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Citation for published version:

Bai, L & Wu, L 2020, 'Political movement and trust formation: Evidence from the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)', *European Economic Review*, vol. 122, 103331, pp. 1-18.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103331>

Digital Object Identifier (DOI):

[10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103331](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103331)

Link:

[Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer](#)

Document Version:

Peer reviewed version

Published In:

European Economic Review

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Political Movement and Trust Formation: Evidence from the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)*

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August 23, 2019

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of political movement on trust formation, in the context of China's Cultural Revolution (1966-76), an influential political upheaval that involved widespread conflict and incentivized non-cooperative behavior. Combining both county-level variation in revolutionary intensity and cohort-level variation in trust formation ages, we construct individual exposure to the revolution using a difference-in-differences strategy. Our findings indicate that individuals in counties with higher revolutionary intensity and of trust formation cohorts report significantly lower levels of trust more than three decades later. This effect is more pronounced for those more likely to have been targeted during the revolution (the bad class origins) as well as those with greater exposure to its early years (1966-71). The results are robust after accounting for the dynamic effects of pre-revolution socio-economic characteristics, an extensive set of region-specific cohort trends, placebo tests, and potential reporting bias.

JEL Codes: N45, O10, P26.

Key Words: Political Movement, Conflict, Trust, Social Capital

*We are deeply grateful to the guidance and support of Albert Park, James Kung and Paola Giuliano. This paper also benefited from comments by Ying Bai, Tommy Bengtsson, Leah Boustan, Ting Chen, Mingwei Fu, Sebastian Galiani, Scott Gehlbach, Jean Hong, Siying Liu, Melanie Manion, Stelios Michalopoulos, Nancy Qian, James Tong, Feng Yang, Wenhui Yang, Jingyi Ye, Nico Voigtländer, Tianyu Wang, Xin Meng, Melanie Xue, and the participants in the seminars at HKUST, UCLA Anderson, Warwick Summer Economic Growth Workshop, Warwick History and Institutions Conference, RCI Workshop (Hong Kong). All remaining errors are our own.

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1 Introduction

Trust plays a crucial role in promoting economic development (Arrow, 1974; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Tabellini, 2010), government efficiency (Putnam, 2000; Aghion et al., 2010), international trade (Greif, 1993; Guiso et al., 2009), financial development (Guiso et al., 2004), and individual well-being (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004), by reducing transaction costs and enhancing social cohesion.¹ Given the importance of trust in economic prosperity and social well-being, understanding the origins of trust and its formation process calls for scholarly attention.

This paper studies the effect of political movements on trust formation, in the context of an influential socio-political movement in 20th century China - the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which involved widespread conflict, political campaigning, and extensive victimization (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1991; MacFarquhar, 1974). Recognizing its legacies, the revolution was later officially regarded as a period of “severe disaster and turmoil.”² The key linkage between the revolution and trust is that it incentivized non-cooperative behavior at the grass-root level, through factional struggles, collective conflicts, and targeted political campaigns. While the guideline of the revolution emphasized class struggle and preserving ideological purity, their definition was often vague and arbitrary, leading people to signal their political loyalty through the identifying and targeting of “class enemies” and “counter-revolutionaries” from within their own communities.³ As such, it provides us with a powerful lens to study how political conflict can affect social trust decades later.

To examine this linkage empirically, we combine newly-digitized county-level data on revolutionary intensity and nationally-representative individual-level survey data on trust. In particular, we utilize a standard measure of generalized trust from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) survey in 2012.⁴ For the main explanatory variable, we collected data on revolutionary intensity from county gazetteers, as proxied by the number of abnormal deaths resulting directly from the revolution during 1966-76.⁵ This includes

¹See Algan and Cahuc (2014) for a recent summary of this literature.

²The official “*Resolutions on Certain Questions in the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC*” stated: [the Cultural Revolution] was an upheaval that was wrongly launched by party leaders, manipulated by counter-revolutionary cliques, resulting in severe disaster and turmoil to the Party and the Chinese people.

³These were often individuals whose backgrounds as former landlords, rich peasants, and intellectuals, meant that they were suspected to be lacking support for the socialist agenda being pursued at the time.

⁴The same question has been used in other large-scale surveys (e.g. the General Social Survey, the European Social Survey, as well as the World Value Surveys).

⁵The sample of counties is chosen to match the CFPS’s regional coverage.

deaths and suicides as a result of targeted political campaigns on the one hand, as well as collective conflicts between rival factions on the other. An important advantage of our data is the availability of separate measures for each type of violence, which allows us to delve deeper into potential mechanisms.

The main challenge in estimating the causal impact of revolutionary intensity on trust is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, since the distribution of conflicts is non-random across regions. To make progress, we use a generalized difference-in-differences strategy that takes advantage of both regional variation in intensity and cohort variation in exposure. The latter is informed by the behavioral and development psychology literature, which suggests the age window between 8 and 22 as the critical period of trust formation (Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Flanagan and Stout, 2010). Given this, we construct a cohort-specific exposure measure, corresponding to the number of years between age 8 and 22 that overlap with the decade of the revolution (1966-1976). This strategy is able to account for all cohort-invariant county factors that affect both revolutionary intensity and trust, and relies on a parallel cohort trend assumption between high- and low-intensity counties.

To examine the validity and robustness of our analysis, we adopt three strategies: (1) we control for the time-varying effects of pre-revolution characteristics, which could be potential confounders (*i.e.*, educational inequality, social and ethnic fragmentation, and historical social capital); (2) we account for an extensive set of region-specific cohort trends, using interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trend, so as to capture any shared trends in trust across regions; and (3) we control for other socio-economic shocks which could drive the main results (e.g., post-1978 reforms), and use various placebo tests as a validation of the main specification. Our results are robust throughout, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Our empirical results show that individuals in a county with higher revolutionary intensity and belonging to a cohort with greater exposure have lower levels of trust, more than four decades later. In terms of magnitude, an increase in revolutionary intensity from the 25th to the 75th percentile value causes the *marginal effect* of an additional year of exposure to increase by 0.49 percentage points. Given this, increasing the years of exposure from 0 to 11 will result in a deterioration of trust by 5.43 percentage points, comparing counties at the 25th and 75th percentiles. These are very sizable effects, which account for around 10% of the mean level of trust among all individuals.⁶ When we examine effects separately by type of conflict, we find that collective conflicts have larger effects than political campaigns.

⁶The average likelihood of answering “most people can be trusted” in our sample is 54.5%.

Utilizing data on individual characteristics, we further investigate whether the revolution had heterogeneous effects across sub-groups. In particular, we consider heterogeneity in terms of class origins, which played an important role during this period. The most noticeable pattern is that the effects are largest for the likely victims - those with “bad” class origins.⁷ Furthermore, we explore heterogeneity by comparing different phases of the revolution. The results show that the effect of exposure to the first phase (1966-1971) dominates that to the second (1972-1976), where the latter phase was much calmer in terms of violence and political campaigns.

To confirm the validity of these main results, we carry out a number of placebo tests and robustness checks. First, we construct alternative measures of cohort exposure by using hypothetical age windows of trust formation (*i.e.*, 2-7, and 23-30 respectively). The main explanatory variable no longer predicts the level of trust when we implement this, lending credence to the identification strategy. Second, instead of the real time span of the revolution (1966-1976), we use hypothetical periods (*i.e.*, 1955-1965 and 1977-1987). The results under this setting show no systematic effects. Third, we investigate whether the revolution has affected outcomes that it should not. Specifically, we use mistreatment due to gender and registration status (rural/urban) as dependent variables.⁸ Since neither were salient dimensions during the conflict period, we expect no significant effects. Indeed, our results confirm this conjecture. Finally, we employ two robustness checks aimed at controlling for potential measurement error in revolutionary intensity. Once again the results remain unchanged.

Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it complements existing studies on preference formation. Previous work has focused on preferences in relation to redistribution (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), time (Galor and Özak, 2016), risk (Callen et al., 2014; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), and politics (Druckman and Lupia, 2000), among others. Many studies within this literature bridge developmental psychology and behavioral economics, relaxing the assumption that preference parameters are stable and exogenous. Our work adds to this literature by examining a historical shock that generated cohort-specific variation, leveraging findings on preference formation as suggested by developmental psychology and behavioral studies (Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Flanagan and Stout, 2010).

Second, our work adds to the literature on trust formation. A growing body of work

⁷These are individuals deemed lacking in support for the socialist regime, due to their families being ex-capitalists, landowners, etc. See Table A2 for a detailed list.

⁸The wording of these questions is as follows: “Have you ever experienced the following? Mistreatment due to gender; Mistreatment due to registration status (rural/urban)”.

investigates the determinants of trust, including individual characteristics (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Rohner et al., 2013), cultural and religious beliefs (Gershman, 2016; Chuah et al., 2016), climate variation (Buggle and Durante, 2017), technological provision (Olken, 2009), civil conflicts and political institutions (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Cassar et al., 2013; Adhvaryu et al., 2014; Lichter et al., 2015; Becker et al., 2015; Buggle, 2016), with both within and cross-country evidence. Our paper shows that exposure to political conflict during the critical age window of trust formation alters the level of trust in later adulthood. This is in line with existing findings, showing that historical traumas can result in a long-lasting deterioration in trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Lichter et al., 2015; Rohner et al., 2013; Cassar et al., 2013).⁹

Third, our paper also contributes to the literature on the legacies of the Cultural Revolution. Compared to the rich qualitative literature in political science, sociology and anthropology,¹⁰ quantitative studies remain relatively scarce. Existing work have focused on the disruption to education and its consequences (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Meng and Gregory, 2002; Giles et al., 2018; Roland and Yang, 2017; Bai and Zhou, 2018), the “send-down” movement (Li et al., 2010), the ideological campaign (Ou and Xiong, 2018), and the intergenerational effects of exposure to the revolution (Booth et al., 2018). Our paper adds to this literature by examining impacts on generalized trust several decades later, employing both regional variation in intensity and cohort variation in exposure.

The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the historical background, before Section 3 provides a description of the various datasets used. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy, Section 5 presents the results as well as robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Historical Background

As one of the most important events in the history of 20th-century China, the Cultural Revolution was meant to be a *soul-touching* movement, aimed at “preserving ideological purity.” Lasting from 1966 to 1976, it shocked China socially, politically, economically and psychologically (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1991;

⁹There is also a literature focused on political attitudes and trust in government. Mishler and Rose (2001) examine the origins of political trust testing institutional and cultural theories in post-Communist societies. Chen and Yang (2015) demonstrate destructive effects of China’s Great Famine (1958-1961) on citizens’ political attitudes and trust towards the government. In the context of the Korean war, Hong and Kang (2017) explore the long-term effects of war-time violence on political attitudes and trust.

¹⁰For a detailed review and bibliography of relevant studies from across the social sciences, please refer to Wu (2016) and Yan (2016).

MacFarquhar, 1974). The revolution includes many sub-events at different stages, in the arena of both elite and grass-root politics,¹¹ educational revolution,¹² cultural reforms,¹³ ideological and other political campaigns,¹⁴ as well as armed fighting and conflict. Given the rich set of existing literature documenting the revolution, we do not attempt to provide a detailed account of events here; rather, this section will describe key aspects that are most relevant for our analysis.

2.1 Political Conflicts and The Features

Given the Revolution’s multi-faceted nature, our study period witnessed a variety of political conflicts. Following the definition of Walder (2014), we categorize them into two main types. The first type is collective conflicts, referring to conflicts of any kind between mass organizations, mass organization confronts military forces, security bureaus, government offices, or public facilities. This type of conflict was closely associated with the “Power Seizing” process and the struggle for local control. It resulted in widespread factionalization among different groups of Red Guard, factory workers, and bureaucrats, and the mass of collective conflict was centered around 1967-1968. In addition to the collective conflicts, the second type of conflict was due to political campaigns, which were mostly run by local authorities, targeted at specific “counter-revolutionary” groups or “class enemies”. Some representative events include the campaigns against “May 16 elements” (1967), “Cleansing of the class ranks” (1968), and “One strike, three-anti campaigns” (1970). Many of the political campaigns concentrated after the establishment of the revolutionary committees. For both types of conflict, two features of the period help us characterize the breadth and depth of the conflict.

The first distinguishing feature of the revolution is its in-depth social mobilization, where almost all individuals were involved. Such mass mobilization was made possible by the pre-existing socio-political administrative structures. For instance, in urban areas peo-

¹¹A representative event is the 1967 “January Storm” in Shanghai, where the local government was accused of lacking support for the revolution and challenged by revolutionary groups in factories and other institutions.

¹²During this period, the schooling system was severely affected. Most universities were shut down for the entire decade, high schools were closed for an extended period (1966-68) and subsequently experienced low-quality expansion (Zhou, 2004). The schooling system became shorter, shrinking from 6-3-3 primary-junior-senior high school years to 5-2-2. There were also changes in curriculum, to focus more on works related to the Revolution. Finally, students were also encouraged to actively participated in the revolution.

¹³For instance, the “Destroying the Four Olds” movement, which refer to old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas.

¹⁴For instance, the “Cleansing of the Class Ranks” campaign in 1968, which focused on identifying and struggling against so-called class enemies.

ple were organized into work units (*danwei*), through which the population was housed, trained, protected, regulated and surveyed (Walder, 1988; Bray, 2005). In rural areas, farmers were organized into People’s Communes (Zhang, 1998), which had either a two- (commune and production teams) or three- (commune, brigade and production teams) tiered structure. These grass-root organizations formed the foundations of a Party administrative hierarchy linking each individual to the central government. As such, they played crucial roles for policy implementation, including those guiding the revolution.

The second feature is that *class struggle* served as the guiding principle for daily life.¹⁵ People were incentivized to “struggle against” class enemies, which were broadly defined as those perceived to be disloyal to the Party or lacking in revolutionary spirit. The spectrum of class enemies was wide yet in many cases ambiguous, comprised of people with “bad class origins” (e.g., landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, rightists, capitalists, gangs, traitors and spies, among others), as well as those deemed to be associated with the Nationalist Party. Foreign individuals or organizations considered disloyal or disrespectful towards the Chairman were also legitimate targets. Given that one’s political loyalty and revolutionary spirit was unobservable, the process of identifying class enemies was often arbitrary, which had resulted in widespread victimization.

2.2 Post-revolution Evaluation

Following the collapse of the “Gang of Four” and death of Chairman Mao, the revolutionary decade came to its end in 1976. Soon after, the Communist Party carried out an official re-evaluation of the period, leading to the publication of *Resolutions on Certain Questions in the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC* at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in 1981. In stark contrast to the policy directives of just a few years ago, the Cultural Revolution was considered to be “*an upheaval that was mistakenly mobilized by party leaders, manipulated by counter-revolutionary cliques, which resulted in severe disaster and turmoil for the Party and the Chinese people.*”

With the assessment in place, the central government and local courts duly began a process of reconciliation by reviewing cases of persecution. Those identified as victims were rehabilitated, while those who committed crimes were arrested and sentenced. According to official records, more than three million wrongful cases of government officials were corrected and more than 470,000 people regained their Party memberships, while tens of

¹⁵As a classification marking one’s socio-political credentials, class origin became an individual’s principal identifier beginning in the early-1950s. It is typically based on parental (mainly paternal) occupation and family background.

millions of people were rehabilitated.¹⁶

2.3 The Revolution and Social Trust

The literature has discussed the incentive structure of the revolution, and how the mass participation was motivated. In particular, scholars covered both benefit-cost considerations of individuals when participating in the revolution at potential cost of others (e.g., mutual snitching), where two features of participation incentives can be highlighted. First, the key incentive of people's participation is not because of public goods can be produced, but because the cost of non-participation is high (Walder, 1994). Second, as the political power and social status experienced a massive redistribution during the revolution, individual political participation and good performance had high returns in terms of political and social advancement (Li, 2015). It could be seen that in schools (Rosen, 1982), factories (Li, 2015) and villages (Unger, 1998), the incentive structures were powerful and pervasive. Regarding real-life circumstances, numerous anecdotal evidence has illustrated individual traumatic experiences under this incentive scheme, and how the revolution and its incentives had torn people apart.¹⁷

Given the features of participation incentives, the key linkage between the revolution and trust is the moral dilemmas generated by this episode, where individuals could benefit from signaling one's political loyalty at the potential cost of others. Therefore, a combination of high return to political loyalty and high cost of disloyalty encouraged mass participation, and this grassroots nature made it difficult to sustain inter-personal trust.¹⁸ Regarding institutional trust, the conceptual framework is more complex, given heterogeneity in the level of political institutions. In particular, institutional trust in our context is a package involving multiple layers, including trust towards the central government/leadership, the provincial government, the city/county or even lower levels of government (e.g., township/villages).¹⁹ Historically, these different levels of governance played various role during the revolution - first, the central leadership established the

¹⁶Source: Ma (1991), *Forty Years of the Chinese Communist Party (1949-1989)*, Beijing: The History of the CPC Press.

¹⁷One example could be drawn from Feng (1991), chapter 11 ("the story of a smile"), and Zhang et al. (2018). In 1968, as a part of "cleansing the class ranks", there was the "Recalling, Listing, and Examining" campaign, where the first required people to recall any hidden counter-revolutionary enemies in daily life, the second asked people to list those candidates, while the third emphasized the examination of the listed candidates in detail.

¹⁸In this sense, the moral dilemma was similar to the case of slave trade (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), which could deteriorate generalized trust and certain group-specific trust.

¹⁹For instance, Li (2004) demonstrated such hierarchy and heterogeneity of political trust in rural China.

guidance and incentives of the revolution, but successive central leaderships intensively revised these institutional designs; second, the lower-level government experienced power redistribution during the first few years (especially during the “Power Seizing” episode of 1967-1968), where a transition from incumbent leadership to revolutionary committees took place. In Section 5.5, we examine both generalized trust and various types of group-specific trust outcomes in detail.

3 Data Sources

Our analysis makes use of two main datasets: (i) revolutionary intensity at the county level, proxied by the number of revolution-related deaths as a fraction of local population, collected by the authors from local gazetteers; (ii) generalized trust at the individual level, as measured in the 2012 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) survey. The rest of this section describes each of these in more detail.

3.1 Regional Variation: Revolutionary Intensity

As documented by previous work, there was considerable regional variation in the revolution’s severity (Bu, 2008; Walder, 2014). Our measure of intensity is based on recorded history from county gazetteers. Often considered as local encyclopedias, these are book-length volumes covering the geography, history, economy, governance, demography, education, culture, as well as social customs of a given region. County gazetteers have been used as important sources for Cultural Revolution studies,²⁰ partly because they contain records for all of the administrative divisions under each county, including county seat, towns, and villages, covering both agricultural and non-agricultural populations.²¹

We collected data of revolution intensity from the gazetteers,²² which recorded their local histories during the Cultural Revolution, typically located in three chapters: (1) chronicle of major events; (2) history of the local Party organization; and (3) a special

²⁰For a detailed discussion and summary, see Walder (2014).

²¹It should be noted that, the unit of county does not mechanically equal to rural area. While (Walder and Su, 2003) refer to counties as “rural”, they employ this rural/urban definition for the reassessment of Richard Baum’s perspective, that “the Cultural Revolution was not particularly a salient fact of everyday life” among peasants and basic-level cadres in China (Baum, 1971). Thus, the definition is not pertinent to the agricultural and non-agricultural populations that a county covered, but serves as a contrast against the frequent perception that the revolution was mainly intensive in the big cities, e.g. Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Wuhan, among others.

²²The collection of gazetteers are located in the University Service Center Library at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

section on the revolution. Specifically, we use information on the number of revolution-related deaths between 1966 and 1976, including: suicides of individuals under persecution, deaths in clashes between rival factions or with military forces, deaths in struggle sessions or as a result of imprisonment or torture, and executions during political campaigns. These different types of deaths reflect divergent facets of the revolution, including the enduring image that it had victimized intellectuals, school officials, entrepreneurs, as well as other less well known images, such as the destructive terror of various political campaigns in both urban and rural areas (Walder, 2014).

As discussed in Section 2, and following Walder (2014), we distinguish between two types of deaths due to: (1) collective conflicts; and (2) political campaigns. The former includes conflicts of any kind between rival mass organizations, confrontations with military forces, security bureaus, government offices, or public facilities.²³ By contrast, political campaigns were mostly run by local authorities, targeted at specific “counter-revolutionary” groups. By distinguishing between the different causes of deaths, we hope to better account for the revolution’s complexity and investigate its implications.

3.2 Cohort Variation: Trust Formation Ages

The second source of variation is cohort exposure to the revolution, constructed based on the ages of trust formation suggested by the literature (Flanagan and Stout, 2010; Sutter and Kocher, 2007). In particular, Sutter and Kocher (2007) study an experimental trust game among six different age groups, and find trust to be most malleable between ages 8 and 22, staying stable afterwards. Similarly, Flanagan and Stout (2010) illustrated that childhood and adolescence were critical periods for trust formation, with the process slowing down towards late adolescence. In the analysis, therefore, we define trust formation ages as [8,22]. As placebos, we also adopt [2,7] and [23,30] as alternative windows to test whether earlier childhood or later adolescence matters for trust formation.²⁴

To construct the cohort-specific exposure measure, we calculate the total number of years between the ages of 8 and 22 for a given cohort that was exposed to the revolution (1966-1976). Figure 1 (upper panel) illustrates the distribution of this measure. Cohorts born either earlier (prior to 1943) or later (post 1969) did not experience the revolution

²³The mass of such conflicts centered around 1966-1968, between the “Seizing Power” movement and the establishment of local revolutionary committees.

²⁴It should be noted that, the ages during which trust is formed are thought to be earlier than those during which preferences for redistribution are shaped, often thought to be 18-25. Regardless of the specific age windows, our study is in line with the *impressionable years hypothesis* for belief and preference formation, as in Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014).

during their trust formation years. In contrast, cohorts born between 1954 and 1958 were most exposed, since the entire revolutionary decade fell within theirs. In addition to the baseline measure, we also construct exposure to different episodes of the revolution. In Section 5, we investigate two such episodes, 1966-1971 and 1972-1976 respectively. This is because the first episode contained more collective conflicts and political campaigns than the second. Figure 1 (lower panel) illustrates the distribution of these measures.

3.3 Generalized Trust

Our main outcome measure of generalized trust comes from the 2012 CFPS survey, a nationally-representative dataset covering 25 provinces. It is conducted by the Institute of Social Science Surveys (ISSS) at Peking University and is considered one of the most comprehensive surveys of its kind in China. It is designed to examine social and economic changes at the individual-, family-, and community-levels. The sampling method used is PPS (probability proportional to size) and it yields a sample that is representative of 95% of China’s population. One useful feature is the availability of detailed information regarding family members of respondents (e.g. gender, birth year and place, occupation, education , etc.). It is thus a powerful dataset for studying how family backgrounds can influence various socio-economic outcomes.²⁵ The first nationwide baseline took place in 2010, with a follow-up wave in 2012. Since the questions on trust were only included in the 2012 wave but certain information is only available from the 2010 wave (e.g. education history, class origin), we merge the two waves together for our sample of 27,946 individuals. Specifically, the wording of the generalized trust question is as follows:

Question: In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?

Answer: 0. You can’t be too careful. 1. Most people can be trusted.

The same question has been used by other widely-studied surveys (e.g., the General Social Survey, the European Social Survey, as well as the World Value Surveys). An extensive empirical literature has discussed the validity of this measure, and scholars have examined it using trust games under experimental settings (Glaeser et al., 2000; Fehr et al., 2003; Bellemare and Kröger, 2007; Sapienza et al., 2013).²⁶

²⁵There are four components: (1) the adult survey, including individuals aged above 16; (2) the children survey, including individuals aged from 0-15, answered by either the children or their parents; (3) the household survey; and (4) the community survey.

²⁶For instance, the GSS trust question was analyzed for the deterioration of social capital in the U.S.

3.4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Our main sample is made up of 27,946 individuals born between 1931 and 1990, and summary statistics of key variables are presented in Table 1. From Panel A, we observe that 48.6% of the respondents are male, while 92.2% are of Han ethnicity, with on average 6.4 years of schooling. In terms of the main outcome variable, 54.5% of respondents gave the answer “most people can be trusted” to the survey question. Unfortunately data on the respondent’s class origin is only available for cohorts born before 1977, so the sample size for certain parts of the heterogeneity analysis is smaller than the full sample.

In Panel B, we present descriptive statistics of county characteristics. In particular, the revolutionary intensity variables are constructed in the form of $\text{Log}(\frac{\text{AbnormalDeaths}}{\text{Population1966}} + 1)$, where we use the number of total revolution-related deaths, collective-conflict deaths, and political-campaign deaths respectively. In addition, we also make use of data on a number of pre-revolution county characteristics, which serve as controls in our regressions. These include measures for social capital (proxied by the number of Ming- and Qing-period charitable organizations), ethnic fragmentation and educational inequality (both computed using individual-level data from the 1982 census), as well as an indicator for whether a region was historically a revolutionary base for the Communist Party. We show the correlation between revolutionary intensity and these pre-revolution county characteristics in Table A1, and report regression results (both with and without province fixed effects) in Table A3.²⁷

Here we see that regions with higher levels of historical social capital saw fewer revolution-related deaths. In other words, there seems to be a degree of persistence in a community’s ability to sustain charitable organizations prior to 1949 and its ability to mitigate violence during the 1960s and 70s.²⁸ Having been a base for the Communist Party prior to 1949 is positively correlated (albeit not statistically significantly so) to revolutionary intensity, and neither ethnic nor social fragmentation appears to play a significant role. Given the concern that these characteristics may affect our outcome variable directly, we include county fixed effects, as well as interaction terms between county

(Putnam, 1995). In a modified trust game where beliefs and preferences can be separated, Sapienza et al. (2013) showed that this measure mostly captures the belief-based component of a trust game. While our analysis focuses on generalized trust, we also present group-specific trust in Table 9.

²⁷The results show that province fixed effects explain a large proportion of the variation in revolutionary intensity at the county level. In particular, for the total-deaths measure (Columns 1 and 2), including the province dummies can account for more than half of the total variation.

²⁸Moreover, the level of historical social capital is also a significant predictor of contemporary levels of trust, as shown in Table A4. Experiencing the revolution more intensely appears to attenuate this relationship, although the effect is not statistically significant.

covariates and our cohort exposure variable, in our preferred regression specifications.

4 Identification Strategy

Identifying the revolution’s causal effect on trust has two challenges. First, local revolutionary intensity is likely endogenous. Thus, a negative correlation between revolutionary intensity and social trust may be driven by unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, pre-revolution inequality and social capital may be driving both revolutionary intensity and trust in the long term. Second, our intensity measure may contain measurement error. Here counties with more deaths may not be worse affected, but rather are more accurate in their record keeping.²⁹ Considering these challenges, we employ a difference-in-differences empirical strategy with a combination of regional and cohort variation. The key advantage of such an approach is the ability to control for time-invariant county characteristics and region-invariant cohort trends that could potentially confound our analysis. The baseline specification is as follows:

$$Trust_{ijc} = \alpha + \gamma Intensity_c \times CohortExposure_j + X'_{ijc}\mu + \theta_j + \eta_c + \epsilon_{ijc}$$

where X_{ijc} is a set of individual control variables, including gender, ethnicity and residential status (rural/urban). θ_j is a set of birth-year dummies and η_c county fixed effects. θ_j and η_c therefore absorb the level effects of cohort exposure and revolutionary intensity. ϵ_{ijc} is an idiosyncratic error term.

Our key independent variable is the interaction term between revolutionary intensity in county c and cohort exposure of individuals born in year j . As discussed above, our cohort exposure measure equals the number of years during the age window of trust formation (8-22) that overlap with the revolutionary decade. A negative γ would indicate that individuals in a region with higher revolutionary intensity and belonging to a cohort with greater exposure have lower levels of trust. The design here is slightly different from its classical setting, which involves a treatment and a control group. Here revolutionary intensity and cohort exposure capture the “dosage” of treatment.

Within this empirical framework, we can address some important concerns about identification: all cohort-invariant county factors that affect both revolutionary intensity

²⁹This concern in reporting bias can be partially alleviated by the fact that most of the gazetteers covering this study period were published in the 1980s and 1990s. During this post-revolution period with the official assessment established (as discussed in Section 2.2), the government initiated a nationwide process of rehabilitation for the victims who were wrongly persecuted. Meanwhile, the balance of political power within the Party had shifted towards those leaders who themselves had been targeted during the revolution. Therefore, the incentive for under-reporting is not clear *ex ante*.

and social trust are controlled for by the county fixed effects. Furthermore, potential reporting error is partially alleviated by this strategy, as it controls for county specific cohort-invariant components in the error. However, the key limitation of such a strategy is the inability to rule out potentially cohort-varying regional factors that simultaneously affect revolutionary intensity and trust. Therefore, a parallel cohort trend assumption between high- and low-intensity counties is needed for such an approach to be valid.

To ensure this is met, four complementary strategies are used: (1) we control for the time-varying effects of potential confounders at the county level (i.e., local pre-revolution levels of social capital, ethnic/social fragmentation, inequality, and history of revolution); (2) we control for potentially correlated shocks during the reform and opening up period, which may have affected the cohorts in our sample, using an index measuring the liberalization of factor/product/financial markets, as well as a measure of lay-offs by state-owned enterprises during the 1990s, both at the province level; (3) we account for a demanding set of region-specific cohort trends, using interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trend, in order to capture shared trends in trust across regions; (4) we carry out a variety of placebo tests – by varying the definition of trust formation ages (i.e., ages 2-7 and 23-30), as well as using hypothetical revolution periods (ten years before and after the true period, i.e., 1955-65, 1977-87) – as a validation of the main specification. All results are consistently robust, and we discuss them in detail below.

5 Results

In this section, we begin by discussing our baseline results of the revolution’s impacts on generalized trust. We then proceed to examine how these impacts vary across individuals, depending on their class origin, family political connection, as well as finer measures of revolutionary exposure. To alleviate concerns that our results may be driven by unobserved heterogeneity, we carry out numerous placebo tests and robustness checks, including using alternative trust measures.

5.1 Difference-in-Differences

As described in Section 4, our empirical analysis relies on two key sources of variation: differential exposure to the revolution across individual cohorts (specifically, as it pertains to trust formation), and differential intensity of the revolution across counties. We rely

on findings from the literature which suggest the age window between 8 and 22 as being the most malleable ages for trust formation (Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Flanagan and Stout, 2010). With these measures in place, we estimate our baseline specification, by interacting cohort-level exposure with county-level intensity. The baseline specification employs standard errors clustered at the county level, following Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014), while we also present alternative standard errors using both two-way clustering (i.e., by county and year of birth) and the method of Conley (1999) to account for potential spatial correlation. The results are shown in Table 2.

The main finding is that exposure to the revolution has worsened individual generalized trust persistently more than three decades later. This holds for all three measures of revolutionary intensity: total number of deaths, conflict-related deaths, and political campaign-related deaths. At the same time, we find precisely-estimated null effects when alternative age windows of trust formation are used. In other words, an additional year of exposure to the revolution does not reduce one’s level of trust if the additional year took place either when a person’s too young to be influenced yet (ages 2-7) or when their attitudes had already been shaped (ages 23-30). These results lend credibility to our interpretation of the main findings as causal, since omitted factors (such as prior conflicts) would presumably have affected other cohorts as well.

In all regressions, we include individual characteristics as well as county and birth-year fixed effects.³⁰ In addition, we also control for cohort-varying effects of several pre-revolution socio-economic characteristics in Columns 2, 5, and 8. Specifically, we account for pre-revolution inequality, ethnic fragmentation and social capital, which may all have long-term impacts on trust, while being correlated with revolutionary intensity.³¹ In particular, pre-revolution inequality is measured using the educational Gini coefficient for people born before 1966 using the individual sample of the 1982 population census. Likewise, pre-existing ethnic fragmentation is measured using the standard index (Alesina et al., 2003), on the same sample. Pre-revolution social capital is measured using the number of charitable organizations during the Ming and Qing dynasties (Wang, 2013).

Moreover, to account for region-specific cohort trends in our outcome measure, we include interaction terms between provincial dummies and the first-, second-, and third-order polynomial of cohort trend. Columns 3, 6, and 9 present results with the full set of controls, using different measures of revolutionary intensity. Regarding magnitude, it

³⁰Individual characteristics include gender, Hukou status, Han ethnicity dummy, marital status, employment status, and years of schooling.

³¹This interpretation would be similar to the local continuity of cultural traits, as in Voigtländer and Voth (2012), where medieval anti-Semitism reliably predicts violence against Jews in the modern era.

should be noted that the coefficient estimates represent how revolutionary intensity alters the *marginal effect* of cohort exposure on trust, since their main *level* effects have been absorbed by county and birth-year indicators respectively. For instance, Column 3 of Panel A indicates that an increase in revolutionary intensity from the 25th to the 75th percentile value causes the effect of an additional year of exposure to increase by 0.49 percentage points. Given this, increasing years of exposure from 0 to 11 will result in a deterioration of trust by 5.43 percentage points, comparing counties at the 25th and 75th percentiles. These are very sizable effects, which account for around 10% of the mean level of trust among individuals from counties below the 25th percentile of revolutionary intensity, which is 51.4%. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that these effects are measured more than three decades after the revolution, which highlights the long-lasting impacts of exposure to these events.

Finally, we show the effects on different cohorts by estimating a series of interaction terms between revolutionary intensity and cohort group dummies. Compared to our baseline approach, this specification does not impose any assumptions on the most relevant age window for trust formation. Instead, it estimates the impacts of revolutionary intensity separately for different cohort groups, and is therefore more flexible. The results are shown in Figure 2, where we plot effects for different 5-year cohort bins with those born during 1931-35 being the comparison group. From this figure, we observe a V-shape pattern in the effects across different cohorts, where the magnitudes are close to zero for both older and younger cohorts, while the effects are largest for individuals born in the late 1950s. While these estimates are relatively noisy, the overall pattern is consistent with the critical ages of trust formation, since the most affected group would have spent more of their teenage years experiencing the revolution first hand.

5.2 Other Socio-Economic Shocks

Given our baseline analysis, one remaining concern is that revolutionary intensity could be correlated with other socio-economic shocks that took place *after* 1976. If so, individuals whose experiences of these subsequent shocks could differ by cohort. This in turn could be driving our earlier results. In this section, we investigate two prominent post-revolution shocks, one positive and one negative. The positive shock is the package of market-liberalizing reforms after 1978, while the negative shock is the large-scale layoff of employees working in state-owned enterprises during the late 1990s. Both of these could potentially be correlated with revolutionary intensity at the local level, and they might also affect individual life-cycle outcomes and their preference formation.

To test this hypothesis, we employ province-level proxies for the intensity of these shocks. For the first, we use an index of marketization intensity in the 2000s (Fan et al., 2003). This index captures a package of market-oriented institutional reforms since the 1980s, measuring the degree of liberalization of factor, product, and financial markets, property right protection, ownership structure, among others. For the second, we construct a measure of SOE layoff intensity.³² In both cases, we control for an interaction term between the shock and our cohort exposure measure, and the results are shown in Table 3. Here we introduce sequentially controls for our two shocks in the first two columns of each panel, before controlling for both in the last column. The overall pattern is that, across different measures of revolutionary intensity, our baseline findings are robust to controlling for these prominent post-revolution labor market shocks.

5.3 Heterogeneous Effects

Having estimated the average effects of revolutionary intensity on trust, we then utilize individual characteristics (e.g., family background) to investigate whether different subgroups were affected by the revolution differentially.

In terms of background, one of the most important markers during our study period was individual class origin. As a political label identifying individual socio-political credentials, class origin established its role as an important determinant in economic, social and political life following the Socialist Transformation in 1956.³³ There are three broad categories: good, middle and bad. Individuals with “good” class origins typically belonged to families of revolutionary cadres, martyrs, pre-1949 industrial workers as well as poor peasants. In contrast, those with “bad” origins included families of former capitalists, pre-1949 rich peasants and landlords (Deng and Treiman, 1997). Being a political minority during our study period, those with bad class origins were particularly vulnerable, due to their perceived lack of political loyalty. In the 2010 wave of the CFPS, we have information on family class origin during the revolution for respondents born before 1977.³⁴

Table 4 reports our empirical estimates for each of the three class categories, using the same regression specification and the full set of controls. The most noticeable pattern

³²The data source is *Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of the P.R.China* (1999), and the measure is constructed as (Number of SOE employees in 1995 - Number of SOE employees in 2000)/Number of SOE employees in 1995, given that 1995-2000 was the crucial period for the layoffs.

³³The classification of class origin is often based on parental (mainly paternal) occupation and revolutionary credentials.

³⁴A mapping between the classification in CFPS and that in Deng and Treiman (1997) is shown in Appendix Table A2.

is that the impacts are largest for the political minority - those with bad class origins. In addition, the effects are present for those with good class origins, while absent for the middle group, revealing a non-linear relationship between class background and victimization. This contrast is unsurprising, given that those with good class origins were the political majority and mobilized to “struggle against bourgeois elements”. Therefore they were more likely to have participated directly. Those with bad class origins often served as targets, while those with middle class origins were less likely to be directly affected by the conflict. Specifically, for both types of revolutionary intensity (collective conflict and political campaign), the magnitude of the coefficient for the bad class is more than triple that for the good class. In particular, going from the 25th to 75th percentile in total revolution-related deaths, an additional year of exposure reduces the probability of trust by 0.33 percentage points for the good class, while the same change leads to a 1.32 percentage points decline in trust for the bad class.

In a similar exercise, we also examine whether an individual’s family background in relation to the Party altered the revolution’s impacts. Based on the results in Table A5, we find that individuals whose fathers were Party members were partially shielded from the revolution’s detrimental effects. The negative impacts were concentrated among individuals whose fathers were non-Party members. This may have occurred because individuals with Party members in their family could signal their loyalty more credibly, and therefore were less likely to be accused of being “counter-revolutionary”.³⁵

Another dimension of heterogeneity we explore is that of exposure to different phases of the revolution. In particular, not all years between 1966 and 1976 had the same intensity in terms of violence, and most of the conflicts took place during 1966-71. The period between 1972 and 1976, while certainly not free from violence, was much calmer. It could be the case, therefore, that an additional year of exposure during the first episode is more important than that during the second. We test this hypothesis by constructing our cohort exposure measure separately for each of the two phases (Figure 1, lower panel). The results are shown in Table 5. Indeed, we see that the coefficient estimates in Columns 1-3 are nearly twice as large as those in Columns 4-6. This is further confirmed when we include both measures together and conduct a horse-race (Columns 7-9), where exposure

³⁵It is worth noting that, while the two dimensions of family background - class origin and father’s party membership - both capture one’s political capital endowment, they are far from being perfectly correlated with each other. This is because relatively few individuals had fathers who were Party members (15% of the sample), while most of them were of good class origin (77% of the sample). Therefore the majority of individuals with good class origins had fathers without Party membership, and the sub-sample of individuals whose fathers were Party members accounts for a very selective group with noticeable political capital endowment.

to the second phase ceases to matter for our outcome of interest. Finally, we extend the analysis in Figure 3 to separately examine the effect of exposure to each year of the revolution during 1966-1976 during one’s trust formation ages. Here we see that exposure to eight out of the eleven years has significantly negative effects on trust, and the largest coefficient estimates are associated with 1968 and 1969. This is consistent with the temporal distribution of conflict activities (Walder, 2014).

5.4 Placebo and Robustness Checks

While our placebo tests thus far have focused on alternative right-hand-side variables (*i.e.*, cohort-specific revolutionary exposure), we also carry out tests using alternative left-hand-side variables. Specifically, we use the following outcomes in the CFPS, where the question is as follows: “*Have you ever experienced the following? Mistreatment due to gender; Mistreatment due to registration status (rural/urban).*” Since the revolution did not target either gender or registration status, there should not be any effect on these outcomes. The results in Table 6 confirm our conjecture that exposure to the revolution should not affect outcomes towards which the movement was not tailored.

As another test of whether our estimated coefficients are picking up the effects of some other experience, we construct a set of alternative cohort exposure measures, this time using hypothetical revolution years. Specifically, we assume the revolution to have occurred either 10 years before (1955-1965), or 10 years after (1977-1987), the actual period. In this setting, any cohort exposure measure constructed based on the fake year windows should not have any impact empirically, unless our interaction term is capturing another shock unrelated to the revolution. The results are shown in Table 7. From these, it is clear that an additional year of exposure to a hypothetical revolutionary period of 1955-1965, or 1977-1987, does not matter for one’s level of generalized trust.

In addition to the placebo tests, we also employ two robustness checks regarding potential measurement error in revolutionary intensity. In particular, while part of the reporting bias can be absorbed by county fixed effects, we may still be concerned that different counties may face diverging political incentive structures to under-report revolution-related deaths. For instance, the gazetteer compilers who were subject to greater local party strength may have stronger incentives to under-report. In addition, it is also possible that the narrative style of gazetteers vary significantly, which could drive the reporting bias. To account for these issues, we conduct two robustness checks, using two proxies capturing local party strength and gazetteer narrative style respectively. The first proxy is the number of party members in 1949 at the county level, while the second proxy is

an indicator variable for county gazetteers’ narrative style.³⁶ Specifically, we use the full set of controls drawn from Table 2, and additionally control for the interaction terms of the cohort-specific exposure and the two proxies, as well as the triple interaction terms between revolutionary intensity, cohort exposure, and the proxy. As shown in Table 8, the results reveal that across all three measures of revolutionary intensity, our baseline estimates are robust after accounting for local party strength and narrative style at the county level. Moreover, null effects of the triple interaction terms suggest that our main coefficient of interest does not vary with the magnitude of gazetteer reporting proxies.

5.5 Alternative Measures of Trust

Our analysis so far has used generalized trust, measured in the 2012 wave of the CFPS survey, as the dependent variable. The same survey also contains a series of other questions regarding group-specific trust, including trust towards parents, neighbors, doctors, local leaders, strangers, and the United States.³⁷ The answers to these group-specific trust questions have a Likert scale structure and varies from 0 to 10, corresponding to the lowest and highest levels of trust. To facilitate interpretation and comparison, we standardized all of the variables.

In Table 9 we report results for each of these groups, and separately for each of the three measures of revolutionary intensity. Several patterns emerge here. First, experience of the revolution does not appear to have affected trust among individuals with close personal relationships, such as parents and neighbors. Second, the previously documented negative effects emerge for local leaders, and trust towards strangers and the U.S. for conflict deaths. Third, consistent with the results from Table 2, the coefficient estimates for conflict deaths are significantly larger than those for total and campaign deaths. Further, to provide a link between group-specific and generalized trust, we practice a simple exercise of Principal Component Analysis across the six group-specific trust dimensions, the results of which are shown in Table A6. The PCA compresses the six group-specific trust dimensions into two major components with eigenvalue above one, where the first

³⁶This is based on the description of natural disasters. While all gazetteers contain record of these, some compilers list them by year and category as detailed events, while others simply describe the overall pattern and frequency of a limited set of disasters. Therefore, this dummy variable is coded as one if a county’s gazetteer has detailed records regarding the events, and zero when merely descriptive statistics are provided.

³⁷It should be noted that, for trust towards “local government leaders”, the perception among respondents could vary as “local government” could refer to different levels (i.e., provincial/prefecture/county/village level), and may also capture different segments of administrative units in rural and urban areas.

has positive loading scores on all six groups and thus intrinsically captures a “general component” of trust regardless of group. Column 7 of Table 9 employs this PCA component as the dependent variable, and consistent with our earlier results, reveals negative effects of the revolution.

As a final piece of robustness analysis, we re-estimate the effects of exposure to the revolution on generalized trust using the baseline regression specification, with data from the World Value Survey.³⁸ As the WVS only includes province indicators, we are restricted to examining the interaction terms between province-level revolutionary intensity and the cohort exposure measure during ages 8-22. For robustness, we also adopted alternative definitions of exposure ages of 2-7 and 23-30. As shown in Table A7, the main results are consistent with our baseline findings. Taken together, our results in Section 5 show that the revolution had long-lasting impacts on trust. Furthermore, individuals who would have been likely victims were more affected, and effects of the first phase of the revolution (1966-1971) mattered more than the second (1972-1976), consistent with the temporal heterogeneity in revolutionary intensity.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate the long-term effects of the Cultural Revolution on social trust. We collect data from regional gazetteers on revolutionary intensity, as measured by the number of resulting deaths. We combine this with individual-level data on trust from the China Family Panel Studies survey in 2012. Our empirical strategy makes use of both regional variation in intensity and cohort variation in exposure.

The results show that individuals living in a county with higher revolutionary intensity and belonging to a cohort with greater exposure have lower levels of trust, measured more than three decades later. The magnitude of the effects are sizable, and they are larger for individuals who were more likely to have been victimized. Furthermore, exposure to the first phase (1966-1971) matters much more than that to the second (1972-1976), where the latter phase was much calmer in terms of violence and political campaigns. The main results are robust across multiple specifications and placebo tests. Taken together, these findings suggest the Cultural Revolution has affected generalized trust profoundly, indicating a loss in social capital driven by political conflicts for certain cohorts.

³⁸The same generalized trust question was included in the 2001, 2007, and 2013 waves.

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Figure 1: Trust Formation Years during the Revolution

Note: This figure illustrates, for each birth cohort, the number of years between the ages of 8 and 22 that would have been covered by the Cultural Revolution decade (upper panel), as well as that covered by each half (1966-71, and 1972-76 respectively; lower panel). This is our main measure of cohort exposure. The focus on such an age window comes from the literature on trust formation ([Sutter and Kocher, 2007](#)).

Figure 2: Effect of Revolutionary Intensity on Generalized Trust, by Birth Cohort

Note: This figure illustrates the impact of revolutionary intensity (as proxied by the total number of deaths as a fraction of local population) on generalized trust, separately by five-year cohort bins. The omitted/comparison cohorts are those born during 1931-35. Data on trust come from the 2012 wave of the China Family Panel Studies survey, while data on revolutionary intensity were collected from county gazetteers by the authors.

Figure 3: Effect of Revolutionary Intensity on Generalized Trust, by Year

Note: This figure illustrates the differential impact of exposure to specific years of the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76). It is an extension of the analysis reported in Table 5. Data on trust come from the 2012 wave of the China Family Panel Studies survey, while data on revolutionary intensity were collected from county gazetteers by the authors.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

<i>Panel A: Individual Characteristics</i>	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Trust	27,946	0.545	0.499	0	1
Male	27,946	0.486	0.500	0	1
Ethnicity Han	27,946	0.922	0.268	0	1
Age	27,946	47.388	14.774	22	81
Urban Hukou	27,946	0.287	0.452	0	1
Years of Schooling	27,946	6.418	5.028	0	22
Mistreatment (Hukou)	27,425	0.072	0.258	0	1
Mistreatment (Gender)	27,540	0.036	0.187	0	1
Good Class Origin	18,390	0.776	0.417	0	1
Middle Class Origin	18,390	0.171	0.376	0	1
Bad Class Origin	18,390	0.053	0.225	0	1
<i>Panel B: County Characteristics</i>	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Log Fraction Total Deaths	156	0.913	1.071	0	5.971
Log Fraction Campaign Deaths	156	0.763	1.068	0	5.900
Log Fraction Conflict Deaths	156	0.239	0.538	0	3.335
Pre-CR Social Capital	156	22.333	48.521	0	159
Revolutionary Base	156	0.385	0.488	0	1
Pre-CR Ethnic Fragmentation Index	156	0.095	0.169	0	0.740
Pre-CR Social Fragmentation Index	156	0.957	0.010	0.928	0.975
Pre-CR Educational Gini Coefficient	156	0.447	0.143	0.261	0.780

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the key variables in our analytical sample, both at the individual level (Panel A) and at the county level (Panel B). All variables in Panel A come from the CFPS. The Cultural Revolution variables were digitized by the authors from county gazetteers. Pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient is calculated using the 1982 census among individuals born before 1966. Pre-revolution ethnic fragmentation index is calculated following [Alesina et al. \(2003\)](#) using the same sample. Pre-revolution social capital is proxied with the number of historical charity organizations ([Wang, 2013](#)).

Table 2: Revolutionary Intensity and Trust: Difference-in-Differences Results

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	Total Deaths			Conflict Deaths			Campaign Deaths		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
A. Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.002*** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.002*** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.003** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.003*** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.003*** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.005** (0.001) [0.002] {0.001}	-0.002** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.002*** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.002** (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}
B. Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 2-7)	-0.000 (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	-0.000 (0.001) [0.002] {0.002}	0.001 (0.001) [0.002] {0.001}	-0.003 (0.003) [0.003] {0.003}	-0.003 (0.003) [0.003] {0.003}	-0.001 (0.003) [0.004] {0.003}	0.001 (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	0.001 (0.002) [0.002] {0.001}	0.002 (0.001) [0.002] {0.001}
C. Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 23-30)	0.001 (0.001) [0.001] {0.002}	0.000 (0.001) [0.001] {0.002}	-0.002 (0.002) [0.002] {0.002}	0.000 (0.003) [0.002] {0.003}	0.001 (0.002) [0.002] {0.003}	-0.002 (0.003) [0.003] {0.003}	0.001 (0.001) [0.001] {0.001}	0.000 (0.001) [0.001] {0.002}	-0.001 (0.002) [0.002] {0.002}
R-squared	0.067	0.067	0.071	0.067	0.067	0.071	0.067	0.067	0.071
Observations	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. Two-way clustered standard errors - at the county and birth year levels - are in brackets. Standard errors adjusted for spatial correlation (Conley, 1999) are in curly brackets. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is an indicator for trust (1 = most people can be trusted; 0 = you can't be too careful). Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table 3: Revolutionary Intensity and Trust: Controlling for Post-1976 Labor Market Shocks

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	A. Total Deaths			B. Conflict Deaths			C. Campaign Deaths		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Marketization Index x Exposure	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
SOE Layoffs x Exposure	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Observations	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946
R-squared	0.071	0.072	0.072	0.071	0.072	0.072	0.071	0.072	0.072
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. Compared to Table 2, the regressions reported here include two additional controls: i) an index measuring the liberalization of factor/product/financial markets since the 1980s (Fan et al., 2003), and ii) the extent of layoffs by state-owned enterprises during the late-1990s, both at the province level. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is an indicator for trust (1 = most people can be trusted; 0 = you can't be too careful). Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table 4: Revolutionary Intensity and Trust: Heterogeneous Effects

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	A. Total Deaths			B. Conflict Deaths			C. Campaign Deaths		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Class Origin:</i>	Good	Middle	Bad	Good	Middle	Bad	Good	Middle	Bad
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.008* (0.004)
Observations	14,268	3,143	979	14,268	3,143	979	14,268	3,143	979
R-squared	0.084	0.150	0.314	0.084	0.150	0.313	0.084	0.150	0.314
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. The dependent variable is an indicator for trust (1 = most people can be trusted; 0 = you can't be too careful). Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table 5: Revolutionary Intensity and Trust: Comparing Two Episodes

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	Episode I (1966-1971)			Episode II (1972-1976)			Episode I v.s. II		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Total Deaths x Years of Exposure	-0.005** (0.002)						-0.004* (0.002)		
Conflict Deaths x Years of Exposure		-0.009*** (0.003)						-0.008* (0.004)	
Campaign Deaths x Years of Exposure			-0.005** (0.002)						-0.004 (0.002)
Total Deaths x Years of Exposure				-0.003*** (0.001)			-0.002 (0.002)		
Conflict Deaths x Years of Exposure					-0.006*** (0.002)			-0.003 (0.003)	
Campaign Deaths x Years of Exposure						-0.003** (0.001)			-0.001 (0.002)
Observations	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946
R-squared	0.072	0.071	0.071	0.071	0.071	0.071	0.072	0.072	0.072
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. In this table, we construct cohort-exposure to the revolution by dividing it into two episodes: 1966-1971 and 1972-1976. Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table 6: Placebo Test: Alternative Outcomes

Dependent Variable:	Mistreatment (Hukou) (1)	Mistreatment (Gender) (2)
<i>Panel A: Total Deaths</i>		
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	27,425	27,540
R-squared	0.051	0.045
<i>Panel B: Conflict Deaths</i>		
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Observations	27,425	27,540
R-squared	0.051	0.045
<i>Panel C: Campaign Deaths</i>		
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	27,425	27,540
R-squared	0.051	0.045
Individual Controls	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table 7: Placebo Test: Hypothetical Definition of Revolution Period

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	Hypothetical Revolution 1955-1965			Hypothetical Revolution 1977-1987		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Total Deaths x Years of Exposure	-0.001 (0.001)			0.000 (0.001)		
Conflict Deaths x Years of Exposure		-0.003 (0.002)			-0.001 (0.002)	
Campaign Deaths x Years of Exposure			-0.001 (0.001)			0.001 (0.001)
Observations	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946	27,946
R-squared	0.071	0.071	0.071	0.071	0.071	0.071
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. In this table, we construct cohort-exposure to the revolution by assuming it happened during 1955-1965 or 1977-1987, and trust formation years are in the age window of [8,22]. Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table 8: Robustness Checks: Reporting Bias

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	A: Total Deaths			B: Conflict Deaths			C: Campaign Deaths		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Revolutionary Intensity x Years of Exposure	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Revolutionary Intensity x Years of Exposure x Local Party Strength	0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Revolutionary Intensity x Years of Exposure x Narrative Style		0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)		0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Observations	27,352	27,352	27,352	27,352	27,352	27,352	27,352	27,352	27,352
R-squared	0.072	0.072	0.073	0.072	0.072	0.073	0.072	0.072	0.072
Local Party Strength x Years of Exposure	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Narrative Style x Years of Exposure	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. Local party strength is measured by number of party members in 1949 at county level, and narrative style is an indicator variable that equals one if a county's gazetteer contained detailed records of natural disasters, and zero otherwise. Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table 9: Group-Specific Trust

Dependent Variable: Trust in	Parents	Neighbours	Doctors	Local Leaders	Strangers	United States	PCA's Primary Component (1-6)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Total Deaths</i>							
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)
<i>Panel B: Conflict Deaths</i>							
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.008 (0.005)
<i>Panel C: Campaign Deaths</i>							
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)
Observations	26,572	26,572	26,572	26,572	26,572	26,572	26,572
R-squared	0.107	0.064	0.062	0.081	0.087	0.118	0.061
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends. Column 1-6 presents results using group-specific trust as dependent variables, and Column 7 used the primary component derived from the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the six dimensions of group-specific trust. The score coefficients of the PCA on this component are shown in appendix Table A6.

A Supplemental Tables

This appendix contains several supplemental tables. Here's a complete list of items:

- Table A1. Correlation Table: County Characteristics
- Table A2. Mapping of CFPS Family Class Origin List to Deng and Treiman (1997)
- Table A3. Determinants of Revolutionary Intensity
- Table A4. Historical Social Capital and Trust
- Table A5. Revolutionary Intensity and Trust: Additional Heterogeneous Results
- Table A6. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of Group-specific Trust
- Table A7. Results from the World Value Survey

Table A1: Correlation Table: County Characteristics (N=156)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
A Total Deaths	1							
B Campaign Deaths	0.9396	1						
C Conflict Deaths	0.5168	0.2518	1					
D Pre-CR Social Capital	0.1478	0.1819	-0.1213	1				
E Revolutionary Base	0.0312	0.0100	0.0357	0.0125	1			
F Pre-CR Ethnic Fragmentation Index	0.0516	0.0710	0.0616	-0.2209	-0.2741	1		
G Pre-CR Social Fragmentation Index	0.0931	0.0562	0.0088	0.3932	0.0293	-0.1014	1	
H Pre-CR Educational Gini Coefficient	-0.2278	-0.2465	0.0694	-0.4062	-0.0500	0.2818	-0.2215	1

Notes: Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. Pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient is calculated using the 1982 census among individuals born before 1966. Pre-revolution ethnic fragmentation index is calculated following [Alesina et al. \(2003\)](#) using the same sample. Pre-revolution social capital is proxied with the number of historical charity organizations ([Wang, 2013](#)). Revolutionary base is an indicator for whether a region was historically a revolutionary base for the Communist Party.

Table A2: Mapping of CFPS Family Class Origin List to Deng and Treiman (1997)

Deng and Treiman (1997)	CFPS Classification
<i>Good-class origins</i>	
1. Revolutionary cadres	
2. Revolutionary army men	
3. Revolutionary martyrs	28
4. Pre-Liberation industrial workers and their families	14, 15
5. Former poor and lower-middle peasant families	11, 12, 13
<i>Middle-class origins</i>	
1. Families of pre-liberation peddlers and store clerks, etc.	16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26
2. Former middle-peasant families	3, 6, 10
3. Intelligentsia middle class (families of pre-liberation clerks, teachers, professionals, etc.)	
4. Others	4 (bankrupted landlords)
<i>Bad-class origins</i>	
A. Families of former capitalists	20,21,22 (capitalists)
B. Families of rightists	
C. Pre-Liberation rich peasant families	5,7,8,9 (rich peasants)
D. Families of bad elements (a label denoting criminal offenders)	
E. Pre-Liberation landlord families	1,2 (landlord)
F. Families of counter-revolutionaries	

Table A3: Determinants of Revolutionary Intensity

Dep Var: Revolutionary Intensity	Total Deaths		Conflict Deaths		Campaign Deaths	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pre-CR Social Capital	0.002 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Revolutionary Base	0.131 (0.200)	0.071 (0.171)	0.055 (0.107)	-0.030 (0.078)	0.101 (0.197)	0.061 (0.195)
Pre-CR Ethnic Fragmentation	0.967 (0.703)	-0.114 (0.791)	0.151 (0.338)	-0.931*** (0.334)	1.136* (0.677)	0.469 (0.921)
Pre-CR Social Fragmentation	2.802 (8.002)	-6.715 (11.245)	3.745 (4.098)	-6.783 (5.576)	-3.785 (8.398)	-5.886 (14.774)
Pre-CR Educational Gini Coefficient	-1.725** (0.707)	-0.442 (0.695)	0.078 (0.393)	0.832* (0.421)	-1.848*** (0.685)	-1.092 (0.678)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156	156
R-squared	0.076	0.504	0.022	0.566	0.097	0.457
Province Fixed Effects	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population1966} + 1)$. Pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient is calculated using the 1982 census among individuals born before 1966. Pre-revolution ethnic fragmentation index is calculated following [Alesina et al. \(2003\)](#) using the same sample. Pre-revolution social capital is proxied with the number of historical charity organizations ([Wang, 2013](#)). Revolutionary base is an indicator for whether a region was historically a revolutionary base for the Communist Party.

Table A4: Historical Social Capital and Trust

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	(1)	(2)	(3)
Historical Social Capital	0.041*** (0.011)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.014)
Revolutionary Intensity		-0.018* (0.010)	-0.017* (0.009)
Historical Social Capital x Revolutionary Intensity			-0.005 (0.007)
Observations	27,946	27,946	27,946
R-squared	0.049	0.050	0.050
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Province Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels. The dependent variable is an indicator for trust (1 = yes; 0 = no). Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, as well as years of schooling and test scores. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table A5: Revolutionary Intensity and Trust: Additional Heterogeneous Results

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	A. Total Deaths		B. Conflict Deaths		C. Campaign Deaths	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Father's Party Membership</i>	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Observations	3,636	18,877	3,636	18,877	3,636	18,877
R-squared	0.158	0.080	0.158	0.079	0.158	0.079
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Characteristics x Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the county level - in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels. The dependent variable is an indicator for trust (1 = most people can be trusted; 0 = you can't be too careful). Revolutionary intensity is measured by $\log(\frac{deaths}{population_{1966}} + 1)$. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, household registration status, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. County characteristics include pre-revolution educational Gini coefficient, ethnic fragmentation index, and social capital. County-cohort trends are constructed as the interaction terms between county characteristics and the cohort-specific distribution of trust formation. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.

Table A6: Principal Component Analysis of Group-specific Trust

Variable	Component 1	Component 2
Parents	0.2732	-0.4647
Neighbors	0.4706	-0.1988
Doctors	0.4541	-0.3158
Local leaders	0.4867	-0.0876
Strangers	0.3776	0.5493
The United States	0.3439	0.5791

Notes: This table presents scoring coefficients for the primary and secondary component derived from the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Both components' eigenvalues are above one.

Table A7: Robustness Check: World Value Survey

Dep Var: Generalized Trust	(1)	(2)	(3)
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 8-22)	-0.009** (0.003)		
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 2-7)		0.006 (0.004)	
Revolutionary Intensity x Exposure during Trust Formation Years (Ages 23-30)			0.010 (0.008)
Observations	4,590	4,590	4,590
R-squared	0.065	0.065	0.065
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y
Province Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Cohort Trends	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Robust standard errors - clustered at the province level - are in parentheses. */**/** denotes significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% levels respectively. Sample from the World Value Survey including the 2001, 2007, and 2013 waves. Revolutionary intensity is calculated as the province-level average of the revolution intensity. The set of individual controls used include gender, ethnicity, age, marital status, employment status, as well as years of schooling. Provincial cohort trends include the interaction terms between provincial dummies and first-, second-, and third-order polynomials of cohort trends.