men, women and the bulk of the movable assets had long left the city, its temples and shrines – to the disgrace of the (later) Romans.\(^\text{75}\) To quote Williams again: ‘[...] it is a story of the transformation of a memory of defeat and capture into victory and rebirth’.\(^\text{76}\) Evidently, it is not my purpose here to try and establish what actually happened, but simply to argue that, whatever happened in the night when the geese suffered from insomnia on the Capitoline Hill, a ransom is a perfectly suitable element in a story of a Gallic take-over of Rome – hill and all, and that it cannot be taken as evidence that an alternative narrative to the successful defence of the Capitoline Hill never existed – as Varro already knew.

ULRIKE ROTH, The University of Edinburgh, u.roth@ed.ac.uk

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\(^{70}\) Wiseman 2008, 18.

\(^{71}\) The depth and range of human suffering that a military attack, possible take-over and sack brings with it, caused by slaughter, pillage, rape, enslavement and possible destruction, is well brought out in Levithan 2013, 205-27, with discussion of specific ancient sack narratives.

\(^{72}\) By challenging the Gauls in open battle, Camillus demonstrates *virtus*, which is absent both from siege warfare (i.e. from the behaviour of the Gauls) and from a barricade inside the city (i.e. the behaviour of the men on the Capitoline Hill). See Levithan 2013, 16-9 and 82-9 for discussion of the ‘virtue’ of open warfare vis-à-vis the shame brought by both siege and barricade (and of the increasing role played by *disciplina*).

\(^{73}\) Forsythe 2015, 324.

\(^{74}\) Punning on Bruun 2000, 42. See Walbank 1957-1979, 184-5 for brief comment on the elaboration of Camillus’ role in later versions, starting with Livy.

\(^{75}\) Livy’s use of the figure of Camillus to ‘make Rome’ in the latter’s speeches has been analysed by Feldherr, who consequently speaks of ‘Camillus the historian’: 1998, 78-81; see also Vasaly 2015, 77-9 (note 11), who speaks of Camillus as a *haruspex* or exegete, and as Livy’s mouthpiece in this role. See also Sordi 1984, 86-8 on the use of Herodotus by Fabius Pictor – as well as his ultimate divergence from the Herodotean ‘model’ narrative – to construct a successful defence of the Capitoline Hill in order to avoid a contradiction with Rome’s destiny as the *caput* – i.e. ruler – of the world.

\(^{76}\) Williams 2001, 142.
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