Disputing providence in seventeenth-century Scottish universities: The conflict between Samuel Rutherford and the Aberdeen doctors and its repercussions

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Introduction

In the middle of 1636 the fiery Presbyterian theologian Samuel Rutherford was summoned before the Court of High Commission, deprived of his parish of Anwoth in Galloway and sentenced to exile in Aberdeen. The reason for his deposition has been the cause for some speculation but it most likely related both to his attacks against Arminianism and his open opposition to the ascendant episcopal party. In Aberdeen it was hoped that Rutherford would come under the sway of the moderate doctors of divinity who taught at the university and ministered in the town. Unsurprisingly, exactly the opposite happened. To Rutherford, Aberdeen seemed a hotbed of Arminianism, and soon he was in open conflict with the so-called Aberdeen doctors, the irenic professors and ministers of Aberdeen. By 1638, however, the tables had turned and Rutherford’s own Covenanting party were in the ascendant. Under pressure to sign the National Covenant, the doctors—John Forbes of Corse, Robert Baron, James Sibbald, William Leslie, Alexander Scroggie, and Alexander Ross—continued to obstinately refuse, although their colleague William Guild soon gave way.

Finally, the Covenanters lost patience with them and at the Aberdeen General Assembly of 1640 arranged a series of formal trials. While Forbes was exonerated of theological charges, both Sibbald and Baron, the latter posthumously, were found guilty of Arminianism. Indeed, Rutherford himself acted as one of the witnesses for the prosecution at Sibbald’s trial. With the exception of Forbes, who was offered a reprieve, all the doctors were then deposed. In a dramatic reversal of roles Rutherford himself was released from exile and in 1639 appointed Principal and Professor of Divinity at St Mary’s College in St Andrews, where for a time Forbes was sentenced to wait upon him. This was apparently something which he could not stomach, and in April 1641 he too was finally deposed from his chair for his obstinate refusal to sign the National Covenant.

Rutherford’s conflict with the Aberdeen doctors is but one important episode in a much bigger narrative. For in the seventeenth century the fabric of Scottish theology was torn in two by the Arminian controversy. David Mullan and others have argued that Scottish Arminianism centred on political and ecclesiological issues, and have thus considerably downplayed theological questions surrounding the doctrine of grace. This paper will argue that the frequent charges of ‘Arminianism’ made in seventeenth-century Scotland often had an important philosophical and theological undercurrent, which becomes fully manifest in the academic exchanges of the time.

However, the question of whether the Aberdeen doctors and their associates were actually guilty of Arminianism, which recent scholarship has denied, is actually secondary for the purposes of this paper. Much more important is the opportunity that the Arminian controversy presents to assess different reform programmes and their priorities in the Scottish universities and to map out, in a provisional fashion, the contours of different schools within Scottish Reformed scholasticism and their debts to the broader late medieval and early modern philosophical and theological context. The adoption and adaptation of Suarezian and Scotistic metaphysics, which constitutes the primary topic of this paper, mark two of the most significant innovations in seventeenth-century Reformed scholasticism.
When we consider that at the forefront of both these movements were leading Scottish philosophical theologians, we come to realize that the picture of seventeenth-century Scotland as an intellectual backwater, which up until recently has generally prevailed, now stands in need of considerable revision.

1. The context of Aberdeen philosophy

The Aberdeen doctors developed their thought in the context of a far-reaching attempt to reform both the Kirk and universities of Scotland. Their spiritual father was Patrick Forbes of Corse, the revered Bishop of Aberdeen. Indeed, David Stevenson has suggested that there is hardly a figure involved in the cultural and intellectual renaissance taking place in the 1620s and 1630s in North Eastern Scotland who was not linked to Bishop Forbes, and this was undoubtedly true of the doctors. At his death in 1635 all of them contributed to his funeral book, along with almost the entire senior faculty of King’s and Marischal Colleges. Together the doctors represented the chief of the ‘learned and piouse ministers’ that Forbes exerted great effort to gather to Aberdeen, and a number of them, if not all of them, owed their promotion directly to him. As Nicholas Thompson suggests, Forbes’s purpose in gathering these ministers was to develop a united Protestant front to counter the Catholic threat, which was particularly intense in Aberdeenshire due to the influence of the powerful Gordon family. The spearhead of his reform was intended to be a revitalised university of Aberdeen serving as a ‘nursery for the Church’.

Following a royal visitation in 1619 Bishop Forbes initiated a comprehensive programme of reform. As David Leech, subprincipal of King’s, bitterly complained in 1637 in a public oration *Philosophia illachrymans*—a stunt which most likely lost him his job—these all centred on the promotion of the higher faculties, especially theology. A particularly acrimonious issue proved to be Forbes’s attempts, against the stiff opposition of Principal William Leslie and Leech himself, to replace the New Foundation of the 1580s with a modified version of the pre-Reformation Old Foundation. Associated with this was the Bishop’s controversial attempt to promote a professorial system, whereby each regent would now teach a single year of the course rather than take a single class for four years as previously. This was intended to encourage academic specialization and was part of a wider effort to enhance and streamline liberal arts education at King’s, and thereby improve the quality of entry-level theologians. At the same time, as Leech recognized, the financial restructuring allowed new funds to be poured into the higher faculties, especially theology. In this way theology received a double benefit from the Old Foundation, which was surely one of the main reasons Bishop Forbes was so anxious to promote it, even attaining royal approval of it during King Charles I’s visit to Scotland in 1633.

One of Forbes’s very first acts as Bishop was to establish a fund for endowing two chairs of divinity. The first at King’s he quickly filled with the strategic appointment of his own son John. Not only did this give him an important ally in the university: John Forbes’s considerable abilities, honed at leading international Reformed academies and universities, perfectly suited him to carry out the task given him by his father and the synod of Aberdeen of mounting a historical and biblical defence of Protestant doctrine against Catholic attack. In the same year funding was also found for a second professorship of divinity at Marischal College. The first appointee was Principal William Forbes, a relative of Patrick and John who later became Bishop of Edinburgh, but he was succeeded after two years by Robert Baron. In a further attempt to reorient the life of the whole College towards theology, Bishop
Forbes also insisted that all eligible regents should, after six years of teaching, take up parish ministry. What Wodrow calls ‘this useful statute’ was clearly intended to bring the academy and Kirk ever closer together and to fill the diocese ‘with pious and learned men’. Together Bishop Forbes and his son also sought to strengthen ties between King’s and Marischal Colleges. In this light, the 1634 appointment of Baron as dean of divinity at King’s may clearly be seen as an effort to regulate and coordinate theology teaching across the colleges. This was buttressed by a marked rise in university-wide theological disputations, most of which were centred on issues dividing Protestants and Catholics. In the English printer Edward Raban, who had moved to Aberdeen in 1622, most likely at the Bishop’s invitation, the university also effectively had its own press, something which quickly proved indispensable for promoting the new Aberdeen theology. All these reforms were clearly coordinated, and they had the aim, Stevenson suggests, of promoting a single university of Aberdeen dedicated to Bishop Forbes’s own vision of theological reform.

The same was true of the curriculum reforms of 1641 pioneered by the doctors, which were intended to supplement the standard Aristotelian fare of Scottish universities with an exposure to ‘methodical writers’ such as Petrus Ramus, Omer Talon, Bartholomäus Keckermann and Johann Heinrich Alsted. As Steven Reid suggests, this was as ‘cutting edge as anything on the Continent’ and unique for Scotland at this time. It was also clearly oriented towards theology. Teaching in languages was aimed at proficiency in biblical and patristic study as much as in Aristotle. At the same time each year of the curriculum was integrated into detailed study of the Heidelberg Catechism, giving students a vision of the whole of salvation history, and especially of Christ ‘the one consolation in life and death’. Indeed, the encyclopaedic nature of the King’s College curriculum—made fully explicit in later statutes—was surely intended to aid the integration of philosophy and theology leading to the restoration of the entire image of God in man.

2. The Aberdeen doctors and second scholasticism

One of the chief promoters of this integrated programme of philosophy and theology at Aberdeen was Robert Baron, and it is his work which gives us a deeper insight into the thought world of the doctors, and especially their fascinating, but in the highly-charged context of seventeenth-century Scottish theology, ultimately problematic engagement with Catholic second scholasticism. If Forbes was the most distinguished theologian of this group then Baron was undoubtedly the pre-eminent philosopher. Even so Baron became well known for his defences of scriptural authority, which leading Scottish Catholic theologians such as George Turnbull and William Chalmers sought to refute. Baron’s most important philosophical works were his *Philosophia theologiae ancillans* of 1621 and his *Metaphysica generalis* which was published posthumously in 1657. These were internationally read, and remained on the curriculum at Oxford and Trinity College Dublin well into the eighteenth century.

From these his intellectual debts to Spanish scholasticism becomes manifest. In particular these thinkers, especially Francisco Suárez, gave him the tools for thinking through the complex relation of philosophy and theology. Following Suárez, Baron argued that the object of metaphysics is ‘real and positive being embracing both the Creator and created’. It thus clearly overlapped with theology, although Baron was clear that metaphysics considers God not as he is revealed in his Word but as he is knowable according to the light of nature. Using Suárez he therefore articulated a view of philosophy as the ‘handmaid’ of theology.
This meant that in addition to its own sphere of operation metaphysics also served an important role in the elaboration and defence of orthodox theology—something which was clearly highly appealing in the Aberdeen context. From the earlier *Philosophia* it becomes clear that Baron viewed Suárez as being as much of a theological as a philosophical authority. For here he seeks to defend his philosophical account of subsistence and its applications to the fields of Christology and Trinitarian theology against all comers. Indeed, the solutions which he offers to those two most profound theological questions of the relationship between the two natures of Christ and between the divine essence and persons in the Trinity are explicitly Suarezian. The account of the Trinity proffered in the early *Philosophia* integrates well with the ontology he developed later in the *Metaphysica*, which has shifted from the basically Thomistic pattern of the *De Ente et Essentia* to a full-blown Suarezian ontology. Indeed, not only does Baron defend Suárez’s position on a number of key philosophical questions, including the distinction of essence and existence, but he also develops his ontology, following Suárez, into a comprehensive *scientia transcendentalis*. In this he is clearly also following in the footsteps of other pioneering Reformed philosophers, such as Keckermann and Alsted, who sought to integrate their own transcendental ontology into a broader theological framework.

If Baron’s application of Suárez to Trinitarian theology was relatively unproblematic, the same was by no means true of his use of Jesuit thought to explicate key questions of divine knowledge and concourse. The best evidence for this comes from his posthumous *Metaphysica*, but the wider importance of these themes is also registered in the graduation theses, a matter we shall return to below. Here, in the course of a lengthy discussion of divine foreknowledge, Baron appeals to the distinction between God’s absolute and conditional foreknowledge found in the works of Pedro da Fonseca, the renowned Portuguese Jesuit. According to Fonseca, for the purposes of human understanding, it is necessary to distinguish in God’s knowledge, which is actually one and indivisible, several logical stages. In the first stage God has conditional knowledge of the whole field of possibility. In the second stage he knows what will happen to both natural and free causes when placed in any given situation. In the third stage God decrees to actualize a particular set of possibilities out of the infinite number available to him. Finally, in the fourth stage God can be said to know all these things as absolutely, and not only conditionally, future. What Fonseca’s distinction between absolute and conditional foreknowledge points towards is the Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge. While Luis de Molina is often taken as the founder of this doctrine, Fonseca, who was Molina’s teacher, played a crucial role in its inception. Baron does not use the term ‘middle knowledge’ here, perhaps because it was too inflammatory, but his own attraction to the concept becomes clear in his discussion of the reconciliation of divine providence and human free will. Again deploying Fonseca’s distinction Baron argues here that the divine decree follows, and does not precede, divine foreknowledge. God thus foresees the free inclinations of the human heart placed in any given circumstance and only then decrees to concur with those acts. Instead of holding, like many of his Reformed brethren, that Adam fell because God decreed that he would eat the fruit of the forbidden tree, he holds instead that God only decreed this after he had foreknown the inclination of Adam’s own will.

Baron’s paramount concern to preserve human freedom, as well as divine immunity from sin, is also evident from his discussion of concourse earlier in the *Metaphysica*. Here he roundly attacks the Thomist doctrine of premotion—the understanding that for every action
of human free will a prevenient motion from God is required in order to excite the will and determine it for action. Against this Baron cautiously holds, citing in support not only the Dutch Reformed theologian Franciscus Junius but also the Arminian Daniel Tilenus and the Jesuits themselves, that there is no ‘previous motion’ from God exciting or determining the human will towards singular actions. Rather, God only cooperates with the creature by conferring being on its action in that very same moment at which the will begins to act—the so-called ‘simultaneous concourse’ of the Jesuits. What this means is that God does not move the will to action but simply concurs with the will’s own free causality. For Baron the alternative Thomist position not only removes human freedom, by taking away or impeding the will’s innate power to opposites, but also makes God the sole author of sin, an opinion for which he cites the authority of the famous Jesuit, Cardinal Robert Bellarmine. In arguing this Baron is quite clear that he is going against the Reformed consensus, an impression he compounds by invoking the authority of Suárez and the Portuguese Conimbricenses against his fellow Protestants.

If Baron was explicit in his approval of these Jesuit doctrines the important question remains of how widespread these views were among the other doctors. In the case of Forbes we find only a brief discussion of divine knowledge in his major systematic work the *Instructiones historico-theologicae de doctrina Christiana*. Significantly, however, this includes a brief discussion of middle knowledge, which does suggest he was thinking along similar lines to Baron. As he says:

> Some theologians declare a certain middle knowledge of conditional things, determinate indeed, and hypothetical, and antecedent to the divine decree. Concerning future sins we concede this not at all reluctantly, unless certain arguments stand in the way.

Forbes goes on to clarify his meaning, arguing that through middle knowledge God can know the possibility of sin but in order to foreknow sin as certainly future a permissive act of his will is required. Indeed, we find Baron making precisely the same point elsewhere. Further evidence for the presence of middle knowledge among the Aberdeen doctors may be gleaned from the extant graduation theses. Unfortunately, such evidence is somewhat patchy. The graduation theses were intended to cover a wide range of material and questions of a more theological nature were often neglected. Nevertheless, they are still an important source, providing a useful barometer for philosophical and theological opinions at the university. The first set of evidence comes from the graduation theses of 1625 presided over by James Sibbald, one of the doctors, who at this time was Regent and Professor of natural philosophy at Marischal College. Here among the *Theses metaphysicae* there is a short but fascinating discussion on the question ‘of what kind is the concourse of the first cause with second causes’. This opens with an explicit assertion that ‘the subordination and dependence of second causes in relation to the first cause in their operation does not necessarily require that concourse which determines second causes naturally prior to their working, and therefore predetermines them’. His reasoning is that such predetermination takes away human liberty, for although before predetermination the human will is able to act, after it is predetermined it is not able not to act. Instead, he argues that divine concourse and the action of the cause must be considered one and the same. Only the effect and not the action itself can therefore be properly said to depend on God. Whether or not it is precisely the same, Sibbald’s solution to the question closely resembles
Baron. While nothing is said about middle knowledge his theory of concourse would surely entail something like it, for before God can decree to concur with the action he must know the free inclination of the will itself.

An explicit, and explicitly positive, discussion of middle knowledge can be found in the 1634 theses presided over by John Seton, a colleague of the doctors, who succeeded Sibbald as Regent and Professor of Natural Philosophy at Marischal. Here thesis 44 of the Theses logicae explicitly states ‘middle knowledge, or precognition of hypothetical futures, does not diminish the freedom of acts, nor introduce anything inconvenient’. The charge that middle knowledge removes freedom may seem strange, but this was part of the ingenious argument levelled against the doctrine by theologians like William Twisse and later Rutherford himself. In responding to it Seton simply turns the argument on the accuser, holding that if middle knowledge were taken away either God’s omniscience would have to err or events would have to be necessitated. Having upheld middle knowledge Seton turns in thesis 45 to the connected question of how God knows the future. Here he denies that God can be said to know the future either by virtue of his decree or of physical predetermination and argues that he simply knows it by intuiting future effects. Seton reprises very similar positions in the 1637 graduation theses, disputed, it must be remembered, only a year before the storm fell on Aberdeen. For the Theses ethicae argue Baron’s twin positions that physical predetermination destroys human liberty, and that both this and divine foreknowledge can be saved through the device of middle knowledge.

It is clear that both the Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge and their critique of predetermination found considerable, if at times qualified, support among the Aberdeen doctors and their circle. The centrality of the topic is apparent from the fact that it turns up not only in metaphysical but also logical and even ethical theses. In the wider context of early modern Reformed debate this is quite remarkable. For as Richard Muller and Eef Dekker have shown, the Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge lay at the heart of Arminian soteriology. In light of this, the broader Aberdeen espousal of middle knowledge, however circumscribed, undoubtedly marks an important concession to Jesuit and Arminian theology. This is by no means to question the Reformed intentions of the doctors, but it is to highlight a doctrinal point which their fellow Reformed would undeniably have found suspect and in many cases heterodox. The fact that these doctrines were also being taught openly in the Aberdeen Colleges to ministerial candidates was therefore undoubtedly a cause of great alarm.

3. Samuel Rutherford contra the doctors

Unfortunately, we cannot dwell at any great length on the thought of Samuel Rutherford, which is as complex as it is fascinating. Instead, we shall seek only to highlight the points which were of particular relevance to his clash with the Aberdeen doctors. Fundamental to Rutherford was the conviction that all things, including sinful actions, are absolutely and immutably decreed by God. Coupled with this, however, he was insistent that such determination does not remove human freedom or responsibility. In other words he argued for the compatibility of human freedom and divine determination. Significantly, Rutherford articulated his maximally actualist and compatibilist metaphysics within the context of a Scotistic metaphysics, derived not only from Duns Scotus himself but also from the fourteenth-century Augustinian theologian Thomas Bradwardine. His basic argument relied on what has come to be called synchronic contingency. This notion, prominent in
Scotus, rooted freedom in an innate power towards opposites. An act was only said to be free if in the very same moment of time that it was done it was open to the agent not to do it. Using this concept, and an arsenal of associated metaphysical distinctions, Rutherford was able to argue that determination of the will by God in no way removes its freedom, since it still retains its innate power to resist this determination. In this he followed in the footsteps of Bradwardine who, as Michael Sylwanowicz argues, was the first to apply Scotus’ theory of synchronic contingency to the reconciliation of divine and human freedom. Rutherford’s opposition to the concept of middle knowledge and his endorsement of divine premotion were both developed from within the framework of his Scotistic and Bradwardinian metaphysics. With Scotus and Bradwardine, Rutherford upheld the principle that God knows the future in his free decree of actualizing it. In such a system there could be neither need nor place for middle knowledge. Following Twisse, however, Rutherford held not only that there could be no place for middle knowledge, but that it was a pernicious doctrine which hampered divine freedom and tore out the very heart of grace. Rutherford also had no place for the Jesuit and Arminian thesis, which was in fact upheld by the doctors, that freedom consists in the liberty of indifference—the power of acting or not acting when all the requisites for action are in place. Instead, he promoted a strong account of Thomist physical premotion. This he developed along the lines opposed so vigorously by Baron and the other doctors, maintaining that every free action, whether good or evil, requires a previous motion applied by God in order to excite and determine the will. No doubt Scotus would have blanched at such a thesis but Rutherford found important precedent for it in Bradwardine’s own adaptation of Scotist metaphysics.

As is apparent, Rutherford’s thought was in many ways diametrically opposed to that of the doctors and it is therefore no wonder that he should take such an active role in opposing them during his enforced sojourn in Aberdeen and later in the formal proceedings against them. Both Sibbald and Baron were condemned not only on the basis of their published writings but also from unpublished manuscripts and letters found in their possession. Recently Denlinger has argued persuasively that one of these papers, the *Septenarius sacer de principiis et causis fidei Catholicae*, which also very probably represents the substance of Baron’s debate with Rutherford over universal redemption, fits entirely within the bounds of Reformed orthodoxy, reflecting closely the asymmetric Augustinianism of the British Delegation to the Synod of Dordt, not to mention of Forbes himself. However, another of these unpublished papers discussed by Garden, the *Isagoge ad saniorum doctrinam de praedestinatione*, could easily have been perceived by the Assembly as having Arminian overtones. For here Baron maintains more strongly than Forbes ever did that God’s permissive decrees concerning future sins can only rightly be understood by presupposing middle knowledge. In fact, this not only marks a difference in emphasis from Forbes, but also a real difference in content. For, middle knowledge is, ultimately, quite incidental to Forbes’s wider Augustinian project and does not leave a deep impression on his theology. By contrast, at least in the *Metaphysica generalis*, Baron speculates on middle knowledge as a universal platform for reconciling God’s providence with human freedom. In fact, he even implies there that every divine decree, including presumably that of election, is posterior to God’s middle knowledge, and that this is the best way of preserving human liberty. Election might not depend on middle knowledge but it is difficult to see how it can avoid taking it into account at some level. If so then this would mark a significant revision, not to say watering down, of the Reformed doctrine of irresistible grace.
Likewise, prominent in the charges against Sibbald were Rutherford’s allegations concerning his unorthodox views on the doctrine of grace. These were also backed up from evidence taken from the funeral sermon that he had preached for Bishop Forbes, which contained a long scholastic discussion of divine concourse and a scorching attack on Reformed and Dominican doctrines of predestination. In particular, Sibbald had to defend his account of the important scholastic distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will, which was often regarded with suspicion at the time due to its role as a mainstay of Arminian theology. While in his own written defence he affirms that God’s will of election is unconditioned—a crucial distinction from the Arminians—he continues to affirm that his will of reprobation is conditioned. Indeed, surely unwisely given the circumstances, Sibbald even took the opportunity to mount a frontal attack on Rutherford’s view, expressed in his *Exercitationes apologeticae*, that God’s command alone renders an action right and holy. Rutherford had argued this against John Cameron, the famous Scottish theologian of Glasgow and Saumur, and Sibbald’s concern to defend him, like Baron before him, shows a wider concern among the doctors to defend Cameron’s legacy. Like Cameron, Sibbald held that God is constrained in his actions towards creatures by his love of his own image—a view that Rutherford later suggested was the essence of Arminianism.

Before his appointment as minister of Anwoth in Galloway, Rutherford had served as a Regent in humanities at his own alma mater of Edinburgh from 1623–6. Given his paramount concern to uphold orthodoxy and his skill as a polemical theologian, it is unsurprising that he should have been chosen to run St Mary’s and reform divinity teaching in the university. Indeed, the appointment of Rutherford was part of a wider Covenanter strategy of theological and educational reform, paralleling the appointment of Guild at Aberdeen and, a few years later, of Gillespie at Glasgow. Alongside these academic purges the Covenanters hoped to institute a standard higher curriculum across Scottish universities. However, this centralized effort at reform quickly foundered at St Andrews and elsewhere, leaving individual appointees from the Covenanting elite to do their best at fighting their own corner.

In this Rutherford had some measure of success. Indeed, according to his former student Robert McWard he found St Andrews ‘the very nursery of all superstition in worship, and error in doctrine’ and left it a ‘Lebanon, out of which were taken cedars for building the house of the Lord through the whole land’. At the same time Rutherford and his friend Robert Blair also faced frequent opposition to their attempts at reform, meaning that St Andrews, like all the Scottish universities in these turbulent times, became something of a battleground of rival academic and theological camps—something we shall discuss further below.

One of the most important gauges of Rutherford’s reform attempt at St Andrews, forming an important base of comparison with the Aberdeen programme, is his *Disputatio scholastica de divina providentia* of 1649. This was written for his divinity students at St Mary’s and provides important evidence of his teaching at St Andrews. In light of Rutherford’s international reputation and the Covenanters’ desire for standardization and conformity in higher education it must be seen as a work of the first importance. The *Disputatio* shows Rutherford to have been a dedicated, if rather narrowly focused, teacher, concerned above all for the spiritual welfare of his students. It clearly marks a continuation of the apologetic and polemical project begun in his *Exercitationes*, namely that of upholding Reformed doctrine and refuting Jesuit and Arminian errors. Rutherford had been entrusted with an important responsibility of safeguarding the spiritual and
theological health of his students and he believed this to be the best way of carrying out his charge. In the preface he warns them to steer between the Scylla of the Catholics, Arminians, and Socinians and the Charybdis of the Epicureans who deny divine providence. He recommends his students to faithful navigators including ‘my Bradwardine’, the ‘most excellent Dr Twisse’, and Gisbertus Voetius, ‘a man of solid erudition and true piety’. 79 Judging from the Disputatio Rutherford intended his St Andrew’s divinity students to have quite as sophisticated a grasp of medieval and second scholastic authors as Baron had expected at Aberdeen. However, there is a crucial difference. The Jesuit philosophers and theologians that Baron had drawn on so constructively, were now Rutherford’s chief opponents. The Disputatio carefully expounds at great length their views on divine providence, divine permission, simultaneous concourse, middle knowledge, and a host of related theological distinctions, only to then seek to comprehensively demolish the entirety of their philosophical and theological foundation. 80

Within the Disputatio there is also important, if implicit, evidence of it having been shaped by contemporary British theological debate. Between 1643 and 1647 Rutherford served as one of the Scottish Commissioners to the Westminster Assembly. 81 There he would have had frequent opportunity to engage with Twisse, the Prolocutor of the Assembly, who as a young scholar had himself played an instrumental role in producing the 1618 edition of Bradwardine’s celebrated Anti-Pelagian work, the De Causa Dei. Indeed, Twisse later referred to Bradwardine as ‘one of the brightest stars in the scholastic firmament’. 82 While Rutherford certainly knew the thought of Twisse and Bradwardine before his extended stay in London, it is perhaps no surprise that the Disputatio demonstrates a more intense engagement with their thought. Indeed, the preface of the Disputatio suggests that Rutherford was self-consciously seeking to develop a Twissian and Bradwardian approach to theology in contrast to the second scholasticism of the Jesuits. 83 Moreover, in his Due Right of Presbyteries Rutherford made a sustained attempt to claim the late medievals for the cause of Reform, viewing them as the proto-Reformers heralded in the Book of Revelation whose desire to cleanse the Church was begun in the Reformation and will see its fulfilment in the purge of the Covenanters’ Second Reformation. 84

There is some evidence that this new approach also had a particular Scottish resonance. In the Disputatio Rutherford defends himself against the accusations of an unnamed follower of Cameron, who had evidently been incensed by his attack on his master in the Exercitationes. 85 The question ultimately hinged on the age-old Euthyphro dilemma, with Rutherford arguing against Cameron and, as he saw it, in line with the best of late medieval and Reformed thought that things are good because God wills them. 86 However, its proximate concern was the politically and ecclesiologically charged issue of adiaphora (indifferent things). This was of course one of the most important issues at stake in the whole controversy with the doctors, and had also been the subject of a private debate between Rutherford and at least one of the doctors, most probably Sibbald, during his Aberdeen sojourn. Indeed, Rutherford’s 1646 Divine Right, which represents a transcript of this debate as well his own response to the famous Duplyes of the doctors, argues that ceremonies cannot be adiaphora for they scandalize the conscience of Christians with their Catholic overtones. 87 In the Disputatio Rutherford utterly explodes what he calls ‘the most vain distinction’ of the adiaphora, using Scotist and Bradwardinian voluntarist logic to refute the more intellectualist reasoning of Cameron and his follower. 88 The concern of the Disputatio to establish a Reformed metaphysics of morality therefore clearly resonates with
wider Scottish concerns, showing the ongoing ramifications of Rutherford’s quarrel with the doctors.

It is here also that we may discern the root of the difference between Bishop Forbes’s reform programme initiated in Aberdeen in the 1620s and 30s and the Covenanter reforms carried out in St Andrews in the 1640s and 50s. The former, as we have seen, relied on an eclectic and encyclopaedic education, and following the lead of the second scholastics was grounded on a new integration of philosophy and theology. As Denlinger and Thompson demonstrate, this was intended to lead to a recovery of the full breadth of Reformed orthodoxy. By contrast Rutherford’s efforts at reform were centred on what can perhaps best be described as an apocalyptic narrowing of the bounds of orthodoxy. They were also marked by a deep suspicion of pagan philosophy. In the preface to the Disputatio he attacked in no uncertain terms the delirium of Plato, the lies of Aristotle, and the babbling of Cicero, showing how far short these fall of the ‘uncreated wisdom’ of Christ revealed in Scripture — a far cry from Leech’s Philosophia illachrymans! Indeed, as Aza Goudriaan has suggested Rutherford desired to construct a Christian philosophy grounded on a late medieval, specifically Bradwardinian, metaphysics of possibilia. This he outlines in an appendix to the Disputatio which represents his rendering, one might almost say subverting, of Baron’s ‘handmaid’ principle. In this the highest principle of philosophy, the principle of non-contradiction finds its authorization only in the transcendent nature of God. For Rutherford there can be no finally independent philosophy. Rather, every thought must be taken captive for the glory of Christ.

4. Aftermath of the dispute

If the doctors were dispersed there still remains to be examined the important question of Rutherford’s own influence on the Scottish universities. The first place to look for clues is at Rutherford’s own university of St Andrews. Here the graduation theses presided over by William Campbell in 1658, which was incidentally the same time when the Resolutioner crisis was affecting Rutherford’s stature at the university, provide marked evidence of his regnant influence. For Campbell offers an impassioned defence of premotionism stating that:

So a predetermining influx, without which the dominion of God could not be secured, must necessarily be held. Indeed without this human freedom is not able to act freely. And so vain are the frenzies of the heretics against it.

Campbell also attacks the ‘fabricated doctrine of middle knowledge’, citing Twisse’s famous treatise against it. If this were all we might be tempted to think he was more influenced by Twisse than Rutherford, although that in itself would not be insignificant. However, in his discussion of possibility and impossibility, which he holds are ultimately rooted in divine nature and not in the things themselves, we find him drawing deeply, sometimes to the point of affectation, on Rutherford’s Disputatio scholastica, showing its penetration to the teaching at St Andrews.

Rutherford’s influence on St Andrews is to be expected. What is perhaps more interesting is to find his views endorsed in Aberdeen, the home of the doctors. Tentative signs of this can be found in a set of theses from Marischal College presided over by Andrew Cant in 1654, the son of the famous Covenanter of the same name. Importantly, these are
dedicated to Anna Maria van Schurman, the darling of Gisbertus Voetius and the Dutch *Nadere Reformatie*.96 Voetius and his circle were great admirers of Rutherford, and had indeed tried repeatedly to recruit him to positions at Dutch universities. The dedication to her is therefore an important reminder of the close ties between Scottish and Dutch Reformed scholasticism, ties which were in Rutherford’s case mediated by influential Scottish exiles to the Netherlands like Robert McWard and John Brown of Wamphray.97 Apart from the dedication, however, evidence for Rutherford’s influence is more ambiguous. Certainly both predefinition and predetermination are affirmed to be consistent with human liberty, but with the significant caveat that this applies only to good and not to evil acts.98 Even more seriously we also find a cautious approbation of middle knowledge and an affirmation that freedom consists in liberty of indifference.99 Cant himself matriculated at Marischal in 1640, the year of the trials and the year before Forbes’s deposition. Despite the fact that his father had been one of the main opponents of the doctors in 1638, he clearly imbibed something of their moderate influence.100 However, such moderation is certainly not a characteristic of the 1657 theses presided over at Marischal by Alexander White. For these not only contain approbation of Bradwardine’s starkly Augustinian views on human depravity but also a blistering attack on middle knowledge, quite out of place in an academic disputation and worthy of the ripest of Rutherford’s invective. It is the ‘most filthy venting of Pelagianism’ issuing out of ‘the whole of Gehenna’. Those who uphold it seek only to topple the ‘most blessed God’ from ‘his glorious throne of providence’ and establish themselves in his place.101 The vehemence of this thesis suggests that the Covenanter programme took some ground even in the home of the doctors.

In stark contrast to this, in the same year appeared, posthumously, the *De Voluntate et actionibus Dei circa peccatum* of John Strang, the eminent Principal of Glasgow. Like the Aberdeen doctors, Strang had been an opponent of the Covenant and an advocate of episcopacy, but by virtue of having powerful friends, most notably his son-in-law Robert Baillie, and of having kept his head below the parapet, he managed to survive the initial purge of the universities which followed the Glasgow Assembly of 1638. However, in 1650, after the surfacing of compromising letters, he was forced into retirement. According to Baillie one of the principal agitators against Strang was Rutherford himself, who in 1647 had been appointed, together with Andrew Cant the elder and others, to a committee set up to examine Strang’s theological dictates (i.e. his lecture notes). Apparently a storm of controversy arose over a difference of opinion between Strang on the one hand and Twisse and Rutherford on the other over the relation of divine providence to sin.102 Turning to the *De Voluntate* itself it is striking to find Strang, like Sibbald, seeking to defend Cameron against Rutherford’s attacks.103 At the same time almost the whole of the work is devoted to an attack on Twisse and his views, shared with Rutherford, on divine causation of sin.104 Yet the *De Voluntate* cannot easily be assimilated to the theology of the Aberdeen doctors, for Strang proves almost as strident an opponent of middle knowledge as Twisse and Rutherford themselves.105 It therefore serves as another reminder of the cross-tensions evident in Scottish academic theology, as well as the wider importance of Cameron in all these debates.

This impression is only reinforced by the 1658 theses at Marischal, which were presided over again by Cant. Here Rutherford’s authority, along with that of Twisse, Voetius, and intriguingly Moise Amyraut, is invoked in favour of the doctrine that God knows all conditionals in his free decree.106 While freedom is connected to liberty of indifference, this
is interpreted in a Scotist sense identical to Rutherford’s own understanding. Near the end of this thesis we find an important discussion of the divine will in relation to sin which sheds further light on Cant’s shifting views on middle knowledge. Here he fascinatingly groups Baron and Sibbald with Baxter, Cameron and the Saumur School, and certain unnamed ‘lights and columns of the Synod of Dort’ as all attacking the predeterminationists and holding to a form of middle knowledge. Interestingly, Cant expresses great sympathy for their views, saying they nearly persuaded him. He is clear, as Forbes had been, that if middle knowledge can be admitted at all it is only in the case of sinful acts. Nevertheless, he ultimately decides against it, now expressing himself certain on a matter which had obviously occasioned him much doubt. All the same, he is explicit in dissociating the doctrine from heresy, arguing that Augustine and the Fathers held a very similar doctrine. In Cant’s theses we thus see the views of Rutherford cited side-by-side with those of Cameron and the Aberdeen doctors. Is this a rare conjunction, or is it perhaps signs of the formation of a new eclecticism in Scottish scholasticism—able to diffuse its divergent tensions—reached in the very twilight of its existence?

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7 Stevenson, King’s College, Aberdeen, 83, 87.
8 See Forbes’s memorial book (Patrick Forbes, Funerals of a Right Reverend Father in God, Patrick Forbes of Corse, Bishop of Aberdeen (Aberdeen, 1635), 1–68, 94–177, 235–294, 343–4) for funeral sermons by Baron, Sibbald, Ross, and Scroggie, an epitaph by Leslie and a funeral meditation by Forbes.
11 Wodrow, Selections, 96.
12 See the reports of the 1619 Visitation in Cosmo Innes (ed.), Fasti Aberdonenses: Selections from the Records of the University and King’s College of Aberdeen, 1494-1854 (Aberdeen, 1854).
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38 Baroň, Metaphysica generalis, XII.70 (362–4); cf. Pedro de Fonseca, Commentarium Petri Fonsecæ Lusitanæ, ex Proensa Nova, D. Theologi Societatis Jesu, in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Triginta Tertius) (Évora, 1604), 6.2.5.7 (144–6). Baroň extrapolates this fourfold order from Fonseca’s work. The reference in the Metaphysica is slightly wrong.

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42 Although he did use the term scientia media in his unpublished work Isagoge ad saniorum doctrinam de praedestinatione: see Garden, ‘Vita R V. Joh. Forbesii a Corse’, 23–4.

43 Baron, Metaphysica generalis, XII.66–70 (358–9, 362–3).

44 Ibid., XII.71 (365).


46 Baron, Metaphysica generalis, VIII.78–86 (154–60).


48 ‘Quidam Theologi medium quandam praedicit scientiam conditionatorum, determinatam quidem, at hypotheticum, et decreto Dei antecedentam. Eam nos de futuris peccatis haud gravate concederemus, nisi quaedam argumenta obstarent’: John Forbes, Instructiones historico-theologicae de doctrina Christiana (Amsterdam, 1645), 1.34.16 (62). Note there are problems with the pagination here.

49 Forbes, Instructiones historico-theologicae, I.34.16 (62–3).

50 This is the thrust of his discussion in the Isagoge; cf. Garden, ‘Vita R V. Joh. Forbesii a Corse’, 23–4.

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54 Anderson, Fasti Academiae Mariscellanae Aberdonensis, ii. 34.

55 ‘Scientia media, seu futurorum hypotheticorum praecognitione, actuum libertatem non minuit, vel quicquam incommode invehit’: John Seton, Theses philosophicae (Aberdeen, 1634), Cr.

56 Samuel Rutherford, Disputatio scholastica de divina providentia (Edinburgh, 1649), 3.5–4.12 (26–30).

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58 Ibid., Theses ethicæ: theses 8–11.


63 Garden (‘Vita R V. Joh. Forbesii a Corse’, 52–3), points to this as one of the charges against Sibbald.

64 Rutherford, Exercitationes aopologetiae, 1.1.1–13 (1–18).


68 Clear evidence of this can be seen in John Forbes, Theses Philosophicae quas Deo auspice, Adolescentes e Celebererima Academia Regia Aberdonensi (Aberdeen, 1624), B2v–B4r. Here Forbes affirms the strong Augustinian doctrine that every act done without grace is sinful as well the compatibility of divine grace and determination. Interestingly, Garden (‘Vita R V. Joh. Forbesii a Corse’), 27 notes both the Augustinian character of Forbes’s doctrine and the fact that the Aberdeen doctors were not always agreed.

69 Baron, Metaphysica generalis, XII.70 (362–364). It is notable that here Baron does not make any restriction to merely sinful acts, although it is true that his main example concerns the question of the Fall.

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