Anger and the veil in ancient Greek culture

Citation for published version:
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/826867>

Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer

Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Published In:
Greece and Rome

Publisher Rights Statement:

General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Download date: 14. Dec. 2020
ANGER AND THE VEIL IN ANcient GREEK CULTURE*

By D. L. CAIRNS

This paper deals with aspects of the non-verbal expression of anger in ancient Greek culture, with particular reference to the use of veils and similar garments as a means of registering anger. It will explore the affinities which exist between this behaviour in particular and other significant uses of the visual dimension of emotional expression in the regulation of social interaction, both in the Greek context and universally.

We begin with a passage in the sixth book of Herodotus, which tells how the deposed king, Demaratus, came to leave Sparta (6.67):

"Εδυνε δὲ Δημάρητος ἐκ Σπάρτης ἐς Μῆδους ἐκ τοιούτου ὀνείδεσ. Μετὰ τὴς βασιλείας τὴν κατάπαυσαν ὁ Δημάρητος ἤρχε αἵρεσις ἀρχὴν. 'Ήσαν μὲν δὴ Γυμνοπαιδία, θεωμένοι δὲ τοῦ Δημάρητος ὁ Λεκτυχίδης, γεγονὼς ἢδη αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς ἀνὰ ἑκείνου, πέμψας τὸν θεράποντα ἐπὶ γέλωτι τε καὶ λάσθη εἰρώτα τὸν Δημάρητον ὅκιον τι εἴη τὸ ἀρχεῖν μετὰ τὸ βασιλεῖν. Ὅ δὲ ἀλγήσας τῷ ἐπειρωτήματι εἶπε φᾶς αὐτὸς μὲν ἀμφοτέρων ἢδη πεπερηθαίνα, κεῖνον δὲ οὖ, τὴν μέντοι ἐπειρώτησαν ταύτῃ ἄρξει Λακεδαμονίωι ἢ μυρίης κακότητος ἢ μυρίης εὐδαιμονίης. Ταῦτα δὲ ἔταξα καὶ κατακαλυψάμενο εἴη ἕκ τοῦ θείου ἐς τὰ ἔωντο ὁικία, αὐτίκα δὲ παρασκευασάμενο ἔθνω τῷ Δίῳ βοῶν, θύσας δὲ τὴν μητέρα ἐκάλεσε.

Demaratus left Sparta for exile among the Medes as a result of the following insult. After he was deposed from the kingship, he was elected to serve as an official. It was the time of the Gymnopaidiai, Demaratus was in the audience, and Leotychidas, now king in his place, as a joke and an insult, sent his servant to ask Demaratus what it was like to hold office after being king. He was grieved by the question and said that he had experience of both, while Leotychidas did not, but that this question would be the beginning of either immense evil or immense good fortune for the Lacedaemonians. Having said this, he covered his head, left the theatre, and went home. Then he immediately made preparations and sacrificed an ox to Zeus, and, having sacrificed it, summoned his mother.

Demaratus’ veiling has nothing to do with his subsequent sacrifice, nor is it merely the act of a man setting out on his homeward journey; rather it is part of his emotional reaction (his ‘pain’, ἀλγήσας) at the public attack on his honour entailed by Leotychidas’ insult. One might be tempted to regard his response as one of shame or embarrassment rather than anger,1 but though the gesture of veiling does emphasize the victim’s humiliation at the affront he has received, and thus bears the
closest of relations to the veiling which frequently expresses *aidōs*, it is
clear from the passage that Demaratus resents the affront he has
received and uses his gesture as a means of communicating the fact
that offence has been taken. We shall return to the force of the gesture as
a form of retaliation later; for the moment, suffice it to say that, though
shame and anger will very likely fuse or co-occur as responses to public
humiliation, this use of veiling to express the victim’s resentful reaction
to a humiliating public affront legitimates the drawing of a link between
veiling and anger. The existence of such a link is in any case
unambiguously proved by a passage such as Euripides, *Medea* 1144–
55: the Messenger reports how Glaucus’s gladness at seeing her new
husband turns to anger when she sees that he is accompanied by his
children; this is manifested by her drawing her veil before her eyes and
turning her face away, and the use of ‘anger’-terms leaves the nature of
the girl’s response in no doubt:

δέσποινα δ’ ἤν νων ἀντὶ σοῦ θαμαξόμεν,
πρὶν μὲν τέκνοι σῶν εἰσιδεῖν ἔνωριδα,
πρόθυμον εἶχ’ ὀφθαλμόν εἰς Ἴασον:
ἐπεὶτα μέντοι προϋκαλύφατ᾽ ὤματα
λευκὴν τ’ ἀπέστρεψ᾽ ἐμπαλῳ παρηδα,
παῖδων μισασθεία εἰσόδους: πόσις δὲ σῶς
ὀργάς τ’ ἀφήρει καὶ χόλον νεάνιδος
λέγων τάδ’: Ὡ ἡ δυσμενὴ ἔση φίλοις,
παύσῃ δὲ θυμοῦ καὶ πάλιν στρέφεις κάρα,
φίλους νομίζουσα’ οὐσέρ ἄν πῶς σέθεν,
δέξῃ δὲ δώρα καὶ παρατήσῃ πατρός
φυγᾶς ἀφείναι παισὶ τοῖς3, ἐμὴν χάρω.

The mistress we now honour in your place, before she saw the two children, looked
eagerly towards Jason. But then she veiled her eyes and turned her white cheek away,
disgusted at the entrance of the children. Your husband tried to assuage the girl’s angry
temper and said, ‘Don’t be hostile to your kin; cease your anger and turn round again,
regarding as friends whomever your husband does. Accept these gifts and ask your
father to grant these children release from their exile, for my sake.’

The use of the gesture of veiling as a response to an affront is also
attested in the visual arts, especially in depictions of the anger of Achilles
and Ajax at their public humiliation. 2 In the case of Achilles, this veiling
has literary parallels: Aristophanes (*Frogs* 911–13) refers to the appear-
ance of a veiled and silent Achilles in a play of Aeschylus, 3 and although
there was debate already in antiquity as to whether this refers to the
angry, offended Achilles of *Myrmidons* or the grief-stricken Achilles of
*Phrygians* (and the visual evidence [in note 2] shows that Achilles could
be depicted as veiled in either situation), fragment 132b Radt shows that Myrmidons had a long silence of requisite type (lines 8–9, πάλας σιωπώ κτλ.), and Taplin makes a strong case for the reference of Aristophanes’ lines to that play.\(^4\)

But the veiled Achilles has deeper roots than this; true, he does not veil in the Iliad, but he does effect an analogous form of separation by withdrawing from the community of the Achaens, refusing social interaction and concealing himself from his fellows.\(^5\) The element of concealing, the denial of visual communication, strongly suggests that veiling as an expression of anger is comparable to withdrawal – Demaratus, we notice, both veils and withdraws. Withdrawal as an expression of anger, of course, is a recurrent poetic theme; it structures the role of Achilles in the Iliad, but also appears in connection with other characters: not only Meleager, who serves as a paradigm for Achilles in Iliad 9,\(^6\) but also (in the Iliad) Paris, Aeneas, and (according to Agamemnon) the whole Achaean army, following Achilles’ example in an equivalent expression of their anger at the king.\(^7\) Another prominent application of the theme is in the withdrawal of Demeter in the Homeric Hymn which bears her name, and her case warrants our special attention in that her angry withdrawal, first from other gods, then from mortals, is manifested not only in physical separation but also in veiling:\(^8\) at lines 40–2 she exchanges her krèdemnon for a kalumma, signifying both her new emotional state and the change which she perceives to have occurred in her status:

\[\text{όξιν δὲ μιν κραδήν ἄχος ἐλλαβεν, ἀμφι δὲ χαίταις} \\
\text{ἀμβροσίαις κρὴδεμνα δαίζετο χεραί φλήσι:\} \\
\text{κυάνεον δὲ κάλυμμα κατ’ ἀμφυτέρων βιάλετ’ ἀμνων.}\]

Bitter pain seized her heart, and she tore the head-binder on her immortal hair with her dear hands, and she cast a dark veil down from both her shoulders.

It is not immediately obvious that this involves Demeter’s covering her head (though this in fact is what the donning of a kalumma = kaluptrē would normally entail), but it is apparent from lines 180–3 that she does;\(^9\) and she remains enveloped in this dark garment until her wrath is appeased and her grief dispelled. This combination of grief and anger motivates her behaviour at 192–205, where, until amused by antics of Lambe, the goddess rejects all forms of social interaction: at first she refuses a seat and avoids eye-contact; then (once seated) she holds her veil before her face and keeps silent, refusing food and drink. That this scene is an aition of Eleusinian ritual (see below) does not alter the fact.
that all this behaviour is also motivated on an emotional level, where the refusal of society signifies both the separation prompted by grief and the disaffection and alienation of anger.

What the veiling of Demeter and the literary and artistic depictions of a veiled Achilles demonstrate is that veiling as a response to an affront is not merely an expression of the occurring feeling of mortification caused by public humiliation; it can also constitute a means of conveying a sustained refusal to engage in social interaction which amounts to a strategy designed to highlight and retaliate against the original offence and which thus bears the closest comparison with the phenomenon of withdrawal as a means of registering one’s anger.

Discussion of the case of Demeter brings us to the sole candidate in the Iliad to be considered as an instance of veiling in anger, namely the veiling of Thetis in 24.89–94:

τὴν δὲ ἡμείβετ’ ἐπείτα θεά Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζας τίπτε με κείνος ἄνωγε μέγας θεός; αἰδεύομαι δὲ μίσηςθ’ ἀβανάτουσιν, ἐχω δ’ ἀχεὶ ἀκριτα θυμῶ. εἰμὶ μὲν, οὐδ’ ἄλον ἐπος ἐσαεται ὥτ’ κεν εἴην. ὃς ἀρα φωνήσασα κάλυμμα’ ἔλε διὰ θεὰς κυάκεον, τοῦ δ’ οὐ τι μελάντερον ἐπλέτο ἐσθος.

Then spoke in answer the silver-footed goddess, Thetis: ‘Why does that great god command me? I am ashamed to mix with the immortals, for I have countless pains in my heart. Yet I shall go, and no word that he utters will be in vain.’ Having spoken thus, the bright goddess took a dark veil, than which there was no darker garment.

Like Demeter, Thetis wishes to remain apart from other gods, and advertises her emotional state by donning a dark kalumma, the only other such garment in early hexameter poetry. Her use of the dark garment, which covered her head as surely as Demeter’s covered hers, underlines the analogy between veiling and spatial separation – Thetis would rather not enter the company of the gods at all, but since she has to, she preserves a degree of separation by putting on the kalumma. But is Thetis’ emotional state one of anger? Laura Slatkin has argued that it is, partly on the basis of the parallel with Demeter, and partly out of a conviction that the Iliad presupposes Thetis’ role in a myth of divine succession in which she holds the key to the continuation of Zeus’ ascendancy and safeguards his position at the cost first of marriage to a mortal for herself and then of her son’s mortality. Having given up the chance to bear Zeus’ successor and compelled to watch helplessly as her son goes to his death, Thetis, on this interpretation, has a great deal to be angry about.
If Slatkin's argument is correct, it provides only grounds for Thetis' anger; 24.89–94 remains the only passage which could be said actually to depict the occurrence of that anger. So the case for that passage as further evidence for the association between veiling, separation, and anger stands or falls on the interpretation of that context. We should give some weight to the parallel with Demeter's dark kalumma and its association with anger, but the strongest argument in favour of identifying Thetis' response as anger is the use of achea in 91. Achos is normally translated 'grief', but is in fact a highly undifferentiated emotional term, used of a number of different forms of distress.11 One of these is anger: achos is both explicitly associated with anger and used to denote a reaction to an affront or potential impairment of honour.12 It is important to note that, in cases such as that of Achilles in Iliad 1.188–92, achos describes not merely an emotion which precedes or co-exists with anger, but is rather used of an emotional distress caused by another's insulting behaviour that can be reformulated in terms of anger as such:

\[ \text{ως φάτω. Πηλελεων \ δ' ἁχος γένετ', \ εν δε \ ητορ} \\
\text{στήθεσιν λασίοισι διάνθιχα μεμήρισεν, } \\
\text{η δ' \ γε \ φάσαγαν \ οδών \ ερισσάμενος παρά \ μηροῦ} \\
\text{τοὺς \ μὲν \ ἀναστήσεις, \ δ' \ Ατρείδην \ ἐναρίζων, } \\
\text{ηε \ χόλον \ παύσεων \ ερητύσει \ τε \ θυμον.} \]

So he spoke. Achos came upon the son of Peleus, and within his shaggy breast his heart pondered in two ways, whether he should draw his sharp sword from beside his thigh, break up the assembly, and slay the son of Atreus, or put a stop to his anger and curb his spirit.

There is thus semantic as well as typological or thematic support for the contention that Thetis in Iliad 24 is subject to anger.13

On the other hand, Thetis' immediate motivation is more readily understood in terms of grief at the imminent loss of her son (she is found mourning his fate at 85–6 when Iris arrives to give her Zeus' message), and this is a notion that achea in 91 could certainly convey. Though achos can signify or imply anger, it need not do so, and indeed in one passage (Iliad 6.335–6) a sharp disjunction is drawn between achos (qua emotional distress, Paris' real reason for withdrawing from battle) and anger (the reason presumed by Hector). If the achea of 24.91 refer to Thetis' grief at the fate of Achilles, then her aidōs at enforced social communication and her subsequent veiling can be compared to the many cases in which the head is veiled to conceal
grief. An interpretation in terms of grief, pure and simple, might also be borne out by a number of passages in which achos is presented as a black cloud which engulfs one at the loss of a companion. Thetis’ dark veil could then be regarded as a transformation of the ‘black cloud of grief’ motif, illustrating that connection between veils and clouds that is manifest (for example) in the etymology of Latin nubere/nubes.

Thus, though there may be (remote and implicit) grounds for anger in the mythological background, the immediate context in Book 24 explicitly and adequately motivates Thetis’ veiling as an expression of grief, and so the case of Thetis probably cannot be used to corroborate the link between anger and veiling. This reminds us that, though emotions such as grief, anger, and aidôs can combine as elements in a single overall experience, and though this total emotional experience can be expressed by the gesture of veiling, veiling is not always to be regarded as overdetermined in this way. Close attention to the immediate context and the signals it conveys regarding the eliciting conditions of the emotion is all-important. Yet this instance does not undermine the general argument of this paper, for we certainly have enough in the other passages we have considered to establish that anger, whether singly or in combination, may be one of the emotions expressed by veiling.

Covering the head to express anger is something that we do not do; as such, then, the gesture is culturally specific. The use of veiling as a manifestation of anger must be understood in terms of the regular Greek associations, first, between anger and honour and, second, between honour and the visual: to possess a proper sense of honour (aidôs) is to be aware of how one appears to others, to show others proper regard, and to know when to pursue and when to avoid eye-contact; to lack such a sense (to be anaidôs) is to be unconcerned about how one appears to others, to disregard their status, and to initiate or maintain eye-contact in circumstances where one should not. Greek definitions of anger regularly locate it in the concept of honour; as an expression of anger, veiling is thus to be seen in the context of a group dynamic in which the norm is mutual acknowledgement of interactants’ status; when this norm is violated, the offended party breaks off communication, registering the breakdown in reciprocity by refusing to participate further.

Veiling is not the only way to do this; the same effect can be created, as we have seen, by means of physical withdrawal, as well as by refusal of eye-contact and by silence; veiling thus belongs with other expressions of anger which involve refusal to communicate with the offending
party. Equally, anger is not the only emotion expressed by veiling or spatial separation: one might compare their use as manifestations of women’s modesty or as accompaniments to the expression of grief, for the relation that exists between veiling and withdrawal in the case of anger also obtains between Penelope’s use of the veil and her preference for her own quarters in the Odyssey (as between female veiling and seclusion in general), or between the practice of veiling to hide one’s tears (as Odysseus does in Odyssey 8) and staying indoors to keep one’s lamentation private (as does, for example, Ajax in Sophocles’ play). One veils or conceals oneself in Greek culture when one’s honour is impugned, impaired, or otherwise at stake (out of shame, out of anger, or when indulging in emotions which it is considered inappropriate to display in public; since women’s honour is permanently impugned, impaired, or otherwise at stake vis-à-vis that of men, they belong indoors and veil themselves in public on a permanent basis). The gesture of veiling in anger thus illustrates graphically to the offender the victim’s sense of having suffered a diminution in status.

The veiling that expresses anger must be taken closely with other applications of the same gesture. The basic function in all these cases is one of separation: the angry individual withdraws from an interaction or a social context in which his or her status has been challenged. Thus veiling in anger bears comparison with other, less immediately emotional manifestations of veiling, in which the gesture conveys the basic fact of separation from the group. This is the function of veiling in several rites of passage: in funerary ritual, the corpse is often veiled, and mourners, too, can be veiled – not only as a spontaneous expression of their grief, but also to emphasize their identification with the deceased and to signify the liminality they share with the not-yet-buried corpse. Similar is the use of the veil in wedding ritual, where it serves to illustrate the bride’s transition from her old to her new status; but perhaps the clearest example of all is the use of veiling in mystic initiation, the practice for which Demeter’s veiling in the Iambe-scene of the Hymn is an aition. In all these cases, although specific emotional reactions or attitudes may be in play, separation from one status prior to assumption of another is the basic function of the gesture, and veiling signifies both the separation and the liminality which separation inaugurates; veiling in anger manifests the same fact of separation, the same notion of a previous status having been altered, and the same idea of liminality; as the creation of this liminality in rites of passage dramatizes the crisis of movement from one status to another, so the veiling of the angry
individual signals a critical period in that person’s interaction with others: the refusal of communication itself communicates a breach in a relationship (and thus a disruption in social identity) which the offending party can either take steps to repair or allow to develop.

As a manifestation of anger, however, veiling also manifests a degree of self-control which is also a feature of the gesture in its association with other emotions, especially in its use as a mark of grief. Plato, *Phaedo* 117c is a good example: Socrates’ companions try to restrain their tears, but after he has drunk the hemlock Phaedo, at least, can do so no longer, but covers his head and weeps, his veiling mitigating the breach of decorum which open lamentation would represent. In a similar fashion, veiling, as in the case of Demaratus, fills the space which might have been occupied by a more violent and uncontrolled outburst of anger, much as Achilles’ withdrawal in *Iliad* 1 is an alternative to his initial impulse to kill Agamemnon on the spot (1.189–221).

In all these ways, veiling as an expression of anger is firmly embedded in cultural forms which, though they may have analogues elsewhere, must be understood first of all in a specifically Hellenic context. These are, perhaps, not the sorts of behaviour that occur most readily to us as typical expressions of anger; yet the phenomena described are rooted in universal features of non-verbal communication with which we are very familiar. Visual contact is of immeasurable importance in interpersonal communication, from earliest infancy onwards: Eibl-Eibesfeldt reports that 70% of the ‘verbalizations of American mothers during the initial contact period’ immediately after birth referred to their babies’ eyes;25 by the age of two month babies are clearly reciprocating visual contact, and at three months they are able to use eye-contact and other visual cues as a means of actively initiating contact.26 Very shortly thereafter (from the age of five months onward) infants begin to use eye-contact to regulate their own arousal in interactions: infants of 5–10 months old exhibit noticeably increased pulse rate on making visual contact with others, especially strangers, and control this by looking away.27 Thus the characteristic ambivalence in human interaction between contact-seeking and contact-avoiding behaviours has its origins in the way that infant makes, withdraws, then re-establishes eye-contact with others. This pattern remains with us for the rest of our lives: it is especially obvious where contact-initiative is accompanied by self-consciousness.28

We see in these behaviours the roots of our Greek gesture as a means of self-control and expression of self-consciousness. But human
ethology is also informative on its specific use as a means of conveying anger. Already at two months old, the infant’s active role in interactions is apparent (*inter alia*) in its use of withdrawal of eye-contact as an emotional lever to ‘punish’ its mother’s ‘neglect’.29 This use of rupture of visual communication (visual cut-off, as the ethologists call it) as a strategy of taking offence seems to be universal and instinctive. There are two other ethological factors which should influence the way we think about the Greek use of veiling as an expression of anger. First, the need for regulation of visual communication in personal interaction is just one feature of the care that has to be taken in preserving the dignity of all parties to a (non-aggressive) interaction.30 In conversation, we orient our faces towards our interlocutor; we do not fix them with a stare while we are speaking, but look away intermittently; when another wishes to join the interaction, we admit them by facing them/making visual contact; we include all members of the group by looking at them. And we break off contact in stages, gradually turning away, making as if to leave, easing our departure by means of the parting formulas that Eibl-Eibesfeldt describes as ‘verbal gifts’ — ‘Have nice day’, ‘See you later’.31 Accordingly, abrupt departure or sudden abandonment of communication gives offence.32 The veiling of angered party in Greek culture not only hints at retaliation, it is a form of retaliation, the victim’s way of punishing the offender’s breach of the rules of interaction.

Another significant factor has to do with role of the eyes and the head in the acknowledgement of status. The role of the visual in status-recognition is already manifested in terms such as ‘regard’, ‘respect’ (and their equivalents in other languages): we reward those whose status we acknowledge with our visual attention. The angry veiler withdraws that visual attention (and thus conveys his or her lack of respect for the offender). But with regard to the acknowledgement of status, the importance of visual attention merges with that of posture and elevation: we talk about being ‘highly regarded’, and the regulation of hierarchies of dominance and deference through posture, stature, and spatial location is another cross-cultural universal.33 We can narrow this down still further by focusing on role of the head in such situations: inclining the head indicates deference, mitigates any suggestion of threat, and thus eases interaction.34 The gesture of veiling de-emphasizes the head (one does not hold a veiled head high): the angry victim of insult clearly does not wish to express deference; but he does wish to advertise his diminished status, to demonstrate the effect
of the other’s insult, and so the same basic relation between the head, posture, and status comes into play (and the gesture can thus illustrate lack of respect from the offender). But the adoption of a posture that advertises the impairment of one’s own status also allows the possibility of reparation (should the offender be so minded); thus there is, after all, an affinity with the appeasement function of the inclined head.

As a means of registering one’s loss of status, of refusing communication in order to punish the offender, and yet also of creating room for the offender’s reparation the Greek gesture of veiling (and its close analogue, withdrawal) exhibit in a specific form universal features of non-verbal communication. This is true also of the gesture’s function as a form of self-control; for all such forms of visual cut-off constitute aggression-blocking responses that contrast markedly with alternative expressions which convey unmediated aggression and escalate the breakdown of the relationship. Such alternatives include threats, abuse, acts of violence, and even killing the offender; but the alternative which is most directly antithetical to our strategy of visual cut-off and thus most relevant to the theme of this paper is the aggressive and threatening use of eye-contact and facial expression (abandoning the normal protocols of ocular interaction) as a means of violating the offender’s personal space. For the blazing eyes, fierce looks, scowls, and frowns that are so prominent (for example) in the depiction of anger in the Iliad also constitute universal features of the non-verbal expression of anger. Veiling and withdrawal are thus not the only ways of visually communicating anger; they contrast with more confrontational and aggressive forms of visual communication. All such strategies involve a threatened sanction against the offender, but they also carry a risk for the individual who implements the strategy: visual cut-off is a (more or less) passive reaction which stresses one’s own victimhood and the other’s breach of co-operation; its sanction is the end of the relationship, the loss of the victim as a future co-operative partner; it is in some ways more attractive than the more aggressive strategy, in so far as it leaves a greater number of options open (repair of the breach in the relationship, punishment of the offender by ending the relationship, other forms of retaliation in future), but the risk it entails is that of isolation and humiliation, should the sanction prove to carry no weight with the offender or if the aggression-blocking response is felt by others to manifest an insufficient degree of self-respect. In contrast, the active, aggressive, and less controlled responses threaten physical harm, but at the risk of one’s own safety and advantage.
We can now see that, in the excellent phrase of Walter Burkert, the phenomenon of veiling as an expression of anger in the Greek context ‘fits the landscape’—a culturally specific gesture can be seen to draw on fundamental elements of behaviour which have their roots in natural adaptations. Other gestures, expressions, or behaviour-patterns, of course, can be thought of in the same terms: bowing, for example, appears to be a universal expression of deference, a function of the way all human beings use their bodies to communicate; we have no trouble in understanding its fundamental meaning, but this is of little practical use to any foreigner who seeks to understand (or, yet more difficult, participate in) the social niceties of bowing in Japan, where the question is when to bow, how far, and to whom. We might compare the modern Greek upward nod as a gesture for ‘no’; one readily comprehends the dismissal, denial, or rejection that the gesture entails, yet its use as the non-verbal equivalent to ‘no’ is not culturally universal. There can be very fine degrees of cultural specificity in the refinement of universal forms. Full understanding of these phenomena, however, must dispense with simplistic polarities of ‘biology’ versus ‘culture’; emotions are the crucial underpinnings of human sociality, and their own fundamentally social character is underlined by the importance of facial expression and other forms of visual communication in emotional life. There are many aspects of emotional scenarios that vary between and within cultures: but the high level of cross-cultural universality in the non-verbal expression of emotion and the evidence that this universality is underpinned by phylogenetic capacity give the lie to the equation of ‘social’ with ‘culturally determined’.

* This paper was first presented as part of the APA panel on the Greek Passions at the annual conference of the Classical Association, Liverpool, April 1999, and rehearsed in a seminar in Glasgow later that same month. I am grateful to members of both audiences, and to my fellow panellists on the former occasion, for helpful discussion.

1. See N. Richer, ‘Aidos at Sparta’ in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell (edd.), Sparta: New Perspectives (London, 1999), 96–7 and 107–8 n. 71. As N. Robertson observes, the anecdote ‘is too perfect to be an actual incident’ (Festivals and Legends: the Formation of Greek Cities in the Light of Public Ritual [Toronto, 1992], 154); the detail of D.’s veiling is thus presumably included because it would be a typical response in such circumstances.

2. See LIMC i, Achilles 440–2, 444–5, 453, 448, 464; Aias I 81, 84; iii, Briseis 1, 14. Achilles also veils in mourning for the death of Patroclus (London E363, ARV² 596.36); see below (n. 22) on veiling and grief. Achilles, of course, is a paradigm of anger, and his veiling on the vases answers to his self-seclusion in the Iliad, A. L. Boegehold, When a Gesture was Expected: a Selection of Examples from Archaic and Classical Greek Literature (Princeton, 1999), 27, 31–2 believes veiling expresses *aidôs* and only *aidôs*, and sees Ajax’s veiling on the cup by Duris (= LIMC i, Aias 1 81) as a...
typical case of the veiling which conceals emotion; true, Ajax has been humiliated, and his veiling does express his reaction to this, but any viewer of such an image knew that Ajax’s reaction was carried forward into violent retaliation and a suicide which demonstrated his irreconcilable alienation from the society which he felt had betrayed him. Because anger and shame are (concurrent and overlapping) responses to an affront, there will be scenarios in which the veiling of the affronted party expresses both emotions.

3. πρωτίστα μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀν καθὸς ἐγκαλόφας, Αχιλλεὶ τῷ ὑπὸ Νάβὴν, τὸ πρόσωπον σῷ ἔδεικνυ, πρόσχυμα τῆς πραγμάδιας, γραμμένας οὖθε τοῖς.

First of all he’d wrap up some individual and seat him on the stage, Achilles maybe, or Niobe, without showing their face, a pompous show of tragedy, and they wouldn’t even make so much as a murmur.

6. Il. 9.553–7, 565–6 (angry at his mother, he takes to his bedroom and lies beside his wife); 574–6 (the elders beg him to come out); 581–3 (his father, shaking the barred door, entreats him).
9. αὐτὰρ ἐπειτα πρὸς δώματα πατρὸς ἡγενθ’ ὠ’ ἄρ’ ὡσιδε βλον τετημένη ἠτορ στείχε κατὰ κρίβην κεκαλαμένην, ἀμφὶ δὲ πέπλος καῦσε οιδίνου καθ’ ἐλεξίζετο ποσσίν.

Then she led him to the dear house of their father, and she walked behind, distressed in her dear heart, veiled from the head down; and the dark robe flapped around the slender feet of the goddess.

13. Overlap between anger and grief is also a feature of the semantics of Lat. dolor (S. M. Braund, ‘A Passion Unconsolable? Grief and Anger in Juvenal Satires 13’ in S. M. Braund and C. Gill [edd.], The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature [Cambridge, 1997], 80), and discernible even in the usage of Eng. ‘grievance’, ‘aggrieved’, but the overlap is more than semantic, for it is a well-established feature of the phenomenology of grief that it should encompass a sense of anger: see, e.g., E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Eng. trans. New York, 1995), 397; G. Holst-Warhaft, Dangerous Voices: Women’s Laments and Greek Literature (London, 1992), 5.
15. ll. 17.591–2, 18.22–7; Od. 24.315–19; cf. also ll. 17.83: Ἑκτορα δ’ αἰῶν ἄχος πῦκασα φρῆνας
ἀμφί μελαντα (‘A terrible achos enveloped Hector’s black phrenes’).
16. See R. B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge, 1951), 421, M. Nagler, Spontaneity and Tradition (Berkeley, 1974), 50–1; for a clear example of a veil/garment metaphorically represented as a cloud, see E. Or. 467–8.
18. See [Plato, Def. 415e11; Arist. Rhet. 1378a30–2, Top. 127b30–1, 151a15–16, 156a32–3; cf. DA 403a30–1.
19. See ll. 3.216–20; if one did not know better, one would judge that Odysseus’ style of delivery, his eyes fixed on the ground, indicates a deep and long-lasting anger (kotos).
20. See, e.g., Ajax at Od. 11.563–5, Demeter at H. Dem. 198, Achilles in A. Myrmidon (fr. 132b; cf. above), and cf. R. B. Rutherford, s.v. ‘silence’ in OCD3, 1406. E. David, ‘Sparta’s Kosmos of Silence’, in Hodkinson and Powell (n. 1), 131 notes the silence which follows Demaratus’ brief response to Leotychidas’ insult and accompanies his veiling at Hdt. 6.67; David’s article on the uses of silence at Sparta is very suggestive of ways in which silence and avoidance of visual communication perform closely analogous functions in interaction (e.g., as expressions of deference, as means of expressing, concealing, or coping with emotion, as a rejection of or exclusion from social contact, in ritual, etc.); but this is a subject for another paper.
24. See L. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin, 1932), 78; W. Burkert, Homo Necans (Berkeley, 1983), 266–9, Greek Religion (Oxford, 1985), 286; Foley (n. 7), 68. For the aition, see H. Dem. 192–205; the ritual is parodied at Ar. Nub. 254–68.
27. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 173, 335.
29. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 205–6, 373, 488, 499, 560; cf. C. Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (3rd edn. by P. Ekman, London, 1998), 231; E. Goffman, Interaction Ritual (New York, 1967, 23; A. Kendon, Studies in the Behaviour of Social Interaction (Bloomington, 1977), 164–5; D. Morris, Manwatching (London, 1977), 164–5; the same behaviour is also found in non-human vertebrates: see K. Lorenz, On Aggression (new edn. London, 1996), 183–4; Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 170. Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s photographs of this strategy in action (frames from films shot in a range of different locations) illustrate both its immediate familiarity in terms of our own experience and its intimate affinity with the Greek gesture of veiling; see his figs. 6.69–70 (pp. 500–2), 7.16 (p. 566); 6.70 is particularly germane to this study, since it shows a small Yanomamô boy using the hammock in which he is lying as an improvised body-adapter (cf. the Greek veil) to complete visual cut-off and demonstrate his anger to his mother.
30. On the importance of the visual in human interaction: Goffman (n. 29), 97, 123, 249–50; M. Argyle and M. Cook, Gaze and Mutual Gaze (Cambridge, 1976); Kendon (n. 29), 13–51; D. R.

31. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 496.

32. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 488, 540.

33. Darwin (n. 29), 262–4; Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 298–9, 305, 373, 405, 499, 501; Lateiner (n. 30), 93–103.

34. From the age of about 8 months, my son, Owen, began spontaneously to initiate interactions with adults (especially women) by making eye-contact, smiling, and inclining his head markedly to one side (cf. Eibl-Eibesfeldt [n. 25], 274, 299, 405). Audiences to whom I have shown photographic evidence of this confirm the familiarity of the head-tilt, not just from their own experience of other humans but also as a typical behaviour of their cats. The inclination of the head and lowering of the body are in fact found as signs of deference in a number of non-human species: see Trivers (n. 30), 145–6 (herring gull), 376 (chimpanzee); Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 299 (chimpanzee).

35. See Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 337.

36. Blazing eyes and aggressive looks: see, e.g., *Il. 1.101–5*, 19.16–18; cf. G. I. C. Robertson, ‘The Eyes of Achilles: *Iliad* 1.200’, *Phoenix* 53 (1998), 1–7; frown: see the instances of the expression Ṿpôrô mòeî collected and discussed by J. P. Holoka, ‘“Looking Darkly” (Ṽpôrô mòeî): Reflections on Status and Decorum in Homer’, *TAPA* 113 (1983), 1–16; cf. S. D. Olson, ‘Kleon’s Eyebrows (Cratin. fr. 228K-A) and Late Fifth-century Comic Portrait Masks’, *CQ* 49 (1999), 320–1; cf. the use of the verb skuesthai at *Il. 4.22–4* = 8.459–61 (apparently a less aggressive response than that implied by Ṿpôrô mòeî); also the frown that betrays an attempt to conceal anger at *Il. 15.101–3*. (I discuss these and other cases more fully in a forthcoming paper, ‘Anger in the *Iliad*,’ in S. M. Braun and G. W. Most [edd.], *Aspects of Anger in the Ancient World*.) On the universality of such expressions, see Darwin (n. 29), 226–8, 234–49 with Ekman’s commentary; cf. 136–42 on the expression of anger in animals; see also Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 369 (evidence from deaf-blind infants).

37. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 499.

38. See Goffman (n. 29), 23. This is the perspective from which Thersites (who, like everyone else, is unaware that Achilles only refrained from killing Agamemnon on the advice of Athena) criticizes Achilles’ response to Agamemnon’s insult as insufficiently aggressive at *Il. 2.239–42*; cf. N. Austin, ‘Anger and Disease in Homer’s *Iliad*’ in J. N. Kazazis and A. Rengakos (edd.), *Euphrosyne: Studies in Ancient Epic and its Legacy in Honor of D. N. Maronitis* (Stuttgart, 1999), 26. (I am very grateful to Professor Austin for showing me this article in advance of its publication.) Veiling as a strategy of taking offence is particularly risky in that it can be construed as a gesture of weakness or failure, as is vividly illustrated by the mockery unleashed by the gesture in Plutarch’s anecdote of the death of Demosthenes (*Life of Demosthene*, 29.4).


40. See Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 485.

41. See Eibl-Eibesfeldt (n. 25), 471; Boegehold (n. 2), 20.

42. Frontisi Ducroux (see n. 30 above) notes the importance of facial expression in the emotional life of the ancient Greeks, as well as the importance of visual communication in their culture in general, but defines this as radically antithetical to the predominant emphasis on inner mental life in ‘our’ society: for the Greek, one’s identity is wholly constituted by the visual attention
of others, and the face does not conceal any hidden depths (Le Dieu masque, 10; Du masque au visage, 27–9, 31–3; Dans l’oeil du miroir, 156–7); the first of these generalizations contains the grain of truth that (as Goffman puts it [n. 29], 45), ‘by acquiring [human nature, i.e. membership of a society through participation in its interaction ritual] the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are imposed on him from without’, but this is a universal feature of human sociality (and, as Goffman further observes [84], ‘The Meadian [i.e. cultural-determinist] notion that the individual takes towards himself the attitude others take to him seems very much an oversimplification. Rather the individual must rely on others to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only certain parts’). Frontisi’s second generalization is easily refuted by the large number of passages in which Greek authors show their awareness that outward demeanour may actively conceal inner feeling; this is particularly striking in those passages of Odyssey (10.374, 20.9–21, 301) where what are normally visible, external expressions of emotion (a threatening look, ‘barking’, smiling) are portrayed as undetectable inner experiences. Frontisi calls for a semiology of Greek face and body language (Du masque au visage, 21) in apparent ignorance of the life’s work of Paul Ekman (bibliography in Darwin [n. 29], 445–8) and the enormous contribution he has made not only to the development of such a semiology but also to the demonstration that such a project cannot adequately be pursued on the basis of cultural-determinist assumptions. A similar cultural-determinist orientation underlies Muellner’s insistence (n. 7) that the sociality of anger and other emotions in Homer constitutes a profound difference between Homeric society and ‘us’, for whom ‘emotions are primarily individualized and internal, and their social dimensions are semantically secondary’ (138); for a much better-balanced approach to the (universal and fundamental) sociality of emotion, see Jon Elster’s recent Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge, 1999).